Athens, February 2, 1968, 1600Z.

3425. Ref: State 108450./2/

1. In friendly, frank 35-minute session with Prime Minister Papadopoulos, following are significant points established:

2. Prime Minister warmly accepted invitation for luncheon aboard USS Roosevelt February 15./3/ This will include underwater operations demonstration.

3. New Constitution--PriMin said expects be ready to publish new constitutional draft and announce precise date of plebiscite very soon. Decision "almost made" to publish for full public consideration and comparison texts present Constitution, Mitrelias committee's draft, and government draft based on latter. Following full discussion and possible changes suggested by local and foreign public opinion, and by US Government and/or foreign constitutional law experts if they wish, final text to be submitted to plebiscite within time period previously stated.

4. Reorganization of state machinery--progress is slow because difficult get at truth amid welter of charges against individuals--"Greek mentality has not changed." PriMin said he does not wish do injustice to individuals. However, he determined move ahead and if mistakes are made, will not hesitate rectify even though accused of retreat.

5. Resumption full military assistance--PriMin said, while he believed it unjustified, he understood how USG could afford "luxury policy" of MAP suspension prior emergence of Soviet fleet in Eastern Mediterranean. Believes USG cannot now afford such policy. Greece, he said, can be relied upon, in its geographic area, to do its full share in defense of free world but must have assistance from its friends.

6. Cyprus--No new developments, but PriMin somewhat anxious about Turkish motives concerning paragraph 4 Vance agreement. He emphasized that on basis historical evidence Turkish policy not based on sincerity. USG, he said, must advise Turks appropriately to prevent future crisis which could only help the Communists.

7. I explained and PriMin said he understood President and administration extremely busy with other matters./4/ I commented, however, on encouraging signs shown in GOG's recent progress on number matters (experimental relaxation press restrictions, signs increasing attention paid to trade unions, etc.) on which there continuing interest in US. I expressed optimism that accomplishment of various constructive steps by GOG would ease current unfavorable attitude in some sections US Congress and press, thus permitting US and Greece get back on most friendly basis established since 1947.

8. PriMin assured me he understood and would continue be completely frank and sincere in our future discussions for which he said he will always be available. He agreed that it would be mutually helpful to discuss and closely follow step-by-step progress towards GOG achievement of conditions making possible full US support. But, he said, this "step-by-step" progress should not be met by a continuing "wait-and-see" USG attitude.

9. Discussion ended when PriMin expressed assurance that USG could count on his government's sincere desire for frank and friendly relations and on his own friendly feelings toward me. I assured him that USG and I reciprocate the desire.

10. Believe that a good beginning was made to eliminate whatever residue might remain of Prime Minister's resentments, hurt feelings, and suspicions created after December 13. He was in affable mood, seemed genuinely pleased with visit, and made no comment on my remark at outset that I was pleased to be meeting with him under conditions and at an hour much more pleasant than the last time (January 12). He continues to be aware that Greece's earliest possible return to democracy is our desire.

Talbot

Athens, February 9, 1968, 1615Z.

3507. 1. FonMin Pipinelis, suffering from thrombosis incurred after strenuous recent activities and affecting his right leg, summoned British Ambassador Stewart and me to his home this noon to describe his recent secret meeting in Switzerland with Turk FonMin Caglayangil and a new initiative on Cyprus. He mentioned that he had seen Canadian Ambassador on same subject earlier today and that Caglayangil was giving similar information today to our colleagues in Ankara./2/

2. According to Pipinelis, he and Caglayangil agreed to tackle long-term Cyprus settlement by focussing first on getting for an independent Cyprus a constitution that would be acceptable to both Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots. Plan they drew up calls for joint secret request to Canada to convene and chair a four-cornered conference of Greek and Turk FonMins with Makarios and Kutchuk to settle constitutional questions but not deal with other outstanding issues. Questions of Greek military personnel serving with Cypriot National Guard and of treatment of minorities in Greece and Turkey would meanwhile be dealt with under separate procedures that Pipinelis and Caglayangil also discussed.

3. Pipinelis emphasized that Canada would be asked to present conference idea as exclusively its own, and that no Cypriots would be informed of secret prior Greek-Turk understanding. He hopes Canada will see its way clear to lead this initiative despite preoccupation of government leaders with forthcoming elections. As he sees desirable scenario, approaches to Makarios and Kutchuk would be made after some days, to reduce chance of Canadian initiative being linked to rumors of Pipinelis-Caglayangil meeting, but four-way meetings would start after Cypriot elections later this month. Pipinelis believes UNSYG will welcome Canadian initiative as alternative to his own flagging efforts to exercise good offices.

4. It was improved climate following November crisis that led to his meeting with Caglayangil, Pipinelis said. Feelings had calmed down in Greece and Turkey, tenseness on island had relaxed, and on January 12 Makarios had taken constructive step of announcing plans to present a new constitution for Cyprus. However, it became apparent new storm clouds gathering and conditions might again deteriorate. Both he and Caglayangil concluded, therefore, that time had arrived for action. Caglayangil had been good enough to suggest they meet secretly, and Pipinelis had readily agreed despite his doctor's efforts to prevent him from traveling.

5. In considering next steps on Cyprus, GOG had reasoned that a final settlement would in any case be so difficult that parties must start by concentrating on what aspect most likely to succeed, or least likely to fail. With Makarios' plan to present Constitution, this had become obvious starting point. Caglayangil agreed with this reasoning, and they had no difficulty in deciding to focus on how to get a constitution for an independent Cyprus that would be agreeable to both Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots, leaving all other issues to be handled separately or later.

6. At first Pipinelis had proposed that constitutional talks be conducted between Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots under aegis of UNSYG. But Caglayangil had rejected this because of Turk distrust of U Thant. Then Pipinelis had proposed that Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots be stimulated to meet together by themselves. Caglayangil has found this idea unsatisfactory because "you have a strong advocate on your side and we don't on ours." Finally they reached agreement on a conference at which Turk and Greek FonMins, Makarios and Kutchuk would all sit together. Caglayangil noted that this was first time a Turkish Foreign Minister had agreed to negotiate directly with Makarios.

7. How should such a conference be convened? Pipinelis was definite that Makarios should not have reason to think this a put-up job between Greeks and Turks. Initiative would need to come from outside. After considering whether US or UK would be well situated to play this role, Pipinelis and Caglayangil had concluded it would be better for initiative to come from Canada which naturally interested and involved through UNFICYP. Thus their secret request to Canada today. Meanwhile they hope US and UK can stand ready to help as needed. In particular, they hope US and UK can encourage Makarios to see importance of proceeding carefully toward agreement with Turk Cypriots on new constitution.

8. In response to our questions, Pipinelis told Stewart and me that he and Caglayangil had also discussed question of Greek officers and noncoms with Cypriot National Guard. Caglayangil had explained pressures GOT is under to get action. Pipinelis had replied that throughout crisis he had known that this was a question Greece could not resolve without agreement of Makarios and that premature removal of leadership would leave National Guard dangerously undisciplined. However, it of little importance to Greece itself whether few military involved stay on island or return home; he would be prepared to try to get Makarios' agreement to progressive withdrawal of Greeks. GOG would prefer that in any case as soon as conditions safe and Makarios agrees, Sir Michael Stewart then told Pipinelis of Kyprianou's statement to HMG January 30 that Cypriots acknowledge GOG right to withdraw its military personnel from Cypriot National Guard, and also that Makarios wants to reduce size of National Guard. Pipinelis welcomed this news, especially as Makarios told him he would not agree to removal of Greek personnel at this stage. Pipinelis indicated he might have another try on this with Makarios after Cypriot elections.

9. Finally, Pipinelis said he and Caglayangil had agreed to establish Ambassadorial-level commission to examine each country's complaints about treatment of minority in other country. Precedent for this exists in Averoff-Zorlu agreement of 1959 that activated Bitsios-Kuneralp investigations. These had proved useful though intrusion of Cyprus crisis of that era prevented their implementation. Pipinelis thinks similar approach may help Greece and Turkey deal with complaints now being raised about difficulties experienced by Greeks in Istanbul, Imbroz and Tenedos and by Turks in Thrace.

10. Comment: Pipinelis was obviously pleased with results of meeting, whose accomplishments appear to have exceeded all expectations.

Pipinelis repeatedly warned us of importance of avoiding leaks.

Talbot

Athens, March 2, 1968, 1428Z.

3777. Subject: Cyprus.

1. Pipinelis expressed great satisfaction to me today that Canadian initiative now launched./2/ As Makarios had seemed ready to go to U Thant in next few days, Canadians have moved apparently just in time. Pipinelis reasonably hopeful Canadian effort will bear fruit, though he said he spends his nights worrying about what could go wrong.

2. Pipinelis hopes Canadians can obtain not merely acquiescence from UNSYG but solid support which may become necessary to persuade Makarios to accept proposal. He hopes U.S. can also help influence Makarios. I expressed confidence that after idea surfaced we would do what we could within limits of our influence. Pipinelis commented that limited influence is everybody's problem in dealing with Makarios, most especially Greece's.

3. Pipinelis saw no serious problem about mid-April date for first meeting, though he agreed with my expressed concern that each passing week could give more opportunities for difficulties and accidents. Pipinelis showed little concern that either Makarios or Turk Cypriots would take separate initiatives in immediate future. While Canadian proposal should give Makarios pause, Pipinelis evidently counts on his understanding with Caglayangil to hold Turk Cypriots quiet.

4. Makarios, in Pipinelis' view, has shifted his ground now that all agree enosis not practicable and he can therefore work openly toward independent solution he has privately always favored. Pipinelis sees Makarios as clearly preparing for direct talks with Turks--either with Turk Cypriots or, in end, with Turkey itself with which he must ultimately reach agreement. This is why Canadian initiative stands a chance.

5. Pipinelis relatively optimistic on ability of parties to reach agreement on terms for a new Cyprus Constitution. Earlier Greek-Turkish dialogue had broken down over international issues, but substantial and useful areas of agreement had nevertheless been achieved on constitutional concepts for Cyprus. These understandings, which Turkish Government had shown courage in agreeing to, are now available to be built upon.

6. Real difficulty ahead, Pipinelis feels, will be question of international guarantee of new Cyprus Constitution. He anticipates Turkey will assert continuing unilateral right of intervention as under London-Zurich treaties, although it knows this would be impossible for an independent Cypriot Government or for Greece to accept. Yet some form of international guarantee or assurance will probably be necessary. This is a void to be filled, and a question to which Pipinelis said he is giving much anxious thought.

7. Department please pass to other addressees as desired.

Talbot

Ankara, March 6, 1968, 1518Z.

4269. NATUS. Subject: Canadian initiative and Ambassadorial calls on Kuchuk. Ref: State 125137, Nicosia 1437./2/

1. News reftels that Canadian initiative has stalled while UNSYG pushes forward proposal which Turk Cypriots cannot accept at this juncture bound to be very disappointing to FonMin Caglayangil. Considerable effort which he and Pipinelis made to set up framework for negotiations whereby all parties reasonably safeguarded has now apparently come to naught although four-sided talks may be revived for future use. FonMin will be inclined blame SYG again for coolness to Canadian initiative. He may also conclude he was right when he originally told Canadian Charge (Ankara 4048)/3/ he could not agree to having SYG briefed prior to approaches to four parties to be invited.

2. When Caglayangil finally agreed at Turkmen's insistence, it was on condition Canadians would not put pressure on him to accept invitation to discuss matter in some sort of UN forum. Turkmen also mentioned he wanted similar assurances from US and UK but these were never actually solicited. Nevertheless, we believe US, after strong commitment to Canadian initiative, should not turn around and pressure GOT or Turk Cypriots to agree to UNSYG's proposal. Such action would sit particularly badly with Caglayangil and would weaken whatever influence we have with him. We wonder why, if SYG sent instructions to Osorio-Tafall Feb 29 (Nicosia 1437), he could not have openly so informed Canadian PermRep Ignatieff during meeting Mar 1 (USUN 3999)./4/

3. We have carefully considered whether this might not be good time for resuming Ambassadorial calls on Kuchuk. Following are factors in favor:

A. Ambassadorial call would help us out in Ankara while FonMin digesting bad news on Canadian initiative.

B. It would closely follow UN Rep Tafall's call on Kuchuk and could therefore be regarded as inquiring into Turk Cypriot views on and responses to Tafall's proposal.

C. London 6939/5/ suggests FonOff embarrassed by extent of delay in resuming calls.

D. Excuses for not calling are running thin. First, we tried some kind of language to effect we do not accept legality of TCPA or recognize them as government (Nicosia 1143)./6/ Secondly, we explored possibility of maximum numbers of Chiefs of Mission defying ban (Nicosia 1194)./7/ Thirdly, we decided to wait until after Presidential elections. Fourthly, we waited until Canadian initiative launched in order to give it major support. Re Nicosia 1434/8/ we do not feel we should wait until UNSC meeting.

4. Factors against Ambassadorial call seem to rest on fear that possible consequences may be (A) PNG action or (B) deep-freeze treatment. Since calls at this time after considerable delay would not appear as challenging to Makarios' authority as in January, we wonder whether possibility of PNG action is not now reduced. On other hand, given SYG coolness to any outside initiatives while he still active in field, we think it may be some time before Canadian or other initiative can be started up again. In other words, deep-freeze treatment may not affect US contacts with Greek Cypriots as long and as adversely as once feared.

5. We therefore suggest taking another and urgent look at problem of Ambassadorial calls. Voluntary issuance of disclaimer of recognition of TCPA might soften Makarios' retaliation, if any.

Hart

Washington, March 8, 1968, 2259Z.

127157. NATUS. Subject: Cyprus: Renewal of Ambassadorial Contacts with Turkish Cypriots.

1. Department believes interval between Makarios' lifting of restrictions on Nicosia Triangle and forthcoming Security Council meeting offers most propitious occasion we have yet seen for renewing ambassadorial contacts with Kuchuk. Although intelligence reports from CAS and British indicate that Makarios intends maintain ban on such contacts, appears doubtful he could take strong stand after announcing restoration of Turkish Cypriots' freedom of movement and while in need support in SC. Furthermore, it can be argued strongly that ambassadorial contacts at this point would be strong asset in getting discussions started with Turkish Cypriots on constitutional proposals. Additional point might be made that restrictions on Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia were maintained in January when restrictions elsewhere lifted because of formation of TCPA and logically lifting of ban on contacts, which also was response to establishment of TCPA, should be lifted in parallel.

2. In addition, UK concerned that French and Italians may break ban before UK, which might prove embarrassing to British relations with GOT, and US in similar awkward position having attempted persuade other governments join in breaking ban.

3. You therefore authorized to pay call on Kuchuk as soon as possible next week after call on Makarios per following para. You should do so in concert with your British, Italian, French and any other colleagues who may be able participate. You should also notify Pakistani, Dutch and Swedish Ambassadors through AmEmbassy Beirut re timing of call.

4. As preparatory step you should convey intentions to GOC, preferably Makarios if he available. We hope you can do this March 11 or at latest March 12 followed immediately thereafter by call on Kuchuk. In addition to explanatory statements outlined in State 109671,/2/ which you may use at your discretion, you should take occasion express USG gratification over Makarios' lifting of restrictions on Nicosia Triangle and his expressed intention settle Cyprus dispute peacefully, as we have long advocated. Improved atmosphere should enhance chances for talks. If US support for peaceful settlement is to be effective, we consider it essential that Ambassadorial contacts with Turkish Cypriots be renewed. Last two sentences para 1 above may also be drawn upon. You may add that it should be clear from our cooperation since first of year, when ban on contacts was announced, that we have not wished embarrass Archbishop or take any step that would endanger our good relations. We hope that he will understand and concur with the reasons behind our desire to reestablish contacts with Turkish Cypriots.

5. Foregoing based on assumption per Nicosia 1299/3/ that action outlined above would not result in your becoming PNG. If you believe this assumption incorrect, notify Department before proceeding consultation your colleagues per para 3./4/

Rusk

Athens, March 27, 1968, 1747Z.

4087. Subject: US policy toward Greece. Ref: State 133784./2/

Summary: In strategic terms I believe we have been on right track with Greece since April 1967 in emphasizing importance of return to constitutionality and representative government. Moreover, given US interests in Greece, absence of acceptable alternative to present regime, and our incapacity to legislate Greece's future, I see no practical alternative, barring accidents, to continuing on same course for at least next six months or so. If this is accepted, our current policy problems are primarily tactical. Here I recommend that we (1) release immediately certain selected defensive and training items on MAP suspension list, with further time-phased releases programmed for (A) June (provided GOG then publishes its own constitutional draft in reasonably acceptable form), (B) September (if plebiscite successful), and (C) as quickly thereafter as we can be confident of early implementation of Constitution, and (2) promptly open discussions with GOG on FY 68 MAP allocations and FY 69-FY 73 planning figures. If political process goes reasonably satisfactorily, MAP relationship could be fully restored before end of 1968, which in any case is probably earliest practical timing. In event of impasse or breakdown, MAP deliveries could if necessary be stopped again at any point. End summary.

1. Looking ahead in Greece has rarely been easy but hardly ever more difficult than now. Malaise, as Department observes, currently characterizes both regime and wider public opinion. Strains within revolutionary group arise from growing awareness that it has achieved no glowing public success since its dramatic seizure of power, that its administrative inexperience and ineptness are now generally perceived, and that its continuing preoccupation with vigorous security measures, however necessary in its own view, is proving detrimental to constructive programs and to public support. Public opinion is also influenced by current economic downturn (not wholly or perhaps even largely ascribable to Junta policies, though general malaise is a factor), and by expressions of hopes (by lower-ranking Junta members) or of fears (by opponents) that present "national government" will cling to power indefinitely. To extent any or all these trends may strengthen in coming months, strains will also mount.

2. In these circumstances we sense Papadopoulos may not yet see his future course clearly, while facing challenges by Junta "hard-liners" that he is not being sufficiently firm and revolutionary. Their spokesmen frankly press for long-term authoritarianism and no nonsense about return to traditional politics. Outside government and army we detect little strong enthusiasm for this military-based regime, though number of big businessmen continue in vanguard of its support. We hear considerable though still disorganized and quietly voiced opposition, none of which it should be noted surfaced during November Cyprus crisis or King's countercoup. Most widespread reaction, however, seems still to be acquiescence by people who are either apathetic, or want to keep their heads down or, for lack of better solution and out of distaste for conditions before last April, are prepared to give regime more time to make discernible progress. Predictably, many Greeks seem to feel that in end Uncle Sam can be counted on to take lead in efforts to oust Junta.

3. At present our Greek contacts perceive no realistic alternative to present regime. Nor do we. Certainly neither King nor Caramanlis, Papandreous, or any other former political leader now commands assets necessary to re-establish leadership. Nor, so far as we can tell, are people now in mood to generate new civil war. While another military coup is conceivable either through split in present Junta or by group outside it, we have no evidence that a successful move of this kind is in offing; and another abortive attempt would have adverse effect of playing into hands of Junta hard-liners, whose reaction would be recourse to further authoritarianism and stricter security controls over populace.

4. It follows that I, for one, view with extreme skepticism risky thesis explicit in Andreas Papandreou's position that if all US support were withdrawn and regime ostracized it would "collapse of its own weight." Were we to act on basis of such an assumption I fear reaction, on contrary, would be one of intransigence, inverted nationalism and ascendancy of radical faction in Junta which would result in increased authoritarianism, worse image abroad, greater divisiveness of Greek issue in NATO and possible jeopardy to our important bilateral military facilities here. Even if, as [garble--contended?] by Junta's opponents, ultimate outcome of such a process would be present regime's downfall, time it would take to produce such a result is unpredictable and process would bring probable danger of civil strife before that corner could be turned. These considerations argue strongly in my mind against adoption of such a policy, especially at this stage when we do not yet know how far it may prove possible to push regime toward a return to more democratic ways or to enmesh it sufficiently in process so it will be unable to retain present degree of authoritarian control.

5. We face possibility that Junta under influence of hard-liners may in fact be pursuing constitutional process fraudulently and with design mainly of misleading US and international opinion and masking underlying aim of prolonging its exclusive hold on power. I see no way at present to guarantee against this possibility, which is what politicians fear. However, waiting for elimination of any chance of it before we make any responsive gesture to constitutional steps already taken would in my opinion be course most likely to bring result we least desire. Specifically, with reference to points raised in para 4 of reftel, continued frustration of regime over US failure to lift any of MAP restrictions could, in our estimate, have following adverse consequences: (1) strengthen hand of radical elements in Junta and thus slow down return to constitutionalism and reinforce authoritarian tendencies; (2) stimulate nascent GOG inclinations to look elsewhere--France, for instance--for military equipment, with attendant disruption of standardization criteria and probable prejudice to military efficiency and pro-American orientation of Greek armed forces, and (3) lead GOG to re-examine extensive military and VOA facilities rights it grants US (and continued to extend in highly cooperative fashion, it should be recalled, during 1967 ME crisis) and possibly to curtail those rights.

6. On other hand, adoption of even an imperfect constitution (comparable, perhaps, to Turkish Constitution of 1961) would be more likely to initiate process of return to greater measure of representative rule. Once a Constitution--indeed almost any Constitution not patently unacceptable--is adopted by plebiscite, I believe external and internal pressures are likely to build up on regime to permit its entry into force in reasonable period (12 to 18 months at the outside). If September constitutional draft should contain provision postponing application for two or more years while regime continued pursue unrealistic or unacceptable revolutionary goals, government would run risk of its rejection. We would in any case be afforded a further legitimate opportunity to put pressure on regime to get on faster with important business of return to constitutionalism.

7. As to what new advice and guidance we might give, I am not as sanguine as Iakovos and Pappas that Revolutionary Committee as whole is yet ready to listen to foreign counsel/3/ though Papadopoulos might consider suggestions within limits. In next few months country's course will be importantly shaped by progress or failure along road to constitutionalism, economic betterment, and relations with Turkey. In my view most pressing problems for GOG now are (A) how to attract broader and higher range of skills to improve governmental performance and thus give flexibility and success image which are prerequisites for a transition to parliamentary rule; and (B) a political plan to find the exit gate from present narrowly-based governmental structure. New Constitution will presumably provide formalities of transition but, realistically, substance of transition is likely to be accomplished only when Junta has fixed upon its own future course from among several current possibilities. It could establish its own political organization with intention of contesting and presumably winning first elections, find strong civilian front man or group from behind which it could continue for some time to exercise real power (as happened in Turkey after 1961), or seek some other resolution of its obsessive determination not to turn country back to "same old corrupt politicians" who ran it before 1967. To extent we can contribute wisdom in solving these real issues of present regime, our advice could be welcomed.

8. I sense that most leading Greek politicians have concluded they cannot afford to jeopardize their own future prospects by collaborating with present rulers. At least some realists among them, however, also hope Junta can be pressed by others to put forward for adoption a Constitution under which political life can be reactivated. To put it bluntly, they don't want to dirty their own hands by dealing with Junta but expect us to do whatever necessary to get show back on road. In past week such personalities as Papaligouras and Mavros have virtually admitted this to me even though they would not say so publicly. On other hand, the only political figures so far willing to help in this effort are asking extremely stiff price of Junta. Markezinis and Tsouderos, for example, have indicated willingness to join present government on condition they be given complete control of economic policy. Papadopoulos has not bought these terms. In these circumstances we have little choice but to follow policies dictated essentially by our own conception of what would be best for Greece and our own interests.

9. On this question essential ingredients, as General Burchinal has put them, are solid and determined NATO membership on eastern flank and comparatively unrestricted availability of bases and facilities in support of US unilateral requirements in Eastern Mediterranean. These goals include further progress on encouraging beginning GOG has made in improving bilateral relations with Turkey and moving toward resolutions of Cyprus problem. Moreover, it is essential to pull Greece along to political posture with which other NATO countries can live. We have even more basic interest in attempting to prevent breakdown of Greek polity with all adverse consequences that would follow.

10. As I have suggested, in my view this means we must deal with present regime, supporting and focusing on its relatively responsible elements, and give it encouragement and not just lectures to get back on constitutional track. Therefore, I believe it is important for USG to make concrete move in acknowledgment of progress to date in constitutional process. First part of two-fold action should be to begin unfreezing MAP suspension lists, starting with clearly defensive and training items, and to resume carefully time phased delivery MAP items. Current Soviet buildup in Mediterranean makes minesweeper natural initial candidate for early delivery. This could be justified on basis NATO requirement without increasing regime's capability in internal security. Training and transport planes would also have high priority. Then in June and September other items could be released. Presumably such lead time would be required under normal circumstances to deliver suspended items. By end CY 68, if all goes well, I would hope we could be past outdated posture of using selected restraints on MAP deliveries as tactic to achieve long-range political purposes. If things go badly, deliveries could again be interrupted.

11. Having taken this initial step, the second action which should be almost simultaneous would be to initiate discussion on FY 68 MAP and this year's 5-year planning exercise based on mix of grant aid and cash and credit sales. In discussing FY 68 program with GOG, we could make certain assumptions on lifting of all suspended items in current program. My advisors tell me very little time remains to meet current year deadlines. I believe it is therefore essential that we move promptly on this second action.

12. In my judgment course outlined above, while it does not guarantee success, represents most promising policy line available to USG for constructively influencing Greek situation in its present parlous condition. On basis recommended decisions USG and Embassy could safely lean harder on GOG than if we abstain from gestures responding to constitutional steps already taken./4/

Talbot

/4/In a March 29 letter thanking Talbot for this analysis, Brewster reported that the question of resuming MAP aid to Greece had not yet been resolved. (Ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Correspondence to and from Athens)

London, April 22, 1968, 7:30 a.m. and 6 p.m.

SUBJECT
United States-Greek Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Assistant Secretary Battle
Ambassador Phillips Talbot
Mr. Daniel Brewster
Mr. Laurence Eagleburger
Mr. Sidney Sober

Ambassador Talbot began by speaking of the recent SIG action/2/ stating that the release of certain selected military items would be most helpful. He then sketched in recent developments in Greece including the government's action remitting agricultural debts, noting that the regime was obviously trying to curry favor with the farmer. It is conceivable that the Greek Government might be looking to a Peron-type situation basing itself on farm-labor support. He also noted that American Church-World Service representatives, who had been working with this Greek Government and previous ones considered this one, in fact, quite efficient. They also believed the Greek in the countryside was fairly well satisfied with his present lot.

Mr. Battle asked whether the business community and the "establishment" was not being affected by the Greek Government's rather spasmodic actions, particularly in the economic field. Ambassador Talbot replied affirmatively stating that the businessman is maintaining a "wait and see" stance and is annoyed with some of the government's more stupid actions. Even though the economy is in a "slow-down period", the government has moved effectively to collect taxes and direct tax receipts have been stepped up by 47% as against a year ago.

The Under Secretary asked what pressures there were internally on the Greek Government to return to political normalcy. Ambassador Talbot replied no effective pressures--basically those at work came from the outside world. He and the British Ambassador were the only two NATO representatives in Greece who were really pressing the Greek Government in the direction of Constitutionalism.

Mr. Battle asked whether the proposed release of the military items listed in the SIG paper would make the Greek Government think that it could get away with less forward motion toward normalization. Ambassador Talbot replied "no". In his view they had not as yet settled in their own minds on the Constitutional question and the next two months were all important. It was during this time that our influence would be most meaningful, that is, while they were shaping their Constitutional thoughts. The Greek regime recognizes that it needs the West but at the same time is examining alternatives. It could also tighten up on the many privileges which the United States enjoys as, for example, the rights of overflight without advance clearance. The Government could generally take on a posture more like the present Turkish stance.

The Under Secretary said the problem he sees in the Greek situation is that the Greek regime is not interested in making genuine progress toward Constitutionalism. They may be prepared to say they are taking actions for the purpose of a facade, but we want to make sure that it is their facade not ours.

Mr. Battle, returning to the question of the timing of the release of certain selected MAP items, asked whether the best timing would be between now and June or between June and September. Ambassador Talbot said definitely between now and June.

Ambassador Talbot then spoke of two contingencies which (although considered remote by his colleagues) might call for a rapid decision as to a United States posture.

1. A take-over by the junior military.

2. A countercoup by senior military with possible participation of former politicians. Ambassador Talbot could foresee a situation where we would be called upon for help.

Mr. Battle responded by saying that we would have to look at the situation at the time, analyzing the composition of the group which was supporting the coup and those who were carrying it out, we would need to weigh carefully its chances of success, and its general acceptability to the Greek people. It was not possible to make any advance commitment.

Ambassador Talbot then described briefly three groups which might attempt to join forces to achieve a transitional changeover.

1. Karamanlis, former Prime Minister, plus ERE elements, the "apostate group" led by Stephanopoulos, and moderate Center Union elements.

2. Another group might include certain non-political "establishment" types, such as Professor Zolotas, former head of the Bank of Greece, Lambrakis, newspaper owner, and a variety of younger men including some former politicians.

3. A left-of-center group including from Andreas Papandreou to the far left. None of these groups are very far along with any planning or coordination of their efforts.

In response to questions as to whether a release of selected MAP items would deflect anti-junta planning by any of the political leaders, Ambassador Talbot thought it would not since the men recognized that the resumption of the shipment of selected MAP items was designed by the USG to press the Greek regime back to Constitutionalism.

The Under Secretary asked why Greek political figures (George Papandreou and Kanellopoulos) were boycotting the Greek regime's efforts to draw up a new Constitution. Ambassador Talbot replied that this stance on their part grew out of the fact that they as politicians could not afford to be associated in any way with the Greek regime's actions.

Finally, Ambassador Talbot raised the question of how active he should be in prodding the Greek Government. The Under Secretary responded that we should continue to push them privately and quietly, but not publicly. Mr. Battle pointed out that Ambassador Talbot could use the same theme he had used with the Greek Ambassador, namely that reestablishment of the traditional warmth in US-Greek relations would depend on the return to normal democratic processes.

In a second session at 6:30 p.m. April 22 (with all participants present except Mr. Sober) the question was raised by Ambassador Talbot as to the value we placed on Greece for the special facilities it offered. He also asked whether it was likely that we would be placing increased demands on the Greek regime for facilities as a result of any possible Turkish phasing-out of military installations. It was stated that on the basis of Ambassador Hart's assessment concerning facilities in Turkey there would be no call at present to absorb further DOD requirements in Greece. In this connection the Under Secretary requested that a memorandum be drafted to the Defense Department asking how valuable and irreplaceable the present DOD installations were in Greece.

There followed a general discussion on the contribution made by the Greek regime to a settlement of the Cyprus problem last fall and to an improvement in Greek-Turk relations.

Speaking of future MAP the Under Secretary noted the problems involved in anticipating the levels of 1969 MAP on a worldwide basis and determining what portion of the Military Assistance Program specifically be allocated to Greece. He thought Ambassador Talbot, on returning to Athens, should give the Greek regime a rather frank assessment of the mood in the United States. He should urge them to continue on the road back to political normalcy but not to the point where it would bring about a major crisis.

Speaking of the house arrest of the two former Prime Ministers/3/ and the fact that forward motion on the release of selected MAP items in accord with the SIG decision was related to lifting this restriction, the Under Secretary stated that without instructing the Greek regime to release these two men, the Ambassador could describe the domestic problem created for us, both in Congress and with public opinion, by their continued detention.

Nicosia, May 6, 1968, 1326Z.

1730. Subject: Cyprus: Local talks. Ref: State 158278./2/

1. We have previously reported abundant evidence that Turks at least considering implementation of some separatist projects. Nicosia's 1409, 1414 and 1615/3/ spell out reasons for our suspicions about air-sea links with Turkey, development of economic autarchy and establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot government. In fact, TCPA itself could be regarded as first step in separatist movement.

2. More recently we would cite following as casting further doubt on Turk-Turk Cypriot "good faith" regarding compromise solution to Cyprus problem:

A. Fact that Turks have not made even minor reciprocal move in areas of normalization and military disengagement in spite of real concessions by Greeks (removal of 7,000 illegals) and Greek Cypriots (lifting economic and travel restrictions and limited withdrawal of National Guard from certain areas);

B. Manner in which GOT torpedoed UNFICYP efforts establish verification procedures in response GOT request (Nicosia's 1710 and 1716);/4/

C. Statement made last week by Denktash to officers of UK HIGHCOM that Legislative Council of TCPA would soon have to meet to "formulate" regulations on certain matters (which is bound to elicit agonized howl from GOC and to be regarded as another step on way to provisional Turk Cypriot government); and

D. Withdrawal last Tuesday morning of compromise offer on venue made Saturday by Turk Cypriot leadership (on basis of timing and Bulak's statement--Ankara 5577/5/--it appears withdrawal ordered by Ankara).

3. Comment: We feel question not so much one of determining "Turkish intentions regarding Cyprus talks" but one of determining Turk Cypriot-Turkish intentions regarding entire Cyprus problem. Key to latter question is, of course, GOT. In this connection our analyses of GOT intentions must necessarily be speculative. What might be done of positive nature is for USG to clarify views (by calling in Esenbel and by demarche in Ankara) to point out that we opposed to unilateral moves by either side that would worsen situation; that we feel it now up to Turks to make some positive response in areas of normalization (UK took such action when Stewart saw Caglayangil in London--London 8477),/6/ and that we hope GOT will be able to accept some form of compromise on venue problem.

4. We see much to be gained by telling GOT officially of our interest in and views on current developments in Cyprus dispute and specifically our belief that time is ripe for positive reciprocal action by Turks-Turk Cypriots. Makarios has little room left for unilateral compromises. In Saturday speech he struck pessimistic tone by commenting that prospects for talks not bright and that, although door for talks open as far as Greek side concerned, "frequent recent Turkish statements do not permit great margins of optimism." In addition, hints are beginning to creep into Greek Cypriot press that because of Turk intransigence perhaps best policy for GOC is return to confrontation with Greece's help.

5. To regain momentum lost in past ten days we believe reciprocal move by Turks in areas of normalization, as well as willingness by both sides to compromise on venue seem necessary./7/

Smith

Ankara, June 17, 1968, 2005Z.

184458. Subject: Cyprus: Turkish Economic Aid. Ref: Nicosia 1939./2/

1. In light of Makarios' comments on GOT economic aid to Turkish Cypriots (reftel), it seems evident that initiation of aid program which GOT reportedly now considering could, if not handled carefully, have effect comparable to that produced by last December's sudden announcement of Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration.

2. Believe would be wise precaution if Embassy could find opportunity to note to FonOff need for handling aid issue so as to preserve climate of confidence necessary for success of communal talks. Aware as we are of Greek Cypriot misgivings about objectives of aid, we hope that if GOT decides initiate economic aid program in Turkish Cypriot community it will inform GOC well in advance of public announcement and will make sure that GOC has full and correct understanding of purpose of aid.

3. We will seek opportunity make same point with Turkish Embassy after you have approached FonOff.

4. If approached on possible US economic aid for Turkish Cypriots, Embassy should offer no encouragement. We have consistently turned down such proposals for several years. Embassy may point out that we no longer give aid to Cyprus; if we did, it would have to be on government-to-government basis; and aid funds are now more severely restricted than ever./3/

Rusk

Nicosia, August 2, 1968, 1050Z.

2175. Subj: Cyprus: local talks and policy planning.

1. Month-long break in local talks provides respite from rather frenetic pace of diplomatic activity maintained since last crisis, as well as opportunity for assessment of current situation and potentialities for further progress or new problems. Our starting point is same as it was in our immediate post-crisis analyses. In words of Yost report:/2/ ". . . Unless and until long-term settlement (of Cyprus problem) is reached recurrence of . . . crisis very likely; and . . . if it recurs, war can probably not be avoided." Essential validity of this judgment should not be obscured by progress made in solving Cyprus problem since December 1967.

2. After four years of immobility punctuated by periodic, bloody crises present 30-day hiatus in local talks permits leaders (and publics) of both communities to digest several new departures of past six months. In our view maneuvering starting in January and extending through first phase of local talks boils down to following:

A. For all practical purposes Greek Cypriots have put aside enosis and Turk Cypriots have done likewise with partition. Both sides approaching problem on basis of independent Cyprus.

B. In spite of real progress in normalization by Greeks and concessions by Turks in local talks, neither side has seriously compromised basic position designed to achieve equally basic goal. Greeks want power to determine destiny of independent Cyprus commensurate with their numerical and economic power. This they view as best achieved by unitary state responsive through new Constitution to will of majority. Turks want security of life and property which they feel best protected by (a) substantial autonomy in areas presently under their control plus (b) some form of background safeguarding role for GOT. Unilateral normalization measures instituted by GOC, although seemingly compromise, actually reinforced their position because to degree integrity of Turkish enclaves lessened by Turks coming out (or Greeks going in), by economic integration, etc., unitary state strengthened. Only known Greek concession in talks is GOC agreement to pay same per capita amount for education of Turkish children as for Greek. This likewise strengthens unitary concept. By same token Denktash has offered to accept representation based on population (20 percent) for Turks in organs of government and to relinquish right of veto in tax matters. However, neither concession impinges on concept of local autonomy.

C. Both Clerides and Denktash negotiating in good faith, though each trying to "get the most" for own side, to satisfy respective leaderships, to find a formula that will both work and be acceptable to public opinion of their respective communities. Each shows sympathetic understanding of problems other has with own communal leadership. Nevertheless negative pressures are great and increasing. However, negotiating position of both sides protected by fact that both have made it clear all compromises are contingent upon, indeed dependent upon, construction of "over-all agreement" including external guarantees of some sort.

D. UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall playing active (but still discreet) role by feeding compromise ideas into talks through his contacts with Makarios and Clerides.

E. Emphasis on "over-all agreement" has activated link between internal problems bilaterally solved and external problems to be solved by multilateral international accords.

3. Problems--We see following problems representing real block to further progress:

A. Loss of momentum--Momentum generated by November crisis--which has been a primary factor in bringing us to satisfactory conclusion of first phase of local talks--appears rapidly dissipating. We detect distressing signs of complacency in some Greek quarters. Certain Greek hardliners taking position they can afford to be firm in negotiations because economic and political factors operating in their favor, i.e., economic depression of enclaves and eventual necessity of Turks having to integrate economically with rest of island. (We suspect Makarios espouses this view.) Turk counterparts genuinely fearing erosion relative security they now enjoy argue they should stick to hard position in local talks, defend integrity of enclaves, and build economic and administrative separateness of their areas.

B. Constitutional differences--against this background of decreasing positive momentum real differences in substance must be considered. Two sides have arrived at point in local talks where they must begin to bargain on fundamentals if significant progress to continue. In pursuing goal of security Turks want autonomy, i.e., administrative and police control, in areas they now hold exclusively. Greeks in striving for unitary state prefer smaller Turkish administrative units based on towns and villages with less autonomy under centralized control. They emphasize common electoral rolls, elimination of executive veto, have suggested elimination of office of Vice President and other elements designed prevent Turks from obstructing responsiveness of government to will of Greek majority. Disposition of National Guard and TMT and related question of general disarming of population also obvious major unsolved problems.

C. Guarantees--International factor--in addition to problems of restructuring Cyprus state, both Clerides and Denktash have stated everything dependent on "over-all agreement." In short, hoped-for new constitutional arrangements will not go into operation until agreement reached on external aspects of problem, namely, for Turk Cypriots, some "adequate" provision for their security and for GOC elimination of GOT's claimed right of unilateral intervention.

D. Compensation--Agreement on reparations for losses suffered (principally by Turks), and how they will be financed is another knotty unresolved problem area.

E. Timing--Finally, question of timing is crucial. Most important dimension concerns position of Denktash in Turk Cypriot community. He is now at height of popularity and influence and is apparently strongly backed by Ankara and GOT Embassy here. Moreover, we feel Denktash has will to compromise, imagination to find ways and means to compromise and courage and position to push compromises with Kuchuk, GOT and Turk Cypriot community. However, longer local talks drag on, more subject he is to attack by hawks in own community and more his now practically unchalleneged position will be undermined. Already Turk Cypriot dailies Bozkurt and Zafer are challenging Denktash position by opposing in advance compromises he must make and by questioning usefulness of talks. Denktash has commented to us on opposition to him in TCPA and his method so far of dealing with it (Nicosia 2169)./3/ Turkish Embassy (Nicosia 2142)/4/ has also expressed concern about time element in connection with Denktash's leadership role. Other aspects of timing problem involve internal situations in Greece and Turkey. In former case, regardless of views about colonels' regime, appears to us here reintroduction parliamentary regime would in all probability mean Cyprus would become political football it formerly was. Basically, GOG is--at least for time being--out of Cyprus equation. Old-line politicians, if they return to power, might well bring Greece back into it. In case of Turkey federal elections are scheduled for 1969. It would seem almost inevitable that opposition will use Cyprus to berate present government if matter still unsettled when elections occur.

4. Recommendations--Given our analysis of problems remaining in current situation, potential which exists for failure of local talks, probably followed by swift deterioration of Cyprus problem, and limited time available to promote successful outcome of promising developments to date, we raise following policy recommendations for consideration by Department and interested colleagues:

A. That Embassy Nicosia emphasize to GOC contacts at all levels our view that normalization by Turk Cypriots, disposition of Turkish contingent (see NKI 170 and 173),/5/ and questions of guarantees are all linked to concessions by GOC on degree of autonomy Turk Cypriots will be given in restructured Cyprus state. As stressed by Denktash, the greater the degree of autonomy achieved by Turk Cypriots, more concessions they will make on normalization and guarantees.

B. That USG as appropriate encourage maintenance of GOG-GOT and GOC-GOT contacts on external aspects of Cyprus problem which so closely linked to internal problems. Progress on external problems such as contingents and guarantees could lead to progress in local talks as well as vice versa.

C. That USG join with Brits in effort to use December mandate renewal to maintain pressure on GOC and Turk Cypriots-GOT to compromise, e.g., by limiting mandate renewal to 3 months and joining other contributors in supporting further troop reductions (Osorio currently favors three-month renewal and further 25 percent troop reduction).

D. That Embassy Nicosia join at an appropriate time (probably sometime in second phase of talks this fall) with Osorio-Tafall in pushing for demilitarization, e.g., further deconfrontation and rundown of troop strength of National Guard and TMT./6/

Belcher

Athens, September 19, 1968, 1440Z.

7008. Subject: Reappraisal of constitutional referendum. Ref: Athens 6963./2/

1. Embassy believes draft constitutional revisions announced Sept 16 are less important substantively than in their confirmation of emerging harder line of regime policies. Prime example is revision of Article 138. Earlier imprecise wording had given regime ample scope to control pace of return to full constitutionality. New formula, by specifying key articles that will not come into effect until government so decides, confronts Greek voters with Hobson's choice. Rejection of Constitution would put aside any early hope of getting constitutional rule. On other hand, acceptance of this Constitution now will mean explicitly approving regime as sole arbiter of dates when Greeks can once more have constitutionally-protected civil rights, political parties and elections. In other words, regime can claim affirmative plebiscite result (which we believe to be virtually certain) as public mandate to continue government in present authoritarian form under state of siege as long as government itself believes this necessary.

2. As expected, many people here see revised draft, plus Prime Minister's explanatory remarks, as further strong evidence of military regime's unwillingness to relinquish power for indefinite period and that as a consequence constitutional referendum will be meaningless.

3. Realistically, any prospect of forward movement after plebiscite depends mainly on appraisal by Papadopoulos and his colleagues that this is least disadvantageous course open to them. Their weak and divided opponents will not soon persuade them that it is. Nor in Embassy's judgment will continuation of MAP suspensions (which in fact will have consequences increasingly adverse to our interests). However, Embassy sees no reason to let regime believe we would regard favorable plebiscite result as genuinely meaningful step in itself unless accompanied by some concrete moves toward restoration of civil liberties and in direction of ultimate elections. We therefore believe it would be desirable to make these points clear to regime leaders in order to avoid any false expectations. Moreover, we would see some advantage if Department press spokesman in response to question about American views on final draft of Constitution should [garble] along lines that we continue to wish for Greece what we believe majority of Greek people sincerely desire--prompt restoration of their civil liberties and early return to representative government. Although such a statement would not be popular with regime it would advertise our continued adherence to goals we have supported since April 1967 coup./3/

Talbot

Washington, October 8, 1968, 4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT
Partial Resumption of Military Shipments to Greece

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation/2/ that you release about 40% of the equipment we've held in suspense since the April 1967 coup. Most of the items to be released would be replacement items for the air force and navy, though there would be some tank ammo and heavy guns. We would continue to hold the tanks and new F-5 aircraft.

The main argument is that the time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics. The colonels have had their constitutional referendum, but they won't hold elections under it until they're ready. We can keep prodding them, but we can't make them. Meanwhile, it doesn't make sense to let our security relationships with Greece--NATO role, commo facilities, Sixth Fleet support--deteriorate further.

A vocal group on the Hill will object to any resumption. You have already had letters from Congressmen Edwards and Fraser, who are active with Melina Mercouri and other friends of Greek democracy. But if you approve, Nick plans to consult with key members--before telling the Greeks but after the foreign aid appropriation--and lay it on the line that we can't let our interests suffer further. He feels now is the time to face these people with the facts of the problem and tell them we have to move. He would like to do this before they go home.

The rationale for releasing only 40% is to keep some pressure on the colonels and to put ourselves on a more reasonable policy footing while leaving your successor room to move either way. I believe Nick is right that we've about run our course on the suspension. The question is whether you want to begin correcting course yourself.

WWR

Approve Nick's recommendation/3/
Leave it till January
Call me

Nicosia, November 8, 1968, 1523Z.

2647. Subj: Cyprus: Impact of Georkadjis affair./2/

Summary: Very tentatively, we evaluate fallout of Georkadjis affair in three areas. In Athens-Nicosia relations, Athens has emotionally demanded and won Georkadjis dismissal but without much heed as to consequences, not least of which is arousal of nationalist feelings on island in irritated reaction to mainland pressure. In local politics, affair has set kettle bubbling with strong pressures for new elections to House of Representatives which Archbishop, urged on by Athens, is resisting. As regards local talks, all right-minded elements are seeking isolate from fallout, but as result Athens-Nicosia tensions and domestic political repercussions, delays seem inevitable.

1. It is, of course, too early to predict with complete accuracy many internal and external ramifications of Georkadjis affair. Our preliminary analysis, however, indicates general lines of impact of Georkadjis problem in three aspects of political situation on island.

2. Athens-Nicosia relations--relations between GOC and GOG appear to have been affected on various levels. First, in terms of official government-to-government relations colonels' hand seems to be strengthened by obvious demonstration they can force Makarios to take action he supposedly reluctant to take. (Degree to which Makarios "reluctant" to fire Georkadjis is moot since His Beatitude may well have been looking for opportunity to dump increasingly powerful Interior Minister.) In any case, Makarios outwardly seems to have knuckled under to GOG demands for Georkadjis' scalp and this has disappointed many Greek Cypriots. Second, by forcing Makarios to accept Georkadjis' resignation GOG has further angered those politically powerful Greek Cypriot elements (i.e., city lawyer-politicians) who resent GOG meddling in GOC affairs, who are not pro-enosis and who are in favor of accommodation with Turk Cypriots (Clerides and Demetriades to name two), although they at least equally angry with Archbishop. On third level, however, Greek-Cypriot relations hardly disturbed at all. Great mass of villagers (as proved to Ambassador Alexandrakis' satisfaction during recent village visit) still regard "Mother Greece" as "Motherly Fatherland," welcome and support GOG presence on Cyprus, and regard Makarios as "Ethnarch" or leader of Greek nation in Cyprus.

3. Entire purpose of GOG in exposing Georkadjis and pressuring for his resignation may well have been to demonstrate to Archbishop (November 6 press carries stories stating that Archbishop ordered issuance of passport to Panagoulis) that there is point beyond which Junta will not tolerate His Beatitude's flirtation with left. According to some reports GOG will demand and get closer cooperation of Cypriot intelligence services (other reports including word from Clerides indicate Archbishop will pull intelligence function out of Interior Ministry and place it under his own direct control as part of apparatus of Presidential Palace).

4. GOG seems be proceeding from one precipitate action to next in Georkadjis/Panagoulis affair without thinking through implications. Initial demand for Georkadjis' resignation was achieved but only because Archbishop promised Georkadjis parliamentary elections before January as price for his final agreement to resign. Now faced with prospect of triumphant election of former MinInt to House, which would be real slap in face for GOG, they now exerting great pressure on Makarios to go back on promise to Georkadjis and according CAS info he has agreed to do so. We wonder if they have considered what implications this might have: i.e. mischief-making, not excluding violence from Georkadjis and supporters; more embarrassing leaks to press; and angry reaction from House members and others who now savouring election prospect. At moment Greek Ambassador thinks he has Archbishop's agreement to postponement of elections, but this may well be so only until His Beatitude next talks with Georkadjis, Clerides and other House leaders.

5. Domestic political situation--As mentioned above part of deal for Georkadjis' final resignation was undertaking by Makarios to hold parliamentary elections by end of January. Clerides informed various former EOKA-fighter groups who were demonstrating for Georkadjis of Archbishop's agreement to hold elections. It now appears that Georkadjis who has long called for formation of anti-Communist political party will organize his own party based on fighter groups with help and support (privately if not openly) of Clerides. Other members of House who support Clerides (floor leader Demetriades and Chamber of Commerce President Savvides) likewise favor early elections and probably would join Georkadjis-Clerides coalition. Believe Clerides would remain in background in order avoid any open clash with Makarios. He told Ambassador (memcon pouched)/3/ he considered role as negotiator in communal talks paramount and overruling any personal feelings re election. He would need all his influence with Archbishop for such time as talks require serious compromises. He would not jeopardize his chances of making contribution to solution merely to satisfy his own strong belief that elections necessary and party organization required.

6. We expect that Archbishop is reluctant to hold elections and prefers to stall. Among other things postponement of elections would probably cause erosion of Georkadjis' strength. Strong demand from Greek Embassy that Makarios prevent elections which would certainly install Georkadjis in House supports Makarios in own predilection to avoid or stall elections. Trouble is that Clerides and Georkadjis and fighter groups believe they have commitment for holding of these elections. Clerides, Georkadjis and his friends, and many Deputies who support Clerides will probably maintain pressure on Archbishop to hold elections. Clerides and Demetriades have even spoken to us of possibility of mass resignation of present members of House which would presumably force elections. (We doubt they would go to such extremes; no one voluntarily resigns in Cyprus.) In any case, tug-of-war between political leaders who would like to form parties and contest House elections and Archbishop who prefers House made up of political personalities without political party and dependent on him can be expected. If holding of elections becomes inevitable we anticipate His Beatitude will attempt to balance off various political factions (organized as parties) by urging all parties to unite in support of him and to agree on allocation of seats before elections. In short, net result of Georkadjis affair in domestic political arena will probably be to make political life much more "political."

7. Local talks--As we have previously reported both GOC and Turk Cypriots have gone out of their way to immunize Georkadjis affair from adverse impact on local talks (Nicosia 2638)./4/ However, holding of elections is bound to complicate local talks even if there is prior Clerides-Denktash agreement. In first place, Greeks will only get Turk Cypriot agreement to holding of elections under 1960 Constitution which compromises Greek position on 1965 electoral law. In second place, Turks will hold their own elections (they would like to clean house as well) but question then arises will new Turk legislators start passing legislation for Turk Cypriot areas. Finally, any election campaign on Greek side risks resurrection of old nationalist war cry of "enosis and only enosis."

8. Georkadjis affair further complicates local talks because internal GOC crisis prevents Clerides from obtaining any clear guidance from Archbishop and Council of Ministers. Given fight shaping up over elections and possibility of new Council of Ministers if elections are held, further postponement of real progress in local talks seems likely. More and more concept of "third phase" of local talks (which would begin in January or later) appearing in press and conversation. As previously reported "third phase" seems to be quite acceptable to GOT Embassy here.

9. Needless to say, typically Byzantine political maneuvering in wake of Georkadjis affair is rife and some surprises may yet be in store--particularly since Panagoulis trial is not yet ended. Our regret is that villain of the piece, Archbishop's pro-Communist advisor, Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, at whose behest GOC apparently became involved with Panagoulis in first place, so far emerging unscathed.

Belcher

Washington, November 15, 1968, 2215Z.

272453. Subject: Cyprus: Tripartite Talks: Normalization and Local Talks.

1. Dept's discussions with reps UK FonOff and Canadian ExtAff held Nov 14 under chairmanship Dep Asst Sec Rockwell. Meeting produced striking similarity of views among three governments.

2. Following are conclusions reached on major points discussed:

a. Normalization and Pacification: all agree that progress in this field seems to have approached its limit with regard to major official moves, but that continuing minor steps taken in Denktash-Clerides forum and at local levels are encouraging and useful in improving atmosphere especially in eastern and central parts of the island. All agreed on continued need for such steps as well as for deconfrontation in such areas as Artemis Road.

b. Local Talks: Canadians and British pessimistic over prospects for local talks in view lack of progress in the second phase. We expressed view it is now too early to be either optimistic or pessimistic pending clear evidence of willingness of parties to compromise or similar evidence of obduracy. All expressed concern at lack of results so far but for moment see no need for outside intervention in talks. All would wish consult urgently with one another if talks in danger of collapse.

c. Relative Importance Normalization and Constitutional Talks: All agreed that normalization should not be overemphasized at apparent expense of constitutional talks and that the two should go "hand in hand".

d. UNFICYP mandate and renewal covered by septel./2/

Katzenbach

Brussels, November 16, 1968, 9-10 a.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary's Meeting with King Constantine

PARTICIPANTS
King Constantine
H. E. Panayiotis Pipinelis, Greek Foreign Minister

The Secretary
Ambassador Ridgway B. Knight
Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director for Turkey

The King began by saying he welcomed the opportunity to discuss once more "the relations between our two countries." The constitution is a new development, and the question is where we go from here--what steps should be taken to encourage a return to "the right kind of system." He wondered what ideas The Secretary had as to how to promote the return to at least the form of representative government as soon as possible. The King said he thought it would be impossible to go from the present system immediately to democratic government. This must be done gradually, but the process must be started soon. He would welcome The Secretary's ideas as to how to get the constitution into effect as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that although the United States has a great interest in this, he was not sure we had any recommendations as to how this should be done. He asked the Foreign Minister what plans existed.

Mr. Pipinelis replied that he had been in the hospital and unable to talk with the Prime Minister recently, but the latter clearly had the aim of reaching full implementation of the constitution by gradual and well-considered steps. Naturally there would be many, and the Finance Minister, who had attended the Cabinet meeting concerned, reported that the first very wise step has been taken in the appointment of a committee to draft the laws necessary to implement the constitution--a press law, a political parties law, a constitutional tribunal law, etc. After examination by the Cabinet, the laws will be put into effect at once, parties must be set up, and elections prepared. In his personal opinion, the Foreign Minister said, the most urgent matter now is the return of His Majesty, "not on formal grounds, but for political and psychological grounds." His presence would lend a new element of stability and enable His Majesty to exercise very important influence, which is essential. He expressed his personal conviction that the Prime Minister agreed with this idea completely, but that he had differences to contend with. No one influence is entirely predominant.

Here the King interjected, "Unfortunately!"

Mr. Pipinelis agreed and added that the Prime Minister's group, both inside the Government and without, is becoming predominant but is not entirely so yet. The Foreign Minister said he tried to find a way out. He supported the Prime Minister completely and is convinced the King's return will be advantageous to all. "Your advice," he said, "and your country's would be invaluable." "A formal démarche," he continued, "could do more harm than good, but you have a series of means to make your views known."

In response to The Secretary's question as to whether the differences he had mentioned were within the Cabinet or without, the Foreign Minister said "both", and the King said "mainly without."

Mr. Pipinelis said he knew how much importance the people--the revolutionary committee, and the people in general, attach to the opinion of the United States Government. He knew the United States had many official and unofficial contacts.

"You are aware," the King said, "of my planned meeting last May with the Prime Minister. Due to one thing and another, this has been postponed. It is very hard to know what is in his mind. I have told him through various people that it is far better to become master in his own house. I think he can't deal with the young people, who are tough. Immediately upon my return I'll work as hard as possible to get rid of them."

The Secretary asked where it had been contemplated the meeting would be held. The King said near Levkas, with the Prime Minister anchored in one cove and the King in another, with the meeting in between at night.

The United States, the King continued, carries great weight, but it's hard to tell how long this will last. It was very encouraging to hear that the drafting committee has been appointed, but the question is whether there will be delays.

Mr. Pipinelis said he did not think so. He was very happy that the committee had been appointed without his urging. The Prime Minister clearly intends to put the entire constitution into effect, but he is not alone. He has influence, but he must bargain. We have no alternative, the Foreign Minister said, but normalization through this Government and the return of His Majesty.

The King said he agreed, and both he and Mr. Pipinelis, and perhaps the United States, might exercise influence.

Mr. Pipinelis said he could safely say that with the King in Greece the possibilities would increase. The King initially should do nothing except permit his influence to grow.

The King laughingly said he'd play tennis.

Mr. Pipinelis said the King's influence would grow and become very important. The present Government is there to stay. It can be influenced but not thrown out without strife.

The Secretary said he had a few observations to make. During his tenure as Secretary there have been sixty-two coups in the world, none of which, he might say, had been engineered by the CIA. Wherever the United States has had influence, it has always been exerted toward return to constitutionalism. The United States has acquired a certain amount of experience in this area. Frequently there are two stages. First there is a restoration of basic civil rights and fair administration of justice, a removal of the fear of oppression, and this leads to the second stage, which, while not constitutionalism, is not totalitarian in its effect on individuals. An important step in Greece would seem to be the return of basic civil rights to prepare the way for constitutional elections.

As to the King's return, The Secretary said, he would be very candid. He could not, as a man of honor, advise the King to return, because to do so would imply assurances, which no one had given The Secretary. He could not make pledges he was unable to fulfill. He would not advise the King either to return, or not to return. The King should know to what he was returning. The Secretary could not advise the King to return to a trap.

Mr. Pipinelis said the purpose was to get advice to the revolutionary committee, not the King, who would have to make his own decisions.

The Secretary asked how much reliance the United States could put in assurances from the revolutionary committee concerning the King's return.

Mr. Pipinelis said it was not intended that the United States get assurances but rather that it give advice.

In response to The Secretary's question as to how much influence the United States could exert on the revolutionary committee, the Foreign Minister said, "considerable if properly done."

The King said it would be effective if Americans outside the Embassy "talked directly to the Colonels."

The Foreign Minister said there were also many other channels.

The King said he agreed The Secretary should not give him advice. He would make his own decisions. But the United States now has influence on the Colonels which may be lost in a year. Results would come from constant pressure on individual colonels for the return of constitutionalism and the King, because they always have in mind what the United States is thinking.

The Secretary said there was no question but that the United States would be glad to see the return to Greece of constitutional democracy, governmental stability, and progress. This advice, the United States has been giving and will continue to give. But in complete candor, the United States could not get involved in what might turn out to be a doublecross.

The King said he did not want his return discussed alone. The real issue is what happens to Greece. "I'm terribly homesick", he said, "but the important thing is, are the people going to get a better deal. I failed to push this Government out by force. Influence is the only possibility. We must persuade them to do the right thing. Then we must see if it's a trap--if I'm going back only as a puppet. It is very important that we-- Mr. Pipinelis, the American Government, and I--press for the earliest possible return to constitutionalism. I have to go back to help the process. I'm absolutely confident of the loyalty of the people, but I'm worried about discipline in the armed forces."

The Secretary asked if there were any possibility of starting with local elections.

The Foreign Minister said this was the course he favored.

The King asked if The Secretary agreed that all should exert pressure on the regime and then see if a trap had been laid.

The Secretary said he would review this when he returned to Washington. There was no question but that the United States would be very glad to see Greece move quickly back to a constitutional system. However, it would not be the first time United States advice had been disregarded.

The King said he was "immensely worried about the armed forces." He was going to tell the armed forces chief that he fully supported his attempts to reinstill discipline. The captains are still ruling the colonels, and the colonels, the generals. There is still dissension between the forces. The armed forces must again earn the respect of the people.

The King said he hoped the United States Government and the new Administration would continue to have no dealings with the Regent, whom the King does not recognize.

In conclusion, the King said a determination would have to be made at some point as to whether or not attempts to exert influence on the regime were being successful. Allowing the situation to continue indefinitely would simply help the Communists, because eventually there would be an explosion.

The Secretary said this matter would be considered very carefully. He was inclined to agree that conditions could not be frozen, because this would be very dangerous. He hoped very much to see fast movement toward constitutional government and wished the King good luck.

The King and The Secretary then had a brief chat alone./2/

Athens, December 31, 1968.

Dear Dan:

My talk with Papadopoulos on December 28 was disappointing. So that you could get the full flavor, we decided to airgram Pete Peterson's full memcon rather than reducing it to more readable length./2/ If you can plow through it, you will see that the Prime Minister argued strongly for military assistance levels to be judged on military grounds alone and virtually rejected my rather lengthy disquisition in support of the proposition that other factors have also to be taken into account even when military considerations are predominant.

I found the Prime Minister less forthcoming about his future plans than on any previous occasion. My effort to launch into a discussion of his plans for moderating the state of siege was turned aside by the comment that there was really nothing more to be said beyond his public address of December 14./3/ He was polite but firm in stating that he would be ready to discuss his future plans with me after the holidays if I desired but would regret it if such a discussion were really necessary to assure good relations between Greece and the United States.

I am not sure how to read this stiffening stance. One explanation is that Papadopoulos feels sufficiently secure in the saddle so that he can be a little more cavalier with us as well as with European countries. Another is that he has decided to get a reading on the new American Administration before defining his 1969 policies on civil liberties and constitutional implementation. If he has decided on a major forward step, he may prefer to hold it until its announcement could be expected to get him off on a good start with the new American Administration. Alternatively, he may have decided not to take any steps now that might prove not to have been necessary should the new Administration be substantially more relaxed than the old one in its attitude toward the Greek regime.

My own hunch is that his unforthcomingness resulted from a combination of these factors. It would be natural for him to regard the present American Administration, and its representative in Athens, as lame ducks and to hold off decisive moves until he can get a reading on the new Administration./4/

If from your distance you have more illuminating insights, I shall be glad to know them.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Phil

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