Documents 343-359
Relations With the Greek Military Junta and Continuing Discussions on Cyprus,
December 1967-December 1968
343. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Talbot) to the Country Director for Greece (Brewster)/1/
Athens, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Countercoup. Secret; Exdis.
Dear Dan:
With the Cyprus issue having survived the war threat, the domestic Greek political pot is boiling once again.
Twice in recent days King Constantine has expressed to me his anxiety about the Junta's intentions. On November 30, when he and the Queen came to the Embassy residence for dinner with my wife and me and Cy Vance and John Walsh, he told me in an aside that he feared the Junta might move that night to arrest Defense Minister Spandidakis and Generals Kollias and Perides. The King had met each of the three earlier in the day and had been concerned that the Generals expected to spend the night in Athens. He had advised General Spandidakis not to sleep at home and the other two to find places other than their usual quarters in Athens.
The difficulty as the King understood it was that Generals Kollias and Perides had been furious at the government for agreeing to pull back the Greek troops (in excess of the contingent) from Cyprus and that Spandidakis as a hawk had also resisted the government's decisions. The Junta ministers, as leaders of the government, had accused all three generals of insubordination and talked of dismissing them. Should they try to arrest them that night there would be a first-class crisis. From other sources we had understood that at the same time the Junta leadership was bracing its security mechanism out of fear that the King might be organizing a countercoup. I put our political and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] people on an all-night alert to watch the situation, which was complicated later in the evening when a homemade bomb was thrown into a crowd in downtown Athens and a woman killed. She was the first casualty of the anti-regime terrorist campaign mounted sporadically in recent months, apparently by very small groups of provocateurs.
At about 3:30 a.m. we thought the King's foreboding might have substance. The Royal Gendarmerie Commander for Attica put out a hurried call for numbers of his best men, who on arrival at gendarmerie headquarters were armed with tommy guns and hand grenades and dispatched in squads of five or six to various sections of the city with the mission of protecting various ministers in their homes. It was only with the arrival of daylight that we were certain that "protect" did not mean "arrest." Later information suggested that the Junta was in fact worried that the evening's bomb incident might be followed by more bombing attempts directed at the homes of certain ministers. It was in this general atmosphere that the King that evening muttered to me that "I'm going to have to get rid of these people (the Junta) one day soon." He was not more specific, however. (He made this comment while attempting to reach Junta ministers by telephone to get the details of the downtown bombing incident. The last time he had used my telephone to call ministers was on the night when I told him that a court martial had given a five-year sentence to Averoff.)/2/
/2/Averoff was arrested on July 12, charged with violation of a rule against gatherings of five or more persons. He was tried and sentenced to 5 years in prison on August 15 and pardoned on August 16.
As you perceive, the dicey part of all this is that those generals whose military pride was most hurt by the decision to withdraw Greek forces from Cyprus under Turkish pressure are precisely the ones on whom the King has been most counting for support against the Junta in any future showdown. An oddity of recent days, in fact, is that on Cyprus questions the King, Pipinelis and Col. Papadopoulos have supported the same policy lines while opponents of the Junta and natural supporters of the King's role in Greece have opposed Greek "capitulation."
On December 5, when I called on the King to recapitulate developments during the final days of the Vance Mission,/3/ we had some further conversation about the domestic situation. He was preoccupied with difficulties he foresaw on the immediate horizon. He senses that with the easing of the Cyprus crisis the Junta will attempt to move very rapidly to recoup its diminishing prestige and consolidate its hold on power. Specifically, he anticipates that the Junta will promptly press for the appointment of Col. Papadopoulos as Deputy Prime Minister and will also try to get rid of Spandidakis and those senior generals (the King's supporters) who had opposed the government's decisions on the Cyprus question.
/3/A memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1.
The King also asked whether I had seen the Caramanlis statement./4/ I had, and I commented that we had been approached by a friend of Caramanlis who had recently seen him in Paris (but I did not identify the source as Athanasios Tsaldaris) to urge that we encourage the King and Caramanlis to get into communication, since they were the only two men who, working together, could resolve the situation. The King rather abruptly changed the line of the conversation without commenting on this point. Nor did he echo my praise of the performance in recent days of Pipinelis; on the contrary, he observed that Pipinelis had made some mistakes in dealing with the Greek governmental and military elements which were saved only by the King's intervention.
/4/In a November 29 interview in Le Monde, Karamanlis had strongly criticized the foreign and domestic policies of the Junta.
It was obvious the King did not wish to discuss political personalities who might be available as alternatives to the Junta, and on this occasion I did not press him. I can only conclude that either the family's antipathy to Caramanlis remains strong or they are in a deep-covered relationship that he did not want to discuss with me. Unfortunately, the former is the more likely possibility.
Meanwhile we have been hearing from all of our political contacts that now is the time for the King to move against the Junta and that he would be certain to have the support of practically all of the old crowd, from George Papandreou to Harry Rendis. Some of the reports indicated they would support a move by the King to create a government of military figures responsive to him or even on the basis of another year or so of martial law or a variant thereof. We have also heard from these sources that the Junta is losing credibility in the country. Certainly it has blundered in foreign relations and now in relations with press proprietors, and these missteps have not gone unnoticed. It may be that skepticism of the Junta's effectiveness will spread through wider segments of Greek society and even that that most potent non-military weapon of all, ridicule, might come into play. This could undermine the Junta's public support but not, at least for sometime, its command of the military units that control the Athens area and its grip on strategic units in the northern commands.
As of today, we don't know what impact the new constitutional draft will have, nor even its thrust. Since the beginning of the Cyprus crisis I have not heard anything (nor have I pushed to seek it) about the draft now presumably approaching completion and the government's plans for dealing with it. However, it could become a factor in the new situation, just as could the open campaign of opposition to the Junta that seems to have been launched by Caramanlis./5/
/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
344. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/
Athens, December 13, 1967, 0915Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels December 10-15 to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting. The source text is the Department of State copy.
164. For the Secretary.
1. King Constantine summoned me to Tatoi Palace at 0915 local and stated he has decided to move against Junta today./2/ He planned to leave Tatoi airport this morning in his aircraft with entire Royal family, Prime Minister Kollias and General Antonakas and fly to Kavalla where military commanders in north prepared to receive him. He will assume command of Greek armed forces, and call for resignation of government so he can reform it to carry forward "Greek renaissance."
/2/Talbot provided a more complete report on the meeting and the events surrounding it in telegram 2749 from Athens, December 13. (Ibid.) In a letter to Brewster, December 18, Talbot provided a postmortem of the counter coup attempt. (Ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Countercoup)
2. King asked that we pass his instructions through our channels to Ministers Pipinelis and Spandidakis ordering them to support his move with NATO allies and then proceed immediately to Thessaloniki to join government.
3. King said he would be grateful if President and USG could endorse his move as step toward constitutional government.
He also asked that we use all available persuasion to convince colonels it would be unwise for them to seek to oppose his action and thus thrust Greece into civil war. He asked that USG do what it can to keep Greece's neighbors from taking advantage of situation. He asked if American stations in Greece could broadcast statement he has taped stating he has gone to Macedonia in order to exercise freely his initiative for reforming of government in order to bring about return to democratic normality. He hoped we could do this if forces loyal to him fail in effort projected for this hour to seize Athens radio facilities. Finally, he also asked me to request our Ambassadors to advise King and Queen of Denmark and Princess Sophia in Madrid./3/
/3/The message was transmitted to the Embassy in Copenhagen in telegram 49, a repeat of telegram 2721 from Athens, December 13. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE)
4. Comment: Whether or not King is prepared, die is cast. I will send further flash when we hear whether he has safely gotten away from Tatoi airport. I do not plan to have King's statement broadcast on American facilities at least until it clear his maneuver has reasonable chance of success. Please inform Pipinelis and Spandidakis./4/
/4/The Greek Foreign and Defense Ministers were also in Brussels attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting.
Talbot
345. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, December 13, 1967, 1158Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to the Mission to NATO for Secretary Rusk.
2730. Ref: Athens 2721./2/ At Greek Pentagon at 1230 local I was taken to office of Chief, Hellenic National Defense General Staff and ushered into presence of Ministers Papadopoulos and Makarezos, Generals Angelis and Zoitakis and Col. Paleologos (KYP). Papadopoulos states that General Angelis had received this morning message from King dismissing him as Chief, HNDGS, and stating he (King) would address message to Greek people. Papadopoulos claimed King had left Tatoi airport one and half hours ago, but he did not know King's present whereabouts. He presumed King had gone to north. According to Papadopoulos it is clear King is attempting to overthrow revolution. He asked me specifically whether I had any knowledge of this action "from any direction." I said there was certainly nothing I could tell him and that if he was implying question whether U.S. involved I could assure him flatly that it was not./3/ In response to my question, Papadopoulos stated that he presumed that Prime Minister Kollias had gone with the King and he stated that Pattakos was now out of Athens but would return within one-half hour. Papadopoulos expressed hope that I would do everything possible to avoid bloodshed in Greece. I responded that through the mission of Mr. Vance the United States had recently made great effort to avoid conflict in this part of the Mediterranean and that we naturally had every wish that civil strife could be avoided inside Greece. I informed Papadopoulos and others that I would immediately inform my government and that I would be available in Athens throughout day if they wish to communicate with me again./4/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 344.
/3/In telegram 4097 from Athens, December 13, Talbot requested that the press be informed that while he had frequently seen the King in previous weeks, the "U.S. Government has no advanced knowledge of this undertaking." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE)
/4/Telegram 2739 from Athens, December 13, reported that at 12:30 p.m. local time Papadopolous and Makarezos called Talbot stating they had no knowledge of the King's whereabouts. The telegram also described military maneuvers in the city of Athens. (Ibid.)
Talbot
346. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, December 13, 1967, 1647Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to the Mission to NATO for the Secretary.
2751. 1. Suggest I be given standby instructions, to be executed at what seems appropriate moment, to attempt to make contact with King and with Junta leaders to express USG's strong hope questions of government in Greece can be resolved without bloodshed. I would like to say US as ally and friend of Greece not intervening in domestic issue but, as recent Cyprus crisis demonstrated anew, warfare in this part of world can redound to benefit only of Communists. We do not know what plans either King or Junta may have, but we should exceedingly deplore any conflict between elements of Greek armed forces that have been assiduously built up in the past two decades with our substantial assistance. However difficult it may be for contending groups to settle their differences peacefully, we urgently request both sides to find ways to solve present crisis by negotiation.
2. Although it will presumably not be practicable to get this message to King in immediate future, there could be utility in conveying it to Junta leaders. As I see our interests, first object is to get quick resolution with minimum of bloodshed. Whatever we may think of King's wisdom in making this move today, our interests now lie on side of his success since his failure would probably not only destroy monarchy but fasten extreme military Junta on Greece for years to come.
3. If and when we satisfied that King has gained full loyalty of northern army, so that preponderance of Greek armed forces committed to his side, I would wish to add to above message strong appeal to Papadopoulos to make deal with King rather than attempting to fight it out. By then he would know military odds against his success. He would know we have strong interest in seeing all elements in Greece accept peacefully government constituted by King. I could say we understand King's broadcast offered Junta forgiveness if they capitulated immediately, and promise that we would strongly urge King to honor this offer even at this late hour if Junta agreed. Alternative, I would point out, could be nothing but disastrous destruction of fabric of Greek society.
4. There could be moment in immediate future when passive presence of Sixth Fleet units in Greek waters could have powerful psychological impact here (notably on Papadopoulos). I will withhold recommendations until we see how situation clarified./2/
/2/In telegram 84028 to Athens, December 13, the Department of State authorized Talbot to act as suggested in paragraphs 1 and 2, but instructed him to avoid any action suggested in paragraph 3 at that time. Any use of the Sixth Fleet would be delayed until developments in Greece were clearer. (Ibid.)
Talbot
347. Transcript of Teleconference Between the Embassy in Greece and the Department of State/1/
December 13, 1967, 5:20 p.m. (EST)
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Exdis.
SecState item 1.
Participants
Amb. Battle
Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Brewster
Subject: Greek crisis
Classification: Secret-Exdis
End Item.
Athens item 1.
We face new situation tonight with Papadopoulos having in effect declared King deposed and new government of which he Prime Minister, etc./2/ My inclination continues to be try to see him and argue issue out on basis Athens 2751/3/ (to which we have received no response). However, Athenians may take a call by me as de facto recognition of this regime which I assume we must consider to be a rebel regime. We are attempting to get some Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officer to Kavala tomorrow to establish contact with King, whose movements and plans continue to be unknown to us. Question arises, however, whether USG should now make its choice and cast die in favor of King. This might involve USG declaration of support of King and instructions to me to join King and his Cabinet wherever they may be at earliest opportunity. You will understand gravity of this decision, involving as it does our total presence and all facilities in all of Greece. My own view at this moment is that in best of circumstances USG will find it extremely difficult to deal with Papadopoulos controlled govt of southern Greece. I cannot say for certain how best civil war can be averted.
/2/During the evening of December 13, the Junta announced the deposition of the King, his replacement by a Regent, and the formation of a new government with Papadopoulos as Prime Minister. The Regent, General George Zoitakis, and Papadopoulos were sworn in by the Archbishop of Athens that evening.
/3/Document 346.
My sense, however, is that rather than attempting straddle issue we might do best by opting strongly on side of King as soon as we have any information that he has in fact won loyalty and support of preponderance of Greek armed forces. As of this moment, we have no assets to learn true situation in north of Greece, nor has King yet established contact with Greek people or with US. Request your comments.
End item 1.
SecState item 2.
Following statement drafted for issuance this morning and delayed in view sketchy info then existing. Please comment on wisdom issuing this or similar statement:
"U.S. statement
King Constantine of Greece has departed Athens and arrived at Larissa in northern Greece. He has issued an appeal to the people of Greece asking for their support for the restoration of democracy.
Since the change of government in Athens on April 21 the United States Government has urged that steps be taken in Greece to bring about a return to constitutionalism. The United States Government has believed, and continues to believe, that it is essential that this be accomplished by peaceful means. We urge the people of Greece to work together for the re-establishment of democracy, avoiding bloodshed and civil strife.
End item.
Item 2. Answering SecState item 2.
Your statement is excellent and I recommend it be put out immediately. You will see that King has been reported by VOA source as seen in Kavala this evening. Rather than "arrived at Larissa" I would suggest "arrived at Macedonia."
My own inclination is to make last appeal to Papadopoulos, along lines of Athens 2751 if you agree, and laying on line our probable position if they persist in partition. We could opt for King early tomorrow when we know better what his situation is.
End item 2.
Athens item 3.
While I was dictating previous item Brigadier Pattakos telephoned Embassy and asked to speak to me. If you agree, I will phone back in few minutes and arrange to see him shortly to make pitch suggested in previous item.
End item 3.
SecState item 3.
We understand that King's statement has been repeated four (4) times today. Is this correct?
End item.
Item 4 Athens answering SecState item 3.
We understand King's message was broadcast 4 or 5 times on Larissa radio between 1430 and 1800 hrs today, and also on Thessaloniki radio. We have not yet heard any broadcast from Kavala or any other from King or forces presumably supporting King.
End of item 4.
Item 5 Athens
State 84028 answering Athens 2751, has just arrived./4/ I will proceed on basis this instruction with any modifications conveyed in present telecon in response to foregoing items.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 346.
End item 5.
Secstate item 4.
We agree you should make pitch in first two paras your message and had already so authorized. Agree you should so speak to Pattakos. Suggest you not use last sentence para 2 in view danger that King would consider U.S. had undercut him by emphasizing negotiations which he may not consider acceptable.
End item.
Item 6 Athens.
We doing everything possible to increase flow of information. All elements contributing all intelligence available to Embassy Sitreps.
End item 6.
SecState item 5.
We agree we cannot straddle issue very long, and must support general goals of King.
However, we prefer to finesse for time being question of state of regime in Athens and group with King. We are inclined prefer standing on position we have taken since April 21 which implies support of King but without making entirely clear difficult legal situation.
There are advantages in your remaining in never-never land for day or so particularly if it appears likely contact with new govt can produce useful result.
We agree subject approval Secretary and President to adherence purposes of King but without going all way with your withdrawal to his at present unknown destination.
Decision your move to north would likely depend on ability of King to control army and generate public support.
End item.
SecState item 6.
Assume your call on Patakos obviates your call Papadopoulos for moment. In general, however, you should avoid paying calls on high level officials if possible unless you have some important reason to do so. If it is possible to hold necessary contacts at low level this is desirable.
End item 6.
Athens item 7 answering SecState item 6.
Thanks, but if we are to attempt to influence Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos tonight I fear no Embassy officer but me can establish contact. I will try to do as much as possible in one call, presumably on Pattakos.
End item 7.
SecState item 8.
We understand and concur.
End item.
SecState item 7.
Is it your recommendation that statement (our item two (2)) be issued immediately or do you wish await further info strength of King with army and public.
End item.
Athens item 9.
Suggest you issue statement immediately.
End item 9.
Athens item 8.
I have just talked with Pattakos who asked me to come to Greek Pentagon to meet with "us". I assume he means Papadopoulos, Makarezos, General Anghelis and he are there together. EmbOff and I will go there as soon as this telecon completed.
End item 8.
SecState item 9.
From Amb. Battle
I have just talked with Secretary who interested having all information as soon as possible especially with respect situation in north. He suggests possibility Embassy send someone to north to ascertain facts. NATO Council adjourns in 12 hours. There is strong sentiment there for what King is trying to do provided he has any base of support and there is anything to back up. If we want Secretary to take any action he must have guidance within 8 hours.
Secretary's inclination at moment is that statement should await clarification of situation in north.
End item.
Athens item 10 answering SecState item 9.
We are trying to [get?] officer from CG Thessaloniki over to Kavala. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] At first light we will see whether there any chance attach? plane can take off from Athens airport for north. US military units in north have been quartered on bases, and we have no other active assets in eastern Macedonia or Thrace. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
End item 10.
Athens item 11. Further to SecState item 9.
I will flash recommendations for Secretary at NATO after returning from forthcoming meeting with Junta colonels.
End item 11.
Secstate item 10. Re Athens item 4.
Larissa armed forces radio announced 2001 GMT on behalf Premier that by decisions King, Ministers Papadopoulos, Zoitakis, Pattakos, etc. dismissed. All armed forces in Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly--90 percent of army and all air and naval forces obeying King's command.
End item.
SecState item 11.
From Amb. Battle
In your message for Secretary you should also include your recommendations re public statement by USG. Secretary still bearish at present time.
End item.
Athens item 12.
SecState item 11 understood and will do.
Do you have anything further?
End item 12.
SecState item 12.
We have nothing further. Thanks.
End item.
348. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, December 14, 1967, 0250Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, USUN, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, DIA, USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and Thessaloniki.
2771. 1. At request of Pattakos, I went to Pentagon at 1:15 a.m. local to meet with Generals Angelis, Zoitakis, and Pattakos and Colonels Papadopoulos, Makarezos, and Paleologopoulos [Paleologos?] and Under Minister of Foreign Affairs Christopoulos.
Papadopoulos, in his new role of Prime Minister, began conversation by asking whether I had heard this evening's radio announcements of government and whether I had any comment to make on today's developments. I replied that I heard not only announcements of government but also message of King. Then, as authorized by Department, I proceeded to read verbatim from first part of Embtel 2751./2/ Elaborating on themes in this message, I reminded Papadopoulos and others that only recently my government had exerted great effort to prevent conflict in this part of Mediterranean, at times bloodshed had seemed inevitable but was avoided only at last minutes. Now once more we have reached point where blood could be spilled--this time in a civil conflict which would be even more tragic. Surely something could be done to avert such a catastrophe. I also said I was under instructions to convey this same message to the King and to urge both sides to resolve differences peacefully through negotiation.
/2/Document 346.
3. In response, Papadopoulos adopted self-righteous position that his government had in no way misbehaved and that it was King and Kollias who, suddenly without warning, left Athens to overthrow revolution. His government, on other hand, had acted properly, even following Constitution in appointing regent. It was King's, not Athens government, which had created present crisis and danger of bloodshed. Papadopoulos, backed by several of his colleagues, repeatedly insisted they had complete control of Greek armed forces, as well as support of all social classes.
4. I commented we are now faced with critical situation involving what are claimed to be two governments, each side claiming loyalty and support of people and armed forces. We are not in position to judge merits of conflicting claims, but existence of two governments obviously would create potential disaster for Greece, as well as legal questions for USG. For example, what is position of King? Has he abdicated, in their view?
5. Papadopoulos argued that, by leaving Athens and disappearing, King had "abandoned" his duties as Monarch. Therefore, according to Constitution, government had appointed regent in his place. I replied that this interpretation would be difficult for me to persuade my government and others to accept, particularly since King had left Athens only some hours earlier and, as far as I knew, is still in Greece and is acting in accordance with Constitution. Christopoulos broke in to assert that there might be legal question if two governments should actually exist, but events would soon prove there is in fact only one government, i.e., that of PriMin Papadopoulos. I warned them, however, that I could foresee difficult legal problem.
6. Immediate issue, though, was how to avoid internal conflict and strife in Greece. How did they believe it could be avoided? Pattakos' first reaction was that it was not their responsibility as they had not created problem. I reminded them that Vance had heard this same remark twenty times a day for twelve days during Cyprus crisis. As he had repeatedly answered, need was not to apportion responsibility but to avoid tragedy. Pattakos then indicated that they would be willing to communicate with King if they knew where he was. General Angelis, however, immediately tended to knock possibility of negotiations by stating flatly King had crossed river and burnt his bridges behind him. Papadopoulos implied that there was no need for negotiation as his government had complete control of country. I again stressed that, though we are not in position to judge rival claims, my government, including specifically Secretary Rusk who now at NATO table, is most anxious about danger of bloodshed and that we hope every effort can be exerted to avoid strife. I would naturally inform USG of this meeting and would be available any time for additional talks.
7. Junta officers, as well as Angelis, Zoitakis, and Christopoulos, gave the [no] sign of friction among them and attempted portray air of confidence. Pentagon itself was reasonably calm, though additional guards were posted inside and outside building.
Talbot
349. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, December 14, 1967, 1915Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, the Secretary of Defense, USUN, JCS, DIA, USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and Thessaloniki.
2807. First installment possible effects of King's abortive countercoup.
1. This estimate will doubtless be revised as the specific events of December 13/14 become known.
2. King Constantine's abortive attempt to overthrow April 21 coup government has wrought change on Junta's future options. The new Papadopoulos government would now appear to be undisputed master of Greece, with no potential internal check on its tenure or its programs.
So long as the King remained a factor in internal political equation, there existed possibility that King could exercise a certain measure of control over Junta and in extreme circumstances it was believed that he had capability to oust Junta with support from certain loyalist army elements in the north. With King now out of country, and clear demonstration that Junta is in ultimate control of armed forces that count, hardliners in Junta will doubtless conclude there is no obstacle to indeterminate rule by Papadopoulos and company.
3. Other pressures that existed before December 13 which were being exerted toward a restoration of constitutional representative government in Greece continue with undiminished potential: US Government, NATO, Western opinion in general, and international climate. Presumably these can have some effect on Junta's program for a restoration of normality. However, there is no ace in hole, no possible alternative to coup group, since a different government could only be imposed by military intervention from abroad, which is apparently inconceivable. Some elements of Junta therefore will now attempt more confidently to enjoy prospect of setting own timetable, with assurance that no one can forcibly change schedule or "force" them to do anyone's bidding.
4. Question which should become more clear in next several days is whether Papadopoulos and company will now take a more relaxed attitude toward constitutional reform and an eventual return to a parliamentary system through elections or feel "events" have put them on their metal. First inclination will doubtless be to think that since they can't be forced out, why should they be in a hurry to leave. And therefore they would probably focus on trying to carry out their revolutionary program of reforming the administration, making bureaucracy efficient, changing habits and working methods of Greek people, and generally "shaping up" country. Regime's leaders might be more willing to use strong measures to effect changes they desire, since they no longer need be as sensitive to anyone else's opinion. Alternate pressure will be that "incident" has challenged "honor" (filotimo) of national government and Junta must prove Constantine was wrong in prognostication in his appeal that they were not interested in constitutional reform and implementation.
5. Effect on Greek people of more stringent measures being used by Junta and apparent lack of any realistic alternative to present regime may be to polarize populace increasingly into regime supporters and opponents, with a diminishing category of apathetics. This would not in immediate future mean activation of larger group of activists (bomb throwers etc.) in opposition. Oppositionists who looked to King to "do something" or expected that foreign pressure would eventually cause government to fall or give up power will now, in some numbers, decide they must turn to direct action against government in one fashion or another. However even elements who favor comparing dangers of WW II resistance and now--when Communists took over active resistance movement in mountains--find it difficult to forecast development activist resistance movement of this type. This particularly true since Greeks of WW II resistance forces were not necessarily from sophisticated urban groups (who are trying be "articulate" opposition at present) but from peasants who had double motivation--foraging for food and shoot it out tradition with "government" of whatever mark existed. In the end, Papadopoulos government, by its new demonstration of strength, determination and staying power will probably gain tolerance of many Greeks whose primary political instinct is to find which way the wind is blowing and then to bend with it, in other words to join ranks with the apparently winning side.
Talbot
350. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, December 19, 1967, 2339Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Rockwell and Brewster, cleared by Battle and Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk.
86871. 1. King Constantine telephoned to Secretary at 9 a.m. EST December 19 to report that messenger Ch. Potamianos returning to Athens. King's views were that there should be firm date for plebiscite on constitution and date for elections set by the junta. Constitution was not an issue because he did not know what was in it. He had to insist on precise dates.
2. King expressed hope US would not recognize GOG unless he returns as safeguard that things will be implemented. He hoped UK and others would also put pressure on GOG using means at their command.
3. He said he was considering possibly going back without further negotiation. (Comment: This brainstorm may have grown out of his talk with Caramanlis and others who have advised him to go back before it was too late.)
4. Secretary did not comment on this idea. He also did not commit himself concerning King's request to link US recognition with King's return to Greece, saying that question would require study.
5. King concluded conversation by stating he would not be making press statement today.
6. We have reviewed carefully question of US-Greek relations and do not want to get into the middle in negotiating question of King's possible return. Obviously the Greek Government is in the driver's seat and not ready to pay much of a price, if any, for King's return. At same time we want to strike a blow with Greek regime for principles of early plebiscite on constitution and a firm commitment concerning elections. We want to use leverage of US relationship with Greece in current circumstances to maximum degree as an additional tool in achieving our basic goal of bringing Greece back to democratic life as soon as possible, irrespective of what King may decide to do.
7. We would like you to get in touch informally and quietly with Papadopoulos or Pattakos (rather than Pipinelis as suggested Athens 4175 [2859])./2/ Say that current developments have complicated for us our relations with Greece, but that this was already difficult for basic reasons which remain a serious obstacle to the kind of relations we would like to have with a NATO partner and traditional friend. We see little chance for a satisfactory relationship until progress is made on removing these problems, which can be described in general as the continuing lack of convincing movement toward the restoration of a constitutional situation. Involved are such issues as firm and early dates for a plebiscite on the constitution and elections, restrictions on the press, and the resolution of political prisoner cases in accordance with due process of law. Add that the strength of opinion of the American people and their elected representatives on these issues prevents the USG from having a normal relationship with Greece, and that accordingly we are anxious to see Greece make decisive progress toward constitutionality.
/2/Telegram 2859 from Athens, December 20, recommended that the King make no statement until Ambassador Talbot had sounded out Pipinelis on future relations between Constantine and the Junta. (Ibid., POL 23-9 GREECE)
8. If you are asked whether the US intends to recognize the GOG, you should say that no decision has been taken pending clarification status of King; you should leave no doubt that basic problem for us continues to be undemocratic nature of regime itself. FYI. We prefer leave situation imprecise for awhile, although we recognize contact with Papadopoulos or Pattakos might be considered a step toward recognition; we hope it can be done in a manner to minimize such an interpretation./3/ End FYI.
/3/In telegram 2892 from Athens, December 20, Talbot reported that he had been unable to secure a meeting with Papadopoulos and suggested delaying further efforts while awaiting further moves by the King and the Junta. (Ibid.)
Rusk
351. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 30, 1967, 0940Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and the Mission to NATO.
1056. Subject: Turk Cypriot Provisional Administration./2/
/2/In telegram 1052 from Nicosia, the Embassy reported on the organization of the "Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration" and the issuance of regulations by that organization. (Ibid.)
1. Acting FonMin Araouzos called me to Ministry half hour ago as first of Chiefs of Mission all of whom he will see today. Subject, as we expected, was government decision to consider further visits by Chiefs of Mission to officials of new "Administration" as recognition of "flagrantly unlawful act" by Turk Cypriots. Araouzos said that GOC "cannot agree to any visits by Chiefs of Mission to officials of the new executive council." If the GOC were to give assent to "official visits" this would merely encourage Turks to take further steps of separative nature. He said that in past visits by Ambassadors and Charges to Kuchuk and other "officials" had been considered for convenience as merely visits to leaders of Turk Cypriot community. The GOC could no longer maintain this fiction and therefore could not agree to any further visits. There could only be one government in Cyprus and that government could not condone recognition of the "new Turk Cypriot Administration."
2. In response my question Araouzos said that this rule did not apply to members of the staff of the Embassy. I remarked that I thought this was essential since I believed in the past our contacts with Turk Cypriot community had been of value in defusing various incidents and in general reducing tension.
3. Araouzos said somewhat apologetically that he recognized this action by the GOC would present us with certain difficulties but that the decision had been taken with the feeling that they had no choice. Speaking personally and without instructions I offered the opinion that this action might prove to be ill- advised in that it gave unwarranted recognition to an action which I and my government did not consider very much more than a mere institutionalizing of a situation that had existed de facto for some time. This was in fact a recognition of the existence of a separate entity in the Turkish Cypriot sector and in that respect at least the action in a sense strengthened the Turkish position. In accordance State 91488,/3/ I expressed our view that timing of Turk Cypriot move regrettable in view of hoped-for implementation of pacification program which had now been postponed. I said that for once I agreed with Communist newspapers this morning which had urged government to proceed with normalization despite Turk action. I hoped that now that government had apparently reached decision that normalization in its best interests it would not allow this unfortunate event to interfere with implementation of program.
/3/Telegram 91488, December 20, commented on the impact of the creation of the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
4. I closed our conversation with statement that I would report GOC decision to my government and would presumably receive instructions.
5. Comment: Have just talked to UK HICOMer who followed me to FonMinistry. Costar said he had same record played to him and was requesting instructions from his government. Of course this poses greater problem to Brits in view their status Guarantor Power. Nevertheless, Costar agrees with me that there would appear to be little choice but to acquiesce in GOC ruling. He, however, is not offering opinion to London and will merely await their decision. He reminded me that we will have to face problem Jan. 1 when Kuchuk gives his traditional Bayram "at home." Members of corps have in past paid their respects and as matter of fact, I have traditionally gone to sign his book on New Year's day after calling on Archbishop. Under circumstances I consider it inadvisable to make calls this year and DCM will sub for me./4/
/4/In telegram 91621, December 30, the Department of State expressed its concern over the latest examples of intercommunal tensions and instructed the Ambassador to seek a reversal of the Cypriot Government's ban on Ambassadorial contacts. (Ibid., POL 18 CYP) In telegram 91622, December 30, the Department of State reported that it had also conveyed its concerns to the Cypriot Charge with a request for the lifting of the ban. (Ibid.)
Belcher
352. Letter From Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Johnson/1/
Athens, January 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, POL US. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Bromley Smith of the NSC, attached to the source text, notes that the letter was "brought by hand from Greece and then delivered to the White House through a private citizen." The citizen was Tom Pappas, President of Esso-Pappas. In a January 10 memorandum for the President, Rostow commented that the letter was a plea for recognition and endorsed the Department of State's suggestion that the President delay a reply until "a useful time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 3)
Dear Mr. President,
I deem it imperative today to expose to you officially and with due responsibility the causes, the aims, and the prospects of the Revolution of April 21st, 1967. I take this step, prompted by the hope that certain misunderstandings as to the nature of the change that has taken place in Greece will thus be cleared. These I consider detrimental to the interests of both nations concerned, as well as to the Free World.
Our country is honored as the cradle of Democracy. This very fact has placed all powers friendly to Greece, as well as all champions of Democracy in an embarrassing position. The regime which existed before the present change, however, had no relation whatsoever with Democracy. It was a regime of factious debauchery, unrestrained demagogy and disintegrating corruption.
It had three basic characteristics: a steady fall toward economic collapse, an ever-increasing deterioration of all institutions, and the menacing erosion caused by Communism in political parties, in the press, in a part of society, and in the government itself. In this corner of Europe, as you well know, Communism has thrice tried to seize power by revolutions which steeped the country in blood. The last (1946-1949) would have inevitably made a captive of Greece behind the Iron Curtain if the United States of America had not materially helped my greatly menaced country.
The Revolution of April 21st, 1967, took place on the eve of certain civil war--the inevitable result of the elections set for May 28. These elections, whatever the verdict at the polls, would not have solved the ever growing crisis. On the contrary, they would have brought it to an explosive climax. And in the midst of the nightmarish chaos that would have ensued, only the Communist Party--the sole organized power besides the Army--would have prevailed. Its persistent attempts to descend to the Mediterranean and annihilate the eastern flank of the Atlantic Treaty would have been crowned with success.
Those who undertook the responsibility to restrain this process at the very last minute, have an individual record of more than ten years' struggle against every shade of Totalitarianism in favor of Freedom and Democracy. They have never thought of imposing a personal regime. Their awareness of responsibility--so lacking in others--as well as their sensitiveness as perceptors of the people's anxiety, due to their origin as members of the armed forces, urged them toward this venture.
The success of this venture, without any bloodshed--a success unique in the annals of world history--is clear proof that the imposed change was an expression of the wishes of a great majority of the Greek people. The latest events (the counter revolution of December 13, headed by the Sovereign of the State himself) constituted a second test for the Revolution, proving once more its necessity, its sway over the people, and its absolute de facto stability.
On the solemn occasion of this my written communication with you, I wish to assure the President of the United States of the following:
It is not the intent of the Revolution to impose a permanent regime, at variance with the fundamental principles proclaimed and championed by the Free World--headed by the United States of America.
The suspension of only a certain number of articles of the 1952 Constitution is temporary. A new Constitution, brought up to date, will eventually be given to the Greek people, no later than 1968.
The regime of this country--Democracy together with a hereditary Sovereign (Constitutional Monarchy)--will remain unaltered.
As soon as the Revolution has accomplished its mission, that is, as soon as it has set the foundations for the economic development of the country, brought the functions of the government up to date, and safeguarded the democratic institutions from the Communist menace, it will call upon the Greek people to elect its deputies in a free, general and secret vote.
The National Government would willingly set the date of the country's entrance into the smooth course of representative government, rid of all the ugliness and dangers of the past, if this were practically possible and psychologically advisable.
Mr. President,
When the Revolution of April 21st took place, Greece was much in the same state as Czechoslovakia had been before February 1948. Ever since World War II, Communism has coveted Greece for strategic and other reasons. This is why Communism has so actively stirred world propaganda against our National Government, thus influencing--as you know far better than myself--a large number of non-Communist elements who shape politics and form public opinion in the Free World.
In this address to you today, the Greek Government hopes that both its professions and its assertions will be duly estimated, and that its sincere devotion to its allies and to the principles of the Free World will meet with due response from the Government of the United States of America.
On the occasion, please allow me to express my best wishes for the New Year.
With kindest personal regards,
G Papadopoulos
353. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, January 9, 1968, 1315Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 GR. Confidential; Limdis.
3099. 1. Mr. and Mrs. Andreas Papandreou called on me at home January 8. Andreas seemed well, vigorous, responsive and as articulate as ever./2/ He dismissed his fainting spell several days earlier as not important or serious but rather as an incidental effect on his metabolism of excitement of being released. Similar incidents had occurred in past years. He said he had not been mistreated in jail but that eight months of confinement with armed guards always physically present has inevitably taken their toll and his strength and energy were naturally reduced. He was now rebuilding them. Worst period in prison was last twenty-four hours after amnesty had been announced but before he was certain it would apply to him.
/2/On December 23, 1967, the Junta announced that it would be releasing Andreas Papandreou and other political prisoners. On January 2, Margaret Papandreou requested a meeting with Talbot in order for her husband to discuss his future plans. In telegram 2929 from Athens, December 23, Talbot raised the likelihood that Andreas would request a visa to return to the United States and outlined means of arranging the most "expeditious" issuance of a non-emigrant visa. (Ibid.)
2. Since his release he had discussed possible future plans with his family but not with anyone else before this conversation. He found many reasons to stay in Greece, but he would then have to remain close to home and concentrate on writing since any serious contacts with old friends and associates would be subject to misunderstanding by regime. Also so long as he remained in Greece he would be a factor and possibly an embarrassment to regime causing it to act more defensively. Thus without inflating his own importance, he had come to feel that perhaps the regime could move more freely toward constitutionalism once he had left the country. In any event, he had decided to return to United States. He had applied for a Greek passport and had reason to think it [garble--would] be forthcoming shortly. If so, he would like to start promptly for the United States. I told him we could give him visa quickly. We also discussed possible effect on him of Supreme Court decision in Afroyim case. I explained that Court had not ruled on questions involving a citizen who took Ministerial oath of allegiance to foreign sovereign and that therefore decision could not be presumed to have given him fresh claim to U.S. citizenship. Any administrative or further judicial interpretation could, of course, modify this position, but as of this date no such finding had been made. Andreas asked if his acceptance of Greek passport now would reduce his prospect of resuming American citizenship in event of later broad construction of Afroyim decision. I responded that to best of my knowledge it would not.
3. Papandreou said he had decided that for indefinite future, "which could be very long time," he would abandon political activities and return to academic career which would now be focussed on broader developmental economics than on his earlier mathematical econometric specialty. With several university offers in hand, he had ruled out Middle Western possibilities (Minnesota, Northwestern) but had not yet decided whether to go back to California or another West Coast institution or to settle on East Coast. It would depend on kinds of contacts he might have in one place or other.
4. Our talk, which has relaxed and friendly throughout, also included candid discussion of some of Andreas' past activities and his appraisal of present prospects in Greece. Ostensible purpose of call, however, was to express thanks for Embassy's intervention "to save my life" on first night of April coup and thereafter. Andreas said he was aware of my approaches to coup leaders and Embassy's concern for his family and deeply appreciated our interest. I commented that Embassy had been prepared to offer assistance to his family if need arose, particularly if he or they should ever appear to be in imminent danger, but happily this had not been necessary. We discussed how much he may have been in actual danger of being killed. I suggested that although I was grateful for his appreciation of Embassy's efforts, in fact maximum danger had probably come immediately during his arrest, before Embassy knew what was going on. Once regime had him in custody and world knew it, any physical attack on him would have been hard to justify. Certainly we had not discovered any indication that regime ever planned to execute him. Papandreou agreed with this assessment. Pattakos had told him junior members of Junta wanted to get rid of him but that Pattakos had overruled them. When after forty-eight hours or so Andreas understood that there were no political killings, he felt his own situation much safer. It could however have been different story if top coup leadership had lost control to more activist juniors.
5. Throughout this phase of our conversation, Andreas made repeated references to comfort he had gained by knowing USG and Embassy maintained lively interest in his situation.
6. While in prison Andreas had thought through events between July 15, 1965 and April 21, 1967, he said. He had come to see situation from perspective of Greek state as a whole without partisan distortions. Now that that phase had passed, and he could talk without sounding as if he were trying to make marks for future, he wanted to make clear what position he had held vis-a-vis United States, since he felt there had been misunderstandings between him and American Embassy and perhaps some bias in reporting. Ever since 1961 he had believed Embassy and State Department had favored Greek rightists and strong role for King. He reminded me that he had asserted this to me in Washington after Greek elections of 1961, which he felt had been distorted not by domestic influences alone (a delicately-phrased assertion that CIA had intervened in those elections). Whatever Embassy may have thought in 1965-66 and 1966-67, he had never advocated departure of King from Greece but merely limitation of King's ambition to play de Gaulle by precise delimitation of Royal powers. Also, he had never advocated departure of Greece from Western Alliance; on contrary, Greece unlike Tito's Yugoslavia could not survive neutralism because its position would not permit this. Finally, whatever criticisms of United States policy he had made, he had not attacked U.S. policies as an enemy but rather as member of family. Having been an American citizen, he had felt he could be as frank as Senators Fulbright and Morse without putting into question his basic belief that United States and Greece must continue closely together.
7. I told Papandreou I accepted these statements. From our point of view, Embassy (and I as former newspaperman accustomed to importance of separating news from editorial opinion) had tried to maximum extent possible to avoid bias. His father and he had asserted to me early in my tour in Greece that Embassy had neglected importance of Center Union/3/ without discussing prior situation which I had not known at first hand. I was confident he would agree that in 1965-67 period Embassy had maintained close contacts with Center Union and I personally had seen his father quite frequently as well as other prominent members of party. Andreas acknowledged that. I went on to observe that he should know that in 1960's, at least (which only period I could speak of personally, not having previously been in government service), both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had determined firmly that there should be one United States policy in a country. It was thus unrealistic to speak of separate diplomatic, military and intelligence policies. Papandreou interjected that he was glad to hear "this important statement." I continued that while Andreas and his father had both assured me that they followed same policies despite differences in style, I had subsequently concluded that in fact there were substantive differences between them. Andreas acknowledged that he and his father in the end had disagreed on policy points. He reiterated, however, that this had nothing to do with their joint view of the importance of the American connection. His own strategy had been to try to detach as large a faction as possible from the Communist-front EDA Party in order to assure an electoral victory for the Center Union. He admitted this was a risky policy, but felt that he could have carried it off despite his father's doubts.
/3/See Document 214.
8. Andreas spoke of American influence in Greece and the importance of getting this country back on constitutional lines. I responded that in early Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan period American influence had apparently sometimes been used tactically, to extent of insistence upon broad-based government to carry out reconstruction and development programs. However, as with other countries well along development trail, in recent years we had held that Greece itself (rather than outsiders) must be mainly responsible for its political, economic, and social development, and that we could no more take responsibility for its failures than for its successes. It was on this basis, that we had not intervened with King last spring to set up temporary government that would have sidetracked elections and presumably averted military coup. Similarly, at present stage, we are not in position to tell Greece what kind of government it should have. Papandreou commented that in many ways this is a pity, since present rulers of Greece need advice. I noted that no one in Greece is unaware of fact that Americans would find repugnant any permanent military dictatorship in Europe in 1960's. Key policy question for us, I added, is whether gradual restoration of democratic and parliamentary rule is more likely to be accomplished if allies turn their backs on Greece at present juncture of work with government of day. Papandreou said that not even while in prison had he ever suggested U.S. should not recognize this Greek government, nor would he now. In his view delicate task for U.S. would be to work with present regime while letting Greeks know our purpose is to urge country toward restoration of constitutionalism. I noted this is precisely posture we developed after April 21 coup.
9. I noted that in U.S. Andreas would find American public opinion toward Greece sharply divided, with important elements of academic community taking different line from other significant groups such as major Greek-American organizations. On how best to deal with present situation, Andreas again said he had been doing much thinking in prison, and that we could count on him not to exacerbate policy attitudes in U.S. He recognizes that present regime is well in saddle, that any immediate opposition would seem likely to be generated only by more extreme elements within revolutionary group, which would be worse than present leadership, and that restoration of constitutional patterns might take long time. I mentioned Turkish experience of plebiscite on first anniversary of military takeover in 1960, followed by elections six months thereafter and then for some time by a civilian government under shadow of military veto before parliamentary institutions firmly reestablished. While Greece is not Turkey, I hazarded view this country might be in for similar process. If constitutional referendum held within next six to eight months and first elections within year thereafter, this would not necessarily be bad. Andreas commented that process should not be allowed to lag too long but also that there danger in trying to push it too fast because junior officers might react to strong pressures by refusing to permit any progress at all. He felt present group, despite its power position, is insecure and uncertain. Because of this, I said we had for some time felt it important that the regime commit itself to constitutional progress at least one step at a time. Now a constitutional draft had been produced practically within promised six months framework, and inclusive dates had been announced within which referendum would be held. This constitutes progress of sorts though we can make no substantive judgments about prospects without seeing constitutional draft as produced by Mitrelias Commission and as revised by government. Before chance to appraise rigidity or liberality of government's draft, I personally would doubt wisdom of pressing for fixed date for elections. Andreas said he agreed fully.
10. The Papandreous promised to let me know as soon as they get definite word about his passport. Department will be advised when visa application received.
Talbot
354. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, January 11, 1968, 1150Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Limdis.
3129. Ref: State 95291./2/
/2/In telegram 95291 to Athens, January 9, the Department of State recognized the "difficulties caused" by the U.S. posture but stated it hoped to use the irregular nature of the diplomatic relationship to apply pressure on the Greek regime. The telegram instructed Talbot to seek an informal meeting with Pipinelis. (Ibid., POL 16 GREECE)
1. In response to intimation I would be glad see him privately and informally, FonMin Pipinelis invited me to his home January 10. We talked two hours, covering both Cyprus (septel)/3/ and Greek domestic situations. Pipinelis was as friendly and forthcoming as he had been during our intensive discussions in November and early December. He grasps our concerns about status and intentions of current GOG and I believe will be helpful in Cabinet discussions.
/3/Telegram 3131 from Athens, January 11. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
2. Pipinelis first reviewed his own movements after moment at NATO Ministerial when he learned of King's attempted countercoup, whose illogicality had flabbergasted him. Papadopoulos telephoned him three times and King once in Brussels. En route home he stopped in Rome to see King, whom he found dispirited yet still defiant. Pipinelis urged King to return to Greece immediately, as Papadopoulos had proposed on day following King's departure. King's refusal was mistake, in Pipinelis view.
3. On return to Athens Pipinelis found reorganized government already proceeding with business and committed to pursuing agreement with Turkey. Pipinelis agreed to continue in government because he believed its leaders were sincere in their announced intentions to cleanse country and restore parliamentary rule. He still believes they are. Indeed, his relations with governmental leaders have become not only friendly but even easier than with his colleagues in Kanellopoulos government last year.
4. I told Pipinelis we regret even temporary break in close and cordial relations we have enjoyed with Greece for many years. We continue to regard our association with Greek ally as important, and I personally am confident way can be found over present barriers to resumption of normal business. It was in that spirit that I had wished to discuss situation with him.
5. As background to questions I wanted to pose, I described repugnance found in United States to idea of any military takeover in Europe in 1960's, extra difficulties caused us by apparent withdrawal of Royal umbrella that had more or less legitimized April 21 revolutionary government, and uncertainties being expressed in US about reality of constitutional progress. I noted that many of those who would most strongly oppose any USG decision to work normally with present GOG were drawn from same circles as opponents of President's Viet-Nam policy and that this added sensitivity to problem. In these circumstances it would be helpful if we could be enlightened on specific plans accepted by GOG for constitutional advance as well as precise information on status of King and Regent in relation to government.
6. In response Pipinelis made following comments:
(1) Constitutional draft. Draft produced by Mitrelias commission was surprisingly close to Karamanlis draft constitution of 1963, he said. In basic concepts it introduced few--too few, in Pipinelis view--changes from existing Constitution. Any fair-minded person would call it not only democratic but liberal. After draft was presented to government December 23, copies were circulated to Ministers with instructions to make comments in writing by January 6. This had now been done. Pipinelis himself had recommended inter alia some changes designed to draw higher quality persons into Parliament. He does not yet know what others have recommended. He believes Ministerial proposals would be studied very rapidly and is fairly confident that a final draft will be promulgated in near future--meaning some weeks rather than months. I commented on rumors that government has now decided to hold back plebiscite until last possible date mentioned by Papadopoulos, September 15. Pipinelis responded that on contrary he believes GOG would find a way to hold plebiscite perhaps not on first declared date, April 21 (which is Orthodox Easter), but near then. I told Pipinelis it would be helpful to us to be able to see Mitrelias constitution. He took note.
(2) Date of elections and initiation of parliamentary government. Pipinelis thinks leaders themselves have not yet settled on date of initial elections. Many uncertainties remain, such as whether revolutionary Ministers will create their own political movement and run for office. Moreover, in his view, it would be very serious mistake to set election date at this stage of present government. From moment elections declared, no matter how distantly, political elements in country would start jockeying for advantage and moral authority of present government would be lost. It always happens thus in Greece. But this would be great misfortune in present circumstances, because this government has much important work to accomplish before leaving office--work of cleansing and reconstruction that an ordinary political government would probably not have will or strength to tackle successfully. To Pipinelis, for allied governments to press for precise date for Greek election would be error both for foregoing reasons and because it is a superfluous issue. Once new Constitution adopted in national plebiscite, process of return to elected government would be automatic and irreversible. Comment: From Pattakos statement in interview with Bavarian radio correspondent (septel) and other sources, we understand that ultimate date for elections is integral part of struggle now under way in revolutionary committee between Papadopoulos/Makarezos and Ladas groups. This tug-of-war appears centered on kinds of revisions to draft Constitution which the hardliners are pushing (see Athens 3122, para 4)./4/
/4/Dated January 10. (Ibid., POL 16 GREECE)
(3) Relaxation of press restrictions and establishment of judicial proceedings for detainees. New press law being prepared. This very important, since Greece must have strong and independent press but cannot afford to go back to morass that was Greek journalism until last April. He could not say when law would be ready, but thinks it likely to come fairly soon. He had nothing specific to report on judicial process for detainees.
(4) Roles of King and Regent. For himself, Pipinelis said, it is apparent that government needs King and King needs government. Therefore, he should return soon. He has repeatedly and vigorously made this point to Cabinet. Papadopoulos has now taken firm line, however, that King should return to Greece but not now because of highly antipathetic feelings in army and general population.
Pipinelis has been unable to shake government leaders on this point, though he still trying. But this is domestic Greek issue. It is true there was a fault in manner of inducting Regent but this was due to force of circumstances and is domestic question not affecting government's support of monarchy or acceptance of Constantine as King. If any other government has legal problems, it should be enough for that government to perceive that King has explicitly addressed leader of this government as Prime Minister and thus has implicitly also accepted Regent who swore him in. Moreover, if another government should agree that King's role continues important, question is whether it can better help persuade GOG of this fact by avoiding contacts or by reopening working relations. He would strongly argue for latter as more fruitful course. Pipinelis added that question of King's return is exclusively matter of timing. Neither side has put up conditions that it would be difficult for other to accept. Once decision made on date of King's return, it would be simple to find a formula to suit interests of both him and government.
7. Pipinelis concluded with statement whose import was that he hopes USG can see way clear to restoration of normal business while there still time to influence present group constructively. He sees no reason to make prominent announcement of resumption of business. It would be possible just to pick up quietly again where matters had left off. This was what German Ambassador had done in calling on him day or two ago, and he hoped others might do it as well.
8. I mentioned having heard rumor that Papadopoulos is under pressure from his associates to make speech this weekend critical of posture of allies and pointed out it would be regrettable if public statement by high official should further complicate already difficult situation at this stage. Pipinelis understood, and promised to speak to Papadopoulos. I also mentioned that in situation like present one we find ourselves approached by variety of volunteer intermediaries, as presumably does GOG. One current example is Tom Pappas, who is understandably worried by interruption of direct communication between our two governments. While we appreciate desire of others to be helpful I would like GOG to understand Embassy is not using any non-official as intermediary but prefers to give and to get its impressions in direct contact with leading GOG personalities. Pipinelis took note of this as well.
9. We agreed to be ready to meet again in weeks ahead at instance of either of us.
Talbot
355. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, January 12, 1968, 0730Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Ottawa, USUN, and the Mission to NATO.
1137. Reference: Ankara 3187./2/ Subject: Cyprus planning.
/2/Telegram 3187 from Ankara, January 9, discussed possible U.S. responses to preclusive moves by either Greece or Turkey in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
1. Ambassador Hart's point that delay in US initiative creates opportunities for both Greek and Turk Cypriots to make moves that narrow negotiating room is well taken. In fact, establishment of TCPA represents just such a preclusive move by Turks-Turk Cypriots.
2. Whether GOC redrafting of Constitution which now underway is designed as preclusive move or not is moot. Certainly there are those within GOC (including, we suspect, Kyprianou) who will prefer unilateral use of redrafted Constitution, no doubt with appropriate bows in direction of Galo Plaza report, as propaganda and negotiating ploy.
3. Less cynical (and probably less likely) interpretation is that Makarios is sincere in his comments to Ambassador that exercise in which GOC now engaged is one of putting thoughts, including autonomy for Turk Cypriots, into revised Constitution which will be advanced as negotiating document and not unilateral initiative. Makarios' desire to use UN forum and his need to be ready for SYG's good offices make preparation of working paper consistent with this interpretation.
4. Experience indicates that we should incline to cynical interpretation. Fact that GOC working on revised Constitution leaked to press reinforces view that GOC does intend to proceed in unhelpful manner to rally public support for new Constitution before any talks with Turks-Turk Cypriots can begin./3/
/3/In telegram 1152 from Nicosia, January 12, the Embassy reported that Makarios had called for Presidential elections. The telegram evaluated his speech announcing this decision to renew his mandate as a "sincere" effort to improve the situation on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
5. In any case, sooner U.S. offer of good offices made and opportunities for unilateral initiatives foreclosed the better. If Makarios' redrafted Constitution contains serious elements of compromise, it can always be used in context U.S. good offices effort.
Belcher
356. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, January 13, 1968, 1:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rockwell, cleared in substance by Katzenbach, and approved by Battle. Repeated to the Mission to NATO and Rome.
98446. For Ambassador.
1. We have decided to move in the near future to a working relationship with the regime in Athens. Our plan is first to consult during the coming week in Washington with NATO reps/2/ and then to authorize you to pay a formal call on Pipinelis. Formal contact with Junta Ministers would not be authorized for time being but is envisaged as following step.
/2/In telegram 98588 to Athens, January 15, the Department of State reported that Rockwell had begun a round of meetings with representatives of the NATO allies to explain the change in the U.S. position. (Ibid., POL 15-1 GREECE)
2. Decision is based on fact regime in control of country, belief we have extracted as much benefit as we likely obtain from present policy, and fact we have interests in Greece which require attention.
3. We do not intend make formal announcement, and will seek avoid publicly discussing question of whether we have recognized GOG. We plan say we resuming working relationship based on de facto situation of control.
4. During your future meetings with FonMin you should continue press for progress toward constitutionalism.
5. If you believe it would be helpful you authorized informally convey to FonMin, without awaiting occasion of formal call, acknowledgment of message which PriMin sent to President via private channel. Text being sent you separately./3/
/3/The Prime Minister's letter is printed as Document 350. In telegram 3248 from Athens, January 19, Talbot suggested that the appropriate line of approach would be a direct response from the President. (Ibid., POL GREECE-US) In response to a January 19 memorandum from Rostow outlining Talbot's reasoning, President Johnson wrote: "OK Talbot call on PM. Isn't this sufficient." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 3) In telegram 101277 to Athens, the Department of State authorized Talbot to convey orally to Papadopoulos an acknowledgement of his letter and to state the President would soon reply. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US) In telegram 3246 from Athens, January 19, Talbot reported that Papadopoulos had been informed by an Embassy official. (Ibid.)
6. In light above we believe it preferable you remain Athens for time being.
7. At luncheon with Palamas January 15 Battle will be generally encouraging re US-GOG relationship./4/
/4/In telegram 100451 to Athens, January 18, the Department of State reported that Rockwell had called in the Greek Ambassador on January 15 and explained the proposed changes in the U.S. position toward Greece. (Ibid., POL 15-1 GREECE)
Katzenbach
357. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, January 16, 1968, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Folsom and approved in S on February 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Review of the Cyprus Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Cyprus:
Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou
Ambassador Zenon Rossides, Permanent Representative to UN
Mr. Andreas Jacovides, Director of Political Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia
Mr. Costas Papademas, Counselor, Cyprus Embassy
U.S.:
The Secretary
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. William J. Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Robert S. Folsom, Country Director, Cyprus Affairs
Foreign Minister Kyprianou opened the conversation by stating that he wished to acquaint the Secretary with his views on the Cyprus situation and to learn in turn the Secretary's views. He said the Cypriot Government has sought seriously to find a solution since the November crisis within the framework of procedures established by the Security Council debate. He added that the Cypriot Government has always sought a solution within the UN context and that since the end of the Galo Plaza mediation this effort has been made through the Secretary General.
We are now faced, he said, with a situation in which the Cyprus Government supports the Secretary General's initiative on both long-term and short-term solutions, but that the Turks are seeking to restrict discussion to "internal security" matters which they say must precede any long term discussions and even then such long term discussions should be outside of the UN.
Cyprus, he said, cannot separate internal security from external security though the Government is prepared to start with internal security matters while working for a package deal. Prerequisites he said are (1) removal of Greek Cypriot fears of an attack from outside, and (2) removal of the fear of the Turk-Cypriot minority. He said his Government had presented the Secretary General with four points as comprising the basis of the Cyprus Government plan:
1. A guarantee against external attack.
2. Complete withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops including the contingents.
3. Disarmament of all Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot forces, leaving only the police and UNFICYP.
4. Discussion of arrangements for effective internal security.
Adoption of these four points, he said, should remove the fear of all parties concerned.
The Secretary pointed out that a guarantee against external aggression may be necessary but may not be possible.
Mr. Kyprianou responded that as long as there is danger of external attack there is increased danger of internal incidents and that if the guarantee is necessary, a way must be found to make it possible. He then said he wished to note new developments: (1) the untimely establishment of the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration (TCPA), established by the Turk Cypriots and Turkish Government officials, which has disturbed the possibilities for internal improvement and evidences continued plans for partition; (2) the decision of President Makarios to seek a new mandate and to offer new solutions for the Cyprus problem to be offered to the Secretary General (these steps, he said, have been necessitated by the aftermath of the crisis and the withdrawal of Greek troops); and (3) a Turkish Aide-m?moire addressed to the UNSYG on the subject of current UN negotiations on Cyprus./2/
/2/Reference is presumably to a January 8 Turkish communication to the Secretary-General. (U.N. Docs. S/8330 and S/8331)
Mr. Kyprianou said that his Government took a negative view towards the Aide-m?moire, because it fails to deal with the external danger to Cyprus, makes no mention of withdrawal of Greek or Turkish national contingents, and deals only with internal security, and even in this, tends to affect the substance of the problem by appearing to lead towards partition. He said the Cypriot response to the Aide-m?moire was being postponed until after his talk with the Secretary.
The Secretary asked if bilateral Turkish-Cypriot talks had been considered.
Mr. Kyprianou agreed that the real question lay between Cyprus and Turkey, but said his Government prefers to deal through the UNSYG. He noted that the issue no longer was enosis, but the independ-ence of Cyprus and the rights of the Turkish minority--a fact which the Turks recognize, while at the same time, they do not want to confirm their recognition of the Cyprus Government.
The Secretary then asked how Mr. Kyprianou saw the question of guarantees.
Mr. Kyprianou said this was a very difficult problem, while suggesting: (1) a special Security Council resolution of guarantee, (2) a U.S. or other single nation guarantee, or (3) a multi-party guarantee; he noted his preference for (1).
The Secretary then asked whether UNFICYP would be required for a protracted period.
Mr. Kyprianou said that even if demilitarization could be completed, the presence of UNFICYP would be required, on a reduced scale, in a symbolic sense until a final solution was achieved.
The Secretary asked how the viability and rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority could be assured.
Mr. Kyprianou replied that this could be achieved along the lines of the Galo Plaza report though not so identified because of Turkish objections.
The Secretary asked if Makarios' reference to the Turkish Cypriot "Community" was significant.
Mr. Kyprianou said use of the word "community" was not significant, that the word was used frequently, that what his government objected to was any reference to "two communities" so implying separation or equality. His government, he added, was ready to apply full guarantees and was willing to accept international guarantees for the minority, but Turkey was unwilling.
Mr. Sisco, after being called on by the Secretary, said that our role in the UN to date has been to support the SYG and that we have felt it best to concentrate on the internal problem as a means of achieving lasting peace and creating the right atmosphere for peace.
Mr. Kyprianou insisted that the internal problem is part and parcel of the whole, that the National Guard, for example, cannot be dismantled without assurances of a guarantee from external attack and withdrawal of the two national contingents. He asserted that a vacuum had been created by the withdrawal of Greek troops and that this vacuum must be filled. He said his government had done much towards normalization and pacification already but cannot go all the way to disarmament without taking care of external dangers first. He said informal talks with Mr. Vance had clarified that withdrawal of Greek troops is only the first step so there must be a second step, but that the Turks deny this, saying the national contingents are not concerned. He dismissed the Turkish assertion that its national contingent is part of the London-Zurich settlement by asserting: (1) that they had violated the Agreement by moving their troops and (2) in any case, that they were not obliged to keep any troops on Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee. He then quipped "What we need is a guarantee against the guarantors", stating his inability to see why the Turks could object to a formula embracing neither enosis nor partition.
The Secretary asked what will happen when the SYG sees the Cypriot reply to the Turkish Aide-m?moire.
Mr. Kyprianou said he expected that either the SYG would continue his negotiations in an effort to find common ground or call a Security Council meeting. He then asked if the U.S. supports the SYG's good offices and whether the U.S. has proposals for him.
The Secretary noted that in good offices proposals are usually not made and, that when made, are offered very quietly in an effort to bring the two parties together.
Mr. Kyprianou asked whether if a quick agreement on the external and internal security issues cannot be reached, the substance of the problem might not be attacked. In this respect, he noted that President Makarios is proceeding along these lines.
In reply to a series of questions posed by the Secretary, Mr. Kyprianou clarified that the Cyprus elections are scheduled for February 25, that the Turks can take part in the elections under the 1965 law, but that they do not have to, that he did not expect violence in the elections, that only the office of President will be at issue and that if opposition candidates wish to run, they must announce their candidacies by February 15.
Mr. Sisco asked if there was any way out of the current ban on ambassadorial contacts with the Turkish Cypriot leaders in the TCPA, pointing out that the situation requires such contacts.
Mr. Kyprianou said the issue is delicate, that he would hope that the Turks could be convinced to abandon the TCPA--that if what they say is true, all they need is a committee, not an "administration" including Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, etc.
Mr. Handley asked if contacts were possible, if it was clear that these were not with the TCPA as such.
The Secretary asserted that it was not very agreeable for Ambassadors to be told that they can't have contacts with others and suggested that maybe we should tell Ambassador Rossides not to have certain contacts here. He stressed that such a ban is contrary to diplomatic custom, except behind the Iron Curtain, and stated his hope that the Foreign Minister would take steps to correct the situation.
Ambassador Rossides interjected that since all agreed that establishment of the TCPA was a faux pas and since it was deprecated from all sides, the Turks might be persuaded to "climb down" eliminating Foreign Affairs, Defense, etc.
The Secretary replied that, due to the ban, we have no Ambassadorial contacts.
Ambassador Rossides then suggested that we talk to the Turks in Ankara.
Mr. Kyprianou next quoted from the past to prove that Kuchuk does not speak for the Turkish Cypriots and that authoritative statements can come only from Ankara. He went on to point out that the Turkish Government refers to the Cypriot Government as the "Greek Cypriot Administration" and to the TCPA as the "Turkish Cypriot Administration", so trying to equate their roles.
The Secretary, at this point, said the U.S. has much more serious problems with Turkey than this and reemphasized the seriousness of the ban, adding that we will be in touch on this matter further.
He then asked what Mr. Kyprianou wanted from us with regard to the SYG's negotiations.
Mr. Kyprianou replied by asking what should be done if negotiations failed to develop and whether a Security Council meeting should be called.
The Secretary said he didn't believe a meeting of that type with debates would deal effectively with solutions.
Mr. Sisco said that it is necessary for the Greek Cypriots to talk to the Turkish Cypriots and that it is inappropriate for us to become involved with the SYG's negotiations at this point. He stressed the need for progress, noting that an impasse might cause a new crisis, that the UNFICYP mandate expires March 26 and that the troop contributors are restive.
The Secretary, noting that the Greeks invented diplomacy, asked if it were not possible for two private individuals to get together for talks.
Mr. Sisco inquired as to Cypriot delegation's contacts with the Turkish delegation.
Mr. Kyprianou replied that contacts were only informal, but were not excluded, even talks with the Turkish Foreign Minister.
The Secretary observed that we will remain in touch with the situation and wish to be helpful. He then asked if the Turkish Aide-m?moire was public and how the Cypriots would reply to it.
Mr. Kyprianou said it was not public and that depending on how the SYG posed it, they might reject it outright or reject it leaving the door open for further discussion.
The Secretary asked whether if the SYG proposed Turkish-Cypriot talks, the Cypriots would agree.
Mr. Kyprianou said yes, they would.
Ambassador Rossides then brought up the subject of the TCPA again, remarking that it was unfortunate, too formal and a cloak for a "'government" administration.
The Secretary stated that we were not informed about it in advance and would have counselled against it had we known in advance.
Mr. Kyprianou again said that if the TCPA is what the Turks claim, it could be reorganized as a committee. He went on to say that a logical solution to Cyprus must be found, that the mere expectation that one side or the other would reject a solution must not be allowed to jeopardize a solution and that a breakthrough to a logical solution is necessary. This he described as an independent unitary state with rights for the Turkish minority or community. The solution, he said, cannot include both independence and no independence, Greek-Turkish involvement and Greek-Turkish non-involvement, nor any other seeds of division. He asserted that, while the Turks officially reject partition, they always work towards this end and that partition cannot solve the problem.
The Secretary asked whether if all the Turkish Cypriots had lived in one area, federation could have been possible.
Mr. Kyprianou simply replied this is not the case.
The Secretary then asked, since geographical division is not possible, whether some form of vertical division is possible, noting that a "unitary state" implies to the Turks their own disappearance.
Mr. Kyprianou asserted that equal rights for all plus special rights for the Turk-Cypriots is possible, but that Cyprus cannot go back to the London-Zurich settlement, that the seeds of division must be removed.
The meeting closed with the Secretary emphasizing that we will keep in close touch with developments.
358. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 17, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by McFarland and cleared by Folsom, Rockwell, and Battle.
SUBJECT
Strategy for Negotiation of a Cyprus Settlement
Recommendation:
That you approve our taking an active part in promoting an early settlement of the Cyprus dispute, by supporting mediation efforts by the United Nations Secretary General or by taking steps that would involve us directly in the mediation process./2/
/2/There is no indication on the source text whether the President approved or disapproved the recommendation.
Discussion:
In the last four years we have twice intervened diplomatically to stop a Greek-Turkish war from developing out of the Cyprus dispute. For the last several years, we have refrained from involving ourselves substantively in the issue, preferring the parties to reach agreement among themselves.
After Cyrus Vance's skilled mediation last November succeeded by the narrowest of margins, we have concluded that a new effort must be made to reach a permanent solution of this dangerous problem, and that a major role for the U.S. in this effort is indicated.
Shortly after the November crisis ended, a Cyprus Study Group, headed by former Ambassador Charles W. Yost, was formed to make recommendations on how the United States could aid in bringing about a settlement. The group's recommendations, which are attached,/3/ have been approved by the Interdepartmental Regional Group headed by Assistant Secretary Battle and by the Senior Interdepartmental Group under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Katzenbach.
/3/Entitled "Strategy for Negotiation of a Cyprus Settlement," not printed.
The basic recommendation that emerged is that the United States Government do all in its power to bring about a long-term Cyprus settlement. We believe that the risk of war has increased to the point that our interests are served best by actively promoting an early solution, despite the resentment that our role could conceivably produce in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. The parties are still very far apart, and it may well be that only the United States has the influence to bring them together. Chances of settlement are now somewhat better than before the November crisis.
Our first step would be to consult with the British and Canadian Governments, which also are strongly interested in settling the Cyprus dispute, and with the United Nations Secretary General, who has already begun discussions with representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Depending on the Secretary General's plans for continuing his discussions and his prospects for success, we would then follow one of two courses: strong support for United Nations mediation of a long-term settlement, or support for its mediation of interim measures while we take over the search for a long-term settlement. In the latter case, we would review the situation again before appointing a United States mediator.
Because the need for action is urgent, we would like to begin the course of action recommended by the paper as soon as possible.
Dean Rusk
359. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. At the beginning of the meeting, President Johnson noted that it had originally been called to deal with the Cyprus question but that the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo necessitated a briefing on that matter as the initial order of business.
SUBJECT
NSC Meeting Held January 24, 1968, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Treasury, Henry H. Fowler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance
Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach
Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze
Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow
Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith
White House Press Officer, George Christian
White House Press Officer, Tom Johnson
Nathaniel Davis
Harold H. Saunders
[Here follows discussion of the Pueblo incident.]
II. The President, in introducing a discussion of the Cyprus problem, welcomed Mr. Vance to the Council table and said he wanted to thank him publicly for his efforts last November and December in avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey. He then asked Mr. Battle to summarize the problem for the Council.
Mr. Battle said that, while Mr. Vance's mission had saved us from war, the Cyprus problem remains. New small incidents occur weekly which heighten tension on the island. Next time it will be impossible to hold Turkey back, especially while the Greek internal situation is what it is. Ambassador Yost had reviewed the situation after Mr. Vance's return. He concluded--and the IRG and SIG have concurred--that the situation is unstable and that it is important that we be ready to move in if required. Via the Vance mission, we have involved ourselves again in the Cypriot problem. The UN is now discussing how to tackle the long range problem and we must let the UN effort run its course, but we are not optimistic about what U Thant can achieve and should not let him fail without having something of our own ready to put in his place. Mr. Battle concluded by saying that he did not want to step into this problem, but he felt we had no choice but to be ready.
Mr. Helms noted that the Greeks have withdrawn their troops as agreed with Mr. Vance, although there are still some 1500 on the island as a regular part of the National Guard. He noted that the Greeks claim that 300 Turk officers remain in a similar capacity. There is still no inter-communal cooperation. Makarios' declaration of a Presidential election at the end of February might further inflame the situation./2/ In sum, the situation is still extremely uneasy.
/2/Makarios made the announcement of elections in a January 12 national radio broadcast.
In response to the President's request, Mr. Vance summarized his feelings as follows: "The situation is still held together with paste and glue, and more paste than glue." If it flares up again, war cannot be avoided. The majority of Turks had wanted to go to war in November. The Greek people felt humiliated and many of them are anxious for a chance to have a go at the Turks. The Cypriots are fatalistic.
He believed that the US should take an active role in trying to achieve a settlement. The pace of the problem is quicker than the pace of the UN Secretary General. He hopes the problem can be solved within the framework of the UN, but he is "not sanguine."
Mr. Sisco agreed that the UN would not be able to do the job. He noted one slight opening in the last 24 hours--that Makarios has apparently agreed to discuss his own draft Constitution with the Turkish Cypriots. He shared the prediction that U Thant would be at the end of his road in a few days. The President asked whether there is more that Ambassador Goldberg could do. Mr. Sisco said the Ambassador had made clear his support of the Secretary General and had urged Cypriots and Turks to get together. He pointed out, however, that the Turks distrust U Thant. The Cypriot Foreign Minister wants to tie the pacification efforts envisioned in the Vance agreement to replace the withdrawn Greek troops with Cyprus' protection against Turkish invasion. The Turks want to concentrate on pacification alone.
Mr. Sisco pointed out that the governments contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force are restive and may be reluctant to renew their contributions when the current mandate for the force expires at the end of March unless there is some progress in further implementing the Vance agreement and moving toward a more permanent arrangement.
Secretary Rusk noted that it is time for serious talks with the Turks and Cypriots. He hoped we could move some diplomatic chips in before the next crisis--before we "get to the end of the road."
Under Secretary Katzenbach agreed that the time fuse is shorter than the UN process. He noted that we are concerting with the Secretary General in order to avoid being blamed for his failure.
In response to the President's request to summarize, Mr. Battle said that we would be in touch with the Secretary General and the parties concerned over the next few days. However, we would like to get our mediator appointed and briefed quietly in order to have him ready to step in the moment he was needed.
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
Harold H. Saunders
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