Documents 273-301
The Military Coup in Greece and the Initial U.S. Response
April-September 1967
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 21, 1967, 1123Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash. Received at 6:33 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA at 6:55 a.m.
4753. This is Country Team message.
1. On basis still fragmentary information I have formed tentative impression that coup was triggered this morning by small army group not including High Command, King or civilian political leaders. Service Chiefs of Staff, faced with question of whether they would cooperate, all appear to be joined and to be actively participating in planning next steps. Military command seems united and now fully committed to coup. King also appears no longer to fear possible arrest as he did when Defense Attach? talked with him at 0415 local time/2/ but rather to have joined with military leadership in considering where to go next. Presumably he was asked about military leadership and all have emphasized their fidelity to King and to NATO.
/2/Telegram 4746 from Athens, April 21, reported that the Defense Attach? had called Tatoi Palace at approximately 5 a.m. to "find out what was going on." King Constantine answered that he had no clear idea of what was happening, adding: "They are headed this way for me. Get word to Sixth Fleet. Get word to Washington and have them send your army in." (Ibid.)
2. We have been told most members of Kanellopoulos government in protective custody. Andreas Papandreou reported in local military prison.
3. Because we had heard rumors that some political prisoners might suffer harm, I had Chief JUSMAGG and Defense Attach? call on General Papadatos to convey messages any such actions would greatly increase complications of already complicated situation.
4. So far as we know, Athens, Thessaloniki, Crete and all other parts of the country are quiet now.
5. I see no present indication of resistance to the coup./3/
/3/In a memorandum for the President, April 21, Rostow outlined the fragmentary evidence available and commented that "the immediate question is what we say. At some point, I feel we should express regret--even if softly--that democratic process has been suspended." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)
Talbot
274. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 21, 1967, 1610Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Confidential. Received at 12:36 p.m.
4769. 1. Margaret Papandreou's father, Mr. Chant, and her friend Mrs. Schacter, came into the Embassy for the second time today and were received by Amb./2/
/2/Telegram 4740 from Athens, April 21, reported that Mrs. Papandreou, her son George, her father, and another person had come to the Embassy to report the seizure of Andreas and George Papandreou. (Ibid.)
2. They referred to fact Article 18 of Constitution (which forbids executions for political crimes) and fact rumors exist that some of political prisoners might be disposed of before morning. Under these circumstances they, as well as Margaret, are acutely apprehensive about Andreas' fate. They also referred to fact that Margaret and her children are American citizens and inquired whether Ambassador was in position to give any particular guidance concerning their actions.
3. Amb said Emb had been following situation as closely as we could but that our information still extremely limited by inaccessibility of persons involved, fact telephonic communications had been cut, and that circulation in city had been prohibited. He informed them he had already conveyed to Greek military (Athens 4753)/3/ his conviction that bloodshed and violence would not only have most unfortunate implications for evolution of the Greek situation but could be expected produce serious repercussions outside of Greece, especially in US. Amb. observed we had been informed that King had not in fact signed emergency decree suspending certain articles of Constitution and that as far as we aware meeting between King and senior military officers still continuing. This suggests to us serious disagreement does in fact exist.
/3/Document 273.
4. Chant and Schacter appeared highly skeptical that coup may have been staged without King's approval. Chant commented if Andreas were executed there would without question be revolution in which many people would lose their lives. He said that in light seriousness situation Margaret believed some word of admonition from Pres. Johnson would be appropriate.
5. Ambassador expressed sympathy for their anxieties regarding personal safety of Andreas. He again assured them US has and would by every means discourage Greek military leaders from any resort to violence or bloodshed and to an appreciation of serious damage which would result both within Greece and in Greece's relations with other countries.
6. Comment: Ambassador has in fact instructed all official American representatives seeking establish contact on various levels with Greek military to emphasize that bloodshed will make an already tragically complicated situation infinitely more so./4/
/4/In telegram 4841 from Athens, April 23, the Embassy reported it had "made numerous inquiries to determine welfare of both Papandreous" and to ensure they were unharmed. It was also ready to "extend protection" to the Papandreou family although it did not believe such action would be necessary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 GREECE)
Talbot
275. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 21, 1967, 2030Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to USCINCEUR, USDOCOSouth, the Secretary of Defense, and DIA. Received at 3:59 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA at 4:16 p.m. Rostow forwarded the substance of this telegram to the President at 6:30 p.m. in a memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)
4787. 1. King Constantine, blazingly angry, has just told me that neither he nor General officers control Greek army tonight. "Incredibly stupid ultra-rightwing bastards, having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster to Greece," he said.
2. According to King, government which he swore in tonight was forced upon him after five-hour rough session with coup leaders during which he had wrung sole concession that it be headed by civilian./2/ King believes Spandidakis generally aware of plan and easily agreed to go along with three officers who mounted coup (presumably those reported separately)./3/ King said he had contemplated shooting perpetrators when they came to Palace to be sworn in tonight, but concluded this would be worthless gesture as his Palace then surrounded by tanks loyal to them.
/2/King Constantine subsequently provided Talbot with a detailed account of his meetings with the coup plotters. Talbot reported this discussion in telegram 4794 from Athens, April 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE)
/3/Probably a reference to telegram 4767 from Athens, April 21. (Ibid.)
3. King is unsure of next developments. He asked how long it would take helicopters to reach Tatoi to evacuate his family if needed. He also asked whether any possibility U.S. Marines could be landed in Greece if necessary to help him and Generals reassert their control over armed forces. He expressed view Greek troops would not fire at U.S. Marines.
4. King also asked if I could make strongest d?marche to his new government to insist that it not only maintain order and protect civilians who have been arrested but also strictly follow orders of King. He proposed that I say "U.S. will hold King responsible for actions of this government and government responsible to King."
5. At King's request we have arranged and will attempt to maintain emergency communications directly with Royal Palace at Tatoi.
6. I have just talked with General Spandidakis and Nick Farmarkis, now his aide, and have obtained immediate appointment with new Prime Minister. I will assert that I am speaking on instructions and state we look to the government to maintain order, we insist that they open up communications for stranded Americans and call strongly upon government to restore normal life as rapidly as possible. With all force we call upon government to protect detainees from physical harm, and I will assert that United States, which gives Greece much assistance, will watch developments minutely. I will also express our support for role of King as Chief of State.
7. Important to hold King's comments closely at this time.
Talbot
276. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 21, 1967, 2330Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, DIA, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth. Received at 7:07 p.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, USIA, and NSA at 7:10 p.m.
4792. 1. By mutual request, I called 2200 local time on PriMin Kollias at his office in presence of Vice Premier and Def. Min. Gen. Spandidakis.
2. In introductory comment, PriMin asserted that today's developments were prompted by grave Communist threat to Greece and by decision of army to thwart this threat. Army has established complete control throughout country without any bloodshed. PriMin emphasized that purpose of his government is to protect freedoms of all Greeks and to restore normality as soon as possible.
3. Gen Spandidakis broke in to report, as we knew, that telephone communications have been restored and other communications would return to normal tomorrow. In response to my question regarding well-being of people arrested today, Spandidakis stated former PriMin Kanellopoulos, Papaligouras, and other people in ERE govt would be released tonight immediately after our conversation or at latest Saturday morning. He said that George Papandreou, but not Andreas, would also be released, although he did not specify when. Spandidakis assured me that none of detainees would be physically harmed.
4. I told PriMin that, acting on instructions from my government/2/ I must state (a) that we were deeply distressed by today's developments, including the use of American-furnished equipment to overthrow the constitutional government of Greece, and (b) that we will look to government to maintain order, open communications to stranded Americans, and restore normal life as rapidly as possible. Spandidakis reported that communications will be restored by tomorrow.
/2/In telegram 180319 to Athens, April 21, the Department of State approved the approach outlined by Talbot in telegram 4787 from Athens, Document 275. The telegram contained an estimate that U.S. helicopters could evacuate the Royal family within 36 hours of a request. It further instructed Talbot to disabuse the King of any notion of a U.S. military intervention, adding that it was "alarmed" by the tenor of Constantine's report to Talbot: "Admittedly he is not calling all the shots but riding herd on this faction of the Greek army and political spectrum would not seem to hold nearly the same dangers as he would have faced had an Aspida-type military team moved in." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 GREECE)
5. Gen. Eaton, who was with me, and I also expressed great concern over use of American-supplied equipment in today's coup. PriMin responded that he was also sorry that use was made of this mat?riel, but that action was absolutely essential in view of Communist threat. By Communist, he explained that he meant not only those who belong to extreme left but also those who "sympathize" with them. (In latter category he undoubtedly was thinking of Andreas.) PriMin asserted that, had military not acted, another Viet-Nam might have occurred in Greece and country might have fallen in Iron Curtain abyss. Neither Spandidakis nor PriMin was precise in explaining what exactly had happened to trigger coup.
6. I responded that I hoped (a) that if army was instrument of coup it would plainly be under control of senior military leaders not of junior officers, and (b) that new government would be completely loyal to and responsive to orders of King. PriMin and Spandidakis both alleged that government is devoted to King and strong supporter of NATO. They expressed hope that GOG, as in past, could count on support of US.
7. Asked about calling of Parliament into session, PriMin told me that Parliament could not meet until elections were held and that latter depended on developments. In any case, he hoped that normal conditions would soon be restored and that elections could be conducted at an early time.
8. Observing both Kollias and Spandidakis tonight, I was confirmed in my impression that PriMin is merely front-man and that real power rests with military. Question is which military./3/
/3/In an April 22 memorandum to the President, Rostow noted that continued U.S. silence on events in Athens, a position that Secretary Rusk had chosen, was creating major difficulties for the "Administration's posture before the intellectual and liberal communities in the U.S." Rostow nonetheless argued that for the present the United States should refrain from a public statement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)
Talbot
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 22, 1967, 0015Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 7:38 p.m. on April 21 and passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA at 7:50 p.m.
4795. I now recommend:
(1) That for present we continue fairly starchy posture toward new Greek Government but still stay in touch with it and not burn bridges by threatening cutoff of aid and other drastic measures unless government's performance in next few days is rough and rotten.
(2) That I attempt to stay in closest possible communication with King and that we rapidly canvass steps which could strengthen his hand, since King likely can prove principal focus for restoring normalcy. While I do not now expect situation to require emergency evacuation of Royal family, urgent response to King's request on helicopters would be practically and psychologically valuable./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 276.
(3) That our public and press posture reveal our regret and our distaste for process of changing governments by military coups but also reflect a certain slowness to pass moral judgments since there remain so many gaps in our understanding of what has happened and why./3/
/3/In telegram 4797 from Athens, April 22, Talbot commented: "So far as I perceive we have now completed reportage of the day of the rape of Greek democracy. I am certain that Greece will long rue this day's events, whose long range effects are hard to foresee." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE) Talbot's comments were reported to the President in an April 22 memorandum from Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)
Talbot
278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, April 22, 1967, 1:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Battle.
180648. For Ambassador.
1. In fast-moving situation facing King and yourself, we recognize we unable to give close and current guidance. However, following are basic points which we believe should govern King's actions and which we suggest you convey to him as opinion USG:
(a) We believe it essential that the King remain in Greece.
(b) We believe he should not depart from Greece except under duress.
(c) We think that his position vis-?-vis the military officers controlling the government is stronger than he appears to think and that he should use what we consider to be their considerable need for him to extract from them the maximum concessions.
(d) We think that his efforts vis-?-vis the coup officers should be toward reaching a compromise of type which will make it clear to Greek people that King has not capitulated but has forced military leaders to make significant concessions. We are not informed as to what other points may be at issue between King and the governing military group except the questions of suspension of articles of Constitution and the martial law decree. But there must be other matters, such as ratio of civilian vs. military in Cabinet, which could be used as bargaining points to off-set concessions which for example might be made regarding martial law decree. Latter concessions might involve limiting decree to specified time and moderating provisions calling for extreme restrictions on civil liberties.
(e) If King is concerned about safety his wife and would feel better if she could go somewhere else, we would be willing to help in this. We believe it would be preferable for her not to leave Greek soil.
(f) Finally, while we recognize that decision as to capitulation vs. resistance must be made by King alone, it is our view that if he capitulates he will have lost all opportunity for leadership. This does not mean that he may not have to compromise on some issues while showing his own stamp on the situation as he forces others to compromise, we would hope in as visible a manner as possible./2/
/2/In telegram 4836 from Athens, April 22, Talbot reported that the Embassy had tried to maintain contact in the last 24 hours with new regime "in order to exercise what influence we have toward more constructive second phase of coup than now appears probable unless coup group abandons its thuggery." He also reported Embassy contacts with Nikos Farmakis and Lieutenant General Spandidakis. (Ibid.)
Rusk
279. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 23, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. The time of transmission on the source text is illegible; the telegram was received at 3:29 p.m. Repeated to CINCEUR, USDOCOSouth, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and DIA. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
4856. 1. Sixty hours after coup Embassy estimates that new authoritarian government is solidly in control. Key is unity of army. New command appointments and military moods discerned by attaches and JUSMAGG strengthen belief that no significant opposition exists to present control of armed forces.
2. Chances of countercoup, never bright, have sunk hour by hour and now seem virtually nil. King, whose surprise at and opposition to coup is becoming increasingly widely recognized here, presumably is also recognizing coup as fait accompli.
3. Coup is revolutionary. Its central core--Papadopoulos, described as the top theoretician; Patakos, the top executive; and Makerezos--are limited, politically inexperienced, tough-minded, no-nonsense types setting out to "purify" Greek political, social and economic life. Their manifesto sounds like Ayub in 1958. Also like 1958 model Ayub, they declare themselves thousand percent pro-American and are urgently seeking any hint of American understanding of what they're doing. With or without it, they know they must succeed or lose their heads.
4. If military coup in this NATO country has demolished liberal political reputation of Greece, oddly enough failure of coup--once attempted--would have been even greater disaster. Coup effort pushed aside political moderates and conservatives (as represented by Kanellopoulos government and its supporters) who were duped not by their enemies but by group with roughly similar anxieties about strong leftist trends in Greece. Had coup failed, carrying conservatives and moderates down with it, only beneficiaries would have been far leftist segment of Greek political life. Greece would then have surely gone where rightists fear Andreas Papandreou was taking it.
5. While it is early to judge causes of coup, personality and policies of Andreas Papandreou may be prime reason Greece today is under dictatorship. King, moderate centrists and moderate conservatives had all been opposing ultra-rightist convictions that only the army could safeguard Greece from Communism. Andreas' style and the thrust of his threats to the Greek "establishment", particularly the armed forces, were alien to normal to-ing and fro-ing of Greek political life. Because they exceeded bounds of Greek political tolerance and therefore induced deepest distrust in rightist quarters especially the army, Andreas lost chance to move Greece in directions he favored.
6. These thoughts are historical footnotes. Question is what direction to take next. Until now Embassy has indicated readiness to stay in communication with new government and top military leadership but has coldly pointed out American reaction to overthrow of parliamentary government of a NATO ally by military establishment trained and equipped by Americans. We have been all but rude to Spandidakis and others in cross-examining their assertions that they and other properly constituted commanders are actually in control of army. Without predicting what policy lines United States might adopt we have spelled out possible consequences in short words. We have made sure arrival of Sixth Fleet task force group in Greek waters has not gone unnoticed by top people. If we haven't educated the mule, at least we have given it those knocks required to get its attention./2/
/2/In telegram 4901 from Athens, April 24, the Embassy reported "deep distress" on the part of the coup leaders to the "negative reaction" of the United States to their actions, and concern about possible employment of the Sixth Fleet against them. It also reported that the new government was "absolutely determined" to fulfill its goals. (Ibid.)
7. Now that we have its attention, what do we say? From our vantage point here, what is essential is to get Greece pointed again in direction of some kind of government with consent of governed. Obviously this government is not about to yield power to a political government. Therefore, question is one of transitional arrangements. One possibility is, for example, Vietnam pattern: a pledge by new government to proceed toward election of a constituent assembly which in turn would produce revised constitution subject to plebiscite. Another idea is establishment by fiat of a national constitutional council consisting of eminent jurists and others of unquestioned integrity and stature. Whatever the mechanism, avowed steps toward restoration of constitutional rule would give promise of way out from present dictatorial deadend.
8. There are fragmentary indications that new government is hunting for some such course. It badly needs cooperation and participation of responsible conservatives, at least. Latter (of whom former Foreign Minister Averoff and Bank of Greece Deputy John Pesmazoglu have already expressed their anxieties to me) could contribute to solution. Moreover, declaration of definite constitutional course by this government would enable King to identify himself with specific constructive purposes and thus bring him back into tolerable relationship with army and public life. This would also help to justify in eyes of American public opinion USG cooperation with coup government.
9. While maintaining stiffish attitude toward present government for time being, I propose unless Department objects to stimulate exploration of above ideas with key members of new government and with others who may be in a position to influence this regime. I also propose to suggest it to King as line worth considering to break current impasse./3/
/3/In telegram 181282 to Athens, April 24, the Department of State informed Talbot that military aid shipments to Greece would be discontinued for the time being and that "In sum, we should follow a policy of watchful waiting, and an attitude of coolness towards new govt while encouraging King vigorously to support move towards more viable government." (Ibid.)
Talbot
280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, April 24, 1967, 8:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Rockwell, cleared by Katzenbach, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Bonn for Secretary Rusk as Tosec 26.
181462. Your 4898./2/
/2/Telegram 4898 from Athens, April 24, requested guidance on policy toward the Greek regime and outlined the Embassy's views on that policy. (Ibid.)
1. We concur in continuation normal working relations with GOC at sub-ministerial level and that JUSMAG should pursue its normal contacts except for forward planning. We query need for long range planning at the moment and suggest that reluctance to engage in this might be advantageous tactic for us at this time.
2. We also concur that we like the King will need a modus vivendi with this Government but believe that establishment of ours should await establishment of his.
3. With regard to high level contacts we believe that for the moment these should be restricted to purpose of gathering information rather than for substantive discussion of future course GOG.
4. We entirely concur in your suggestions as to points we might put forward as basis our willingness to work with this regime but believe that we should hold off on going to bargaining table for moment, leaving it to King to press for broadening basis of Government. We hope that he will work to decrease extensive security measures now in force and continue encourage men of stature and ability to come into Government.
5. We anticipate increasing Congressional and public disapproval of association with this regime, to say nothing of collaboration with it, and that its use of MAP equipment in staging coup will be particularly sore point.
Katzenbach
281. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 25, 1967, 2300Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to Bonn for Secretary Rusk, USCINCEUR, USDOCOSouth, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, DIA, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, USIA, CIA, and NSA.
4942. 1. During 75-minute conversation at Tatoi this evening King Constantine appeared under considerably less strain than I had seen him at any time since coup. He thought meetings with Cabinet members yesterday had gone well. My net impression is that he is moving rapidly to adjust his relations with coup government and has moderate expectations of gradually regaining leadership of army and government.
2. According to his account, meeting with Cabinet group Monday evening went very satisfactorily. After berating coup instigators once again for having moved without his knowledge, he had told them: "Now you have done it and you are here. Now you must not fail." Patakos had replied that coup had already succeeded. King's response was that "not at all. You have succeeded in taking country, but unless you succeed in running it you have brought Greece to final disaster." He had then lectured them on need to get expert advice on economic and other problems and act constructively and effectively. Cabinet members had repeatedly insisted on their loyalty to King. In response to his repeated questions, they had also insisted that army is loyal him.
3. King said he had pressed Cabinet hard on need to demonstrate to Greece's allies that its goal is resumption of constitutional government. Drawing on points discussed earlier between him and me,/2/ he had told them that government must promptly set up some sort of constitution-drafting committee to prepare revised constitution that would be examined by government and then subjected to national plebiscite, after which elections could be held under new constitution. To his great satisfaction, they had agreed to announce this program. He had therefore consented to attend Cabinet meeting Wednesday at which he believed major item of business would be promulgation of new constitution-making process.
/2/Talbot reported on discussions with the King regarding treatment of the junta in telegram 4840 from Athens, April 23. (Ibid.)
4. I commented that main problem might be to obtain domestic and foreign credibility. It would be easy to announce such a scheme, but who would believe it? Perhaps Royal decree could be issued, committing both King and government to fixed process. King said he would pursue this line Wednesday.
5. I told King our main problem at moment is what sort of relations to have with coup government. While question of recognition does not arise, we remain exceedingly uncomfortable at having Greek ally under military dictatorship. Embassy is showing this discomfort in cool and reserved posture. Obviously, Americans would find it extremely difficult during this period to deliver tanks and similar major weaponry to regime which has used American-made tanks to overthrow established government. He would understand that this would have to be our posture until Greek Government itself sorts out its purposes and programs. Perhaps our rather stiff posture might even help him re-establish his Kingly position with this regime.
6. King agreed, adding that he hoped we would not get such an inflexible position that we could not respond if this government should demonstrate its readiness to return to constitutional rule. I commented that given public and congressional opinion, this was a risk, but that unless this government reached that state there was no prospect that American reserve would melt. King said he understood.
7. King said he had finally faced Cabinet with protracted question of unsigned decree declaring martial law and suspending certain articles of the Constitution. He had told Cabinet that government had acted without his signature, that he saw no sense in signing decree now and did not propose to do so. There had been no visible reaction, so he thought he probably had gotten away with this issue.
8. However, they insisted (Athens 4934)/3/ that his secretary, Major Arnaoutis, go abroad and he had agreed. This left him without staff. I suggested that anyone in his position needed some confidant, and expressed the hope that he would find someone who could effectively replace Ambassador Bitsios (who cravenly resigned at height of crisis) and Major Arnaoutis.
/3/Telegram 4934, April 25, reported on a meeting between the King and Colonel Papadopoulos and summarized the King's comments on the meeting and recent developments in the military. (Ibid.)
9. King said Cabinet members had told him government greatly needs his support and that public increasingly anxious because of stories he not in accord with regime. They asked him to show himself at Easter eve religious ceremonies next Saturday night and to take part in traditional egg-cracking frivolities in army barracks. He said this depended on whether army is truly loyal to him. He would reserve decision for some days until he could get better reading. They professed army absolutely loyal to King even though they and army commanders had acted without his knowledge last Friday morning, "but only to protect you, Your Majesty."
10. King said these are people inexperienced in government who include some really stupid types such as Farmakis, but that it now becomes his role to gain their confidence, persuade them that he is not plotting a counter-coup, get time to work on country's serious problems, and gradually reassert his authority. I commented that this is sort of program that would require his continuing to follow delicate path of neither embracing nor breaking with coup group, and taking advantage of their need of him at early stages to extract all vital concessions. He replied that he is type who gets giddy on tightrope but he will try.
11. I noted that since first night of coup I had not been in touch with Ministers of new government but that Prime Minister Kollias had summoned me for Wednesday morning. I said I was asking instructions (Athens 4941)./4/ He expressed hope I could talk with Prime Minister to reinforce King's line before Cabinet meeting./5/
/4/Telegram 4941, April 25, requested permission to respond favorably to Prime Minister Kollias' request for a meeting. (Ibid.)
/5/In telegram 182277 to Athens, April 25, the Department of State replied: "We have no objection to your seeing Kollias. Suggest you take this opportunity to ask regarding welfare of political prisoners and newspaper owners." (Ibid.)
12. I mentioned that Sixth Fleet task group is still in Aegean Sea though it has other chores. If situation easing, did he think it might be on its way? King replied that while government's true intentions may take two or three weeks to come out, he now is confident he and his family will stay in Greece. He would have no objection to departure of task group, though he would hope it could come back rapidly if situation should deteriorate. I said that we keep task groups always in Mediterranean, which isn't such huge sea after all.
Talbot
282. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 28, 1967, 2015Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USCINCEUR, and the Secretary of Defense. Passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, NSA, and USIA.
5016. 1. At his request/2/ I rendezvoused today with Brigadier Patakos, Minister of Interior. We met at the home of JUSMAGG officer with whom Patakos was associated at Fort Knox in early 1950's and has worked in recent months on questions related to armor training center which Patakos commanded. Initially somewhat reserved but later open, Patakos quickly expressed pro-American attitudes and identified his American connections. These include siblings in Sioux City, Iowa and Salt Lake City and two nephews who are officers in US Army, one a major in DOD/ASCI and the other a dental officer in Vietnam.
/2/Talbot reported the request and sought authorization for a meeting in telegram 4984 from Athens, April 27. The Department of State gave authorization in telegram 183174 to Athens, April 27. (Both ibid., POL 23-9 GREECE)
2. Patakos impressed me along lines we have heard him described. As military operator, precise and effective executive, who insists he is in a revolutionary movement but is himself no long-haired revolutionary theorist. Like other coup leaders, he had been working almost without sleep for a week, but was alert and energetic throughout our conversation. After leaving me, he was to meet King at Tatoi.
3. After somewhat slow conversational start, I proposed we might proceed by his commenting on questions that face USG as it attempts to understand what happened in Greece and to sort out its policy in relation to new situation. He would understand events of past week in Greece had come as great shock to us, and that in interest of looking to future it would be well to be frank and specific. Patakos agreed. He neither requested nor got any assurance about U.S. policy. In answering my questions, he commented on purposes of revolution, plans for constitution-writing, current status of detainees, and intentions toward political prisoners. He repeatedly referred to what has happened as "the revolution" and to present GOG as "the revolutionary government." He exuded confidence that revolution is irreversible fact, whether or not US finally accepts proffered hand of friendship. With consolidation effected, he emphasized current task is to look forward to running government and returning to constitutional rule.
4. Patakos assured me he sincerely desires friendship of America. He would be our friend even if we were not his. New GOG had not made deep or broad plans prior to the coup but had acted primarily to save situation in Greece which leaders felt was rapidly deteriorating. Now they are studying and planning to rectify all shortcomings they had earlier suspected. They had not known all specifics before, but now with opportunity to look into Ministries and other facets of government, they feel able to develop concrete programs. Demagogues had split the Greek people into factions and lawbreakers such as robbers and murderers could be found on the streets. Greeks had even seen individual biting ear of a policy official. Revolution has tried to unite country and cleanse Greek life. In his own Ministry he had found civil servants sitting all day doing nothing except drinking coffee. Now, like military, they have daily planning conferences at 7 a.m. New government wishes to be more responsive to public needs, and to bring tranquility to the people. It should restore their confidence in economic and political facets of Greek life.
5. We wasted little time on military aspects of takeover. As to ways in which his group will move to next phase of governmental operations, he had studied problems Ayub and Turkish military leaders had faced in managing government after their military takeovers, and would draw on their experience while adding essentially Greek approaches. With confidence born of one week's experience, he felt sure new GOG could operate Greece's official establishment much more effectively than had its predecessors.
6. I asked about role of King. He reaffirmed that King had known nothing about coup. He could not be a revolutionary, and therefore was kept out until it fait accompli. King remains as head of state and head of army, though not responsible for appointment of persons in government. (I do not feel remarks I was able to draw from Patakos fully illuminates what role new GOG expects to permit King to play. My tentative conclusion is that Patakos, like most traditional Greek politicians, views throne as useful unifying symbol, so long as King doesn't interfere too much in their affairs. This aspect will bear further watching.)
7. As to constitutional status, Patakos said Constitution has not been suspended. He stated flatly GOG will shortly set up constitution commission of eminent jurists who will determine what sort of Constitution Greece should have. They will draw on experience of other states, such as US. They will examine why Greece's affairs sank so low under existing constitution and what changes would be necessary to prevent repetition. Proposed revisions, or new Constitution, will be submitted to government and thence to plebiscite. Once adopted, new Constitution would provide framework for new elections. I asked how long this process would take. He did not know, would not guess, and declined to be drawn into comment on my speculation that it might take anything from a few months to a few years. I asked when constitution-making process would be announced. He said as soon as possible, which he defined as within next few days. I commented that this would be of considerable interest to my country, a nation deeply devoted to democracy, which after military takeovers in such countries as Pakistan, Turkey and South Vietnam had unfailingly and vigorously encouraged existing authorities to take steps that would lead their people back to constitutional and representative rule. Patakos said he understood this. Process could start quickly in Greece.
8. I asked about situation of detainees. Patakos was carrying a folder which he opened to reveal exact statistics and certain names that he was about to report to King. (He asked me not to transmit these to Washington until he had had chance to present them to King and Prime Minister. To help establish basis for continuing relations, we will telephone him tomorrow to get his approval for transmission of following statistics to Washington.) According to Patakos, up to April 26, 6,500 prisoners had been taken into custody and 1,701 subsequently released, leaving 5,437 still in custody. Of those, 1,558 had already been installed in camps on Island of Yioura and 1,727 were now being shipped in that direction by boat, leaving 2,152 still in detention on mainland. Some of these latter would be sent to camps being constructed on Yioura and on island of Makronisi.
9. For ease in handling, detainees being classified in three categories, "A","B," and "C". Investigation of these people does not look to misdeeds of long ago, presumably during the Communist war of 1946-49, but rather to their current records. Persons in "A" category would be quickly releasable if nothing adverse found. In "B" category are persons not easily determined to be releasable but also not well-known Communists or anarchists. These persons will be examined to determine whether they should be put in "A" or "C" categories. In "C" category are those individuals who are initially regarded as dangerous. If investigation proves otherwise, some of these too could be released. Others will be "instructed" and "re-educated" to become good citizens.
10. In addition, Patakos spoke of 25 "special class" detainees in Athens, 33 others in provinces, and 4 in "special economic class." These are being held in hotels or at home under guard. (Names he mentioned being transmitted separately.)/3/
/3/In telegram 5016 from Athens, April 28. (Ibid.)
11. Patakos said Andreas Papandreou is detained for two reasons. First, on charges of involvement in Aspida conspiracy, he is being investigated by public prosecutor (this confirms our understanding that GOG has decided to bring Andreas to civil trial on Aspida charges, which as we understand it could bring maximum sentence of 28 years). He is also being held because of his declarations that he would cause revolution. Patakos would not say that Andreas would be tried on these second charges. His summary response to my several questions was that Andreas would be held in detention until they could be satisfied that he would not attempt revolution. I concluded that GOG is thinking of dealing with Andreas on civil charges unless he gets disagreeable in which case he could be court martialed on second set of charges.
12. As to others, Patakos said Mitsotakis has now declared he is "with" government but leaders of revolution unconvinced./4/ He did not name economic detainees, but did not dissent when I said we had heard these include Professor Stratis Andreadis, Chairman of the Ionian Popular Bank and other financial and industrial institutions, and Bank's general manager. Patakos said heavy bank withdrawals on first days after coup had stopped suddenly when a few bankers detained.
/4/Telegram 4969 from Athens, April 26, reported that in his initial contact with a U.S. Government official Patakos had explained that the junta feared Mitsotakis would lead an insurrection in Crete. Patakos added that Mitsotakis had shown hostility to the new regime, but, as a fellow Cretan, he would try to secure his release. (Ibid.)
13. In response to my further questions, Patakos answered specifically that regime intends to kill no one. All such rumors, including recent stories of planned execution of Glazos (Athens 5013)/5/ are false. He warned however that saboteurs would be dealt with severely--whatever that means.
/5/Not found.
14. Patakos summarized by restating strong desire to work closely with Americans. Whether that possible or not he said, success of revolution is sure./6/ He expressed satisfaction at direct contact with me, and hoped we could continue to meet and deal frankly with new problems that might arise.
/6/In the conversation summarized in footnote 4 above, Patakos concluded: "Just remember, we are with you whether you want us or not." This comment was reported to Secretary Rusk in an April 27 memorandum from Battle. (Ibid.)
Talbot
283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, May 2, 1967, 7:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Rockwell, cleared in NEA, and approved by Battle.
186592. For Ambassador from Battle.
1. Would appreciate receiving your early views on where we go from here with new GOG, and how fast.
2. There is feeling here that King seems to be giving way too rapidly in his relationship with new regime and that perhaps he should be withholding more cards at this time in order be able ensure meaningful concessions.
3. There is also concern lest pressures within Greece for us to enter into normal relationship with regime result in our moving in that direction without having gained anything in return. We feel we must not permit our leverage to be dissipated thus.
4. Regime has made a number of appropriate statements with regard to its desire that Greece return to a constitutional situation but the timing of this development is of course left imprecise.
5. Meanwhile hostile pressures against the GOG are building up abroad and in this country, with urgent reference to the fate of political detainees but also based on a profound distaste for the coup regime.
6. Although we have spoken in general terms to the new leaders about need to lift restrictions on civil liberties and to establish goal of returning to constitutional normalcy, we have been precise so far only with regard to detained political figures. We have been pondering whether we should seek to pin regime down to a definite blueprint of political steps in direction of normalcy and if so what this blueprint should be and how soon we should put it forward. The price would probably have to be the relaxation of our restrictions on military aid and the commencement of normal relations with the GOG, with the resultant disadvantages for the U.S. image. We would of course have to satisfy ourselves that the regime meant what it said and that real progress in the direction indicated was likely.
7. We wonder whether it would be a good idea for you to discuss this whole question with the King in order to obtain his views. At same time you might wish to intimate that from the tactical point of view it might be better if the King should move more slowly in reaching an accommodation with government leaders.
8. It has also been suggested here that we might use our present leverage to try to push the GOG further in the direction of a Cyprus solution, perhaps by pressing for agreement on a sovereign Turkish base on the island, or perhaps on the transfer of Grivas. We doubt we have enough leverage to move the GOG very far on Cyprus, even should we decide to accept the disadvantages inherent in trying.
9. Most of these are difficult questions to judge with any sense of certainty, and we feel the need of your wise counsel in helping us consider them.
Rusk
284. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 5, 1967, 1130Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
5117. Ref: State 186592./2/ For Battle from Ambassador.
/2/Document 283.
1. We are keenly aware of fact we risk slipping into normal relationships with GOG without specific assurances of concrete progress toward reestablishment of democratic government in Greece. It would be equally foolhardy to break off all contacts when major interests are at stake. We try to walk the tightrope.
2. Our contacts with new government have been limited and exploratory. We have reported our conversations with Kollias, Spandidakis, Patakos and Makarezos. We expect to make contact with Papadopoulos shortly.
3. Our impression is that the coup leadership is pro-US, pro-NATO, rigorously if not fanatically anti-Communist. It apparently regards itself as revolutionary with a mission of cleansing and reorienting Greek economic, political and social life on new and wholesome basis. We find little evidence it believes its mission can be accomplished within a short period of time.
4. Since the coup, information has gradually become available indicating that coup group has existed in some form or other since 1957 under aegis of Papadopoulos. Group considered itself as reformist element whose objectives were to seize power and revitalize Greek institutions generally in line with principles which governed IDEA. They considered IDEA, however, to have lost its dynamism. According to reports, Papadopoulos has long been known as "Nasser" to some of his colleagues because of his intriguing nature and his concept of role which army under leadership of aggressive middle-grade officers could play in modernizing the Greek society.
5. This junta or revolutionary group is reported to have been comprised of about 40 officers. This group seems to consider King useful symbol with which it will cooperate but is unlikely to subject itself to his control. Although vast preponderance of Greek officers are probably genuinely loyal to King, coup leadership has moved swiftly to retire a number of senior officers. They have successfully established their members in many key commands and have exploited the natural tendency for the mass of the officer corps to be responsive to command channels. Army promotions to be made in next week or two will provide important evidence as to whether traditional hierarchy has regained measure of control or whether partisans of coup managers will be advanced to key positions without regard to seniority and fitness.
6. Our contact has been too limited to form a valid conclusion as yet whether this leadership will be prepared to divest itself voluntarily of the responsibilities of government in foreseeable future. Some observers believe Papadopoulos and perhaps other officers will eventually leave army and form new political party. However and whenever current phase terminates, Greek political life in future will be vastly changed in structure and personalities.
7. We are concerned about internal political implications of current situation and its impact on long term US position here even though coup was in fact greeted with certain amount of initial satisfaction by an undetermined portion of population disgusted with protracted political instability and low public morality.
8. It is difficult predict how much time may elapse before leftist and militantly democratic elements of population recover from shock and reaction sets in. Tenor of broadcasts from bloc radios suggests Communists may consider that coup provides them unexpected opportunity to enhance their position in Greece. A large number of Greeks believe United States concurred in or tolerated coup. Many Greeks assert only Communists dispose of an organization capable of leading resistance against a dictatorship and warn that Communists must not again be permitted to become leaders of democratic resistance as in World War II. We accept essential validity of these latter points although it is difficult to weigh precise force in current situation.
9. We recognize, nevertheless, that almost any kind of government which could be created at this time would depend ultimately on Greek military for support and that consequently we must seek accommodation with them. Moreover, we are sensitive to fact that split in Greek armed forces (with possibility of actual conflict) would be extremely dangerous for Greece and for US position here. Although Greek armed forces are ostensibly solidly behind new government, there is probably growing number of officers who are aware that King did not in fact initially concur in coup and who privately feel character of coup (extensive suspension of civil liberties, seizure of control by middle-grade officers etc.) has not in fact produced type of solution to political crisis which they may have hoped for. Such sentiments, if confirmed, might exercise important moderating influence on policies of coup managers.
10. In these circumstances I believe we must attempt create situation in which coup managers will feel compelled by their own personal interests to give precise assurances and take concrete actions to implement program aimed at restoration constitutional government. These interests include GOG expectation of continuing foreign assistance of varying sorts (military, development credits, etc.) as well as general foreign and domestic reputation of the regime and support for it.
11. With no early alternative to present regime in sight, problem is how to achieve the sort of turn around to civil rule that ultimately followed the Turkish military coup of 1960. This would involve a GOG commitment to constitution-drafting to create some sort of government based on consent of governed. It should include progressive restoration civil liberties, establishment of committee of jurists to revise Constitution, plebiscite on constitutional revisions, encouragement to coup leaders to yield office to qualified civilians, elections within specified time frame, etc. Dept will have noted CAS reports indicating Papadopoulos group has in past devoted serious effort to question constitutional revision.
Crux of problem is endeavor insure through public commitments that specific action is taken as part of more or less irreversible process before this government is permanently embedded in dictatorial form. We are attempting to develop points that could be pressed, and I assume Department is also working on this in response to our request (Athens 5000)./3/
/3/Telegram 5000 from Athens, April 27, requested guidance from the Department of State on ideas to pass to the Greeks regarding a return to democracy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE)
12. It is to these ends that Embassy is pointing its efforts. Specifically:
(A) I propose to continue urging King to maintain a position vis-?-vis the government that would clearly reflect his reserve but without ostensible hostility. Last week our immediate goal was to save King for some useful future role. Yesterday we discussed this role as well as steps he might take to overcome growing impression he may have come into full accord with coup group.
(B) We propose maintain only limited contacts with government and coup leaders and continue to emphasize that USG cannot easily carry forward programs with Greece until constitutional situation clarified. Yesterday we spelled out to Admiral Avgheris, FonMin Gouras and King that delivery main important types of military equipment has been suspended pending review of MAP and that concrete evidence that GOG sincerely moving restore constitutional government would greatly aid USG resume program on previously established basis.
(C) We probing GOG economic policies also. In view of adverse balance of payments prospects (Athens 5066)/4/ I anticipate upcoming requests for help at least in supporting Greek applications to international lending institutions. These will give further opportunities to point to moral.
/4/Dated May 3. (Ibid.)
(D) Washington could support this approach in several ways. For example, USG should continue to emphasize in its public statements that it is awaiting concrete steps toward reestablishment of democratic government. I recommend that in near future President Johnson make statement roughly along lines of that made by Secretary. Secretary's statement was briefly alluded to, but not quoted, in only one Athens newspaper and ignored in others./5/ Also, Secretary or Under Secretary could usefully call in Greek Ambassador and set forth importance which we attach to return of democratic government as a condition for full and intimate cooperation with GOG.
/5/For text of Secretary Rusk's April 28 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1967, pp. 750-751.
(E) I hope you and I can keep in closest communication on question of resuming delivery of major items of MAP equipment. In general, they should not be delivered until we are satisfied with programs developed by GOG for return to representative government. We in Embassy will make sure GOG understands this. As you know, however, I am anxious that we not get into bureaucratic bind that would impede MAP shipments when conditions are right. There is a fine line between using MAP deliveries to press for constructive policies and dismantling keystone of our mutual security cooperation with Greece. We weathered military coup in Turkey without damage to our strategic interests. We must have same objective in Greece.
(F) If Department finds above lines acceptable, we should consult with other Western powers, particularly UK and Germany, with a view to having them adopt a posture similar to ours.
13. I believe it would be premature for us to take initiative with regard to Cyprus problem at this time. Gouras and Caglayangil had 90-minute talk at Bonn and presumably will go on from there. We can add little until our own relations with GOG are worked out. There are, however, intimations Cyprus occupies very important place among preoccupations this government.
14. Initially we must speak candidly in private while in public making clear not only expectation as to line GOG will follow but also our confidence that they intend to follow such a course. Leaders of this coup are doubtless very sensitive having risked greatly and won handsomely in first phase of their program. Presumably they are also dedicated men. Although politically relatively unsophisticated, they also are probably convinced they are acting not only in interest of Greece but of West and NATO.
Talbot
285. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 5, 1967, 1600Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 GREECE. Secret; Limdis.
5136. Athens 5047./2/
/2/Telegram 5047, May 1, reported that Margaret Papandreou was concerned that her husband's captors were "brainwashing" him through the use of dangerous drugs. (Ibid.)
1. During my call on King Thursday evening I told him in confidence of Mrs. Papandreou's assertion that her husband is being administered drugs and of her description of medical history of Andreas and attendant dangers of any regime of drugs. He could anticipate consequences if Andreas' health should suddenly deteriorate while in detention. Even at propaganda level, it could do Greece no good if drug charges should be aired abroad and some international committee be formed to examine his condition.
2. King said he had heard nothing that indicated Andreas had any health difficulties. Cy Sulzberger, who had seen him last Saturday, had described Andreas as in normal health and in good spirits./3/ However, King thought he could emphasize to Patakos great importance of avoiding any chance that political prisoners would lose their health and vitality while in detention. If his probing should pick up any indication of drug administration, he would be in position to pursue question in detail.
/3/For Sulzberger's account of his meeting with Papandreou, see Age of Mediocrity, pp. 331-333.
Comment: King said he and Sulzberger had agreed to tell no one they had met. Please protect./4/
/4/For Sulzberger's account of his meeting with the King, see ibid., pp. 336-341.
Talbot
286. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/
Paris, May 9, 1967, 2018Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, USCINCEUR, and EUCOM for POLAD.
17886. NATUS. Subject: Sec McNamara's talk with General Spandidakis. Following is memcon, still subject to clearance with SecDef:
1. Minister of Defense Spandidakis, accompanied by Ambassador Palamas and an interpreter, called on Secretary McNamara in his USRO office at 1630 immediately following conclusion of the Defense Ministers meeting. Ambassador Cleveland and Assistant Secretary McNaughton were present. Spandidakis initiated the conversation by saying he assumed McNamara wanted to know why the military acted in Greece. He then talked through the interpreter for 15 minutes.
2. He said that from 1964 things had been deteriorating in Greece, that the political parties had been corrupted, that there were a number of liaisons with the Communists, and that there was a Communist build-up everywhere including the army. It was clear the country was going to fall in Communist hands, so the army, to prevent this, took over on April 21 despite the Constitution. Spandidakis referred at this point to the need to prevent a return to guerrilla warfare ("another Vietnam") in Greece. He said the ease with which the revolution was carried off in a few hours proves it was accepted by the Greek people. He said there were no "victims" (he would not count as victims the two people who were killed in violating the curfew). He pointed out that peace reigned in Greece two days after the action. He said the population, except for a Communist small (12-15 percent) minority, accepts the action.
3. Spandidakis said the attacks on the Greek action are mainly from foreign countries, by Communist governments or by groups associated with the Communists. He referred also to false rumors such as the alleged kidnapping of the King's daughter to put pressure on the King, and the rumors about the regime's intentions to execute Andreas Papandreou and Communist leader Glazes. But he said the "greatest bitterness is in the rumor that the US would revise its assistance to Greece." He said this made no sense because the alternative was to surrender to Communism. He said that, as it is, the ties between Greece and NATO are stronger now than before.
4. He said it is true that some people have been detained, including George Papandreou--who, he says, is now being treated better than he would be in his own house. He referred to others being kept in hotels, in comfortable circumstances as the press could see for itself. He said such detentions were necessary to stop their stirring up trouble.
5. Spandidakis said the government had a four-point program: (1) to reorganize the government mechanism, (2) to establish economic control, (3) to revise the Constitution to "bring it up to date", and (4) to "return the country to a constitutional order." He said no one knows how long the program would take, that it depends on the depth of the preexisting disorganization. He said, "All of us are of a democratic point of view; we are not going to establish a Fascist regime in Greece". He added that today there is no Parliament but, except for that, there is more democracy today than before April 21; he said they had anarchy at that time. He pointed to the interest taken by the new government in the farmers and low income groups, who have expressed their appreciation.
6. Secretary McNamara said he was grateful for the explanation and for Spandidakis' frankness (which frankness, together with sincerity, Spandidakis had emphasized on three occasions). McNamara said he would likewise be frank. He said it was unnecessary to tell a Greek of the admiration that the American people have for the Greek people: we have had a very close relationship with them over the past two decades; and our civilization is based upon theirs, dating back 2500 years. He said it is completely natural for our young people to expect to travel in Greece; indeed, his daughter had spent the last year there and is still there. He said it concerns us greatly that Greece has moved away from constitutional processes.
7. McNamara said it would be unbecoming of him to comment on Greek internal affairs, but that it was not inappropriate for him to comment on US internal affairs. He then said that the American people could never understand a statement that there is more democracy today than before April 21--with the press suppressed, assembly prevented, people restrained, no free speech, and other constitutional guarantees suspended. Also, important to the view by the American people was the absence of any schedule for resumption of constitutional processes. These, he said, are strong feelings of most of the people in the US, and he and other government officials are servants of the people. He said it would be extraordinarily difficult to maintain the Greek military assist-ance program without modification if there is no acceptable time schedule for the resumption of constitutional processes.
8. McNamara said that he believed Spandidakis' statement that he opposed a Fascist government, but that the American view would be greatly affected by the degree to which the Greeks indicate (a) a desire to make the change, (b) a schedule for the change, and (c) actions toward the change. McNamara said the US would be willing to try to help--e.g., by avoiding any public denunciation. But he said, the Greeks should not underestimate the concern of the US and the strong hopes for movement back toward constitutional processes.
9. Spandidakis at this point said, "Then you must explain the facts to the American people". McNamara responded that, unfortunately, the facts seemed to be as stated earlier--people detained, constitutional processes suspended, etc. He said that the US looks to the future with hope along the lines he had described.
10. Spandidakis said that a revision of the Military Assistance Program would be dangerous, spelling out the Greek reliance on US aid. McNamara said that the whole Greek situation is dangerous, and that, until action is taken to remedy it, the dangerous situation will continue. He hoped the Greeks could see a path for return to constitutional government which would make progress in that direction obvious to outsiders. He added his view that the greatest deterrent to the Soviets and the thing most likely to encourage support from the US would be a demonstration by the Greeks that they can return to constitutional processes.
11. Spandidakis said that continuation of MAP will shorten the time required. McNamara answered that, as Greek plans along the lines he had described became firmer, we can be informed of the progress, and public support for MAP in our country will grow.
12. Spandidakis asked what if the election had taken place and Greece had gone Communist. McNamara said he would not speculate but did not believe Greece would vote the Communists into power. After Spandidakis explained that only 12-15 percent of the population are Communist, but that more than 50 percent of the people were going to make the mistake of following them, Palamas said that the political parties had been behaving in such a way as to let the Communists take over. McNamara repeated that the important thing was to lay out a course of action to return to the constitutional processes.
13. The conversation was concluded at 1720 with a short exchange on reliability of NATO as an ally of Greece in trouble--both Spandidakis and Palamas suggesting that NATO was in such disarray that it could not be counted on to come to Greece's aid. McNamara said that, in his view, NATO is in much better condition today than it was a year ago, pointing to a year of "tremendous accomplishment" in both the political and military sense, pointing to the way the Allies had successfully survived the French withdrawal and eviction, and to the birth and apparent good start of the NPG. He added that we need (and will, in his view, be doing) more NATO planning in support of defensive actions on the flanks.
Cleveland
287. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 10, 1967, 1658Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Received at 2:19 p.m. and repeated to the Secretary of Defense, DIA, JCS, USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, Ankara, London, Paris, and Thessaloniki. The meeting described in this telegram was the first between Talbot and Papadopoulos. The Ambassador reported on their discussions relating to the Greek internal situation in telegram 5191 from Athens, May 10. (Ibid., POL 15 GREECE)
5209. NATUS.
1. Col Papadopoulos, member of ruling military triumvirate, repeated to me last night government's brief public policy statement on Cyprus, i.e. enosis with protection for Turkish Cypriots through peaceful means, specifically through dialogue with GOT. Papadopoulos added that he is firm believer in need for close and harmonious relations between Greece and Turkey and that he hopes these relations can be restored to what they were before crisis over Cyprus. No decision has yet been taken, he said, on date for resumption of dialogue.
2. These comments confirm our impression that new regime leaders have been so engrossed in consolidating their position within army and in familiarizing themselves with numerous domestic problems that they have not yet begun to focus seriously on Cyprus./2/
/2/In telegram 193045 to Athens, May 12, the Department of State noted that the situation in Greece made an initiative on Cyprus premature. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
Talbot
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, May 10, 1967, 3:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Owens and Brewster and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
191368. NATUS. Ref: Athens 5135, 5144, 5148, 5182./2/
/2/Telegram 5135 from Athens, May 5, reported King Constantine's view of the Greek internal situation. (Ibid.) Telegram 5144 from Athens, May 5, reported a conversation with King Constantine regarding changes in the Constitution imposed by the Junta. (Ibid.) Telegram 5148 from Athens, May 6, reported Pattakos' comments on constitutional reform plans. (Ibid.) Telegram 5182 from Athens, May 9, reported on Embassy efforts to push the Junta to a return to civilian rule. (Ibid.)
1. Your excellent telegrams over weekend have been read carefully here. Dept deeply appreciative your thoughtful analysis.
2. We agree that our approach to new Greek Govt must be to walk tightrope and that problem is essentially how to show people in Greece and elsewhere that U.S. (and King) not attached to new govt, while at same time working with GOG to get Greece back on constitutional road. As you state, our chief effort now must be to create situation in which coup managers will feel compelled by their own personal interests to give precise assurances and take concrete actions towards restoration of constitutional govt.
3. As we see it, major problem of next few days and weeks is to convince GOG that it must take specific, concrete steps to demonstrate to world that it sincerely plans to return to constitutional govt. As you have pointed out to King, vague assurances of good intentions will not suffice. Govt plan to appoint committee of eminent jurists to revise constitution, as announced by Pattakos, is step in right direction but, as DCM emphasized to Makarezos, to be fully effective must be accompanied by announcement of dates when revision will be completed and when plebiscite will be held to approve final document. Your suggestion that King use occasion of birth his child to announce timetable for return to constitutional rule is excellent one and you should encourage King to attempt obtain GOG approval such move. Also important will be nature of persons appointed to revision committee. Ideally, they should be persons of international stature; in this connection, govt may wish consider appointment of some eminent foreign jurists to such committee.
4. We are somewhat encouraged by your description King's policy of cooperating with new govt at same time retaining image of separateness from them. We also feel his effort to encourage senior officers of known loyalty to reconsolidate their command authority is wise move and could be crucial factor at later stage. You should continue to encourage King to apply pressure on new govt by selective non-attendance at certain functions (as described to you in Embtel 5135) and we share your view that Embassy should follow King's lead and thus indicate clearly to coup managers our support for King's efforts.
5. In addition to positive steps by govt we wish to encourage, we should also use our influence with King and Kollias to discourage further repressive measures by govt, such as establishment special military courts, abolition political organizations, and recently announced elimination of municipal elections. New govt has real public relations problem which could be alleviated somewhat by more restraint by coup managers in public announcements.
6. Most urgent question as far as American and international public opinion is concerned remains, of course, fate of political prisoners and particularly of Andreas Papandreou. We fully aware of deep opposition on part of coup managers to release at this time of Andreas Papandreou and other political prisoners. However, you should continue to impress upon them at every opportunity fact that to large extent world image of new govt will be based on its handling of prisoners' question and trial of Andreas.
7. As occasions arise where such action can serve useful purpose, we plan continue press GOG in desired direction through public statements. Concerning the calling in of Greek Ambassador here to stress importance of early return of GOG to democratic processes, Amb. Matsas has been recuperating from recent operation and thus far has not been available. We will do so when he returns to duty.
Rusk
289. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 14, 1967, 1435Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA.
5265. For Battle from Talbot. Ref: Athens 5264./2/
/2/Telegram 5264, May 14, summarized the situation in Greece 3 weeks after the coup. (Ibid.)
1. Reftel conveys Country Team impressions of situation here three weeks after coup. To these let me add some personal thoughts as you face new rounds on Hill.
(a) Rather astonishing extent of acquiescence to coup can no longer be explained just as stunned reaction. Mood of relief has osmotically spread through community. As when power suddenly fails in boiler factory, only in this unexpected moment of quiet are many people realizing how much strain they had felt in normal high-decibel political din. Many now admit, too, to having feared destructiveness of impending electoral clashes. I'm reminded of Pakistan in 1958, when first reaction to Ayub's coup was also sheer relief. This is a real phenomenon, not a shibboleth.
(b) How long this mood will last, we don't know, certainly not indefinitely. Greeks are Greeks and will come to resist. But while it does, it has two major consequences: (1) it gives coup group almost ideal climate in which to consolidate control, and (2) it insulates many Greeks from impact of European and American outcry against "rape in cradle of democracy". I am surprised at how widely we are getting rejoinders that Americans should understand it was Papandreous, especially Andreas, who strangled democracy here.
(c) This all heading, I fear, into major breakdown of genuine communication between important segments of opinion in Greece and in US. It is not merely matter of American disbelief of Greek feelings of relief at recent developments or of Greek wonderment at American lionizing of Andreas. More basic is fact that Americans and Europeans think Greece is clothed in Athenian values, while Greeks themselves remember how often in past 3,000 years--and in past 145 years since independence--they have been shuttlecocked between Athenian and Spartan concepts of government. Veterans in this century of seven wars, five military coups and at least two other attempts, one Royal assassination and three Royal withdrawals, at least three dictators, and more than 20 parliamentary governments since 1950, five of them in past 21 months, modern Greeks have enjoyed stable parliamentary rule really only between 1952 and 1965 (Papagos-Karamanlis-Papandreou). Thus I encounter reactions of "Well, here we go again. Wonder what it will be like this time. Hope it won't be too bad; at least they've been rather soft to start with--no killings or anything like that". This is very different attitude from outrage at rape of democracy, and perhaps more in keeping with cynical ennui of Eastern Mediterranean.
(d) Defining this attitude doesn't solve our problem, nor does it suggest that present nonparliamentary regime will remain popular; far from it. But it does suggest that when volatile Greeks as usual look for some other path after some time, we should try to be ready to encourage and help them on realistic basis that neither they nor we want Greece soon to sink back into parliamentary tumult characteristic of pre-1952 period and of recent past.
(e) How to do this? Just pressing GOG to set precise dates for plebiscite and elections will not be enough, I fear. Based on previous Greek experience with plebiscite promises, date setting would not necessarily assure early return to representative government. In any event, GOG has proven resistant to our advice not only because military Ministers have already come to enjoy power but also because they seem to have persuaded themselves that setting early date (only kind they think would interest us) would inhibit their carrying through essential reforms. Despised politicians, they believe, would then merely hole-in and await time they could regain control of moneybags and patronage. And the one thing these military Ministers are determined not to do is to turn country back to same old hacks they stole it from.
(f) If Papadopoulos and company are to be diverted from road Nasser took after deciding Wafd could never again be trusted to govern Egypt, therefore, Greeks and we need to concentrate on how to get parliamentary democracy that avoids anarchy. Several Greeks, including Karamanlis and Pipinelis, have long been thinking about this. Ideas we could feed in from experience in other countries (requested in Athens 5000)/3/ would be helpful.
/3/See footnote 3, Document 284.
(g) In long run, I doubt we could cooperate efficiently with a Papadopoulos-dominated GOG. Frontal effort to break him now would, however, be without guarantee of success and if successful could well shatter Greece. Task as I see it is to try to restrain him and his coup associates from excesses, wrap more talent and disciplined organization around them, and keep pushing in direction of a constitutionalism that will work. Meanwhile, I believe we should continue supporting King and stay as much as possible in posture of neither giving Greeks what they most want--full aid and recognition--nor coming to definitive break.
2. I am not so presumptuous as to think all this will be useful to you, but writing it has helped me clarify my own thoughts. Good luck in arduous chores you face.
Talbot
290. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 15, 1967, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Greek Coup, 1967. Secret; Sensitive. A note on the memorandum reads: "rec'd 5-15-67, 3:30 p.m." The memorandum is marked with an "L," indicating that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
You will have seen Marquis Childs' story (Tab A)/2/ in this morning's Washington Post on our alleged involvement in the Greek coup.
/2/The May 15 article was entitled "A Coup in Greece; A Bit of Blackmail."
The story is about as inaccurate as it could be.
The facts are these:
--On March 8 and 13, 1967, the 303 Committee considered a proposal that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] put $200-$300,000 into the Greek elections which were then scheduled to back candidates who would be anti-Andreas. Although, as indicated in the attached minutes (Tab B),/3/ we all felt considerable reservation about the proposal, we examined it carefully because the Ambassador recommended it. We finally decided that Foy Kohler should take the matter up with Sect. Rusk, and if the Secretary felt the proposal was vital, I would raise the matter with you. On March 14, Kohler reported as follows:
/3/See Documents 259 and 261.
"He (Sect. Rusk) comes down negative. In the Greek case, he believes the possible political gain is outweighed by the security risks. He commented that if the dual-national Greek-Americans are concerned about the prospects and if $200-$300,000 will make the difference, they should have no trouble raising that sum themselves without involving the United States Government."
In general, the view we took was that it was becoming less and less appropriate for us to try to influence elections in places like Italy/4/ and Greece [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Moreover, there was considerable skepticism--shared by me--that the outcome in Greece would be much affected by this kind of money.
/4/For documentation on Italy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII.
In any case, the issue before us was not `what should we do or not do about a coup': it was, `what should we do or not do about an election which at that time we all believed was more likely, rather than less likely, to take place'; although we knew there was considerable anxiety in certain Greek quarters about that election.
I have already asked State to undertake an investigation of who might have spoken about this matter to Marquis Childs. The problem in tracking down this particular inaccurate and distorted leak is that, because Ambassador Talbot came in with a cable,/5/ a considerable number of people in State probably knew that we were considering something to do with Greece. I have every reason for confidence in Foy Kohler, who is an exceedingly tight-lipped man.
/5/Document 255.
I will let you know the results of our investigation.
Walt
291. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 21, 1967, 2323Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Paris, and USUN.
5377. NATUS.
1. In my first discussion with him since April 26, Prime Minister Kollias Friday revealed GOG's sensitivity to official American view of situation in Greece. Our exchange started with some rather starchy references by Kollias to United States "misunderstanding" of Greek military action to save Greece. After my assertion that our biggest question is what direction new GOG will take, Kollias concluded with assurance that formation and operation of constitution-revising committee will proceed promptly. On the whole, I believe exercise was useful.
2. At first Kollias was edgy and visibly upset by what I gather was well-embellished telegram from Ambassador Matsas describing talk with Secretary May 17./2/ Greeks, Kollias said, are "very sorry" and he feels "great bitterness" because American friends do not seem to realize great necessity for change and continue unfavorable criticism on top of which they also cut military assistance. Greeks many times have shown they can live on cats and mice rather than betray ideal in which they believe. Greece even if left in lurch by its allies will continue to fight for real democracy and continue to love Americans and be grateful for support they have given since 1947. Greeks understand liberty and they understand need to overcome corruption of recent parliamentary process in order to restore true liberty to their country. He himself had starved and fought as simple soldier in cause of liberty and had now given up judicial career of forty years to assist in service of his country. He would never agree to serve a cause whose purpose was imposition of a dictatorial regime. Rather this government's purpose is to establish real freedom and democracy in order to save country from chaos and catastrophe that was about to befall it. Revolution of April 21 was perhaps most civilized, most liberal and most bloodless revolution ever to occur. All information government has received from interior of country is extremely satisfactory. Eighty per cent of people share enthusiasm for change.
/2/Telegram 196553 to Athens, May 17, reported that Rusk had pressed Matsas on the issues of the fate of political prisoners and political repression by the Junta. (Ibid., POL 23-9 GREECE)
3. After twenty minutes of similar oratory I managed to riposte that having listened with close attention I was greatly disappointed to realize that GOG apparently had not understood major points USG has been seeking to make. We have our views on what has occurred before April 21 and thereafter. American people had not believed recent conditions in Greece ideal, but it would be unrealistic to think Americans would not have reacted to what has happened.
4. Events of April 21 raised questions which need sorting out before future U.S. road can be determined. Thus the military assistance review (whose details I spelled out to correct his assertion that aid had been cut off but also to leave him in no doubt that review could ultimately be concluded in any of several directions). However, I went on, USG is not concentrating on the past; it is not suggesting that clock could be turned back. Rather, it is looking to present and future. What direction is this government going to take? If it is to move along lines of military governments fastened on some Arab countries, for example, Americans could be expected to react. ("No, no," Kollias objected.) If on other hand this government pursues objective of restoring representative government as quickly as possible, we could expect American policies to move in another direction. Problem is one of being convincing. As Prime Minister aware, announcement of plan to form constitution-revision committee and submit its product to plebiscite after review by government was favorable step. Yet that simple declaration not enough to persuade international opinion in face of other things that have happened in Greece.
5. We know, I continued, that Greeks can fight their battles, alone if necessary. But we do not want to see GOG isolated from world. We have been privileged to be closely associated with Greeks in their struggles, especially in past twenty years. That is why we are so much interested in persuasive evidence that GOG will indeed move briskly toward constitution revision and representative rule.
6. Speaking personally, I told Prime Minister that my colleagues in Washington had made great efforts to persuade influential Congressmen and others not to heat up American reaction before receiving firm evidence of GOG intentions. This was a difficult exercise, and I did not know how much longer it could be carried on. Assurances given now by GOG could be much more helpful in calming international opinion than same assurances given after some weeks when adverse attitudes may have grown.
7. With his adrenaline still running, though less vigorously than at first, Kollias declared that it is and has always been the desire of this GOG to have country return to normal political life as soon as conditions will permit. GOG said so in its initial proclamation to the people, and has since repeated its pledge. Prime Minister could categorically assure me that names of twenty members of committee which will be charged with revision of Constitution will be announced by end of this month. Committee will be given up to six months to prepare revision and after study by GOG this will be submitted to plebiscite. He could also assure me that with help of God and with aid (unspecified), government would be in position within one year to proclaim elections. He made it clear, however, that without aid GOG would not be in position to establish conditions that would make elections possible within this time.
8. I commented that public statement along lines he had just set out to me would in my opinion have beneficial effect. He said he could make announcement about constitution-revising committee members' appointment without delay, but that talk about elections would be different matter since that would depend not only on GOG. Full memcon being pouched./3/
/3/Transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-656 from Athens, June 3. (Ibid., POL 15-1 GREECE)
Talbot
292. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Talbot) to the Country Director for Greece (Brewster)/1/
Athens, May 26, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, POL 15-1. Secret; Exdis.
Dear Dan:
In view of the distribution given even Exdis telegrams, I would prefer for some time to report to you by letter some of the more sensitive items that emerge from my conversations with the King. This will give you direct control of distribution of this sort of information in Washington--a control that I believe to be essential in these circumstances.
Yesterday the King described further steps in his thinking about how to meet a confrontation with Col. Papadopoulos and the Revolutionary Council, should one occur./2/ His visits to military units scheduled for June will, he hopes, give him a chance to test the loyalty and discipline of units to which he might want to turn. He thinks that the 20th Armored Division (General Erselman) and other Third Corps elements along the Evros River (Gen. Zalocoris) might provide him a welcome in case of need. His tentative idea in the event of a confrontation would be to get his family out of the country and then make every effort to get to the north by plane or ship (presumably Royal Hellenic Navy ship) in order to base himself with loyal units, broadcast to the nation, and announce that he was moving south toward Athens to reassert his command over the Armed Forces and his headship of the nation. The success of such a plea, he feels, would depend in part on the loyalty of the Greek Armed Forces, but very substantially also on United States actions. He would hope that we could work out a plan between now and early June which I could then discuss in Washington. He continues to think how fine it would be if the Sixth Fleet could be in the area at the time of confrontation. Its mere presence would probably turn the tide, in his view. He hopes that he and I could also talk, however, about the possible availability of Marines to come ashore peacefully as in Lebanon in 1958, should the need arise. I immediately cautioned him against expectation of any involvement of U.S. forces. It is a long time since 1958, conditions are different, and any such action could be taken only on the express instructions of the highest levels in Washington. I would not want him to draw false encouragement from anything I might either say or not say in response to his comments. He said he understood this but that "we should think of some plan before you go to Washington, so that you can discuss it there in detail."
/2/Talbot reported on his May 25 conversation with King Constantine in telegram 5466 from Athens, May 26. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE)
This is the King's second foray with me on the question of his own contingency plans if it should become impossible to carry on with the present government. Presumably he will raise it again when I see him sometime in the first week of June. We are working on some thoughts here, which I hope to get to you promptly, but I will urgently need the Department's instructions and guidance in coping with further stages of development of the King's ideas.
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Phillips Talbot/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, May 31, 1967, 5:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 GREECE. Secret. Drafted by Owens, cleared by Brewster, and approved by Rockwell.
205238. Ref: Athens 5521, 5509, 5510, 5486./2/
/2/Telegram 5521 from Athens, May 30, reported on membership in the Greek constitutional committee. (Ibid.) Telegram 5509 from Athens, May 29, noted that the Junta had no intention of an early return to parliamentary rule. (Ibid.) Telegram 5510 from Athens, May 29, reported the arrest of two former Ministers and regime opponents. (Ibid., POL 29 GREECE) Telegram 5486 from Athens, May 27, reported other arrests of former political figures. (Ibid.)
1. While we consider appointment of committee to revise Greek constitution as positive step towards eventual return to constitutional processes, we are nonetheless disturbed by other steps taken by new government, as well as by comment by Min Papadopoulos and press organs close to him, which appear to indicate that govt. does not intend to return to parliamentarianism in near future. We recognize that somewhat contradictory developments may represent split within coup leadership as to ultimate aim of April 21 "revolution." Therefore, as part of continuing U.S pressure towards return to parliamentary government, as well as to encourage those elements within govt. supporting return to constitutional processes, we recommend that you call on PriMin Kollias at early opportunity to set forth following points:
(a) U.S. is encouraged by May 30 announcement of appointment of 20-member committee which will revise constitution and submit it to govt. within six months. This step is consistent with earlier statements by King and govt. leaders of an intention to return to constitutional processes, and we hope that it will soon be followed by announcement of date completed document will be presented to Greek people for approval.
(b) However, we are disturbed by certain other developments which seem to suggest a step-up in repressive measures. Among these is arrest of additional non-Communist politicians, including John Tsouderos, as well as delay in release of several thousand political prisoners, as earlier promised in govt. statements. We are also concerned by statements in newspapers reflecting govt. opinion that return to parliamentary democracy will be far in the future, as well as by articles in such papers seemingly aimed at discrediting parliamentarianism. Also disquieting is Papadopoulos statement that "termination of life of revolution before it fulfills its tasks would be act of highest treason both to nation and to people (Athens 5509).
(c) Degree to which new govt. moves (or does not move) towards restoration democratic institutions is closely followed by American public and Congress. (U.S. press and public concern at recent developments in Greece is illustrated by May 30 NYTimes editorial "Backsliding in Greece.") Possibility of returning to normal Greek-U.S. relations, including resumption of MAP, will be directly influenced by new govt.'s progress in returning to constitutional processes and its handling of political prisoners. To extent govt. steps up repressive measures it lessens chances of early return to normal relations.
2. You may wish to draw on above in discussions with other key govt. leaders./3/
/3/Prior to his return to the United States, Talbot held meetings with Prime Minister Kollias, Pattakos, Makarezos, Spandidakis, and Papadopoulos. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Coup Managers.
3. We would also appreciate your assessment of recent developments as indicative of split within coup leadership over question of future return to constitutionalism.
Rusk
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, July 7, 1967, 5:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GREECE. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Rockwell and cleared in S/S. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and Belgrade.
2763. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.
1. The Secretary received Greek Foreign Minister Economou-Gouras July 7./2/
/2/A summary report of the meeting, sent to President Johnson, is ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, President's Evening Reading.
2. Gouras said that he brought good news re Greek internal situation. New government being supported by people. Examples were attendance at ceremonies in Piraeus municipal theater and Athens stadium. Gouras had thought first might have been arranged but was certain enthusiastic stadium crowd spontaneous.
3. Foreign Minister recalled he had discussed with Secretary at Luxembourg GOG plans to return to constitutional situation./3/ He happy reaffirm GOG will keep this promise perhaps in an even shorter time frame, a year and a half or two years at latest. He hoped constitutional committee would have finished work before end of year. Gouras explained previous constitution did not have moral support of people since it permitted abuses by political parties. New one will imitate U.S. constitution in that members of government will not be permitted at same time be members of Parliament. Number of deputies will be cut from 300 to 150. Not yet decided whether will be one chamber or two.
/3/No memorandum of conversation has been found, but Secto 19 from Luxembourg, June 14, forwarded the text of a Greek paper on the return to constitutional government. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 191)
4. Gouras alleged Greek financial situation encouraging. Savings in banks and post office accounts last month up 18% over corresponding month 1966.
5. Secretary suggested one or two members of committee considering revision constitution come to U.S. to talk about how provisions of U.S. constitution work; drafters of constitution thought weak executive better than a strong one and result their work is that carrying on business of government requires lots of time and willingness to cooperate between branches thereof; implications of this should be carefully studied. Secretary also suggested that committee make public statements from time to time to show that effort a serious one which making real progress. He thought this would be helpful in counteracting impression that work of revising constitution only window dressing.
6. Foreign Minister said change in Greece was not simple military coup designed merely to change a government but was true revolution similar to that which occurred in 1909 when elder Venizelos came from Crete; military members GOG were not ambitious but modest men who would return to barracks after they had achieved a healthy democracy for Greece. Contrasted their attitude with what he described as previous conspiracy between EDA and leftist branch of CU to establish Communist dictatorship in Greece.
7. In discussion of time which might elapse between plebiscite on new constitution and elections Gouras said difficult be precise. One problem would be revision of electoral lists, as those who have taken part in conspiracy against Greek values will be deprived of right to vote.
8. In response to Secretary's question Gouras said Greek economic situation strong; there was public confidence in government, the drachma had been stabilized, and export-import situation good.
9. Foreign Minister complained of "aggressive" campaign being carried out against Greece by Iron Curtain countries. Mentioned his own past role in bettering relations with Greece's Balkan neighbors. Maintained matter of agreement with Yugoslavia not important and new one would be negotiated.
10. In discussing position of King, Gouras said he more popular than ever. Maintained he has accepted revolution and told government he would support it in its task of strengthening Greek democracy. When Secretary inquired who exercises real power in government, Gouras said Prime Minister has very strong position. Military members of course have material power but Prime Minister has decidedly powerful influence over them. Gouras denied rumors of discord between three military members.
11. In response Secretary's question re trade unions, Gouras asserted situation all right now. At Geneva meeting ILO Greek representatives gave unsatisfactory explanation. Nonetheless malicious reports re trade union situation continue to be circulated in order influence international opinion against Greece.
12. In subsequent private session with Secretary Gouras took up MAP. Said military members GOG might "do something crazy" under pressure USG exerting by suspending shipments. Secretary said he going before Senate next week at time when latter very upset by whole U.S. arms policy as result India-Pakistan and Arab-Israel wars and Greek coup. Would jeopardize entire Military Assistance Program if, Secretary said with regard to Greek program, more than that situation continuing under study. Thus Secretary could give Gouras no assurances beyond saying policy under continuing review. Gouras disappointed but said would do best to explain in Athens.
13. Re Cyprus Gouras said GOG had offered 60-year lease on Dhekelia base to Turks but they had turned down. GOG very disappointed. Gouras had had three-hour discussion with Caglayangil in New York with no positive result.
Rusk
295. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the NATO Capitals/1/
Washington, July 12, 1967, 11:35 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Horner and McCaskill, cleared by NEA and EUR, and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Moscow and Belgrade and repeated to Nicosia and Istanbul.
CA-263. NATUS. Ref: Paris' 275; Moscow's 98./2/
/2/Telegram 275 from Paris, July 6, requested guidance regarding Cyprus in the wake of a July 5 Soviet statement by TASS. (Ibid.) Telegram 98 from Moscow, July 7, reported on the Soviet propaganda offensive charging Western plans for action against the Makarios government. (Ibid.) The Soviet statement expressed concern about U.S. backing of a coup in Cyprus; for text, see Weekly Digest of the Soviet Press, July 26, 1967, p. 20.
1. There has been cumulative but still inconclusive evidence over past few weeks that current authoritarian GOG may be giving consideration to plan for ending Cyprus stalemate irrespective of position Archbishop Makarios and those around him. However, we have no concrete evidence to indicate GOG contemplating "coup" despite circulation coup rumors in Athens and Nicosia during last two weeks./3/ Recent radio and press attacks on Makarios and those around him might well have been designed to bring pressure on Archbishop to abandon his position on "genuine enosis" and we now inclined believe GOG will continue pressures on Makarios to obtain his acquiescence in GOG/GOT agreement or his resignation.
/3/In telegram 17 from Athens, July 1, Talbot reported that while no evidence existed of plans for a coup against Makarios, the Junta was planning some action regarding Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
2. GOG thinking seems to comprise following elements:
a. Because of its character, it is better able than democratic Greek Government to make settlement which would meet GOT desiderata. Offer of 60-year lease to Turks suggests that GOG may go all the way and offer GOT a sovereign base.
b. Settlement perplexing and frustrating Cyprus problem would satisfy nationalistic aspirations most Greeks, and would add to GOG's own internal and international prestige. This government more than most Greek Governments likely view honorable Greek settlement, i.e., some form enosis, as essential.
c. Makarios and some of those around him either are not prepared to accept form of enosis which would satisfy GOT, but may even prefer continued independence. GOG concerned about growth of anti-enosis sentiment being encouraged on island.
d. Existence of crypto-communist AKEL and its satellite organizations on island is threat to Hellenism as a whole. GOG also clearly concerned about Lyssarides and his influence on Makarios, and about Clerides and others who have vested interest in continuing independence of Cyprus.
3. We assume essential element in any GOG planning would be prior agreement with GOT, possibly in some detail. Thus far there no indication any such agreement reached. In fact, GOG FonMin Economou-Gouras, now in US, has informed us/4/ that in recent talks with GOT FonMin Caglayangil he still attempting to prevail upon Turks to accept long lease on Cyprus base, whereas GOT insistent on sovereign base area. In this connection, of course, it possible Gouras not privy to thinking of Athens coup group which may be willing transfer sovereign base area.
/4/See Document 294.
4. If GOG thinking along these lines, sequence events envisaged may be something along following pattern (though not necessarily in that order):
a. Secret agreement with GOT, providing for (1) Turkish possession of a sovereign base area in Cyprus, either at Dhekelia, or Karpas Peninsula (but presumably the former), and (2) stipulated guarantees of communal rights of Turkish Cypriot minority.
b. Neutralization, using Greek military units on Cyprus as necessary, of Archbishop Makarios, other Greek Cypriot leaders not clearly in favor of enosis, and, of course, Communists (AKEL) and others of left-wing persuasion. Such neutralization would accord with self-proclaimed objectives of current Greek leadership, and recent official statements from Athens would seem to pave the way towards, or foreshadow, some such action.
c. Placing in positions of power in Cyprus of Greek Cypriot elements in confidence of GOG.
d. Announcement, possibly in collaboration with GOT, of some form of union between Cyprus and Greece. This might take form of Commonwealth relationship, with King Constantine acting as sovereign of Cyprus, GOG assuming responsibilities for foreign affairs, defense, and perhaps also internal security, and, for the rest, internal self-government for Cyprus including careful delineation of role and privileges of Turkish minority.
5. Depending upon kind of action GOG may take, we would expect particularly strong reactions within NATO, which includes three contributors to UNFICYP--Denmark, Canada, and UK. Scandinavians are consistently critical of what they consider shortcomings of fellow NATO members (e.g., Portugal), and Danes have already raised question of Greek internal political developments. These members might well recall reiterated Greek insistence over past three years in NATO that solution to Cyprus problem was responsibility of UN. More recently, Belgium, Italy and UK have pressed for cancellation of NATO military exercise in Greece for fear of domestic reaction against cooperation with military junta.
6. Soviet Union has initiated considerable diplomatic and propaganda pressure in attempt forestall any change in Cyprus status. Formal TASS statement July 4 expressed Soviet concern with developments around Cyprus and with attempts aggravate again situation in area endangering existence Republic. Statement alleges implementation old plans for coup d'etat not accidental but result NATO plan to exploit situation in Greece extending antipopular militarist dictatorship to Cyprus. Soviet diplomats made virtually identical oral d?marches to US (Depcirtel 2553)/5/ and UK expressing concern that attempt planned to liquidate sovereignty GOG asserting "certain circles NATO" are behind it. Soviet opposition was reaffirmed to liquidation Cyprus' independence, its dismemberment, and conversion into NATO military base, noting such developments could lead to "significant sharpening already strained situation in area." D?marches cite previous UNSC resolutions on Cyprus and call on receiving governments as permanent members UNSC take all measures to thwart these dangerous plans. Other East European communist states expected to follow USSR in strident and probably drawnout propaganda campaign. Yugoslavia, already claiming security threatened by advent authoritarian government in Athens, would probably view anticipated events as extension "imperialist" plot. President Tito alleges has shaped diverse developments such as revolutions in Ghana, Greece, Indonesia and recent events in Middle East. We would anticipate considerable Soviet and East European efforts gain non-aligned support for moves keep Cyprus question alive, even if anticipated actions were carried out effectively and quickly and with agreement Turkish government. Recourse to Security Council may be expected.
/5/In circular telegram 2553, July 7, the Department of State informed posts that Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Kohler had denied any NATO plans existed for intervention in Cyprus in a July 6 meeting with Soviet officials. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
7. US position on Cyprus is that we are ready to agree to any arrangement acceptable to the parties concerned, i.e, Cyprus and the three guarantor powers (UK, Greece and Turkey). We have urged the Turks and Greeks to continue talking, but have not asked them to keep us informed about these talks.
Rusk
296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 21, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 35. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
Normalization of US-Greek Relations
We have had a number of interdepartmental discussions recently on the subject of normalizing our relations with the Greek Government./2/ Both in the Regional Group under Assistant Secretary Battle and in the Senior Group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach, with Ambassador Talbot present on both occasions, certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon. I am in accord with the conclusions reached.
/2/An interdepartmental regional group discussed the issue on July 6. A July 13 memorandum to Rusk from Battle reporting its recommendations is in Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Org. 3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) discussed the recommendations on July 19. A July 24 memorandum by Brewster summarizing the conclusions of the SIG meeting is ibid., Lot 71 D 6, DEF 19.
From the point of view of our relations with Greece, I consider the steps outlined below important to our interests. Ambassador Talbot is returning to Greece at the end of next week and should be able to tell the Greek Government something positive on this score shortly after he arrives.
Recommendation: That you approve the actions described below:/3/
/3/Rostow endorsed the recommendations of Secretary Rusk in a July 22 memorandum (attached to the source text), but President Johnson took no action on the recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Vol. 35)
Foreign Policy Aspects
1. Since the April military coup we have withheld delivery on certain major arms to Greece and been quite cool in our relations with the Government with the idea not only of exhibiting disapproval of the methods by which the junta seized control but also, hopefully, of encouraging some return, however gradual, to more constitutional processes.
2. We now believe these tactics are no longer useful and that, if continued longer, may be counterproductive. The King has come to the same conclusion. Ambassador Talbot considers it quite possible the Greeks, although highly desirous of close relations with us, may adopt the same tactics by causing certain difficulties with some of our facilities there.
3. We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and USIA; they have increased in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U.S. interests.
4. We propose that Ambassador Talbot be authorized to inform the Greek Government of certain relaxations as set forth below, making clear that future actions in this regard will be related to progress in the restoration of constitutional processes: (a) a coastal minesweeper ($2.9 million); (b) one F-104G trainer ($1.5 million); (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge); and (d) 175mm cannons ( 8-$1.05 million). These items were chosen (a) as having a clear NATO context and (b) as obviously not lending themselves to the suppression of civil disturbances.
5. We believe we should not release just yet either tanks, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. (With respect to FRG shipment of military assistance to Greece, particularly including tanks, we believe we should give the Germans the go-ahead signal in the near future but not just at this time.)
Congressional Problems
1. Although the timing of this action is not particularly favorable given the concern in Congressional quarters with respect to arms programs, both sale and grant, nevertheless, we believe we must proceed and that the over-all interest of foreign policy requires that we do so as soon as possible. We judge that although there will be some adverse reaction in Congress and elsewhere, it will not be great and can be reasonably contained by stressing the following:
a. This is a minimum step.
b. Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U.S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.
c. It is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO under whose umbrella the arms programs are developed.
d. We must avoid pressing Greece in the direction of the French with their lukewarm and unhelpful posture in a NATO context.
2. If you approve the above course of action, we will undertake a certain amount of educational work on the Hill. How much can perhaps better be determined after the appearance on July 26 of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on military assistance programs.
Dean Rusk
297. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Talbot) to the Country Director for Greece (Brewster)/1/
Athens, August 7, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Letters from Athens. Secret.
Dear Dan:
Having heard nothing further on the limited military assistance items whose transfer was recommended by SIG and IRG, I assume that the process of getting White House and Congressional clearance has, as we had more or less anticipated, proved difficult. I also assume that my extended presence in Washington would not have changed this situation, and that it was wise for me to leave the Capitol and return to Athens on schedule.
At this end my impressions are gradually taking shape, but I have hesitated to express my views on the changing scene before fresh talks with the military members of the Government as well as with the King and the Prime Minister. Later this week I would hope that process would be sufficiently advanced to permit me to express fresh opinions with confidence.
My tentative impressions are that internal consolidation by the coup group has substantially advanced during my absence and that as more prospective difficulties have become apparent there is greater sensitivity and some change in the wider public mood.
Specifically, purging of persons on whom the coup leaders cannot confidently depend has proceeded not only through the upper reaches of the Air Force and Navy (but not yet the Army) but also into the gendarmerie and police as well as civilian ministries and agencies. Some changes are distinct improvements, e.g., ETVA and GAEC. Elsewhere replacements have either proved undistinguished or, indeed, unavailable. While the departure of Zolotas and John Pezmazoglu will undoubtedly attract the most international attention, with Galanis at the helm this shift may be less important than changes in other areas.
Distasteful developments include the tightening of the screws in the fields of education and the arts. The Embassy's airgram (A-68)/2/ spells out these details. Nor is it encouraging to hear that Papaconstantinou is running into increasing frustrations so that instead of an early end to press censorship we could just possibly see an early end to Papaconstantinou as a Government official.
/2/Airgram A-68, August 3, reported on education and the arts under the Junta. (Ibid., Central Files, CUL 2 GREECE)
As the Embassy has reported, the economy shows many signs of weakness including spreading unemployment in the industrial sector. You have seen our reports of labor restiveness. Businessmen, too, seem more acutely aware now than in June of the prospect that this reform government will put a sharper tax bite on them than has been their past lot.
On the constitutional front there is a good deal of confusion and of skepticism. We should get deeper into this question during the current week. In any event, I hear numbers of people now discussing matters from the implicit assumption that the coup group will attempt to stay in power indefinitely.
By and large, however, my impression is that a good many influential Greeks believe the country still has open options and that perhaps the King with American encouragement can bring this Government to a recognition of the need for constitutional progress. Since this is so central a question in the United States, I would rather hold off for some days before making a current estimate of the prospects. As the Embassy's recent reporting has made clear, there are a good many difficulties.
All this should not, I believe, be interpreted to mean that we should go slowly on the limited moves agreed to by IRG and SIG. On the contrary, my fears have been strengthened that the Greeks are moving into a prickly and negative mood and that it will not be easy to persuade them to wait quietly while we sort out our domestic policy issues. The argument in favor of flexibility in handling military assistance remains very strong indeed. If we are to have any chance of pulling Greece into the direction of constitutionalism, this one limited bit of leverage should certainly be available to us.
I recognize that an interim letter of this kind may do more to raise the level of your concerns than to clarify your analyses of the situation here. I will have to try to be better based and more explicit in communicating with you later in the week.
With best wishes always,
Yours sincerely,
Phil
August 8
P.S. After dictating the above paragraphs yesterday, I had a reception last evening for Archbishop Iakovos which brought into the open a disturbing note of which we were already generally aware. None of the invited Ministers turned up. (Nor, it appears, did either Kollias or Papadopoulos attend the Fourth of July reception.) In the course of the afternoon, when Papadopoulos' staff man, Major Lambropoulos, telephoned the Minister's regrets for the evening, Geoff Ogden told him that Congressman Brademas would like to see the Colonel and suggested a drink at the Residence sometime today. Lambropoulos was exceedingly curt in explaining the Minister was busy today and in any event a request to see the Minister should be made through the Protocol Office of the Foreign Office. He had earlier given Stephen Calligas a similar answer to a request by Malcolm Forbes for a meeting. It is evident that we have a problem. Whether resistance to social relations is a harbinger of further counter-irritance to our policy of coolness and non-decision on military matters is a question we will try to probe promptly though deftly.
298. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 7, 1967, 1130Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Secret; Exdis.
684. Ref: Athens 604./2/
/2/Telegram 604, July 31, reported King Constantine's impressions of the internal political situation. (Ibid.)
1. During my conversation with King July 30 he referred once again to the possibility that in end he might have to come into confrontation with present regime. As Dept aware King's view of inevitability or desirability of confrontation has varied in past several months depending generally on temperature of his cooperative relationship with Junta (read Papadopoulos). More recently King has indicated he views immediate period after submission of draft Constitution as sensitive one in which confrontation may be unavoidable if regime does not keep faith with its assurances re Constitution and early referendum [document number not declassified]./3/ This same three-month period is also considered one of incipient crisis by a majority of Greeks who for present are willing to give regime chance to prove its intention.
/3/Not found.
2. King spoke of contacts he had made with senior Generals and others, and seemed reasonably expectant that in event of showdown he could get adequate support to oust Junta. He did not want to precipitate action, however, unless US knew and approved of his purposes. He did not ask, as he had done in the past, about prospects that he could count on American fleet presence or logistic assistance.
3. In replying, I pointed out that at present US heavily committed in many parts of the world. I tried to get him to understand that US should not be looked to for participation in any change in governmental arrangements. This sort of decision could be made only by him. King said he understood, but if it should become necessary to move he would advise USG in advance.
4. As example of influences now being brought to bear on King, I was interested in his account of secret visit to him by retired General Gennimatas, former Chief of HNDGS. Latter had reminded him there had long been suspicions that Papadopoulos and other colonels had been plotting and that he, Gennimatas, had dispersed them to distant commands whereas subsequently Gen. Spandidakis had permitted them to reassemble in Athens posts. He thought this could mean Spandidakis was in on plot, though he hoped not. In any case, colonels are more known than respected by armed forces, who now accept their authority for lack of current alternative. Gennimatas proposed that when new Constitution ready King move to dispose of colonels. They could be thanked for their role in saving country from Communism, decorated, and returned to dispersed units or retired. From then on, armed forces would pay no attention to them. Alternatively, they could be forced to resign from army in order to stay in politics. Here, again, they would lose grip over armed forces. Key point, he said, was not to permit important further changes in the army before the new Constitution readied. It would then be essential to move before Junta consolidated control over army commands. Whatever course King might choose to pursue in ridding country of these colonels, Gennimatas was convinced armed forces would support him absolutely. King had listened with interest but without commitments. He said he did not know whether Gennimatas was organizing a movement among senior military people against the colonels, but in any case he would not interfere. (DATT comment: Gennimatas' views are correct but he is not known to be in any particular contact with any group.)
5. Comment: We have recently had reports of preliminary plotting by several groups of officers (mostly recently retired) [2 document numbers not declassified]./4/ We believe some of this is motivated by their belief King would support a countercoup. (It is fairly generally assumed that his trips to north were for purpose polling amount of support he could count on in such event.) Some may also believe that American attitude of coolness toward a "colonels" regime implies we would support a countercoup by other military. However, we see no evidence yet that plotters pinpointed so far would be an improvement over current regime, either as scheduling early return to constitutional processes or acting with more leniency in repressive measures. This estimate would, of course, be revised if regime gave indications of betraying assurances both to US and Greek public re return to parliamentary life. We will also have to watch carefully what, if any, progress various groups make in coalescing to point they undermine regime's control of key units in Attica area or consolidate their control of sufficient other ones (Larrissa and the north) to neutralize regime's superiority in Attica.
/4/Neither found.
6. (Comments cont'd) Some of the plotters are known to have been awaiting my return and any comments I might make, either directly or around town, to get nuances of latest Washington attitude toward present regime. To extent there are incipient coup ambitions in Greek military, we face tricky period of attempting to avoid giving impression either that we firmly endorse present regime or that we would encourage some countercoup.
7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DATT concur in comment.
Talbot
299. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 29, 1967, 1620Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Athens and Nicosia.
966. Report No. 1. Subj: Cyprus and the dialogue.
1. Following must be fully protected as Caglayangil intended his comments only for my ears.
2. I have now had two conversations with him/2/ and expect follow-up tomorrow with Asst SecGen Turkmen, following which expect to present more complete report containing suggestions for President's future conversation with King Constantine in Washington. In interim it is clear that:
/2/Reported in telegram 967 from Ankara, August 29. (Ibid.)
A. GOT and GOG are and have been in contact throughout last month regarding Greek proposal for PriMinister level meeting. There is no lack of contact. Proposal has been under intensive review and apparently considered by National Security Council evening Aug 29. Ambassador Tuluy here from Athens as an advisor. Further details by separate message.
B. GOT is not well impressed with proposal for PM-level meeting which it sees as reflecting GOG desire for "gesture" to show to NATO Allies that it is legitimate govt by appearing to negotiate major question with its neighbor. On substance GOT sees no signs GOG prepared to take real step forward. Caglayangil adversely impressed by "bargaining tactics" of Greek Govt, failure to make progress on substantive preparations for high-level meeting. GOT concerned over position in which would find itself in proceeding to such meeting (which could not be held without publicity) in face recent Greek public pronouncements that only solution for Cyprus is enosis. If Prime Minister Demirel went to meeting under present circumstances his political opposition would galvanize general Turk public around suspicion he meeting Kollias "to discuss enosis."
3. I made point that our assessment of King Constantine, with whom Ambassador Talbot enjoys particularly close relations, is that he is deeply committed to find Cyprus settlement which would lay basis for permanent friendship with Turkey; and that he could and would be sort of guarantor or underwriter of any agreed settlement, thus legitimizing it for an elected successor Greek Govt. Caglayangil agreed with our assessment of King but stated GOT does not feel same confidence toward rest of GOG, which in discussions continuously raises the ante "from two to eight" in its own favor. GOT has emphasized to GOG that on basis its four principles "there are 20 ways" to settle Cyprus problem: federation, cantonment, adjustment of Zurich agreements, etc. Greece on other hand offers Turkey "lease for sixty or eighty years". Former US Ambassador Warren (believe he meant Amb. Hare) had supported such offer to Inonu who replied that even if Parliament accepted it he would refuse for "only a big power can keep a base on foreign territory." In answer my query about personalities he said Economou-Gouras is a technician and ineffectual. Kollias much better but controlled by, not controlling, the military leaders. I said this left question of how dialogue could be carried forward but I expected that King Constantine would mention privately to President at Washington GOG's "unanswered" proposal for PM level meeting. As it possible that King is not fully informed on GOT-GOG exchanges proposal, was there something useful President could say in rejoinder?
Caglayangil suggested might be emphasized to King that in view tension in Middle East now is time for rapid solution of Cyprus problem. Greece should recognize that Turkish attitudes conditioned by former possession of Cyprus and by allegiance of Turk-Cypriots to Turkey. It should therefore take into account not just what is in Turkey's interest but what is within Turkey's range of possibilities, in negotiating Cyprus settlement. Then he hesitated and said Turkmen would let me have more closely reasoned suggestion August 30. (This being Turk holiday I expect it may be August 31.)
I also stressed that we also felt that now was time to reach such agreement since present Govt of Greece, if it could be galvanized to take substantive steps would not need concern itself as much with press or public position as would a successor elected government. Latter in fact would probably be unable to tackle such basic decision but on other hand would find it hard to reverse or declare illegitimate such agreement if it carried King's endorsement. Caglayangil and Turkmen seemed to agree./3/
/3/In telegram 972 from Ankara, August 31, Hart reported that a meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers would take place September 9-10. He added that Demirel had expressed pessimism about chances of a breakthrough. (Ibid.)
Hart
300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
KCG/G-2
Washington, September 7, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Briefing Book Files: Lot 69 D 553, Visit of King Constantine. Secret. Talking points for the President's meeting with the King were attached but are not printed.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting with King Constantine of Greece
King Constantine is coming to Washington at his request./2/ While the main purpose of his visit is to explain the aims of the Greek Government which came to power in the April 21, 1967 coup and to obtain U.S. understanding and support for the Government, at the same time he will seek Presidential assurances of U.S. backing in any confrontation he might have with the Greek junta. The King views his role as one of continuously pressing the coup leaders in the direction of a return to democratic processes. He also believes that his standing with the junta, as well as Greek-U.S. relations, will be enhanced by the resumption of U.S. military assistance to Greece. The very fact that you have agreed to receive him will strengthen his position with the Government.
/2/King Constantine had been scheduled to make a good will tour of Europe and Canada. Following the April coup, the Western European portion of the tour was cancelled. Telegram 589 from Athens, July 30, reported that the King hoped to utilize some of the days originally scheduled for Europe to make an informal visit to the United States and had requested a meeting with the President. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 7 GREECE) President Johnson approved an invitation on August 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, King Constantine) Telegram 876 from Athens, August 18, reported that the King had expressed the desire for a private meeting with the President to discuss Cyprus and internal Greek developments. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GREECE)
We share the King's view that he can play a constructive role in encouraging the Greek Government in the direction of constitutionalism. However, we believe we should caution him against pushing the regime to the point of provoking a confrontation, since we do not want to see armed conflict in Greece and would not wish to intervene militarily in his behalf. We realize that walking such a narrow line is a difficult course to follow, and believe that the visit offers the occasion to reassure the 27-year old King of our recognition of the importance of the monarchy as well as our appreciation of his vital role in returning the country to constitutionalism. On military assistance, we believe that you should inform the King that full resumption of MAP is out of the question at this time because of strong public and Congressional sentiment against such a move; however, we are prepared to consider releasing a few of the items now currently suspended. In this way we can bolster the King's position vis-?-vis the coup leadership as well as prevent our own relations with the Greek Government from becoming frozen.
In sum, we believe that the visit of the King can serve a useful purpose in making clear our profound desire for continued close relations with Greece as well as our belief in the necessity for an early return to constitutional government. It also provides an opportunity to reassure the King of our support for him and at the same time to discourage him from moving into a confrontation with the junta.
Dean Rusk
301. Memorandum of Meeting Between President Johnson and King Constantine/1/
Washington, September 11, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Secret; Nodis. The source text, which bears the handwritten dates "9/13" and "9/15/67," bears no drafting information but, according to a September 25 covering memorandum by Benjamin Read, it was prepared on the basis of Walt Rostow's recollections. According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with King Constantine alone in the Oval Office from 12:37 to 1:30 p.m., when they joined Vice President Humphrey, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lucius Battle, Greek Charg? Alcibiades C. Papadopoulos, and Grand Marshal of the Greek Court Leonidas Papagos for a luncheon. The King left the White House at 2:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) During his Washington visit, the King also met with members of Congress. A memorandum of this conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Athens Post Files: FRC 72 A 5030, POL 7 Visits, King Constantine.
King Constantine of Greece in his conversations with the President described developments in Greece and pointed to two times at which the confrontation with the coup leaders might occur: (1) at the time the committee report on the constitutional revision was reviewed by the coup leaders, and (2) at the time of a plebiscite on the constitutional revision. The first might be in December, the second later in 1968. The King was not certain that a confrontation would occur on the other hand--it might occur at any time if a "second round" were attempted--but these two times were obvious potential points when the crunch might come. The King elaborated on the fact that if a confrontation were to occur, it would be on issues of real substance, not on such questions as, for example, military appointments.
The King expressed a lack of confidence in the coup leaders' ability to come up with coherent government policies. He did not think that they had the talents to govern. He was evidently by no means confident that they would stick to the constitutional commitment and schedule.
Speaking of return to constitutional government and the King's relationships with the military in general, he noted that he had some support of certain military leaders in the northern areas but he recognized that as time went on the coup leaders were attempting to infiltrate all commands with officers of absolute loyalty to them.
The King spoke at some length about the question of confrontation and his relationships with the coup leaders. He gave the impression of being serious-minded and devoted to the concept of returning Greece to constitutional procedures and democratic processes. He stated that he was willing to get his family out of Greece if tensions between him and the coup leaders grew, and to go so far as to risk his life if a confrontation were unavoidable.
He inquired as to what we were prepared to do in the case of a confrontation and spoke of the possibility of (1) the landing of marines as a show of force, (2) the positioning of Sixth Fleet units in Greek waters, and (3) a sympathetic U.S. posture and a public statement reaffirming the U.S. support for the King's efforts to return the country to constitutionalism.
The President explained the problems growing out of such a request and noted that a military intervention would not be feasible. The question of a public statement would be studied in the light of circumstances at the time, but he could not commit himself in advance on this question.
Addressing himself to the question of military aid, the King made a plea for restoration of military aid, noting that the continued withholding of aid was not achieving the U.S. political objectives and causing serious irritation to the coup colonels. Some military aid linked to continued loyalty to the constitutional scenario would be helpful.
The President made clear that he could make no commitment until legislation was passed but indicated that he understood the King's argument.
In terms of specific requests, the King pointed to the need to be in a position to communicate with his people in the event of a confrontation and asked for a possible use of VOA radio facilities (either Thessaloniki or more likely Rhodes). Secondly, he asked for more efficient two-way communications facilities between the Palace and the US Embassy in Athens. His third request was for US support of a program loan of $70 million for Greece to assist in the reconstruction of the earthquake-damaged areas. On this subject Mr. Rostow explained the problems involved in reopening the question of a program loan for a country that had graduated from the AID school and had achieved the economic growth rate which Greece had over the past years. Speaking to the question of the earthquake, it was stated that the needs on that front could be examined with a view to any assistance of a humanitarian nature that might be given to relieve the temporary housing needs in the stricken areas. There was talk of examining the possibility of obtaining Nissen huts but it was understood that this matter would have to be explored more fully with Athens.
The King explained the legal position with Andreas Papandreou, and the President explained our political problem with him and other political prisoners. It was clear the King did not rule out an amnesty once the legal procedures had been followed.
The King explained his deep disappointment in the failure of the Cyprus talks. Secretary Rusk volunteered that he would take the matter up with the two Foreign Secretaries in New York.
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