Documents 218-242
Continuing Discussions of a Cyprus Solution
January-October 1966
218. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, January 11, 1966, 1731Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.
1054. Ref: Deptel 744./2/
/2/Telegram 744 to Athens, January 10, requested an analysis of Tsirimokos' proposal for the resumption of U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)
1. We believe Tsirimokos had two main objectives in mind when he proposed mediation proceed under SYG aegis. Maintenance of UN cover for any talks on Cyprus is important for Stephanopoulos govt, just as it was for Papandreou, who had systematically drummed into mind of Greek public that UN path was only traversible course towards just solution of Cyprus problem. Will be recalled that GOG last May felt compelled to justify its agreement to begin its dialogue with GOT with argument that it was simply following suggestion of Plaza who had recommended talks among parties to dispute.
2. Second, Tsirimokos probably concluded that one sensible way out of cul-de-sac created by Plaza's resignation/3/ would be for SYG himself to assume Mediator's mantle. To find someone else would be difficult and could lead to repetition of situation which has culminated in Plaza resignation. We doubt Tsirimokos expects that SYG would take up active role as Mediator, at least not initially. Rather, Thant could simply state that under mandate of March '64 SC resolution, he was placing himself and Secretariat at disposal of parties concerned for whatever ways they considered appropriate for assisting them in finding early solution to problem. Tsirimokos would not object to participation member SYG in mediation (Embtel 1055)./4/
/3/Galo Plaza resigned on December 22, 1965.
/4/Dated January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
3. Re para two Nicosia's 342,/5/ we see merit in parcelling out Cyprus problem into [garble] elements in order to discover where points of flexibility may exist. But it may be difficult to mount the scheme organizationally, particularly considering sensitivities of participants to each separate negotiation. We believe it might be preferable first to await results of GOG soundings in Ankara regarding resumption of dialogue. Tsirimokos is aware, as we all are, that Makarios cannot be ignored, but he is rightfully fearful that Makarios and Cyprus press will seek to torpedo talks before they have any chance of success. It seems to us that we should concentrate our efforts now in stressing to GOG importance of avoiding imposition of preconditions to future dialogue with GOT (Embtel 1055). We might also suggest to GOT that it accept UNSYG cover for talks and that it be as forthcoming as possible with Greeks on resumption of dialogue./6/
/5/Dated January 8. (Ibid.)
/6/In telegram 576 to Ankara, the Department of State reported that Menemencioglu had stated that the Turkish Government strongly opposed the idea of resumed U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)
Talbot
219. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, January 24, 1966, 0545Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, London, Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
367. NATUS. Ankara's 819 to Dept; Embtel 364./2/
/2/Telegram 819 from Ankara, January 20, suggested a U.S. approach to the forthcoming talks with the British on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 364 from Nicosia, January 21, endorsed these proposals but noted that neither the Cypriot nor Greek Government appeared ready to negotiate .(Ibid.)
1. We agree with Ankara's 819 that general framework for solution should consist of enosis with compensations to Turkey in some form. However, we have serious doubts about anyone getting Makarios to agree to serve up sufficient compensations here on the island to enable GOT to regard solution as double enosis. Unless outside parties ready to impose double enosis concept on Greek Cypriots most we might be able persuade GOC accept would be GOT military presence in one of UK sovereign areas. Of course, [garble--no?] indication now that GOC would consider even this much compensation. In addition to enosis with compensations we believe solution should also include some form of non-federation-federation. (Embtel 953 to Dept, dated Jan 2, 1965)/3/ Our talks here on island with various parties lead us to believe that neither Greeks nor Turk Cypriots are adamantly opposed to concepts set forth in that cable. This makes non-federation-federation perhaps best starting point for negotiations.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid.)
2. Believe that one way of getting around enosis problem would be to come up with some formula for postponing decision. This might be along following lines: parties would agree that although other elements of settlement would come into effect immediately question of enosis would be delayed until end of pre-established period, say five years. At that time people of Cyprus voting as whole and not by community would hold plebiscite under UN supervision. They would be asked to consider whether they favored continued independence or enosis with Greece, but it would be agreed in advance that none of rights given Turk Cypriots in other parts of settlement or arrangements preserving these rights would be changed no matter which way vote went. During five year period international financial assistance would be given to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to leave island if they so chose or to resettle elsewhere on island itself. (Last concept would have to be worked out carefully to avoid it being cloak for partition.) Also during period UN would maintain fairly large observer force which would assist UN Commissioner for Human Rights. At end of period and after plebiscite Turk Cypriots only would be asked to vote on whether or not they wished such Commission and Observer Force to continue.
3. We realize that this suggestion means continuation of enosis issue for several years but think it might be easier for Turks to accept than immediate enosis even with compensation, thus perhaps lowering price of latter. Furthermore, pro-enosists here becoming discredited and considerably weaker than at various times previously during Cyprus crisis and there is now very little pressure which can be brought to bear on Archbishop to accept enosis with compensations. As long as Makarios is around he will determine island's basic attitude towards enosis and Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly accept his tactical approach of obtaining unfettered self-determination first.
4. On short range approaches believe that in addition to measures suggested Ankara's 819 we might consider seriously idea para 5 Deptel 1765 to USUN,/4/ of having Bernardes center his operations in Nicosia and deal with GOG and GOT through respective Embassies. With his low visibility Bernardes could "mediate" without trappings of formal mediation, facilitate GOG and GOT "dialogue" without either formally having to agree to such and expand Turk and Greek Cypriot talks on daily problems into wider elements of overall settlement without attracting undue attention. In fact, Bernardes already has opportunities in daily diplomatic round here to make moves along these lines, but because of his mandate and temperament is extremely cautious and presumably would need some push from SYG. Best of all, perhaps, using Bernardes in this way would give us chance to monitor and even guide course of talks (Embtel 351)./5/
/4/In telegram 1765 to USUN, January 21, the Department of State provided guidance for dealing with diplomatic inquiries about the U.S. position on U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)
/5/Dated January 24. (Ibid., STR 10 VIET N)
5. In any case we think that emphasis on obtaining "mediation" and "mediator" somewhat misplaced in context realities Cyprus situation. [garble] is that mediation implies partial effort by Mediator and our guess is that as Tuomioja and Galo Plaza before him Bernardes would end up with same general conclusions as Plaza report. In light of this we would cast Bernardes in role para 4, rather than as new Mediator. However he thought he could get parties to talk with each other through him we agree with Ankara that US-UK "external initiatives" will be necessary to reach final agreement.
Cross
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, January 29, 1966, 6:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 CYP/UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moffitt; cleared by UNP, GTI, and Hare; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
1813. NATUS. Cyprus mediation. Ref: USUN's 3297./2/
/2/Telegram 3297, January 26, reported that the Secretary-General was seeking U.S. views about a four-power guarantee of an independent Cyprus. (Ibid.)
1. Dept concurs in response you made to Rolz-Bennett re undesirability involving Soviets directly in any effort mediate Cyprus dispute or any joint action with Soviets in promoting or guaranteeing solution. We have always viewed Cyprus question as of primary concern to West and NATO and Soviet position on question as opportunistic effort to weaken NATO ties in eastern Mediterranean. Request you continue discourage SYG from pursuing Big Four guarantee idea and convey this position to UKUN.
2. Seems to us that any suggestion of international guarantee for ultimate Cyprus solution is premature. What is needed at this time to move Cyprus problem off dead center is resumption active UN mediation effort directed to finding elements on which agreement might be reached. While not prepared at this stage to rule out any proposal for solution, Dept tends to agree that, to obtain GOT acceptance of any formula, it may be necessary to continue prohibition against enosis at least for time. If this proves be case, however, continued exclusion of enosis would be only one element in any package which it might be possible to develop. For example, future status of Turk Cypriots in independent Cyprus would be critical. We feel that finding these elements is first order of business.
3. We hope therefore SYG will act soon on resumption mediation and believe, as indicated Deptel 1765,/3/ expansion Bernardes role offers best prospect for agreement on new mediation. Believe would be useful try to influence SYG in this direction prior Rolz-Bennett's departure.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 219.
4. Despite parties' statements in GA, we do not agree with SYG and Rolz-Bennett conclusion that an independent Cyprus is "common thread" running through position of parties; GOG, while it may not be optimistic about achieving enosis, clearly hopes that unfettered independence for Cyprus would ultimately lead to union with Greece.
Rusk
221. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, January 28, 1966, 1652Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Received at 8:09 a.m. on January 31 and repeated to London, Paris, Athens, Nicosia, EUCOM and USDOCOSouth for POLAD, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
858. NATUS. Embtel 841./2/ FonMin Caglayangil summoned me to his residence Jan 28 for first exploratory talk on elements of possible solution to Cyprus problem. Turkmen from FonOff Cyprus Bureau also attended. FonMin said he had wanted to see me before leaving for RCD meeting in Pakistan and hoped to see me upon return. Meanwhile he wished express Turkish desire to find logical, just solution acceptable to all parties and give us Turk aims and viewpoints:
/2/Telegram 841 from Ankara, January 26, reported that a statement by Caglayangil comparing Cyprus and Austria did not represent any change in Turkey's position. (Ibid.)
First: Turkey wants to study what initiatives are possible in UN, how to evaluate present situation, what are mediation prospects, how would Greeks and Greek Cypriots act.
Secondly: Turkey interested in what are available alternatives in seeking basis for settlement satisfactory to all. Legally, London-Zurich treaties are valid, GOT agrees, however, that treaties not eternal but maintains that principles continue exist. Principles on which Turkey must insist re Cyprus are: (A) no unilateral annexation; (B) acknowledgement of existence of two communities; (C) no domination of one community by the other; and (D) both communities must participate in administration.
Turkey can negotiate on alternatives (federation, cantonal system) but not on basic principles. In answer to my questions, FonMin said he did not wish to go into details of cantonal or other system, all of which can be studied later. Could include "municipal autonomy" or other features. FonMin continued GOT has no complaint against treaties but it is Greeks and Greek Cypriots who want to amend them. Let them make proposals. Turkey is willing to amend treaty provisions if proposed alternative solution at variance with treaty but acceptable to all parties because it is logical and just. Our aim is to find such alternative.
I asked FonMin if he had adopted independent Cyprus as basis of solution and was no longer considering double enosis formula such as Acheson plan. He replied double enosis does not injure principles outlined above. Any solution including double enosis, federation, cantonal government, a base (by which, I believe, he meant Turk base on Cyprus), might fit in with principles.
I said US not committed to any particular solution, nor did it even have a favorite one. We only desired an agreed and permanent one. Asked FonMin whether two communities had co-existed without much irritation under Ottoman and British rule. He replied they had never lived together without irritation and conflict, but problems always of local nature until possibility of enosis and independence gave rise to increased conflict. Noted that it useful to discuss Cyprus problem now before situation heats up again, referred to GOT interest in own economic development and to Cyprus issue hanging over GOT like Sword of Damocles. Said Turk-Greek bilateral relations must be improved and added, after Turkmen's intervention, that these relations cannot improve outside context of Cyprus problem. Observed that Turkey had raised no claim on Dodecanese, but Greek unilateral annexation of Cyprus would upset Turk-Greek balance established by Treaty of Lausanne, and Turkey would be strategically surrounded.
Re UN mediation, FonMin said he had no personality in mind. Voiced strong opinion that institution of mediation should be one in which Mediator seeks find middle ground and bring opposing parties together. Said Mediator could not also be arbitrator and judge, like Galo Plaza. I raised as my personal idea possibility of Bernardes discreetly expanding his activities and functions on Cyprus without benefit of official nomination or publicity. FonMin said only that GOT did not want Mediator with preconceived ideas. Turkmen commented that Latin Americans do not have feel for European problems and tend see things in Latin American context. Probably thinking of Bernardes as well as Galo Plaza, he added that person who had been engrossed in island scene might not see larger Turk-Greek picture. FonMin said this problem would not arise if European were Mediator. Then he warned that enosis by force or apparent independence views of eventual enosis would not be peaceful solution but would lead to guerrilla warfare, sabotage, etc.
FonMin remarked that UK Ambassador told him of his return to London for consultation on Cyprus with FonOff and colleagues from Athens and Nicosia. FonMin said he thought UK would then consult with us and hoped that US and UK not reach any firm position without consulting Turkey. I replied that any US-UK consultations that might occur would certainly be exploratory. He then asked whether it true that US Ambassadors in Athens and Nicosia had made proposals re Cyprus to respective governments. I said I sure they could not have done so because US has no solution to propose on Cyprus issue.
Comment follows by septel.
Hart
222. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 3, 1966, 1440Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, Paris, USUN, Izmir, Istanbul, and Adana.
885. NATUS. USUN's 3340 to Dept, Deptel 629./2/ Embassy shares Department's views contained Deptel 629, especially paragraph 4. Nevertheless Department may find Embassy's estimate of Turk views useful supplement. We believe four-power guarantee of Cyprus independence (and against enosis and partition) would not be feasible or desirable from Turkish point of view. Principal reasons are:
/2/Telegram 3340 from USUN reported that the Secretary-General had been apprised of preliminary negative U.S. response to his four-power guarantee proposal. (Ibid.) Telegram 629 to Ankara was sent for action to USUN as telegram 1813, Document 220.
1. GOT still not inclined to place great trust in USSR. Despite past disappointment in US and UK and recent efforts toward Turk-USSR normalization of relations, GOT continues regard USSR as more friendly to Greece and Cyprus than to Turkey;
2. Turkey is committed to position against unilateral enosis but not necessarily against partition or double enosis (Embtel 858);/3/
/3/Document 221.
3. Turkey is concerned about its strategic position vis-?-vis Greeks and Greek Cypriots whom Turks tend regard as one enemy, not two. Therefore, in event Cyprus is annexed to Greece, or if Turks lost foothold in Cyprus represented by their 650 men contingent and Makarios becomes undisputed lord of island, resulting Greek strategic envelopment of Turkey (as Turks prone to see it) constitutes situation which FonMin said was unacceptable.
4. Nature of guarantee and rights of Turk Cypriot community within independent Cyprus more important in Turk view than guarantee of independence for Cyprus. SYG and Rolz-Bennett arguments do not seem take account of future role of Turk Cypriot community in independent Cyprus.
Hart
223. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 5, 1966, 1125Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for Crawford and James, USDOCOSouth for Freshman, and USUN.
1163. NATUS.
1. GOG-Makarios communiqu? (Embtel 1154)/2/ which climaxed week of discussions shows how far present GOG anxious to avoid cleavage with Archbishop over any part of current Makarios doctrine for Cyprus.
/2/Dated February 3. (Ibid.)
2. Theodoropoulos (FonOff) volunteered to us that communiqu? was "too long" (by which he likely meant it to be understood that so much detail in communiqu? led to spelling out of positions issue by issue which would make future negotiations difficult). He said current tight identity of views between Makarios and GOG was victory for diplomacy of Tsirimokos because it had patched up outstanding differences between Athens and Nicosia. In this connection, Theodoropoulos recalled that Archbishop had been cool to current GOG and in particular to Stephanopoulos because latter on record in Parliamentary speech in course of which Stephanopoulos suggested "dark forces" had obstructed adoption of Acheson plan. This had led Makarios to refrain from congratulating Stephanopoulos on his elevation to Prime Minister last September.
3. GOG public position on future discussions with Turks has certainly been getting appreciably less flexible in the last month. Tsirimokos at reception this week honoring Makarios said, "We agree on basic principle that Cyprus problem is not problem of negotiations and haggling between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus problem is basically and mainly, if not exclusively, despite its impact on Greek-Turkish relations, a problem of self-determination, independence and sovereignty of people of Cyprus. It is up to them to decide their future and their fate."
4. This contrasts with Tsirimokos remarks in Parliament and to the Ambassador (Embtel 1005)/3/ last December when he indicated a much more flexible view on propriety and utility of Greek-Turkish talks.
/3/Dated December 30, 1965. (Ibid.)
5. Theodoropoulos reiterated that if Turks want to talk about enosis, Turks and Greeks are competent for such discussions since problem then is addition of territory to Greek soil. But discussions which have to do with the regime on the island as an independent state principally concern Republic of Cyprus and cannot therefore be conducted without Makarios' participation as principal. GOG would be happy to see GOT consult with Makarios re administration of island but GOG will not discuss such questions separately with Turks.
6. In contrast to rigor of above, FonMin Tsirimokos told me in pre-dinner conversation two nights ago that he counts good Greek-Turkish relations as extremely important and hopes some agreement could be reached in area of a specific guarantee of independence of Cyprus for ten years. He thought rights of Turk Cypriots could be worked out, preferably on basis that enjoyment their rights be assured by international (presumably UN) mechanism rather than by Greek-Turkish joint or separate arrangements. He believed agreement along these lines would do away with any purpose to continued presence of Greek and Turkish contingents on the island. He agreed with me that Turks would consider such an arrangement only on such justification as that Turkey had succeeded in barring enosis for fixed period, at end of which Turks could presumably be in a stronger position to attract world support for justice of Turk views. Tsirimokos concluded that he did not believe in official negotiation on these points, but suggested obliquely possibility that "your people in Ankara" (meaning US Emb) could smoke out whether Turks interested in arrangements sketched out above.
7. Discussion of defense questions between GOG and Makarios said to have resulted in decision that Greek General Staff would study defense of Cyprus with view to possible reduction of forces. We have no direct confirmation, and Tsirimokos (for public consumption) announced yesterday that "under present conditions, GOG did not intend to reduce its military forces in Cyprus."
8. Theodoropoulos reports three candidates are under active consideration as new GOG Ambassador to Ankara but "snags" have developed with respect to each candidate. Hopes this personnel placement problem will be ironed out soon.
Comment: For domestic political reasons GOG wanted to succeed in making Makarios visit occasion for doing away with impression of divergency of views between Makarios and GOG. This impulse, we believe, will continue to inhibit GOG in taking initiatives to re-start dialogue with Turks except if specific and stated purpose is solution involving enosis. Greeks keep pointing out that nothing in Turk attitude so far suggests to GOG that more generalized dialogue likely to have fruitful outcome.
Talbot
224. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 21, 1966, 1513Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, Paris, EUCOM and USDOCOSouth for POLAD, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
965. NATUS. Ref: Deptel 711, Embtels 949, 966./2/ Cyprus. After delineating background and noting questions to be resolved in US-Turk relations, FonMin Caglayangil told Ambassador US and Turkey should work on one or several alternatives. Best alternative should be selected and both countries should then direct efforts to achieve it. He suggested he, FonOff SecGen Bayulken and Cyprus Bureau Chief Turkmen should participate on Turkish side and Ambassador and one member Embassy staff on US side. He would devote as much time as he could to these meetings although he might not be able to attend every one.
/2/Telegram 711 to Ankara, February 17, provided instructions for discussions with Caglayangil. (Ibid.) Telegram 949 from Ankara, February 17, requested guidance for this meeting. (Ibid.) Telegram 966 from Ankara, February 21, reported Caglayangil's discussion of the domestic "background" to Turkey's foreign policy positions. (Ibid.)
FonMin observed that Cyprus should not be considered separate question outside context of US-Turk relations. Cyprus situation now static but cannot be left thus. Cyprus was sore point for Greece as well as Turkey because all three had other problems, especially economic, to which they could more effectively devote their energies. Furthermore, GOT had to consider continuing difficult situation of Turk-Cypriot community. Turkey convinced question must be solved by means of negotiation, and US had important role to play. US should therefore be active now and try to help solve problem before it reached another acute crisis. FonMin pressed for exchange of views and information with us and for dispassionate ("outside-looking in") evaluation of Cyprus alternatives. If US-Turk agreement on best alternative reached, US would then, he hoped, use its influence to achieve results.
Ambassador replied we could begin exchange of views anytime. He noted big difference in Greek and Turkish positions on approaches to problem of Cyprus. However, it seemed to us that there was still room for maneuver and negotiation between Greek and Turkish positions. Ambassador observed that first Turkish principle was opposition to any unilateral enosis (Embtel 858)./3/ Then he continued along lines para 3 Deptel 711./4/ FonMin made no substantive comment, and Ambassador continued along lines para 1 Deptel 711. FonMin agreed continuation of UNFICYP of great importance.
/3/Document 221.
/4/This paragraph discussed Greece's position on Cyprus.
In reply to Ambassador's question, FonMin had nothing new to add on Rolz-Bennett's visit (Embtel 952)./5/ He said perhaps Rolz-Bennett's report to SYG would form basis for SYG to explain to Security Council that mediation will not work under present circumstances. Perhaps, FonMin continued, SC can take new decision on mediation, for example, establish team of three mediators. In any event GOT told Rolz-Bennett that Turkey ready for mediation so long as functions of Mediator agreed upon ahead of time to preclude Mediator becoming arbitrator and promoting publicly his personal views.
/5/Telegram 952 from Ankara, February 18, reported Rolz-Bennett's visit to Ankara. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP) Rolz-Bennett visited Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia February 9-19.
Discussion concluded with FonMin saying he would be in touch concerning further talks on Cyprus.
Hart
225. Field Information Report/1/
[document number not declassified]
Athens, March 7, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, POL 15 GVT. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissem.
COUNTRY
Greece
SUBJECT
Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group
DATE OF INFO
August 1965-23 February 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (24 February 1966)
SOURCE
[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] information has been fairly reliable
1. In late 1963 and early 1964 a group of rightist Greek Army colonels (reported at that time as the military conspiratorial group) organized to stage a military coup if Georgios Papandreou accepted support from the United Democratic Left (EDA). After Papandreou's election, the group was dispersed by transfers to Cyprus and northern Greece. Those officers have now completed their tours in these areas and are gradually returning to key command positions in Athens through the help of Lt. Colonel Georgios Vagenas, Director of the Greek Army General Staff (GAGS) office dealing with assignments.
2. Although Vagenas is not a member of the military conspiratorial group, he is friendly with many of its members and is influenced by Lt. Col. Georgios Papadopoulos, who is now with the First Army in Larissa, and Lt. Col. Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, both of whom are competing for the leadership of the group now being revived. Col. Ioannis Lazaris, Director of the Chief of GAGS office and reportedly well thought of by the Palace, is also influenced by Stamatelopoulos. Lazaris is also a key man in the placement of officers.
3. The following members of the military conspiratorial group have recently returned to key positions in the Athens area:
a. Lt. Col. Kostas Papadopoulos, brother of Georgios, has been assigned as commander of the Dionysios Battalion since early February 1966;
b. Lt. Col. Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, commander of the Agia Paraskevi Battalion since mid-October 1965;
c. Lt. Col. Antonios Mexis, expected soon to take a battalion command in the Athens area;
d. Lt. Col. Ioannis Ledis, Director of Military Police with headquarters in GAGS;
e. Lt. Col. Dimitrios Ioannides, expected soon to take a battalion command in the Athens area;
f. Lt. Col. Theodoros Patsouros, expected soon to take a communications command function in Athens;
g. Lt. Col. Michail Roufogalis, temporarily assigned on 23 February 66 to head the Security Office of the Greek Central Intelligence Serv-ice (KYP), is expected to move to "A" Branch of KYP./2/
/2/Field Comment: A Greek security official reported in late February that Roufogalis will act in Papadopoulos' stead while the latter is in Larissa. [Footnote in the source text.]
h. Lt. Col. Antonios Lekkas, expected soon to take a key command in the Athens area.
Ladas, Ioannides, Patsouros, Lekas, and even Kostas Papadopoulos, who is at odds with his brother, are supporters of Stamatelopoulos. Roufogalis is close to Papadopoulos, but Stamatelopoulos is trying to win his confidence.
4. Just before the Center Union (EK) 16 February 1966 rally in Athens, Lt. Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos came to Athens to contact military colonels in the event a coup was deemed necessary to thwart mob violence instigated by EDA or by Georgios Papandreou at the rally. Papadopoulos told his military contacts that Lt. General Grigorios Spandidakis, Chief of GAGS, had summoned him to Athens./3/,/4/
/3/Source Comment: Spandidakis is generally aware of the rightist military conspiratorial group but believes that it is more in line with his thinking relative to military intervention if necessary; i.e., that the King would rule through martial law. He therefore condones many of the transfers taking place now. [Footnote in the source text.]
/4/Field Comment: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Papadopoulos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that he had come to Athens to determine what type of support the army could expect from the police in the event there was trouble during the 16 February rally. If the crowds decided to march against the Palace or Parliament, Papadopoulos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the army would take over. Papadopoulos also [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that there were only "precautionary plans" [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. The aims of this rightist group are to counter or avert leftist infiltration of the government and the military. Its fears that an uprising similar to that which occurred in the Greek Forces in the Middle East during World War II were increased with the discovery of another military conspiratorial group, Aspida, which the rightist group believes was inspired by the neutralist trend oriented by Center Union (EK) Deputy Andreas Papandreou. As a result of the strenuous efforts by former Chief of KYP, Lt. General (retired) Alexandros Natsinas to have a Reader's Digest article on Brazil, "The Country that Saved Itself", translated and widely distributed in Greece, the group saw a parallel between the situation in Greece under the Papandreous and the situation created in Brazil by the Joao Belchior Marques Goulart regime. It identifies itself with the thinking and policy of the Brazilian military junta.
6. The group has been divided since 1963, when Stamatelopoulos felt that Papadopoulos was willing to sacrifice competence and integrity for political expediency by his aid to certain officers to obtain key KYP positions and other command positions. Papadopoulos' actions were in response to political pressures and his desire to placate General Natsinas, then his superior, who was too closely identified with the National Radical Union (ERE). Stamatelopoulos' faction preferred not to align itself with any political party. Papadopoulos has used Natsinas and Nikolaos Farmakis, a former ERE deputy noted for his extreme rightist convictions, as contacts to rightist politicians. The key factor now joining the Papadopoulos and Stamatelopoulos factions is their common desire to neutralize the power of any officers who have any connections with ASPIDA. Emphasis is now being placed on identifying these officers who continue to occupy secondary posts within the military commands of Athens and who are in a position to learn of the group's activities. The tempo of replacement of these officers is expected to increase during March 1966. As a figurehead, the Stamatelopoulos group tends to favor Major General (retired) Georgios Ballas.
7. Stamatelopoulos' faction has contact with the Palace through one of the King's aides, Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Zagorianakos. The King's personal secretary Major Michail Armaoutis does not have Stamatelopoulos' confidence. Stamatelopoulos feels that if the King opts for extra-constitutional military activity, the King would prefer martial law with rule by decree--a situation which Papadopoulos and the higher military commanders (particularly Spandidakis, Lt. General Christos Papedatos, and other generals hand-picked by Lt. General (retired) Konstantinos Dovas, former Chief of the King's Military Household) would be inclined to accept. Stamatelopoulos' faction prefers a military junta which would allow the King very few prerogatives; this faction blames the Palace for the political instability, starting with the fall of former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1963.
226. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, March 22, 1966, 1135Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, USUN, Paris, USDOCOSouth, and Ankara.
438. NATUS. Athens 1379 to Dept; Athens 1388 to Dept./2/
/2/Telegram 1379 from Athens, March 20, discussed the problem created by Grivas' presence on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1388 from Athens, March 21, analyzed the impact of the Makarios-Grivas struggle on Greek politics. (Ibid.)
1. Aside from its effect on Greek politics (reftels) current acute phase of Makarios-Grivas feud represents danger to peace and stability on island. We believe there are dangers inherent in Grivas "victory", i.e., unequivocal control over forces of Greek side on Cyprus especially National Guard.
2. From US viewpoint Grivas' initial appearance on island in June 1964 had some utility, mainly in organizing and disciplining National Guard and disbanding or absorbing armed bands of Lyssarides and Sampson, etc. These purposes were largely accomplished by end of '64 but since that time Grivas presence here has had disruptive effect on developments. It is not clear how much collusion or tacit agreement existed between Makarios and Grivas at critical moments such as Famagusta last November or Ambelikou earlier but obviously Grivas did not exert restraining influence and consensus was that both were Grivas doing. On political side his followers constitute most intractable (even though they are anti-Communist) group on island. They are against anything except enosis now and likely continue to be adamantly opposed to any compromise solution.
3. Earlier when "instant enosis" was actively being considered as possible solution perhaps Grivas had value as man who could be relied upon take effective action on island, theory being that he had necessary prestige with Greek Cypriots and could hold island briefly until GOG assumed administrative control. None of various schemes floated on island at that time envisaged him as ruler of Cyprus for more than few hours or days, it being well understood that except for Makarios' alleged opposition to enosis there existed no real complaints against his government for corruption or mal-administration. Now "instant enosis" followed by immediate appearance of GOG is unthinkable because of inevitable Turkish reaction. At same time Grivas continues to remain at center, in eyes of Cypriots at least, of opposition to Makarios and possibility will always exist that Grivas, if he had wherewithal in shape of armed forces at his disposal would become exasperated with Greek Cypriots over trivial or personal reasons and attempt coup d'etat, unilaterally declaring enosis with ominous consequences or even more idiotically attack Turk Cypriots. Furthermore, having given him this facility GOG would be hard put to disengage from Grivas' actions and thus would also bear brunt of Turkish response. (One wonders, under circumstances, what Stephanopoulos could have thought would be end result of ill-advised move in appointing Grivas supremo in Cyprus.)
4. We are inclined to say that best result of this confrontation now leading to Makarios-Grivas showdown would be to neutralize Grivas by giving him only nominal authority and aiming at his eventual withdrawal from island under face-saving circumstances. This could be achieved by leaving Grivas in command Greek units and appointing someone stature Gennimatas as National Guard commander who would be more stable cooperative individual understanding dangers to Greece and Cyprus of precipitate action against Turk Cypriots or in respect to enosis. We suggest that if occasion presents itself Embassy Athens if appropriate might express opinions along these lines as soon as possible to GOG officials perhaps including Bitsios in Palace.
Belcher
227. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, April 6, 1966, 1547Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Nicosia, London, Paris, Adana, Izmir, and Istanbul.
1203. Embtel 1121./2/ NATUS. Cyprus. At luncheon which I gave for FonMin Caglayangil April 5, Political Counselor summarized impressions of four day trip to Cyprus and subsequent conversations in Athens. This provided opportunity for us to explore Foreign Minister's views on Cyprus situation and Turk attitude toward possible solution.
/2/Telegram 1121 from Ankara, March 22, reported the latest Turkish positions on the Cyprus issue and the recent Greek-Turkish exchanges. (Ibid.)
Political Counselor summarized impressions of Cyprus as follows:
A. Apparent that Turk Cypriot leaders both in Nicosia and other parts of Cyprus were determined to do utmost to protect Turk Cypriot population and defend its rights.
B. Greek Cypriot area of control seemed to be developing normally in economic terms, in contrast to evidence of restrictions and limitation on Turk Cypriot construction, travel, economic development, etc.
C. Over long run, Makarios has interest in at least maintaining status quo because he will thereby strengthen his position and contribute to continuing erosion Turk Cypriot position on island.
D. Turk Cypriots hold limited cards on Cyprus. They do not have enough bargaining power to offset Makarios' efforts to whittle away their rights and position.
In informal personal discussion in Athens among Embassy representatives from Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara, three possible approaches to Cyprus problem were aired.
1. Continuation of existing situation. While this seemed in line with Makarios' wishes and might be acceptable to Greeks, continuation of existing situation could not be regarded as satisfactory by Turk Cypriots or by GOT.
2. Reconsideration of Acheson plans which might still contain some useful elements which were worthy of negotiation among parties concerned.
3. Modus vivendi with provision for deferred settlement, in ten years time, for example. Language would have to finesse ultimate settlement of issues of enosis and partition, and stress would be on protection of Turk Cypriot physical security in intervening period. Variable elements would include future of Greek troops on Cyprus, status of Greek and Turkish contingents, role of UNFICYP, various types of administrative, judicial and police arrangements for Turk Cypriots, and possibility of UN or other international organ to guarantee security Turk Cypriot community.
FonMin replied in several installments as follows:
1. Prior to becoming FonMin, he had reached conclusion that because two communities could not live together, only solution was partition or federation. However, seems unlikely such solution could be attained at present time.
2. In GOT view, it was also apparent Greek Govt was weak and not in position to make decisive commitment re future of Cyprus. For this reason GOT agreed that modus vivendi, if it could be achieved, followed by interim period leading to final settlement might be possible way of approaching Cyprus problem.
3. Continuation of status quo was out of question since GOT had made it clear that this, in itself, was form of fait accompli. Lack of settlement might provoke some Greek Cypriot elements to take action against Turk Cypriots which would compel intervention of Turk armed forces. On other hand, Turk Cypriots, beleaguered and frustrated by status quo, might themselves instigate incident which would incite Greek Cypriot reaction and thereby trigger Turk intervention.
4. Neither Turks nor Turk Cypriots had any faith in Makarios' interest in security of Turk Cypriots. GOT would therefore find it impossible to agree to withdraw Turk military contingent prior to final solution.
5. FonMin stressed instability in Eastern Mediterranean which would continue to exist, in absence of progress toward settlement, with all that this instability means to NATO. Suggested that NATO had important stake in guarantees for Turk Cypriot security and noted sadly that lip service which NATO paid to London-Zurich agreements was of little use to Turk Cypriots.
6. Turks considered that basic principles of London-Zurich agreements were still valid and must be incorporated in any new agreements although they were willing to accept modifications and adjustments in LZ to reflect current situation. Any settlement, even of interim nature, must be in accord with honor and dignity of Turkey.
In reply to FonMin's question re contact with Greek FonOff, Pol Counselor mentioned talk with Theodoropoulos April 2. In general terms latter had personally expressed positive interest in approach toward modus vivendi now with provision for deferred settlement.
Hart
228. Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, April 7, 1966, 1525Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, USUN, Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
469. NATUS.
1. Conversation with Bernardes yesterday indicates continued impasse here with regard his taking any new initiative within context his extended mandate./2/
/2/On March 4, Secretary-General Thant informed the Security Council that he was broadening Bernardes' responsibilities by authorizing him to employ his good offices and to approach the parties in order to achieve discussions at any level. (U.N. Doc. S/7180)
2. His most recent conversation with Makarios showed, if anything, a hardening of Greek Cypriot position with regard any further concessions to Turkish Cypriots living in enclaves. He said Archbishop had warned him that in making any proposals under extended mandate he should bear in mind that Greek position based on concept of unitary state and any proposals out of line with this concept would be automatically rejected by Greeks.
3. In discussing question of any conversations with appropriate representatives Turkish Cypriot community, Makarios has made clear that he not prepared authorize conversations unless Turkish Cypriot side included representatives of dissident Turkish Cypriot elements, i.e. specifically Dr. Ishan Ali. Bernardes commented that this proviso was new and obviously completely unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots. He went on to say, in his view, there was no "will" on part of Greek Cypriots to enter conversations and as matter of fact Archbishop had pointed out that if Turkish Cypriots willing now to sit down to discuss future, in three months time they would be even more willing. In meantime, Archbishop said he prepared wait matter out and reiterated old theme of letting Turks die on vine in their enclaves.
4. Bernardes said his attempts to point out need for some progress prior to June force renewal apparently fell on deaf ears although he continues to believe Makarios would be worried if force were reduced by more than half. Bernardes believes Greek Cypriot leadership being deluded by own propaganda that Turkish Cypriots on verge of collapse. He (and Embassy) have been at some pains to attempt moderate this belief on the part of Greek Cypriots but apparently with little success.
5. As further indication that Greeks in no mood make further compromises in "return to normalcy" Bernardes pointed out that they had substantially changed signals on question of Land Registry Office. Clerides had originally told UN to negotiate on basis of books being in UN custody and on this basis his staff appeared be making progress. A few weeks ago, however, Greeks changed position and now insisting that books come under GOC custody with only supervisory role for UN. It must have been obvious to Greeks that Turks would never accept on this basis.
6. Needless to say Bernardes discouraged by lack of progress here and while not seeing any great potential good in travel to Athens and Ankara, he is now considering attempting use his influence there late this month or early May.
7. Comment: Unfortunately our recent conversations with Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not give me any grounds for optimism or encouragement in my comments to Bernardes.
Belcher
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Athens, April 20, 1966, 1830Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State, USUN, EUCOM for POLAD, Nicosia, London, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana. The source text is the Department of State copy. Passed to the White House and USIA.
379. Cyprus.
1. Turkish aide-m?moire/2/ rightly pinpoints continuing Greek and Greek-Cypriot conviction that time is definitely on their side as important reason for lack of forward movement on Cyprus issue. Present weak GOG is aware of certain dangers in permitting situation to rest as it is, but sees these dangers outweighed by risk to its own survival in granting any major concessions in return for what whole Greek political spectrum has accepted as only truly viable solution, i.e., enosis. Except for those few who talk of grasping nettle to arrest deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations, tendency of Greeks is to continue trying to keep island quiet and to play for time.
/2/Transmitted in Secto 5 from Ankara, April 19. (Ibid.)
2. Implicit Turkish ultimatum would unquestionably anger Greeks. We assume GOG would deny GOC is restricting freedom of movement of Turkish-Cypriots and insist Turkish-Cypriot leaders are in fact themselves preventing their brethren from leaving enclaves and returning to their villages. Regarding other "inhuman" restrictions, Greeks would presumably contend that these are properly matters for discussion between two communities under aegis of Bernardes. GOG would also point to Turkish "inhuman" actions against Greeks of Istanbul, most of whom have been forced to leave during past two years. Finally, I believe GOG would insist (as it regularly and ruefully reminds us) that, however willing it might be to help ease restrictions on Turkish-Cypriots, its influence over Makarios is definitely limited and it is Archbishop who would have final say.
3. If Turks should begin move toward direct actions on island, even in so humanitarian a cause as aide-m?moire adumbrates, Greeks would of course go screaming to United Nations and USG to stop attack on sovereign nation.
4. I assume that Turks in their deep frustration over recent developments on Cyprus now see tactical advantage in involving USG in morass of internal problems on island at moment when they have also opened question of U.S. military facilities for discussion. As U.S. has long asserted and as aide-m?moire now underscores, responsible parties would indeed do well to press on with alleviating conditions of Turk-Cypriots. This would be true even though, as Ambassador Belcher may comment, GOT assertions about inhuman restrictions on Turk-Cypriots are not necessarily to be accepted at face value. However, I doubt USG, with its limited leverage on Makarios, can help situation by getting overly involved in details of Turk-Cypriot conditions. Would not prospective Bernades tour of capitals offer opportunity we can urge Turks to grasp for impressing on parties the seriousness with which GOT regards restraints against Turk Cypriots?
5. Fundamentally, I see no present course open to USG other than continuing to press for direct talks among parties. With departure of Tsirimokos/3/ and prospect that Stephanopoulos will win vote of confidence and appoint less difficult FonMin, we can hope for more active Greek effort to ease tensions with Turkey (though not, so far as I yet see, at material cost to what Greeks consider to be their interests). In this connection, we here interpret Grivas-Makarios conflict as at least in part reflecting intention of certain elements--e.g. Stephanopoulos, Costopoulos, Markezinis--to retain position on island which could in appropriate circumstances permit Athens to enforce on Nicosia an agreement which might have been reached between GOG and GOT. Though clearly not willing eschew enosis forever and thus blocked so long as Turks publicly insist on prior exclusion of enosis, Greeks may edge toward serious discussions if Turks are really disposed to find a solution. Presumably these talks would include consideration of ways of protecting Turk-Cypriots as part either of final settlement or of interim agreement that would include postponement for some years of decision on Cypriot independence, enosis, or partition.
/3/Tsirimokos resigned as Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Ministers on April 11.
6. Prospects for injecting realism into Greek-Turkish talks would be enhanced if Turks could be persuaded also to talk directly with Makarios regime and to permit direct talks between Makarios and Turkish-Cypriots. Recognizing how vigorously GOT has resisted opening those channels, I nevertheless believe we should push this idea.
7. If Greek political scene quiets down somewhat after current confidence debate, we here will do all in our power to rub Greek noses in realities of Turkish frustrations. At same time, I hope USG can make clear to GOT that threat of force applied unilaterally to provision Turkish-Cypriots would bring us all to a dire state.
Talbot
230. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/3
Ankara, April 22, 1966, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dillon and approved in S on May 6. The meeting was held at the Foreign Minister's residence. Secretary Rusk was in Ankara April 19-22 to attend the CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting.
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Parker T. Hart
Asst. Secretary Raymond Hare
Robert S. Dillon, Second Secretary, American Embassy
Turkey
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel
Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil
Haluk Bayulken, Turk Foreign Ministry
Ilter Turkmen, Turk Foreign Ministry
Sukru Elekdag, Turk Foreign Ministry
SUBJECT
Cyprus
Foreign Minister Caglayangil opened the conversation by telling Secretary Rusk that he was pleased to have an opportunity to talk about problems of mutual interest and particularly wanted to discuss Cyprus and the aide-m?moire which the GOT has recently delivered on the subject to the USG. The same aid-m?moire had also been sent to HMG but to no one else./2/
/2/The Embassy in Ankara commented on the Turkish aide-m?moire in telegram 1346, April 26. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk replied that he wanted to stress that his remarks on the aide-m?moire would be strictly preliminary and that there would be an official reply after he had had an opportunity to discuss it with the President. The Secretary assured Caglayangil that the USG shared his concern about the situation of the Turkish Cypriots. He hoped that the GOT would make a full d?marche on the subject to the UNSYG.
The Foreign Minister then alluded to the recent appointment of a Greek Cypriot as Minister of Agriculture on the island as another example of the Makarios technique. He stressed that the difficulty in talking with Makarios or in presenting the Turk demand for "normalization of conditions" for the Turk Cypriots (contained in the aide-m?moire) to the UN would be that Makarios would say let them go back to their villages. This, of course, would not be normalization because the Turk Cypriots would remain under pressure; what the Turks have in mind is equalization of living conditions for the Turk Cypriots within their present enclaves.
The Secretary indicated that he understood the point, but asked if that were an obstacle in going to the UNSYG. Bayulken, SYG of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, interjected "no--we can make a d?marche and wait awhile." The Secretary then asked the GOT position on Turkish participation in the Cypriot Government. For example, at one time the UNSYG had offered some guarantees in connection with Turk participation in the government.
Caglayangil then replied that Turk participation in the Cypriot Government was a good step toward normalization and would be a part of a modus vivendi which the Turks could accept. However, the prospects for such participation looked dim. The aide-m?moire was addressed to the idea that the Turks must have the same conditions in their sectors as the Greeks have in theirs. If the two communities were living under the same conditions then time would cease to be a factor working in favor of the Greek Cypriots.
The Secretary said that the USG accepted the central idea of normalization. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister was correct in saying that Makarios would reply, "if the Turks want normalization, let them go back to their villages." Makarios would not want any steps taken that would represent de facto partition.
The Foreign Minister said that he had two very important points that he wished to emphasize: (1) the Greek Government was weak, which offers easy opportunity for Makarios to engage in provocations; (2) the Turk community was weakening; particularly its morale was weak. It also might engage in provocations. The GOT, USG and "even a reasonable Greek Government" were concerned with other important problems and would want to avoid provocations. However, Makarios, the Greek Cypriots and the Turk community would not be bound by the same sense of responsibility.
The Secretary said that he believed that the governments involved did not want to inflame the situation; therefore, it behooved all to be patient and diligent in seeking solutions to the problem.
The Foreign Minister replied that the GOT was the last one to whom patience needed to be recommended. He felt the GOT record was clear and that it had been extremely patient. He emphasized that the aide-m?moire did not represent a new GOT decision nor was it in preparation for a move (the implication was a military move). However, the GOT wished to raise some of the difficult questions involved. These were also questions that in some manner had to be answered for Turkish public opinion. For instance, what should Turkey do in case of new massacres? In case of an attack on the Turkish contingent? In case of the withdrawal of the UN forces which could lead to the events suggested in the first two questions? For how long can the Turkish community be left in its exposed position?
Without waiting for a reply, he continued that he wanted to reemphasize a point that he had already made to the Secretary. "Why is the U.S. in the Cyprus problem at all? It is not a signatory power to the treaty of guarantee. However, Cyprus has in fact become a very important factor in Turkish-American relations. There was an outbreak of violence on the island in 1963. Turkey could have intervened. At a time when there were no opposing forces on the island and an intervention could have been successful, relatively bloodless, and could have prevented the terrible things that subsequently happened to the Turkish community, why did we not intervene? The answer is that the U.S. did not want us to do so. For example, the Johnson letter was an obstacle and we are still under an obligation to reply to public opinion in Turkey to the question why we did not use this right of intervention guaranteed by the treaty."
The Secretary replied that the problem to the U.S. had not been a question of treaty rights but a question of a war between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. position had been that the serious consequences of such an event to the NATO alliance must be considered.
The Foreign Minister said that he had given the same answer to the Turkish Parliament. However, this did not change the situation that the treaties had been violated. Furthermore, in any appeal to NATO the answer was a foregone conclusion, do nothing. Under the treaties a solution to this type of problem was already provided. Greece and the UK were committed as was Turkey to intervene to prevent violence. The real solution should have been tripartite action to protect the communities and to enforce the treaties. This had not happened because neither the UK nor Greece was willing to live up to treaty obligations. He also wanted to clarify that the GOT did not hold treaties to be permanent and that Turkey was prepared to negotiate changes as needed. He ended by emphasizing again the great pressure of public opinion on the GOT as regards a satisfactory solution to Cyprus.
The Secretary said that he wanted to thank the Foreign Minister for understanding that the U.S. did not invent the Cyprus problem. He hoped that it was also understood that it was because of our friendship with Turkey that we had become involved. However, he wanted to say frankly that Turkey must not allow this problem to become the central issue of our bilateral relations. Around the world there were 25 such problems e.g., India-Pakistan, Indonesia-Malaysia, etc. If in each case these specific problems were to be made the central issue of our own bilateral relations with the countries involved, we would be given a burden we could not carry. "You would make us your satellite and we cannot be a satellite. This is the kind of situation that would drive us into isolation."
The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for his frankness. He said that the present Turkish Government did not start to make Cyprus the central issue. He did not want to discuss internal Turkish politics, but when this government came to power, Cyprus had been made the central issue between the U.S. and Turkey by the previous government. At any rate, the GOT was now saying that if present conditions on the island continue, it must take initiative. It has prepared an aide-m?moire with a specific list of conditions to which the Turks object. The GOT wants the U.S. to come forward and say yes, the Turks are right. Human rights, etc., are being violated. This sort of stance would help the problem of Turkish-American relationships.
The Secretary answered that he had personally spent much time with the Greeks, Greek Cypriots and other parties on the problem of the Turkish Cypriots. President Johnson had also. A moment ago the Foreign Minister had raised a series of difficult questions. The Secretary wanted to emphasize that what we all wanted was to prevent the situations that gave rise to those questions. In other words, the questions were so difficult to answer that one must prevent the questions from having to be asked.
At this point Prime Minister Demirel entered the conversation, saying, "We accept the fact that you have very difficult worldwide problems but we are saying that here in this country, Cyprus is the hot issue from which none of us can escape. The events on the island have been inhuman, cruel, and against human rights. Why is the U.S. connected with Cyprus? It was not a party to the Cyprus agreements. Those agreements contained a procedure for solving the kind of dispute that arose in December 1963. That procedure was three party intervention. This did not occur for the reasons we discussed. Now the agreements have been violated several times. Makarios has said there are no agreements. The USG has said 'no' to the use of the guarantees contained in the treaties. We understand that the U.S. position was based on its concern that there be no war between Greece and Turkey. We are an independent country. Perhaps we should have gone ahead anyhow. However, that's all behind us. As it appears to Turkish public opinion, you do not want us to use the agreements. But why did you react so strongly to the prospect of our intervention and then do nothing when the Greeks sent 15,000 troops to the island? Cyprus is almost under Greek occupation. Why was there no reaction to this? Perhaps there is no need to discuss this point but you must understand that it is a factor. It is for this reason in the eyes of Turkish public opinion you have responsibilities. Now our Foreign Minister is saying that the issue may flare up again. This is no threat. There are responsible governments in Turkey. However, if something happens again--public opinion will demand action. If anything happens, it will be difficult to keep peace although we want to keep the peace and it is clearly to the advantage of the Turks that there be peace in this part of the world. If the UN force withdraws leaving 10,000 Greek troops on Cyprus, what happens if shooting starts? We want you to influence Makarios and the Greek Government to see that nothing happens. We cannot always be the ones to give."
The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make another point-- because of Cyprus the Turkish army was constantly on the alert and had been distracted from its NATO mission. Another point to be remembered was that in the NATO Council the Greek Foreign Minister had said categorically there were no Greek forces on Cyprus. Now, however, Makarios, Grivas and the Greek Government were engaged in a public dispute about the function of the force, its command, etc., and there was no further pretense it did not exist.
Bayulken interjected to say that the Greeks had used the excuse that Turkey was on the point of invasion, which was not true. He also wished to emphasize, returning to the aide-m?moire, that the GOT must have a pipeline to the Turk Cypriot force supply. This was part of normalization. Furthermore, if something should flare up on the island, then what? Would there be another letter from the US? If the Turks should react, and if there were a threat from the outside, would Turkey get NATO help?
The Secretary replied that it was important to discuss this kind of situation within NATO. He then asked for Turkish views on the UN force. The Foreign Minister replied that it must continue and that an improvement in the manner in which it carried out its function was an important factor for the improvement of the condition of the Turks.
The Secretary asked the GOT's view of the Russian position. For instance, he had heard rumors that the Russians had told Makarios that they would send no more arms. The Foreign Minister replied that the Russians accepted the principle of two separate communities on the island and accepted the idea of a federal constitution. Their other condition, however, was no outside intervention. In his opinion, if the Turks and their allies were able to come up with a solution, there would be no Russian interference.
Secretary Rusk then commented that there was at present a very weak Greek Government and asked if the GOT entertained any hope that a future GOG would be strong enough to make an agreement on Cyprus. Prime Minister Demirel replied that he expected no stronger Greek Government at any time in the future. If the Greeks were to go to elections, Cyprus would be an issue. Subsequently, a Greek Government would have even less flexibility. He wished to emphasize that his party, although it could have, had not used Cyprus as an issue in the October elections.
The Secretary then said that it had been a valuable chance to discuss the aide-m?moire. In Washington he would be discussing it again with the President following which there would be an answer.
Demirel said he wanted to emphasize his belief in Turkish-American friendship and his regret that the Cyprus issue had become a trap for this friendship. It was clear that Turkish public opinion felt that if Cyprus could not be solved by the guarantor powers, it should be solved within the NATO alliance.
The Secretary ended the Cyprus discussion by promising, "We will do our best."
231. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, May 6, 1966, 1135Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for Crawford and James, USUN, and USDOCOSouth for Freshman.
1652. NATUS Info.
1. I invited PriMin Stephanopoulos to lunch at residence May 4 to meet AsstSec Hare.
2. Regarding Cyprus, PriMin said GOG sincerely desired to resume friendly relations with Turkey and to find solution to Cyprus question. He said that in his meeting with Turkish Amb Tuluy he had emphasized this point, and in addition assured GOT that (1) GOG would not accept coup d'etat by Makarios on island and (2) GOG renounced use of force as means of settling dispute. PriMin added that he hoped GOT would also declare itself along same lines.
3. Initial question, PriMin continued, was how to begin talks. One major problem was Makarios: if talks were held in secret and he learned of them--which he probably would--then he would denounce them as "betrayal" of Cyprus cause; whereas if Makarios were informed in advance of them, he would undoubtedly "torpedo" them. King, he said, had suggested that talks be undertaken without knowledge of Makarios, but PriMin commented that he doubted that this would be possible, particularly in view of many connections Makarios has here. PriMin observed that Makarios could count on support of opposition (Papandreou) and Communists in Greece, as well as certain elements of right-wing press whom he has "bought." PriMin then posed question, asking what we thought would be best approach. AsstSec Hare replied that he agreed it would be extremely difficult to keep such talks secret.
4. Another problem, Stephanopoulos continued, was "level" on which talks should be held i.e., whether at Ambassadorial, Ministerial, or even "higher" level. Should talks be held at higher level and not succeed, it could be disastrous. AsstSec Hare asked if PriMin had confidence that both GOG Amb Delivanis in Ankara and GOT Amb Tuluy in Athens had "necessary contacts" to carry out this task. PriMin replied that as far as Delivanis is concerned, he has complete confidence that Amb shares fully views of GOG on Cyprus problem: as to his abilities, only time would tell. Tuluy seems genuinely to want to find solution to Cyprus crisis, Stephanopoulos said.
5. PriMin then talked of possible final solution. Enosis, he pointed out, would be best for all concerned, since an independent Makarios could be dangerous element in area, due to his connections with the non-aligned nations. However, if GOT insisted, perhaps question could be put off for "three to five years," at end of which time plebiscite could be held to determine will of Cypriot people. Possible solution, he continued, would be changing of one of British bases into NATO base, in which GOT could participate: GOT could even represent this base as their own to Turkish public. British, he continued, have indicated they would be willing to discuss giving up one of their bases if by such means solution could be found to Cyprus problem.
6. PriMin then asked for U.S. views on problem. AsstSec Hare said he had found during his recent visit to Ankara/2/ that GOT is most anxious to settle Cypriot problem as quickly as possible so that it can face up to economic problems confronting country. However, opposition would not let govt alone on Cyprus question, thus forcing it to devote considerable time and effort to this problem. However, AsstSec Hare said his visits to both Athens and Ankara had indicated there was sincere desire on both sides to find early solution to Cyprus question. Perhaps for first time, AsstSec Hare said, psychological climate in both countries is similar, and this should facilitate moving ahead on problem. When Stephanopoulos complained about Turkish "threats" to invade Cyprus, which he said made his own position more difficult with Makarios and Greek opposition, Sec noted that Demirel also had problem with his own opposition, and that "threats" should be seen in this light.
/2/As part of the U.S. Delegation to the CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting April 19-22.
7. Comment: As in our previous talk (Embtel 1589)/3/ PriMin impressed me with his sincere desire to restore good relations with Turks and get discussions underway, although Greeks still preoccupied with mechanics of initiating talks. Further, there appears to be growing inclination to accept idea of putting issue "on ice" for period of up to five years, although in Greek view such a delay in settlement would need to be coupled with some provision that at end of period would enable Cypriots to opt for enosis. Despite his good intentions, however, it is apparent that PriMin is hesitant to move forcefully lest he give opposition and Makarios opportunity to attack him.
/3/Telegram 1589, April 26, reported Stephanopoulos' assessment of the prospects for his government and his views on the Cyprus situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US)
Talbot
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, May 14, 1966, 1150Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, Paris for Crawford and James, EUCOM for POLAD, USDOCOSouth for Freshman, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
1441. NATUS Info. Cyprus. Embtels 1429, 1421, 1346 and Secto five (Notal)./2/ Reviewing recent developments, Embassy does not believe Bernardes' visit has had much effect on Turks. They have been conscious of his limited ability to improve conditions of Turk Cypriots and have never expressed much enthusiasm about his expanded instructions. They are also aware of negative US position on SYG's four-power guarantee proposal./3/ Furthermore, while pressing forward toward bilateral talks with Greece, GOT apparently does not foresee much hope in outcome of such talks unless some means is devised to move Makarios.
/2/Telegram 1429 from Ankara, May 12, reported Turkish reaction to a Greek aide-m?moire on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1421 from Ankara, May 11, reported on Bernardes' May 9-11 talks with Turkish officials. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 1346 from Ankara, see footnote 2, Document 230. Regarding Secto 5 from Ankara, see footnote 2, Document 229.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 220.
We believe GOT recognizes that attitude of Makarios is key to any Cyprus solution. We also believe that GOT sees need to use all available means to apply pressure on Makarios. Accordingly, this would call for rather far-flung GOT approach to problem which is foreshadowed in Turk aide-m?moire.
Following would seem to be included in this policy:
A. Bilateral talks with Greece on final solution. If it agreed that final solution currently impractical, negotiations would turn to modus vivendi. Since Turks believe realistically that even modus vivendi, or interim arrangement, would require elaborate, lengthy negotiation process, they have focused on more immediate question of welfare and security of Turk Cypriots. They have furthermore weighed in with aide-m?moire for maximum effect.
B. GOT will not exclude any reasonable proposal coming from any direction. This means it will not automatically reject Bernardes' proposal, or more specifically SYG's four-power UNSC guarantee, or mediation, or role by NATO powers, etc.
C. Aide-m?moire clearly sets forth Turk position to US and UK. It refers to GOT's "new assessment of the problem" and offers to consult with respective governments. It therefore invites the two governments to take active role in situation. If they should refuse, the GOT could always assert it had consulted US and UK.
D. Use of somewhat threatening tone in aide-m?moire is not only attributable to GOT frustration and its increasingly weakening position on Cyprus. It seems also designed to spark activity in other quarters (like US) to bring pressure to bear on GOG and GOC to adopt reasonable and forthcoming posture.
E. Recent military and naval exercises by Turk armed forces seem designed to enhance credibility of eventual Turk unilateral action. They may feel need to stress to outside world that second Presidential letter to Turkish PriMin/4/ will not sidetrack GOT plans.
/4/Not found.
F. GOT also wishes to expose insincerity of Makarios in his stress of independent Cyprus at UN while pursuing pro-enosis line at least in communiqu? signed in Athens and in "permission" to Athens to discuss enosis with Turkey in his absence.
G. Deadline for bringing political discussion to some kind of conclusion has probably not been established by GOT but instead depends on developments. It is unlikely, however, that GOT would allow situation to drag on into late fall or winter without action on its part unless it were persuaded that signs of progress and diplomatic activity justified delaying deadline.
H. As completely last resort, we are convinced GOT is prepared to undertake unilateral action to assist welfare and security of Turk Cypriots. In first instance, such action might well be non-military but would be supported by military units if any interference occurred.
While taking foregoing into account, we should also bear in mind that US reply to aide-m?moire along bland lines of UK reply would be negatively received by GOT. Instead we would recommend US reply along following lines:
1. As follow-up to Secretary's remarks to reporters at Ankara airport upon departure from CENTO meeting (Deptel 323 to Nicosia, 1082 to Ankara)/5/ we should express sympathy for welfare of Turk Cypriots and convey our willingness to explore their needs with GOT. We should also indicate our willingness to discuss the means whereby these needs could be satisfied.
/5/This telegram, May 11, informed the Embassies that the Department of State was reviewing proposals that would improve the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community. (Department of State, Central Files, CENTO 3 TUR-CAN)
2. We should urge GOT to take advantage of apparent GOG willingness to negotiate outstanding issues. We would hope to keep in close touch with GOT on status of these talks.
3. We should include in our reply specific statement that we are willing in principle to do what we can to assist in promoting settlement between Turkey and Greece. We should add that timing of any such assistance would naturally depend on the attitude of negotiating parties and on our view whether we could usefully contribute to settlement.
4. We would consider desirable for the GOT to consider possibility of agreeing to reciprocal freedom of movement for Turk Cypriot and Greek Cypriot civilians to and from each other's areas of control.
5. We would have to state frankly that we believe military action by Turkey in regard to Cyprus would be unprofitable for Turkey and unlikely to improve the prospects for satisfactory settlement.
We strongly support continuation of UNFICYP as long as situation requires it and provided other nations assist in its maintenance. We would, however, point out that climate for continuation of UNFICYP at an adequate level may rapidly worsen in the absence of evidence of sincere negotiation efforts.
Point 4 above probes somewhat into Turk intentions as decided at COM meeting in Beirut (Beirut's 1074)./6/ Caglayangil's busy schedule did not afford Ambassador suitable occasion to probe, but recent discussion with Turkmen suggests GOT below Caglayangil level not yet willing to show flexibility on question of reciprocal freedom of movement (Embtel 1429). Ambassador will probe this matter with Caglayangil at earliest opportunity.
/6/Telegram 1079 from Beirut, May 1, reported on discussions of the Turkish aide-m?moire at the U.S. Chiefs of Mission meeting. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
In addition to other considerations, we believe we must call attention to fact that in Turkey we are dealing with moderate [illegible] party government essentially friendly to us. Not only immediate question relating to bilateral defense agreements but also shape of future relations with this government and with Turks may be affected by tone and nature of our reply. Equally important to GOT will be US attitude toward lending helping hand in negotiations with Greeks or in latter stage when Makarios must inevitably enter picture. Essentially US position should be friendly and forthcoming as possible and should avoid placing unrealistic hopes on GOT-GOG bilaterals or give impression of "passing the buck" to UN. Latter particularly important since UN not regarded here as capable of developing constructive solutions to Cyprus problem in keeping with Turk national interests.
Re timing of US reply to aide-m?moire, we inclined to believe it could be delivered to FonMin upon his return to Ankara from present travels (Brussels May 14, RCD meeting in Tehran May 18 to 23, and official visit to Baghdad about May 24 to 26). Even so, FonMin might be unavailable since he is up for reelection to Senate and election day is June 5, just before Brussels Ministerial Meeting which he expects to attend. Nevertheless, on assumption that his Senate seat is safe and that he will be available here last week in May, we believe US reply should be ready for delivery at that time./7/
/7/Telegram 547 from Nicosia, May 17, recommended that the United States avoid involvement in issues such as the conditions of the Turkish Cypriot minority and urge the Turks to adopt a policy of insisting on total freedom of movement on the island. (Ibid.)
Hart
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, May 31, 1966, 5:57 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Churchill, cleared by GTI and L, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Athens, Nicosia, London, and USUN.
1152. Ref.: Ankara's 1441; Nicosia's 547./2/
/2/See Document 232 and footnote 7 thereto.
1. Turkish Aide-m?moire represents clever diplomatic move to (1) involve U.S. more deeply in Cyprus problem, in direction of improving welfare Turk Cyps and perpetuating Turkish enclaves, or failing that, (2 clear way for Turkish ultimatum backed by real threat of limited military action. This presents us with dilemma in replying, since either forthcoming or cool response would lead us in undesirable direction.
2. Turkish move appears to have been based on assumption even interim political settlement unlikely in near future. We somewhat more optimistic regarding possibility interim "modus vivendi" arising from planned Greek-Turkish talks, with possible assist from USG. We, therefore, believe it logical and beneficial put off dilemma posed by Aide-m?moire by postponing (rather than intensifying or refusing) discussion with Turks on ways improve welfare Turk community and continuance UNFICYP. This approach implies we must take hard look our position, if Greek-Turkish talks fail.
3. Except for general wording on avoiding actions that would disturb talks, we agree Nicosia's 547 that response should not include direct reference to unfortunate consequences Turkish military action.
4. With above in mind we propose respond to Turks with following Aide-m?moire:
5. "The United States Government greatly appreciates the Turkish Government's past willingness to consult on problems involving Cyprus and is gratified to be given the opportunity to comment on the Turkish Government's current thinking regarding this subject as set forth in its Aide-m?moire of April 19. As the Turkish Government is aware, the United States Government has followed the Cyprus problem closely since December 1963, and shares the Turkish Government's profound concern that this issue continues to be a source of friction in the Eastern Mediterranean.
6. "The United States Government is aware that even though the conditions existing during the first year after the outbreak of the present crisis appear to have been ameliorated somewhat, the Turkish Cypriots still live under circumstances which are abnormal and regrettable. The United States Government sympathizes with those who have suffered hardships as a result of the unsettled conditions on the island and has done what it could to improve the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots by donating relief supplies to the Turkish community and by offering other assistance. The United States Government shall continue to seek ways in which it can be of further help, pending a settlement of the fundamental political problem that will permit a stable, secure life for the people of Cyprus.
7. "The United States Government is closely following and encouraging the efforts of the UN Secretary-General's personal representative, Ambassador Bernardes, to bring about improved conditions on the island. The United States Government welcomed the decision of the United Nations Secretary-General to enlarge the terms of reference of his Special Representative, and hopes that this broadened mandate will open opportunities for such improvement.
8. "The United States Government notes the importance which the Government of Turkey has attached to the role of the UN in Cyprus and its relationship to the security and welfare of the Turkish community on the island. The United States has consistently supported the peacekeeping efforts of UNFICYP since that force was established in March 1964. It notes with satisfaction that the Turkish Government also recognizes the role which UNFICYP has played in the maintenance of peace and order. The United States Government shares the Turkish Government's belief that a UN presence must be maintained on the island and to this end the United States is prepared to cooperate in supporting the UN peacekeeping effort in Cyprus. However, as the Aide-m?moire of the Turkish Government properly notes, many countries have become reluctant to continue their contributions to UNFICYP in the absence of significant progress on the underlying political issues.
9. "Since receipt of the Aide-m?moire of April 19, 1966, the USG has been advised of the intention of the Turkish and Greek Governments to resume talks on this subject. In the opinion of the USG this must be considered a most encouraging development which will permit consideration of the means of achieving a settlement leading to stability in Cyprus. The United States Government would like to keep in close touch with the Turkish Government on the status of these discussions.
10. "While these talks are in progress, it would clearly be desirable to avoid statements or actions that might in any way impair the still tenuous links of communication among the parties involved. However, if the forthcoming discussions should fail to have the hoped-for result, the United States Government would wish to discuss further with the Turkish Government the matters raised in the Turkish Government's Aide-m?moire".
11. Comments requested ASAP./3/
/3/The addressees endorsed the language of the document in telegrams 1540 from Ankara, June 3; 581 from Nicosia, June 1; 5749 from London, June 1; 5106 from USUN, June 1; and 1787 from Athens, June 1. (All ibid.) The final text of the memorandum was transmitted to Secretary Rusk for delivery to Foreign Minister Caglayangil in Tosec 97 to Brussels, June 6. (Ibid.)
Ball
234. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, June 1, 1966, 1015Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to London, USUN, Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
582. NATUS Info. Ref Embtel 579./2/
/2/Telegram 579 from Nicosia, May 31, reported a hardening of the Cypriot Government position on treatment of the Turkish Cypriots. (Ibid.)
1. Talked with FonMin on problem of rising tensions and Bernardes proposals to defuse number problems by trading new relief ship for Turk Cypriot concessions. Kyprianou said he not meeting Bernardes until Saturday to discuss but his first reaction was this was non-starter. He parrotted Archbishop's remarks of some months ago that GOC not prepared facilitate Turk aim of perpetuating de facto partition by making life simpler and more comfortable for Turkish Cypriots in enclaves.
2. With regard new tougher policy vis-?-vis Turkish Cypriots he was adamant in assessment that govt must take some action against Turkish Cypriot provocations. Claimed their aim in Bey Keuy, Chattos, Trepimeni, Knodhara area was consolidation of new enclave and GOC would not permit it. Asserted this was GOC policy and not merely some idee fixe of Grivas. Despite dangers of action there was a point beyond which GOC could not go in permitting Turkish Cypriots enlarge or further strengthen their perimeters. It was UNFICYP job, which they not doing, to prevent, but failing that GOC must take necessary steps. He did not accept my arguments that increased pressure on community in general only served strengthen control of Turkish Cypriot leadership and we dropped matter by agreeing that our assessments disagreed.
3. Comment: Believe situation can only be defused by additional outside efforts both in Athens, as suggested reftel, as well as through continued support of UNFICYP efforts which so far unavailing. Have informed UK HICOMer along lines reftel and foregoing. He is informing London and will see what he can do to help in Athens as well as here./3/
/3/In telegram 351 to Nicosia, June 1, the Department of State stated its agreement with the need for diplomatic action by Greece to defuse the tense situation on Cyprus and authorized a d?marche by Ambassador Talbot in Athens. (Ibid.)
Belcher
235. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, July 22, 1966, 1800Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
365. Dept repeat further as desired.
1. At Luncheon today PriMin briefed me on process [progress?] of Greek-Turkish dialogue to date.
2. His impression is that GOT (meaning Demirel, Caglayangil and some around them) are serious about reaching accommodation with Greece in order concentrate on economic questions but that "forces" beyond their control frustrate attempts to proceed. He characterized atmosphere as one of serious intent but where both parties are fearful of next step in belief increasing number pressures desiring sabotage discussions will win out and that interrupted discussions will mean serious setback for both Athens and Ankara. He identified as forces in Turkey limiting GOT maneuver press and the military. He cited sequence of recent events on Imvros and Tenedos as basis Greek assessment split in Turkish intentions re dialogue.
3. He said GOT representatives visiting Imvros lately have told Greeks there that Turkish Government would like to straighten out situation, but cannot in view fact Turkish National Security Council has decided militarize Imvros and expropriate property. Turkish press now playing up Greek "colonizing intentions" re islands and citing Greek concern as example Greek imperialism (megali idhea). Stephanopoulos reports Toumbas now of opinion that he does not see how GOG domestically can withstand any more press play re "persecutions" on Imvros and suggested time had come to refuse extension residence permits of Turk nationals (particulary on Rhodes) who come under expired 1930 Treaty of Establishment, even though he, Toumbas, believes dialogue is important and would like to see it continue.
4. Stephanopoulos of course lamented fact Turkish tactics (particularly extremist anti-dialogue forces) are only playing into Makarios' hand. He repeatedly professed sincere determination withdraw Greek forces from Cyprus if some arrangement could be reached for demilitarization and some form Turkish assurance and suspension military action. He said fact Greek forces on island are hostages in hands of Makarios is source deepest concern to responsible members his government. Makarios indicates lack of concern should his actions lead to Greek-Turkish military confrontation on island. According PriMin, Archbishop thinks he can undermine current Greek Government by lending support to ERE leader Canellopoulos who, because of his complex regarding Karamanlis and his desire to strengthen his own position as head of party, wants early elections. Makarios is making funds available to new Athenian daily Eleftheros Cosmos which is scheduled to begin publishing next week and which is expected to support views of Makarios on Cyprus and of Canellopoulos on domestic issues. (However, Canellopoulos can bring down government at any moment on domestic issues before recess committee, without depending on Cyprus question.)
5. PriMin says next stage dialogue is Turkish expression their views on Greek suggestions for definitive solution involving demilitarization of Cyprus, conversion of UK base into NATO or multipartite base with Greek and Turkish participation, plus liberal minority rights for Turkish-Cypriots. Stephanopoulos suggested now would be appropriate time for American intervention to convince Turks to consider carefully how GOT can help keep dialogue alive.
6. PriMin also mentioned possibility of provisional arrangement including demilitarization, conversion of UK base into NATO or multipartite base with Turk and Greek participation, minority rights, plus plebiscite after five years. If Turks would agree to plebiscite, PriMin said, he thought GOG could persuade or somehow get Makarios to return exclusively to his ecclesiastical functions. Key feature of this scheme would be GOT's giving up right of intervention in Cyprus under Article 4. In any case, PriMin added, some Greek-Turkish agreement is essential before GOG can act to control Makarios.
7. Comment: I do not believe we have yet reached point where it would be advisable for U.S. to weigh in with either side regarding substance of dialogue, particularly since according Stephanopoulos GOT has not responded to Greek ideas for definitive solution. I am very much concerned, however, that elements opposing dialogue may shortly be successful in spoiling atmosphere for talks. Measures against Greeks on Tenedos and Imvros are receiving increasing attention in Greek press and helping elements here who do not wish talks to succeed. I would much welcome Embassy Ankara's comments on what PriMin alleged is situation in Turkey, particularly with reference to Demirel government's relation to Turkish military and latter's attitude towards dialogue./2/
/2/In telegram 433 from Ankara, July 27, the Embassy reported that the Turkish Government favored dialogue. (Ibid.)
Talbot
236. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 11, 1966, 3:36 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, POL 15. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Talbot, Bracken, Day, and Anschuetz.
713. At my request, I called on George Papandreou on August 5 for his views on current political situation. He was obviously braced to make more specific comments than on some earlier occasions.
1. Papandreou described Greece today as at critical stage. He said there are two roads it can follow. Present course would lead to catastrophe--other to normality. Queen Frederika, former ERE PriMin Pipinelis and former DefMin Garoufalias are urging King on first course. Queen Frederika is exploiting King's sense of honor (filotima) to hold him to present catastrophic course. Present course if pursued will bring dictatorship and revolution, which would be Communist-led but supported by many non-Communists, as occurred during EAM period and guerrilla war of 1946-49.
2. Papandreou said both he and King had taken opposing positions in past and both should now forget past and look to future. Neither can renounce all past stands. In his July 23 speech, he had spoken sternly about past, but in conciliatory tone about future. King could break current impasse by making gesture of reconciliation with people in form of declaration calling for elections and confirming his desire to see smooth operation of democratic government in Greece, free and honest elections, and constitution observed. He, Papandreou, would support this.
3. Papandreou said basic issue for Constantine was and is control of army. Army should be national, not belong to any party. Former DefMin Garoufalias had made a mistake by identifying himself with the Palace because he wanted to become PriMin. Papandreou could assure King that, if there were elections and he came to power, he would appoint as DefMin someone in whom both had confidence. Neither he nor Constantine wants to see organizations in army of IDEA and Aspida type. However, King wants an army loyal to him personally.
4. Papandreou commented that people speak of splinters in the Center Party. This is not true. He alone controls party. Center policy is his policy. But if he should "leave," he cannot guarantee that this will be the case.
5. Papandreou then made his main pitch. What is needed at present critical moment is help by Americans. US could use influence to help King see need for abandoning road leading to dictatorship. Action on American side would not be considered intervention. Dictatorship could cause chaotic situation which could have serious repercussions outside Greece (unrest in Balkans; free hand to Turkey to intervene in Cyprus). Successful functioning of democracies is in US interest all over world. It is logical for US to speak on this point to save Greece from civil war.
6. In response to my question, Papandreou said he has had no contact with Palace. Someone needs to convey his views to the King, someone outside invidious Psychiko circle (meaning Queen Mother and her confidantes). If he (Papandreou) attempted to convey this kind of feeling, it would be interpreted as compromising his position, and both sides would suffer. Gesture to be effective must be spontaneous initiative on part of King. It must not appear that there are secret agreements. Papandreou added he had not heretofore intimated these thoughts to anyone, not even to his friends.
7. I remarked that some feel rapprochement between himself and King is being impeded by public statements of younger CU elements. Papandreou acknowledged there are some "eager for applause who have found that anti-monarchist statements bring this applause. Today they say these things for demagogic reasons; if allowed to continue, they only become persuaded." Longer present course continues bitterer are public emotions, even though demonstrations may become fewer.
8. I asked whether he expects monarchy to be electoral issue. Papandreou replied that election declaration by King could bury the issue. Campaign would then be fought mainly "between parties" of which there are really only two: ERE and Center. Except for EDA, foreign policy would not be an issue. Papandreou added that his own position is well known, i.e. Greece belongs to Western Alliance but should cultivate economic and cultural relations with East.
9. Papandreou denied that EDA has succeeded in confusing issue whether popular front exists between CU and EDA. His position of not cooperating with EDA is well known and he holds to it. Questioned about kind of electoral law he favored, Papandreou said it makes no difference whether simple or reinforced proportional system used. He wanted only return to normality. Regarding a person who could head an interim government, he quipped Greece already has an interim government with Stephanopoulos. Who heads a government, whether Kanellopoulos or Zolotas, is not significant. Important point is need for statement regarding free and honest elections.
Comment:
1. If he means it, Papandreou's suggestion that King could have voice in selection of DefMin in any future Papandreou government represents shift from his earlier position. It was ostensibly on this issue that Papandreou broke with King in July 1965. That he should now propose a "mutually acceptable" DefMin suggests he currently sees himself caught in dilemma between aggressive harshness of positions taken by his son Andreas and continuing opposition to elections by Palace and other elements who fear what Andreas would do to Greece. There are some qualified observers who believe that in recent weeks George Papandreou has indeed (as he stated to me) become seriously concerned for the political future of Greece and who assert that his remarks on July 23 and his approving comments on the August 6 Mavros open letter to the King (see Weeka #32 August 13)/2/ must be interpreted as a deliberate effort to separate himself from more violent statements of Andreas.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 2-1 GREECE)
2. Papandreou looked alert and seemingly now in good health. Nonetheless, several times he showed his awareness time remaining for his active political leadership may be short. Though he repeatedly asserted he now controls all elements of party, I inferred that he realizes this is no longer true, particularly with regard to his son Andreas. This could account for his expressed desire to re-establish communications (on his own terms) with King while he is still in charge.
3. Papandreou has various means, other than the American Embassy, by which he can communicate his views to King. He may well see certain tactical advantage in trying to involve us in kind of middle-position between Kastri and Palace. He also is undoubtedly aware that, during course two conversations with Andreas in recent weeks,/3/ DCM urged Andreas (with obvious lack of success) to soften his attack on Palace in order help create conditions which would advance possibilities for inevitable elections. My conversation with George Papandreou might have been regarded by him as opportunity to get American influence actively in support of early elections.
/3/No record of these conversations has been found.
4. At appropriate early occasion I propose to inform Palace of Papandreou proposal, but without comment./4/ Palace, like Embassy, will not fail to have most serious reservations because of discrepancy between George Papandreou's comments to me and statements of Andreas Papandreou whose speeches over weekend were even more acerbic and aggressive toward King and more inflammatory in revolutionary tone. Nevertheless, I would hope Palace would find in Papandreou's remarks to me encouragement to establish dialogue directly with Papandreou through its own channels.
/4/Talbot informed the Palace of Papandreou's views in a meeting with Ambassador Bitsios, Chief of the Royal Protocol Office, on August 18. He reported his talk with Bitsios in telegram 868 from Athens, August 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE)
5. However, over and above the question of George Papandreou's sincerity and his willingness and ability to disengage himself from Andreas' policies, the Palace is faced with a more fundamental dilemma. This dilemma is whether Greek national interests and the particular interests of Palace would be better served a) by indefinitely postponing elections, notwithstanding increasingly vicious attacks of Andreas and risk of aggravation of question of the regime, in the hope that George Papandreou will disappear as an active political force and that CU will then fragment or b) by accelerating elections before position of Andreas in CU can be further consolidated and while the moderate elements in CU, presumably including George Papandreou, still have an important position. Ironically, increasing violence of Andreas may in fact precipitate elections before Andreas will have been able to achieve effective control of the CU.
Talbot
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, September 15, 1966, 1455Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
1343. Following on my talks with Ambassador Hart last week and private luncheon Tuesday with Greek Prime Minister I have following comments on Greek-Turkish dialogue and possible U.S. involvement:
1. Comparison of Stephanopoulos report to me of GOG and GOT positions (Athens 1293)/2/ with that given the Secretary by Caglayangil would indicate that, unless Turks still not revealing their full hand to us, either (1) Greeks are confused as to substance of GOT position or (2) to encourage U.S. involvement they are deliberately portraying gap in positions as narrower than it really is. I believe it would be helpful to probe further in September 17 meeting with Toumbas for confirmation Turks are actually considering enosis, even though "loose" as reported in para 3 of Athens 1293.
/2/Telegram 1293 from Athens, September 13, reported Stephanopoulos' belief that dialogue with Turkey had reached a point that might require U.S. mediation. (Ibid.)
2. First task may be to clarify communication between two sides rather than more direct participation, particularly if Caglayangil's statement in para 1 State 46636/3/ implies Turkey intends to view U.S. support for Turkish position as touchstone U.S.-Turkish relations. Further discussions while FonMins at UNGA might elucidate this.
/3/Telegram 46636, September 13, reported on talks between Rusk and Caglayangil on Cyprus. (Ibid., POL TUR-US)
3. Revelations volunteered so far give inadequate basis for judging utility of U.S. re-entry into negotiations along lines GOG is about to propose. My net impression, however, is that Greece and Turkey have not yet exhausted their maneuvering room in current dialogue. It would follow that they should be pushed to try harder to reach a settlement. Our basket is already pretty full and they have at least as much interest as we in peace in Eastern Mediterranean. In any event U.S. ability to exert influence toward settlement would depend on what U.S. would be prepared to do or not to do to bring Turkish position nearer to conditions that could be imposed on Greece and Greek Cypriots.
4. However, since demise of Stephanopoulos government could bring Greek-Turkish negotiations to grinding halt, we have interest in seeing dialogue move as rapidly as possible. It may be long time before we again see combination as constructively committed to resolution of Greek-Turkish difficulties as are Demirel-Caglayangil and Stephanopoulos-Toumbas. Also, it would be brash to forecast how much longer extraordinary secrecy so far maintained in dialogue can continue. When leaks start, public reactions could build up rapidly. For these reasons, I hope we can be in position to offer assistance such as Ambassador Bunker's services on very short notice if two parties demonstrate willingness to take his suggestions seriously.
5. I gather Caglayangil may involve U.S. assistance for interim solution. In considering whether there would be opportunity for constructive U.S. action along this line, we should keep in mind several factors: (1) status quo (including presence UNFICYP) is almost impossible to freeze precisely. Negotiating interim solution would therefore involve some of same compromises regarding internal structure as would permanent settlement; (2) unless basic revisions of Zurich-London could be agreed upon as basis of interim solution, which seems unlikely, Treaty of Guarantee and possibility of Turkish intervention under Article IV would continue to exacerbate Greek-Turkish relations; (3) under interim solution Cyprus would presumably remain independ-ent, in which case Greeks are convinced Ankara would have to address itself to Nicosia rather than Athens and negotiate with Makarios. GOG considers interim solution just as difficult to negotiate as permanent one. I would tend to agree.
6. Nor am I sanguine about peaceful prospects of solution of "unfettered" independence. In that event, Cyprus would seem likely immediately to become cockpit of international struggle. Soviets and non-aligneds would develop sudden vested interest in preserving Cyprus as uncommitted country outside NATO area. Simultaneously Greeks (with or without government inspiration or support) would undoubtedly mount strident, intensive campaign for quick referendum to bring enosis. Presumably Turks would regard such Greek actions as betrayal of understanding, and might reserve right to counteract. In one case we could be confronted with serious derogation of Western interests in Cyprus area; in other, with sharpened bitterness between Turkey and Greece. "Unfettered" independence with prior implicit Turkish acquiescence in enosis campaign would be a different thing, and might be workable compromise.
7. With reference to Stephanopoulos report that Greeks and Turks are discussing disposition of Dhekelia base area, this at least is progress over 1964 Karpas Peninsula debate which if raised now would in my opinion be non-starter. Question of nature of Turkish rights in base area would be closely related to issue of demilitarization of Cyprus along Dodecanese lines. A Turkish military base on a demilitarized island would seem anomalous, though Turks would presumably find restriction to Dhekelia less attractive if rest of island were within Greek active border defense zone. It may be that Dhekelia issue can be resolved only within context of an Acheson-style Greek-Turkish defense board, a device by which defense needs of Cyprus could be reduced to proper proportions.
As to form of enosis, we here have been pondering idea of commonwealth along Puerto Rican line. From Greek (and U.S.) point of view this would have serious deficiency of leaving Makarios in saddle internally while making Greece responsible to Turks and rest of world for policy pursued in Cyprus. Nonetheless, if idea of enosis is still shocker to Turks, commonwealth theme might be worth examining by both parties despite Greek resistance to getting committed to anything short of full enosis.
9. I advance these random thoughts at this time on assumption Department will in immediate future be intensively considering next steps./4/
/4/In telegram 48821, September 16, the Department of State commented that while the Turkish Government might not have totally ruled out a dialogue on enosis, the Greek Government should avoid raising the issue. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
Talbot
238. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, September 16, 1966, 1532Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, and USUN.
1426. Ref: State 46636; Athens 1343 and 1293./2/ Cyprus.
/2/Regarding telegram 46636, see footnote 3, Document 237. Telegram 1343 is Document 237; regarding telegram 1293, see footnote 2 thereto.
1. In light Secretary's conversation with Caglayangil and in anticipation his forthcoming meeting with Toumbas, I am putting down these thoughts to clarify a few points in hope this message may be useful to Secretary before meeting with Toumbas.
2. It seems agreed among us (Athens, Nicosia and Dept) that present Turk-Greek dialogue offers best hope for permanent settlement of Cyprus issue for some time to come. We also recognize that sincerity of both sides and secrecy of talks are good omen. Our fear lest dialogue fail if Greek Government should fall encourages me to believe that USG should use available time to make concerted effort to contribute to success of present negotiations.
3. I realize that we have been well burned before in trying to mediate Cyprus problem and are therefore reluctant to let ourselves be dragged into the middle.
4. In present circumstances, we are also handicapped by lack of knowledge. We have some idea of Greek proposals and of Greek attitude toward Turkish reactions. We do not have any idea of Turkish proposals nor specific Turkish attitude to Greek proposals nor of Nicosia's likely attitude to either side's position. We really do not know how close or far apart the two sides are on any issue.
5. We should probably recognize that our decision to intervene in Turk-Greek negotiations may well be based less on careful assessment that we can help bridge relatively narrow gap in two sides' respective positions than on sheer hunch and on feeling that we cannot turn down plea for help from two NATO allies who come to us as fair and impartial friend after having virtually exhausted their own resources.
6. If Caglayangil and Toumbas meet in New York at end of September, their meeting should give us important indication whether talks losing momentum. Despite certain urgency, I would recommend that we await results of that meeting and evaluation of subsequent situation by respective Foreign Ministers before taking any steps (known to parties) to help out dialogue.
7. If after that meeting both Foreign Ministers agree on U.S. taking active role in dialogue, I believe that will be propitious time for offering services of experienced figure like Ambassador Bunker. In regard to Makarios we should focus hard on any suggestion Embassy Nicosia may have which could help us neutralize his talent for upsetting applecart./3/
/3/In telegram 410 from Nicosia, September 19, Belcher commented that Makarios might prove more amenable to talks as a result of the perception that time was favoring the plans of the Turkish Cypriots. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
8. On balance, time is approaching when we shall have to take risk of more active involvement if we are seriously concerned about alternatives to peaceful accommodation. Attitude of Turks and Greeks in this dialogue since June gives me some ground for optimism that we may be able to help them, and Cypriots, to find some way out on Cyprus issue. I therefore wish to reaffirm line expressed by Secretary to Caglayangil that we are prepared to seize opportunity for constructive action.
9. I will have more to say later on detail of various proposals.
Hart
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, September 19, 1966, 4:58 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewster and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and USUN.
49718. Greek Foreign Minister Talks--Cyprus, September 17.
1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon./2/
/2/Not found.
2. Greek Foreign Minister, speaking on Cyprus issue, said he believed strongly in Greek-Turk dialogue and tensions in Greek-Turk relations had relaxed. It essential to seek permanent solution which would not have in it germ of new difficulties. Greek position based on three principles: 1) protection of prestige of Turkey, 2) granting of most advanced and generous type of minority guarantees, 3) guarantee of Turk security. Agreement of course extremely difficult to reach and there were those in Greece, Turkey and on Cyprus who did not want solution and want to torpedo dialogue. GOG is not only trying to solve Cyprus issue but to settle whole range of Greek-Turk problems. Package offered by Greeks covers 1) Cyprus solution, 2) bilateral treaty of alliance within NATO framework, 3) commercial and industrial relations, 4) fisheries, 5) tourism, 6) cultural relations. He added, without going into detail, that final solution should take form of "some kind of enosis." Independence raised all dangers of Cuba-like Cyprus.
3. Soviets, he is convinced, oppose solution and as example he noted that Soviet Charge on Cyprus had expressed view that "opinion poll" be taken on question of enosis among young people who had not participated in 1950 plebiscite. Soviets obviously hope exploit expected shift in sentiment which Toumbas said was not anti-Greek but anti-West. A nation of only five hundred thousand cannot avoid falling into sphere of influence of one of great powers if independent.
4. Toumbas stated Greek and Turk representatives holding another meeting this week. Foreign Minister added he neither optimistic nor pessimistic about outcome of dialogue but wanted to continue to hope for best. He asked if Greek efforts fail and there is breakdown in talks, what would US consider doing procedurally? He had in mind good offices.
5. Secretary thanked Foreign Minister for report. He was encouraged to see talks being carried on seriously and privately. He thought Greeks had achieved one very important thing which USG esteemed highly, namely creating atmosphere of restraint. He noted Turk Foreign Minister had said his Greek colleague dealing on this subject in serious and responsible way. Secretary urged dialogue continue and not be broken off, since consequences of failure would be very serious. Utmost patience and determination were required and if talks did not succeed today there is always tomorrow. Cyprus question of interest not only to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus but to all of NATO and USG. USG had used its good offices in past and had suffered many bruises from this endeavor. Therefore we do not want to rush in. Secretary then made three points: 1) every possible effort should be made to maintain peace on island; 2) Greeks and Turks should exert maximum effort to work towards solution, 3) if there are ways in which US might be of help, we would be glad to give it most serious consideration. Secretary added he was not sure we had expertise or miraculous formula to solve Cyprus problem and that roots of problem go back into history to before birth of US as a nation. He believed strongly that those who had to live with results of solution should be ones to find it and he had complete respect for GOG efforts in this regard.
6. At end of meeting Secretary stated he hoped to see Foreign Minister again in New York, particularly if there were any future developments on Cyprus issue. Secretary noted that not having pressed for details concerning dialogue was through no lack of interest in problem but because we feel private conversations are most fruitful.
Ball
240. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, October 6, 1966, 0627Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, London, and Nicosia.
1740. Cyprus. Ref: Ankara 1426./2/
/2/Document 238.
1. Tenor of speeches of FonMin Caglayangil and Toumbas before UNGA and their further contacts in New York have diminished sense of urgency about what U.S. role should be in event of break of Turk-Greek talks. Nevertheless, it may be useful for Embassy to record certain current impressions.
2. In reviewing messages re Turk-Greek talks, Embassy is struck by fact that only solid information has been provided by high Greek sources to Embassy Athens. We must remain cautious however lest these sources without malice aforethought may have misrepresented Turkish positions.
3. We also assume that both Greek and Turk positions at outset are superficially irreconcilable. We would therefore not wish to encourage idea that initial Greek positions may eventually be acceptable to Turkey or that initial Turk positions are unalterable.
4. We are inclined to believe, for example, that Turkish Government would be in deep trouble if it accepted full enosis of Cyprus with Greece and participation in NATO base, as suggested by Stephanopoulos (para 4 Athens 1293)./3/ If Turks are to hold sovereignty over base area and can obtain nearly complete demilitarization of island outside base area, GOT might be interested. However, we note Greek PriMin rejected this (para 2 Athens 1293).
/3/See footnote 2, Document 237.
5. When Caglayangil told Secretary enosis would be "difficult proposition" (State 46636),/4/ it may have been form of politeness to avoid appearing rigid. On other hand, Turks have long been favorable to idea of double enosis but reject unilateral enosis. Adjective qualifying enosis is important.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 237.
6. FonMin may also have in mind interim solution which would freeze status quo with aim perhaps of preventing Makarios from undertaking new initiatives pending further negotiations on permanent settlement. While we are aware of problems involved, interim solution might provide for certain Turk and Greek steps to ease tension and increase mutual confidence during period that Cyprus still remains independent state. It might not go so far as to take up Cyprus constitutional-legal problems and might therefore be easier to negotiate than permanent settlement.
7. Yet another possibility in which we see benefit is "limited accord" which in itself resolves nothing but has merit of maintaining suitable atmosphere for difficult negotiations. Such accord might provide for continued secrecy of talks, agreement on attitude toward press, immediate consultation on new bilateral and Cyprus issues vital to each side, periodic high-level meetings of political leaders, etc.
8. In reviewing various ideas ranging from "unfettered independence" to double enosis to commonwealth and condominium, we must take into account Turkish four principles. Any permanent solution must be susceptible of being interpreted as fulfilling more or less these four principles. These were described by FonMin in Ankara 858 of January 28/5/ in slightly different terms from those used by FonOff SecGen in Ankara 1394 of September 15./6/
/5/Document 221.
/6/Telegram 1394 from Ankara reported that Turkey would not comment on the substance of the talks with Greece. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
A. No domination of one community by the other. Permanent solution probably must grant Turk Cypriots broad rights to administer themselves, at least approaching what they now have within enclaves.
B. No unilateral modification of London-Zurich treaties. Permanent solution must acknowledge this point even in process of throwing treaties to the winds and establishing new constitutional-legal framework which would still give Turk Cypriots role in central administration.
C. No unilateral enosis. Permanent solution must include turning over to Turkey some land in compensation for enosis. Turk-Greek negotiators may have to bargain hard on which piece of land (Evros River area, Aegean offshore island, Karpas Peninsula, Dhekelia base etc.) should be turned over on what basis (Turk sovereignty, joint Turk-Greek sovereignty, long-term lease from Greece to Turkey, temporary NATO arrangement, etc.).
D. Maintenance of the balance established by Lausanne Treaty. This suggests that developments on Cyprus are of strategic interest to Turkey and position of Turk Cypriot community cannot be ignored.
9. For time being, we have no special formula to suggest. In absence of precise knowledge as to Turkish position, we believe we should merely continue stressing that it is to Greek and Turkish advantage to push talks toward settlement. As stated above we see no danger at present of an imminent breakdown and are therefore reluctant to speculate too far afield on possible compromise formulas for settlement.
Hart
241. Airgram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
A-196
Athens, October 8, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved by Bracken.
SUBJECT
Ambassador's Conversation with George and Andreas Papandreou, September 29, 1966
SUMMARY
At a luncheon at Kastri at which I was the only guest, George and Andreas Papandreou were at pains to get across three messages. The first was that the CU will not make a popular front with the Communist-line EDA and cannot do so because of policy disagreements over legalization of the Communist Party of Greece, return to Greece of refugees from the guerrilla war, Greek membership in NATO, and the national democratic political character of the Center Union. Secondly, they asserted that Greece under a Papandreou Government would remain a staunch ally of NATO and the West, though--to use Andreas' words--Greece would insist that its voice be heard more than in the past. Andreas expressed his admiration for Turkish diplomacy as the way for a small country to project its views in the councils of powers. Third, the Papandreous proposed that the King install a service government which would (a) be set up with non-political personalities agreed upon by the Center Union and ERE, (b) gain a vote of confidence for a restricted period and for the restricted purpose of adopting an electoral law (presumably by the simple proportional system), and (c) be in power for long enough to adopt the electoral law before the beginning of the 45-day period provided by the constitution for the holding of elections. The Papandreous thought that this procedure, based on a precedent established in 1958 with the Georgakopoulos Government, would add "a few weeks" to the life of the service government. For the first time in my discussions with George Papandreou, he ruled out the possibility of an interim ERE government and emphasized that only a "service government" of non-political personalities would be acceptable.
[Here follows a detailed report of the discussion.]
Talbot
242. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, October 22, 1966, 1127Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London.
2061. Cyprus.
1. During course of long private conversation Oct 21 FonMin Caglayangil brought up his last private talk with Secretary Rusk in Washington,/2/ during which he stated he had told Secretary that while GOT had little confidence in results, it was continuing its secret bilateral conversations with Greece on Cyprus. Since that talk there had been no real closing of gap in basic views. Toumbas, despite his good will and very correct and sincere attitude, was shying away from the bases [garble] durable and final solution. Politics of Greece restricted him and he appeared intent on gaining time in view of Greece's internal concerns. Greeks in general were insisting on enosis which could not be accepted by Turkish opposition, which was "cruel" and would say that if enosis was to be solution it could have yielded that concession to Greece itself, when in power. "Form of enosis was not Turkish affair" Caglayangil said and apparently Greeks had to have some form of enosis. As matter of fact, bilateral Greek-Turk talks had not yet included any discussion of enosis or political ties of Cyprus. Each side had at once identified "unacceptable" proposals and by mutual consent these had been set aside and dialogue focused on such matters as demilitarization of island, rights of Turk Cypriots and a base to guard Turkish community. GOT had recently insisted that Greece set forth its definite opinion on one vital element: a statute for Turkish forces on the island. If Greece could clarify its position on this matter dialogue could be continued, but GOT had no hope that this could be done. If dialogue should produce no results (and in a short time Turkey would know) this would constitute a rupture.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 237.
2. Recalling breakfast meeting with Secretary Rusk at Ankara in April,/3/ Caglayangil referred to Turkish aide-m?moire in which it made clear (and in accompanying conversation) that some "normalization" and "equalization" of Turk-Cypriot position on island must be undertaken. Disparity in rights between the two communities was totally objectionable and unfair. While Greeks were free to come and go everywhere on island, Turks were subjected to harassments, restrictions, assaults, and blockades. It was not humane. Secretary Rusk had agreed with Caglayangil in private portion of Washington meeting that there must be some normalization and avoidance of restriction on human rights. Now winter was approaching and situation could not be allowed to go on. If GOT were in position to tell Turk Cypriots that everything would be settled in six months and they should therefore be patient, that would be one thing. But Turkey could not give such assurance. If it should come to point where GOT had to demand from Makarios removal of restrictions imposed on Turk Cypriot community then GOT could be obliged to act to ensure compliance.
/3/See Document 230.
3. In response to my request for clarification status of dialogue, Caglayangil confirmed dialogue not ruptured but continuing as of now. If Greek reply to Turkish request regarding a base for Turkish troop presence on Cyprus "approached" Turkish point of view there would be possibility of further contact, for example, between Caglayangil and Toumbas. If not, there was no utility in prolonging dialogue.
4. There ensued long discussion, during which I emphasized first and foremost importance of continuing this dialogue and not having rupture. I said we estimate that present GOG while fragile was best govt in Greece foreseeable at present in its attitude toward Cyprus problem. I asked whether he had given thought to possibility of keeping talks in some status of continuation despite lack of progress and perhaps in establishing something like "hot line" to be used with Athens if events on Cyprus became serious. Caglayangil responded that he had, but there must be condition that there be some improvement in Cyprus situation. He agreed it would be most undesirable to "declare" that there had been rupture of the talks. It might even trigger fall of present Greek Govt. However, there continued in Cyprus harassments, inability of Turk Cypriots to cultivate their lands, to circulate freely, and he stressed time and again need for assurance that Turkish aid to Turk Cypriots could get through to people. Toumbas had agreed with him on this. GOT "had no desire to arm Turk Cypriots". Arms had been too long held by both sides and shootings were chronic and irresponsible on both sides. What he objected to most was inequality of treatment. I said it had been my impression, and I felt I had received every important communication sent to Washington by our Embassy in Nicosia, that situation, while far from "normal" was nevertheless distinctly better than it had been few months ago.
There had been recent postal agreement. He nodded. Little by little and very painfully I thought some of elements in situation were being diminished. I asked whether in view of this situation on island could justify breaking off dialogue. Caglayangil seemed to agree, but then backed away to say situation not basically improved. He referred to sudden blockadings of Turk Cypriots under blanket accusation they were responsible for forest fires or explosions. He said GOT had issued most categoric instructions to Turk Cypriots not to fall into provocations. As regards explosions and shootings, he knew they occurred sporadically and were started by both sides. "For all I know", he said, "Turks may be to blame for an explosion but Greeks should not without awaiting investigation and under general influence of prejudice declare publicly Turk Cypriots to blame and then blockade some Turk Cypriot community. This is inhuman."
5. Caglayangil volunteered GOT not trying to rush final solution. GOT understood that "right now" Greece could not talk about partition and "right now" Turkey could not talk about enosis. As far as Turkey was concerned conversations could go on for another year or two years, or a modus vivendi worked out if situation on island could be made to improve, but this situation had had profound repercussions on Turkish public opinion. I then asked whether I could define his position as this: "If there could be some real sign in improvement in situation on Cyprus this would help him in justifying prolongation of dialogue." He agreed.
6. I then said that he had referred to free access of Turks to their lands. One very important point which concerned me was whether Turk Cypriot leadership would permit Turk Cypriots to circulate freely to and from enclaves if Greek Cypriots permitted it. I had been disturbed over stories that Turk Cypriot judges had been actively dissuaded by local Turk authorities from resuming their positions on bench. Caglayangil made clear it was Turk Cypriot community not Turkish Government that dissuaded them and that judges did not wish to return. I said it very important to know whether, if Greek Cypriots dropped restrictions on movement of Turks, e.g. to return to their own lands (to which I understand they had been invited by GOC anyway), they would be permitted to do so and not prevented. Caglayangil replied that he could give me fullest assurance on this point. I said I proposed to relay this to Washington and he said, "Please do."
7. When I asked Caglayangil specifically what he was suggesting we do, he again referred to private conversation with Secretary and said he had been "greatly encouraged" that Secretary had agreed with him that improvement of Turk Cypriot situation must somehow be found. GOT needed assurance that Turk Cypriots would have access to port facilities, that they could build some decent housing, that Turk relief could get through. He was very concerned that if he had no alternative but to demand from Makarios lifting of restrictions confrontation would take place from which Turkey [garble] not possibly back down. There was "question of prestige of a country of 31 million against this small island."
8. As we had carried on this conversation for well over an hour out of total conversation of two and one-half hours, I said I would like to mull all this over and come back to see him soon.
9. Comment:
"Procedural agreement" does not appear sufficient in itself to stop GOT-Makarios confrontation if GOG-GOT dialogue lapses, even if not declared ruptured. Caglayangil obviously in dilemma over his posture on Cyprus problem on eve opening of Parliament and expected opposition probes and heckling. I think it clear he wants to declare dialogue still on. He needs badly evidences of clear improvement Turk-Cypriot situation and hopes Washington can back Athens in pressuring Govt of Cyprus.
Hart
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.