Documents 98-127
98. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 1, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
191. Embtel 188/2/ gives general account my conversation with Erkin yesterday re Cyprus. Following are points with specific reference Geneva conversations which require TAG transmission.
/2/Telegram 188 from Ankara, August 1, reported that Turkish positions were hardening as a result of Makarios' actions and that Erkin was again stressing the need for immediate action on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
1. Erkin said that in his opinion cession of Karpas Peninsula was not enough. Would be impossible sell to Turkish people. Regarding territorial compensation elsewhere, GOT uninterested in acquiring territory in Western Europe, which apparently British idea. Re Kastellorizon, it so small that impossible consider as serious concession. These comments were made somewhat incidentally with Erkin making no attempt at outlining formula which could accept.
2. Erkin said he felt situation had developed to point where US and GOT should agree on solution, following which Acheson would endeavor convince GOG and GOG to convince GOC. I observed this not my understanding of modus operandi of Acheson who I thought had made clear that his first effort would be directed to attempting narrow area of difference between Turk and Greek viewpoints, following which consideration could be given to bridging gap by specific recommendations of our own. However, I assumed that whether this done would depend on degree of disparity of Turk and Greek views as established by current Geneva exchanges.
Erkin did not pursue further.
3. Erkin said he had heard from Erim that Acheson hoped get somewhere by end of next week. He hoped so because passage of time inimical to Turkey.
4. Referring to Athens leak as "despicable" and references of Makarios to Acheson as unpardonable, Erkin said this not first time however that there had been leak and referred to an unspecified article in London Times which he felt had been made privy to info furnished by British representative in Geneva. He observed this unfortunately falls within familiar pattern of British laxity in maintaining confidence and added this puts GOT and especially himself on spot when, having scrupulously adhered agreement maintain secrecy, others fail to do so with result that Turkish press demands know why press elsewhere given information of vital importance to Turkey while Turk press kept in dark (only info in our records which might have bearing on this is London's 441 to Dept/3/ which did not attribute anything to Acheson but did suggest rather assured awareness by Times of trend developments in Geneva).
/3/Telegram 441 from London, July 27, reported British press stories indicating a "more flexible" attitude on the part of Papandreou after his talks in London. (Ibid.)
I drew on Deptel 156/4/ as authorized re Athens leak and Erkin appeared quite satisfied as far as our role concerned.
/4/Telegram 156 to Ankara was sent for action to Athens as telegram 165, Document 95.
5. Finally, Erkin wanted know what we would be prepared do if Geneva talks broke down and to what extent GOT could count on our support. I replied would be difficult give specific answer to this question for simple reason that it based on hypothetical situation in which talks might end. Would depend on degree of progress made, analysis of resulting situation, etc., which are presently unknown. Erkin did not dispute this but did say he foresaw time approaching for some major decisions and he would ask us most earnestly to give subject serious consideration now.
Hare
99. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 2, 1964, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London.
282. From Acheson for Ball, Finletter and Talbot. Reference: Deptel 291./2/ Our communications with you are better than telegraphic, they are telepathic. As indicated my telegram to Athens,/3/ we too have been thinking of possibility skipping Cypriot full independence stage and going direct to enosis; we too saw dilemmas cited your telegram.
/2/In telegram 291 to Geneva, August 1, Ball, reacting to Makarios' rejection of the "Acheson memorandum," outlined a suggested scenario for U.S. action and requested Acheson's comment. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 281 from Geneva, August 1. (Ibid.)
Following are our immediate comments, possibly to be followed by others later:
We would prefer to see next move in steps, rather than one big, desperate leap. Turks have been remarkably patient, but this can't last for length of time needed to work out whole scheme you outline unless in meantime they see something moving at least slightly in their direction. They have given quite a lot already, the Greeks hardly anything at all. I much doubt Turks would be responsive even to Ray Hare's eloquence so long as they have clear impression Greeks simply standing fast on extreme position.
I therefore hope Labouisse can induce Papandreou to send Nikolareisis back before mid-week with forthcoming proposals,/4/ including long-term lease arrangement for at least part of Karpas Peninsula. Believe Turks would compromise for about time mentioned your telegram, and they might even accept shorter time period. These are things that could be bargained out, through me, or directly, if Greeks would once accept principle of Turkish base.
/4/In telegram 197 from Athens, August 2, the Embassy reported that Costopoulos had told Anschuetz that Nikolareisis would "probably" return to Geneva on Tuesday, August 9. (Ibid.)
According to Nikolareisis, Papandreou accepted rest of my proposals and threw in Kastellorion to boot. It is important that Nikolareisis be empowered confirm this on his return. (Recent reports from Athens have cast serious doubt on sincerity of Papandreou's offer.)
If we can get these points accepted Athens, we can go to work full blast to work out agreement on substance of settlement.
As to method of putting agreement into effect, seems to me line to be explored is that of formulating some fairly vague announcement of agreement in principle which would say that understandings reached provide for safeguarding Turkish national security and welfare of Turkish Cypriots together with right of Cypriot self-determination and that both governments are satisfied on this. Then plebiscite or other action on enosis could be precipitated.
Realize this will call forth Makarios opposition and require very strong Greek propaganda effort together with use all available methods control His Beatitude, but if we don't approach enosis with at least this much assurance to Turks we risk overthrow of Inonu government and even Republican regime in Turkey. Fact is, procedural dilemma we face simply will not go away.
We are hesitant about proposed use of NATO because:
1. It would seem impossible to keep it secret, considering atmosphere and attitudes in Greece and number of governments who would know about it.
2. If, or rather when, it becomes public knowledge, it will produce an array of Afro-Asian and SovBloc states, and probably also U Thant, in support of Makarios.
3. We doubt that NATO has any more or as much influence as US on Greeks, and we have already failed in massive frontal attack on Papandreou. As personal comment I would add that I couldn't predict where effort guided by Mike Pearson would end.
4. Finally, public NATO pressure on Greece if successful would have effect of change in Greek policy and position from one founded on Greek national interests to one adopted under duress applied by Anglo-Saxons. Could any democratic government stand this?
In short, I think we had better continue to try to play this big trout rather than risk everything by hauling on the line./5/
/5/In telegram 176 to Athens, July 30, Ball commented that he "accepted" the scenario outlined by Acheson and instructed Labouisse to ensure that Nikolareisis' instructions met the requirements of this plan. (Ibid.)
Tubby
100. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 3, 1964, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
200. Embtel 197 rpted Ankara 73; London 57; Geneva 58./2/ Costopoulos and Nikolareizis lunched with Anschuetz and me today. Conversation confirmed in general information Costopoulos gave Anschuetz yesterday as reported reftel; i.e., GOG determined continue negotiations, GOG will not retract any acceptances already made. Nikolareizis authorized propose only NATO base or Turkish participation British base. However, Costopoulos, in our presence, repeated instructions to Nikolareizis, explore without commitment implications of leased base arrangement.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 99.
Nikolareizis explained that Acheson proposals re Turk minority which Nikolareizis conveyed to Papandreou and Papandreou approved in principle, had been made purposely unspecific by Acheson in my effort stimulate examination of problem. Acheson memorandum this subject which was transmitted subsequently outlined much more comprehensive arrangement involving provisions which GOG could not accept for reasons which Embassy has previously reported. Greeks "accept principles outlined in general conversation but not proposed treatment in depth mentioned in memo."
Referring to Lausanne Treaty provisions for Tendos and Imbros, Costopoulos pointed out that (aside from fact Turks had not carried out provisions) situations were not parallel. Argument was that purpose Article 14 was to ensure that people on island, who mostly Greeks, should have local self-determination. Applying this to Cyprus, he contended that, even with current abnormal concentrations of Turkish population in certain sections of island, there is no single unit under present Cypriot administrative system in which Turks actually constitute majority. (We suggested this depended on how one drew the lines.) In those areas where Turks are temporarily most heavily concentrated, Costopoulos maintained economic factors alone would prevent continued existence these concentrations: i.e. Turkish farm lands and properties are in many cases remote from proprietors temporary abodes, while permanent installation in these areas of temporary concentrations could only be accomplished by dislocation long-term Greek residents.
Nevertheless, said Costopoulos, GOG perfectly prepared accept principles of Treaty Lausanne as applied to minority and would accept UN commissioners to supervise application these principles. GOG could not, however, accept arrangements which would in effect create and perpetuate barriers between communities. Nikolareizis will be prepared discuss this matter in depth with Acheson.
Discussion provisions for administration of Turkish Cypriots led directly into discussion of role of Turkish military contingent. Costopoulos reiterated his thesis that if indeed it were possible remove Turkish minority from island, it would then be possible to grant sovereign military base to Turkey. However, under special provisions for Turk ethnics outlined in Acheson memo, taken in conjunction with large sovereign military base, would only perpetuate and aggravate errors London/Zurich Accords. He made it clear Greeks regard Turkish military justifications for base as spurious. Nikolareizis commented that Turkish demands for base area are larger than either one of the British bases which have at various periods accommodated between 5,000 and 30,000 men. Neither Costopoulos nor Nikolareizis denied, however, genuine necessity devise some means avoid humiliation of Turks.
Nikolareizis said he expects return Geneva August 5.
Comment: Today's conversation tends confirm but adds little new to our previous reports. Costopoulos has made it clear that in his mind a leased base not categorically excluded. His authority to Nikolareizis to explore possibility is made on his personal responsibility and not that of Prime Minister. I cannot determine, however, whether Costopoulos merely endeavoring preserve GOG negotiating position, or whether Papandreou is actually more unyielding on this issue. My surmise is that if agreement on other issues could be satisfactorily reached, Greeks might be induced to agree to leased base provided it were moderate in area and personnel. Greeks well aware that separate element of possible agreement can be evaluated only as part of total package.
Labouisse
101. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 4, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Received at 10:57 a.m. and repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, and USUN.
296. From Acheson. Had interim sort of meeting with Turks this morning at my request for purpose of preparing them for bad news it seems probable Nikolareisis will be bringing from Athens. I told them I thought we were nearing moment of decision and would not have a great deal of time left to reach agreement. Prospects did not look very good to me. Although I did not know what sort of reply Nikolareisis would bring, I felt pretty sure it would not be satisfactory from Turkish point of view. At same time, I also felt pretty sure it would not necessarily be final Greek word.
Turks took this calmly and said it was really only what they had expected from beginning. Sunalp emphasized belief that Papandreou and Makarios were really working in partnership to play for time until they could achieve their common goal.
I then asked how much longer Erim felt he could continue conversation. I myself thought there was still some hope but apparently he did not. If that was case, was he still prepared to go on and for how long? He replied that would depend on me; he was ready to keep talking until I myself became convinced that case was hopeless. Implied that this conviction on my part would itself be help to Turkish position, just as he had thought my endorsement for need of Turkish military presence on Cyprus had provided moral support which was useful even if no agreement reached with Greeks.
Comment: Conversation most amiable but rather discouraging.
Tubby
102. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 4, 1964.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with LBJ, 1964. No classification marking. Drafted by McCone on August 5.
SUBJECT
NSC Meeting, 4 August 1964, 12:30 p.m.
In attendance: The President, McNamara, Vance, Rusk, Ball, Robert F. Kennedy, Dillon, McGeorge Bundy, Carl Rowan, McCone
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
2. Ball on Cyprus:
Makarios endeavoring to sabotage the Geneva meeting. Some pluses to this--not all negative. Greek negotiator returns to Geneva today and Papandreou plan for Enosis. Quiet deal with Turks. Leak would destroy effort--Turkish have leased from Greek Govt.
Time on our side.
Bundy--relations with Commies and Nasser./2/
/2/NSC Record of Action No. 2496, August 4, on this meeting reads: "Cyprus: Noted a briefing by Under Secretary of State Ball on the situation in Cyprus and the status of the current negotiations in Geneva." (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265) In a memorandum to Ball, August 4, Komer expressed surprise at the optimism that Ball had shown during the briefing. In an August 4 memorandum to the President, Komer noted that it was time to rethink the Cyprus problem since Makarios would leak any deal that Acheson worked out. (Both in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 11, Memos)
103. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 6, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.
315. From Acheson. Had long and frustrating talk yesterday evening with Nikolareisis. Essence of message he brought back from Athens contained in three points:
1. My suggestions about safeguarding Turk-Cypriot rights, as set forth in memorandum of July 24th,/2/ go too far and would perpetuate division between Greek and Turk communities. GOG considers objective should be to eliminate this difference so that all Cypriots could live together in peace and harmony.
/2/Reference is presumably to Document 90.
2. Concession of sovereign area to Turkey is "out of the question". Greek Government renews offer of NATO base with Turkish troops and Commander. Nikolareisis additionally authorized to explore concrete elements which would be involved in leased base: such as area, purpose, length of lease, number of troops to be accommodated, etc., but not authorized make any commitment that GOG would agree to such lease.
3. Injection of Makarios into picture as result his latest visit to Athens and his public statements, makes it impossible for GOG to continue Geneva talks on basis independence for Cyprus. Talks on this basis would require collaboration of Makarios, who has made it clear he will not accept any negotiated settlement. Therefore, only way we can proceed is on basis that immediate result of talks will be enosis; on this assumption, GOG would be discussing through me disposition to be made of its own territory and thus not have to invite Makarios in.
Nikolareisis handed me memorandum evidently prepared in Athens on subject protection to Turkish minority. It largely rejected proposals set forth my memorandum July 24th. Said GOG could accept Lausanne-type guarantees and U.N. commissioner, provided latter's functions were "defined in detail". Also could accept appointment two Turk-Cypriot Eparchs but they must be on exactly same basis as Greek Eparchs and there must be no separate system of administration for Turks, even at Eparchy or village level. Central Turkish authority in Nicosia to look after special rights of Turks throughout island was unacceptable as producing form of partition and being "contrary to the reestablishment of good administration and peace in the island". Special Turkish courts could be accepted only for application personal status law; in all other respects, Turks must be subject to ordinary, nonmixed courts.
I commented that this memorandum (copy being pouched)/3/ was pretty bad. After some further discussion it appeared that there might still be room for clarification of my ideas and possible compromise. We therefore agreed to study this and talk about it again after we have had time for reflection.
/3/Transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-63, August 7. (Ibid.)
The base question: I pointed out any Turkish force on island must have some physical location which would have to be granted to someone. This someone could not be NATO. Since it was not sovereign entity, therefore why not accept idea of long term lease to Turkey, which might conceivably act as trustee for NATO in interest of Greek-Turkish and general Western defense? I added this idea would be hard to sell to the Turks but I would try. Went on to indicate extent of what appeared to be present Turk minimum demands, i.e., whole of Karpas Peninsula plus north coast as far as Akanthou Pass north of Lefkoniko. Also mentioned their desire for port and airbase as well as problem which might arise if peninsula proved to have substantial population.
I then advanced idea that Turkish base on Cyprus (and minority protection as well) might be brought within the framework of larger Greek-Turkish joint structure similar to that in effect between U.S. and Canada. This could include joint defense board to discuss mutual problems of security in Eastern Mediterranean as well as a political, economic and social entity and perhaps other organs.
This would enable both Greece and Turkey to submerge their differences over Cyprus and resume friendly cooperation which was so important to them both. Nikolareisis did not comment specifically but seemed receptive to this idea.
We concluded discussion on base by my making appeal for GOG assurance it prepared to discuss lease in good faith so that I could have something solid to work on with Turks. Nikolareisis countered that on his part he needed something concrete as to what we had in mind. (I take it this means Papandreou unwilling to give him real authority without knowing beforehand order of magnitude of base area proposed and other characteristics of eventual arrangement.) Nikolareisis suggested starting from premise that Turks now have 650 men on island and would need base large enough only for that number. I said I thought Turks were thinking in considerably larger terms, on order of one division. We agreed to discuss this whole question further.
On matter of discussing enosis rather than Cypriot independence I said I was in entire accord; it was Papandreou--not I--who had kept saying that full and complete independence must be objective. Nikolareisis said would be helpful if I would put this strongly to Papandreou, possibly in letter. I said I thought this was dangerous, since letter might fall into wrong hands and I was already under grave suspicion as result Makarios' statements in Athens. Thought my position on enosis had already been made clear both here and by Labouisse in Athens. However, I could probably get Labouisse to make further oral communication.
Our real problem in discussing enosis, I said, arose from Turkish distrust of GOG and GOC. They seemed to believe that Makarios and Papandreou are in cahoots./4/ How could we prove to them case was otherwise? First of all, we must reach agreement on substance of what was to happen after enosis and secondly we must devise means to put this agreement into effect without bringing about collapse of Turkish Government. We must save Inonu, who was sole strong, moderate figure in Turkish regime. If enosis brought about without any public indication that Greece and Turkey had reached agreement safeguarding Turkey's minimum interest, GOT would certainly fall. Only way I could think of was to have very general statement issued after agreement reached and then quickly bring about enosis. But Papandreou would have to give more than he had up to now to persuade Turks to stand still.
/4/Erkin expressed this view to Hare on August 3. The discussion was reported in telegram 202 from Ankara, August 4. (Ibid.)
Nikolareisis concluded conversation by assuring me Papandreou was very anxious to find solution, while I, on my part, renewed my appeal for greater Greek help in finding solution./5/
/5/Acheson communicated the substance of this conversation to the Turks on the same day and reported their reaction in telegram 318 from Geneva, August 6. (Ibid.)
Tubby
104. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 7, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 7:08 a.m. and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Geneva for Acheson, and London. Passed to the White House.
212. Embtel 202./2/ Erkin asked me come in late yesterday to brief him on "anything you have received since we last talked", i.e. only two days before as reported reftel.
/2/See footnote 4, Document 103.
Since nothing had as yet been received in response his questions, I armed myself with such new information as was available regarding more favorable attitude of Makarios on freedom of movement of UN peace force and food distribution as reported by Nicosia and USUN, as well as our own efforts and those of UN in that regard. Also made inventory of current developments in other fields mutual interest including turning over second $40 million loan tranche, delivery of 104-G's and tanks under MAP, completion agreement for joint use Cigli airfield after prolonged negotiation, local currency assistance in building new labor union headquarters, imminent arrival of parachute jump training team, continuing efforts to obtain increased consortium assistance and satisfactory progress Turk parliamentary visit in U.S.
Contrary his wont, Erkin took notes on these items and then observed fundamental question remained what to do in rapidly deteriorating situation. He had lunched with Inonu who had asked him tell me situation grave as result such GOC acts as economic and physical blockade of Turks, obstructions to peace force in fulfilling mission, continuing armed attacks on Turks, breakdown of judiciary, territorial waters legislation, military secrets law, cutting of Turkish water supply and attempted removal Turk Cypriot Amb here in order replace by Turk Cypriot from Bonn and fill Bonn post with Greek. He said Inonu had asked him say that continued GOC aggression could result in Turk retaliation from air.
There ensued rather involved discussion in which I endeavored ascertain whether Erkin was talking about reaction from cumulative frustration or as result some new development. Using our relations with Soviet Union as example I pointed out that there had been recurrent situations over the years when cumulative friction had caused voices to be raised in advocacy of trial by arms but we had resisted this even at the time when we had atomic monopoly. Other examples abound; meeting such problems is real test statesmanship and diplomacy. To give up is to shirk our job.
Also in such tense situation was important that GOT keep careful watch on actions of Turk Cypriots. I had just received several disquieting reports in this regard, one to effect that people of Ktima had wanted pay water bill but had been prevented by Turk "organization" and another indicating Turks responsible for fray involving UN forces in Nicosia (Nicosia's 175 to Dept)./3/ In drawing attention to these, I realized that general pattern of incidents showed predominance of Greek Cypriot instigation but would be deplorable if in tense situation thus created spark would be supplied by some Turkish initiative. Regardless of how it might come about, it could be made to appear that it had been deliberately created to afford excuse for GOT retaliation.
/3/Telegram 175 from Nicosia, August 6, reported on exchanges of fire within the city of Nicosia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
This was stiff stuff but Erkin took it well, observing in latter connection he would get message off to Cyprus immediately to enjoin restraint on Turks.
Re occasion for retaliation, Erkin inquired what had President Johnson meant when he spoke in Washington talks of war as only last resort?/4/ Also he already being asked why U.S. should feel warranted in taking such strong action in Vietnam (which he personally thought right) and at same time restrain GOT when it similarly inclined act in its own interest. To this he had no answer.
/4/See Document 72.
Conversation then turned again to type of incident which might cause GOT retaliate and Erkin mentioned, as he had in reftel, situation which could arise if Geneva talks fail and enosis carried out as purely Greek affair. Reference also made to danger of any substantial move to subdue Turks and indicated this was what Inonu especially had in mind when he warned of possible necessity of retaliation. Erkin renewed request for our views in this regard (to be borne in mind that, aside from real desire consult, these approaches could be cited as fulfilling our understanding re consultation in event decision taken retaliate in some way).
Broadening conversation, Erkin then expressed great concern re deteriorating relations with GOG, saying that, if Nikolareisis returned to Geneva with negative response, point of no return [would] have been reached between Greece and Turkey since action such as removal Greek forces from Bulgarian frontier to bolster strength versus Turks, illegal military build-ups in Dodecanese and intensive naval patrols from Mytilene to Rhodes would indicate that "Greece wants war". Wouldn't I agree?
I said definitely not. In first place would be completely irrational in view disparity between Greek and Turkish forces. Secondly, such information as I had indicated Greeks don't want war and that this feeling prevalent in Greek armed forces.
Erkin said this not assessment of GOT, citing public statements by Papandreou re readiness reply militarily and report Greek Amb in Nicosia had expressed opinion war inevitable. This why he was asking our views since moment may come when too late for USG to do anything. I said would submit to Dept but in meantime had considerable confidence in my own appraisal and felt GOT would be making serious mistake to proceed assumption Athens actually picking fight.
Erkin then brought up subject of Makarios, recalling that in previous conversation I had suggested would be mistake to assume that public professions of identity of view between Makarios and Papandreou accurately reflected basic relationship; also that I had suggested elements of opposition to Makarios on island as well. Relating to suggestions made in past to desirability of doing something to remove Makarios from picture, he said couldn't see how this could be done as result of Turk-Greek agreement but would rather have to precede agreement since seems Makarios still in position exert controlling influence on Athens. I said didn't wish get over my head in unauthorized discussion but one thing seemed obvious, which was that if Turkey and Greece should come to agreement on solution which would involve enosis in one way or another, role of Makarios would pretty much disappear. Obviously intrigued by even mention this subject, i.e. elimination of Makarios, Erkin said still felt difficult reach solution as long as Makarios remained in power and speculated on possible move by Grivas to replace him. I asked if there had been any contact by Grivas with GOT. Erkin said none; all that known is publicly announced intention of Grivas to promote enosis while saying steps would be taken safeguard Turkish community.
Erkin concluded conversation by making renewed appeal "to extract something from Washington" regarding views and intentions of USG since, if Geneva talks get nowhere, necessary devise alternatives for dealing with situation. Once again he wished emphasize gravity of situation as it is developing and to make clear he not talking under impulse of emotion but "coldly and solemnly".
While I was with Erkin he received telephone call from Deputy Prime Minister Satir who had just talked with Erim in Geneva who reported Acheson dissatisfied with proposals brought by Nikolareisis. Erkin's first reaction was to take this as indication of final break which he had predicted but I suggested Greeks adept at bargaining in old and established Near Eastern tradition where it is not first but "last price" that counts. Now not time throw in hand.
Was interesting that Erim's report was made to Satir, presumably acting on behalf of Inonu, rather than Erkin which would tend substantiate suggestion in reftel that Erkin-Erim relationship may be element in situation. However, would be mistake stress this unduly since believe what Erkin had to say was essentially what he very much had on his mind.
This tel being sent Immediate in view radio reports this morning of serious fighting in Mansura area, which is precisely type of development which could trigger Turk retaliation./5/
/5/In telegram 223 from Athens, August 7, Labouisse "strongly endorsed" Hare's suggestions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) In telegram 221 from Ankara, August 7, Hare reported that the Turkish Cabinet would meet at 10 p.m. to discuss events in Cyprus and that Erkin had promised to pass along a report to the Embassy. (Ibid.)
Hare
105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, August 7, 1964, 12:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Sisco. Also sent to Ankara, Nicosia, London, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.
198. From Ball to Ambassadors. Ref: Ankara Critic One Repeated to you separately./2/
/2/This telegram, August 7, reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin had informed Hare that in response to hostile actions, his government had ordered a "demonstration" by the Turkish Air Force over Cyprus and that Greece had been informed of this decision. "Erkin made urgent plea for USG to do anything in its power to avoid disaster, saying that GOT wants above all else is to avoid spread of hostilities." (Ibid.)
For Athens:
You should approach GOG at highest level with following message:
1. They should do everything possible to prevent the GOC from reacting against Turk-Cypriot population or from attempting to destroy Turkish aircraft since either action could rapidly escalate dangerous situation.
2. GOG should avoid any reaction that could contribute to escalation or impede progress being made in Geneva.
3. GOG should discourage any move by GOC to bring this matter into Security Council since this again could lead only to exacerbation of relations and interference with possibility successful Geneva negotiations.
4. We have told GOT that we strongly disapprove this demonstration and have cautioned them to take no further action that might heighten the danger of escalation./3/
/3/In telegram 226 from Athens, August 7, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos had already urged Makarios to avoid any further provocation and, although treating the Turkish air raid as very serious, discounted the likelihood of armed intervention. (Ibid.)
For Ankara:
We assume that by "demonstration" Turks intend only to fly planes over as they did on December 26 and that there will be no bombing. Please confirm this. Please also tell Erkin we are greatly disturbed by GOT decision. We are doing everything possible in relevant capitals to dampen reaction and prevent this from leading to escalation and disrupting the intensive efforts we have been making in Geneva./4/
/4/Upon receipt of telegram 221 from Ankara indicating that the Turkish "demonstration" would involve strafing and bombing, the Department of State instructed Hare in telegram 184, August 7, to request that the Turkish Government limit its action to a "flyover" and avoid any bloodshed. (Both ibid.)
For Nicosia:
Please contact Thimayya and encourage him to do everything possible to prevent GOC reactions against Turk-Cypriot population. Suggest you do not inform GOC if this telegram arrives before air planes since that is not our responsibility and we do not wish to provide basis for any suspicion we are approving GOT action./5/
/5/In telegram 197 from Nicosia, August 8, Belcher reported that, fearing the effects of a Turkish air attack, he had warned both U.N. and Cypriot Government officials of its likelihood, while urging upon them the need for an immediate cease-fire. (Ibid.) In telegram 109 to Nicosia, August 8, the Department of State noted: "Understand your reasoning behind your actions but nevertheless it is essential that we maintain confidential relationship with GOT." (Ibid.)
Rusk
106. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 7, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Nodis-TAG. Received at 2:14 p.m. and repeated to Ankara and Athens.
325. From Acheson for Ball. We must begin prepare for last act of Geneva. Mediator plans to leave August 7 for Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, returning Geneva August 20, a veritable phantom Finn. Believes he should then urge on SYG that he (Tuomioja) make his final report if I am still stuck in mud. He will tell Greeks during visit to Athens his report will stress no change in present status Cyprus toward full independence and beyond is possible under UN Charter except by unanimous agreement signatories present treaties. Hence, if they want enosis now offered on silver platter they must pay comparatively small price to get Turkish agreement.
Believe we too should begin to make terminal noises, stating that if next round of talks produces no progress I shall go home to report and have no personal intention of returning. USG's future course not up to me.
Should like to give to Nikolareisis as personal opinion that under existing pressures and Makarios' present policies Turkish physical reaction inevitable, that I have urged restraint and will continue to do so, though knowing that advice is useless; furthermore, Turkish attitude quite understandable. Finally, that if USG asks, as it has done in past, my opinion on what our action should be in event Turkish move, I should give Lincoln's advice to Stanton (in view of Far East situation) "one war at a time." We are deeply involved on many fronts and Greeks and Turks are not only people with domestic political problems. Whether through UN or otherwise I would be against US military involvement in Cyprus.
Would also say to Greeks that if, as Nikolareisis suggested, move directly to enosis after understanding reached with Turks is contemplated, danger of popular upheaval Turkey could be overcome by announcement that Turkish forces would shortly arrive not as enemies but by prior agreement and to aid in orderly transition of Turkish Cypriots to enosis. They would thus transform greatest hazard in path of enosis to important asset. It also might even work, and help Inonu as suggested mytel 315./2/
/2/Document 103.
To Turks I would say that they know our advice that Cyprus not worth a war; we still believe that. But we would neither attempt to stop any military action by them, nor rescue them from the consequences of their action if any occurred. They would be entirely on their own.
To both I would say that, in UN, US would reenforce the Mediator's view that changes in status can only be recognized if accomplished by legal means.
So much for terminal noises.
Problem in reaching agreement lies primarily in Athens and primarily there with Papandreou. He has not made one attempt toward the agreement he could have and which would give him nine-tenths of all he hoped for. I cannot reach him because Nikolareisis is not wired for sound. Harry has got to get into the act with a baseball bat and make him see that he is risking everything by taking 100 percent negative attitude and not making one constructive suggestion. Specifically we want to get here some one with power at home authorized to work out a long-term lease of the peninsula--or any other place--without any more nagging restrictions than the British have and under some sort of organization like Canada-US Joint Defense Board. If no Greek can come here perhaps Harry ought to fly up secretly in military aircraft for talk with me and return to be a relaying station in Athens. God only knows what N says I say.
Impossible for Ray to do anything unless a Greek first comes here bearing a small gift or rather small downpayment on a rare bargain.
Tubby
107. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, August 7, 1964, 8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Received at 3:13 p.m. and repeated to Athens, London, Paris for USRO, Geneva for Acheson, the White House, OSD, CIA, and JCS.
192. At request Minister Interior, Thimayya and I went to see President urgently while he went to see Grivas. President in middle of Council of Ministers meeting which he broke off for hour-long discussion with us.
Thimayya made suggestion that President issue statement calling for cease-fire by Greeks on condition urgent negotiations be commenced at once for removal all posts both Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot in Mansoura area. President pointed out that this was similar to suggestion he had made some time ago and had even offered withdraw unilaterally if UN would take over Greek posts. UN had been unable do so but perhaps if both sides gave up posts outside villages UN could then maintain peace in area. Thimayya agreed this would be good idea and worth trying as last-ditch effort save situation from complete chaos. As we speaking of these matters word received of overflight reported previously and of fact villages of Alevgha and Selain Tou Appi had fallen to Greeks (according to Turk sources as told to UN). At same time President's secretary requested helicopter assistance in evacuating number seriously wounded Greek Cypriots from village Kato Pyrgos. All UN helicopters grounded due some mechanical fault and General offered ambulance.
President said he would contact Grivas (who still with Georkadjis at Athalassa command post) immediately and would go there to confer in view need for urgent communication facility only available at post./2/
/2/Telegram 194 from Nicosia, August 7, 11 p.m., transmitted the text of Georkadjis' report on the military situation in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
I offered send any message he wanted to Ankara for urgent transmission for GOT but pointed out that suggestion of bilateral withdrawal if not coupled with Greek cease-fire would have little effect. President said he would contact me as soon as he had conferred with Grivas, who is in command of operation.
General Thimayya pointed out communication difficulty in that his commander in area had been unable for past 36 hours contact any responsible Greek Cypriot. He expressed hope that communications from Athalassa command post might be more effective.
Belcher
108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, August 7, 1964, 9:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8, CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Talbot and cleared by GTI, Cleveland, and Ball. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia, London, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.
193. Ankara's 223, 224 and 225./2/ While we are sorting out what happened today and implications for Geneva talks, NATO, and UN, you should make crystal clear to GOT our conviction further air action tomorrow would be major misfortune. We understand Thimayya exerting every energy to achieve effective cease fire and there are indications that Greek-Cypriots are becoming responsive to his proposals. Whereas Geneva talks admittedly have not yet found basis for GOG-GOT agreement, we have not at all believed Acheson has reached end of road. We fear today's events may have substantially increased roughness of diplomatic track; whether Acheson can salvage talks will be highly dependent on next actions taken by all parties. If any possibility of continuing Geneva talks is to remain, it is essential that there be no further military action./3/
/2/Telegram 223 from Ankara, August 7, reported that Turkish aircraft had already left on their mission. (Ibid.) In telegram 224 from Ankara, August 7, Hare reported that Erkin said no bombing was planned in the overflight of Cyprus and that he would check into reports the jets had fired at targets. (Ibid.) In telegram 225 from Ankara, August 8, Hare reported that the Turks were concerned by reports that Mansoura had fallen to Greek Cypriot attacks and maintained that no Turkish aircraft had fired during the overflight. (Ibid.)
/3/In telegram 234 from Ankara, August 8, Hare reported that Erkin stated that the Turks had no plans for further demonstrations and wanted to continue talks at Geneva. (Ibid.)
We have invested very great effort to pull our two allies back from abyss which yawns before them. We hold no brief for many Greek-Cypriot actions and have appreciated Turkish restraint. However, military action in midst of particularly delicate and significant diplomatic round in Geneva can only drive Greeks into an extreme position publicly as well as privately. It makes clarification and consideration of base question well nigh impossible this week as planned. Moreover, we disagree with Turkish estimate that Greeks will not react. As we have strongly urged restraint on Turks, so we are strongly urging restraint on Greeks.
For Athens: Follow up initial approach with Greeks and ensure they take measures to dampen reaction and particularly to get cease fire into effect./4/
/4/In telegram 235 from Athens, August 8, the Embassy reported Greek public statements calling for a cease-fire on the island. (Ibid.)
For Nicosia: Our ability to restrain Turks is obviously inter-related to Makarios willingness agree with Thimayya on cease fire. We should support his efforts actively in every appropriate way./5/
/5/In telegrams 202 and 210 from Nicosia, August 8, Belcher reported his efforts to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)
Rusk
109. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
August 8, 1964, 8:35 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and McNamara, August 8, 1964, 8:35 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. The President was in Texas; McNamara was in Washington. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated press statement.]
RSM: but, [we have] a very serious crisis brewing in Cyprus.
LBJ: Some of the reporters were quite critical about my coming down here last night./2/ One of these Navy chiefs told me--said, "Here's a war going on on two or three fronts here and he's walking off here to play for the weekend." Now, what's the best way to answer that?
/2/The President had left Washington at 6:29 p.m. the previous night for the LBJ Ranch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
RSM: Oh, I have seen no evidence of that at all up here and no reports on the tickers of anything like that.
LBJ: No. I just think they were visiting among themselves, but I may get a question along that line this morning. What do you think I ought to say? [pause] Hello?
RSM: Yes, I was just thinking. I think you could say that you were advised by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that there was no reason for your continued presence in Washington this weekend.
LBJ: Will you touch that base with Dean then?
RSM: Yes, sir, I will. Well, I know that he felt that way. I will call him, but he and I talked of this last night and we both agree. I'll call him and tell him.
LBJ: No, no. That's okay then. Now, what can this bring on as far as we're concerned in Cyprus?
RSM: Well, I just talked to George Ball two minutes ago about it, and it's his feeling--and I would certainly share it--that it would be wise to get Labouisse into Geneva/3/ immediately to talk to Acheson. George had just finished a conversation with Acheson on the telephone,/4/ hoping that possibly Acheson could make some proposal here, possibly an overt publicized proposal by the U.S. Government as to how the Greeks and the Turks might settle their differences. Unless something like that's done, it's very possible the whole place will go up in flames today.
/3/See Document 111.
/4/A memorandum of this conversation is in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Cyprus.
LBJ: All right, then what do we do?
RSM: Well, the first thing to do is to get Labouisse up to Geneva so they can discuss this matter. I say it may go up in flames today, I should really say this weekend. I think we have, maybe, 12 to 48 hours here. So I'm getting an airplane down to Athens to take Labouisse to Geneva, and State is working on some kind of a proposal that might be made, really, along the lines that Acheson has already been proposing, which, in substance, was something that looked as though both the Turks and the Greeks might accept.
LBJ: Why is Labouisse going down there, because he's the Ambassador to Greece?
RSM: To advise on what the Turks, what the Greeks latest thinking is.
LBJ: What they might do?
RSM: Yes.
LBJ: Alright, now suppose--how does it go up in the flames. The Turks are bombing the island?
RSM: The Turkish planes, as you know, strafed one of the harbors yesterday.
LBJ: Yeah.
RSM: In response, it appears that the Greek Cypriots are attacking Turkish Cypriot towns on Cyprus today. And they have the force at hand to take those towns and destroy the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Government is in a state of panic at the moment. Erkin has talked to Hare,/5/ our Ambassador, and expressed great fear as to what will happen. The Turkish Government just couldn't sit there and let the Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus be slaughtered. They'd be forced to respond. But they apparently ran this four-sortie attack, four-airplane attack, yesterday without having a clear-cut plan as to how they would respond to a Greek Cypriot response. It's a perfect illustration of starting something with too little force and without knowing what you're going do when the other side kicks back.
/5/See Document 104.
LBJ: Now, how could we be involved?
RSM: Well, I don't think we would be involved militarily, Mr. President. But I think that the diplomatic offense that George Ball has in mind is the way we should act.
LBJ: Alright.
[Here follows discussion of military operations in Southeast Asia.]
110. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 8, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to USUN, Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, Athens, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
229. Had early morning session with Erkin prior his joining Cabinet meeting in which I drew on Nicosia's 199 to Dept/2/ giving latest sitrep and status negots on UN taking over positions in Mansoura complex; Athens 226 to Dept/3/ covering constructive recommendation by GOG to Nicosia; Athens 223 to Department/4/ re lack Greek desire for war and probability that further bargaining could be useful in Geneva; Athens 227 to Dept/5/ re instruction to Nicolareizis to continue talks with Acheson; and finally importance of avoiding further air action in order promote peace efforts in Nicosia and settlement efforts in Geneva as instructed Deptel 193./6/
/2/Dated August 8.(Ibid.)
/3/See footnote 3, Document 105.
/4/See footnote 5, Document 104.
/5/Dated August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
/6/Document 108.
Erkin expressed appreciation and made following comments:
1) Said he would send message Turk Charge Nicosia as requested by Thimayya but reiterated Turk approval was for withdrawal both sides from posts inside and outside villages affected and taking over by UN on status quo ante basis, e.g. Greeks should return Mansoura to Turks if occupied by them. He said this was point on which Ministers felt very strongly last night, with many insisting GOT should otherwise resort to bombing. Erkin said he would clarify again to Turk Charge and hoped we might assist in Nicosia as occasion afforded. As matter stands Erkin fears Markarios seeking hold villages occupied in which case turning over higher land to UN and disarming villages would merely serve consolidate Greek Cypriot gains. However if there is complete mutuality of action GOT prepared agree.
2) Essential that attacks not now be launched against Kokkina such as made against Mansoura. This very important.
3) Erkin has impression casualties in Mansoura have been heavy and anxious obtain accurate info (would seem any info furnished on this or in similar cases might best be double-tracked through Turk Emb Nicosia).
4) GOT greatly concerned re situation Turks at Paphos where population being subjected excessive privation. Necessary obtain full info and that remedial steps be taken.
5) GOT respects ability and diligent efforts of General Thimayya.
6) Inonu had hard time in Cabinet last night. Most of Ministers were demanding immediate and strong action, stressing that they represented will of people. Only advocates of moderation were Inonu, Erkin and General Sunay. Otherwise drastic decisions would have been taken last night since there was even opposition to recessing until this morning.
Believe info and thoughts which we were able feed Erkin before and during Cabinet meeting last night and again this morning have been very helpful to him in maintaining certain "one up-manship" with other Cabinet members and interesting to note that, whereas he has been avowed interventionist in recent weeks, he now appears be using influence in cause of moderation.
Since foregoing drafted have had second talk with Erkin giving details of new cease-fire proposal. Para numbered one therefore represents views which have subsequently been revised.
Hare
111. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. The President was at the LBJ Ranch in Texas; Ball was in Washington. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
LBJ: Yes?
GWB: Hello.
LBJ: Hello.
GWB: Hello, Mr. President. We've been watching the Cyprus situation all through the night. We thought we had it stabilized last night, but this morning the Turks resumed their air strikes using napalm and 750-pound bombs. They've got maybe 65 planes that they're using. And the Makarios government has just told our people in Nicosia that unless they stop within a half an hour, they're going to turn on the whole Turk Cypriot population on the island and attack them all over the island with just a general massacre./2/ Now, we've gotten the stiffest kind of notes--of messages--both to Makarios and to Inonu,/3/ telling them they've got to stop immediately while this is all sorted out. But what I wanted to suggest was that I'm not at all sure that this thing is going to be held, and it may blow up within the next few hours into one of the bloodiest events we've seen in modern times, and I just wondered if your people shouldn't be making preparations so you could get back here fast if you have to do so.
/2/See Document 113.
/3/See Document 108.
LBJ: Alright.
GWB: Now, I may, if it's agreeable with you, I may have to use your name to Inonu in order to stop this. I don't think it will be necessary, but if we can't get them to stand down, I'd like to be--have authority to do it.
LBJ: Sure, sure. I wouldn't think it would do much good, though.
GWB: Well, I'm not sure. This is the one hope we've got to get this thing stopped before it turns into a general massacre. But these people are all so bloodthirsty there's just no telling. And the military may be out from under control, as far as Inonu is concerned, in Turkey which is the other matter that we don't know about.
LBJ: What did it look like last night?
GWB: Well, last night the bombing had been limited. And, actually, the attack had been limited. They didn't use bombs. They used only rockets and machine guns. And it looked as though the incident were closed. And this was the impression that the Turks gave. But the Greek Cypriots continued the fighting in these villages, apparently through the night, and that was enough to set--give the Turk military an excuse to go forward again today, and this time they're armored differently and with napalm and 750-pound bombs, it's become a very serious business. They've got a lot of the--a number of the villages are in flames, so that now the one recourse that Makarios has is to threaten to use the Turk Cypriots on the island--all hundred thousand of them--as his hostages and just massacre them unless this thing stops. So that we've gotten, as they say, the toughest messages to both sides. But whether they'll stop now with this bloodbath stuff, I can't tell. It's very questionable. So that the thing may be out of control. But, we're--doing my best. But in the meantime, I just have the feeling that someone--the way the world will look at it, that there ought to be preparations so you could move.
LBJ: I was planning to go to a funeral and come in immediately after the funeral in the middle of the afternoon./4/
/4/The President attended the service for Mrs. Bess Beeman and departed for Washington at 3:15 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
GWB: Well, that may be alright if this doesn't get out of hand. But if it does, I would just want to raise the question with you as something to consider.
LBJ: Where's Dean?
GWB: He's on his way down now. I've been here all night. I've been in touch with him through the night.
LBJ: Bob's in town too.
GWB: Bob's in town; I've been in touch with him. And with Bus Wheeler and so on and so on.
LBJ: What are the possibilities--what else could we do?
GWB: Not much more, unless we wanted to intervene militarily, and I don't think anybody wants to do that. We're going to get the Sixth Fleet moved over closer, at least--just got a call in to Bob to talk to him about it now. We've got destroyers standing off Cyprus to take our own people off--there are about 350 Americans on the island--if it comes to that. But beyond that I don't know what we could do. The Security Council was in emergency session until 1:30 this morning but adjourned without coming to any decision. At that time, it looked as though the Turks were going to quit and this was an incident which we could then use to sort things out diplomatically. But the Turks have overplayed their hand and apparently the military may be out of control, so that it's going to be very hard to do anything. The Greek Cypriots called in or advised our fellow late last night, which was 2:30 o'clock over there, that they had asked the Soviet Union to intervene militarily./5/ Now, the Soviet Union hasn't done anything. I'm quite sure it isn't going to do anything other than to help them in the Security Council. But, we let--I let Moscow know right away last night, to put them on guard, and we'll have to watch this during the day, so we're alerting the fleets to be on guard.
/5/In telegram 219 from Nicosia, August 9, received in the Department of State at 12:11 a.m., the Embassy reported that the Cyprus Government had requested Soviet military intervention. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
LBJ: What'd we say to Moscow?
GWB: I just notified the Embassy there to find out everything they could, but we didn't want to take any strong line because there was no indication of any favorable response on Moscow's part.
LBJ: What do the British say?
GWB: Well, the British are in the position of taking orders from us. We're really getting nothing from them of a substantive kind, although we're keeping them on--of course, they've all gone away for a weekend over in London, as usual. Butler is out on an island somewhere, and I think Home is away from London, too. And they are partly inaccessible. But we're keeping the government informed, and, actually, I made use of the government planes last night to get them scrambled up off the island to have a look around to see what Turkish forces were in the vicinity. There's nothing, so far, of sea forces except about half a dozen destroyers that they have standing off. But there's no question that they're all loaded and ready to go as far as a land invasion is concerned. They've been making preparations for the last 24 hours, and this is a culmination of several weeks ago.
LBJ: What does Acheson say?
GWB: I talked to him last night/6/ and he was fairly relaxed, but, of course, that was before this last attack. Now, I sent--I got a plane through Bob and sent Harry Labouisse up late last night to have a talk with Acheson so that Acheson, I mean Labouisse could come back to see Papandreou with a strong note from Acheson about the possibility of settling and the need to settle immediately. Labouisse is back in Athens now. The Greek Government so far has behaved quite well. Papandreou called on Makarios to stop the fighting last night but, apparently, without success. He has now summoned Grivas to come back to Athens. And it was our hope in the earlier hours this morning that he would work out some kind of a means of getting rid of Makarios so that this matter could be settled between the Greek and Turk Governments. But the Turks are overplaying their hand so badly that it may be very hard to put it back together now. But we'll keep working on it.
/6/A memorandum of this conversation is in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Cyprus.
LBJ: Now what are the one or two possible alternatives? Our intervention would be one. You can rule that out. Any--what else?
GWB: I don't think from a military intervention point of view, there's anything that can be done because there's no United Nations force that could be gotten together for this purpose. Of course, if the Soviet Union--
LBJ: Well now, why not? Why not? Why couldn't the United Nations--why wouldn't that be something to at least pursue or hold out hope on?
GWB: Well, I think--
LBJ: you mean, just realistically, they don't have them, but couldn't we--?
GWB: They simply won't do it. That's all I mean. There are 6,000 UN troops in there now, but the orders that all the component governments have given to their own elements is that if an invasion should start, they would retire into the British bases and not stop it, because with 6,000 men they are not capable of stopping a Turkish invasion. And anyway, there isn't a one of the United Nations forces that's in there that's prepared to fight the Turks.
LBJ: Well, is there any possibility that we could get the governments to agree to do that, and we could tell the Turks that we're going--that the United Nations is going to be fighting you if you don't stay away?
GWB: Well, realistically with the experience we've had in the UN of even getting the 6,000 and the nervous--the Canadians calling us every hour and saying they want to pull out, and the Swedes threatening to pull out, there's no member of the UN, I think, that's going to be willing to put up any forces against a Turkish invasion. I think the best bet there is just to use the biggest, the toughest leverage we have on the Turks. If we can't stop them, why we'll just have to cordon off the island and let the thing settle down itself. Because I don't think there's any way of putting outside forces between the Turks and the Greeks if they really get at it, without--I don't think there's anybody prepared to put forces into a situation like that.
LBJ: Well, UN intervention, our intervention--what else is conceivable?
GWB: On the military side, I think that the best thing we could do is to make sure that the Soviet Union doesn't do anything. But as far as trying to stop it, the only other way to stop it then is just to tell the Turk Government, which I already have, that they're going to be condemned in the eyes of the world by all civilized nations if they go ahead, in the face of the threat of a massacre, and precipitate it. And I've told the Government of Cyprus that if they go ahead with a massacre of this kind, they will be condemned as murderers by all civilized people. That we are working very hard with both governments--with the Turkish Government that gets the planes stood down. And if there's any civilian control left in the Turkish Government, I think we could probably do it. It's--but apart from that, there's no way we can stop this fighting because there's no available force that can go in and get in the middle of it. And, actually, for an outside force to come in--once this massacre starts, it's hopeless. I mean, if you had 50,000 men and put them in, you couldn't stop the bloodshed, because it's going on and it will go on in every little village all over the place. And a major force would only exacerbate it, actually, if they came in from outside. We just have to live through it and pick up the pieces. But it's a mess.
LBJ: Well, UN intervention, our intervention--I guess you've got to consider the likelihood of Soviet intervention, haven't you?
GWB: We've considered it very hard and we've looked at it very long and we don't think at all it's going to happen. But, nevertheless, we're going to try--we're going to get some fleet units up there just to be on guard if anything should occur. It would be very hard for them to intervene, almost impossible--except by air. They couldn't put enough ashore by submarine to do it and they can't get their--any naval units out there. They would just be exposing themselves in a way they never would. I don't think--they have told the Turks, within the last week, that if the Turks intervened they wouldn't do anything about it. And I don't, for a minute, think that they're going to respond to Makarios' call. We're going to take every prudent act to make sure that they don't, but I just don't see any serious possibility of it.
LBJ: Now, what are we waiting on to take our people off?
GWB: Well, I think we--
LBJ: Do we have the facilities there to do it now?
GWB: Yeah, We've got a destroyer standing offshore. We've got the airlifts all set up. The best way to evacuate them is by air. I'm--I hope that--we've got about a half an hour to play with here--and I hope that we won't have to pull them off in a wholesale way because it could even make the--it might trigger the thing. But they're pretty secure. I mean, it's as badly an exposed situation as it is [inaudible].
LBJ: Not very secure when you got 65 planes bombing an island, are you?
GWB: Well, we can get the Turks to stay away from our people, I think. They know where they are.
[Here follows discussion of military operations in Southeast Asia.]
112. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 9, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Geneva for Acheson, Paris for USRO, London, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
238. From Anschuetz. Have just seen Papandreou at his request. Costopoulos (Fon Affairs) and Garoufalias (Defense) also present.
Papandreou said GOG had received telephone call from Makarios demanding intervention of Greek aircraft to repel Turk bombings which resumed this morning. Papandreou alluded to his statement last night which he said constituted formal repudiation of Markarios' policy. Fighting has now stopped, however and Turkish action is putting GOG in untenable position. Whatever one might think of Makarios, he is apparently in the right in this instance, and public opinion in Greece and in Cyprus will not permit GOG stand aside indefinitely. Kyprianou had telephoned demanding formal declaration of GOG support by one thirty today failing which GOC would have no alternative but to seek help elsewhere. Papandreou appealed to USG halt Turkish attacks. Assured Papandreou USG was exerting its best efforts. Pointed out direct and immediate Soviet or UAR intervention seemed rather unlikely and requested assurance that GOG armed forces would not be engaged without further consultation with us. This assurance was given, but with insistence that next few hours would be extremely critical for GOG. I commented that awkward as is present position GOG, actual engagement Greek armed forces would be infinitely more serious.
Costopoulos said Grivas is returning within the hour. GOG at a loss understand how Kokkina-Mansoura affair had gotten out of control despite best efforts GOG. Garofoulias asserted no Greek nationals involved this affair.
All three Greeks were in rather emotional state. I assured them I would be in touch with them later today.
Labouisse
113. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Nicosia, August 9, 1964, 3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to the Department of State (where it was received at 9:58 a.m.), USUN, the White House, Geneva for Acheson, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, DOD, CIA, COMSIXTHFLT, Istanbul, Beirut, and USDOCOSouth. The source text is the Department of State copy.
165. Just seen President in urgent last minute appeal to him, order cease-fire in order avoid further spread of violence. After making numerous points and expressing my real regret that we had not taken advantage of cease-fire which lasted almost 18 hours, I urged him in spite of reports which he had recounted of destruction of Greek villages as distinct from any military targets, make urgent announcement of cease-fire using whatever justification needed which would put GOC in best possible light. As he was saying "Do you think that Turks would stop if I did so?" aide came in to announce 2 further air strikes by 4 and 7 planes respectively on villages of Pamos and Kato Pyrgos setting center of towns afire. With this news President turned to me with hopeless shrug and said "What can I do?"
I suggested that he and his Ministers were putting USG in impossible position by using US as means of transmittal of "ultimatum" for two reasons (1) time element too short and (2) Turks unlikely respond this sort of threat. I urged him again in most urgent tones reconsider this terrible decision so fraught with dangers for his people.
I said I would do what I could but I was not at all hopeful that restrictions which he had placed on situation would make possible a favorable outcome. As he accompanied me to door I asked again regarding time limit and he indicated 1:30 GMT.
We at Nicosia recognize that if US successfully stops Turks on this occasion and in response this type ultimatum we will henceforth be held responsible for controlling Turks and subject this type of blackmail. However even so I believe we must make every conceivable effort obtain at least temporary cessation of bombing in order not to create holocaust on this island with all its ultimate consequences for our alliances not only in area but elsewhere.
Belcher
114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, August 9, 1964, 10:23 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.
224. For Ambassador from Ball. Please approach Papandreou urgently and make following points:
1. In spite of what GOC may have told him, they officially advised us last night that they were calling on the Soviet Union for military intervention; they confirmed this advice to the British Government. It is utterly essential that Papandreou concert with Grivas to insure that no Soviet, Egyptian or other armed forces be introduced into the island.
2. The situation in Cyprus is on the verge of holocaust. Makarios has threatened a general massacre if the Turkish attacks do not stop. We are urgently trying to get the Turk planes to stand down and at the same time are pointing out to GOC that they will be regarded as murderers if they loose an attack on Turk Cypriot population generally.
3. Under these circumstances Papandreou must show his leadership by stopping the fighting on the island and getting Makarios under control. We will do all possible to stop the further Turkish offensive but Papandreou must get Grivas and his men in hand.
4. Above all Papandreou and Inonu must now promptly settle this matter along the lines of the Acheson proposals. There is no longer time for horse-trading or equivocation or passionate oratory. This is a time for calm heads, incisive action and rational leadership.
5. Tell Papandreou that all of us, including President Johnson, have greatly admired his restraint so far and the message that he sent to Makarios last night./2/ We must move on from there.
/2/In his August 8 letter, Papandreou appealed to Makarios to cease Greek-Cypriot military operations.
Rusk
115. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 9, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 12:33 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
244. Deptel 201./2/ For Under Secretary Ball from Hare. Had appointment with Erkin immediately following receipt your telegram. Asked him what reaction had been to my asking them hold hand after receipt your telephone call. He said has talked to Inonu who had said unable do so. I then asked see Inonu to deliver your message and Erkin and I went to his house together.
/2/Telegram 201 to Ankara, August 9, instructed Hare to "tell Inonu urgently that Turks have now made their point emphatically by military action. However, if they proceed further in the face of imminent warning of a general massacre, neither the US nor world opinion will condone this and they will have hurt their cause irreparably." (Ibid., POL 7 US/BALL)
He was friendly but tough, saying every hour given Makarios is used for evil and he unwilling give him any more time. As for today didn't expect there would be much if any more air activity due to advanced hour. What he would agree to is to call off further air strikes if by tomorrow morning Makarios stops attacks at Kokkina and agrees to eventual withdrawal from area occupied by Greeks. This to be followed by agreement restore peace immediately on whole of island.
Inonu said felt confident this could be done if put to Makarios straight and hard. Time serves no purpose with him. Overnight will be time enough. He insisted on sunrise as expiration period put this over. I said couldn't see how this could possibly work since would give no time for exchange views in morning. In end he agreed I should see Erkin at nine o'clock tomorrow morning to determine where we stand. This was maximum I could wring out of him./3/
/3/The Department reported this to Nicosia in telegram 128 to Nicosia, August 9. It instructed Belcher to meet immediately with Makarios to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)
He also said he convinced that if quiet restored in island Acheson should be able finish up in week.
He seemed think you and Acheson miraclemen. I said knew you damned good but would not want assignment he giving you tonight.
Longer telegram follows giving conversation in detail but this is guts./4/
/4/Telegram 247 from Ankara, August 9. (Ibid.)
Will be available all night but suggest Flash telegrams preferable to telephone which usually pretty poor.
Hare
116. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Received at 5:07 p.m. Also sent to Ankara and Athens and repeated to Geneva for Acheson, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, USDOCOSouth, JCS, OSD, DOD, JCS, and the White House.
Nicosia, August 9, 1964, 10:30 p.m.
240. Under Secretary from Belcher. Since I have seen Makarios only 15 minutes ago to deliver message as reported Embtel 239 and contained in Deptel 124/2/ am now awaiting results this latest approach. Am loathe to hit him again with same issue complicated by new conditions apparently being imposed by Inonu. Furthermore, I feel I must consult with my British colleague who has been instrumental in obtaining two postponements of dire action previously planned by Greek Cypriots. British High Commissioner's approach and his messages to Ankara and to London spoke only of cease-fire in Kokkina for purpose of subsequent negotiations. Am seeing Bishop at once for this purpose and hopefully by the time I return we will have some indication GOC response to message from Security Council President. We still have a few hours in which to make ultimate pitch.
/2/Telegram 239 from Nicosia, August 9, reported that the Ambassador had delivered a message from President Johnson. (Ibid.) The message, sent to Papandreou, Inonu, and Makarios, urged restraint on all parties and cooperation with the United Nations in its peacekeeping efforts. The text was transmitted in telegram 124 to Nicosia, August 9. (Ibid.)
My own belief is that injection of conditions on top Security Council President's appeal might throw whole [garble] assuming there is chance of favorable reply from Makarios./3/
/3/In telegram 121 to Nicosia, the Department reported that the Turkish Representative to the United Nations had indicated he would recommend that his government accept the Security Council appeal for a cease-fire. (Ibid.)
Belcher
117. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 9, 1964, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 7:31 p.m. and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Geneva for Acheson, London, USUN, and Paris.
247. I delivered President Johnson's letter to Papandreou at seven thirty this evening./2/ Costopoulos and Anschuetz also present. Papandreou said he found the text excellent and was prepared to publish it.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 116.
Papandreou launched into a long analysis of the situation in Cyprus. GOG had an agreement with Makarios and Grivas that they were to indulge in no military operations except with the approval of the Greek Government. Both Makarios and Grivas violated that agreement. Makarios had probably planned the operation in the Mansoura area for some time, and Grivas was dragged along because he was attracted by the military advantages of eliminating the Turkish beachhead there. GOG had transmitted three messages to Cyprus with regard to fighting in this area. First was a telegraphic message Saturday morning August 7, the second a telephone call and last night the written message which was published (Embtel 235 to Department)./3/ Last message was public repudiation of Makarios. Makarios' actions have demonstrated that it will be impossible to have a common or parallel policy with him.
/3/Dated August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Papandreou stated that Grivas had been offended by his messages and had said he would resign (Grivas tender of resignation confirmed by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).
Papandreou said that in light Makarios-Grivas action the Turks were right in staging their demonstration yesterday. Today with cease-fire of the Greek Cypriots, the situation is reversed and the Turkish attack without justification. If Turks will guarantee to discontinue their attacks, Greek Government will accept responsibility for maintaining cease-fire. (When asked if he could ensure this, he replied he believed he could.) Tonight may be a terrible night in Cyprus because the Cypriots consider they are abandoned. And it is reported that Georgatsis might organize some activity against Turk Cypriots. The only activity which the Greeks have taken today was what he called the theatrical demonstration of four planes which flew over Cyprus to reassure the Greek Cypriots.
If it is possible to obtain Turkish assurances to desist, both sides should accept authority of UNFICYP. Moreover, appeal of Chairman Security Council/4/ provides an additional basis for insisting upon a cease-fire. With a cease-fire Papandreou said it would be possible to move promptly toward a basic solution of the problem.
/4/On August 9, the President of the U.N. Security Council appealed to Turkey to end the use of military force.
I seized on this to emphasize US conviction necessary to reach settlement all issues with Turks in shortest possible time.
I covered briefly my discussion with Acheson in Geneva. I took general line agreed with Acheson and will follow up tomorrow at another meeting with Prime Minister scheduled for noon.
It was clear to me that Papandreou prepared to accept some sort of lease arrangement although question of size, etc. will still pose problems. I believe he fully understands urgent need for agreed solution. As he was very tired and clearly showed strain of recent days, I told him that I would wait until our meeting tomorrow for full discussion.
I hope Geneva will send revisions of draft agreement in time for tomorrow's meeting.
Labouisse
118. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 10, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Flash. Received at 5:53 a.m. and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, USUN, Paris for USRO, London, Geneva for Acheson, and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA.
254. For Under Secretary Ball from Hare. Saw Erkin nine o'clock and made presentation as instructed Dept 219./2/
/2/Telegram 219 to Ankara, August 9, outlined Security Council Resolution 193 (1964) on Cyprus and instructed the Embassy to underline to Turkish officials the resolution's evenhandedness and the need for Turkish restraint. (Ibid.) The resolution, sponsored by the United States and United Kingdom, was adopted on August 9 by vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 584-585.
He was very upset, pointing out that key of Inonu provisions was for withdrawal of Greeks from Mansoura complex and restoration of status quo ante.
Without such agreement, SC resolution would merely guarantee gains made by Greeks and he reluctant even submit such proposal for consideration of Cabinet. He felt we had let GOT down very badly. Also there had been no mention whatsoever re expediting Geneva negotiations.
I said felt Erkin looking at situation through wrong end of telescope. Inonu had mentioned four points: 1) cessation Greek attacks; 2) withdrawal by Greeks to position before attacks; 3) general peace in Cyprus; 4) speeding up Geneva talks. Security Council resolution covered points 1 and 3 and I knew for certainty that point 4 in train. This left only point 2, which obviously important from GOT viewpoint, but I saw nothing in resolution contrary to it. Possibly full knowledge of what took place either in New York or collaterally would reveal that progress made on this point of which I unaware. But in any event I saw no reason why subject couldn't be pursued and I would ask urgently for further guidance from Washington.
Meanwhile I gave him a copy of Cyprus "Gridiron" for Aug 8/3/ indicating full understanding by USG on this point.
/3/Not further identified.
Erkin said would appreciate my doing so since pressure to continue aerial strikes very strong. TAF Commander Tansel had told Inonu last night that task could be completed in one more day and had made plea against holding up today. Inonu had refused but now would be put on spot by SC resolution giving Greeks all they want except possibly Kokkina and no info available re status there since no reports received since yesterday.
Foregoing summary of very rugged session in course of which I felt necessary draw on Deptel 222/4/ to reinforce but even so I would hesitate say Turks will hold line unless we can give them something quickly to assure prompt Greek evacuation of territory occupied. Erkin said absolutely essential this point be covered by some political action for which we must assume responsibility of accomplishment, or Turks should be allowed complete job themselves. Previously we had persuaded GOT in advance to stop action it felt necessary but had then been unable correct situation; now we were suggesting they stop part way through and again we are not taking steps necessary to strike balance.
/4/Telegram 222 to Ankara, August 10, stressed the need for Turkey to adhere to the Security Council resolution for a cease-fire. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP)
Hope I can have something pass Erkin on this as soon as possible since whole affair now seems dangling on this thread. Fact that Gridiron Aug 8 would indicate no policy difference with GOT on evacuation question is hopeful indicator.
Foregoing covers conversation as it took place and does not take into consideration reports of renewed Kokkina attacks covered Embtel 253,/5/ which, if confirmed, could drastically change whole situation.
/5/Telegram 253 from Ankara reported that Erkin had information on two further Greek-Cypriot attacks on Turkish-Cypriot positions. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
Hare
119. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 10, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on August 13.
August 10, 1964, 12:35 PM--Meeting in Cabinet Room
PRESENT
The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vance, Messrs. McCone, Wheeler, Reedy, McG. Bundy
For second item: William Bundy, John McNaughton
1. Cyprus
Secretary Ball reported briefly on the events of recent days and concluded with a report that a cease-fire appeared now to be accepted, although fragile and precarious. In this situation, he felt that the prospects for successful negotiations were somewhat less gloomy than they have been. He reported that Mr. Acheson in Geneva was encouraged, that the Greeks have adopted a serious negotiating position and had added a serious negotiator, Sossides, to the Geneva operation. In summary, Mr. Ball believed that we should press to make the cease-fire stick, and move forward with Mr. Acheson's negotiations. The President agreed with this position.
[Here follows discussion of Southeast Asia.]
McG. B./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
120. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 11, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Received at 10:30 a.m. and repeated to USUN, Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
260. 1. At meeting with Papandreou and Costopoulos yesterday, I went over same general ground touched on in Sunday night meeting concerning Geneva conversations,/2/ but in more detail. I again stressed that US Govt considered it essential we drive swiftly toward basic long-term solution; pointing to deadly serious prospects in event of failure; that Acheson considered Turks had moved very considerable distance from their original demands for partition or federation, but that we did not consider GOG had moved much from position of six weeks ago; that, while Acheson and Nikolareizis were on best of terms, Acheson did not feel latter had sufficient authority to move things forward, that there was too much tendency to explore in principle, and that there was apparently some failure of communications between Nikolareizis and Athens as witnessed by Nikolareizis' reported acceptance by Papandreou of Acheson's minorities proposal and GOG subsequent apparent reversal. The situation was much too dangerous to drift any longer in this way. We must get down to cases and work out practical arrangements this week. I suggested that Greeks were in way of obtaining large part of what they want provided they make reasonable concessions to meet Turks on questions of minority protection and military security which to them are very real. After going over main points of Acheson's memo for his August 10 talk with Nikolareizis,/3/ the draft Defense Board "treaty" was translated to Papandreou by his son who had joined meeting.
/2/See Document 117.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 121.
2. Papandreou acknowledged that Nikolareizis' instructions had been to explore possible solution which was reason he had not been able be more forthcoming, but he agreed on need to move on urgently. His initial reaction to the Defense Board concept was that it was something for future, and that we should concentrate on key issues (a) treatment of minorities and (b) question of base. I replied that I was sure Acheson was not wedded to Defense Board concept as end in itself, but considered it as a proven and reasonable means for handling problems before us, adding that getting down to key issues was just what Acheson had been seeking to do and was pressing Greeks for now.
3. On base question, Papandreou clearly indicated acceptance of lease arrangement, ruling out concept of transformation of British bases as too complicated, etc. I urged that he react quickly to Acheson's proposals on this, adding that the twenty square kilometer suggestion was much too small to be considered. (He then discussed privately in Greek with Costopoulos size of present British bases.) When I alluded to Karpas Peninsula, Costopoulos asked what would happen to inhabitants. I said all this was matter for negotiation. (Incidentally, I am told British base areas include previously existing villages.)
4. On minority rights, Papandreou made much the same noises as in past, agreeing to provide solid bill of human rights with UN supervision and rights of appeal to Hague Court. He said he would consider anything which did not smack either of federation or cantonments. Referring to my comments re Nikolareizis' transmission of his views, he said there had surely been mistake--"possibly Nikolareizis was being too agreeable." Papandreou said that Acheson memo on minorities although entitled enosis was in substance partition and federation. This was impossible for Cypriot people to accept and recent events did not make it easier. He said USG must remember that, even when Makarios is out of picture, the Cypriot people will have strong ideas which cannot be dismissed. He stressed point that often US fails to distinguish between Makarios and the will of the mass of people of island.
5. Conversation ended by his asking for copy of Defense Board treaty, saying that Sossides was expected back from Geneva in evening and that he would talk with him with view to pressing forward constructively. I shall follow up.
6. I also talked to King Constantine in general terms about urgent need for agreed solution which would take fully into consideration Turkey's military requirements and prestige, as well as protection of minorities rights. He agreed except concerning Turkey's argument re need of base for its military security. This was outmoded military concept, but he did agree that Turkey needed something for prestige reasons provided there was no disguised partition or federation. I said it was most important for GOG to be more flexible and forthcoming in Geneva talks, and he undertook to help in this direction. When I suggested that it might prove helpful in final analysis to get major opposition leadership committed to anything government agrees to, the King replied he was satisfied he could bring this about.
Labouisse
121. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 11, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 12:23 p.m. and repeated to Athens, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
275. Geneva's 343 to Department, and last night's telecon with Under Secretary Ball./2/ Saw Erkin this afternoon and discussed Geneva situation and prospects as suggested.
/2/In telegram 343 from Geneva, August 10, Acheson reported on two meetings with Greek representatives in which variants of a Turkish base lease agreement were discussed. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP) Memoranda of the two telephone conversations between Ball and Acheson are in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus.
Erkin said GOT definitely wants push ahead with talks and referred to stress on this point in Inonu's message to Papandreou, which Erkin said he had drafted himself (Embtel 273, repeated Geneva as 109)./3/
/3/Dated August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP) In his August 11 letter, Inonu wrote Papandreou suggesting they work together to reach a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. In August 13 reply, Papandreou stated that Greece was ready to assist the U.N. Mediator in finding an agreed solution to a question.
Re suggested treaty, Erkin didn't seem feel strongly one way or the other, observing that agreement on specifics has priority and inquiring if I had anything new to put forward in that regard. I said I didn't but stressed fact that Greek reps now showing disposition get down to brass tacks. This did not mean that margin of difference in substance had been decreased; far from it. But it did mean that for first time it may be possible really to come to grips with problem.
Regarding Erim, Erkin said he is now in Istanbul on several days leave as result preoccupation of GOT with Cyprus crisis but he is due back Thursday and should be returning to Geneva shortly thereafter. Erkin said he would certainly do his best go get Erim on his way as soon as possible.
Hare
122. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 13, 1964, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, CIA, DOD, and the White House.
364. From Acheson. Mission tel 356./2/ Nikolareisis came to see me last night, much relieved news he had received from Athens that Turks had agreed to cease overflights in Cyprus. He reported Sossides will return Geneva Friday bringing with him definite proposal for Turkish base, map, and at least outline of proposed plan for safeguarding minority under enosis. Said there were "currents in Athens" opposed to continuing along this line but that Prime Minister, Deputy PM Stephanopoulos, Sossides and (with reserves) Costopoulos were "on our side" and determined to go ahead. He said he was pleased Sossides is actively engaged in our affair, describing him as young, intelligent, enthusiastic and close to both PM and Deputy PM.
/2/Telegram 356 from Geneva, August 12, stressed the desirability of a Presidential statement designed to strengthen Inonu and Papandreou. (Ibid.)
He commented that Inonu's message to Papandreou had been constructive and said he had urged Athens to give forthcoming reply./3/
/3/See footnote 3, Document 121.
We gave Nikolareisis a revised memorandum on minority rights designed to help meet Greek objections to original proposals of July 24 [27]. Asked him not to send it to Athens until we had had opportunity to discuss it with him and Sossides in light of latest Greek ideas which Sossides was bringing. Copies of memorandum being pouched./4/
/4/Transmitted in airgram A-86 from Geneva, August 14. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14 CYP)
For Department and Ankara only: (Ankara's 283 to Dept and Dept's 242 to Ankara.)/5/ I think Hare's advice is good, and it is re-enforced by Nikolareisis who urges that we keep talks in our hands in Geneva and that I personally present Greek proposals to Turks. Accordingly, we shall await Erim's return to make new approach on that side.
/5/In telegram 283 from Ankara, August 12, Hare recommended that Acheson outline his proposals directly to Erim in Geneva rather than through the Embassy. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP) Telegram 242 to Ankara, August 12, transmitted the text of Makarios' letter to President Johnson. (Ibid.)
Tubby
123. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 15, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
383. From Acheson. As I had anticipated, Turks took Greek counter proposal very hard, but they were even less flexible than I had hoped.
When we met at eleven this morning with Erim and Sunalp, I began by expounding fairly fully proposals which Nikolareisis and Sossides had outlined to me last night (Mission tel 382)./2/ Showed them on map exactly where Greeks proposed Turkish base should be and gave them brief oral summary of proposals for protection of minority. Turks listened closely, had a few questions of fact, and Erim said European Commission on Human Rights would probably not be best organ from Turkish point of view because it did not have power to issue binding decisions. We said we saw no objection to use of ICJ or subsidiary body instead.
/2/Telegram 382 from Geneva, August 15, outlined Greek proposals for a Turkish base area leased for a period of 25 years. (Ibid.)
When I got through, both Erim and Sunalp made it very clear that Greek position was unacceptable. Erim pointed out proposal involved complete abandonment of London-Zurich Agreements, especially concept of separate Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Turks had been willing to accept changes, in agreements, but only on condition that every change in favor of Greece was balanced by something for Turkey. No GOT, he said, could accept what Greeks were now proposing. Turkish people would not stand for it. GOT was already under heavy pressure from public opinion and army which considered it was not tough enough. It would not be realistic for him to discuss with me what Greeks had offered. In any case, he had authority from Ankara only to talk on basis of my own earlier proposals; anything else, he said, he would have to refer to Ankara, and he would do this with report I had just given him.
Erim went on to reiterate that my proposals were about the least Turkey could have considered. Sunalp interjected that Greek base suggestion was ridiculous and that Greeks were "being comic" in putting it forward. Erim emphasized that he was prepared to continue discussion on basis my suggestions provided Greeks would do likewise. If they did not, Turkey would have to make its own proposals. In this connection he gave us map of Cyprus showing four zones. First enclosed all of Karpas Peninsula and something more, which he said would be Turkish military base. Second enclosed area stretching from Famagusta through northern Nicosia and up to north coast between Kyrenia and Lapithos; this, he said, would be Turkish territory but demilitarized. Third covered everything south and west of this line down to a line drawn along watershed from Pomos on coast of Tylliria through Mt. Olympus southwestward to coast at Petounda Point, between Larnaca and Limassol. This zone would be Greek but demilitarized. Fourth zone began from this line and covered rest of island, which he said would be Greek without limitation.
I commented this was merely another form of partition and left us where we were six weeks ago.
We had back-and-forth discussion for some time. I admitted Greeks had been slow to make proposals and had refused to accept my ideas. But what was the alternative to reaching agreement somewhere along their lines? I was convinced that there would very soon be a major fresh outbreak of violence on Cyprus. Sunalp agreed and said violence would come from Turkey too. "Then what?", I said. There would be a first-class mess. Suggested they should start from broad Greek-Turkish treaty I had put forward and thus get everything in far wider context. Erim said this was all very well but Turkey could not accept it if price was enosis. They could not trust Greece to keep any agreement, look at how quickly GOG had repudiated London-Zurich. It would be better for Turkey to stand on London-Zurich than to accept what Greeks were proposing.
I said if Cyprus case went to UNGA there would certainly be resolution calling for full and complete independence. Erim objected GA could not terminate treaties. I agreed but said nevertheless it would do so. Turkey would have to fight to block full Cypriot independence. To this, Erim replied it would be better for internal position GOT to accept independence under UN resolution than to go along with Greek proposition. He thought GA should be stopped, in any case, from ignoring Turkish rights, because it had recognized them by resolutions passed in 1957 and 1958. I pointed out GA would not be likely to be influenced by this. I added that Turkey could not afford to wait for Assembly to meet; major trouble in Cyprus would happen long before that. Sunalp said Turkey would intervene.
Throughout discussion I kept bearing down as strongly as I could on disastrous results of failure to reach agreement and inevitable consequent Greek-Turkish war. Turks repeatedly assured me they understood this and did not want war. Nevertheless, they were not afraid of war and did not see why they should be ones to make all concessions while Greeks made none. Sunalp commented that he hated war, having been in one (Korean) but also hated to see Turkey lose its rights and have its people suffer on Cyprus.
I observed that there was no way of telling where war would end; Russia might intervene. Turks should recognize that Makarios was like mad man whom Greeks could not stop. They had made grave mistake in giving him so much leeway. To this Sunalp remarked Turkey would have to pay for their mistake; I agreed but added that if Turkey made a grave mistake of its own in going to war it would have to pay for that too.
It seemed to me that the only alternatives left were violence and war on the one hand and acceptance of something like the Greek proposals on the other. The latter would at least get rid of Makarios. Turks should realize they could not get anything resembling partition from Greeks. Sunalp retorted that Greeks could not get enosis from Turkey. I said I realized it was tough decision for them to make, but there it was.
In conclusion, I asked Erim if he wanted me to tell Greeks that their offer of base at Cape Greco was totally unacceptable, or if he wanted to consult Ankara first. He said I should go ahead and tell them. Even with regard to whole Karpas Peninsula, GOT had rejected idea of leased base, and it would find present Greek proposal quite out of question. I said I would talk to Greeks again today and see Turks again tomorrow or Monday.
Tubby
124. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 15, 1964, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
385. From Acheson. Ref: Mission tel 383./2/ Saw Greeks again this afternoon and gave them Turkish reaction to their counter proposal. I will not bother Dept with details, but I made it very clear that Turks considered proposal ridiculous and quite unacceptable and that they had said that they were prepared to talk only on basis of my proposals (by which they meant whole of Karpas Peninsula plus my original ideas of minority rights and safeguards) or on basis counter proposal of partition. To illustrate latter, I showed Greeks map Turks had given me this morning (para four reftel). Added Turks insisted that they would only consider sovereign base area, not lease, although I thought there was bare chance they might accept lease if terms and base area were satisfactory.
/2/Document 123.
Essence of Greek reaction was that Turks clearly wanted more than military base, they wanted what was in effect form of partition. This Greece could never concede because it would be totally rejected by Greek people as well as by Cypriots. GOG would enlarge its Cape Greco offer if that were necessary from purely military point of view to accommodate adequate air and naval base, but it could not go beyond that.
We went round and round most of the old arguments about asserted Turkish unreasonableness, lack of Turkish right of intervention, domestic troubles of Papandreou, etc. I assured Nikolareisis and Sossides that I had done my best to convince Turks that they should take lesser of evils and accept something like what Greeks offer as better than war. However, I said, I did not believe I had made any impact. I feared we had come to end of rope. Greeks seemed to agree with me. They put forward no new suggestions and held out no hope that further consultation in Athens would bring anything forth.
We finally asked whether there was no chance at all of Greek Govt considering whole or part of Karpas Peninsula as Turkish base on long-term lease. Sossides thought there was no chance of granting anything more on that peninsula than could be offered in Cape Greco region. What Turks wanted, he said (and I agreed), was something resembling partition, which is a good deal more than would be needed for military base. GOG simply could not meet this.
Sossides went on that in these circumstances, with all hope gone in Geneva, GOG would have to drop its plans to work actively for enosis and would give full support to Makarios in his drive for full and complete independence. We questioned why this need be. He said Greece would have no basis for enosis campaign if there were no agreement with Turkey. If it staged coup d'etat, this would precipitate war with Turkey. We suggested war would probably come anyway, because Makarios would do things on Cyprus that would bring about Turkish intervention. Sossides, however, thought that if Makarios were relieved of his fear of negotiated settlement he would be willing to hold his hand on the island until General Assembly met, avoiding unbearable provocation of Turks, and would get his full independence endorsed by GA.
I suggested that Sossides should go back to Athens tomorrow and put to Papandreou two possible alternatives: (a) Greece should try to keep negotiations alive by agreeing to discuss Turkish area on Karpas Peninsula, or (b) it should abandon Geneva talks and concentrate on keeping Makarios quiet. Independent Cyprus under Makarios would be pretty bad, but it would probably be better than Greek-Turkish war. Sossides seemed to agree.
Comment: In light of today's meetings, I come to two pretty firm conclusions:
(a) Turks won't accept Greek proposals and there is no use talking about them further; on other hand, Turks will take my proposals as basis for discussion and will probably be flexible as to western boundary of Karpas Peninsula area although apparently inflexible on question of lease instead of sovereignty. (There is less than 50-50 chance they would talk about lease.)
(b) Greeks will probably not accept anything like whole of Karpas Peninsula for Turkey, if indeed they will accept any part of it, and will be inflexible re sovereignty issue.
This leaves us with not much of anywhere to go. Question is should we accept failure and look for best way to terminate talks, or should we try to continue until something happens on Cyprus to blow everything up? Argument for first course is that chance of avoiding violence and consequent Turkish intervention might be increased if Makarios knew Geneva talks were dead and he would probably get UNGA support for independence. Arguments for second course are simply good old bulldog spirit and chance miracle will happen.
In any event, I would not propose to leave Geneva before Mediator returns from his trip next Friday. I shall see him tonight or tomorrow morning to report. When we do leave, I would imagine best course would be for me to say nothing here and Dept simply to say that I am coming for consultation and that timing of my return to Geneva is uncertain.
Would be glad to have comments and reactions of addressees.
Tubby
125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/
Washington, August 15, 1964, 11:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball.
418. For Acheson from Ball. To be delivered at 7:30 a.m. These are my night thoughts after reflecting on our teletype conversation this evening./2/
/2/A transcript of this conversation is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation.
1. I am inclined to feel that we may have misread the emphasis in your 383./3/ The Turkish counter-proposal put forward by Erim seemed even more extreme than the original Turkish position. The saving aspect of Erim's presentation, which we may have overlooked, was a reaffirmation of GOT willingness to continue negotiations on basis your suggestions. A disturbing aspect was Sunalp's presence as a kind of military commissar and his assertiveness, which indicates that Turk military are a force threatening to become a discrete sovereignty not wholly under Inonu's control.
/3/Document 123.
2. At this point, it seems essential to put leash on ebullient Turk military while moving at the same time to push a thoroughly scared Papandreou into serious negotiations on basis your proposals.
3. Hope of success would seem to imply that neither Greeks nor Turks take your proposals as a minimum which each must improve to satisfy its own requirements. If Turks accept leasehold rather than sovereignty then Greeks must exhibit territorial generosity. Whether Papandreou, who is both old and in bad health, could carry it off remains to be seen. But, in any event, Greeks must be told that your proposals remain the basis for negotiation since their counter-proposals have proved abortive.
4. The situation as of tonight seems precarious in the extreme. Even with luck we may be only four or five days away from an explosion. The signs pointing to this are the following:
a. The Turkish military have tasted blood. They are full of cockiness and apparently obsessed with the desire to finish the job they started last weekend. Their military plans are hair-raising since they would involve among other things taking out all airfields on the Greek mainland.
b. The Greeks will not be able to stand down again if the Turks move.
c. Makarios is putting increasing pressure on the embattled Turk-Cypriots, presumably to produce an act of provocation that will set in train events which can frustrate any settlement you achieve at Geneva.
d. The Turk-Cypriots are more than ever in a Gotterdammerung mood--particularly those squeezed between the Greek-Cypriots and the sea on the north coast.
5. We are still inclined to send Presidential messages both to Inonu and Papandreou. As we now see it the Inonu message would be stern but free from indignation.
6. We are not persuaded, however, that NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting offers merely "oratory". Both the Greeks and the Turks have military power today only because they are members of NATO. That military power was not provided for use against one another. By getting into an internecine war they are exposing the Southern NATO flank and inviting Soviet intervention. This was not the purpose for which NATO was designed. That point should be brought home to them. I think it might better be brought home by the NATO Foreign Ministers solemnly assembled than by the USG alone.
Rusk
126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, August 16, 1964, 11:43 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. The President sent a parallel message to Prime Minister Inonu, transmitted in telegram 270 to Ankara, August 16. (Ibid.)
306. Please deliver soonest following message from President to Prime Minister Papandreou:
Begin verbatim text.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have read with interest and appreciation your reply to Prime Minister Inonu's message./2/ Your readiness to look to the future and your sense of urgency about a negotiated solution are highly valued here.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 121.
I am sure you agree that nothing must interfere with the urgent business of achieving an agreement between Greece and Turkey. Yet today peace on Cyprus is precarious. Events could take the matter out of the hands of diplomacy at any moment. We know you are exercising your maximum influence and power on the Greek Cypriots in order to insure that they not provoke incidents in the days ahead. You and I both understand that if the Greek Cypriots renew their attacks or continue their present heavy pressure against the minority community, Turk Cypriots will call for assistance from Turkey and the situation might then become quite unmanageable.
I have followed with the keenest interest the discussions that Mr. Dean Acheson has been having in Geneva. No other question has taken so much of my own personal time and attention. I am pleased at the progress made on questions relating to the position of the minority community and on the principle of a Turkish base. The major remaining point appears to be the location and extent of the territory allocated for Turkish security arrangements.
I fully endorse Mr. Acheson's conclusion that the Karpas Peninsula has a special logic in that it protects the approaches to Iskenderun. In my view this consideration overrides the difficulty that some Greek Cypriots in that area might not wish to reside on a Turkish base even under a lease arrangement. In any case this should not be an insuperable problem particularly since the numbers affected would be small. I urge you to empower your representatives at Geneva to concentrate seriously on the Karpas location in this critical phase of the negotiations.
Let me say to you quite frankly that the United States is distressed to find it necessary to inject itself into the Cyprus problem. The three guarantor powers are all NATO allies, with responsible governments that should be able to find a solution without our taking a part. We are involved, however, because of our concern for NATO and our friendship for Greece and Turkey whose own relations have become so fragile.
I do not know what the next days may bring forth in this tragic situation. But I urge upon you and Mr. Inonu that war between Greece and Turkey must never be allowed to occur. Both of you have an utterly fundamental obligation to seek the counsel of NATO at the Foreign Ministers level before you become involved with each other in conflict. When France and Germany both became NATO partners, they put behind them a long history of conflict. Greece and Turkey have the same obligations.
The primary purpose of this message is to ask two things of you.
The first is to urge you to come to an agreement with Turkey on the basis of Mr. Acheson's suggestions. We must never suppose that the job of diplomacy is finished until an agreement is reached. An agreement between Greece and Turkey will not only avert a war between two NATO allies but will also provide an opportunity for the Greek and Cypriot peoples to combine their talents and energies to the greater good of Hellenism.
The second is that you continue to exert all your power and influence with the Greek Cypriots to maintain peace on the island. This includes securing their fullest cooperation with the United Nations and its forces as well as the lifting of blockades and obstructions that impair the ability of Turkish Cypriots to meet their daily requirements for food and other necessities.
Please be assured that I fully understand that you have very difficult political problems in your own country where feelings are at so high a pitch. I also understand your difficulties with Archbishop Makarios and other Greek Cypriots. But I am convinced that an agreement between you and Turkey is possible, that such an agreement could result in a definitive solution of the Cyprus problem and that this could be accomplished in such a way as to strengthen your NATO ties rather than destroy them.
You may be assured that I am making representations in other capitals and at the United Nations consistent with what I am now saying to you.
With personal good wishes
Sincerely yours,
End verbatim text./3/
/3/In telegram 317 from Athens, August 17, Labouisse reported he delivered the President's letter to Costopoulos who assured him that the Papandreou government would continue to negotiate in good faith at Geneva. (Ibid.)
Rusk
127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/
Washington, August 16, 1964, 1:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball.
426. For Acheson from Under Secretary Ball. In reflecting on our recent spate of communications, I wonder if you would agree that the scenario now looks like this:
1. Presidential letters as amended are going to Inonu and Papandreou today./2/ Papandreou letter should be at hand for review of situation in which Sossides is presumably engaged in Athens.
/2/See Document 126 and footnote 1 thereto.
2. Hopefully UK will try to crank up Guarantor Powers' action to prevent Cypriot military involvement with Soviet Union.
3. Acheson to resume negotiations with Greeks as soon as Sossides returns--hopefully Monday or Tuesday.
4. If after Sossides returns negotiations still look on brink of failure, we would advise Papandreou and Inonu that we regard NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting as urgent next step.
5. Depending on response of Papandreou and Inonu, we would call Foreign Ministers' meeting at which we would make the points outlined in your teletype; namely,
(a) demand no US equipment used by either side.
(b) point regarding Section 5 NAT.
(c) advance concurrence by other NATO members that Greece and Turkey should delegate you to arbitrate remaining unagreed elements of settlement.
6. We would seek NATO support for Guarantor Powers d?marche to Cyprus.
7. We wish to give further thought to emphasis on London-Zurich treaties before deciding whether they should be raised in NATO./3/
/3/The National Security Council discussed Cyprus at its August 17 meeting. According to notes prepared by McCone, Ball reported that the Turks had confirmed the cease-fire, that a "real break" had taken place between Greece and Turkey, that Grivas felt betrayed by the Greek Government, that Acheson was encouraged by events, and that Turkey appeared "amenable" to a deal. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with LBJ, 1964)
Rusk
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.