Documents 128-155
128. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 16, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Received at 5:47 p.m. and repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
389. From Acheson. Lord Hood, Jernegan and I spent hour with Nikolareisis and Sossides early this afternoon and went over Turkish position carefully with them to make sure it was correctly understood./2/ (Mediator has told us last night that they seemed to have impression Turks had greatly hardened their attitude and were again insisting on full scale partition as basis discussion.) I made clear that Turks were perfectly willing to talk on basis of my proposals and that their partition was merely tactical counter to Greek proposals which Turks considered complete departure from line I had been taking and completely unacceptable. Greeks said they fully understood this. I then told them Erim this morning had indicated willingness to discuss long term lease of Karpas Peninsula instead of cession of sovereignty, proposed [provided] concessions were made on Greek side in regard to area covered. Explained that Turks were insisting on substantial area--at least entire Peninsula--plus absolute freedom to do what they wanted on that area without restrictions as to kind or number of troops or uses to which base might be put. Yesterday, I said, they had insisted they must also have full sovereignty, but today they had moved somewhat away from this.
/2/Acheson reported on his morning talks with the Turks in telegram 388 from Geneva, August 16. (Ibid.)
I urged upon Greeks importance of giving this Turkish position serious consideration and trying to come up with something that would meet it. Repeated points previously made about Turkish views on essentiality of quid pro quo for every change made in existing treaties and again reiterated need to accept as reality Turkish feelings about prestige and national honor. Greeks made usual reply about how difficult it would be to cede area of size Turks were demanding and how useless this was from military point of view. We went around this circle a couple of times. Sossides suggested it might be useful to get impartial committee of military experts, or SACEUR himself, to arbitrate as to what area was really needed from NATO military point of view. I objected that Turks had political problem to consider as well as military and probably would not accept outside military arbitration. Also expressed doubt SACEUR would be willing undertake this duty. Sossides conceded that there was something in what I said and suggested that perhaps we could use military judgment only as starting point and then add on something to meet political problem. For example, he said, if SACEUR ruled that 25 square kilometers was enough, I could multiply this by 5 to take care of political factor.
My reply was that I thought we would do better to concentrate on what was needed to reach agreement and then bring in outside elements, such as military experts to dress up terms of settlement and give them rationale.
I told Greeks Washington was greatly disturbed by developments and would be making representation in Athens for great efforts to reach agreement and keep situation on Cyprus from blowing up. Emphasized again and again importance of keeping things quiet and keeping talks going by making some significant response to Turkish proposals, which were essentially mine. Both Nikolareisis and Sossides displayed serious doubt that GOG would consider anything like so large an area as Karpas Peninsula, but I got impression they might be somewhat impressed by my presentation and that Sossides was at least disposed to explore in Athens possibility of moving in that direction.
To my suggestion that since Mediator was no longer going to Athens today,/3/ it might be well for him (Sossides) to stay on longer here, he replied that he thought it more necessary he should go back to Athens and give clear picture present state of affairs. We finally agreed this probably would be best course but urged that he come back as soon as possible, preferably by Tuesday. He planned to take 3:15 flight out of Geneva this afternoon and presumably he is on his way.
/3/Tuomioja suffered a stroke on August 16 and died on September 9. In telegram 390 from Geneva, August 16, Acheson assessed the impact of the loss of the U.N. Mediator. (Ibid.) Secretary-General Thant designated Pier P. Spinelli to oversee Tuomioja's office on August 18, and designated Galo Plaza to succeed him as U.N. Mediator on Cyprus on September 16. He also announced that Carlos Alfredo Bernardes would replace Plaza Lasso as Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Cyprus as of September 25.
We had some discussion about effect of Mediator's illness on our talks here. Greeks were noncommittal, but at least did not say that Tuomioja's disappearance from scene would necessarily require discontinuance.
In connection with problem of preventing trouble in Cyprus, Sossides said there were two prerequisites from GOG point of view: (a) Turkish bombing and overflights must cease; and (b) expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul must be halted. We pointed out overflights had in fact ceased and said we were working on Turks about expulsions and likewise urging them to keep Turkish-Cypriots quiet. Told them we had reason to believe from authoritative source that recent Soysal statement that all Greeks would be expelled from Istanbul after September 15th was unauthorized and did not represent policy of Inonu and Erkin.
Tubby
129. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 18, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Nodis-TAG.
408. For Department only. For Ball from Acheson. Perhaps an explanation of the rationale of my No. 401/2/ may be helpful. It attempts to combine lures linked to responsibilities, and threats to the bloody-minded linked with clear support for a specific settlement which both the GOG and GOT would, I believe, accept if the pressure of their public and military for extreme demands could be balanced by really effective outside pressure for moderation.
/2/Telegram 401 from Geneva, August 17, outlined Acheson's scenario for achieving a quick settlement of the Cyprus issue once an accord between Greece and Turkey existed. (Ibid.)
To accomplish this, my plan begins by assuring the Turks that we start from the joint premises that revision of existing treaties requires consent of the signatories and not merely a mob vote in the UNGA (the Turks set great store by this), and that revision by agreement is desirable, a view with which the Turks also agree.
The second idea is to relax the tension in Cyprus, restore for the benefit of Turkish Cypriots order and the necessities of life, and subject Makarios to a restraint which may end in his removal, by entrusting the task to the GOG, which can be held responsible. In return for this GOG is offered a prize which it greatly desires--i.e., NATO undertaking (which dilutes U.S. part in it) to restrain the Turks from intervening as long as the GOG maintains, or does the best anyone can to maintain, order and minimum just treatment of all in Cyprus. This plan offers the best chance of accomplishing the result sought and permits the Turks to accept Greek action on behalf of all guarantors as an acknowledgement of the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. NATO's cover for the protection of Greek troops on this mission can be subsumed under Article 6 of NAT without unseemly stretching. Hence everyone gets something but has to pay for it and is threatened by trouble if assigned responsibility is refused or interference with others contemplated.
The proposal to make the Greeks responsible for preventing interference with the supply and rotation of the Turkish contingent is to end this unnecessary provocation and humiliation of Turkey by Makarios' flaunting of his denunciation of the treaties. It also puts pressure on the Greeks to accept their role as peacekeeper since, if they do not and Turks are fired upon when performing a treaty function in no way connected with intervention, Makarios will have fired the first shot and even the Russians will be hard pressed to find aggression in the Turks forcing the relief of their authorized contingent.
All these proposals are studded with deferential salaams to the U.N. so that U Thant and Thimayya can gracefully accept aid which they should regard as a gift from Heaven.
Acheson as arbitrator is your idea.
The gloss on the President's warning not to use NATO arms for unauthorized NATO purposes is to permit their use for authorized purposes on Cyprus. It also introduces a new reason for Sixth Fleet interposition, if desired, against improper intervention--i.e., blockade to permit search and seizure of unauthorized NATO weapons upon NATO, rather than purely American orders.
The last idea is merely to make things even. While bad boys will be prevented from fighting one another, good boys will be protected from attack or threat of force from USSR.
Tubby
130. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, August 18, 1964, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, USUN, Geneva for Acheson, and Paris for USRO.
338. After turning over President Johnson's message/2/ for which Makarios expressed thanks we discussed food and water problems facing Turk Cypriots. I opened discussion by referring to fact world press beginning interpret GOC restrictions as designed pressure innocent people through deprivation bread and water and surely this was not record he wanted outside his country. Our ensuing discussion followed lines his talk with Plaza reported Embtels 328 and 335./3/ Makarios repeated commitments made to Plaza and said that this morning's meeting with UN reps would finalize arrangements. When I asked specifically whether kerosene would be provided today so Turks could bake bread he replied matter would be discussed and decided on today. In afterthought (which we have conveyed to Plaza) he said couldn't see why Turks should have kerosene while Greeks can't have land registry records or parcels in central post office (both in Turk quarter). I suggested it not only unfair equate these matters, but outside world would not understand actions preventing baking of bread as means forcing release of documents and mail. Surely the women, children and old folk should not suffer nor appear in eyes of world to be made to suffer in this fashion for decisions taken by their leaders.
/2/Johnson's August 14 reply to Makarios' August 9 appeal to restrain the Government of Turkey was transmitted in telegram 179 to Nicosia, August 14. In it, the President urged Makarios to cooperate with the United Nations in its efforts to restore peace in the region. (Ibid.) Makarios' letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Cyprus--Makarios.
/3/In telegram 328 from Nicosia, August 17, Belcher reported that Plaza believed he had made progress in discussions with Makarios over the issue of resupply for Turkish Cypriot villages. (Ibid.) Telegram 335 from Nicosia, August 17, reported Makarios' uncompromising opposition to any solution arising from the Geneva talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Only new factor re Ktima water supply is assertion by President that when Greeks offered cancel all bills due if Turks agreed pay from now on, they refused (presumably on basis Constitution splits municipalities and therefore payments Turks can only be to own municipal authorities. It is for this reason they have refused to pay Greeks since 1960 Constitution went into effect).
I said we sincerely hoped GOC could make some immediate gesture which would give better press and also reduce tensions in Turk community and in Ankara. Said I hoped he was gauging very carefully how much economic pressure Turk Cypriots could take without explosion which could bring additional catastrophes to island.
With regard Geneva talks President had little to add to what other he told Plaza as reported Embtel 328. He did emphasize however that "Papandreou will accept anything I agree to but I don't necessarily accept any decision he may make." He added he felt State Department had got cart before horse in Geneva tactics and expressed continued resentment at being left out of discussions. I said he must realize we appreciated fact solution would have to be acceptable Greek Cypriots as well as others but that we also believed it necessary pave way by assisting Mediator in finding agreement between Greece and Turkey. No solution, whether saleable to Govt of Cyprus or not would work if other two disagreed. He was not convinced.
Meeting 11:30 this morning will show whether we are justified in limited optimism engendered by apparent changes which Archbishop has told Plaza (and me and Bishop) he will put into effect re freedom of movement and food and fuel supplies./4/
/4/In telegram 342 from Nicosia, August 18, Belcher reported that the United Nations and Cypriot Government had reached an agreement easing economic restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. (Ibid.)
Belcher
131. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 18, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for USRO, Geneva for Acheson, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
337. 1. My talks with Papandreou of Sunday (Embtel 314)/2/ and last night (Embtel 327)/3/ reveal state of dejection and hopelessness of the GOG. They seem to have lost whatever sureness of footing they had. Papandreou's suggestion Sunday night of a Presidential declaration and his proposal last night for instant enosis with details to be worked out later had certainly not been thought through. He gave the impression casting about for some way out of his dilemma. He seems at the end of his tether (partly through his own fault) and he sees the US as his only hope. Although the Soviets had moved onto the scene when we met on Sunday, his main preoccupation then seemed to be his fear of another Turkish attack and the consequent involvement of Greece in a war with Turkey. Last night the Turkish threat seemed to preoccupy him less. He then had in mind Kyprianou's instructions to go to Moscow./4/ These instructions caused him to see Greece losing Cyprus to Soviet influence and the consequent failure of his own policies. He translated this failure into personal political defeat at the hands of the Communists who would be the only ones to gain by it.
/2/Telegram 314 from Athens, August 16, reported the "mood of dark despair" of Papandreou. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 327 from Athens, August 18, reported Papandreou's concern regarding the entry of the Soviet Union into the diplomatic maneuverings over Cyprus. (Ibid.) On August 15, the Soviet Government issued a statement offering aid to Cyprus against foreign intervention, after a request from President Makarios. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 586-587.
/4/Makarios' decision to send Kyprianou was revealed to the Greek Government on August 17.
2. Papandreou's reaction to the events of the last ten days has shown, not surprisingly, considerable emotion and some inconsistency. For example, while he was allegedly threatening Kyprianou with a parting of the ways in the event of a Soviet alliance, and was also in effect asking US and the Turks to accept his pledge of good faith in giving the Turks a fair deal in the event of enosis, he was at same time withdrawing the Greek elements from Sixth ATAF and LANDSOUTHEAST and presiding over a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense which decided to disengage, as necessary, military, naval and air units of the Greek forces now assigned to NATO. (Greek statement on this makes clear this was direct reaction to GOT withdrawal air defense units.)/5/ We consider these Greek gestures unfortunate and untimely but not reversible until the general climate here improves.
/5/The Turkish withdrawal took place on August 17.
Basic fact which recent events have driven home is that there can be no solution of the Cyprus problem which does not take into consideration will and emotions of Cypriot people. They cannot be by-passed or forced into line, and the Turkish air strikes are going to make it especially difficult to obtain agreement from the Cypriot people (regardless of Makarios) to any Turkish base on the island. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that we should make every effort to keep talks going in Geneva. Even though Mediator's illness has greatly complicated situation, as of the moment it appears that Greeks are still willing to try to narrow the gap separating them and Turks.
4. However, it is unhappy fact of life that Papandreou government is fundamentally weak, poorly organized for effective action, and short on talent. Papandreou himself by nature is long on words and short on deeds. It may be, in the end, because of this weakness and because of difficulties faced in obtaining any kind of Cypriot acquiescence, the US will have to accept the unhappy burden of being the guarantor of an "instant enosis" solution that leaves GOT/GOG final agreement to be hammered out at a later time. This might turn out to be the only way to forestall a Soviet intrusion on the island. This unpalatable position for the US, leaving us the target of the ill will of all the parties, should be adopted only in extremis.
Labouisse
132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Secret.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
This is the main topic for the NSC meeting tomorrow;/2/ it is moving rapidly toward the point of decision. The Turk air attacks and now Soviet threats have brought the issue to a boil.
/2/The National Security Council met at 1 p.m. on August 19, but no record was kept of the discussion. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
Whether or not the Soviets are serious, the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks all seem to think so. The mood on the island has become violently anti-US and pro-Soviet, which makes the Acheson plan all the harder to achieve by agreement. Makarios may be playing with fire, but once again he has moved faster than Athens--or ourselves.
The one saving grace may be that Moscow's move is scaring Greece and Turkey into seeing reason. They may at last find a common interest in preventing Makarios and Moscow from coming out on top. But speed seems imperative if we are to push through a settlement by fiat before the Makarios-Moscow axis is firmed up.
I. State seems to favor one more try at Geneva, in hopes that Athens and Ankara may at last stop haggling and strike a bargain. In fact, their positions are not too far apart. The gut issue is how large a base the Turks get and whether it should be sovereign or on a long term lease. It's not clear that we have yet said everything we should to press Greeks and Turks once more, and we'll push this with Ball tomorrow.
II. Should this fail, Acheson and Ball are thinking of a NATO pressure play to force a solution. In essence Acheson himself would split the remaining difference between Greeks and Turks. We would then ask all the NATO powers to join us in: (a) telling Greeks and Turks to buy; (b) calling on Greece on behalf of Guarantor Powers to restrain Makarios; and (c) if this fails to maintain order, declaring that whatever violence may occur just be confined to the island.
To latter end, NATO would declare that: (a) No NATO-supplied arms could be used by Greece and Turkey against each other--if so, NATO will take measures to take back the arms and penalize the offender by denying him any more military aid; (b) the NATO powers would act under Article V to prevent Turk action against Greece or vice versa; and (c) if the Soviets intervened, NATO would move. This complex and ingenious plan raises several key questions:
A. Granted that a NATO umbrella is desirable, can we get enough members to play? Only a majority is technically needed, but if the Scandinavians or Low Countries balked, it would look thin. Would de Gaulle cause trouble? Would many insist on full explanation of the "Acheson award" or offer amendments?
B. What are the consequences of taking the play away from the UN and giving it to NATO? U Thant might be privately relieved, but can he publicly acquiesce? What about the SC resolutions?
C. Do we want in effect to put the Sixth Fleet between Greeks and Turks if they seem to be going for each other? This is what is called for, since we have the only power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
D. Could Greece really enforce the terms on the Cypriots? If Makarios smells a rat he'll appeal to the UN and to Moscow.
III. An alternative to bringing in NATO is Papandreou's scheme for instant enosis. He pleads that the only way to short-circuit the burgeoning Nicosia/Moscow axis is to impose enosis now. Then the Greeks would make a deal with the Turks. We feel the Turks would never buy unless the terms are worked out beforehand. But if they can be, Papandreou's plan may be simpler and more direct than the NATO scheme--or perhaps the two can be combined so as to reinforce each other. If Greeks and Turks turned to NATO (knowing already what they'd get) we'd be home.
IV. The ultimate question is whether a Greek-Turk deal, assuming we could get one, can be imposed on the island. The evidence is quite inconclusive. Makarios has outmaneuvered the Greeks every time so far, and now he thinks he has Soviet backing. I think you will want to press George on this; the rest of us have not made much progress.
Finally, whatever road we take, we have all the ingredients of major crisis shortly. Makarios will try every trick he has, and the Soviets are now committed to make at least some trouble. Ball and Acheson must still carry the main load, but I think you'll want at least a daily report.
This is a brief summary, and I think it gives you what you need for tomorrow, but if you have time, the relevant cables are attached./3/
/3/Not attached. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Geneva 401, 403; Athens 327; Embtel 327 Exdis."
R. W. Komer
McG. B./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears Komer's typed signature and Bundy's typed initials.
133. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 19, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, London, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
425. From Acheson. Ref: Nicosia 345 and Athens 343 to Dept./2/ Instant enosis, whether staged by Papandreou or by Grivas on his own, seems to us here to contain fatal flaw that Turks will not stand still for it or after it unless they have prior assurance from someone they trust that it will be quickly followed by settlement meeting their essential demands. What Grivas proposes to offer Turkey falls far short of this and so does what Papandreou has indicated he is willing to do up to now, although he has been distinctly more forthcoming than Grivas.
/2/Telegram 345 from Nicosia analyzed intelligence information. (Ibid.) Telegram 343 from Athens, August 19, reported that Cyprus had offered a lease on a 50-square mile base to Turkey after the completion of enosis. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, we have clear impression from Erim and Sunalp, with whom we had discussion this afternoon, that Turks do not trust either Papandreou or Grivas./3/ They regard Papandreou as deplorably weak and Grivas as bitterly anti-Turk.
/3/In telegram 426 from Geneva, August 19, Acheson reported that Erim had made clear his government's preference for dealing with other Greek political leaders. (Ibid.)
Therefore, I think that coup d'etat in Cyprus at present time would appear to Turks as clear double-cross and that they would be most likely to blame us for putting up smoke screen of Geneva talks and leading them down the darkened path. Whether they would or would not, I should be extremely surprised if their response to coup were not immediate invasion with all consequences that that would have.
We may not be able to stop Grivas, but I think it would be unwise for us to connive with him unless he is willing to go whole way in granting rights to Turks. We should be able to deter Papandreou for present, and I think we ought to try to keep him on the Geneva path.
Tubby
134. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Geneva, August 20, 1964, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-Tag. Also sent to the Department of State, where it was received at 10:44 a.m., and repeated to London and Ankara. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN. The source text is the Department of State copy.
97. For Ambassador from Acheson. Ball asked me in telecon this a.m./2/ to send to you and him the following letter from me to Prime Minister Papandreou to be delivered by you, upon receipt of clearance from Washington, to Prime Minister and the King.
/2/A transcript of the teleconference is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation.
Begin letter:
My Dear Prime Minister:
May I begin this letter by expressing deepest appreciation of the help you have given to our work here in Geneva by your own constant attention and thought and by permitting Mr. Sossides to join in our efforts.
Today the President has informed me of the urgency which he believes imminent Soviet involvement in the Cyprus problem has imparted to our work, and because of it has asked me to let you know our joint view that only a little while is left in which a settlement can be made and to give you my own views, which he has endorsed, of the general nature of the settlement which seems to me possible and fair. I know from our conversations with Mr. Sossides that you are impressed as we are here of the danger, which the Russian moves have intensified, that Cyprus will fall under Communist influence and of the far-reaching effects which this will have upon the political and power situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I am sure we agree that the danger gives Turkey and Greece a common interest far transcending the exact lines on a map to be drawn in reaching an agreement. The problems presented to both sides in reaching a settlement are political and it is from that point of view that I approach them.
I am prepared to apply the utmost pressure and persuasion to get the Turks to give up any claim for sovereign territory on Cyprus, to reduce the dimensions of their requirements for a military base on the Karpas Peninsula and to settle the rights of minorities along the lines which I have discussed with Mr. Sossides and which I can translate into a draft to be available tomorrow. Specifically, I would urge the Turks to limit their plan to a lease for 50 years for that part of the Karpas Peninsula running from its northeasterly end to a line drawn north and south just west of Komi Kebir. I am persuaded from the study which I have made of the situation with the aid of military advisers that there is a sound military justification for such a base in the defense of the approaches to the Turkish mainland and in the defense of the base itself from surprise attack. It is quite possible that to draw the western line of this area as I have suggested would present a political problem to you at this time. This problem could be avoided by leaving the line undrawn, to be supplied after military study by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, with the assurance by the Government of Greece that if the line should be drawn as indicated it would be accepted. Indeed, the willingness of the Government of Greece to enter into such a settlement might be indicated to me without entering into any present direct commitment to the Government of Turkey. With this assurance I would do my best, and believe I could succeed, in obtaining the agreement of the Government of Turkey not to intervene to prevent or to demand prior intergovernmental agreement before the achievement of enosis between Greece and Cyprus.
Without something of this sort the Turks would surely believe themselves to be faced with having their treaty rights almost contemptuously destroyed and themselves faced with the alternatives of unconditional enosis or unconditional independence for a Cyprus under Communist domination.
What I have suggested will present the gravest difficulties for the leaders of both Greece and Turkey and for the peoples they lead. But I am confident that, in the face of imminent common peril, each nation can find unity at home in support of solutions which look beyond momentary controversy to the fundamental security and welfare of great Hellenic and Turkish states and support abroad by the grand alliance of free states against interference with their execution.
May I request, my dear Prime Minister, the early return to Geneva of Mr. Sossides to help us to this solution.
(Add whatever polite closure is appropriate.)/3/
/3/In telegram 141 from Athens to Geneva, Labouisse reported that Acheson's letter to Papandreou had produced an "awkward personality situation" because of its failure to refer to the more senior Nikolareisis. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Tubby
135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, August 20, 1964, 1:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
327. For Ambassador from Ball. The President now directs you to go ahead immediately with delivery of the Acheson letter as contained in Geneva's 97 to you./2/ In making your approach please have these points in mind:
/2/Document 134.
1. If we cannot put this deal over right now the chances of success at a later date are slight. The interjection of the Soviet Union into this already tangled web of affairs will make the task almost hopeless.
2. Acheson's solution is not a bargaining position. It is his decision that this is the minimum that can be given to the Turks without an explosion in Turkey which would have disastrous consequences for everyone. You must make this point sufficiently emphatic in order to overcome the mercantile instincts of your clients.
3. Time is really of the essence. That means now. We are talking in terms of a deal within 48 hours.
4. There are real advantages in a Greek decision today. The presence of Garoufoulias on the Island/3/ should be helpful in making this work. Kyprianou has not yet left for Moscow. Any delay will change the picture to everyone's disadvantage.
/3/Garoufalias visited Cyprus on August 21.
5. It is not for us to tell the Greeks how to bring about instant enosis. You can say to the GOG that we have deliberately avoided any direct involvement with Grivas since we do not wish to interfere in the measures they may deem necessary to achieve the results.
6. Obviously this is not a deal Papandreou can carry off by himself. The King and military must also be aboard. Presumably the King will wish to have the ERE in line. A Greek national decision seems to us essential if we are to force this down the throat of the Turks which in any event will be very difficult.
7. If you find any disposition to further haggling you can tell the Greeks that we are putting this deal up to the Turks at the same time and we do not propose to haggle with them either.
8. What we are offering the Greeks after tremendous endeavors on our part is the possibility of avoiding a Communist take-over of the Island. Moreover, it is the opportunity to avoid setting in train a whole series of different events which in combination could result in the extension of Communist power over a very much larger area. This is a major decision directly affecting the future position of Greece itself. You cannot say this too emphatically.
9. From the time of Papandreou's visit here the Greeks have continually asked us what solution we propose. We have invested enormous time and effort in reaching this decision. This is it.
10. Yours is an epic assignment. We appreciate the difficulties but very large concerns hang on your success.
Good luck.
Rusk
136. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 21, 1964, 2 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Received at 10:20 p.m. on August 20 and repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
362. Have just returned from 10:30 p.m. meeting with PriMin at which Costopoulos, Andreas Papandreou and Sossides were present on Greek side. Anschuetz and Brewster accompanied me.
I opened discussion by recalling PriMin's urgent request for "instant enosis" and USG assistance; also my reservations that this could be accomplished without prior agreement on Turk demands. I said highest officials USG including President had concerned themselves with matter for past several days and had confirmed view that would be impossible proceed without prior understanding with GOT. After taking into account various developments in long history of matter, and in view urgent necessity reach immediate solution, Washington officials and Acheson had come up with proposal which went long way to meet Greek aspirations. We were by no means sure however that Turks could be persuaded to go along.
I then presented Acheson letter to Papandreou which Andreas Papandreou read in English and then translated into Greek. In submitting letter I made unvarnished presentation based inter alia on points Deptel 327 to Athens,/2/ emphasizing that this proposed solution not a bargaining position and represents Acheson's and USG's best assessment of what might be made acceptable to Turks. I stressed particularly that a Greek national decision was essential to put solution across and underlined the fact that this solution offered the possibility of avoiding a Communist take-over of island and averting the extension of Communist power over a very much larger area including Greece itself.
/2/Document 135.
PriMin acknowledged danger which Communist control of Cyprus would pose for Greece. After listening to the presentation attentively he explained that he must have a solution which can be rationally explained not only to his own people but also to the people of Cyprus and their "devilish leader Makarios." He confirmed offer Costopoulos had made to me two hours earlier that GOG prepared lease an area of 99 square miles on Karpas Peninsula. He added that if he had to deal only with Greek public opinion he could possibly have agreed to lease of roughly 200 square miles. However, in his struggle with Makarios he would be placed in a very difficult, and probably impossible, position if he granted Turks double the area of the two British bases.
I stressed again that the area delineated, which appeared to be not much more than 5 percent of land area of Cyprus, was absolute minimum which Acheson considers Turks might be willing to accept. We went over map a number of times showing where Turk demands had originally started and how they had been compressed.
At termination meeting Papandreou confirmed Sossides would leave for Geneva tomorrow carrying back Papandreou's answer to Acheson letter. I concluded by earnestly imploring PriMin to give this letter most serious consideration as a final offer inasmuch as it was Mr. Acheson's view, shared by entire USG including President, that this was best deal which could be obtained for Greece.
Comment: Greek side listened most attentively to entire proposal. Presentation I had made earlier in evening to Costopoulos had obviously had salutary effect. There was no detailed discussion of method of public presentation Acheson proposal if accepted, or of procedures in effecting enosis which I made clear we considered responsibility of GOG. However, when passage in letter re possible future determination of western boundary by SACEUR was reached, FonMin dryly commented in Greek to Papandreou, "That's the Vaseline." Although Papandreou made no comment it was apparent that he appreciated that he was confronted by a fundamental decision and that this decision must be made promptly. I believe he would sincerely like to meet Acheson proposal but has not yet resolved in his own mind how he can face Makarios and Cypriot opinion as well as his own potential supporters such as Grivas and Georkadzis.
Postscript: I threw everything at him but the glove. Goodnight for now.
Labouisse
137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
Washington, August 20, 1964, 11:36 p.m.
335. We have read your 362/2/ with considerable dismay here. Despite what I know was a valiant effort on your part, it does not appear to us that Papandreou has understood the urgency of the situation or what great responsibility we are taking in offering him a solution to his otherwise insoluble problems. I believe it essential therefore that you see the King at the earliest possible hour today and make the following points:
/2/Document 136.
1. What you are proposing is exactly what he asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--our assurance that we would hold the Turks still if the GOG would move incisively to bring about instant enosis under terms that would give the Greeks 95 percent of what they want.
2. This is not an offer made cavalierly to be treated in a leisurely manner. We are at one minute to midnight. The GOG had better understand this. If the President is to continue to assume the responsibility for trying to keep peace in the Mediterranean and keep the Communists out, the GOG must do its part at this decisive moment.
We in Washington--including the President--will be profoundly shocked and disappointed if--after all our anguish and exertions--the GOG boggles at the leasing of 100 square miles of territory beyond the last Greek offer and thus permits Cyprus to pass under Communist control. (The total area of the Karpas base we are talking about amounts to 204 square miles.)/3/
/3/In telegram 366 from Athens, August 21, Labouisse reported that Papandreou was ready to agree to a deal on Cyprus on the basis of Acheson's proposals, but it must include assurances from Turkey that it would cease the deportation of Greek minorities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
4. If Papandreou cannot bite the bullet and act incisively, then the King must realize that a national decision is required and required immediately./4/
/4/In telegram 368 from Athens, August 21, Labouisse reported that he had met with the King who promised to attempt to secure support for a Cyprus deal from the ERE leadership. Constantine also noted the importance of Turkish agreement to cease pressures on Greeks in Istanbul and that Greek Cypriots living within a base area would not be forced to relocate. (Ibid.)
5. Up to this point, the GOG has failed to come up with a single constructive suggestion that takes into account the realities of the situation. What we are offering is a way out of a catastrophic dilemma at little cost to Hellenism, either in territory or national pride. If this offer is not taken immediately, we see no alternative that offers anything but disaster.
6. Not only will our plan extricate Greece from great danger at minimal cost, but it will enable Greece at long last to achieve the historic objective of making Cyprus once and for all a part of Greece and making Athens the single capital of Hellenism.
7. There is no time for Sossides to return to Geneva for further talks with Acheson. We must have a prompt decision or the whole plan will fall apart. The proposal will leak--as knowledge of our efforts has consistently leaked from Athens. Makarios will be put on guard. Grivas will be poisoned against the plan and his capabilities to achieve it will be undermined. Papandreou will once again find himself impotent.
8. We must have an answer today without waiting for Sossides' return to Geneva. The Turks have been alerted and Kyprianou may be on his way to Moscow at any hour. We cannot undertake to get the Turks into line if the Greeks procrastinate. This is the time to decide and to act and we are unlikely to have a second chance./5/
/5/In telegram 107 from Geneva to Athens, August 21, Acheson commented that while he did not believe the moment proper to extract further concessions from the Turks on either minorities or Cypriots living within a base area, he believed that such concessions would be forthcoming after an accord. (Ibid.)
Apart from your talk with the King, we would like comments on the following points:
1. We are puzzled by Papandreou's concern that he will not be able to explain the plan to Makarios. This seems incomprehensible to us since we had not assumed that such an explanation was ever contemplated. Obviously no plan that would possibly be acceptable to the GOT could ever be acceptable to Makarios.
2. We had assumed that the GOG would take measures to bypass Makarios and bring about instant enosis through whatever means they felt necessary. This seems to us the only possible way to effect a solution of this problem. If the GOG does not understand this, we fail to see how any solution can be effected.
Rusk
138. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 21, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 11:01 a.m. and repeated to Ankara and Athens. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
445. From Acheson. Turks came to see me this morning to say they had reported proposal I put to them yesterday and already had "governmental decision" back from Ankara. Essence this answer was that Turkey had accepted initial proposals I made in Geneva but this was final, not bargaining position. What I had proposed yesterday was radical change involving abandonment of "principle" of sovereign area as well as basic principles of my plan for protection Turkish minority right. This Turkey could not accept.
I took strong exception to statement Turkey had accepted initial proposals. Told me they were acceptable "as basis for discussion". In my view, this meant discussion of all aspects, not merely that Turkey would accept my offer and try to get more. Erim said there must have been misunderstanding; Turkey would have been willing to discuss certain details, such as exact boundary of sovereign base area, but it was quite unable discuss idea of lease instead of sovereign possession.
I urged that Turks refrain from giving me at this time final rejection of latest proposal. They should wait and see what Greece did. It appeared GOG did not like my ideas any better than GOT. At least, Turkey might allow Greece to take onus for breakdown of talks.
Erim insisted, however, on going ahead, saying I could "use it or not." According to Ankara, he said, sovereign base area of adequate size would have been barely acceptable compensation to Turkey for enosis, but leased base could never be adequate counterpart. Turkey must be free on its base to do anything it wished in both civil and military fields. So far as minorities were concerned, my original proposal had been acceptable, but Greek counter proposal (which he implied I had adopted) was completely different. As he had already said, Turkish Government was not prepared to discuss basic changes. Since GOG had failed agree to my position, Turkey preferred no settlement at all.
He then began once again to talk about federalism, mentioning that USSR had never declared itself as opposed to this solution. Establishment of federal state on Cyprus would preserve Turkey's freedom of action, which would be lost once enosis took place. He went on to emphasize that it was impossible for Inonu to sell enosis to Turkish Parliament and people without sovereign base as counterpart.
At this point I read him excerpts from latest Ankara press summary which showed newspapers were talking about enosis as possible solution and pointing out dangers of self-determination for Cyprus in light of Soviet Cypriot rapprochement. They were pointing with alarm to danger of Russia achieving a Mediterranean Cuba. Greek press, I said, was taking somewhat similar line. This seemed to indicate to me that both Turkish and Greek opinion had realized we had entered a new phase.
As to federalism, I emphatically said this was not presently feasible alternative. Makarios simply would not accept it and he would have Soviet support.
With all the energy I could muster I tried to impress upon Erim that our only chance to save situation is now. This offer gave Turkey a great deal, even though I admitted it was not what GOT would like. There really wasn't all that difference between sovereignty and a lease. What had sovereignty meant in case of Britain and Cyprus? Possession between 1914 and 1960, less than the fifty years being offered Turkey. It would be incredible folly for GOT to turn down this last opportunity. Rejection would be disastrous for Turkey, for U.S., for Greece and for Cyprus. Turks should realize they can't get what they want without fighting. And that would bring down whole house of cards. I strongly hoped Greece and Turkey would not lose sight of their real national interest. They must not allow themselves to be blinded by wretched island of Cyprus to real Slav danger which threatened them both.
I summed up by saying that I had done everything I could. I had no more ideas. If my latest proposal were not accepted, I would be finished. Only thing I could do, and what I planned to do, would be to ask Amb. Hare to make final approach in Ankara to urge GOT to reconsider. (I said, however, I would not ask him to do this unless I heard that Greeks had accepted.)
Erim and Sunalp listened to this calmly, injecting occasionally repetitious remarks about Turkish inability to give more ground than I had asked them at first. Their only substantive suggestion was that we go back to validity of existing treaties and that U.S. and Turkey make new joint statement that these treaties must be respected. I said we had made our position in support of treaties clear ever since Inonu visit to Washington. Restatement in present circumstances would be futile.
At one point, Erim remarked that if there should be settlement between Greece and Turkey GOT would prefer to have all aspects of agreement made public at same time. We did not follow this up, but I assume he was referring to my earlier suggestion that agreement not be published, at least in full, until after enosis had been accomplished.
We parted amicably, with Sunalp remarking he would probably not see us again because he had received orders to take command of 29th Division at Erzerum. Erim said nothing about leaving Geneva.
Comment: Seems apparent that sovereignty is key issue in Turkish mind. With it, they can pretend to their people that they have achieved form of partition; without it they think this impossible. I got no reaction at all to my repeated warning about dangers of Soviet domination of Cyprus. Erim observed very calmly that if this happens "you will have your Cuba and we will have our Cyprus, each ruled by a man with a beard."
Tubby
139. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, August 21, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 11:59 a.m. and repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
357. Dept and other addressees already well aware views this post regarding impossibility any lasting peaceful solution involving Turkish base on island. From fragmentary info gleaned from various telegrams would appear we have now presented GOG fully approved USG plan which includes sizeable base on Karpas if not most of peninsula. At same time we are suddenly presented by GOG with "instant enosis" as only way Greeks can see out of present virtually impossible situation. At risk of being considered out of step feel I must observe that we are moving into almost hopeless dilemma and we cannot continue even for short period to ride both Geneva and (reluctantly but perhaps with no choice) "instant enosis" horses. Our reasoning is along following lines:
1. "Instant enosis" depends upon availability of reliable Greek troops for use in bringing it about and good discipline on part of Greek Cypriot armed elements.
2. Sovereign Turkish base not sellable here. Why should Greek Cypriots accept less than they think they will get at UNGA? And especially now that GOC has or thinks it has full Soviet backing? Greek army can hardly be expected to force base upon Cypriots who likely actively fight against it (Athens 353 to Dept)./2/ Even leased base would be categorically refused by majority of Cypriots and certainly by their leadership including Georkadjis/Grivas. Therefore both crucial elements for imposed solution are lacking.
/2/Telegram 353 from Athens, August 20, reported a discussion with the Greeks regarding Turkish base demands and indicated that the Greek Government had not yet taken a decision on the issue. (Ibid.)
3. Turks believe we think Turkish base rather than NATO base can be imposed here if GOG agrees in Geneva. Therefore, it would seem that in Turkish eyes USG would be responsible if "instant enosis" did not result in establishment Turkish base.
4. Mood here is such that it not inconceivable Grivas et al. might go ahead with enosis anyway without our support and of course without any Turkish base. This will surely be terrible fait accompli for Turks to swallow after having held their hand on assumption that US would obtain them sizeable Karpas base.
Realize the foregoing obviously presents us with harsh choice. We feel here that possible solution could lie along lines our 345/3/ but if decision made for higher policy reasons to give Turks territorial concession, we must be prepared for real bloodshed, rapid increase in Communist strength, to say nothing of possible Soviet intervention in more active form and at best, festering sore which will continue to torture our major alliance./4/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 133.
/4/In telegram 359 from Nicosia, August 21, Belcher advised the Department of State that "instant enosis" was impossible on terms that included a Turkish base. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP) In telegram 206 to Nicosia, August 21, the Department of State instructed Belcher to avoid any statement to Greek or Cypriot officials that might suggest official doubts about the "instant enosis" with a Turkish base deal. (Ibid.)
Belcher
140. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, August 22, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Received at 9:01 a.m. and repeated to Athens and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
363. For Under Secretary Ball. Have just had two and half hours very difficult conversation with Inonu and Erkin in which I initially based presentation on summer negots to date in order establish extraordinary effort at highest level made by USG in this matter, following this by giving substance Ball telecon of last night/2/ and delivering Acheson letter./3/
/2/Following receipt of telegram 445 from Geneva (Document 138), Ball initiated a teleconference with Hare at 5:15 p.m. on August 21. Ball instructed Hare to press the Turks to settle on the basis of the Acheson proposals. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation) Hare reported that he requested a personal meeting with ailing Prime Minister Inonu in telegram 359 from Ankara, August 21. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
/3/Transmitted in telegram 112 to Ankara, August 22. In his letter, Acheson stressed the need for an immediate agreement on the basis of the proposal he had offered. (Ibid.)
To make long story short Inonu was obviously well primed and steadfastly insisted no agreement possible which did not provide for larger base area and full sovereignty, with especial emphasis on latter. He agreed however that this should not be considered as final decision but rather as exchange of views which he would report to Erim and I to Washington in order obtain reactions of USG. If our proposal unchanged he would submit to government for final decision but he made clear he would not support; to do so would end his political career. Limit to which he could go was original Acheson proposal.
It will probably take me several hours to try to patch this rather strange conversation together;/4/ strange in sense that arguments advanced by Inonu, although having degree of cogency, did not give impression of indicating what he really had in mind.
/4/In telegram 364 from Ankara, August 22, received at 12:56 p.m., Hare outlined in greater detail Inonu's objections to the Acheson proposals. (Ibid.)
As contrasted with Inonu's calm, Erkin's pressure seemed be running rather high. Said Turks always being asked make concessions; base proposal worthless; as Turk citizen support of proposal would constitute betrayal of his people; better let things go on as they are or even have enosis with no arrangement. Then and possibly with some significance he observed that in any event there now seemed be "light of hope for federation" and, when I asked him genesis of this idea, his first reaction was to say not result of consultation with Russians, which I had not suggested. Mention of same thing by Erim to Acheson (Geneva's 445 to Dept)/5/ only yesterday may or may not be coincidental.
/5/Document 138.
In sum, my talk was longer version of that between Acheson and Erim yesterday, with sovereignty and area of base given as striking point, but I am not at all sure that this was not used as excuse to get out from under whole thing, which in curious contrast with what appeared be inspired press build-up for something like what we finally proposed.
I of course used every gun at my disposal but Inonu had obviously entrenched himself well in advance and would give no ground beyond agreeing keep open for another round.
Hare
141. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 22, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Received at 1:23 p.m. and repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
461. From Acheson. Now that, despite heroic efforts by Labouisse and Hare, both Greece and Turkey have rejected the only remotely possible proposal, I recommend that we liquidate Geneva and try new policy outlined in following telegram./2/ I would say in both capitals that last Acheson proposal was final effort to reach agreement and no modification will improve its acceptability. It has now been rejected by both Greece and Turkey and deemed unenforceable on Greek-Cypriots. USG can make no further effort. It therefore considers Geneva talks concluded and will direct Acheson return to Washington. USG considers this turn of events most grave for all. It will continue to make every effort to prevent Cyprus from falling into Soviet orbit, but unfortunately it is now clear that this cannot be done by agreement between its two allies most concerned. USG will have to keep foremost in mind what is practical and what is in the interest of the entire Western world. USG would deeply regret any development which might lead either ally to believe that its interests had not been sufficiently safeguarded but it must be guided by the interest and purposes of the Alliance as a whole. It will continue the closest consultation with its allies.
/2/In telegram 462 from Geneva, August 22, Acheson recommended a policy of supporting Greece in an effort to neutralize Soviet influence over Makarios. (Ibid.)
I have already given the Department some thoughts on concrete actions we might now take (my tels 401, 408 and 439)./3/ I am revising these in immediately following telegram in the light of the final developments.
/3/Telegram 408 is Document 129. Regarding telegram 401, see footnote 2 thereto. Telegram 439, August 20, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Tubby
142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, August 22, 1964, 3:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
347. For Ambassadors from Ball. Your 375./2/ We cannot accept the Greek Government's vacillation and you should make this point quite clear to them. The President has been advised that the GOG has accepted our proposal and we intend to proceed on that basis. We are using every possible means to bring about a Turkish agreement and we cannot accept any Greek second thoughts at this point.
/2/Telegram 375 from Athens, August 22, reported that as a result of Garoufalias' visit to Cyprus, the Greek Government was convinced that Makarios would reject any settlement involving cession of territory in the Karpas Peninsula to Turkey. (Ibid.)
I suggest, therefore, that in your next meeting with Papandreou you convey to him the deep sense of surprise felt in Washington by his apparent backsliding. You must continue to keep the pressure at the maximum until we get this whole business nailed down. So far as the United States Government is concerned this is a last major effort and we do not intend to see it fail. If it should break because of the lack of courage or determination on the part of the GOG we would have to make clear to the world where the responsibility lay.
We have been considering how to respond to the Greek request for guidance in handling the situation in Cyprus. You should alter or amend the following suggestion as you see fit.
With the approval of Papandreou and hopefully of Canellopoulos also, the King would send word to General Grivas that he wished to see him. He would then make the following points to General Grivas preferably speaking in the presence of Papandreou and Canellopoulos.
1. The Government has fully considered the USG proposal and believes that it should be carried out.
2. A quick solution through the American proposal is the only door still open of preventing the Communization of Cyprus without the practical certainty of a Turk attack.
3. The Americans have been making a substantial effort to help find a solution. They have assured the GOG that if enosis is immediately effected through a peaceful bargain with the Turks on the basis of the American proposal they would promptly provide substantial assistance for the rebuilding of Cyprus and the development of its resources.
In connection with this last point you may indicate that we would be prepared to undertake an aid program that could result in the reclaiming of more land for Cyprus than would be included in the proposed Turkish base. How you should formulate that is for you to decide. We are reviewing the situation with the experts this afternoon and will forward you promptly some harder data as to the possibilities of desalination and soil reclamation.
What must be gotten across to General Grivas is that what the American proposal offers is an opportunity for him to fulfill his Dighenis role and thus reclaim Cyprus for Hellenism and save it from Communism to which Makarios is leading it. He would also secure for the people of Cyprus the chance to make their Island blossom like a rose./3/
/3/In telegram 379 from Athens, August 23, Labouisse endorsed the proposal for support of Greece made by Acheson as the best means of checking Soviet influence. (Ibid.)
Rusk
143. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 22, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Received at 4:36 p.m. and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and Geneva. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
378. Embtel 375./2/
/2/Telegram 375 from Athens, August 22, reported that because of Cypriot resistance to a Turkish base area the Greek Government was in "total disarray" and unable to accept the Acheson proposal. (Ibid.)
1. I told PriMin that statement that GOG did not consider itself in position carry out enosis on basis Acheson proposal came as shocking news on top of yesterday's confirmation that he was prepared to accept the Acheson proposals in principle and was drafting a letter along those lines. I said new situation confronted us with possible disaster.
2. PriMin acknowledged above, but appeared greatly distraught and genuinely disturbed over report on Grivas' position and atmos-phere in Cyprus. PriMin added that although it was folly to risk war over question of the size of a base, he was not master over Greek Cypriot community as Inonu is over Turk Cypriots. He said he had been most sincere in his statements to me yesterday and day before and that he had and is acting in good faith; that Acheson proposal is acceptable to gov as way to avoid war and resolve Cyprus question, but that he is helpless because he could not impose this solution on the island. This was brought forcefully to light by Defense Minister's discussions in Cyprus. He finds himself in a serious impasse and does not know where to turn.
3. He and Costopoulos asked several times for US guidance. Would it be desirable for government to state publicly that it accepted concept of Acheson plan but that Makarios turned it down? As result of such statement, Greece would, of course, have to withdraw its forces from Cyprus and leave the island to its fate. Both Papandreou and Costopoulos questioned that this would be desirable course of action, as it would play more into Makarios' hands and drive him even closer to Moscow and Nasser. "But what can be done?"
4. Papandreou said only way out that he could see was proposal he had made to me on Monday (Embtel 327),/3/ which would bring about instant enosis with no prior commitments, get rid of Makarios, cut out Soviets, and leave it to GOG to promise full safeguards (presumably along general lines Acheson proposal, with few relatively minor modifications).
/3/See footnote 3, Document 131.
Comment: As indicated, we believe GOG was sincerely attracted Thursday night to Acheson plan as being solution basically in over-all Greek interest (Embtel 362)/4/ but frankly stated their reservations regarding their capacity to make concessions regarding Turkish base. Yesterday morning Papandreou under intense US pressure took policy decision to accept US proposal in principle (Embtel 366)/5/ although he continued express misgivings as to his ability to execute program. Today following Garoufalias' return from Cyprus, Papandreou's illusion GOG might have capability to execute program evaporated.
/4/Document 136.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 137.
It was always the case that the prospective settlement with Cyprus had to be of a nature such that the Greeks could impose it, overcoming whatever resistance exists among the Greek Cypriots to the settlement. As events moved along, under our pressure the Greeks gave more and more ground, hoping that what they were conceding was not beyond their capability to deliver. In their anxiety to obtain settlement based on enosis, they got beyond their capability to deliver.
Labouisse
144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/
Washington, August 23, 1964, 2:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London.
479. Geneva for Acheson. For Ambassadors. After a long telecon with Ray Hare early this morning/2/ and the dubious result of his subsequent final try with Inonu,/3/ I have reluctantly concluded that Geneva, as originally conceived, has run its course.
/2/Initiated at 4 a.m. on August 23. (Ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation)
/3/See Document 140.
In order to salvage remaining possibilities, I ask your comments on the following new proposed course of action:
1. In Athens Labouisse would say to the GOG that it has proved impossible to persuade the Turks to accept anything less than the Karpas Peninsula Base and even that is doubtful on a leasehold basis.
2. However, we are not prepared to let conditions drift to the point where Cyprus becomes another Cuba, as will almost certainly be the case if the Makarios regime continues in control of an independent GOC.
3. We are, therefore, considering saying to the GOG that they should go forward with their plans to bring about enosis and that we will undertake to see that, if they bring it off with reasonable promptness, neither the Turks nor any outside power will intervene with military force.
4. The conditions of this offer are:
(a) The GOG must undertake, once enosis is concluded, to negotiate promptly and in good faith with the GOT regarding the mutual recision of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.
(b) In the course of this negotiation, the GOG must undertake as a minimum to offer the Turks, in exchange for the abrogation of those treaties, two major concessions.
(c) The first is the assurance of minority rights to the Turk Cypriot population in the form developed by Dean Acheson.
(d) The second is an undertaking by the GOG to grant to the GOT a 50-year lease for a suitable area to be mutually agreed on with the advice of SHAPE.
5. While the GOG may be reluctant to agree now to negotiate these concessions in the absence of a simultaneous Turkish agreement, we can point out to them that without an understanding with the GOT a post-enosis Cyprus will face sticky problems. For example, it will be confronted with the presence of a Turkish garrison which the Turkish Government will no doubt insist on maintaining under the Treaty of Alliance unless the juridical situation can be sorted out by agreement. The garrison, the rights claimed under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, and the unresolved status of other Treaty provisions can make relations very difficult. This is true even though the UN General Assembly might pass a resolution calling upon the Turks to relinquish these rights and get out./4/
/4/In telegram 387 from Athens, August 24, Labouisse endorsed Acheson's proposal and stated that in order for Papandreou to carry out enosis successfully, he would have to be able to limit the commitments he had already made to Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
In Ankara we would propose to take the following actions:
(1) Hare would say to Inonu that he regrets that the GOT has not accepted our proposal and that Turkey will probably never be able to obtain as good a deal again.
(2) The USG, however, is not prepared to let Cyprus become another Cuba.
(3) We are advising the GOT, therefore, that we are encouraging the GOG to bring about enosis and propose to tell them that we will assure that this is achieved without outside intervention from any quarter.
(4) At the same time we are insisting, as a condition of this assurance to the GOG, that the Greek Government must agree as outlined in paragraph 4 above.
The advantage of this course of action from the point of view of the GOT is that it does not require the Turkish Government to agree to anything. It would merely accept notice of our statement that we expect it to stand down on Cyprus and that we propose again to concentrate on the great issues that bind Turkey to the Western Alliance. We should get some sense of the risks involved in giving the Greeks an assurance of Turkish standdown through General Porter's visit to Ankara in the next two or three days. I would like particularly to have Ray Hare's comments on this./5/
/5/Hare's comments are in telegram 370 from Ankara, August 24. (Ibid.) In telegram 379 from Ankara, August 24, Porter reported that he would make an effort to convince the Turkish General Staff that the Karpas Peninsula was militarily sound for a base. (Ibid.)
In order to share these risks and at the same time give a firmer underpinning to the proposal, we might consider trying to associate the UKG as well as Germany and Italy with our action.
If we get an affirmative reply from the Greeks and implicit acquiescence from the Turks, you might wish to stop off in Rome, Bonn and London on your return to the US to try to get them on board.
Meanwhile, both Dean Rusk and I feel that it would be helpful if you could stay on in Geneva for some days more until we fully explore the possibilities of trying to work out an arrangement along the above lines. This would minimize the possibilities of a sudden sense of alarm resulting from the conspicuous termination of the Geneva talks. Moreover, your departure at this point from Geneva might well encourage Makarios and the Greeks to take a more obstructionist stand. Your continued presence, on the other hand, could reinforce the general situation while both the Greeks and Turks are sorting out their final arrangements./6/
/6/In telegram 467 from Geneva, August 23, Acheson stated his readiness to stay as long as necessary to carry forward Ball's proposals. (Ibid.)
In preparing the above suggestions we have obviously taken into account the Papandreou letter to Acheson (Athens 153 to Geneva)/7/ which gives some encouragement to the course of action proposed.
/7/Papandreou's letter was transmitted in telegram 381 from Athens (repeated to
Geneva as 153), August 23. (Ibid.)
I would greatly appreciate a reaction from all addressee posts regarding this proposal./8/
/8/In telegram 911 from London, August 24, Bruce registered his "deep misgivings" about Ball's proposals. (Ibid.)
Rusk
145. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 24, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House.
388. 1. Before receiving Deptel 351,/2/ I had informal talk last night with King Constantine, during which I reviewed sad state of affairs and stressed our grave disappointment and shock over inability of GOG to carry through on Acheson proposal. He told me he had talked with Garoufalias on his return from Cyprus and was satisfied that latter's report of situation on Cyprus was fair and objective. Makarios is extremely popular on island and his influence very great. King seemed convinced there would be serious public reaction, both in Cyprus and in Greece, if GOG sought to force Turkish base on Cypriots.
/2/Telegram 479 to Geneva (Document 144) was repeated to Athens as telegram 351.
2. I asked whether Grivas could be stiffened by pressure from him and Greek army. He replied it was not question of trying persuade Grivas to take tougher position versus Makarios, but rather, for reasons stated above, it was not in cards to overcome Makarios' influence just through force.
3. I spoke of Papandreou's letter to Acheson re a base./3/ The King thought Greek and Cypriot people could be brought to agree to one. However, he said questions he had asked me on Friday (Embtel 368)/4/ were most pertinent. For example, he could not imagine granting Turkey base if mistreatment Istanbul Greeks continues. He also emphasized importance not forcing any population movements and continuation of normal traffic in base area. The King seemed to think smaller base on Karpas might be possible to sell on above conditions, but he was obviously not sure of himself.
/3/See footnote 7, Document 144.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 137.
Comment: The King appeared to be groping for something to save situation and was not thinking in terms of procedure or of how GOG could in fact go about arranging base. Although the young King is giving commendable attention to his country's Cyprus dilemma, there is no doubt his mind is somewhat diverted by prospect of his coming marriage./5/ Moreover, his ability to influence the action of his government is subject to severe, if not precisely defined, constitutional and practical limitations.
/5/King Constantine's marriage to Princess Anne Marie of Denmark was to take place September 18.
Labouisse
146. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 25, 1964, 9:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
405. Department may wish repeat to Nicosia. Embtel 399./2/
/2/Telegram 399 from Athens, August 25, reported that Papandreou had justified his press statement as a tactic needed to put himself in a position to deal forcefully with Makarios. (Ibid.)
1. Meeting with Papandreou took place at Kastri with his son, Andreas, and Dan Brewster present. Papandreou said Makarios coming at PriMin's invitation and that he would also see King before leaving this evening.
2. I then stated that I was finding it very hard to explain Greek policy on Cyprus to Washington. I referred to Papandreou's public statement last night regarding "complete accord" with Cyprus leadership, while at same time Kyprianou was saying there could be no base on the island/3/ and Makarios telling Nicosia press Cyprus attitude on Soviet military aid remained unchanged. How did all this fit in with what PriMin had been telling me about his distaste for and differences with Makarios, etc.
/3/Reported in telegram 398 from Athens, August 25. (Ibid.)
3. Papandreou replied he was in death struggle with Makarios and had to make these tactical "moves." He referred to rest of his statement to effect there was no pressure and no agreed solution, adding there was surely no agreement in Geneva.
If he (Papandreou) had approval from us of his offer, then he could disagree with Makarios, hence, his statement that there is no agreed solution was accurate. He said he was in complete accord with Makarios in that Makarios is also claiming that he is for enosis following self-determination. Moreover, as long as there is a "spontaneous" Soviet offer to prevent Turkey from attacking Cyprus, he could not condemn Makarios for accepting this. I questioned whether the Soviet offer had been spontaneous in response to Makarios' appeals. I also recalled his statement to me of several days ago that, if Makarios should make an alliance with Soviets, there would be parting of ways.
4. Papandreou then reviewed briefly events of past weeks, saying Turkey threatened to attack and in fact had attacked the island, at which point allies did not stop it. Neither did Greece help nor could it help. With no one offering guarantees that Turkey would not attack, Papandreou's position was made extremely difficult vis-a-vis Makarios. He affirmed, however, that Greece would not change its foreign policy position, and if Makarios undertook any commitments to Soviets, he would withdraw Greek forces.
5. There was then some talk on what had been achieved at Geneva. According to PriMin, Sossides had asserted that Acheson (as late as last night) was greatly disappointed at fact Turks "who had originally accepted concept of leased-base had reverted to position of maintaining sovereign base was only solution." I corrected this misimpression, stating it was Acheson who had proposed leased base concept but that according our record, Turks had not as yet budged from their position that they required sovereign base area.
6. Andreas Papandreou then spoke of despicable manner in which press on Cyprus and in Athens were attacking Papandreou government for even considering negotiated base. Papandreou's position on island was completely destroyed because Makarios was spreading word that Papandreou had betrayed Cypriot cause. PriMin then stated his tactics were to attempt to disarm Makarios.
7. Papandreou said he was going to talk to Makarios strongly and insist on following policy lines:
a) That there be no tie-ins with the Soviets or commitments made to them. He added he would make clear to Makarios that Greeks could not fight on side of USSR.
b) That there be peace on the island and no provocations.
c) That common aim would be enosis and not independence.
8. Papandreou asked that he be permitted to sum up his policy concerning Cyprus:
a) He preferred an agreed solution which would bring peace and lead to enosis and NATO-fication. That is why GOG participated in Geneva and Makarios did not.
b) Papandreou expected acceptable plan to be found at Geneva but this was not achieved.
c) Since bombings of Mansoura an agreement which would satisfy Turkish needs and be acceptable to Makarios and Cypriot people has become far more difficult to attain.
d) Although everyone on island is convinced there would be no base, he, Papandreou, took full responsibility for a base area size of British bases in his letter to Mr. Acheson (further proof that he differs with Makarios). He added unfortunately there has been no response to his proposal. He has been told that Turks are insisting on sovereignty of whatever base they might obtain and hence agreement impossible. He could not accept sovereign base. If Turks could accept his proposal he would be willing to struggle with Makarios.
e) Following "Geneva failure", he now faces situation without basis of Geneva talks. He would be more than delighted if coup d'etat for unconditional enosis would be achieved in which case Makarios would be his captive. Acheson has been informed of this and although Papandreou had no hopes that this could be accepted, it would be desirable. He was willing to eliminate Makarios.
9. He repeated again that he planned to stress with Makarios that there be no aggressive action on part of GOC and no provocations. GOG wishes wash its hands of responsibility in this area. Problem would then go to UNGA. If Turks attack because Geneva has failed, GOG will fight on side of Cyprus "but under flag of enosis and not of independence." As to Soviets, he emphasized he would demand that Makarios make no commitments.
He repeated that if he were to make any commitments, Greek army will leave Cyprus.
10. I stressed great importance of Papandreou making clear to Makarios today that, despite his statement of accord, Greeks would not put up with further Makarios brinksmanship. I specified various areas which must be covered, including cooperation with UN on island, cessation of Greek-Cypriot attacks, discontinuance of economic blockades, permission for rotation Turk contingent. Papandreou said these were "details", but it very nearly got Greece into a war. I noted that frequently it was not general understanding but "details" which caused wars, and added that Makarios was trifling with peace in his tactics. If by a provocation the communities on Cyprus were to fight each other it would be Makarios' fault, yet because of PriMin's public statements of identity of views, he was permitting Makarios to determine Greek foreign policy and possibly, to involve Greece in war.
Papandreou agreed that Makarios trifling with peace, but asked what more could he do? He asserted that he could not make public statement against Makarios now. I replied that he could at least make it crystal clear to Makarios that he would have to go it alone if he did not conform to Greek wishes. Papandreou said he would make strong statement to Makarios against provocations.
12. Papandreou said he realized what a problem he had with Makarios and that he proposed to enhance Greek military forces on island to ensure pacification of island and to do whatever he could to enhance GOG influence on Cypriot press and public opinion. I said that something along these lines made sense to me, but that if he had in mind sending planes to Cyprus, this was something else again. This would not only be provocation to Turks, but would run counter to UN resolution. Papandreou's spontaneous reaction was "you want Greece to control island and yet you don't want airplanes delivered. If GOG does not send them, Makarios will say he will get them other places."
13. Meeting concluded with Prime Minister repeating that he was in death struggle with Makarios and that he hoped I would give him time to work things out with Makarios today and report to Washington after events of this afternoon.
14. In parting, I raised question of municipal elections, expressing view that if Athens found itself with an EDA Mayor in a fortnight, this would be very bad for Greek image. Papandreou stated that I could be assured there would be no Communist Mayor of Athens.
Comment: Main purpose of my call was to stiffen him up against Makarios and to let him know I was genuinely unhappy with his public stance. He appeared to us to be in trouble. Whether his tactics will work with the wily Archbishop remains to be seen.
Labouisse
147. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, August 26, 1964, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-TAG. Received at 9:22 a.m. and repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London. Passed to the White House.
482. For Ball from Acheson. Reference: Athens' 407 and 408 to Department./2/ I see nothing in King's statements to Labouisse or his message to President which warrants any optimism. Having balked at leased base in own name, Turks certainly will treat with contempt proposal that they have NATO base instead. Lease of base on Castellorizon will not make any difference. "Full guarantees" for Turkish minority on Cyprus is old story. Although I think Turks would probably settle for my revised minority proposals, they have never flatly said so and in any case sovereignty and size and location of base are key questions.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 148.
Fact that settlement on basis King's proposal would be Greek national solution and would involve negotiation rather than coup d'etat is undoubtedly important from Greek point of view but, I should say, totally irrelevant from viewpoint of GOT.
I would therefore reiterate my advice against giving USG agreement to instant enosis without prior agreement with Turks./3/
/3/In telegram 503 to Geneva, August 26, Ball responded: "You can be assured that I have no intention of giving USG agreement to instant enosis without prior agreement with Turks. We are definitely off that ticket." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Re Deptel 492 to Geneva,/4/ I accept changes proposed in my letter to Papandreou but would like third sentence of your new third paragraph to read as follows: "However, as you know, the Government of Turkey is finding as much difficulty in accepting these proposals as you are, although it has not, as I understand it, finally rejected them." As implied by my comments above, I think there is no advantage in holding up delivery of letter (as instructed Deptel 364 to Athens)./5/
/4/In telegram 492, August 25, Ball explained that he wanted to allow both governments, but especially Papandreou, to ruminate over the proposals they had rejected and suggested changes to a proposed letter from Acheson. (Ibid.)
/5/Telegram 364 to Athens, August 25, instructed Labouisse to hold up delivery of Acheson's letter. (Ibid.)
In mentioning "period of silence on our part", do you have in mind that Jernegan and I should simply sit in Geneva awaiting developments or that we should come home for consultation, thus emphasizing "shock treatment"?
Tubby
148. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 26, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Received at 11:07 a.m. and repeated to Ankara, London, Geneva for Acheson, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House.
411. DCM called on Costopoulos in effort obtain [garble] considerations lying behind King's letter to President Johnson (Embtel 407)./2/ Costopoulos said GOG would be prepared to assume obligation of negotiating NATO base after enosis. In fact, there could probably be two bases, one on Karpas Peninsula of about 50 square miles and one in Cape Greco area of about 50 square miles, totalling approximately area existing British bases. He referred also to base on Kastellorizon. Papandreou probably prepared make this undertaking in writing. Costopoulos made it quite clear he had little confidence in Makarios' sincerity.
/2/Telegram 407 from Athens, August 26, reported that the King had won Makarios' agreement to the creation of a NATO base on Cyprus following enosis, and government and opposition agreement in Greece for the lease of a base on Kastellorizon to Turkey. (Ibid.) The text of the King's message to President Johnson was transmitted in telegram 408 from Athens, August 26. (Ibid.)
DCM commented information regarding location and dimensions of bases indispensable to permit USG evaluate King's proposal and that a written undertaking on the part of Papandreou to this effect would be essential to add element of reality to situation.
Next step would be to request Grivas come to Athens, possibly tomorrow, to obtain his concurrence, at least in principle. Costopoulos implied question of precise area and location of NATO base, or bases, might not be specifically discussed with Makarios or Grivas. This aspect of solution would be undertaken only by GOG as an obligation to be discharged after enosis. GOG would, however, say publicly at time enosis proposed and Greek and Cypriot Parliaments convoked, that GOG would be prepared grant NATO base and that Makarios had concurred.
Costopoulos confided to DCM on "top secret" basis, that Kyprianou and Georkadjis had agreed to support a GOG push for enosis when the appropriate circumstances have been created. This apparently included agreement to principle of NATO base and willingness denounce Makarios in event his defection. Meanwhile some additional 500 military, "not fighters, mostly technicians" (sic), were being sent to Cyprus and other unspecified measures being taken strengthen GOG position there.
DCM pushed Costopoulos hard regarding current status of Cypriot/Soviet negotiations. Costopoulos was very vague, but after further interrogation said one of principal reasons for Makarios' visit to Cairo tomorrow is to make arrangements for basing of "the 15 planes" which Makarios is endeavoring to have delivered as soon as possible. Although Costopoulos declined to be precise, DCM came away with impression planes presumably of Soviet origin might be available within next week or so, and that they would be piloted ostensibly by Cypriots but actually by Greek civilians. (Comment: Garoufalias once argued that use Greek civilian pilots would provide GOG with best possible control if Makarios insisted planes be made available to GOG.)
Comment: Costopoulos explanation leaves much to be desired, and DCM tells me FonMin obviously did not appear prepared to talk of matter in any detail. I have asked to see PriMin. If GOG prepared screw up its courage, give us assurances in writing along lines King's proposal but with more detail, and force issue with Makarios, King's proposal probably worth serious consideration by GOT, UK and USG. GOG (assuming Grivas backing) may have in mind possibility using alleged Makarios "commitment" as justification for public break with him.
Labouisse
149. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, August 27, 1964, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Ankara, London, and the White House. Passed to DOD and CIA.
435. Deptel 378./2/
/2/Telegram 378 to Athens, August 27, contained the revisions to the text of a letter to King Constantine. (Ibid.) The original text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 366 to Athens, August 26. (Ibid.)
1. While hesitating further to delay delivery of President's message to King, I feel that President Johnson should be aware that I continue to entertain the gravest doubts about the wisdom of his proposing that Greeks now make concessions beyond those suggested by Acheson. The following expansion of reasons set forth in Embtel 424/3/ deserves most serious consideration:
/3/Telegram 424 from Athens, August 27, outlined suggested changes to the Presidential message. (Ibid.)
A. In involving himself in a successful effort to push Makarios further than Papandreou had been able on the question of a base, the King also involved himself in a delicate constitutional issue. You will appreciate that the govt has seemed reluctant to discuss his proposal with us and may be sitting back to see what results will flow from the King's "meddling." The King will be plunged into profound embarrassment vis-?-vis the govt if one of his first real efforts in diplomacy results in his getting a tougher line from the President than the US has so far put to the govt. This will considerably damage the King's prestige (which Papandreou may well wish to do) and make him less willing in the future to try to be helpful.
B. The rap on the King's knuckles is exaggerated by the inconsistency between what the President now would be proposing and Acheson's characterization of his less demanding proposals as "fair" (his letter of August 20)/4/ and as "equitable, realistic and reasonable arrangements" (his letter of August 26)./5/ Moreover, Acheson has told the GOG that the Turks have not finally rejected his proposals.
/4/See Document 134.
/5/The Acheson letter of August 26 was transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A-166 from Athens, August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
C. If it is to be our policy to push the Greeks for concessions beyond those which Mr. Acheson was proposing, this policy, it seems to me, should be put first to the govt rather than the King.
D. I strongly recommend that if the President wants to include the paragraph in question, it be rephrased to read as follows:
"After all, that part of the Karpas Peninsula which Mr. Acheson proposed for a Turkish base is only a little more than 5 percent of the area of Cyprus. This would not appear in any serious way to derogate from the great benefits that would flow to the Greek peoples from the accession of Cyprus to the territory of the Hellenese." (This re-phrasing eliminates the reference to a larger area than was proposed by Acheson and the reference to the granting of the area in perpetuity to the Turkish Government.)/6/
/6/In telegram 385 to Athens, August 27, the Department of State approved further modifications in the President's letter to King Constantine. (Ibid.) In telegram 449 from Athens, August 28, Labouisse reported that he had delivered the message. A copy of the letter is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Cyprus-Miscellaneous.
Labouisse
150. Summary Notes of the 542d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, September 1, 1964, 12:45-1:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Smith.
Global Briefing-Cyprus
[Here follows McCone's briefing.]
Under Secretary Ball: With respect to Cyprus, the Geneva phase of the negotiations is over. Two months have been spent in narrowing the gap between the Greeks and the Turks and defining their differences. There are two reasons for the failure of the Acheson talks at Geneva:
1. The weakness of the Greek Government which was unwilling to move in and take over in Cyprus, and
2. The Turks' insistence on having a sovereign base on the island, which in effect, meant partition. The Greeks insisted on leasing an area to the Turks; hence, Enosis.
We should not despair of a Greek reply to President Johnson's letter/2/ which may indicate the Greeks are prepared to give way, thus permitting continuation of bargaining.
/2/King Constantine's September 3 reply to the President's August 28 message stated that Greece could not accept the Acheson proposals. (Ibid., Country File, Greece, Presidential Correspondence)
The UN Secretary General's press conference was not helpful in that he said that the Cyprus Government had to be a party to any deal between Greece and Turkey.
There are two timebombs in the situation:
1. The rotation of Turkish troops on the island which will take place within the next few days.
2. The cessation of the rights of 10,000 Greeks living in Turkey, which will undoubtedly cause trouble.
A Tamaya report on Cyprus is impartial and gives a true picture of the situation. It cites the heavy pressure of Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriots.
[Here follows Secretary Rusk's briefing.]
Bromley Smith
151. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, September 2, 1964, 8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and USUN. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
471. Costopoulos told me at lunch he had just come from small Cabinet meeting which considered report made by Garoufalias following his return early this morning from overnight visit to Nicosia.
Costopoulos said (presumably on basis Garoufalias' report) that:
A. Makarios had not succeeded in obtaining UAR airfield facilities.
B. Nasser had promised provide certain unspecified type war materials, presumably obsolescent British equipment for most part.
C. Makarios insists Kyprianou visit Moscow shortly. Costopoulos interpreted this as indication Soviets proving somewhat shy in discussion with Cypriots. GOG has no specific information regarding negotiations with Soviets including question of planes.
D. Kyprianou coming to Athens tomorrow and may request see me. Costopoulos asserted Makarios had suggested calling on me at time his most recent visit here in order assure USG that he (Makarios) has no desire or intention fall into hands of Soviets.
E. Costopoulos said he thought Soviet motor torpedo boats had been delivered to Cypriots and that Greeks providing at least some elements of crews. He was not precise.
F. Makarios agreed to rotation Turk contingent (Embtel 470)/2/ provided this done under supervision UNFICYP in order insure departing Turks genuinely soldiers (not non-combatant peasants) and that replacements not all officers.
/2/Telegram 470, September 2, reported on Greek efforts to disengage from Makarios. (Ibid.)
I reviewed for Costopoulos our analysis of Turk legal position with regard right rotate its contingent, fact London/Zurich Accords could be changed only by mutual agreement (Deptel 400)/3/ as well as our position on use MAP equipment (Deptel 403)./4/ Costopoulos seemed well aware of US positions.
/3/Telegram 400 to Athens, August 30, outlined the legal basis for Turkey's right to a troop rotation. (Ibid.)
/4/Dated August 31. (Ibid.)
I also pointed out introduction military equipment into Cyprus from any source might produce violent Turk reaction and that USG would be constrained raise such action in Security Council as violation UN resolutions. Costopoulos accepted this statement with a faintly ironical smile, noting that this position was at variation with the personal advice Nikolareizis received from Acheson.
We had inconclusive discussion with regard to what likely occur in event Cyprus problem raised at UNGA as well as some discussion of status Greek citizens in Istanbul after September 16. Costopoulos mentioned GOG has discussed Istanbul situation with UN SYG with view to raising question in Security Council in near future.
I endeavored obtain from Costopoulos statement of how GOG sees evolution of Cyprus problem. Costopoulos answered it is important that new Mediator be appointed, that conditions for negotiations be restored and that tranquility be maintained on island. This would decrease tension and passion which in turn would enhance capability GOG gain acceptance on Cyprus of solution negotiated with Turks, provided Turks proved reasonable.
When pressed as to outlines of possible negotiated solution, Costopoulos pointedly referred to an article on Cyprus in August 27 issue of foreign report published by Economist. Without accepting responsibility for formula set forth in this article, he said that solution along these lines (with the exception of the removal of the Patriarchate from Istanbul) could be contemplated by GOG.
Plan set forth in Economist foreign report provides for enosis with protection of Turkish minority. Turkey would receive large scale economic development assistance, removal of Patriarchate to Mount Athos or Patmos, establishment of NATO base possibly on one of present British bases with Turk participation, transfer of Kastellorizon to Turkey and rectification of boundary between Greek and Turkish Thrace so that the railway line from Istanbul to Idirne would fall entirely within Turkish territory. I noted that aside from fact Turks unlikely to accept this proposal, interesting to note implied provisions that US would pick up substantial part of bill for Turkish economic development plan, and that British would provide military base. Costopoulos acknowledged I had not failed grasp essential elements this formula.
Costopoulos, in his indefatigable effort assure an appropriate future for Makarios today noted that Patriarchate of Alexandria likely to become vacant shortly. Although we both appreciated poetic aspect of this solution, neither Costopoulos nor I evidenced any optimism that Makarios would be irresistibly attracted by this opportunity.
Labouisse
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, September 3, 1964, 8:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Jernegan. Also sent to Ankara, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and London to deliver to Acheson at breakfast. Acheson left Geneva on September 2, stopped in London September 2-4, and returned to Washington on September 4.
432. While we are continuing to seek a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem we have been giving further study as to how we can:
a. prevent deterioration in the relations between Greece and Turkey that may lead to a dangerous explosion;
b. create a climate in which we can prosecute a productive search for a permanent settlement; and
c. widen the scope of negotiations in order to get the discussion off dead center.
The first order of urgency is to bring about the relaxation of tensions on the Island and restore a more stable--if still uneasy--relation between the two communities.
The second is to prevent the Turks, Greeks, or Cypriots from setting in train a chain reaction of retaliation and counter-retaliation.
With these objectives in mind we are considering the floating of a possible arrangement between the GOT and GOG, aimed at a wide range of Greek-Turkish issues. Each side would explicitly recognize this arrangement as an effort to prepare the conditions in which a final settlement may be possible. Each side would agree to continue to search for such a settlement urgently and in good faith.
There would be several advantages to such an arrangement if it could be negotiated. If both sides complied, it could reduce the probability of an explosion. If the arrangement broke down because one side or the other proved unwilling or unable to carry out its share of the commitments, we would at least have isolated responsibility and made it easier to handle a major row in the Security Council.
Assumptions
The assumptions upon which we are suggesting the general lines of an arrangement are the following:
a. The GOG has sufficient military force under its control on the Island to enable it to assure that the peace is kept--if it has the will to do so. There are in the neighborhood of 10,000 Greek troops on the Island and in addition the 30,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard has been placed under the command of Greek officers.
b. The GOG would genuinely like to narrow the engagement of its own military forces in relation to the Cyprus problem. At the same time it would like assurance that the GOT will not intervene capriciously. (Support for this assumption implied in Costopoulos' suggestion to Labouisse, reported in Athens 470 [471] to Department.)/2/
/2/Document 151.
c. The GOT would like to avoid the creation of a situation in which it feels compelled to intervene with military force. It would, therefore, welcome an arrangement that contributed to the quieting down of the Island and the improvement of the welfare and safety of the Turk-Cypriot population.
Main Lines of Arrangement
Commitments by GOG:
1. The GOG would use its best efforts to assure that the GOC did not interfere with the rights reserved to the GOT by the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and Establishment, including the right of the GOG [GOT] to rotate its garrison.
2. The GOG would undertake to assist the restoration of more normal conditions on the Island. It would use its best efforts to prevent the GOC from interfering with aid to Turk-Cypriots from outside organizations and agencies. It would assist in the rehabilitation and resettlement of Turk-Cypriot refugees. It would endeavor to end the economic blockade, etc.
3. The GOG would undertake not to provide military support to the GOC against Turkish action, except in case of an unprovoked attack by Turkey.
4. The GOG would undertake to prevent the GOC from seeking or obtaining military equipment or personnel or any other form of military assistance, from any nation not a party to the London-Zurich Agreements.
5. The GOG would refrain from any acts of discrimination or harassment against Turkish nationals living in Greek territory, including Western Thrace.
Commitments by Turkey:
1. The GOT would extend for at least an additional six months the special privileges granted to Greek nationals under the 1930 Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation/3/ and would undertake not to engage in any acts of discrimination or harassment against Greek nationals living in Turkey.
/3/For text, see 124 LTS 371.
2. The GOT would undertake not to exercise its rights of military intervention under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee unless the GOC were acting in such a manner as (a) to deprive the GOT of substantial rights accorded it under the London-Zurich arrangements or (b) to endanger the lives or welfare of the Turk-Cypriot population.
3. The GOT would use its best efforts to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from engaging in any provocatory acts.
4. The GOT would avoid any provocation against the Government of Greece, including interference with fishing rights, etc.
Method of Procedure
Obviously the points included above are merely suggestive of the general scope of an arrangement. Each point would necessarily have to be articulated and expanded through negotiation. Some points might have to be excluded and additional points added.
The development of such an arrangement could be approached through several possible ways. We might ask Brosio to undertake this through NATO channels since what is contemplated is an arrangement between two NATO members. Alternatively we might undertake the negotiation by asking the GOC and GOT to send representatives to meet with Mr. Acheson in Washington--or possibly Rome. Or we might have Embassy Athens first put the proposition to the GOG and--if that yielded promising results--have Hare follow through in Ankara.
In any event we are faced with a tight time schedule since several prospective actions are scheduled for the middle of the month. The termination of the special privileges accorded Greek nationals under the Treaty of Establishment will take place on September 17. The Security Council discussion of the extension of the UN Peacekeeping Force is scheduled for the second week in September. At the same time the Turkish Government has indicated that it may wish a Security Council review of the economic blockade.
Each of these actions may contribute to a deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations. Taken together their cumulative effect could be serious.
We would appreciate your prompt reactions to these very preliminary suggestions. We shall look forward to reviewing them with Mr. Acheson upon his return to Washington./4/
/4/In telegram 475 from Ankara, September 5, Hare commented that the suggested proposals would help get through a difficult situation "while a permanent solution being sought," and offered some specific revisions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Rusk
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, September 4, 1964, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London and Ankara.
483. King Constantine asked me to see him Thursday afternoon. He handed me a letter to President Johnson, text of which being sent in immediately following telegram./2/ We then talked for more than an hour about the Cyprus situation.
/2/Telegram 484 from Athens, September 4. The letter requested deferral of any further initiatives to secure settlement in order to alleviate tensions. (Ibid.)
The King expressed his great sorrow and disappointment that the President has not found it possible to support lines suggested in the King's message of August 25/3/ as they had seemed to him only way out of the mess. He supposed, however, there was nothing President could do under circumstances. King said that even though Makarios has since come out against any base on Cyprus, he felt he could still hold him to his word re NATO base.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 148.
King asked how it would be possible to "trap Makarios", whom he branded as an impossible scoundrel. I replied that it seemed to me largely matter for GOG to find some means of controlling him, pointing out that part of trouble resulted from Papandreou's public support of Makarios to such an extent that his government had gradually worked itself into Makarios' pocket. I said it essential that calm be restored and harassments stopped, going into such points as rotation Turkish contingent, blockade, full support of UN. The King agreed and said he thought his government was doing all possible now on this score. I suggested there was much GOG could yet do without increasing Greek forces in Cyprus, and went over Acheson's suggestions to Sossides as well as points made by Belcher in Nicosia's 304 to Athens,/4/ adding that I personally could get no sense that there was yet a line of command on Greek side. The King carefully listened to these comments and I believe took them to heart and will use his influence with government.
/4/Telegram 304 from Nicosia to Athens, September 2, suggested actions that would increase Greek control over the Cypriot Government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
The King then reverted to matter of finding a solution, asking what could possibly be done. I said here again that much depended on ability and courage of government to take things in hand. He did not disagree, but reacted as do all Greeks by saying there are definite limits to Greece's ability to persuade Cypriots. He was afraid the USG did not comprehend this point nor the fact that Turkey had no justification for having separate position on island provided rights of minorities protected. I again went over arguments in Deptel 400/5/ (which, incidentally, we have been using for some time in our conversations here but which usually fall on deaf ears), concluding that if Makarios continued his insistence on no compromises it seemed to me Greece faced a dismal outlook.
/5/See footnote 3, Document 151.
The conversation was friendly and intimate. At one time the King asked smilingly whether I wanted him to get rid of Papandreou. In same vein I asked whether he could if he wanted to. He replied he could not do so now.
He is deeply and genuinely troubled about Cypriot situation which is also having its serious and alarming repercussions in the country, economically, politically and psychologically. He would like very much to find a way to "trap Makarios" but he appears convinced that Turkish threats and air action have served to strengthen Makarios' position.
In my talk with the King, as with the PriMin, FonMin, Deputy PriMin, and with other Greek leaders, I have been following the line that, whereas we are still most interested in helping to find way out, their responsibility for doing so rests largely with the Greek Government. I believe that psychologically this, plus the general deterioration mentioned in preceding paragraph, is beginning to have an effect. However, I have grave doubts that the Greeks will ever be able to change the attitude of the Cypriot people sufficiently to meet the demands of the Turks.
Labouisse
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, September 4, 1964, 7:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
448. We had just completed drafting following telegram when we received Deptel 240./2/ Believe that it, if taken with Embtel 431/3/ (Notal) provides lines of action which are complementary to those proposed in 240.
/2/Telegram 432 to Athens (Document 152) was repeated to Nicosia as telegram 240.
/3/Telegram 431 from Nicosia, September 2, noted concern regarding the declining influence of the Greek Government over Makarios and suggested means by which Greece could improve its leverage. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Suspension of Geneva negotiations and GOG-GOC communiqu? announcing agreement of two governments to take Cyprus problem to UNGA has led us to explore among ourselves ways and means whereby lid could be kept on situation here while at same time doing something to impede present rapid drift to left. We still believe that some variety of "instant enosis" before UNGA along lines proposed Embtel 174/4/ and 345/5/ would be course of action most in US interest. However if, as it appears from here, Turkish agreement to "instant enosis" cannot be obtained on terms which would assure successful operation, we think that determined effort by USG of sort we are proposing could be valid second-best policy. This policy would have as its objectives keeping the peace on island, preventing Communist domination and producing for the post UNGA period a more rational and internationally responsible attitude on part of Cyprus leadership. Presumably enosis would still be our ultimate solution to Cyprus problem but none of our proposed lines of action would appear to stand in way of that goal.
/4/Dated August 5. (Ibid., POL 23-8 CYP
)/5/Dated August 19. (Ibid, POL 27 CYP)
Keep the peace. Basic assumption upon which whole policy is based is, of course, that Turks do not invade Cyprus during this period. This means that on island provocations to them are held to a minimum. At moment, as USUN's 589 to Dept/6/ expressed very well, two most inflammatory issues are troop rotation and economic blockade. These show some chance of being alleviated or fuzzed over but there will be other difficulties which will immediately arise. We foresee no basic change prior UNGA in present impasse which manifests itself in virtual absence intercommunal area travel, continuing Greek Cypriot pressure aimed at stimulating defection among Turks to end de facto separate entity, lack of all direct official Cypriot Greek/Turk contact and steady deterioration Turkish Cypriot living conditions.
/6/Dated September 1. (Ibid.)
On food and living condition for Turks we can see no new or imaginative alternative to unremitting and coordinated pressure on GOC at all levels by USG through Embassy here, UNSYG through his representative on island and other interested governments. All of us are engaged in this now but are seeking ways improve coordination. (Galo Plaza's modest successes in raising blockade indicate that he should be kept on if at all possible.) We would also try direct world press attention more sharply at pressures on Turks. At same time, we would continue (as now in our weekly luncheon meetings with leaders) to try to prevent Turkish Cypriots from creating their own provocations by over-exaggerating their plight.
On military side of keeping the peace, believe that continued UNFICYP presence with hopefully wider or at least more discretionary powers remains important. However, determining factor will be degree of restraint GOG can exert through its forces here and through Grivas. We have made proposals in Embtel 431 (Notal) for strengthening GOG hand in Cyprus and would hope that these could be pursued actively.
Political action in Cyprus. The West still retains certain basic assets in its competition with Communist forces for Cyprus. These are: ideological affinity of Greek Cypriot people with the West growing out of their age-old yearning to return to Mother Greece, a Western country; fear of a Communist take-over on part of business, educated, and professional groups who, while they lack political strength, have some if dwindling influence; presence substantial number Greek troops, loyal, well-disciplined and anti-Communist, Greek Cypriot National Guard as yet not extensively penetrated by Communists; several Ministers and General Grivas who are anti-Communist and oppose Makarios' policy on this subject. In addition, USG has worked with non-Communist nationalist Greek Cypriot organizations in fields of labor, youth, veterans affairs, farmer unions and certain newspapers.
Unfortunately, due sharp anti-US hysteria which prevails in Cyprus today because of what Greek Cypriots believe to be US pro-Turk policy we are precluded from taking full advantage of contacts in anti-Communist forces listed above. There are two possibilities which occur to us to get out of box we are in:
(1) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] seek take advantage of contacts with certain carefully selected key figures on only grounds possible under present circumstances, namely by privately indicating that USG fully supports concept of enosis with NATO base and is working covertly now and will be openly later to bring this about, and
(2) Assess and support anti-Communist programs through Greek Embassy (perhaps using Greek Embassy Political Counselor proposed Embtel 431 Notal).
Number one has serious risks in our opinion since it could lead to leaks with bad Turkish reaction thereto and increased pressure for overt commitment to enosis. Therefore after consideration we strongly prefer number two.
Meanwhile as far as possible we would try to establish appearance of business as usual. Fulbright and other student exchange programs would be carried forward as if there were no question that Cyprus was going to emerge on Western side from present difficulties, trade promotion activities and contacts in economic community would be pursued with same principle in mind, our aid program would be continued along lines set forth Embtel Toaid 45./7/
/7/Not found.
Other random suggestions are that:
(a) Greek language VOA broadcasts should be increased in number of hours. We have noted that Greek Cypriots are indefatigable radio listeners and great comparers of news broadcasts.
(b) Greek American associations could be utilized as means keeping some American lines open into Greek Cypriot community. Aside from limited objective of Embtel 443/8/ Notal believe real effort in "people to people" type program would pay dividends; scholarships to village boys to American farm school at Thessaloniki; direct contact with moribund Cyprus American Academic Assn as an agent on island; support of sports clubs along lines one-shot deal arranged through Eugene Rossides; community to community program; visits here by prominent Greek Americans traveling in Greece or general area, etc, etc.
/8/Telegram 443 from Nicosia, September 4, suggested a U.S.-Greek effort to dissuade Makarios from sending Kyprianou to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
In interim before UNGA, image of US as pro-Turk would tend to grow due to Greek Cypriot propaganda campaign and open Soviet support of GOC position. There is little we can do except attempt to present impression of strength, calm and faith in eventual mutually satisfactory Cyprus solution; here on island we will avoid air of impatience in such official contacts as remain since this is inevitably taken as sign of exasperation at "failure" of Geneva talks and "frenzy" to achieve "NATO" settlement prior to UNGA.
Additionally I would hope be able establish more meaningful relationship with President than has been possible in recent months about which we will submit further comments septel.
Most difficult to handle big problem remains that of Soviet penetration and, of that problem, most dangerous aspect is Makarios tendency to try to play US off against Soviet Union (Embtel 441/9/ provides very good example of how GOC naively thinks it can do this). We know Soviet game here is receiving close attention from Dept so will only suggest that somehow US should put Soviet themselves on notice through diplomatic channels that Cyprus is in Western sphere of influence and that further Soviet penetration into this area will not be tolerated.
/9/Telegram 441 from Nicosia, September 3, reported on Belcher's presentation to Kyprianou on the issue of the Moscow trip. (Ibid.)
Belcher
155. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, September 8, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Secret. Drafted by Bundy.
The principal subject for discussion at the President's luncheon today was Cyprus. Those present with the President were: Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Dean Acheson,/2/ and myself.
/2/Acheson returned to the United States on September 4.
Acheson and Ball revealed their agreement on the conviction that the only solution now would be a fait accompli in which the Turks would move to occupy the Karpas peninsula, triggering an instant enosis under Greek leadership, with a consequent supercession of Makarios. Acheson in particular emphasized that no negotiated solution was possible because of the weakness of Papandreou and the strength and intractability of Makarios. On the other hand, a program of indefinite delay could only strengthen the hand of Makarios and increase the danger that an eventual Turkish explosion would be both violent and undirected.
A number of questions were raised by the President. What would happen to the Turks on the island? Mr. Ball answered that he would expect most of them to stay and that, with luck, bloodshed would be limited. The President asked whether the Greeks would follow this scenario and whether they could control the Greek Cypriots. Ball and Acheson pointed out that there already exists between Athens and Nicosia agreement to move to instant enosis if the Turks move against the island. They expected that this agreement would probably be carried out.
The Secretary of State asked whether Makarios would appeal to Moscow instead of to Athens. Mr. Ball thought he would not, and he said the appeal would not be answered in any serious way. I asked what would trigger the Turkish action, and Acheson answered that nearly anything would serve. The most immediate possibility was the refusal of troop rotation.
The President summarized by saying that Mr. Acheson's argument appeared to be that we must expect a resort to action in one way or another, and that the choice was whether it should be messy and destructive or controlled and eventually productive, in accordance with a plan. Mr. Acheson agreed with this definition of the problem. He indicated that in his discussions with a Turkish military leader the Turks had shown that there was a great Turkish interest in such a plan and that the Turks would do their best to execute it with a minimum use of American weapons and a minimum resort to those kinds of force--like air bombing--which were internationally unpopular.
Mr. Ball pointed out that it would be impossible to warn the Greeks of any planned Turkish action because of the danger of leaks to Nicosia. He also noted that the British would be troubled about this plan because of the status of Cyprus as a Commonwealth state. Mr. Acheson remarked that this might be true for Butler, but that Mountbatten would be friendly and that the British bases would be protected under this plan.
The President indicated his own doubt that the plan as put forward could in fact be neatly and tightly controlled, without risk of escalation. He thought that in particular the Greeks would be very likely to move with all their strength on the island against a Turkish lodgment, and he asked McNamara for a careful Joint Staff study of the problem. The President also noted that the next two months were not a good season for another war, and the question was raised whether it was essential to press along this road before November./3/ No definite answer was given, and it was agreed that Mr. Ball would prepare a more detailed staff study of the entire plan, to include both its military and political elements.
/3/On September 11 at 10:45 a.m., Bundy telephoned Ball to discuss the meeting with the President: "Bundy wanted to know if he and Ball had the same sense of the President's feelings about it. Bundy said he got the impression that Acheson thought the President wanted to make sure nothing happens. Bundy did not read it this way. Ball did not either. Bundy read it, 'Don't make something happen out of your own energies.' Bundy thinks we need to be ready in case something does get hot. Ball agreed. Ball thought something might happen in connection with the mercy mission to Cyprus on Tuesday. Ball plans to go over this with Hare this morning. Hare has to be able to go back to Inonu and say that if you are bent on retaliation 'this is the way to do it'." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus)
McG. B./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
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