Documents 156-175
Discussions on Cyprus
September 1964-June 1965
156. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, September 8, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
485. During past few days, Turkish political developments appear headed toward two brinks simultaneously: severe attack against Inonu and pressure for national coalition; and resurfacing xenophobia expressed in desire reorient Turkish foreign policy, including Turkish withdrawal from NATO.
To dump Inonu at this time is serious and could even be dangerous, but to go toward neutralism has even more serious implications. This double trend was almost inevitable outcome internal pressures and general mounting dissatisfaction as Cyprus situation continued degenerate and efforts promote solution failed materialize. Dissatisfaction appears fanning out two directions mentioned above. Interesting note dissatisfaction with Inonu almost stronger in RPP than in opposition. Latent world-wide dissatisfaction which chafes against foreign presence everywhere important factor second development. While xenophobia centering on U.S. presence and alliance, it is also being focused on NATO.
While these developments approaching respective brinks, maneuverability Inonu govt on both foreign and domestic issues is close to zero. Striking example is present strong Turkish opposition to enosis in any form expressed by PriMin's statement, "Declaration of enosis means war,"/2/ banner headlined in Sept 7 Cumhurieyt (Ind) with notation battleground would not be confined to Cyprus. Few weeks ago there was cautious acceptance enosis if accompanied by suitable guarantees for GOT, by press, Parliamentary and academic contacts (Embtel 478)./3/ At that time, enosis regarded as preferable alternative to independent Cyprus which, in Turkish eyes, tantamount establishment Mediterranean Cuba. Together with stiffening against any type of enosis is softening toward Soviet foreign policy initiated by Inonu speech to house Sept 3. Responsible pro-govt but left of center Cumhuriyet and Milliyet have played incorrectly Inonu's speech as emphasizing criticism of U.S. and support of Soviet Union. Cumhuriyet sub-headlined Sept 4, "PriMin, who states U.S. has placed wrong diagnosis on Cyprus problem, announced Soviet Union, itself a federal republic, would accept as suitable, federal administration for Cyprus."
/2/In a September 3 statement to the Grand National Assembly.
/3/Telegram 478, September 5, reported on the Turkish Parliament's special session on Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Many extravagant statements being made concerning readiness, almost eagerness, to go to war over Cyprus. PriMin on Sept 6 declared "any decision outside our wishes renders war a necessity." This has been taken up by spokesmen smaller parties during Sept 7 Parliamentary debate (being reported separately), and by many Turk Cypriots, especially Denktash. Turk character, while not always quickly aroused, if once brought to state of combat readiness and eagerness, does not easily recede from this fever pitch. Many thoughtful Turks wondering why Inonu playing this game, feel it fraught with danger and could set Turkey back many years if armed conflict results.
In addition above, readjustment existing alliances also being advocated. JP source indicated to Embassy officer Aug 26 that group within RPP planning submit resolution to GNA request Turkish withdrawal from NATO. According this source, group within RPP sponsoring resolution headed by Deputies Feyzioglu and Kirca. In private conversation, Kirca has stated Turkey is approaching policy of neutralism, which is considered by some Turkish leaders as one most in Turkey's national interest. This view also supported by CNU group (Embtel 353)./4/
/4/Dated August 20. (Ibid.)
During RPP group meeting Sept 5 Inonu was subject to heavy attack for lack of decisive policy over Cyprus. Chief aim among rebel group within RPP headed by Feyzioglu appeared to be replacement present government with RPP/JP coalition which Feyzioglu would head. In past, Feyzioglu has made contacts with JP re such a coalition but reports from JP sources indicate JP leadership cool to latest Feyzioglu overture. During Sept 7 House debate, the RPNP, NP and NTP all spoke in favor of formation national coalition.
However, JP, while criticizing the government, did not reiterate its willingness, expressed as recently as a week ago, to take over the reins of government, and did not seem prepared to do so. Erim speech at House on behalf RPP appeared discredit opposition attacks and save day for RPP (being reported separately) but not clear whether sufficiently strong deterrent to exert definitive check on emotional impulsion toward internal political change and reorientation of foreign alignment.
Hare
157. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, September 16, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
545. I called on Costopoulos this morning and explained that in Washington we had been engaged in general review of Cyprus situation./2/ I had come back with no specific new proposals, we still awaiting GOG response suggestions which we had made with regard to further initiatives under 1956 NAC resolution,/3/ and that although we continue to be ready actively to assist in reaching solution, willingness find solution must come in first instance from parties directly involved. The horses have been led to water but have refused to drink.
/2/Labouisse, Hare, and Belcher returned to the United States on September 10 and met with Secretary Rusk on September 12. No record of this meeting has been found.
/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, p. 17.
GOC-Soviet negotiations. Costopoulos said he was afraid something serious might be developing, perhaps Cypriot efforts to extract Soviet guarantee in integrity of Cyprus. GOG would be tempted to break with Makarios on this issue, but would it be in Western interest to do so and to withdraw Greek forces presently on the island? I replied that much of present embarrassment of GOG is due to fact Makarios has always succeeded in obtaining implied Greek endorsement of Makarios' actions through continued reaffirmation of "complete identity of views" between the two governments. If GOG fails take strong public position in event creation of mutual GOC-USSR obligations, this fact would never be understood by Western opinion. GOG cannot avoid responsibility for taking firm line with Makarios during his visit here.
Costopoulos asserted that in recent conversation with Soviet Ambassador he had pointed out that a USSR-GOC agreement, quite aside from conflict with the provisions London-Zurich Accords, would probably cause serious difficulties at moment for consideration of Cyprus question by the UNGA. He said Kyprianou would probably request Secretary's reaction during his call on Friday to possible Soviet-GOC agreement. I assured Costopoulos that Kyprianou could anticipate a candid statement of our position./4/
/4/See Document 159.
Istanbul situation. Costopoulos said prospect of large number of Greeks being forced to leave Istanbul in next few days has made almost impossible continuation of GOG efforts to improve understanding with GOT. He noted GOG will probably be forced raise this matter again in SC and that GOG cannot accept policy which seems to justify Turkish treatment Greek community in Istanbul because of Cypriot pressures on Turks which, as USG knows, GOG is attempting to eliminate. Approach reflected by USG unworthy US traditions and principles, and unfortunately Security Council discussions this problem have gone virtually unnoticed in American press. I took occasion to read virtually verbatim USUN's comments on Security Council debate last Friday (USUN 735 to Dept)./5/
/5/Telegram 735 from USUN, September 14, outlined the reasons that prompted the U.S. and other delegations to decline to link the issues of the Greek minority in Istanbul to the Cyprus blockade. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Costopoulos asked me whether USG would be prepared make direct unilateral representation to GOT with regard to Istanbul situation expressing not only USG regret but also pointing up fact Turkish pressure in Istanbul is only discouraging Greek efforts reach some sort understanding with Turks. I said that I would transmit his request, but that he should understand that USG position had been stated by Mr. Stevenson. So long as GOG has never been able publicly disassociate itself from GOC policies, it is difficult not to relate Turk treatment Istanbul Greeks to Makarios treatment Turkish Cypriots. Costopoulos remonstrated that USG had been made fully aware of efforts which GOG has taken discourage provocatory measures on part of Makarios.
Brosio's mediation. Costopoulos alluded to fact Greek NAC PermRep Palamas here and that Greek Ambassador to Ankara returning to join consultation. He reiterated that until now it has been Greek policy keep substance of Cyprus matter out of NATO forum, although question of precisely what aspects Greek-Turkish relations GOG would be prepared discuss in NAC now under review. He gave little intimation there is likely to be basic change in present policy, but said he would inform me results current deliberations. Although GOG cool to use 1956 resolution, GOG still prepared officially inform NATO SYG, in connection with his watching brief, as well as certain other interested NATO powers, of GOG intention not to provide support to Makarios in event of provocations.
However, Turkish threats vis-?-vis Istanbul Greeks make such GOG initiative difficult at this moment.
Economic blockade. Costopoulos was hopeful Makarios would, in fact, keep his promises with regard to elimination of economic blockade. Makarios has begun to realize that his policy runs directly counter to his hopes for sympathetic consideration Cyprus problem in UNGA. I commented that Washington has been disappointed by long series of Makarios' broken promises and is watching with great interest as well as reservation current efforts eliminate economic blockade.
Troop rotation. GOG has raised question UN supervision of rotation Turk contingent with Thimayya and with U Thant. Costopoulos himself mentioned possibility of UN supervision to Turkish Ambassador who did not seem to be inclined take exception to this suggestion. It would be helpful, Costopoulos said, if U Thant would send a message to Makarios indicating UN willingness to supervise the rotation. No date for rotation has been discussed.
Comment: Local press has been widely speculating on new US solution for Cyprus. If GOG shared in this anticipation (even to small degree and notwithstanding previous Embassy warnings to contrary), this morning's session must have been disappointing and sobering for Costopoulos. I made it extremely clear US ability to be helpful could be based only on GOG's determination seek reasonable solution. Conjuncture of visits by Makarios, Palamas, Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Soviet-Cypriot negotiations, termination of Treaty of Establishment, etc., may possibly produce within next few days a clearer indication GOG policy./6/
/6/In telegram 767 from USUN, September 16, the Mission reported a softening of the Cypriot position on troop rotation. (Ibid.)
Labouisse
158. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, September 17, 1964, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Nicosia, Moscow, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
535. Saw Erkin late yesterday to give him reading on Washington talks as directed by Under Secretary, i.e. that situation had been given long, hard look; that time not ripe for new American initiative but necessary improve situation on island; that important Turk Cypriot leaders acting in such way as seem to be exploiting their compatriots. In so doing emphasized this not indicative any lessening interest in finding solution but concentration on immediate essentials which could smooth road to longer term objectives.
Erkin was not in particularly happy frame of mind, saying he had hoped we would be able come up with something new and definite. Failure do so will make it necessary for GOT take strong measures itself and also leave field open to Soviets who are at this
moment actively engaged in negotiations with Makarios. How is it they find it possible be so active and we unable do so? I said for simple reason that acting irresponsibly to cause mischief is always easy whereas acting responsibly for constructive purpose much more difficult. Repeated we not slackening effort; merely focusing attention on immediate objectives.
On other aspects of problem Erkin commented as follows:
1. He was not enthusiastic re initiative of Brosio but only specific criticism made was with reference to use of PermReps in role of "three wise men" rather than approaching at ministerial level.
2. Said he had just dictated reply to Costopoulos who had made plea through Turk Amb in Athens for holding up deportation of Istanbul Greeks and used as argument efforts GOG had made to resolve rotation problem. Erkin had said in reply that he had been able arrange postponement of four weeks but that he at loss understand use of rotation as argument since there had been no result.
3. Elaborating on foregoing, Erkin said GOG still seemed be operating on assumption that things going their way and unnecessary to do anything except let matters take their course. I demurred, saying that, although this might have been true sometime back, I was convinced that responsible officials in Athens now quite aware of danger of allowing Greek policy to be determined by Makarios and that this had been brought out with especial clarity in connection GOC flirtation with Soviets. It true that this changed attitude has not as yet produced strikingly obvious results but it is in right direction and should be understood. Erkin seemed interested but dubious.
4. GOT had consented somewhat reluctantly to appointment of Galo Plaza as Mediator but had immediately had reason regret decision when it had been learned that he had submitted report misrepresenting situation of Cypriot Turks which had been shown up in true light by subsequent report of General Thimayya.
5. There seems to be uncertainty as to when Cyprus question will come up in UNGA. If it goes into Political Committee later discussion likely but could be as soon as late November if it taken up in UNGA itself as question arising out of general debate.
Position of GOT will be that it still seeks federation but if there is question of enosis GOT will insist on double enosis. By same token, if proposal is for self-determination, GOT will insist on double-self-determination. GOT will definitely not accept UNGA resolution which would result in Greek-style enosis.
In this connection, Erkin observed only tangible result of Geneva talks was that U.S. and U.K. had promoted cause of enosis without being able obtain recognition of Turkish interests.
6. Concluding in same critical vein, Erkin revived complaint that, whereas USG not hesitant in initiating discussion with GOT in matters of interest to us, process often seems be one-way street because of our failure respond to requests for our views on matters of interest to GOT. As example, he referred to fact no reply received to his request for our reaction to Inonu speech (Embtel 470 and Deptel 386)./2/
/2/Telegram 470 from Ankara, September 4, and telegram 386 to Ankara, September 6. (Both ibid.)
Although sauce with which foregoing served up unduly vinegarish (please don't mention this to Turk Emb reps since difficulty caused when reported back here), substance believed be quite accurate reflection of Erkin's thoughts and attitude./3/
/3/In telegram 440 to Ankara, September 18, the Department of State stressed the need for the Turkish Government to take steps, such as a pause in deportation of Greeks from Istanbul, to lowering tensions and prepare the Turkish public for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)
Hare
159. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rusk.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY RUSK AND MR. KYPRIANOU, CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER
After I had asked other colleagues to excuse us in order that I might have a private talk with Mr. Kyprianou,/2/ he told me that it was necessary for him to go to Moscow because he did not wish to give offense to the Soviet Union in light of the fact that they had pressed President Makarios himself very hard to come to Moscow and he intimated (somewhat slyly) that he needed to be present to be sure that the Cypriot delegation in Moscow did not get off the track. He said that his purpose in going was to inform the Soviet Union that the ultimate object of Cypriot policy was union with Greece. He then asked me whether I did not think that if the Soviet Union and the United States both agreed to the union of Cyprus and Greece, this would ensure that Turkey would make no military moves.
/2/Kyprianou visited Washington September 18 for talks on the Cyprus question. A memorandum of the other portions of his conversation with Rusk is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. A memorandum of his conversation with Assistant Secretary Talbot is ibid., Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP.
I told him that whether he went to Moscow was his own affair but that I would urge upon him most solemnly that it would be a great mistake for Cyprus to abandon its position of non-alignment and find itself in a military or security arrangement with the Soviet Union. I said, very directly, that should such arrangements be in effect and there were trouble between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries or between the United States and the Soviet Union, the result would simply be that Cyprus would be crushed. He tried to leave the impression that he expected nothing more than the unilateral declaration made by the Soviet Union in the Security Council yesterday to the effect that if Cyprus was attacked, the Soviet Union would defend Cyprus. I then told him that he could be sure that the Soviet Union would be playing a double or triple game in this situation since their object would be to stimulate difficulties for other people and tension between NATO allies. I pointed out the possibility that the Soviet Union might in fact stimulate Turkey to oppose enosis.
Mr. Kyprianou told me that upon his return to Nicosia from Moscow he would communicate very privately through Ambassador Belcher about his impressions of the Moscow visit.
Dean Rusk/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, September 30, 1964, 4:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Jernegan, Cleveland, and EUR; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and London.
793. Request you see U Thant soonest and convey sense of great dismay which Dept feels at his statement to SC September 25./2/ From our vantage point, he has not only given Greek Cypriots the victory that they sought in vain to achieve in a resolution but he has sacrificed fundamental prerogatives of office of SYG entrusted to him by GA. As he must well understand, efforts (instigated by Rolz-Bennett) to get reference in resolution to Makarios propaganda proposals contained his September 15 communication aborted because members refused to lend themselves to such partisan exercise./3/ US Del repeatedly indicated we would not support resolution which made explicit reference to Makarios proposals unless SYG's hand strengthened. Now we find SYG elevates and dignifies these proposals in his statement to SC and suggests UNFICYP commander cooperate with Makarios in seeking their implementation. Turks are obviously disturbed at this, and we do not blame them. At same time, SYG said nothing about his intention to ask Thimayya to discuss with parties concerned ways to implement para. 232 of his report./4/
/2/For extracts (U.N. Doc. S/PV.1159), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 595.
/3/Reference is to Resolution 194 (1964) (U.N. Doc. S/5987), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on September 25; for text, see ibid., p. 594. An extract of Makarios' September 15 message to Secretary-General Thant (U.N. Doc. S/5950/Add.2, Annex) is printed ibid., p. 593.
/4/The Secretary-General's report covered the period from June 8 to September 8; he submitted it to the Security Council on September 10 (U.N. Doc. S/5950 and Corr. 1). For extracts, see ibid., pp. 590-591.
In addition, we are deeply disappointed that SYG retreated from his announced intention contained in para. 231 of his report to defray UNFICYP expenses from regular UN funds if voluntary contributions inadequate. We find it incomprehensible that SYG should retreat in face of opposition of the minority non-contributors to the UN on a principle involving fundamental authority of SYG and UN to undertake peacekeeping operations in an emergency. In doing so he has offered serious rebuff to supporters of a strong UN capable of acting when confronted by emergencies. In effect he has disavowed support by those who have spoken up in defense of SYG's competence to deal with unforeseen contingencies on his own authority. We note, for example, that Morocco spoke precisely to this point in debate.
Request you inform SYG in clear terms that USG deeply disappointed at this exercise. If this reflects attitude to be expected of him in confrontation which now approaching between the supporters and non-supporters of UN on Article 19, we are frank to say that we think he will preside over disintegration of UN as effective instrument for peacekeeping and will assure its transformation into nothing but a debating society.
Rusk
161. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, October 1, 1964, 1:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
601. Embtel 596./2/ Made pre-arranged call on Erkin this morning for purpose general discussion.
/2/Telegram 596 from Ankara, September 30, reported rising Turkish concern over the issue of troop rotation and the latest Turkish diplomatic efforts to deal with this issue. (Ibid.)
As might have been expected he was very upset re recent turn of events affecting questions rotation and Cyprus road, saying he had just talked to Inonu and was at wit's end know what to do. Feeling in country is very strong and "pressures" (unspecified but presumably military) being exerted on govt. U Thant has turned out be just as bad as Makarios. GOT had been criticized before for using air force but they will do so again if necessary to effect rotation and be prepared "to fight it out".
I asked Erkin if he could clarify situation as he sees it. Following is distillation of what he had to say:
Rotation and opening Kyrenia Road are separate questions and must go ahead with first regardless of second. However, if we happened to be susceptible of simultaneous solution that would cause no problem.
As regards Kyrenia Road, both sides are agreed re Nicosia by-pass, Turks also agree that, with exception of Turk contingent and UNFICYP no armed forces would be allowed on road. Turks had agreed remove Turkish police against strong Cypriot Turk objection and Cypriot Turk armed forces would also not be allowed use (since this contrary to what we told yesterday, I managed get this repeated three times in effort avoid misunderstanding).
What GOT cannot stomach, however, and what it never agreed to in contacts with SYG was that Turk contingent could only use road without arms. GOT has given assurance that contingent would only use road for normal "requirements of service and liaison". It has also stated that contingent commander would maintain close contact and cooperation with UN commander. What further could reasonably be asked of GOT? After all there are limits to concessions and GOT cannot take action which would undermine integrity of a duly constituted military unit.
Emphasizing that contingent is only question as far as road concerned, Erkin asked that I communicate most urgently with Washington and seek its views with minimum delay since this could be most important in influencing current decision making here.
Comment: It will be noted that foregoing differs importantly from situation as presented yesterday by Turkemen in sense that it reduces problem to Turk contingent use of road by eliminating Cypriot Turk fighters, which in line with what Eralp presumably informed SYG in writing (Nicosia's 562 to Dept)./3/ Would also constitute point which, according USUN's 926 to Dept,/4/ is regarded as negotiable by Bunche.
/3/Telegram 562 from Nicosia, September 30, transmitted the purported text of a Turkish note to the UNFICYP Commander on the rotation and Kyrenia Road problems. (Ibid.)
/4/Telegram 926 from USUN, September 30, reported on U.N. officials' discussions with Makarios over the rotation issue (Ibid.)
How to reconcile difference between reftel and situation as postulated by Erkin is unclear. Hopefully, since Erkin had just gone over with Inonu, it represents a modification in position following report from Eralp and I believe we should proceed on that assumption, although confusion in this connection has been so great throughout that it is difficult know when on firm ground.
Would strongly recommend we take this opportunity flash something back here for communication to Erkin by tomorrow morning. This would serve two purposes; firstly, to capitalize on what could be settlement of rotation at time when pressure building up here to go off deep end; secondly, to give concrete evidence of our continuing interest in Cyprus problem at time when, despite full explanation, there is strong feeling here that we have abandoned Turks to their fate. In fact, Erkin made this pretty clear this morning and, although we cannot always pander to psychological reactions, I believe that in this case there is sufficient substance to it to justify recognition, especially since the context in which problem now raised would seem to be potentially constructive and not involve our getting into unduly deep water./5/
/5/Telegram 978 from USUN, October 5, reported that an agreement on control of the Kyrenia Road had been reached. (Ibid.)
Hare
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, October 6, 1964, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.
585. As we have reported and as has been observed by USUN (USUN's 962 and 963 to Dept)/2/ Makarios has apparently adopted policy of "killing Turks with kindness" at least for period before UNGA. This Greek Cypriot policy combined with GOT's apparent willingness make major concessions on Kyrenia Road which in effect would mark beginning of disintegration entire Turkish Cypriot position on island (Embtel 578)/3/ give us some reason to believe that our present policy is by and large proving successful on surface. However, it seems to us that any US policy which is confined merely to keeping lid on situation in Cyprus must be based on using time gained to obtain two results:
/2/Both dated October 2. (Ibid.)
/3/Dated October 3. (Ibid.)
1. To bring GOT and Turkish Cypriots to accept concept of enosis with guarantees of rights for Turkish minority plus some face-saving gesture;
2. To bring GOC and other pro-Western elements on island into strong enough position vis-?-vis Makarios to enforce guarantees to Turkish minority and provide face-saving gesture to GOT.
Ankara, of course, is in best position to judge whether there has been any real give in GOT's attitude toward Cyprus recently. Although we still awaiting outcome current negotiations on Kyrenia Road this initial step in reducing GOT support of Turkish Cypriots appears to us as possible straw in wind and in line US overall policy and interests.
However, it is on GOG and pro-enosis Greek Cypriot side where there have been great slippages. While we are marking time there has been a noticeable decline in strength and influence of GOG and increasing momentum in the drift to the left. We have seen in past two weeks press campaigns which were inconceivable even on part of Communist papers three months ago. These have now reached point of Makarios inspired attacks on hitherto sacrosanct Grivas himself. Such attacks, of course, have as their real targets Greece and concept of enosis. There are reports of increasing conflicts between Greek officers and National Guard conscripts and good evidence that Makarios is working actively against Greek officers behind the scenes attempting to weaken their ability to influence developments here.
Makarios himself is becoming ever stronger with a popular base spread throughout all sectors on the island. To Cypriots of all types (and to many foreign observers) Archbishop seems incapable of making political errors, e.g. by skillful maneuvering over past two months he has eroded limits of what could be given GOT for prestige purposes from Turkish sovereign base on island, to Turkish share in NATO base separate from British sovereign bases, to Turkish participation in NATO base carved out of British bases, to present rapidly retreating possibility that Greek Cypriots would tacitly agree to undercover deal by GOG with GOT for NATO base in British area with modest Turkish presence after enosis.
Makarios, himself, of course is now talking in terms of no foreign bases on island at all and there is rapidly developing groundswell which, if unchecked, will produce almost united Greek Cypriot opposition to continued existence British bases to say nothing of any variety NATO base. Andreas Papandreou's remarks to Le Monde/4/ might indicate Makarios has support for anti-base position in some GOG quarters as well. Greek Cypriots regard Makarios' negotiations with Moscow as complete success and now expect him to continue his victorious march through Cairo to General Assembly.
/4/Printed in the October 4-5 edition. The Embassy in Athens reported public reaction in telegram 665 from Athens, October 7. (Ibid.)
Meanwhile pro-enosis and anti-Communist elements who have usually been found around Grivas are falling apart. Their newspapers are unable to compete with pro-Makarios media. Their organization is weak and they have no significant political following aside perhaps from still remaining personal popularity of Grivas.
GOG recently made what in retrospect looks like ill-conceived and desperate gesture in sending Papandreou's personal emissary Delipetros to Cyprus./5/ Latter's heavy handed approach assured failure and served mainly to tarnish pro-enosis nationalists and deepen the gap between Makarios and GOG. As usual in contests of this sort Makarios has emerged even stronger than before.
/5/A memorandum outlining Delipetros' activities in Cyprus is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Cyprus.
What we are saying is the time for pro-Western solution of Cyprus problem seems definitely to be running out. Since viewed from here possibility of GOG-GOT accord on Cyprus looks dim, we do not see much hope of checking Makarios except by use of regular Greek troops on island and National Guard units which they control. Moreover because Makarios is having notable success in isolating Greek military further and further from mass of Greek Cypriots we cannot much longer count on successful action by them. Unless dramatic and decisive steps are taken very soon to reverse the trend, Cyprus will certainly become, after UNGA, an independent neutralist anti-Western island with a growing Communist element which could thereafter easily turn the island into Mediterranean Cuba.
In other channels we are making certain recommendations for actions US could take. However, nothing will work or should even be started until Turks are brought to recognize real danger they are running if they delay acceptance painful fact that only way out is enosis. If they move fast enough to withdraw their opposition to enosis, it is possible they can obtain some firm guarantees of rights for Turkish minority on island and some face-saver for GOT. If not, Cyprus will certainly become serious and immediate threat to Turkey's security.
Belcher
163. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, October 9, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
685. Re Deptel 609./2/ Cyprus. Basic Greek policy seems to be to continue build up Greek military and political capabilities on the island, to exercise all possible influence to reduce tensions (including overt collision between GOG and Makarios), and move ahead toward discussion of problem in the General Assembly. We find little indication of high level intention to take any initiatives in immediate future toward unseating Makarios. As reflected by recent press attack against Grivas and return of Delipetros from Nicosia to Athens, GOG efforts on island are producing obvious tensions and subterranean struggle between Makarios and GOG is now becoming apparent. Vigorous reaction by Makarios would seem imply GOG efforts have made or were about to make certain degree of progress.
/2/Telegram 609 to Athens, October 8, requested an analysis of Greek efforts to gain influence with Makarios' civilian advisers. (Ibid.)
While GOG has no illusions that debate in UNGA will of itself produce a solution, it assumes that the sentiments which it expects to be reflected and which are now being prepared in Cairo by Makarios will provide additional political restraint on Turks. GOG officials display considerable degree confidence in ability of Cypriots, strengthened by Greek personnel and equipment, effectively to deter Turkish military intervention. Although genuinely disturbed at prospect of increasing Soviet influence in Cyprus and in Mediterranean, GOG undoubtedly feels (as reflected in Andreas Papandreou's Le Monde interview) that introduction of Soviet factor serves not only as additional restraint on Turks but also possibly as useful element to force US and Britain to take more realistic view of situation.
I do not believe Andreas Papandreou's statement, particularly regarding possible NATO base, reflects current views of GOG in general or of Stephanopoulos or Garoufalias in particular. (I do believe, despite Andreas' rather weak protestations when I discussed matter with him, that reportage probably reflects rather accurately his own orientation and unfortunately his influence with his father is a factor determining high-level GOG Cyprus policy.) There is no doubt, however, GOG and Greek public opinion feel deep-seated resentment at failure of NATO and US to make a categoric condemnation of Turkish aerial attack and use of NATO weapons. Both Costopoulos and Andreas Papandreou have spoken to me in this sense in last few days when I taxed them with Andreas' interview, and I am certain this is one of reasons GOG considers UN will provide more effective forum than NATO.
Lurking in minds of all high GOG officials is keen awareness that Cyprus solution would provide tremendous political prize to those individuals who bring it about. They are also aware potential entry of Makarios in Greek politics in event of enosis. Some Greeks believe (as Eralp appears to do, USUN 204 to Dept)/3/ that Makarios not categorically opposed to enosis providing it is Makarios who brings about realization on his terms and is thereby in position to profit from his victory. Viewed from this perspective the issue becomes not only enosis, but whose enosis? In this context, Andreas Papandreou's reported opposition to possible Cyprus NATO base might be construed as effort to outflank Makarios on issue.
/3/Telegram 204 from USUN to Athens, repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1039, October 8. (Ibid.)
We find no evidence here that anyone is thinking of reexamining Acheson proposals and certainly not of improving previous Greek offer. Consensus seems rather to be, as Nicosia has pointed out, that evolution of situation has made it unrealistic to think in these terms and that in many respects, notwithstanding hazards of increasing Soviet influence, situation is evolving in manner generally favorable to Greek and Cypriot aspirations.
Sossides in recent conversation told DCM that if, however, US Government prepared in conjunction with British to stand the Turks down, GOG prepared utilize its military and political assets on island to precipitate enosis. This would mean US support for solution which could be politically acceptable in Cyprus--a solution which could withstand counterattack from Makarios. Sossides said under current circumstances this solution would require "unconditional enosis", protection of Turkish minority, and eventual conversion of British base into NATO base with Turkish participation. He estimated that, if this formula were accepted, GOG could precipitate enosis within a month or two. Sossides is in touch with Grivas and participated in arranging Delipetros mission to Nicosia which was designed to strengthen GOG capabilities there in the press, radio, and among certain political personalities.
In contacts with other Greek officials in recent days, we have had no confirmation of Sossides' statements to DCM regarding present willingness GOG to move ahead in event US and UK prepared to support a solution providing for "unconditional" enosis and British base converted into NATO base. Prime Minister and Garoufalias have stated to DCM and me on several occasions in past that if US would support a solution which could be made politically acceptable on the island, Greek armed forces and Grivas would take measures forcibly to remove Makarios if necessary. We will seek new reading on their views.
Evidence seems clear GOG actively seeking extend its control on island a) in order deter Turk intervention which would lead to Greek-Turk war and b) in anticipation that situation might develop in which GOG assets could be effectively applied to bring about enosis.
As I see it there are two principal contingencies in which GOG would consider it feasible openly to challenge Makarios and attempt precipitate enosis: a) Cypriot involvement with bloc to degree which obviously approaches satellization, or b) US prepared support solution which GOG considers can be made politically acceptable on the island.
Have appointment with Papandreou for tomorrow morning in effort determine his analysis current situation and likely GOG course of action./4/
/4/In telegram 639 from Athens, October 10, Labouisse reported that Papandreou was adopting a wait-and-see approach to the Cyprus question pending U.N. action and U.S. and British elections. (Ibid.)
Labouisse
164. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 9, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by King and approved in S on November 20.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, IO
Gordon D. King, Officer-in-Charge, Cyprus Affairs
Mr. Galo Plaza, United Nations Mediator
The Secretary showed Mr. Galo Plaza a copy of the Turk-Soviet joint communiqu?/2/ and noted that the Soviets appear to have gone further in supporting the Turkish position on the inviolability of treaties than we had in the joint communiqu? issued after the Inonu visit to Washington. The Secretary then noted that Cyprus Foreign Minister Kyprianou said when here some weeks ago before his Moscow visit that he would tell the Soviets point blank that the Greek-Cypriots want enosis eventually. The Secretary expressed the thought that the Soviet reaction to Kyprianou's statement together with the tone of the Turk-Soviet communiqu? could be somewhat sobering for the Greek-Cypriots.
/2/Not found.
Mr. Galo Plaza said that it is important to know what type of enosis is being discussed since Makarios' definition is quite different from that of the Greeks. Plaza said that he had urged the Greek Government to sit down with Makarios and arrive at an agreed definition. He has the impression that Greece has pressed Makarios to arrive at such a definition with them, but that Makarios has successfully evaded an answer. Mr. Ball noted the former United States assumption that a strong pro-enosis line from Greece would arouse the latent enosis sentiment on the island and undercut Makarios, but he feels this is no longer possible. Galo Plaza agreed and said he considers Papandreou to be over confident regarding his ability to handle Makarios. He described Makarios as head and shoulders above any other Greek leader, in effect a "Mr. Cyprus" who was capable of running Greece as well. This was apparent from the beginning, Mr. Galo Plaza said, and had convinced him that he must work through Makarios and do nothing behind his back. Makarios told him the day before Tuomioja died that, even if the Geneva talks brought forth a proposed solution very much along the lines that Makarios himself wanted, he would still reject it since it was being applied from outside. In line with his determination to work through Makarios, Plaza noted that, as soon as he reached New York after his last round of talks, he wrote the Archbishop a full report; and the Archbishop was very flattered. Plaza said that he made the point with Markarios after the Cairo Non-aligned Conference/3/ that the Archbishop had to be flexible since the Turk-Cypriots were cornered and he alone had room to maneuver; Makarios agreed. Earlier, Plaza explained, he had had a similar experience with Makarios in connection with the economic blockade after Kokkina-Mansoura. He told Makarios that it was not possible to hold a people under siege in the twentieth century, and that he must call the blockade off. The Archbishop then personally wrote his five-point program to ease the economic blockade and offer amnesty to the Turks. Makarios, Plaza noted, is always alone and all decisions are made on his own. He now appears more flexible and realized that he has been very lucky to date. He wants to attend the United Nations General Assembly, but indicates that he will check with Plaza first before deciding to attend and that he is willing to do whatever Plaza recommends is best for the mediation. Plaza feels that Makarios wants to be the one to reach a settlement. He also feels, however, that if Makarios had from the beginning exercised the good behavior he has shown in recent weeks, the problem would long since been solved.
/3/The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Cairo October 5-10.
Galo Plaza explained that his own plans are to return tomorrow, November 10, to Nicosia where he will have very concrete talks with Makarios. He will then proceed to Ankara, Athens and London before returning to New York in time for the opening of the General Assembly. He had been thinking of making an interim report at that time, but has given up the idea. Now he plans to report orally to the Secretary General in January. The report, he feels, will reflect neither total agreement nor total disagreement among the parties. It will contain his findings and his recommendations for a solution.
Concerning Turkey and the Turk-Cypriots, Plaza noted that Inonu and the Turkish leadership told him very firmly that they must find a way out of the Cyprus problem, but that it must be on honorable grounds. Inonu described Turkish objectives to Plaza as being, first, an honorable way out, second, Turkish security and, third, the welfare of the Turk-Cypriots, with the latter being much the weakest point as demonstrated by the Government of Turkey commitment on the Kyrenia road without prior consultations with the Turk-Cypriots. Plaza said that through most of his consultations to date he had done more listening than talking except in Ankara where the Turks began speaking of separation of the two communities. Plaza said he told the Turks that he was completely opposed to any physical separation of the communities in a federation scheme and that he would not accept partition as a basis for discussion since he considered a Greek-Turkish border through Cyprus, with Greek-Turkish relations dependent on the unpredictable and volatile Cypriots, as completely unrealistic.
Plaza said he asked Inonu, and later the Athens Government, for views on an independent, non-aligned, demilitarized Cyprus. Both the Government of Turkey and Government of Greece said this would leave a weakened Cyprus which would be prey to many outsiders. The Turks, however, said that this would be acceptable from the point of view of their security. In answer to Mr. Talbot's inquiry, Plaza said that such an arrangement might be similar to the Austrian example and that it could, in fact, be based on an international agreement which would include the Soviets. The Turks, he noted, are definitely against instant enosis which would mean war with Greece. The British asked him why it should not be possible to bring about enosis by a takeover of the island by Grivas and the 10,000 Greek troops there. Plaza told them there was not a chance of this; Makarios has all the political power and could defeat any such move. Concerning enosis, Plaza noted, the United Nations itself could not write off a member state but could certainly accept such an arrangement if the countries concerned joined of their own accord.
The Secretary asked if it were far afield to think that the parties might start on the basis of the London/Zurich Agreements and proceed to amend them into something more workable. Plaza reacted negatively to this. He noted that both sides have now firmly rejected London/Zurich as a basis for the future and that the United Nations is trying to find a new basis for a political settlement; any attempt to return to London/Zurich would start the battle again.
Plaza re-emphasized that the Turks are weak in this dispute and would settle for much less than the goals they first spoke of. They must find an honorable way out, not for the fact of Turkish public opinion, but in order to satisfy the Turkish armed forces.
Galo Plaza noted that the Greeks have spoken of giving the Turks one of their small islands near Cyprus for a military base under a 50 year lease. The Greeks have also, he noted, spoken to the British about the possibility of one of the British bases on Cyprus being committed to NATO and shared with the Turks. Plaza checked this with the new British Government in London. The British did not reject the idea and, in fact, said that they are willing to go as far as necessary to reach a solution.
Mr. Cleveland asked if Galo Plaza's recommendations might include suggesting several alternative solutions to the Cypriot people in a referendum; he asked specifically if such alternative solutions could include enosis. Plaza said that it could since it would be the choice of the people and not a proposal by the United Nations.
The Secretary asked if the Turks might agree to participate with Greece in some sort of defense board concept. Plaza expressed doubt and noted that the Turks and Greeks have forces on the island now which show no evidence whatsoever of cooperation. He expressed the feeling that independence must come as the first step but that first Makarios and the Greeks must decide what they mean by enosis. Many complications lie ahead even before a firm definition can be reached.
The Secretary asked if Galo Plaza advised the United States Government to lie low for the present. Plaza stated that this was desirable to a point, but that United States was also needed with the Turks. When the Secretary pointed out that we have used much of our capital with the Turks through past intercession, Plaza expressed understanding but felt that efforts must be made to impress on Ankara the need to be realistic. He noted that they had first told him they must have population separation with the Turkish communities getting 30% of the land to correspond to their percentage of land ownership. Later Ankara dropped this to 20% and still later to a base area with enough space for some Turk-Cypriots in the event of another crisis.
Galo Plaza expressed the conviction that, with reference to the Turks, speed is important now because of Inonu's age. The Turks become nervous, he noted, whenever Inonu is ill since there is no one strong enough to make decisions if he goes.
The Secretary said that, if Turkey is trying to find a way out of the Cyprus dispute, it may find it earlier without any United States involvement. Inonu could be undermined if he appeared again to be responding to United States pressure. Furthermore, such pressure could cause an adverse reaction in the Turkish military.
Galo Plaza referred then to Geneva and said that the Acheson effort created the impression the United States and not the United Nations had the main initiative. Mr. Ball pointed out that the Geneva exercise did, however, deflate Turkish demands significantly. He noted further that we have suffered in our relations with Turkey because of their reaction to Geneva so that anything we do now could simply make it tougher for the United Nations. The Secretary observed in passing that since things change so rapidly these days, a 50 year lease on a base would seem long enough for an 80-year old Prime Minister. Plaza stressed the view that in any case a settlement involving base rights was not really satisfactory since bases are becoming anachronisms. He noted, however, that King Constantine said he had three times asked Makarios if he could accept the commitment of one of the British bases to NATO. Makarios did not reject this nor did the British. In response to the Secretary's question, Plaza said this could include Turkish soldiers and specifically the Turkish contingent on the base. He said this is an idea that he is trying to sell to the Turks. He hopes to persuade them that this is better than a sovereign base. It would appear not as a concession from Greece, but as something which the Turks themselves had won. In any case, he felt on the basis of his discussions with the Turks to date that they view their position more realistically than he had expected.
When Mr. Ball asked if the Cyprus Constitution required that if the British give up their bases they must be turned over to the Government of Cyprus, Plaza said that this would not complicate NATO-izing the base since it would in any case be done through Makarios.
The Secretary asked how the Department could best keep in touch with the Mediator. Plaza suggested that he could best continue his contacts through Ambassador Belcher. He noted, however, that he badly lacks intelligence reports and would appreciate assistance in this regard. The Secretary agreed that we could help provided the information was not passed to the Cypriots, Greeks or Turks. He cautioned also that we could not guarantee the accuracy of our reports.
In conclusion, Plaza stressed the importance of keeping the mediation effort within the United Nations as a United Nations initiative. He said the Americans are willing to take the blame and consequences of Geneva; he would take the blame for the mediation from now on. He realized that the United States is reluctant to press the Turks, but asked that we support him when the Turks ask our opinion of his approaches.
165. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 19, 1964, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth for Burris.
888. Ambassador's statement Nov 18 emphatically denying U.S. involvement in resignation Andreas Papandreou (Embtel 875)/2/ evoked immediate response from Prime Minister Papandreou, who late last night issued following statement: "I fully agree with statement of U.S. Ambassador. In fact, there was no U.S. Embassy intervention in matter of ministerial change. I, too, express my deep regret that such connection has been made. Besides, there could be no intervention."
/2/Telegram 875 from Athens, November 19, reported the reaction to Andreas Papandreou's November 11 resignation. (Ibid.)
PriMin's statement seconding Ambassador's categorical rejection of charge of U.S. involvement in resignation was signal for cessation of govt press campaign against U.S.; most pro-govt papers today headline denials of U.S. intervention and except for pro-govt Ethnos, which initiated accusation, pro-govt papers imply denials have clarified situation and removed any doubts of U.S. complicity. Typical are headlines of sensational afternoon pro-govt papers Ta Nea and Athinaiki, both of which are usually critical of U.S.; Athinaiki headlines: "No U.S. Intervention in A. Papandreou's Resignation; Mr. Labouisse Expressed His Vivid Astonishment," while Ta Nea writes: "U.S. Not Involved." Unwilling to reverse itself completely, Ethnos suggests Labouisse denial was only "partly" supported by PriMin's statement, since PriMin said "U.S. Embassy" not involved in resignation, thus suggesting that other U.S. agencies may have played a part.
Opposition ERE press had field day at government expense on subject, with all ERE papers charging that PriMin was remiss in not rejecting charges earlier and that Ambassador's statement "forced" PriMin to denounce charges. Characteristic of ERE press is headline of influential Kathimerini: "U.S. Ambassador Labouisse amazed that resignation was associated with Cyprus settlement--PriMin was forced to share amazement," while conservative Acropolis headlines: "Severe reply from U.S. Ambassador Labouisse forced PriMin late last night to retract." Acropolis added: "U.S. Ambassador's statement was made when PriMin in his statement in Parliament virtually adopted and made official campaign of two Communist newspapers and of certain govt newspapers with personal ties with Andreas Papandreou against the Americans who were point blank accused of having exerted pressure for resignation of PriMin's son."
Comment: PriMin's failure during Parliamentary debate to denounce charges of U.S. intervention in his son's resignation--charges which he knew were patently false--is inexplicable. It is possible he was willing to go along with campaign that made his son appear as "victim" of foreign pressure, despite damage he knew it would do to U.S. prestige in Greece, in hope it would detract attention from real reasons for resignation. It is also possible that by billing Andreas as staunch defender of Greece's independent policies and as defender of Cyprus, the Papandreous hoped to build up Andreas' political appeal in country as well as within party where he was facing increasing antagonisms. In any event, Ambassador's statement clearly rejecting U.S. involvement forced PriMin to take stand on issue, which he did by issuing categorical, albeit tardy, denial. His delay in doing so, however, opened him and his govt to opposition charges that he was using charges of U.S. involvement as smokescreen for accusations of scandals involving his son.
While question of U.S. complicity now appears to be laid to rest as far as Greece is concerned, Archbishop Makarios has invited young Papandreou to visit Cyprus tomorrow. Very probably, Cypriots will attempt to foster myth that Andreas Papandreou fell victim to U.S. "pressure" as result his stand on Cyprus question, and undoubtedly Makarios and Cypriot press will play this for all it's worth./3/
/3/The Embassy reported on possible causes of Andreas Papandreou's resignation in telegram 895 from Athens, November 20. (Ibid.)
Labouisse
166. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, November 30, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Paris for USRO, London, USUN, and Moscow.
872. Embtel 860./2/ Although our Cyprus policy as recently re-stated by Assistant Secretary Talbot (Deptel 630),/3/ has been not to favor particular solution but rather to lend support to any proposal that had prospect of acceptance, in fact our thinking and efforts during and even after Geneva discussions were oriented toward modified form of enosis as solution which held out best hope being definitive and of avoiding continuing trouble. However, review of recent developments in Cyprus situation indicates changes in several important factors which were previously determinants in our policy thinking.
/2/Telegram 860, November 26, suggested delaying a U.S. response to questions raised by Foreign Minister Erkin. (Ibid.)
/3/Dated November 21. (Ibid.)
First and most important is that both GOG and Makarios have in fact given up idea of "instant enosis", at least for the time being. Thus, while enosis with sufficient compensations for Turkey may still remain preferred US solution it retains little value as working concept in shorter run.
Furthermore, experience has shown us that no matter how much Papandreou continues talk about building up GOG position on island, he has failed put GOG in position force enosis on Makarios or even accelerate pace of events. It now clear that on Greek side, Makarios and Makarios alone will call tune as to timing and nature of any significant steps toward enosis. This has obvious implications for our long-standing assumption that nub of problem was to get GOT and GOG talking, so that hopefully they could reach compromise agreement which Makarios would have no choice but accept. What has emerged, actually, is coincidence of GOT and GOC interest (though for different reasons and perhaps for short term only) in maintaining Cyprus' independence. Logically, this should lead Turks and Greek Cypriots talk together but neither side seems ready yet recognize this as tolerable alternative to present course of mutual hostility (Deptel 642)./4/ In meanwhile, earlier open-mindedness of Turks to idea of modified enosis has changed. Unhappy denouement of Geneva talks and their aftermath have made even more acute feeling of Turks that they have been suffering unacceptable losses to their position and their prestige. As consequence enosis has again become dirty word for them, their whole attitude has stiffened and they have reverted to original position of federation, with partition relegated to automatic reaction if any overture made toward unilateral enosis.
/4/Dated November 25. (Ibid.)
Another change in policy background has to do with Soviets' role and influence. Will be recalled one of principal reasons for seeking urgently obtain agreement last summer on modified enosis formula was to abort growing Soviet influence in and over Cyprus and specifically to forestall Greek Cypriot mission to Moscow. In interval not only Greek Cypriots but Turks have been to Moscow. Although Russians may not have intended Moscow discussions give as much encouragement to Turks as latter reflect in conversations with US and others, nevertheless discussions and joint communiqu?, at a minimum, created new element of uncertainty for Greeks and expectations for Turks. Thus, although does not appear have been any change in basic Soviet position, Soviets can now win kudos from both Greek Cypriots and Turks by taking public stance in favor of independence which per se no longer appears, in Turkish eyes at least, as pro-Makarios position.
Then, there is experience of Mediator himself. Despite Galo Plaza's inveterate optimism and political virtuosity, including close rapport with Makarios, his multiple conversations with all parties concerned have not resulted in any narrowing of gap (as Acheson's did) but instead have served reveal that gap greater than was thought. Measure of bleakness Galo Plaza's prospects is his decision defer submission his final report until after UNGA discussion of Cyprus item.
In addition all of foregoing we constrained adduce one parochial but nonetheless important consideration, which is continuing erosion of US political stock in Turkey. Given fact we have had no choice but sail on more or less straight line between Greek Scylla and Turk Charybdis, we had to expect growing disillusionment and despair on part of Turkish friends for our failure support them in position which they consider right and honorable. This mood has gradually given way to one of adapting themselves realistically to changed conditions but at same time seeking opportunities make them as favorable as possible to Turkey's needs, e.g., Erkin's Moscow visit and federation pitch made to Galo Plaza.
Put in summary form, the Cyprus question, as far as USG is concerned, has changed greatly in almost all of its aspects since we became actively concerned with it.
First, problem itself has changed as our immediate objective of preventing war between Greece and Turkey has essentially been accomplished. It is true that Turks still talk grimly of war with Greece if enosis should be carried out as a unilateral act but, as prospect of such action fades due to Greek second thoughts and Makarios having other ideas, likelihood of an armed clash recedes.
But unfortunately this does not get us out of woods since original major problem has now been replaced by series of others, which are perhaps of lesser magnitude individually but taken as a whole are not only immediately troublesome but could have important long term effects in the area and on our position in it. Turkey and Greece, on whose past cooperation so much depended, are now at daggers drawn and prospects are for further deterioration. Greece and Turkey who were model members of NATO, are now unhappy critics of that organization and partisans of non-alignment are raising voices. USG is under severe criticism in Nicosia, Athens and Ankara, which is unpleasant but bearable in its spleenish aspect but has serious implications as regards our specific national interests in Greece and Turkey which tend run parallel qualitatively but are considerably greater in Turkey quantitatively. Result is that problem which started out as primarily affecting others has now become one in which our own interests are directly involved and fact that war threat has receded should not leave us in doubt as to real situation.
In circumstances it would seem this time for re-evaluation in order determine whether policy evolved under other circumstances still holds good. If so, it should be consciously revalidated in terms which are explicable in light of present realities. If not, we should see what could be done by way of modification or substitution. In this re-examination cognizance should first be taken of fact that range of possibilities for settlement has been greatly reduced by exclusion of idea of early enosis, whether in unilateral, conditional or double form. This means scrapping Geneva concept and leaves independence, even though non-permanent, as single remaining solution with only question being determination of what kind of independence. As matters stand Makarios and Galo Plaza appear in agreement in principle if not in detail on an independent, unaligned, demilitarized Cyprus with certain minority right provisions for Turk Cypriots, and Papandreou's having pretty much chucked in his hand, is now taking position that anything that suits Makarios will go for him. This also would seem to be what Sovs would like since it would lead to pressure on British to give up their base rights and leave Turkey and Greece estranged and good for troubled waters fishing. This also coincides with Turkish policy to extent that it would block enosis but it leaves sharp cleavage on form which independence would take and it is on this narrowed but clearly defined gap that all the asperity and emotionalism which have characterized this problem in past are now concentrated in situation where both sides remain as deeply entrenched as ever in their positions with result that hope for agreed solution remains perhaps even more remote than before. In fact, Papandreou has categorically gone back to his original position of excluding all talks with Turks and there is no indication that Makarios, still confident of success without compromises will be any more flexible in future than in past.
It is for this reason that policy of advocating agreed solution, although having possible tactical advantages in situation where we (and also British) are at wits end act positively, is, following Geneva break-down, dead-end street as far as Turks concerned and leads them endeavor induce US break log-jam by coming out in support of what they profess believe type of independence adapted to realities of situation. Unfortunately their nerves are pretty raw these days and they sometimes put their arguments in heavy handed form which is aggravating but this should not obscure fact that, regardless of form of presentation or our ability do something about it, this is normal approach in situation where Turks still deeply feel that something needs be done to redress imbalance but repeatedly stress that they would be open to compromise if real dialogue could be initiated.
This then is situation in which we find ourselves and in light of which review would seem in order. Should decision emerge from such study to give some form of support to principles of federation, we should realize that we might be backing horse that would never get far down track (Nicosia's 775 to Dept)./5/ On other hand, there would be certain equity in making attempt since it would amount to giving Turk solution fair try as we did with enosis this past summer. It is foreseen, however, that it would be difficult to give type of general pig-in-poke endorsement of federation which Turks suggest. Furthermore, it would seem to be wishful thinking on part of Turks to assume that a word from US would cause Galo Plaza to retrim his sails and still more improbable that Soviets would fall in line (although, unlikely as it may be, sight should not be lost of possibility that they might take initiative themselves if this suited their purposes. After all in terms Soviet geopolitics Turkey easily remains at top of priority list). However, this does not alter fact that real imbalance exists, that Makarios has upper hand and that some concession by him is essential if matter is to be directed on more hopeful course. This observation is made in knowledge that current GOC policy is antithesis of this and that they too urging US abandon policy of neutrality (Nicosia's 789 to Dept),/6/ which natural as far as GOC concerned but would make shambles of our relations here for simple reason that it would be directed to solution of greater rather than lesser imbalance in situation where our influence should presumably be directed to latter not only as matter simple justice but also in our own over-all interests. If USG, hopefully with assistance of Galo Plaza, could use influence to persuade GOC to undertake negotiations in spirit of sincere compromise there might be some hope. If not, all doors for helpful action prior UNGA would seem tightly shut since obvious GOT unable take initiative in absence some favorable indications in Nicosia or Athens.
/5/Telegram 775 from Nicosia, November 27, reported that a Cypriot federation could only be imposed by force. (Ibid.)
/6/This reference is incorrect; the correct telegram has not been identified.
Question currently posed, therefore, is whether we see any useful purpose could be served by putting renewed pressure on GOC primarily and GOG secondarily to take first step toward compromise solution and mutatis mutandis advise Turks as discreetly as possible of our views. In so doing, would be important make clear we not washing hands of Cyprus, that any limitations on our action are result of careful re-examination of facts and that we shall do our best be helpful as situation develops, especially in UNGA.
Incidentally, British Amb tells me Erkin approached him last Thursday in much same sense he had talked to me two days before (Embtel 856)/7/ except that he included UK along with US, Soviets and Mediator in array which could push federation over goal line and focussed approach on immediately following visit of Mediator in London. German Amb told me he was also approached on same day by Bayulken and German support solicited on assumption that Galo Plaza left Ankara sympathetically disposed to federation idea.
/7/Dated November 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Hare
167. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 2, 1964, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris for USRO, London, USUN, and Moscow.
785. Ankara's 872 to Dept./2/ Reftel has again clearly described painful dilemma in which US finds itself namely that we cannot press forward on course which would provide permanent solution to Cyprus problem without at same time seriously damaging, if not destroying, our important relationship with Turkey. Since this is so, agree with Ambassador Hare that practical question now before us is what kind of independent Cyprus and is there anything US can or should do to shape this independence. Stating question another way is what kind of independent Cyprus can Turkey live with over next few years.
/2/Document 166.
Our analysis of proposals reftel is based on following assumptions: 1) federation of Cyprus really means partition of Cyprus and therefore will require force to be imposed; 2) Makarios is in no mood to negotiate precisely because as reftel puts it he has upper hand and 3) US has very little leverage on Makarios and because of our proposed stand in UNGA we are likely to have even less influence.
Federation as envisaged by Turk-Cypriot leaders and we suppose by GOT is solution which might possibly be imposed temporarily at great cost by force of arms. Admittedly we have not yet got a definition of this all important word but before we go any further down this dangerous road we should know exactly what is in mind in Ankara. Geographic separation of most of two communities with boundaries cutting Famagusta and Nicosia and running west to Kokkina area is Turk Cypriot meaning. This is not merely a horse which can't go far down the track. It will stop any race which might possibly lead to an agreed solution through the efforts of the Mediator. Also worth noting again that Galo Plaza will need a lot of proselytizing on this one and obviously concept ought to be checked out thoroughly with him before we make any decision. We convinced there is no chance of selling this concept to Greek Cypriots generally or to Makarios in particular.
Since GOG has refused to agree to talk with GOT, possibility that Makarios who knows that he is master of Cypriot house would agree to talk with Turks would seem to be even more remote. As we have been regularly reporting and which reftel recognizes, Makarios and Greek Cypriots have preponderance of power, de facto control of government machinery, and strong determination to reach goal of "unfettered independence." Makarios would react to suggestion to negotiate as another example of pressure to give up positions which he has already won over Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, not only would he refuse but if he follows past practice, would likely kick off another round of anti-US/NATO hysteria claiming foreign interference once again. Moreover, as long as GOC has indicated to Greek Cypriot public that answer to problem lies in resolution at UNGA, it would be politically impossible for GOC leadership to agree to undertake talks with GOC. In sum, we cannot detect any spirit of compromise here, at all. All shades of opinion, even those who deep down are for "instant enosis" at this stage of game agree with GOC public position that next step is UNGA and the best effort should be made there to obtain world consensus to invalidate treaties and resolution supporting unfettered independence and principle of self-determination.
GOC/Makarios current strategy is maintain facade of reasonableness combined with unilateral action of non-provocative nature. Meantime GOC proceeding step by step put into effect most of 13 points first promulgated year ago just prior to opening scene present tragedy. GOC already has accomplished de facto majority rule in Parliament, unified judiciary, abolished separate municipalities, and is considering new tax and measure to abolish Greek Communal Chamber. Such measures will continue to be applied between now and UNGA. After these "milestones" no matter what nature of resolution, Greeks here will probably promulgate new constitution providing framework for unitary state. The prospect is chilling for Turk Cypriots; they will be ignored and left to wither on vine like Arab refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza. At same time there is little likelihood that GOC will give new provocation to GOT to intervene.
Moreover, subsequent to UNGA and assuming GOC cannot get satisfaction in wording of resolution, we shall see not just continuation of series of faits accomplis establishing unitary state, but we shall also see accelerated leftward drift with all the trouble this means for USG installations and British bases. Therefore erosion of Western position, not to mention steady decay of Turkish Cypriot situation, both political and economic, to advantage only of Communists on island and elsewhere is something GOT must face. Turks (and we) must be prepared to live with this situation.
We must also recognize unhappy fact that except for our influence with GOG, US now has little influence on Makarios. Our modest aid programs are aimed chiefly at reestablishing some semblance of normality for Turkish community and to keep our foot in door while maintaining some momentum in Makarios' "peace offensive." They would have only marginal effect in getting GOC to do anything else. On other hand, GOC has relatively good leverage on us in shape of our communications facilities. After UNGA wherein we and UK will be villains of piece, GOC frustrations will be focused on US installations as most accessible target of vituperation and next on UK bases rather than on Turks (who strike back).
All these developments will involve no compensation to Turks and there will be no way of accurately measuring costly consequences to Alliance of which Turkey a vital link.
Under circumstances since we do not have means of persuading GOT to accept solution in best interests of Alliance, we must examine ways in which to ease burden for them. Perhaps as Galo Plaza and British seem to think, they will find UNGA educational experience and may emerge more malleable and thereby more susceptible to mediation effort, or failing that, when tempers have chance to cool they may be somewhat affected by realization US and West generally are losing on island. Even perhaps after dust settles and Turks can quietly come to realization that in fact there is no Turkish Cypriot position left on island, some face saving device can be devised where Turks bow to world opinion and to interests of Alliance in stemming leftward drift in Cyprus and perhaps also Greece. In meantime, if Turks, we and British can face sort of deterioration in all our positions described above, then we see the best intermediate policy for US as one of inaction combined with positive attempts to establish effective relationship with Makarios. If we do not choose even this path, then it is hard for us to see where we and Mediator can look further knowing that federation ? la Turque is as much a casus belli for Greeks as enosis is for Turks.
This cable started out to be merely a somewhat strengthened reiteration of our previous commentary on hopelessness of selling peaceful federation here. We realize that Dept has in effect turned down (Deptel 403)/3/ our previous proposals for inaction at UNGA and thus what we feel is best method for starting useful dialogue with Makarios (Embtel 674)./4/ However since Ambassador Hare has argued cogently for new review of our Cyprus policy in light of GOT federation proposals we suggest that it might be appropriate to reconsider advantages of a policy of inaction at same time.
/3/Dated November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
/4/Dated October 30. (Ibid.)
Belcher
168. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/12
New York, December 4, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Baker and approved in S on December 10. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is marked "Part II of II."
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSIONOF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964
SUBJECT
The Cyprus Problem
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
John Baker, USUN
Cyprus
Foreign Minister Kyprianou
Zenon Rossides, Permanent UN Representative
During his December 4 talk with Foreign Minister Kyprianou, the Secretary asked him for his evaluation of Soviet policy. Kyprianou stated that when he was in Moscow at the end of September 1964,/2/ the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Kuznetzov, had told him that the Soviet Government prefers Cyprus to remain an independent state. Enosis would bring about the union of Cyprus with a member state of NATO. Kyprianou stated, however, that Kuznetzov had remarked that if the people of Cyprus want enosis (union with Greece), the Soviet Government would respect this preference.
/2/Kyprianou visited Moscow September 26-October 1.
Kyprianou stated that the Soviets had described to him the line which they were getting from the Turkish Government on federation. Kyprianou stated that he told the Soviets that this solution was out of the question completely. It was not a solution at all, he said--it would lead to partition.
Kyprianou observed that he did not see Khrushchev during his visit but that he had been introduced to Kosygin with whom he had a lengthy conversation. Kosygin was not yet then Prime Minister./3/
/3/Kosygin became Prime Minister on October 15, following the overthrow of Khrushchev.
The Soviets further told Kyprianou that they continued to regard the London treaties of Cyprus as unequal, exactly as Soviet Representative Fedorenko had stated in the Security Council.
Kyprianou remarked that he thought there was little change in the Soviet position on Cyprus except for the fact that they might be getting closer to the Turks on the question of opposing Cypriot union with Greece. He believed that the Cypriots could still count on Soviet support on matters such as Cypriot independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty.
In response to the Secretary's question as to whether or not a General Assembly discussion of Cyprus would embitter the atmosphere, Kyprianou replied that the Assembly debate would help if it produced the right kind of resolution. Such a resolution might provide a way out of the problem of finding a solution to the Cyprus question. On the other hand, if the Assembly does not produce the right kind of resolution, the mediator's role would be frustrated or ended by "developments". Kyprianou later observed that if it were not for the tactical problem, the Cypriot Government could even suggest in the debate the inclusion in the resolution of statements on guarantees for the Turk Cypriots in order to make "the way out" easier for the Turkish Government with its own military people. Kyprianou remarked that in Turkey, public opinion does not exist.
The Secretary observed that the Security Council had noted the importance of an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem and remarked that the Assembly could not circumvent that.
Foreign Minister Kyprianou replied that by avoiding any mention of how the settlement will be brought about and by enunciating principles which would set the framework for a solution, the Assembly could play a useful role. Kyprianou stressed that he did not want anything in the Assembly resolution which would strengthen the veto which already is implicit in the agreed solution formula.
The Secretary observed that the trouble with enunciating principles of the Charter was that one can cite principles which clash. Kyprianou replied that "we like all articles of the Charter". He said the Government of Cyprus supports respect for treaties but not treaties or interpretations of treaties which are in contradiction with the Charter, which supersedes all treaties according to Article 103.
The Secretary asked what progress had been made on his suggestion of "killing the Turk Cypriots with kindness." Kyprianou observed that he had relayed to Makarios Secretary Rusk's advice in this regard./4/ He stressed that there had been progress in restoring normal conditions stating that in Limassol, Larnaca, and Famagusta things were entirely normal as far as free circulation was concerned and in Paphos conditions were improving, although there was still a problem of Turkish Cypriots being prevented by the Turk Cypriot leadership from returning to their homes. Kyprianou stressed that the central problem is in Nicosia "where the Turkish Army is."
/4/See Document 159.
Kyprianou described the new law on the judicial system and the makeup of the Supreme Court. He emphasized that Turkish judges were taking part in spite of the opposition of the Turkish Cypriot political leadership. He said he believed the judges had convinced the Government of Turkey that it was in the interest of the Turkish Cypriot people for these judges to participate in the new judicial system.
Kyprianou observed that the Government of Cyprus is trying to implement a new law unifying the municipalities.
He also observed that a small Armenian minority was suffering worse than either Greeks or Turks on Cyprus, stating that the Armenians suffered mainly at the hands of the Turks. Kyprianou stated that if the Turkish Cypriots would open up their communications and permit their people to move freely out of their sections of town and permit Greeks to move freely through them, it would be a big step toward the return to normalcy.
The Secretary asked what the economic balance sheet for 1964 of Cyprus would be. Kyprianou replied that exports had increased and imports had decreased, improving the balance of payments. The Secretary observed jestingly that perhaps there were some imports in 1964 that were not on the customs lists.
Ambassador Rossides asked the Secretary what would be useful in an Assembly resolution.
The Secretary stated that he felt that the process itself of discussing Cyprus in the Assembly was an inflammatory one, and stated that he was studying Article 33 of the Charter on whether or not it was wise to resort to the General Assembly with a problem of this kind.
The Secretary asked Kyprianou if his Government had any contacts with the Turks and their leaders. Kyprianou replied that there were none and that such contacts were very difficult. He observed that the mediator kept in touch with Turk Cypriot leaders. Kyprianou said that in London on his way to New York, he had heard a rumor that there would be some changes in the Turk Cypriot leadership on the island. This rumor suggested that certain Turk Cypriot leaders would be leaving the island and certain other ones coming in to take their places.
The Secretary inquired as to what possibility there was for the parties to the Cyprus dispute to "trade" and through a quid pro quo work out a solution. Kyprianou stated that the Cypriot bargaining position was weak. Cyprus had nothing to offer. All it can offer is guarantees to the minority. But it cannot offer part of Cyprus to Turkey, or "we'd all be hanged."
The Secretary observed that we did not see any solution now. Kyprianou stated that the Government of Cyprus does not see a solution either and was therefore not urging Galo Plaza to bring out a report before the General Assembly met. Galo Plaza was looking forward to the Assembly, he said, hoping it would assist his work.
Kyprianou then went over the primary Turkish Government sine qua nons in the Cyprus problem:
1) Rights of the Turkish Cypriots
2) Security
3) Prestige
He remarked that if the Cypriots were to be independent, they could not accept demilitarization of the island, unless the Turks did likewise.
If the solution were enosis, however, demilitarization could be involved. Foreign Minister Kyprianou observed that a UN guarantee could perhaps be obtained.
The Secretary asked what progress was being made internally with the Greek Cypriots on the shape of a solution. Kyprianou remarked that some Turks were amenable to an agreement, but without Turkish Government agreement, the Turkish leadership on the island would be unlikely to be agreeable. The Foreign Minister felt that the Turkish Cypriots for the most part, do not have a preference as to independence or enosis but are most interested in where they can get reliable guarantees of human rights. He thought that they would be happy to accept these if they involve some degree in autonomy and religion, culture, education, and personal status, combined with some Government financial assistance.
169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, December 29, 1964, 9:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Churchill, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
722. Nihat Erim discussed Cyprus situation with Under Secretary December 29./2/ Ball said we see no solution in direction either enosis or double enosis. If progress appears possible toward independent Cyprus with protection of Turk minority, we should strive for this. Ball said we would do our best preserve sanctity of treaties in GA. He said he was assured that UK will support our position in GA. Since there is general agreement that present treaty system not working and since we hold to principle that treaties can be changed only by agreement, next step should be negotiations looking toward security of rights of Turk Cypriots in manner that does not impair sovereignty of an independent Cyprus.
/2/A memorandum of their conversation is ibid.
Erim said he much comforted by position outlined by Under Secretary. In his view, adequate security for Turk Cypriots meant federal system with separated communities. Ball responded by repeating his views as indicated above. (In earlier conversations with Talbot and Jernegan, memcon being pouched, Erim had already heard difficulties we see in federation concept as means satisfying Turk needs.)/3/
/3/A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
Erim said island is quiet, but Makarios getting everything his way. Only obstacles to complete Makarios victory are continued separation Turkish community and strong points in Turkish hands. If Turk community accedes to proposals by Makarios or Galo Plaza to return to homes and give up strong points to UNFICYP, Makarios will have completed "fait accompli" and can claim no further problem exists. Erim said this assessment accounts for Turk refusal discuss Makarios proposals.
Erim said, after US stopped Turk invasion, Greeks sent 10,000 troops to island without public condemnation from US. Turk leaders might understand reasons, but impossible explain to Turkish people. Russians successfully exploiting situation with strong propaganda effort.
On next steps after GA, Under Secretary asked whether Erim thought UK might appropriately call for negotiating meeting. Erim said UK was reluctant become further involved but might make suggestion if requested by US. Ball said we would discuss this with British.
Rusk
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, January 22, 1965, 7:56 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Moffitt; cleared by Sisco, Buffum, GTI, and L/UNA; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
946. Ref: Athens 1041 and 1071, Deptel 403 to Nicosia./2/ Para 1 Athens 1071 suggests that GOG misunderstands US views on question of including reference to international treaties in any GA resolution on Cyprus. Might be useful to set Costopoulos or Pilivakis straight next time either raises Cyprus question.
/2/Telegram 1041 from Athens, January 8, reported Greek concern that U.S. insistence on inviolability of treaties would strengthen Turkey's position in U.N. discussions. (Ibid.) In telegram 1071 from Athens, January 15, Labouisse reported that he had repeated to Costopoulos that the United States was concerned about efforts to use the General Assembly to undermine existing international agreements. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 403 to Nicosia, see footnote 3, Document 167.
As indicated Deptel 403 to Nicosia (rptd other addressees) US feels strongly that GA should not interpret or modify international agreements or give moral sanction to their unilateral repudiation except in accordance with agreement's abrogation clause if any. GA powers under Article 14 to recommend measures for peaceful settlement of disputes are to be interpreted consistently with Charter's objective of promoting "respect for the obligations arising from treaties . . ." (Preamble). We feel sure this view shared by large number UN member states.
It is not, however, our position that any resolution, regardless of its terms, must inevitably contain paragraph affirming continued validity of L/Z agreements. Whether US would advocate inclusion in any resolution on Cyprus of language specifically upholding legal validity of Agreements will depend on circumstances, including question of whether such resolution tended to call into question validity those Agreements.
While as GOG knows, US holds L/Z Agreements still legally valid, we do not consider them immutable. In fact, realities of situation make clear they will have to be changed in some respects. However, any changes in Agreements should be product of negotiations among parties.
FYI: We prefer not to tell GOG at this time whether Cypriot draft Res would meet test outlined in foregoing. GA debate on Cyprus item still some weeks off, and Cypriot Res in present form may, or may not, be an active document when debate begins. However, as stressed in Deptel 403, Cairo type resolution would cast doubt on validity of Treaty Guarantee and certain basic articles of Cyprus Constitution. Draft Res floated by Cyprus UN Del (USUN's A-857)/3/ is stripped down version of Cairo Res and presents same problems in terms our position. Operative para 1 of Cyprus draft Res obviously intended imply that L/Z Agreements at variance with UN Charter and therefore invalid under Article 103 of Charter.
/3/Airgram A-57, January 7, summarized conversations with Cypriot and Turkish representatives on the issues involved in U.N. consideration of the Cyprus question. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Operative para 2 of Cyprus draft would have GA call on "all states in conformity with their obligations under the Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4 . . ." to refrain from threat or use of force or "intervention directed against Cyprus." This obviously included as challenge to Article 4 Treaty of Guarantee. End FYI.
Rusk
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and Paris for USRO.
Nicosia, January 23, 1965, noon.
941. Paid routine call on President Friday.
After covering number of incidental items, raised problem of Cyprus issue in UNGA in view Article 19 problem. Said we would be interested knowing what GOC plans were for period after UN disposed of issue in General Assembly assuming voting problem settled. Makarios reminded me that he had always maintained that no matter what sort of resolution came out of General Assembly, whether good or bad from Greek Cypriot point of view, he realized UN had no capability for imposing whatever solution recommended. Therefore problem of future remained where it had always been--with people of Cyprus. Said he was giving serious consideration to promulgation of new Constitution (this is idea mentioned to me more than once by Clerides) which could be put forward on temporary ad referendum basis pending final approval by people as a whole. He observed that Turk Cypriots might or might not accept Constitution at that time, but this made little difference to him under circumstances. Whatever happens at UN and whatever his decision may be regarding possible new Constitution Archbishop assured me he had no intention using further violence to impose Greek Cypriot will on Turks. He would give GOT no excuse for intervention and certainly had no intention of declaring enosis with Greece until he certain Greece understood possible consequences and prepared accept them. In his mind this ruled out enosis for time being since appeared be casus belli for GOT. When I pointed out that it all very well to govern under some new constitutional framework but that this did not provide for "normalization" and eradication of physical barriers now existing between two communities, Archbishop said that this matter was up to Turks. They were free as far as he concerned to stay as they were behind Green Line and within their ghettoes if they chose not to play part in life of state under new Constitution. Said he was following Secretary Rusk's good advice to Kyprianou given both in Washington and New York and would continue "peace offensive" expressing belief that in time more and more Turkish Cypriots would accept facts of life and return to normal existence. Makarios gave no indication he expected obtain favorable judgment in New York.
In view numerous press rumors of possibility GOC planning conversations with GOG or even with GOT, Makarios indicated he was not in favor of talks at this time since he feared they likely be unsuccessful and failure of talks to produce substantive progress might well only worsen situation. He would not be drawn out on question of possible trip to Athens but commented on my use of words "other interested parties" with reference to possible talks. With considerable emphasis Makarios said that as far as he concerned only interested parties to internal aspect of Cyprus disputes were two communities in Cyprus. Since Greek Cypriot community in majority they would determine fate of island, of course taking into account legitimate rights of Turk minority. Reiterated they had no intention using force in this connection but would rely on time being on their side. On several occasions he reiterated his ultimate aim for Cyprus was enosis but that as responsible leader and with Greek interests at heart he could not do anything which would be against the pursuit of this age-old aim of Greek Cypriots.
With regard Gromyko statement,/2/ Makarios said this was further evidence that Soviets like all nations were pursuing own national interests and it quite obvious that there was much more at stake for them in Turkey than in Cyprus. Said he believed Soviets had decided against wholehearted support of Greek Cypriots and were now obviously intensively wooing Turks. Said he felt there something basically inconsistent in Gromyko statement with regard federation as possible solution. This would merely perpetuate divisions within island and make even more difficult achievement of ostensible Soviet aim of viable independent unitary state. Said it obvious that Soviets (as well as UAR) against enosis for own national interest, but by proposing solution which perpetuated divisions, Soviets at same time were creating system in which dream of enosis and "double-enosis" would continue be ultimate aim of both Greeks and Turks in island. Added he personally utterly opposed to federation concept and could not see how it could be applied in Cyprus in view of distribution of minority throughout island.
/2/Reference is to the Soviet proposal for a "federal" form of government in Cyprus, made in an interview in Izvestia, January 21.
While President did not say so specifically, it was obvious he not too perturbed by nature Gromyko statement since it contained many words having great appeal to Greeks. Federation concept merely mentioned as one possibility and Greek reject this but cling to remainder of statement supporting territorial integrity, no foreign intervention and continued independence of island. From his response to my comment Gromyko's words would bolster Turks' spirits considerably, it was obvious that this made little difference to him. (President later issued following press statement: "The Soviet Foreign Minister's statement is open to various interpretations. In my view the Soviet Union supports, in the case of Cyprus, independence unfettered by treaties. But I cannot say that Moscow favors union of Cyprus with Greece.")
In response suggestion that there might be something on which to find basis for common ground in fact that we now found Soviets, Turks and, at least for near future, Greek Cypriots supporting concept of independent Cyprus, President commented that he found no room for compromise beyond providing Turks with rights and guarantees offered minorities in other states. If this could constitute common ground then there should be possibility of Turk Cypriot participation in life of country.
With regard extension of UNFICYP mandate President reiterated statement he made to Thimayya yesterday to effect he would rely on his advice as to needs but hoped could reduce numbers.
Comments and suggestions to follow.
Belcher
172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, January 28, 1965, 1:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Talbot, Bracken, Sisco, and Springsteen (U). Also sent to Ankara and repeated to London, Nicosia, and USUN.
961. FYI. In separate conversations with Secretary and Under Secretary January 26, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin reported that Greek UN delegation had been in touch twice recently (apparently within previous day or two) with member Turkish delegation. Greeks had frankly expressed their growing conviction that nothing leading toward Cyprus solution would come out of UNGA. Had proposed, therefore, that tripartite Greek-Turkish-Cypriot talks be arranged. In first conversation, Turk representative had suggested Greeks talk to Kyprianou about this. Second contact was made by chief Greek delegate Bitsios who reported Kyprianou was consulting Makarios for instructions.
Erkin seemed regard this as encouraging sign and to be quite ready undertake at least bilateral talks with GOG, provided they could be kept completely secret. He asked that USG speak to Greeks, without revealing his approach to us, to urge such talks. Both Secretary and Under Secretary endorsed bilateral negotiation, and Erkin was assured we would make approach to GOG.
When specifically queried about Turkish attitude toward tripartite talks, Erkin first expressed fear British would insist upon being included because of their worries about Cyprus bases. Ball said he thought British might be so relieved to have something going on which might lead to solution that they would not insist on taking part. Erkin later said that if Greek Cypriots included in discussions, Turkey would have to insist that representatives of Turkish Cypriots likewise be present. Again indicated his preference for initial talks with GOG alone.
Suggestion was made that there might be better chance of bringing Greeks to negotiating table if Turks indicated willingness to talk about all outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey, rather than Cyprus alone. Erkin balked at this, saying Cyprus was of overriding importance, but did suggest GOT would be willing sign undertaking with Greeks to settle other problems once agreement had been reached on Cyprus. Dept officer commented this, of course, was matter of tactics which hopefully Turks could work out in further preliminary contacts with GOG representatives.
Re substance of possible solution for Cyprus, Erkin once more spoke of federation as only logical way out, since modified enosis exemplified in first Acheson Plan had proven unacceptable to Greeks. Insisted that physical separation of Greek and Turkey Cypriots would not be nearly so difficult as people asserted. More than half Turkish Cypriots were concentrated in area north of Nicosia. (Dept officer pointed out these people would need much greater area than they currently occupied if they were to support themselves permanently. Erkin agreed.) Turkey, he said, would not insist on forced transfer of all Greeks out of Turkish area or all Turks out of Greek area. It would undertake not to annex Turkish area to Turkey unless Greece took rest of island for Greece. We avoided any commitment to support federation, saying we still believed parties must work things out among themselves without outside intervention.
There was some discussion of UN Mediator's position, with Erkin reporting he had seen Galo Plaza January 25. Plaza had said he would make final round of capitals concerned after UNGA debate on Cyprus and then submit report. If it appeared debate was to be indefinitely postponed, he would make his rounds without waiting for it and submit report. It was agreed this line presented dangers and that Dept would try to talk things over in Washington in near future. It was also agreed, at Erkin's insistence, that nothing would be said to Mediator about possible Greek-Turkish talks. End FYI.
In light of foregoing but without revealing any knowledge of Greek approach to Turks or Erkin's approach to us on subject, please take earliest opportunity renew to Papandreou or Costopoulos our suggestion that direct, private negotiations between parties immediately concerned offer best hope of progress toward Cyprus settlement./2/ You may put forward as our view growing conviction that UNGA debate and whatever resolution may emerge from it is most unlikely move question any farther forward. In fact, we could not say with any real confidence at this moment that debate will even take place in near future in view of situation in GA. Therefore, it seems futile to lose time and possibly see situation deteriorate while waiting for something which has so little promise of positive results. We continue believe GOT desires talk to GOG, probably secretly at first, and hope GOG will make contact directly to explore this with Turks.
/2/Telegram 1163 from Athens, February 2, reported that the Greek Government had responded to Turkish suggestions by encouraging dialogue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Costopoulos added that a change in the Greek approach might be possible depending on future Turkish moves and the outcome of the General Assembly debate on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
If Greeks insist on participation Cypriot Government in talks you should urge they keep open mind on this and not make it firm condition. Important thing is to get something started. From past experience we would judge both Greeks and Turks would prefer avoid public attention to their contacts, and this would obviously be much more difficult if additional parties added to negotiations in early stages.
If it seems appropriate, you may say that we do not think it would be helpful to bring UN Mediator or other outsiders at this stage (including US) into picture. FYI. We think Turks distrust Plaza so much they would refuse even to begin if he were in any way involved.
On January 27 Ambassador Menemencioglu informed us Greek UN delegation again in touch with Turkish delegation with news that Makarios believes time not right for tripartite talks. Menemencioglu consequently feels chance for successful outcome of recent contacts remote. End FYI. Nevertheless, we believe you should proceed with above approach and point out to Greeks that some kind of bilateral talks even more essential if Makarios unwilling enter discussions at this time.
For Ankara: Our reading of developments in Nicosia suggests talks have better chance of evolving if GOT would exploit current sparkles of interest on part of Greek-Cypriots in talks with Ankara Turks. In any event it would help GOG exercise influence over Makarios (if that is Erkin's aim) if GOT would carry on facade of discussion with Makarios, even though it pins more hope on working out solution with GOG.
Ball
173. Airgram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
A-605
Athens, January 29, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Labouisse.
SUBJECT
Conversation with King Constantine
I met with King Constantine, at his request, on the afternoon of January 27. The King apparently had no special reason for asking me to see him, other than to exchange views on the general political and economic situation affecting Greece. The King observed that things were "in a mess" referring both to the internal Greek scene and to Cyprus.
Internal Political Problems
King Constantine remarked that there was much talk about the spread of communism within Greece, and while he thought there had been some growth in the activity and boldness of the extreme left which caused him concern, he believed the press comment and other talk on the subject was exaggerated. I said that our observations led us to a similar conclusion although we agreed that the matter should be carefully watched.
Constantine then said that some people (unidentified) had wanted him to act against the Papandreou Government but he did not consider a move in this direction wise or practicable, at least at this time. There was no one on the scene who could replace Papandreou, as the latter still had a strong popular appeal among the Greek people. He went so far as to say that if he should try to unseat the Prime Minister now, Papandreou would "go into the streets."
The King then commented on the appointment of Tsirimokos as Minister of Interior. He recalled a meeting some time ago with Papandreou in which the latter had volunteered that he would never appoint Tsirimokos to the Interior Ministry./2/ Later, when the Prime Minister came to him to say that he wanted to make that very appointment, the King sought to elicit the reasons for Papandreou's change of heart, but he could obtain no satisfactory explanation except "political desirability." Constantine said that he tried to argue the Prime Minister out of making the appointment but that, although he felt the latter came close to giving in, he finally stood his ground saying that it would cause him to lose face if it should become known that he had given in to the King on this particular issue. Constantine observed to Papandreou that "if the King should happen to have a good idea once in a while there was no reason to reject it just because he was the King." But the Prime Minister stood firm and the appointment was made.
/2/Elias Tsirimokos, former leader of the Democratic Union Party, was a critic of U.S. policies in Greece with ties to EDA. Labouisse reported on his discussions with Papandreou on the Tsirimokos appointment in telegram 1103 from Athens, January 21. (Ibid., POL US-GREECE) Tsirimokos became Minister of the Interior in February 1964.
The King told me that he had initially considered standing up to Papandreou over the Tsirimokos appointment, forcing the Prime Minister's resignation. However, he sensed that a possible trap was being laid for him and he was not sufficiently sure that he could win if he stood his ground.
As he seemed to be desirous of some reaction from me on this, I observed that I could well understand the importance of his being reasonably sure of success before taking on the Prime Minister. I told him that I had been approached by persons suggesting that the King should unseat the government and that my reply had been that I thought the circumstances not propitious and that if the King acted prematurely he could do the regime irreparable harm. I went on to say that there might well come a time when he would feel he must act, but I cautioned him not to do anything hastily. He agreed and then said that if Papandreou should "tamper with the Army as he has with the gendarmerie," he would definitely make this an issue and would call for the Prime Minister's resignation.
I inquired whether there were any indications that the Prime Minister is contemplating any such action against the Army Officer Corps, but the King did not think this was in the cards at the moment. He mentioned that Papandreou had at one point wanted to move Garoufalias from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Coordination but both the King and Garoufalias had objected.
We then spoke of the deterioration of the general economic situation in Greece. The King's views coincided with those of the Embassy; namely, that whereas there has been some deterioration and will doubtless be more, a real disenchantment with Papandreou among the public because of failure of his economic policies will not be felt for some months at least. The King then observed that meanwhile the main problem was to maintain and strengthen the forces of law and order to offset possible increased boldness from the extreme left.
Concerning the opposition party ERE, the King said that it was holding together but that there was no outstanding leader who could inspire the people.
Cyprus
I asked the King what Grivas was doing in Athens, to which he replied that he was here to "seek more authority." Grivas apparently wishes more authority over the Greek forces in Cyprus and also is asking for some additional Greek officers to assist him with the Greek Cypriot forces. The King does not believe that the additional authority will be given him, but made no further comment about the additional officers.
Grivas had called on the King that morning and, during the conversation, Constantine asked Grivas whether Cyprus would accept the Acheson plan at this time. Grivas reportedly replied that although he personally was more receptive now than he had been, he could not persuade the Cypriot people "to go that far."
The King then went on to stress the point he has made during previous conversations with me that the deterioration of the situation in Greece was partly due to the continued Cyprus crisis and that it was most important that an early solution be found. I agreed, pointing out the various efforts we had made to encourage an agreed solution and repeating again our position concerning the necessity for the parties themselves to get together for talks. I told him that I saw no possibility of any solution coming from the UNGA debates, stressing the limitations of power in the General Assembly on this issue. He said that it was because he realized that nothing would probably come out of the General Assembly discussion that he thought other efforts should be made.
He then said that he was searching in his own mind for some possible way out of the impasse and went on to outline a proposal which was thoroughly confusing. He inquired what would happen if Makarios could be persuaded "to declare Cyprus independent, asking all troops to leave the island and saying that he would thereafter negotiate with the Turkish Government re one or two bases." Wen I looked somewhat surprised at this proposal, he hastened to add that if Makarios would not act along these lines, possibly Grivas could set him aside and he could make the declaration. He added that he of course realized that nothing like this could be done without US approval, tacit or otherwise. I said that the proposal struck me as quite impracticable: in the first place I understood that Cyprus was independent, and secondly, that I could not imagine the Turks being willing to withdraw their contingent from the island against some promise of future negotiations. I pointed out that this was a far cry from the Acheson plan of last August and that Turkey had even rejected that. Therefore, I did not believe this a saleable proposition. I tried to probe to find out whether or not there was something else the King had in mind, or whether some suggestion had been made to him by Grivas or others about the possibility of Grivas displacing Makarios, but the results were negative.
It appears possible, judging from other comments we have heard in recent days, that Grivas may have been entertaining thoughts of attempting a coup somewhat along these lines. However, as we have reported, it does not appear that the Government has been willing to go along with him. In recent talks with the Foreign Minister, he has been categoric in asserting that Greece will take no action to upset the present calm on the island.
Comment: The King is a young man of good will sincerely troubled by the political situation and eager to advance Greek interests. His enthusiasm, his desire to be helpful, his inexperience and the fact that he is naturally the target of many persons seeking to promote partisan interest make it especially important to weigh with caution his suggestions for action. Moreover, the narrower interest of the Crown as well as the broader interest of Greek internal political stability require that his initiatives be prudent and made only after mature reflection. During the first year of his reign, he has, on balance, handled himself with skill and with restraint. I shall continue to encourage him to act in this manner.
Henry R. Labouisse
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, February 1, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN, London, Athens, and Ankara.
955. Deptel 495./2/ Bernardes has had very interesting meeting with Makarios. Latter confirmed that Sov Charg? has made it very clear that if enosis is GOC goal then "deal is off." If enosis is declared and Turks move in as they have threatened, then Sovs will stand aside; nor will they move if it is obvious that Turks take action as result of GOC attack against Turk Cypriots. Bernardes says Makarios told Satouchin that he could not specify GOC goals. Would appear that Sovs have indeed made clear to Makarios that he cannot count on them unless he prepared to deal enosis out of his future and they have at same time made clear what we have suspected all along: that they are quite pragmatic--as distinct from impression they made on gullible Cypriots--and would not get involved in nasty situation resulting from some GOC miscalculation.
/2/Telegram 495 to Nicosia was sent for action to Athens as telegram 961, Document 172.
There would seem to be no reason to doubt Makarios' statement to Bernardes. It confirms reports we have been getting and sending on to Dept in recent days and although Greeks here only now and then suffer from pragmatism, they and GOC must now realize that there is real trouble ahead in their attempts to use UNGA and supposed "open-ended" Soviet backing to achieve their aims. They may therefore be more amenable to negotiation than at any time in recent months. We have suggested this in recent cables,/3/ but this is not to say that Makarios is now willing to accept dictation from Athens.
/3/These suggestions were made in telegrams 945 from Nicosia, January 26, 947 from Nicosia, January 27, and 953 from Nicosia, January 29, all in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP.
Which leads us to suggest that we should be very cautious indeed in proposing some new set of negotiations or talks (Deptel 495) between Greece and Turkey without being prepared to accept that the results may be abortive as the last time we did so. There is nothing that Makarios would like better than to have a chance now to burnish his somewhat, but not seriously, tarnished image a bit by appearing the super patriot again, as he did when he rejected Acheson Plan mark one once it was presented to him by Papandreou. In fact right now he needs another such chance in order to counter criticism that he had become too involved with the Soviets. As we have suggested, GOC-Makarios appear boxed in, and we should be careful not to give them opportunity get out.
We continue to believe that the time is ripe for some new initiative, whether or not along the lines of our suggestions, and that Plaza is our best bet, despite real or imagined unhappiness on part of Turks with him (which USG might do something to counter). We are convinced however that no new game will be productive that deals Makarios out of the first hand. He is in charge here and he has made it unmistakably clear that there are no "parties concerned" with the internal problem as far as he is concerned, except the people of Cyprus, consisting of a Greek majority and a Turk minority. This position has international appeal and from viewpoint US interests whether he has the right to feel this way is immaterial: he is in a position to sabotage any bilateral agreement reached between Greece and Turkey and emerge stronger domestically than ever before, as he did after the last time he was dealt out of the game. Had we not better promote the Clerides position--i.e., GOG and Makarios talks to line up a possible mutually acceptable position which might then be negotiated by GOC and GOT, or by GOG and GOT. Our own feeling is that interests of settlement would be better served by direct negotiations between Makarios and GOT. Trouble with GOG handling joint position for GOC-GOG is that latter will always be vulnerable to Makarios if he thinks GOG is moving in wrong direction to detriment of Cyprus or if he sees some personal advantage in pulling rug. On other hand direct GOC-GOT negotiations based on joint GOC-GOG position would seem to have effect of multiplying pressures on Makarios while giving him important psychological (and political) incentive of appearing to be master of own fate.
Belcher
175. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 4, 1965, 2:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 16, Secret. Drafted by King and approved in U on February 16.
SUBJECT
United States & Government of Cyprus Positions on the Cyprus Problem
PARTICIPANTS
United States:
The Acting Secretary
John D. Jernegan, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
Robert Anderson, U
Gordon D. King, Cyprus Affairs, NEA/GTI
Cypriot:
Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou
Ambassador Zenon Rossides
The Foreign Minister called on the Acting Secretary at his own request in order to exchange views on the Cyprus problem before his departure for Nicosia next week. During the hour long conversation, the following points emerged:
1. Prospects for the UNGA. Kyprianou expressed pessimism over prospects for the General Assembly. The Acting Secretary agreed that the chances for the General Assembly are not good, that it is likely to adjourn on or about Monday February 8, and that the adjournment may be for several weeks./2/ He inquired about the plans of the Government of Cyprus.
/2/The General Assembly recessed on February 8.
The Foreign Minister noted that the Government of Cyprus has been hoping for a General Assembly debate to strengthen its positions and that of the Mediator. With the likelihood of an adjournment, Kyprianou felt that it is now necessary for him to return to Cyprus for consultations.
2. United States Position. Kyprianou asked how the United States feels now about the Cyprus problem.
The Acting Secretary stated that there is no change in the United States position. The United States, he noted, has always hoped for a resolution of the problem through discussions. A solution cannot be reached otherwise. The United States has long been skeptical that the General Assembly debate would make a contribution to the settlement. The United States position regarding a settlement is the same, that the parties must work out a settlement themselves. We are not prepared to dictate the solution. We tried to help in Geneva and it did not work. We have no plans and no proposals.
The Foreign Minister rephrased his question, asking what, after the experiences of the past year, the United States sees as a solution. Negotiations, he stated, have been tried and failed and would be of no use now unless there were some hope for a settlement.
When Mr. Ball noted that no talks have been tried since last year in January in London, Kyprianou said that negotiations have been repeatedly tried over many years. But what, he pressed, is the United States view of a solution? The positions of the parties concerned are well known: the Turks favor federation; Cyprus wants unfettered independence, majority rule, and self-determination. Cyprus knows, he said, that the United States wants an agreed solution but does the United States have some advice on a solution?
Mr. Ball observed that he could only tell the Foreign Minister what he had told Erkin. The treaties are still on the books. No one denies that they are not very workable. When this is the case, the only thing to do is to get together and talk. We told Turkey that we have no solution. Furthermore, a United States solution would not be useful. Because of the power and size of the United States, even if we made a proposal it would be taken as an attempt to coerce the parties concerned; so we refuse to make such a proposal. When we asked Mr. Acheson to offer advice to the Mediator, he was acting as an individual who put forward ideas which were not United States positions but were intended to move the parties toward agreement. He served as a catalyst. However, the effort did not work and is now academic. At present, there is nothing we can contribute by choosing a solution. On the contrary, we would be doing a disservice.
Mr. Jernegan stated that another facet is also important: countries which have made clear their views on a solution all have a direct national interest in the matter: the Greeks want enosis, the Soviets oppose enosis, the Turks want federation, etc. However, the United States by the nature of things is not directly concerned with any particular solution. We do not support enosis, nor do we condemn it. We do not support federation, nor do we condemn it. We want only to have peace and stability in the area.
The Foreign Minister insisted that there must, however, be a lasting solution. In order for it to be lasting, it must be acceptable to the majority of the Cyprus population. The majority does not want federation. Even a considerable number of Turk-Cypriots do not want to divide the island. But to say that all the parties concerned have a veto means that no solution is possible. In this context, the United States should press for the right solution. The United States cannot take a stand contrary to its principles. Others may do so, but not the United States. The situation only becomes more and more dangerous when the belief is accepted that the various parties have a veto. Turkey, for example, is not hurting because of the dispute. Neither for that matter is Greece. Therefore, they can afford to carry on and, as long as Turkey holds to its present course, no solution is possible.
3. The Soviet Position. Kyprianou said that it is wrong to believe that the Soviet position against enosis will make the Greeks or Greek-Cypriots anti-Soviet. They will instead again think it is the fault of the United States for not taking a firm stand. He asked why the United States is quiet over Turkey's approaches to the Soviet Union. When Mr. Ball pointed out that the United States did not object when the Government of Cyprus approached the Soviets, Kyprianou maintained that the Government of Cyprus quickly learned of the United States attitude through the American press. He said that, by contrast, even when Turkey withdrew from the MLF, there was no United States criticism. Mr. Jernegan pointed out that the change in Turk relations with the Soviets amounted to no more than a slight rapprochement to which the United States could not object.
The Foreign Minister said that the danger in this development is that it may lead to a competition between Turkey and Cyprus concerning the Soviets. If the tendency is to make the Soviets central to the dispute, each party may attempt to bid higher for Soviet support. Mr. Ball said there is no doubt that the Government of Turkey is willing to play up any kind of support it can get. However, he noted, the Turk-Soviet conversations, as the United States sees them, are not very far-reaching. We were surprised, in fact, at the Soviet statement regarding federation. Mr. Jernegan reiterated that the development is not a major element and expressed its primary importance as giving somewhat more encouragement to the Turks.
Kyprianou stated his belief that the Soviet position is simple. Moscow, he felt, supports the Government of Cyprus up to the point of enosis. If the Government of Cyprus says that it abandons enosis as an objective, the Soviets would be 100% on the Government of Cyprus side. Only here do Soviet interests coincide with Turkey's.
4. Turkish Objectives. The Foreign Minister maintained that in the long run it is not even in Turkey's interest to forget enosis. At present, he said, the Turks oppose everything Cyprus wants, but their basic interests would not prohibit enosis. He then professed to be puzzled as to Turkey's aims. He insisted that the Government of Cyprus really does not know, even though the Turks talk about federation and partition.
The Acting Secretary suggested that the Government of Cyprus ask them. Kyprianou hurriedly stated that the Mediator has been asking and cannot find out. He asked if it were prestige the Turks wanted, or land. He opined that the Turks know it is not possible to partition the island. He said that minority safeguards through the United Nations could be accepted in the Government of Cyprus. As far as East-West relations are concerned, Cyprus will choose enosis through self-determination and enosis will solve all problems. Therefore, he concluded, it is difficult to know what else Turkey could want.
Mr. Ball stated that, in a situation such as this, many deep emotional feelings, some rational, some not, are involved. Pride comes into the picture, national prestige, concern for the Turk-Cypriots, etc. It is very difficult to say that, objectively, the best interests of Turkey or Greece or Cyprus lie in a particular formula; this has been tried but is not what the parties concerned find acceptable. As far as Turkey's desires are concerned, Mr. Ball suggested that much depends on the manner in which a solution is worked out. Turkey might accept solution "A" at one time and not at another. He noted that, once last summer, there was a moment when it appeared Turkey might accept mere tokens to save its prestige, involving the lease of a small bit of land for a base, coupled with enosis. Mr. Ball said that he believes there is currently an enormous desire in Turkey to get rid of this problem. It has been here a long time and has become a domestic liability for the Government of Turkey.
5. Talks between the parties. The Acting Secretary expressed the view that a quiet kind of conversation over a long period of time would be useful. He noted that talks could perhaps involve Cyprus, Greece and Turkey with someone from the Turk-Cypriot community and suggested that it would be far better to enter into discussions than to let the situation continue. Mr. Jernegan added that discussions should involve some kind of quiet contacts perhaps between the Government of Cyprus and the Government of Turkey, and should be secret bargaining sessions to discover if the first positions of the parties are final.
Mr. Ball expressed the opinion that Turkey's first position is not final. He argued that an undertaking to hold discussions would in itself be useful, even if it fails. Such discussions, he pointed out, should not be gone through quickly, and in the meantime it would help for reasonable stability to continue on the island.
The Foreign Minister contended that the Turk-Cypriots have been building their strength during this period of calm. The Acting Secretary responded that some new tensions have arisen and mentioned specifically President Makarios' election proposal and the upcoming Turkish contingent troop rotation problem. These, he said, could make the situation very rough, but nevertheless talks could be quietly entered into and quietly held between Cyprus and Turkey, or among Cyprus, Turkey and Greece.
Ambassador Rossides criticized the London-Zurich agreement and suggested that a real solution is one which will enable the Greek-Cypriots and Turk-Cypriots to live together. He argued that divisiveness must not be insisted on and predicted that, if Turkey does insist, again there will be trouble. Federation, he said, is all right in a situation where it is necessary to bring parts together into a whole, but in Cyprus federation would mean breaking up that which is already whole.
The Acting Secretary reiterated that the United States is not insisting on any particular solution, federation or otherwise, but feels that since the island is quiet now, this is a chance for profitable talks; they hold the only hope. Mr. Jernegan suggested that the Government of Cyprus might find a basis for satisfying the Turks without physical separation. Ambassador Rossides agreed. Mr. Ball suggested that such a possibility should not be excluded. He reiterated his thought that in a quiet atmosphere, over a period of time, Turkey might not stick to its original position. However, he stated, outsiders should stay out, including even the British. The Soviets should stay out as well, he added, and the United States.
Mr. Jernegan noted that the attitude of all the parties has changed in the last few months; it is now clear that anything which is acceptable to Turkey and to the Greek-Cypriots would be acceptable to everyone else. Kyprianou objected that some differences between Turkey and the Turk-Cypriots are now apparent. He expressed the opinion that it would be helpful if agreement could be reached between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to approve whatever the Greek-Cypriots and Turk-Cypriots would work out. Both Mr. Ball and Mr. Jernegan expressed strong doubts that either Turkey or the Turk-Cypriots would agree to such an arrangement; Mr. Jernegan added that, if the Government of Cyprus worked something out with the Turk-Cypriots, Turkey might possibly accept it after some study.
Mr. Ball emphasized that his advice to the Foreign Minister about entering into talks he had already given to the Turkish Government and that he would willingly give it to the Greek Government. The Foreign Minister stated that the Government of Cyprus' fear has always been and still is that it cannot get a lasting and proper solution if a country outside Cyprus has a veto. He termed this "always a mistake". During negotiations back in the 1950's, he contended, the matter could have remained a colonial issue but the United Kingdom brought in Greece and Turkey. Cyprus, he said, is now trying to overcome that mistake. The Government of Cyprus feels that if a solution were definitely in sight, it would welcome negotiations. However, it has reservations about abandoning principles when it knows that negotiations will fail.
The Acting Secretary reiterated that the only way to find out is to try. He stated that if one tries to solve the problem on the basis of abstractions, opposing abstractions cancel each other out. A good deal of pragmatism, he suggested, is the best approach; the best way to find a solution is to look for one and the best way to look for one is to talk.
6. The Mediator. The Foreign Minister remarked rather wistfully that if the Mediator's preferred solution were only known, talks might be more hopeful. Mr. Ball expressed doubt that the Mediator is in as good a position to look for a solution as the Government of Cyprus is. Mr. Jernegan pointed out that the Mediator working alone could be caught between strongly opposing positions, shuttling back and forth between the parties; under such circumstances, the talks might die. It would be better, Mr. Jernegan added, if the Government of Cyprus and the Turks talked together.
The Acting Secretary suggested further that the Mediator might be most useful if Cyprus and Turkey and Greece had representatives located somewhere with the Mediator on hand to help.
7. Situation on the island. Mr. Jernegan noted that two issues have revived tensions on the island, the Turk contingent rotation and the problem of another Red Crescent shipment. He expressed the view that the negative attitude of the Government of Cyprus on these matters could destroy the present relative calm. He questioned very seriously if this Government of Cyprus action is worthwhile. Kyprianou described the second issue as a relatively minor one. The Government of Cyprus, he noted, has allowed all previous Red Crescent shipments in free even though everything in them was available on the island and Cypriot merchants were angry with the Government. As a result of Government of Cyprus leniency, this is tending to become an established practice. But with regard to the issue of the rotation, he said, a question of principle is involved. The Government of Cyprus questions the very presence of the contingent. The last time the Government of Cyprus agreed not to oppose rotation, it turned out that the Turks sent out 500 Turk-Cypriot students and brought in 500 Turkish soldiers. When Mr. Jernegan objected that there was United Nations supervision of the last rotation, the Foreign Minister insisted that the United Nations could not possibly tell whether or not such a thing happened. The Government of Cyprus, however, knows it as a fact and it makes the problem very difficult. Mr. Jernegan suggested a pragmatic view that even if true, it is a small matter compared to the obstacle the Government of Cyprus refusal raises to a final settlement.
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