Documents 176-193
176. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, February 10, 1965, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, USUN, Paris for USRO, and London.
991. Deptel 518./2/ Saw Bernardes morning Feb 09 immediately after receiving reftel. He shares our assessment of troop rotation problem. He will see Makarios in next day or two and present strong oral demarche to Makarios which he will follow up with letter for the record. He does not recommend we use SYG yet since once having done so there is little left in our armory in event SYG turned down at this stage. Says he believes Greeks mistakenly thinking in terms of substantial quid pro quo. He has reports from N.Y. that Kyprianou had suggested to UNSYG that appropriate concession by Turks would be turning control of Kyrenia Road over to GOC. Bernardes described this as wildly improbable concession by Turks and indicative of Greek failure make any objective assessment of Turk position. When I outlined Aktulga's exposition of Turkish attitude toward rotation (Ankara's 1152 to Dept)/3/ he agreed saying that he and his staff could not conceive of Turks making further concession on rotation question. Said he had already spoken to Makarios three times: once when he first knew of Turk request, again after hearing from Georkadjis that negative decision imminent, and again last Friday. Makarios had made it very clear at last meeting that he expected extract something further from Turks and also had mentioned Road. Bernardes had thought he had in mind some further relaxation of present restrictions on unarmed Greek use but word from New York mentioned above indicated they had grander ideas.
/2/Telegram 518 to Nicosia, February 8, approved Belcher's proposal to meet with Plaza and Bernardes and urge them to make a "preemptive" appeal to all parties on the troop rotation issue. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1152 from Ankara, February 6, reported that Turkey would neither make concessions nor enter into prolonged negotiations over the issue of troop rotation. (Ibid.)
Bernardes believes Makarios will push this question to the limit despite fact that by doing so he is obviously not acting in accordance with SC resolution. Bernardes letter will refer to GOC action last November permitting rotation and will call upon him in terms SC resolution to make concession on rotation in order not further increase tensions. We do not believe this will elicit any favorable response at this time and that it will be necessary towards end of month to call on SYG for public appeal to Makarios to which he thinks Makarios at last moment will acquiesce. Bernardes pointed out that this time he certain Turks not bluffing when they say failure to rotate on time (by March 8) would require special legislation by Turk GNA. (Perhaps Ankara could comment on this.)
Will discuss this question with Plaza tomorrow afternoon and will discuss with UK and Canadian colleagues here to see if they perceive any utility in seeking additional instructions from their governments to make individual d?marches to GOC in support of UN action.
As Dept aware I have already raised matter informally with Makarios and Araouzos, but there may be some additional mileage to be gained if I were to do so under instructions./4/
/4/In telegram 526 to Nicosia, February 11, the Department of State declined to authorize another d?marche to Makarios on the troop rotation issue, stating that it preferred to use the United Nations as a forum for dealing with this issue. (Ibid.)
Belcher
177. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 16, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
1227. Deptel 1032./2/ For Jernegan from Ambassador. I share your concern over indications that Grivas, Makarios, and GOG are working at cross purposes and offer following comments:
/2/Telegram 1032 to Athens, February 11, requested Labouisse's analysis of requirements for aiding Greece in keeping the security situation in Cyprus under control. (Ibid.)
1. GOG-Grivas relation
As we have previously noted, Grivas is under clear directive from GOG to prevent any provocative actions by Greek Cypriot forces (Embtel 1177)./3/ FonMin Costopoulos has told me Grivas was instructed during his recent visit to Athens to resist "another Mansoura"/4/ and to use his efforts to maintain calm on island. Recent CAS reports also confirm Papandreou's and Costopoulos' advice to Grivas to maintain status quo. I also note Nicosia's 999 to Department/5/ reports Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis informed Thimayya this past week that he had been requested to repeat GOG instructions to Grivas to take no action which would increase tension.
/3/Telegram 1177 from Athens, February 6, reported Greek desire to keep the situation on Cyprus calm and Costopoulos' view that Makarios' stand on troop rotation was not "irrevocable." (Ibid.)
/4/Reference is to the fighting around this village in August 1964 that provoked Turkish air attacks and the subsequent crisis.
/5/Telegram 999, February 11, reported that UNFICYP officials had seen signs of Greek efforts to restrain Grivas. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Important question remains, however, whether Grivas will act according GOG wishes or will become persuaded, as Embassy Nicosia fears (Nicosia's 992),/6/ that new adventures may be worth the risk. Since Grivas' role or status on island has apparently never been clearly defined, it is difficult to know how much control GOG actually has over him. Greek General Staff members have always responded vaguely to our questions regarding their relationship to Grivas and to his calls at Greek Pentagon. They have emphasized, however, that he is individualistic, "stubborn mule from Cyprus." King Constantine has told me he understands Greek General Staff can influence Grivas but that latter is not subject General Staff's command. Costopoulos takes same line re fuzzy mil command channels, but considers Grivas will follow GOG policy guidance.
/6/Telegram 922, February 10, reported UNFICYP concerns regarding arms build-up among Greek Cypriots. (Ibid.)
We recognize Grivas may be toying with idea of a coup d'etat to take Makarios out of the play and to create situation in which Cyprus Government would be actively pro-enosis and anti-Communist; such coup might put Papandreou in extremely awkward position domestically if Grivas were publicly to offer enosis and Papandreou were not in a position to respond for fear of Turkish reaction. There is also reason to suspect that Grivas actually proposed during his Athens visit that Makarios be set aside and was disappointed by what he considered to be lack of GOG policy on the Cyprus issue. Greek sources have been very discreet about Grivas' talks here. However, the King and today the Foreign Minister (contradicting his previous statement) told me General Staff making available some additional officers to Grivas to enable him strengthen command of Cyprus National Guard.
2. Cypriot elections and Turkish rotation
Costopoulos informed me that GOG was unaware of Makarios' plan for new elections and did not approve his statement on this subject. FonMin also confirmed to me today that Papandreou had spoken sternly to Kyprianou when he stopped here last week on return from New York and had urged him to avoid any actions likely to aggravate situation, and specifically, to refrain from holding elections, proclaiming new Constitution, and preventing rotation of Turkish force. Re latter, Costopoulos told me he suggested to Turk Charge that rotation be under supervision Thimayya and that Turks had agreed.
Costopoulos hoped that, if Turks delay rotation short while, there would be no snags. He also said Plaza had agreed to try to help in persuading Makarios against changes in Constitution and to permit rotation.
3. GOG views on interim solution
To your question whether GOG appreciates problem of readjusting and adapting itself to prolongation of status quo, I think the answer is qualified yes. Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and postponement of UNGA debate have helped to make Greeks realize that unconditional enosis is out of question, although they still call for unfettered independence with right of self-determination. In these circumstances, GOG policy is to play for time, to avoid any incidents on island, and to await outcome of Plaza's efforts. Costopoulos this morning expressed opinion that Mediator's position was even more important in view postponement of UNGA. He observed, however, that when filed, his report would probably satisfy no one. Costopoulos also expressed hope Plaza would not file a final report in March, but would keep door open by simply submitting brief "temporary" report stating he had been unable find agreed solution and would be available for further talks. He will urge this on Plaza when he comes to Athens tomorrow and he believes Plaza may be willing extend his mediation efforts for some time to come. (This may well be wishful thinking.) Finally Costopoulos noted that there was little prospect of reaching agreed solution while political situation in Turkey in flux and until after Turk elections.
If Mediator, however, eventually outlined general plan for interim solution to problem and suggested talks, I think Greeks would find this face-saving way to get off hook of no negotiations--providing Plaza's recommendations did not rule out enosis at some future date. There are, I believe, elements in GOG that may still be considering whether current situation might permit a new effort to find solution roughly along lines of August 20 Acheson formula, although Karpas area would probably not be acceptable as leased base area. More and more Greeks realize they must break out of current impasse, and Papandreou himself, I believe, knows continuation of tension and uncertainty is heavy drain on Greek economic resources and also potential threat to longevity of his government./7/
/7/In telegram 1217 from Athens, February 13, the Embassy reported information that Papandreou believed the Cyprus issue had entered a new phase. (Ibid.)
If some kind of interim arrangement must be made for an independent, demilitarized Cyprus, Papandreou will probably prefer that responsibility fall on Makarios and that Makarios conduct the negotiations. (This factor also explains in part Makarios' reluctance to talk to Turks.) In such an event, however, Papandreou will be increasingly vulnerable to attacks from the opposition asserting that he did not avail himself of his opportunities to assert his control over Makarios and to attempt to achieve at least a conditional enosis (subject to base rights, etc.).
In final analysis, what Papandreou could not accept, nor could any Greek leader, would be an agreement permanently forbidding enosis. In this respect, I believe the Greek position coincides with ours, i.e., enosis is the only solution which appears to hold out hope for lasting stability in the area.
Labouisse
178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, February 25, 1965, 6:25 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by King and Moffitt; cleared by GTI, BNA, IO, and UNP; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and USUN.
5342. Cyprus. Ref: Nicosia's 1030 and 1013 to Dept; Deptel 5269 to London; Deptel 511 to Nicosia, pouched London./2/ Dept officers discussed with British Embassy Counselor Trench Feb 24 apparent divergencies in US and UK attitude re Mediator's plans and nature of his proposed report. Following points were made to Trench:
/2/Telegram 1030, February 23, reported the views of Bishop and Plaza on the content of the U.N. Mediator's report. (Ibid.) In telegram 1013, February 17, Belcher reported that Plaza's views on the contents of his report had not changed. (Ibid.) In telegram 5269, the Department of State reported that the British Government had stressed the need for a constructive response to the Mediator's report in talks with Greek and Turkish representatives. (Ibid.) Telegram 511, February 6, reported on Ball's February 4 discussions with Plaza. (Ibid.) Plaza submitted his report to Secretary-General Thant on March 26; for extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 505-510.
1. Turks have pressed us several times to agree that Plaza should not submit report with recommendations; we committed ourselves to Turks to discourage submission of report.
2. Greeks also hold view that report would not be useful at this time.
3. We understood as of our last talks with British on subject in December that they also opposed submission substantive report.
4. Now, however, Plaza seems determined to submit report with recommendations which apparently weighted heavily in favor Greek Cypriot views.
5. We deeply concerned since we feel Turk reaction to such report may be dangerous.
6. We note at same time that UK and US views appear to be diverging; we concerned over differing UK-US assessments of Plaza's tactics and wish call to UK's attention.
7. We feel that Plaza may be giving UK one idea and US another as to what report would look like.
8. We also feel that among elements in Plaza's proposed solution, he is talking about demilitarization of island and not Republic; this appears to be one of matters which he may be making different noises about to UK and US.
9. We feel British should take measures to clarify Plaza's views on report before he commits himself to Makarios and leaves Nicosia to return to New York.
We queried Trench as to British attitude toward submission substantive report by mediator. Trench said he had little guidance on this but quoted from telegram on FonSec Stewart's statement to Greek and Turk Ambassadors, and Bottomley's statement to Cyprus HICOMer, on Feb 19 (Deptel 5269 to London) urging that parties exercise maximum restraint pending submission of mediator's report next month. Stewart's statement as read by Trench indicated British hope that Plaza report might contain new elements which could help toward settlement. Trench also stated that Cypriot HICOMer London had asked Bottomley whether British favored talks among parties. Bottomley had replied by letter to effect talks might be more meaningful after mediator's report submitted. From this it seems clear British at least reconciled to, if not in agreement on, submission report with recommendations for solution.
Trench said he would report conversation to London and give us HMG reaction when received. We hope this reaction will throw light on British thinking re wisdom of public report by mediator./3/
/3/In telegram 4203 from London, March 2, the Embassy reported that on the basis of discussions with the Foreign Office, Plaza still believed that Makarios was the key to a Cyprus solution and that the time had come for direct Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot negotiations. (Ibid.)
Rusk
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, March 15, 1965, 8:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by EUR, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
1161. Following report of conversation between Under Sec and Greek Amb. is based on uncleared memcon./2/ It is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review. Above caveat, however, does not affect portion of telegram requesting action by Embassy Athens.
/2/Not found.
Cyprus. Greek Ambassador called on Under Secretary Monday March 15 to respond to questions raised in March 12 conversation (Deptel 1048 to Athens)./3/
/3/Telegram 1048 to Athens, March 12, reported on discussions between Ball and Greek Ambassador Matsas in which the Under Secretary outlined U.S. concern over Soviet armament of Cypriot forces and requested an explanation of the role of the Greek Government in these developments. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-6 USSR-CYP)
Stated he was instructed to deliver GOG reply in form aide-m?moire (text per Athens 1359)/4/ which he handed to Mr. Ball, suggesting it be read and discussed. Matsas was defensive throughout conversation and attempted justify in rambling fashion that Greece 1) had not acted contrary to best interests NATO, and 2) importation of military equipment by GOC was not something Greece had encouraged or could prohibit but derived from need of GOC to defend itself against Turkish threat.
/4/Telegram 1359 from Athens, March 15, transmitted the text of a Greek note denying any involvement in arrangements for the supply and training of Cypriot forces with Soviet arms. (Ibid.)
Following main points and responses emerged during talk:
Under Secretary remarked Aide-m?moire raised more questions than it answered. Several facts were obscure: for example who has been training in Alexandria and for how long. Our information indicated Greek officers had been sent in February. If training is completed in one month rather than three, it can only mean personnel were previously trained in Nike missiles. Whether personnel "released" or not, they had residual allegiance to GOG or Greek military and Greece had obligation to NATO. Matsas promised to request more information.
Ball reviewed our understanding of GOG efforts to bring stability to island by injection into defense apparatus of some 13,000 personnel, some of whom had been released from Greek services, and pointed out our tacit acceptance of this situation was predicated on assumption GOG could control situation, both provocations against Turk-Cypriot community causing local incidents, as well as such problems as rotation of Turk contingent. Importation of heavy hardware created provocatory situation. We do not know what Turkish reaction will be. Thimayya has reported to UN that some of missile equipment had arrived on island and it would not be long before Turks became aware of it./5/ Our point of view is simple. Situation has worsened. If there are advantages in having Greek forces engaged in Cyprus can we expect GOG to assume responsibility for maintenance of order and prevention of provocations? Matsas protested that GOG could not exercise complete control over GOC activities. Present degree of control has benefits for NATO since otherwise weaponry would be in hands of young EOKA men or raw recruits of Cyprus National Guard.
/5/Belcher reported on Thimayya's views in telegram 1097 from Nicosia, March 14. (Ibid.)
Talbot pointed out we have concerns at different levels, but related: (1) question military and intelligence people are asking--whether Greek forces sent to work with Soviets or Egyptians had been trained or had intelligence of Nike missiles since contacts brought about might provide opportunity for Soviets to acquire information on NATO forces or missile operations of NATO; and 2) our assumption that if NATO military personnel, even though released, but subject to residual authority of NATO government, come into contact with highly sophisticated Soviet equipment, government concerned would discuss this with NATO. Matsas engaged in form and substance arguments. It was finally agreed form might not be violated if personnel released from service but matter of substance still important since training on Soviet equipment provided opportunities for obtaining some knowledge of NATO equipment. Matsas comprehended security aspect and promised to seek further explanation. He rephrased problem as need for GOG to persuade USG whatever Greece has done has not been harmful to NATO interests. Mr. Ball repeated we are not concerned with form but with larger considerations--that Greek personnel presumably owe allegiance to GOG, in position of operating Soviet equipment, with Soviet training, and this should be formally reported to NATO.
Talbot raised question of effect of recent shipments of heavy equipment on SC meeting March 17 and extension of mandate of UNFICYP. He noted that in past SYG has taken position sovereign nation has right to import arms for self defense but these heavy arms raise question whether action is in accordance with earlier resolution. We do not know what difficulties this will cause for SC meeting or who would be charged with responsibility. Matsas said GOG could not be charged since it had not told GOC to buy arms and had not been able to prevent. There was no consensus on what might develop in UN as result recent shipments.
Under Secretary said we have been trying with enormous effort to bring about some kind of settlement of this perpetual turmoil at some cost to our interests since role of peacemaker is never easy. He supported Mr. Talbot's statement of difficulties new situation has placed in way of progress toward settlement and correctness of our assumption that in light of our involvement so far we were entitled to more candor in connection with buildup than had been case.
Matsas asked for examples of what might be done to put situation in perspective. Ball replied with statement of some possible immediate steps: 1) arrange avoid having missiles emplaced, if erected put under control of UNFICYP, and 2) further deliveries of heavy equipment, such as 100 mm. guns, stopped; 3) rotation, that it take place without conditions in accordance with assurances we understand have been given. Matsas said GOG did not have degree of control to stop deliveries, noting it would have had chance had there been no aerial aggression or no Turkish threat. Ball noted that provocative nature of this equipment is the real question, together with effect it has had on Archbishop's position, causing him to take harder, more inflexible line. Matsas said putting weapons under UN control would certainly be resisted by GOC and would require change in UN mandate. Under Secretary said it was matter of speech. They need not be controlled, they could be neutralized under UN.
Matsas queried whether there was any indication yet of Turkish reaction. Ball replied we had no idea, but there are number of reasons for avoiding stirring up Turks when we should be working to bring about settlement. He noted we had been encouraged by indication GOG in congratulating new Turkish PriMin had hinted willingness to talk. Matsas referred to Mediator's report, surmised it would contain suggestions for formal conference or other less formal way of consultations to move toward settlement and asked whether USG knew conclusions of Mediator. Talbot replied in negative.
Conversation concluded with Under Secretary's noting we would await more information from Matsas. Matsas indicated he would discuss further with Talbot on Tuesday.
For Athens: Aide-m?moire and Matsas' line indicate Greeks have not understood, and do not yet agree, with our assessment of unfortunate consequences particularly with regard to negotiations for settlement which introduction of missiles, AA guns and tanks has caused. Matsas indicated he did understand our NATO concern for security aspect. We do not want to chastize Greece; we do not doubt their sincerity and faithfulness as an ally. However we do believe you should follow up in Athens to convince Greeks it is in GOG's own best interests not to dwell on explanations of past but 1) to concentrate on estimate of difficulties facing us both in present situation and 2) to examine what each can do.
As Under Secretary and Talbot pointed out, we have spent enormous effort to improve chances for negotiation of settlement, something also of vital interest to Greece. Realistically we must analyze obstacles to negotiations brought about by present tense situation, caused by buildup together with Makarios' tougher line. Next we must examine ways and means of defusing situation. First step is neutralization of missiles. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports continue indicate senior Air Force personnel are concerned with situation and are agonizing over fact missile hardware is arriving on island before crews are trained, with possibility Makarios might ask for Soviet crews. They therefore are more in tune with us on this point than GOG officials. Suggest some approach be made to them in your discretion if possible before Grivas' consultations to solicit their efforts in obtaining action on neutralization of missiles and some delay in future shipments mentioned by Under Secretary./6/
/6/In telegram 1101 from Nicosia, March 15, Belcher reported that the Greek Government had passed on the substance of U.S. protests on the introduction of Soviet arms to the Cypriot Government and that the Cypriot Minister of Defense had called the Embassy to complain about U.S. efforts to obstruct the acquisition of these arms. Belcher believed that this move was part of a Greek campaign to demonstrate its limited control over Cypriot actions. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
Rusk
180. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, March 16, 1965, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House.
1364. I called last night on PriMin Papandreou at his home in Kastri together with Anschuetz. The PriMin was in serious, almost grim, mood and seemed rather tired.
I immediately launched into discussion of Cyprus question and covered substantially same ground covered by Ball and Talbot yesterday with Matsas (Deptel 1161)./2/ I said that although during latter part of February and first days of March, situation had seemed to be improving on island (for which I credited Papandreou's influence on Makarios and Grivas). In recent days things had taken serious turn for worse. There seemed to be two elements in this. First, increasingly hard line taken by Archbishop Makarios, as indicated by his restrictions on Turkish population, his refusal to cooperate with UNFICYP to reduce tensions in Famagusta, and his reported statement that his "peace offensive" had not yielded results with implication that therefore Archbishop would have to assume tougher line. Second aspect was introduction of Soviet heavy equipment including surface-to-air missiles into island, manned by Greeks trained in UAR. I pointed out introduction these missiles could be "straw that broke camel's back" with regard to GOT, taking into account steady erosion Turk position as result Makarios policy of "faits accomplis." USG had been shocked that loyal NATO ally, Greece, without informing US or NATO, permitted its citizens to be trained in Soviet weapons. USG viewed this development with gravest concern, and we request GOG to exert all its influence on Makarios immediately to stop any further deliveries of SAMs and to seek means to dispose of or neutralize arms already delivered.
/2/Document 179.
Papandreou first commented on "unacceptable" manner in which matter had been presented to Matsas. He said he realized Cyprus problem could involve question of war and peace between Greece and Turkey and possibly consequent escalation into confrontation between blocs. He reiterated that US had no more loyal ally than Greece and spoke with sincere regret of fact there had been series of misunderstandings between GOG and USG since he had come to power. He referred specifically to his inability to accept President Johnson's suggestion for direct talks with Inonu. Failure USG to take position on merits of Cyprus problem had unhappily permitted Moscow to inject itself dangerously into situation. His own invitation to Moscow was part Soviet disruptive policy. Although he had accepted invitation to Moscow he had interposed conditions with regard to timing and diplomatic preparation which would never be met. Internal divisions within country make it impossible for him to leave at this time and inasmuch as Soviet Union would never accept self-determination and enosis for Cyprus, diplomatic condition precedent for visit to Moscow will never be fulfilled. Reflecting obvious sensitivity to unfavorable reaction which might be created by his current domestic policy toward left, he reiterated his uncompromising opposition to Communism as well as his dedication to use of democratic measures to combat it. These measures he insisted require time and organization, but democratic approach is only one which holds ultimate hope for success.
PriMin then reverted to question SAMs and asserted delivery of SAMs do not constitute threat to GOT because they can be used only against aircraft and only in event of GOT aerial attack on Cyprus. Papandreou noted that last August Turks had been able to bomb island with impunity and that Cypriot Govt had legitimate right to seek defensive weapons. He observed it is much better that these missiles be in hands of Greeks, and not Russians, and thus could be controlled. He asked if I would prefer to have Russians man these weapons. In apparent effort vindicate participation Greeks, Papandreou noted that as result of training in use of SAMs, GOG now in possession of considerable technical data on these Soviet weapons which it would turn over to US. I noted USG had not been informed by GOG that it is in possession of such data but that we would welcome receipt of it. However, price is much too high and we would prefer not have secrets than see Greek soldiers trained by Soviets and Soviet missiles introduced into Cyprus.
Papandreou then turned to what he described as GOT's "threatening attitude." He asserted Turks are constantly threatening to bomb Cyprus which in turn justified Cypriots to seek defensive weapons. When I asked him provide instances such threats, he answered that aside from frequent declarations of GOT military figures, British MP Francis Noel-Baker, who had seen GOT PriMin one morning last week, had informed him that PriMin Urguplu had admitted that he could not control Turkish military which boasted that GOT Air Force needed only "seven minutes" to be over target on Cyprus.
PriMin continued that in view of these circumstances he could not logically tell Makarios to give up his defenses. It would be "illogical" for him to tell GOC that they must disarm themselves and only "pray" against Turkish attack. Papandreou then returned to his favorite theme, which he has repeated to me many times (cf. Embtel 314 August 16, 1964)/3/ throughout Cyprus crisis: if US would only issue warning to both GOT and GOG against any military intervention in Cyprus, then he could assure US that there would be no further troubles on island itself. He himself could go there to establish GOG control over situation. PriMin spoke at some length on advantages to be gained from such "guarantee".
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
I answered that if GOT unwilling to give such pledge throughout past year it is most improbable that events now would induce them to do so. I contrasted Cypriot acquiring of SAMs as means to deter GOT attack to person who gets inoculation against disease only to find that inoculation itself provokes the disease. I stressed that GOT could consider Makarios' actions as attempted blackmail to which they would not submit, since GOT continues adhere their own interpretation of their rights under treaties.
I told Papandreou we would like certain specific information, which Under Secretary Ball had requested of Matsas and I had requested of Garoufalias, concerning arrangements made with UAR and/or USSR concerning training of Greeks to operate SAMs, number of SAMs, etc. GOG note (Embtel 1359)/4/ had not been responsive in this regard. PriMin replied somewhat indignantly that as GOG note had stated, there were no agreements between GOG and UAR or USSR; PriMin said individuals involved were all retired personnel who had joined Cyprus forces of own accord. In fact he had only learned there were Greek personnel involved when present question arose. I noted I had been informed that GOG had recalled from US all those Greek technicians being trained in operation Nike-Hercules missiles in US immediately after completion of training instead of permitting them spend some extra time in US as has been custom. This led some observers surmise they might be recalled to replace those learning to operate Soviet SAMs. I added that I would like to discuss all of these aspects with DefMin Garoufalias. Papandreou said he would give DefMin instructions to supply me with all information I needed.
/4/See footnote 4, Document 179.
I then posed question to Papandreou as to what specific measures GOG could take re SAMs. Papandreou countered he was more than willing make every effort reduce tension but that it must be "joint effort." Therefore, he said, he would use all of his influence with Makarios and Grivas to prevent any further shipments of SAMs if US and/or GOT agreed to give guarantee against any future Turkish aerial attack on Cyprus except in case of serious provocation. He noted Grivas was coming to Athens and he would tell Grivas that he must obey instructions to refrain from aggressive actions and if he would not do that, he must resign.
I pointed out such GOT guarantee was highly unlikely. Consequently, question is whether PriMin would make necessary effort without this assurance. Reluctantly, PriMin said he would do all he could, even in absence of such guarantees. However, he concluded that he would be counselling "illogical" course, since he was asking Makarios to be "defenseless" in event of possible Turkish attacks.
Anschuetz asked if PriMin considered present situation might not be suitable moment to initiate direct GOG-GOT talks. Papandreou said policy of GOG is to not take any initiative prior to submission Mediator's report. He remains firmly attached to policy of maintaining peace on island pending eventual solution and says he will do all in power to that end.
Comment: Although interview was discouraging, I believe Papandreou and his govt will make sincere efforts to prevent escalation and, given some cooperation from Turkish side, to reduce tensions. Last night Papandreou limited himself to general assurances and provided no concrete commitments or precise information. Papandreou, of course, attempted to bargain for cessation of shipments of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles to Cyprus and apparently saw controversy over SAMs as opportunity to present his favorite proposal for US "guarantee" that there be no outside military intervention in Cyprus. When he saw this was not possible, he agreed to exert his efforts to stop any further shipments, although it remains to be seen whether he can actually produce on this. His argument that Makarios and Cypriots may not be willing to follow his advice on this "illogical" line seems to me quite possible. Leaving Soviet equipment, emphasis on defensive nature of the missiles will have popular appeal here and on the island.
Although I feel that Papandreou and others with whom we have talked have come to realize very serious aspect of Greek involvement with Soviet SAMs they obviously find themselves in most serious dilemma and are hard put to work way out. Because of defensive nature of missiles and strong position Makarios and Grivas will doubtless take for their installation, it will not be easy. However, impotence of Papandreou's position, demonstrated once again, derives from knowledge he cannot control Makarios but must keep up pretense he is in control of situation, from his fear of taking a position which would compromise him vis-?-vis public opinion in Cyprus or in Greece, and fact that emotionally he is convinced Cyprus is justified in doing what it can to defend itself, notwithstanding reservations about methods employed to do so. On other hand, friction with USG and American public opinion deeply distresses him and he would sincerely like to be responsive to US requests.
I wish to stress to Department and others in Washington that final paragraph of Papandreou's reply to our d?marche/5/ is a sincere reflection of Greek feeling. In spite of all we have told Greeks over many months, they remain convinced that we pamper the Turks, reserving our condemnation for the Greeks.
/5/This paragraph stated that Greece had been and continued to be a "sincere and faithful ally" while Turkey, which had opened a "courtship" with the Soviet Union, had not attracted "any allied criticism which seems to be reserved as a prize of the steadfastness of Greece." (Greek aide-m?moire, March 14; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
To set the record straight (see para number 5 of Papandreou reply) FonMin Costopoulos did not tell me that members of active Greek military were training in UAR. He referred to "Greeks" or "Greek crews" as I recall. As Costopoulos may be called to task for going even that far and as he is undoubtedly very friendly to us, I made a point last night in my talk with Papandreou of minimizing Costopoulos' role as an informant. I stated that I had gone to see the FonMin because of the rumors I had heard from other sources; that, although the FonMin had acknowledged missiles were possibly on the way and that "Greeks" were training on them, he had not mentioned "regulars" but that we very naturally assumed those Greeks had been trained on Nikes and were part of Greece's armed services.
I intend continue press gravity of situation upon FonMin Costopoulos, DefMin Garoufalias and other high-ranking Greek officials at every opportunity.
Labouisse
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, March 18, 1965, 9:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Talbot and U, and approved by Talbot.
1179. For Labouisse. Your 1364./2/ If Papandreou interprets "guarantee" as some sort of assurance that the US will use all possible diplomatic means to prevent further "unprovoked" Turkish aggression and we could agree on meaning of "provocation", it might be possible to relieve Papandreou's worries somewhat on Turkish military threat. If GOG can prevent provocation, we and the Greeks would have more influence with Turks. Could Papandreou give us assurances GOG can prevent provocations for at least six month period, understanding this means: Rotation of Turkish contingent without conditions; no customs or import restrictions on Red Crescent shipments; no economic blockade on Turkish community; more cooperation with UNFICYP in working out piece by piece negotiations to prevent incipient incidents and bring about more freedom of movement? If Papandreou and other responsible elements of GOG guarantee they could keep status "unprovoked", we would be in position to go to Turks and obtain clarification of their assurances they will take no military action unless provoked and gain their agreement on "provocation". If you believe desirable you might respond to Papandreou's request using above line./3/
/2/Document 180.
/3/In telegram 1187 to Athens, March 19, the Department of State instructed Labouisse to make "every effort" to ensure that Papandreou understood that a positive response to the Turk suggestion of direct talks would be critical in assisting U.S. efforts to reduce the threat from Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Rusk
182. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, March 19, 1965, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Noforn; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, USUN, and London. Passed to the White House.
1376. Jernegan and I called on PriMin Urguplu this afternoon on what was intended to be essentially a courtesy call with additional thought that occasion might be used to do a little spade work on getting conversations started as suggested Deptel 1010,/2/ and as my conversation with PriMin three days before had suggested that hopes from Turkish side looked quite promising (Embtel 1355)./3/
/2/Telegram 1010 to Ankara, March 16, reported the build-up of Soviet arms in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 1355 from Ankara, March 17, reported on talks with Urguplu and Isik on Cyprus and the impact of the issue on Turkish politics and Greek-Turkish relations. (Ibid., POL 15-1 TUR)
Accordingly, after usual exchange of amenities, Jernegan opened on modestly hopeful note that, after long and fruitless exchange of views through intermediaries and in view of various recent events which again spotlighting problem, it would seem that effort might be made to seek results by direct confrontation which had proved impossible of accomplishment by indirection.
PriMin listened attentively and then lowered boom--very hard.
Speaking from previously prepared notes he delivered himself as follows:
Time had come, he said, to stop talking of consulting parties and exchanges of views. Have now reached stage where views and advice are less than useful; situation much too serious. Determining factor is situation on island. Weapons, officers and men have been introduced on Cyprus allegedly for defense but actually for aggression against Turk Cypriots. If Turks attacked island, these could be used against Turk forces but real objective is Turk Cypriots.
Pointing to thick file of documents, Urguplu said that they contained messages of type being received daily describing dire plight of Turks on island. Also contained in file were other messages from Washington, United Nations, etc., conveying repetitive message to effect "we are not able restrain Makarios; you must be patient".
Furthermore, as far as UNFICYP concerned, its Commander admitted helplessness and only seemed be thinking of how evade trouble if it breaks out.
In some unexplained way he seemed to think that some unidentified recent talk which Dept officer Churchill had with unnamed officer of Turk Emb in Washington served confirm this negativist attitude.
As consequence, situation has been reached when GOT can no longer be satisfied with "appeals and talk"; it must act. Turkish people believe their govt has left Turks in Cyprus to mercy of Makarios. GOT does not wish provoke an incident; for that reason needed supplies have not been sent in by force, but time has now come for decision and decision has in fact been taken in meeting of Security Council held today under Pres Gursel.
A brief outline of this decision had been given press (Embtel 1374)/4/ but he would add following;
/4/Telegram 1374, March 19, transmitted the text of a Turkish press release regarding a meeting of the Turkish National Security Council on the Cyprus issue. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
1) GOT intends warning GOG that, "if its inhuman actions do not stop in a very short time", it will have to intervene (in Cyprus). GOC will also be advised.
2) Date has been fixed for rotation. Permission will not be requested, treaty right will be exercised. If resistance is encountered, force will be used. All considerations have been taken into account re effects in Greece and elsewhere.
3) Other previous unimplemented decisions of Security Council will be carried into effect after study will be completed in several days.
Urguplu then said GOT wishes make clear that it considers GOG real "counterpart" in this affair, said it was from mainland that commanders, forces and "NATO equipment" had been sent to Cyprus.
This decision, said PriMin "is most regrettable" but Turkey has been left alone and isolated and time has come when it felt it necessary act on its own.
As regards Soviets, they had brought some relief (by political support) which GOT would prefer to have had come from its allies. Furthermore, GOT knows that in US, UK, France, etc., there is greater sympathy for Greece than Turkey. In so saying, Urguplu observed that he had served in the United States, had liked Americans and had worked for and believed in American-Turkish cooperation as Ambassador in Washington, but unfortunately he does not see same understanding on part of USG now. It was hard say this but must be frank.
There were many other angles of matter which might be discussed but preferable stick to essentials. Only hope is to stop "inhuman acts" and then negotiate.
With this said, he wanted to know what we are going to do. Were we going to make new appeals? Would we again be heard saying we had tried and failed? If we continue talk only in terms of advice, he saw no possibility of restraining Turk public and parties (Note: this somewhat elliptical but, like rest this message, based on almost verbatim notes drafted in sequitur without editing in order assure accuracy).
Urguplu said that same matter would be discussed tomorrow with political party leaders, including Inonu. On Monday Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses would be similarly consulted (in secret) and on Tuesday would be put before Parliament in secret session. Thus far endorsement of policy has been unanimous and PriMin was confident that would be same with parties and Parliament. After this process completed Greek Govt would be officially informed.
Urguplu said foregoing was only being divulged to us. He regretted news was not good but this was not first time that situation faced which might result in war.
He concluded by saying that he had spoken with complete frankness. Still possible that there might be last drop of that reasonableness for which Greek ancestors known.
At this point Jernegan said there were several questions which he wished pose for clarification:
When would Greeks be informed? Reply: Following conclusion of consultations with parties and Parliament.
What kind of "inhuman acts" did PriMin have in mind? Our most recent reports indicated no notable deterioration. Reply: All kinds of harassments, economic restrictions, inability move freely, "everything, everything". For example, there were some 40 items on list of things Turk-Cypriots were not allowed to buy.
In saying that permission would not be asked for rotation, did that mean would not even inform GOC? Reply: GOC will be informed but may be at about same time rotation takes place. Galo-Plaza and U Thant had arranged for rotation toward end of month and then it would be.
How about awaiting Plaza report? Reply: Turkish people are mocking government for what is regarded as "wait and see" policy.
Not in form question but observation, Jernegan here said not correct to assert that friendship in U.S. greater for Greece than Turkey. True that there are many more Greeks in U.S. than Turks but Turkey greatly appreciated.
Jernegan also said that so-called support of Turkey by Soviet Union was hardly impressive; seemed just be lot of words with no commitment. We don't believe that Soviets really want a solution; just playing game. We could do same thing but would be harmful rather than helpful.
To this, Urguplu replied that he was happy to hear these words of friendship for Turkey. As regards Soviets, words may be vague but friends of Turkey not even prepared go that far. What's more, believes Turks understand Russians very well and we need have no reason for concern on that score. Jernegan said we did indeed understand this and it was for that reason that we had not been perturbed despite insistence in certain quarters that we should condemn GOT action to improve relations with USSR.
Jernegan then said he had noted that in my conversation with PriMin several days before, Urguplu had spoken somewhat hopefully of talks with Greeks./5/ Could not suggestion such talks be renewed in intended communication to Greeks? Reply: Situation has changed. Furthermore Greeks didn't reciprocate Turk indication of willingness talk (PriMin didn't explain nature these feelers but Bayulken later said he probably referred specifically to talks with Greek named Drossos who recently here in guise of newsman but was regarded as informal emissary). Also situation deteriorating so fast that will be too late for talks unless urgent action taken to redress situation. To this Jernegan said he had understood time would be given Greeks to take remedial action after delivery of notice. Urguplu said this correct but time would be short.
/5/Reported in telegram 1355 from Ankara.
Once again Jernegan asked what would happen if Greeks prepared talk. Urguplu said would wait while and see what happens but made clear would not wait long. In any case, talks on basis enosis out of question. Jernegan said he felt sure GOG would not insist on this.
Finally, reverting to basics, Urguplu said wished make clear that if USG should seek intervene again as it did last year, results would be catastrophic for US-Turk relations. He wished stress this. Turks are patient people but there comes a time when they will act regardless of effect on mother, father, brother or son. It is not question of talking about what Turks can do with Greeks but of what U.S. can do. If we can do nothing, "events will follow their natural course".
Jernegan asked what PriMin had in mind that we could do. Urguplu said that was up to State Dept.
At this rather conclusive point conversation was cut short by announcement that Cabinet was assembled and awaiting PriMin.
At one point in conversation, I said that woven into the remarks of Urguplu I seemed to detect a certain suggestion of what might be termed impatience with USG of rather serious sort. If so, I wished recall that over the years and particularly since World War II U.S. and Turkey had established fine record of mutual effort in building up security strength of Turkey and also paving way for future development of internal strength. Many Americans and many Turks had contributed in this on basis of fundamental and enduring interests. Would be tragedy if Cyprus, which totally unrelated to this mutual effort, should be allowed affect basic relationship. Furthermore, in case of Cyprus itself, we had made unusual effort to be of assistance and fact problem had proved so intractable should not be charged unduly to us. As he had with Jernegan, Urguplu replied with right words but that was all.
Comment: Any similarity between this conversation and that of my talk with Urguplu of three days before would be that of night and day, or, to put it another way, practically all of the same points were covered in both conversations but in mirror-like reverse. It would be reassuring to discount this as being attributable to the temperamental reaction of an over-strained man such as we sometimes saw in Erkin or in a display of super-gamesmanship at which Inonu was adept, but this was seriously and ominously different.
This was not a man speaking for himself with the authority of high position but rather a man speaking under the impulsion of other forces over which he can exert little control. This is not, of course, the first crisis we have met in this wretched business but, serious as the others were, this one disturbs me the most for the reason that it seems to have developed a sudden head-long quality as distinct from previous crises where there was always an Inonu at the wheel who could be approached and could change course if he personally so decided.
Jernegan and I are having working lunch with FonMin Isik tomorrow and will see if we can find any rays of light in what is tonight very dark cloud./6/
/6/In telegram 1378 from Ankara, March 20, Hare further commented that Urguplu had stressed that mounting public impatience with the Cyprus situation was reducing his margins for maneuver. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Hare
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, March 21, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
1402. Re Deptel 1179./2/ I called on Prime Minister at his political office this noon at his request. Anschuetz accompanied me. FonMin Costopoulos, DefMin Garoufalias, UnderDefMin Papaconstantinou, and GOG Amb to Cyprus Alexandrakis were also present.
/2/Document 181.
PriMin said he "agreed completely" with proposals contained in Deptel 1179 which I presented yesterday to Costopoulos (Embtel 1401)/3/ suggesting that if GOG can give assurances that GOG can prevent provocations for at least six months, US would be in a position to go to Turks and obtain clarification of GOT assurance they will take no military action unless provoked. Papandreou said that he could give assurances "without reservations" to six month moratorium on provocation from Greek side. He said he had just spoken to Grivas, who agreed in principle. Garoufalias and Alexandrakis will leave for Cyprus this afternoon in effort to obtain agreement of Makarios on this. PriMin emphasized that although he agreed in principle with proposals, implementation must be completely honest with "no hidden aspects."
/3/Telegram 1401, March 20, described a meeting in which Labouisse presented the proposals outlined in telegrams 1179 and 1187 (see footnote 3, Document 181) to Athens. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
PriMin then went point by point over proposals.
1. Rotation of Turkish forces. GOG understands this to mean that no obstacles would be placed in face of rotation of Turks. However, he emphasized that unit must be composed of soldiers and must not constitute attempt to infiltrate Turkish officers. I asked if in accepting rotation PriMin meant that Greek side would not ask for exchange, or try to bargain. He answered yes.
2. No customs or import restrictions on Red Crescent shipments. PriMin said this unimportant matter and that GOG completely in agreement on condition that it be "honestly implemented."
3. Economic blockade. PriMin said this also "logical and reasonable".
4. More cooperation with UNFICYP. PM said of course.
5. GOG guarantee that so far as it was within its power situation on island would remain "unprovoked." PriMin said GOG agreed but with understanding that GOC is independent government. However, he assured me he would exert all possible influence on Makarios to accept this.
PM then said that US proposals had given him "great satisfaction" and that ideas "correspond to what we believe." At same time he asked that USG exert all its influence on GOT to accept same principles.
I pointed out to PriMin that Department's proposals were result of my meeting with him last Monday (Embtel 1364)/4/ at which time he had asked for guarantee against Turkish attack. I recalled that while I had said a guarantee against military intervention was impossible, the USG is proposing that if PriMin can give assurances there will be no provocation from Greek side for six months then we would be able to use all our diplomatic power to obtain clarification and agreement from Turks against intervention. PriMin answered that he considered it essential to have harmonization of USG and GOG views, all other points being minor and can be worked out. He said he was sending Garoufalias, who has his complete confidence, to arrange matters with Grivas and Makarios. PriMin said that GOG wants peace and he believes that GOT does also. However, he fears that misunderstanding could cause conflict. For this reason he said this latest American initiative is "praiseworthy."
/4/Document 180.
I then pointed out that proposals did not include certain points which were so obvious as to not need mentioning, such as GOG and GOC refraining from attack on Turkish contingent or proclaiming instant enosis. PriMin said "I give my guarantee on this" at which time Garoufalias interjected "unless you request it."
I said I wanted to be perfectly sure that we understood one another's positions clearly. I said that it was my understanding that the PM accepted completely the proposals contained in Deptel 1179. He said yes, on condition that proposals be "honestly applied."
I asked then if Makarios accepted proposals, to which PM replied that that is why he is sending Garoufalias to Nicosia. Garoufalias interjected that Grivas accepted proposals in principle although he wanted clarification of some details, but there remained question of Makarios, and that he hoped to have Makarios' answer when he returned, probably on Tuesday.
I then brought up question of Ambelikou and asked if Grivas is willing to accept UN control of position. Garoufalias answered that Grivas did not accept this but had counterproposed that UN forces be stationed there together with GOC forces. PriMin noted Grivas maintains it was Turks who started trouble by building road and then moving in platoon of troops. Therefore, Grivas insists that he remain in his position there but that UN force can join him. Grivas is reluctant to turn position over to UN because he claims that Turks built road even though UN was there. I pointed out that such a move by Grivas of turning over his positions to UN would be example of good faith and evidence of cooperation with UN that was needed.
Garoufalias then spoke at some length defending Grivas' position. He also asked us to inform Ambassador Belcher to ask Thimayya to be "more objective" re situation. He said Grivas believed there was tendency in UNFICYP of support for Turkish position because of what they believed was their "underdog" status.
I asked for more details on what FonMin told me yesterday about the Turks blocking the road between Nicosia and Limassol.
Garoufalias answered that Turks had not actually blockaded road as yet but had constructed block houses near it. I said Grivas should not take action on his own but should go to see Thimayya even if Turks move. He said Grivas would not take any initiative but it was essential that Thimayya do so. He said he would tell Thimayya and Grivas when he saw them to try and settle this and other questions.
Costopoulos asked me what I knew about press reports of GOT plans to deliver ultimatum to GOG. I said I did not know any details but I was aware that within GOT there are those advocating hard line and those following more conciliatory policy. I said thing of most immediate concern to Turks is the "inhuman treatment" of the Turkish Cypriots. For that reason, every measure must be taken not to provide examples of "inhuman treatment". PriMin said that as far as he knew everyone was free to move on the island and that there is no extreme hardship except for those in the Turkish created pockets.
When I left Amb Alexandrakis accompanied us to door, and I emphasized upon him once more necessity of avoiding incidents on island. I said that the Greeks are in incomparably stronger position and should be able to act with restraint toward any Turkish moves. Alexandrakis answered that while it is true Greek Cypriots are in top position on island itself, fact that Turkey is so close and constantly threatening attack makes Greeks underdogs as far as overall situation concerned.
Comment: Seriousness and importance with which Greeks view our proposals was highlighted by fact that Prime Minister had come into town on Sunday, contrary to custom, and had been holding conferences all morning with Grivas and high GOG officials before seeing me. I believe Papandreou genuinely pleased at Department's response which he considers is obviously a step toward reduction of GOT threat. Key question remains as to whether, assuming Makarios' acceptance in principle, GOG can enforce observance of conditions. Another factor of prime importance is that Turks refrain from sabre-rattling.
Labouisse
184. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, March 26, 1965, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
1439. Jernegan and I called last night on Prime Minister pursuant invitation extended previous day. Costopoulos and Sossides were present as well as Anschuetz who accompanied us.
PriMin invited Jernegan open conversation. Jernegan replied PriMin might be interested in general impression which he had formed during his recent visit to Ankara. Jernegan reviewed current political situation in Turkey, determination GOT take more resolute position regarding deteriorating Turkish position on Cyprus, and desire new elements in GOT to improve their relationship with Turkish military. He noted there is no hysteria in Ankara but rather conviction that current situation could not be permitted continue. GOT recognizes possibility of war, tragic as it would be for Turks as well as Greeks, cannot be excluded. Jernegan emphasized GOT considers GOG real interlocutor regarding Cyprus problem and is therefore eager to initiate direct conversations with GOG.
PriMin expressed appreciation Jernegan's presentation. As a political leader himself he understood political and psychological problems which confront GOT. Pending final solution GOG attempting arrange provisional solution based on maintenance of peace and status quo on island which in turn would develop better climate between GOG and GOT. As result GOG initiative GOC has been forced accept rotation, abandon economic blockade and assure there will be no military provocations or operations. These conditions were forced on GOC after threat of break by GOG. Papandreou reverted to his basic argument that failure of bilateral talks would only aggravate problem and again expressed regret he had not been able accede last summer to President Johnson's request for direct talks.
Papandreou went on say that with submission Mediator's report period in which talks inadvisable is drawing to an end. However, he was at loss understand how Turks could justify such pressure for talks just on eve of Mediator's report. Following submission Mediator's report new discussions between GOG and USG would be in order.
Papandreou noted GOT proposes avoid talks with Makarios. In fact, Turkish Cypriots virtually do not exist as an effective economic or intellectual factor on island while Greek Cypriots exist both in numbers and as a state. Turks assert GOG has an army in Cyprus, which is true to an extent. Greek military personnel were sent, however, to assist Cypriots who were faced with threats from Turkey at a time when Cypriots themselves had virtually no military resources and no control Makarios himself. Greek assistance to Cyprus is purely for defense, but now Turks again threaten because defense has been established. Some means must be found to break out of this vicious circle. Although GOG has moral and material force to impose its will if its demands are logical, Makarios is morally strong when he is threatened with attacks or with bombing. Since GOG has imposed its will on GOC to permit rotation, etc., Turks must now also demonstrate good faith by refraining from threats and thereby gain time to reach an understanding. War between Greece and Turkey is improbable but cannot be excluded, Papandreou said. If Turks want war they will have it because GOG cannot avoid it. However, he said, I am determined there will be 1) no pretext for war or 2) no misunderstanding which would constitute justification for war. War, if it comes, would probably not be limited. Bulgaria might move under pretext of protecting Greece while Tito would act to prevent Salonica from falling into hands of Bulgarians. I do not want historical responsibility for a war, he said, and I assure you that status quo will be maintained on the island and that there will be no pretext for war and no misunderstanding. With settlement of problem of rotation of contingent and guarantees against military provocation, dangerous aspects of problems have been eliminated. It is ridiculous consider minor economic issues as justification for actions which would cause war or peace to hang in balance. If Makarios takes any initiatives which would provoke military action, I will denounce him. I have told Makarios I will not follow him in such action and will not be led to war by him. After all, enosis will eventually be accomplished through union of Cyprus with Greece, not Greece with Cyprus.
Papandreou reiterated, as he had at our last meeting, that he regretted certain coolness which had developed in Greek-American relations as result of Cyprus. He hoped this ungrateful period will have passed without harm. Greece has been a sincere and loyal ally both in easy and difficult times and this will continue.
Costopoulos inquired whether in this pre-electoral period there is any real hope that concrete results could be anticipated from direct GOT-GOG relations. Jernegan suggested position GOT would certainly be easier if it could assert it had established contact with GOG. Urguplu is a man of good will and even Turk military do not want war, but they feel that time is working against them. Papandreou again warned that if discussions were undertaken which after a period of weeks or months were to reach an impasse, possibility of ultimate solution would become even more remote. Jernegan pointed out that if nothing happens, even on surface, GOG might within the same period of time find itself at point of no return vis-?-vis Turks. Papandreou insisted that indirect contacts through Acheson and Mediator had not produced an impasse, but that an impasse as result of direct conversations would be grave.
Papandreou asked toward what type final solution Turks seemed oriented. Jernegan said he had not come away from Ankara with any very clear impression. Turks seemed rather more preoccupied with concrete facts of current situation, although it had been made clear that enosis is totally excluded as a solution.
I alluded to Papandreou's earlier assurance that there would be no pretext or misunderstanding which could justify Turkish attack and that there would be no economic blockade or difficulties regarding Red Crescent supplies. I said frankly our discussions with Garoufalias had not produced this impression, that we believe GOT is restless particularly because of alleged oppressive measures against Turk community especially with regard to economic measures. Papandreou laughed and said Garoufalias was very tired after his long meeting with Makarios and Cypriot Cabinet. He reiterated his determination to impose on Makarios such measures as U Thant or United Nations would recommend in these matters.
Jernegan noted Tuluy, new Turkish Ambassador in Athens, is an extremely well qualified and able man. Consequently, it might be extremely useful if Costopoulos or PriMin could see him soon. Even though situation may not yet be mature enough to approach question of final solution, such contact would be of tremendous value in clearing away misunderstandings of fact regarding situation on the spot and thereby avoid any explosion.
I also urged GOG not just await Mediator's report in hope creating new situation but take immediate steps reduce misunderstanding and clear path for the future. Our talks with Garoufalias upon his return to Nicosia had not been encouraging and reports from Nicosia itself discouraging. While we have no information which leads us believe Turk community subjected to actual military threat, we are not at all confident GOC will take measures which will relieve economic pressures on Turks. In fact, according to some reports, ideas which I had discussed with PriMin in response to his suggestion and which he had accepted, had been presented in Nicosia as "American proposals" which GOC had turned down rather than alter its present policy. Position attributed to Makarios, that no flour could be included as part of Red Crescent supplies, hardly confirmed he is prepared cooperate for purpose reducing tension. It would be useful talk directly to Turks about such "details" which, small in themselves, are charged with explosive potentialities. Jernegan added it is much more important for GOG convince GOT it is sincerely endeavoring to reduce tensions than to attempt to convince USG.
Papandreou said that he would see Tuluy soon, possibly tomorrow,/2/ and that he is prepared to tell him what he has told us. He acknowledged GOG policy may be misunderstood and said he is glad to have new persons of good will like Tuluy, Urguplu and Isik to deal with on Turkish side. Conversation with a diplomatic representative, such as Turkish Ambassador, is a natural and normal thing and would permit exchange of views without disclosing precisely what subjects were covered and without unduly exciting public speculation.
/2/Papandreou met with Tuluy on March 27. The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 1446 from Athens, March 27. (Ibid.)
Comment: Meeting provided useful opportunity for Papandreou personally to restate directly to Jernegan line which he has been taking with us. It also afforded Papandreou with an excellent appraisal situation existing in Ankara. As indicated, Papandreou attempted to put best possible face on results of Garoufalias' efforts in Nicosia, as well as to reiterate his thesis, more than somewhat threadbare, that he could impose his authority in Nicosia in those cases where GOG position is morally unassailable. His efforts to discount importance of certain economic pressures being applied against Turk community suggests he does not in fact have much confidence in his ability to insure a complete relaxation in Makarios' policy in these regards. I am hopeful, however, GOG has been pushed to undertake serious contacts with Turkish Ambassador here. Incidentally, Tuluy has confirmed to me that Costopoulos had told him he wanted to see him often to discuss current matters (see Embtel 1401)./3/
/3/See footnote 3, Document 183.
Papandreou clung tenaciously to proposition that Mediator's report will provide basis for new assessment of situation and possibilities long-term solution. I am not confident he is yet prepared enter into bilateral conversations with regard to such final solution. Papandreou's comment that publication of Mediator's report should be the occasion for further discussion between USG and GOG lends weight our suspicion that he hopes induce USG again to become intermediary.
We are seeing Costopoulos and Garoufalias again tomorrow to pursue further with them results Garoufalias talks in Nicosia. Nicosia's 1150 and 1155 to Dept most useful./4/
/4/Telegram 1150, March 22, reported the Turkish Cypriots' need for supplies. Telegram 1151, March 26, commented on the Turkish Cypriot food supply. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Labouisse
185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, March 26, 1965, 4:16 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Greene and cleared and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
620. Following is uncleared, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review.
In hour and half conversation on March 24, Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou reviewed recent Cyprus developments with Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary Talbot. Meeting at Kyprianou's request.
Kyprianou said situation on island now relatively quiet. GOC seeks (1) to reduce tensions and return to normality; (2) agreement on minority rights for Turk-Cypriots. Current tensions caused by self-isolated Turk-Cypriots and their intimidation other Turk-Cypriots. Agreement on minority rights complicated by question of who are true Turk-Cypriot leaders. If there is any serious problem, it is minority rights; GOC prepared to discuss this.
Under Secretary reviewed recent talks in which we have been involved. Said GOG suggested US might seek agreement from Turkey that it not intervene on island for six months. Thus climate for negotiations might develop. GOG seemed enthusiastic about its suggestion and sent Garoufalias to Nicosia to discuss proposal. Now we hear Garoufalias has had no success in talks with GOC. Under Secretary said he wanted emphasize this Greek idea; we would cooperate by speaking to Turks only if Greece and Cyprus in agreement. What is needed is period of quiet in which parties immediately involved can talk.
Kyprianou commented GOC could never meet conditions for talks established by Turks since latter and self-imposed Turk-Cypriot blockade only causes current problems. [sic] Secretary and Under Secretary insisted there other problems such as arms buildup, relief supplies, refugee housing. Secretary said central problem that of Turk-Cypriot security.
Kyprianou replied to latter point saying he doubted Turkey only interested in Turk-Cypriot security. Partition remains final aim. Still GOC ready discuss minority rights which could be guaranteed by UN whether Cyprus remains independent or joins Greece. There could even be UN observers to oversee minority guarantees.
Under Secretary said these thoughts worth exploring with GOT. Pointed out formation new Turkish Cabinet/2/ might make explorations with it fruitful. If talks on that basis seemed impossible, then GOC should try another approach. Important point is to get talks started. But if GOC wants useful discussions, it must suspend actions which would hinder talks.
/2/On February 26, the Justice Party formed a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Suat Urguplu.
Secretary said thought had come to him which he had not explored with anyone. Present Turk-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot officials elected to govern Cyprus, not to negotiate communal settlement. Perhaps communities could now hold new elections for sole purpose electing small number delegates to something like constitutional convention. Delegates could explore possibilities of interim arrangement and then during extended truce examine possible long term solutions.
Kyprianou said his immediate personal thought was that only GOC officials could represent Greek-Cypriot side, but elections might be held by Turk-Cypriots. However, how could GOC talk to Denktash, for example, without hurting real moderates like Ihsan Ali? How could Turk-Cypriots hold free elections when extremists intimidate moderates?
Talbot inquired about possible talks with GOT. Kyprianou thought discussions with Turk-Cypriots would be easier for GOC and perhaps for GOT also. Latter would certainly participate from behind curtain anyway. Asked whether Turks would be prepared to talk directly, Under Secretary replied we did not have Turkish proxy, but since Turks ready to talk to Greeks, they might also be ready talk to Greek-Cypriots. We know Turks sick of crisis.
Talbot said recent period has been one marked by waiting for developments such as UNGA debate, mediator's report. Latter expected within next few days, after which new phase will begin. This phase should be based on frank talks.
Kyprianou asked whether Cypriot-Turkish talks would be better than some between Greek-Cypriots and Turk-Cypriots. Under Secretary said we only interested in helping talks begin and precise composition of parties a secondary point. If talks began between Turk-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, they would probably eventually be expanded to include Greece and Turkey anyway. Important point is to begin talks and see how they go. It would be welcome initiative if Archbishop would inform Turkey he plans to initiate talks with Turk-Cypriots and, if there progress, Turkey and Greece should eventually join discussions. If Makarios did not want to make this approach directly, perhaps Athens could make it for him.
Kyprianou asked whether Turkey would accept such an approach. Under Secretary replied we do not know, but important point is to explore such ideas and see where talks might lead. Suggested recent assignment new ambassadors in Athens and Ankara might present useful opportunity. What we hope for is conversations. Immediately involved parties should determine precise procedures and USG would be helpful where possible.
Kyprianou concluded saying would wait for mediator's report and then determine what to do next.
During conversation there were several exchanges on two immediate problems:
Red Crescent supplies: Kyprianou said GOC could not extend free entry procedures since there ample supplies on island and businessmen would be hurt. ICRC had said latest customs free shipment should be last. Under Secretary said in this problem we faced with an immediate condition, not mere theory. Lawyers should be first to appreciate importance not being too legalistic. If GOC wants meaningful talks, it should suspend actions standing in way of those talks.
Ambelikou: Talbot said current situation seriously increases tension and asked why Greek-Cypriots could not withdraw as requested by UNFICYP. Kyprianou said UNFICYP had not acted when asked by GOC and so Greek-Cypriots must now take own action to counteract Turk-Cypriot moves. UN clearly in wrong at Ambelikou. Under Secretary said UN should be considered neutral force whose requests given special consideration.
Greek Ambassador informed Talbot March 25 that Kyprianou told him that US officials had not pointed to "perils of situation" and were not "alarmed". He was disturbed because this was counter to his reporting to Athens and his recommendations for action because of "critical phase". We suspect Kyprianou's remarks to him may have been ploy to resist GOG pressures. However Talbot told Matsas we would endeavor to clarify in Nicosia and Athens as appropriate.
Rusk
186. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Tehran/1/
Washington, April 6, 1965, 9:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Ball, King, and Bracken; cleared by IO; and approved by Jernegan and Ball. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO. Rusk was in Tehran April 6-9 for the CENTO Ministerial Meeting.
Tosec 16. Cyprus. From Ball. GOT stated publicly it considers Plaza's services at an end because he exceeded his mandate. Thant's letter in response strongly defended Plaza and report and called on Turks to reconsider position on Mediator./2/ His letter did not ask Turks to change attitude toward substance of Mediator's report.
/2/For extracts of Plaza's report (U.N. Doc. S/6253), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 505-510. The Turkish letter to Thant and Thant's reply (U.N. Doc. S/6267) are summarized ibid., p. 510, footnote 36.
Turks have replied to Thant with letter which we understand is somewhat conciliatory but does not rescind Turkish rejection Plaza; letter will not refer to report./3/
/3/U.N. Doc. S/6267/Add. 1, summarized in telegram 3950 from USUN, April 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Your discussion with Isik may provide an opportunity to bring the Turks nearer to reality. At the moment it is difficult to find any thread of rational strategy in their conduct. The purely negative position they have taken is not good enough. We have been trying to prevent public discussion of the report. However, by disqualifying Mediator and repeatedly threatening military action, Turks have opened the way for a GOC initiative for early SC debate on Cyprus issue. Moreover, they have weakened their position in that debate. Yet they will certainly ask our support and be bitter if they do not receive it.
Under these circumstances I think you should take a strong line with Isik. You should emphasize that Turkey is tearing itself apart over a situation that involves only 100,000 Turks and that the world is getting tired of stubborn inability of a handful of people to live together. We have made a great effort to assist Turkey to find an honorable solution. But Turkey's position does not improve with time.
We have made clear from the beginning that there was only one way to solve the Cyprus problem and that was by negotiation. This also is the burden of the Mediator's report. The Mediator suggests that negotiations start between the two communities on Cyprus. This may be impracticable but the GOT might still find some profit in announcing that it was advising the Turkish Community to begin such negotiations. This could put Makarios on the spot. Obviously, the GOT could provide competent men who could serve as advisors to the Turkish Community if such negotiations ever materialized.
If the GOT does not regard this formula as feasible, it might propose to negotiate directly with Makarios on behalf of the Turkish Community. This might be one way of forcing the hand of the GOG--compelling it to undertake negotiations with the GOT or risk losing its position in the situation.
USUN has expressed concern about the apparently aimless direction of Turkish actions and you may wish to raise one or more of the following questions:
1. If GOT expects our support, we think they owe us fuller explanation of what they are really driving at, expressed not in terms of ideal desiderata but of real possibilities in real world.
2. It not at all clear to us what GOT really expects to achieve through present course of action.
3. After Geneva experience, do Turks think GOG has capability of forcing Makarios to accept either partition or Federation?
4. Does GOT hope keep Cyprus problem on shelf for six months (beyond Turkish elections) meanwhile trying prevent status and welfare Turk-Cypriots from deteriorating?
5. We had understood GOT wanted protection for Turk-Cypriots and assurances against enosis; if Turks feel guarantees these two items insufficiently stated in report, what guarantees conceivably acceptable to other side would they propose?
6. If GOT continues along present course, we must assume question of Plaza report will come up for debate before UNSC very soon; how can US or other friends of Turkey be helpful unless we are fully informed re objectives present Turkish posture and actions?
You may wish also mention following elements in Plaza report which Turks might find positive and useable.
1. Debarring of enosis.
2. Demilitarization (genuinely demilitarized Cyprus would greatly reduce Turkey's security worries).
3. Human rights (Plaza's suggestions leave considerable room for GOT to maneuver, particularly in developing international institutional arrangements ultimately to replace London-Zurich).
4. Autonomy for Turk Cypriot community in communal affairs, specifically education, religion, and personal status.
5. Recognition of "hard fact" of distinctive character of two communities and that, without weakening unity of state, Turkish Cypriots should have "an equitable part in public life of country as whole."
6. UN role in settlement (UN assistance in demilitarization; UN safeguard of human rights; UN guarantee of final settlement terms).
Repeating to you USUN's 3840/4/ which briefs principal features of Plaza report.
/4/Dated March 30. (Ibid.)
Ball
187. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 9, 1965, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, USUN, Ankara, Nicosia, and Geneva for Labouisse.
1519. Ambassador called last night on PriMin Papandreou and FonMin Costopoulos. DCM was also present. Bourguiba had just completed a 3-day official visit/2/ and Papandreou was evidently tired from obligations involved in visit. Despite PriMin's weariness, he seemed relaxed.
/2/April 5-8.
Papandreou initiated discussion by having Costopoulos read text of GOG statement on Plaza report (Embtel 1517)./3/ PriMin observed that there is basic "contradiction" in Mediator's report since it recognized right of self-determination but then suggested Cypriots should deny themselves that right because of threat from Turkey. Thus Plaza was in effect asking Cypriots to renounce rights guaranteed by UN Charter because of threat by one member of UN against another. GOG is, however, attempting mold its policy in harmony with Plaza report, since it is GOG view that Plaza should continue his role. There are two aspects to Cyprus question: first is need for provisional settlement and secondly final solution. Until now, GOG policy has been to wait for submission of Mediator's report. Now that report has been issued, basic question is what to do next.
/3/Dated April 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
In view of "vacuum" currently existing following publication of Plaza report, GOG would like to demonstrate "good will." GOG had "obliged" Makarios to give "real pacification" to Turk-Cypriots. First step is to begin negotiations between two communities on Cyprus. However, to do this Mediator must play role. Since Kuchuk would not respond to simple request to talk, Makarios will seek Plaza's assistance. Makarios, he continued, has had erroneous idea that Cyprus exists in isolation and consequently has assumed that by terrorizing Turk Cypriots they will submit. This, however, ignores fact that Turkish state and UN exist and since Makarios' "defeat" in his relations with Moscow Makarios no longer has courage to insist on his own policy.
Papandreou then referred to question of direct negotiations between Ankara and Athens. Papandreou observed that new Turk Ambassador, Tuluy, is "difficult" but that he has organized mind and could give intelligent answers "even when we disagree." He had told Tuluy that until now he had refused negotiations not because he is uncompromising, but because he has perhaps been "wise." Failure of direct negotiations could lead to rupture in relations between GOT and GOG. Even now time is "not yet ripe." Talks now would simply mean each side would air its views, with GOT advocating partition or federation and GOG supporting enosis. Result would be stalemate or even worse.
Rather than holding talks between GOG and GOT now on substance of problem, more meaningful step would be to "show our good will" and thus win time. Both sides must try to progress on day-by-day basis through maintenance of contact through diplomatic channels. Beginning will be by pacification in Cyprus "through total protection of Turkish minority." He had told Amb Tuluy time is necessary because there will be elections in Turkey in September or October and present GOT would find it difficult to make sacrifices immediately before elections. Thus, as GOG sees it, appropriate schedule is for negotiations now in Cyprus between two communities with help of Mediator to be followed by negotiations between Ankara and Athens after Turkish elections. Although Tuluy did not express agreement he said he would transmit these thoughts to his govt.
Question of final solution still remains, Papandreou acknowledged. From point of view of GOG it is not imperative find an immediate permanent solution since time is working for Greeks. Greeks control 98 percent of area of island and 98 percent of its military force. Situation cannot remain stationary, however, because (1) UNFICYP cannot continue forever and (2) Turkish restiveness cannot be indefinitely restrained. Plaza report had made it clear London and Zurich are unworkable and that there can be no federation and no partition. Therefore, there are only two possibilities for future of Cyprus: (1) completely independent Cyprus and (2) Cyprus as part of Greece--enosis. Put another way, choice is between "oriental" (pro-Soviet) Cyprus and "occidental" Cyprus, which through union with Greece would become part of NATO.
Papandreou then outlined GOT criteria in Cyprus solution. Basically, they are (1) protection of Turkish minority, which GOG was willing to guarantee, (2) security of Turkish state, which GOG could provide through Cyprus' membership in NATO, and (3) GOT prestige, which GOG is willing to "assure".
With regard GOT prestige, PriMin said settlement could be handled in such way it would seem to be Turkish victory. When Ambassador pressed Papandreou on what GOG could actually give which would meet demands of Turkish prestige, PriMin could only answer that "something" would be given, but that he did not know precisely what at present time.
Papandreou then reverted to practical steps which could be taken to ensure provisional tranquility. He said GOG wished collaborate with GOT for complete pacification of island and that he had repeated this to Amb Tuluy on previous evening during reception for Bourguiba. Even if GOT rejects Plaza report, GOG will seek to find way to bring about peace on island in conjunction with Turks. PriMin reiterated that GOG is working to create situation in which war would never arise as result Turkish "misunderstanding." If conflict came it would be only because Turks wanted it and not due to misunderstanding of Greek intentions. Papandreou referred to fact that Tuluy had given Costopoulos an aide-m?moire (Embtel 1454)/4/ containing list of things GOT believes endangers Turk community on Cyprus. GOG is giving it serious attention in hope correcting most conditions to which GOT objects.
/4/Dated April 4. (Ibid.)
Ambassador referred to question of Soviet SAM's for Cyprus. Papandreou said this question is finished as far as GOG is concerned and that DefMin Garoufalias had given strict orders that no Greek be involved in any aspect of this program. When Ambassador pressed for information on what arrangements Makarios had made for training of Cypriot personnel and delivery of additional missiles, Papandreou disclaimed any knowledge. However, Costopoulos referred to rumor reported by Grivas that Egyptians considering training Cypriots in use of the missiles without knowledge of GOG. Costopoulos asserted he had instructed Greek Ambassador who had been in Athens during Kyprianou visit to inform GOC that if such thing happened, all agreements between Cyprus and GOG should be considered as terminated (sic).
Comment: Conversation provided additional evidence of GOG desire to work sincerely with GOT toward reduction of tension on Cyprus and to maintain continuing contact with Turkish Ambassador Tuluy to this end. Papandreou has had two conversations with Tuluy and Costopoulos at least three, including one this morning.
GOG seems confident of its ability to encourage a reduction of tension in the island. GOG also appreciates fact Plaza report represents substantial tactical advantage for Greek case which, accompanied by decreasing tension on the island, might hopefully create a situation in which new efforts find solution could be fruitful. However, this calculation would collapse if Turks, aware that time is on Greek side and sensitive to increasingly less favorable position of Turkish case vis-?-vis world opinion, were to permit initiatives by Turkish community which might galvanize situation into new crisis.
Recent references in Athens press to Acheson plan as well as from Papandreou's formulation of final solution as choice between "oriental" or "occidental" Cyprus make it rather apparent that GOG hopes involve USG again in process finding solution. For time being at least, it appears our role here should be to encourage intensification GOT-GOG contacts in hope that in process certain general areas of understanding will eventually emerge which would provide valuable preparation for the time (perhaps after GOT elections) when GOT and GOG will feel they are in position to address problem of final solution on the merits.
Anschuetz
188. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/
Tehran, April 9, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Geneva. Secretary Rusk traveled to Geneva on April 9 to attend a meeting of U.S. Ambassadors to the Middle East.
1104. Department please repeat to field as appropriate. Secretary in breakfast talk with Turkish Foreign Minister Isik this morning repeatedly emphasized that US would hope for and expect full consultations with NATO in advance of any military action Turkey might decide necessary to ensure physical safety and supply daily necessities Turkish community in Cyprus.
Isik said he was unable to give such assurance. Secretary then warned that in event GOT takes action without consultation Turkey would find itself isolated and this would spell disaster. Isik indicated he understood this point and insisted that GOT would take military action only if forced by circumstances to do so. He implied that such circumstances might include (1) protracted threat to well being Turkish Cypriot community or (2) attempt by Makarios to bring about "juridical" fait accompli further diminishing rights of Turkish community. GOT, he said, would not take action impulsively.
Secretary pointed out that juridical innovations could always be changed by negotiations but Isik replied that GOI now has no other means than military action to oppose Greek Cypriot domination Turkish community.
Looking beyond Cyprus dispute to long-term objective of improvement relations between Turkey and Greece, Secretary asked Isik what role GOT would like to see us play. Isik's answer was that USG should seek to ascertain basic conditions sought by both sides, try to find a solution and then push both to agree. When US begins pushing Turks, provided solution be presented privately rather than in a public report, GOT will study US proposal "as carefully as possible." Secretary emphasized that USG has no independent view of Cyprus problem. Our objective has always been to help bring about a solution acceptable to parties to dispute.
Isik assured Secretary that GOT is "really interested" in talks with Greek Government if there is some prospect of concrete results. Isik feared that it would not be possible to preserve relations with GOG if urgent question of physical situation of Turkish Cypriot community is not settled within a "normal" period of time. If basic preconditions of (1) no territorial annexation and (2) no Greek Cypriot domination of Turkish community are acceptable to GOG, Isik felt there might be some hope that secret talks could lead to an agreed solution.
Foregoing is drawn from uncleared memcon, drafted after Secretary's departure for Geneva./2/
/2/A memorandum of conversation is ibid.
Herz
189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, April 20, 1965, 9:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by EUR and Jernegan, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, USUN, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.
1342. We believe that efforts you have made so far to bring more reality to Greek consideration of possible elements of Cyprus solution should be accelerated.
One of points toward which GOG exhibits less comprehension, particularly since submission Plaza report, is unattainability of enosis without compensation to Turkey. This applies whether enosis sought in immediate future or over years as reportedly under consideration by Clerides.
Suggest you use occasion of your farewell talks with King, Papandreou, Costopoulos and others to help Greeks clarify in their own mind:
(1) Enosis cannot be achieved without compensation;
(2) If Greeks attempt enosis without prior arrangement with Turkey, there will be violent action by Turks. They have made this clear in public and private statements;
(3) Western alliance cannot be expected impose enosis or restrain Turk action while instant enosis attempted. Both Greece and Turkey are important to Western alliance and we could not (even if capable of doing so) try to help bring about enosis at expense of a frustrated Turkey who would surely then follow neutralist policies.
It seems to us that more realistic consideration by Greeks of above points would help Costopoulos in proposed initial talks with Isik on occasion NATO Ministerial, which we certainly hope will not be sabotaged by reported GOT actions against Istanbul Greeks./2/
/2/In telegram 1664 from Athens, May 7, Labouisse reported that he had made the points outlined in this telegram in calls on the King, Queen Frederika, Stephanopoulos, Costopoulos, Garoufalias, and Kanellopoulos. (Ibid.) The Ambassador left post on May 8.
Rusk
190. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
London, May 13, 1965, 1700Z./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for USRO.
/2/Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich Mean Time.
Secto 16. The Secretary's conversation at noon today with Costopoulos, Palamas and Pilavachi showed clearly that Greeks feel on very shaky ground in regard to proposed bilateral talks with Turks re Cyprus./3/ Main things worrying them seem to be:
/3/Isik and Costopoulos met during the NATO meeting. Their discussions were reported in Secun 15 from London, May 11. (Ibid.)
A. Turkish insistence on talking about conditions for continued independence of Cyprus and reluctance to discuss enosis./4/ Costopoulos repeated point he had previously made to Ball that Greece had no right to negotiate about independence of island in absence of Makarios and that any attempt to do so would open way for Archbishop to sabotage whole operation. On this, we suggested talks might begin without any prior understanding as to their basis and that Greeks could take initiative to bring up enosis with compensation at very beginning, thus channelling further discussion in right track from their point of view. Costopoulos looked dubious and did not comment.
/4/Reported in Secun 11 from London, May 11. (Ibid.)
B. Greece does not feel it can undertake talks without some UN connection; Costopoulos thinks it important that "third person" at least have blessing of UNSYG even if he is selected by prior agreement by the GOG and GOT. Still thinks New York is best location and cannot accept Turkish idea of talks under NATO auspices. We asked whether Greeks had yet made suggestion about New York to Turks. Costopoulos said no and indicated he was hoping we would present this idea to Turks. Secretary asked why they could not sit down together and exchange ideas on their respective 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices for location and personalities to be involved; perhaps one of these sets would match. Costopoulos did not respond directly, merely reiterating difficulty of discussing anything but enosis in absence of Cypriot representative.
C. He fears Turks will be unwilling devote time necessary to work out solution this very difficult problem and that if there are any delays in course of talks Turks will charge bad faith and take action or make threats which will completely upset situation. Secretary emphasized that to prevent such actions or threats it was absolutely essential to have complete calm on island and full protection for Turkish-Cypriots. Costopoulos rejoined it was equally necessary that Greeks and Patriarchate in Istanbul be protected, otherwise Greek public would explode. He urged that we use our influence to make this point understood in Ankara.
D. Costopoulos fears Turks want to make propaganda out of fact talks underway and might prematurely reveal substance of discussions. He emphasized that to prevent difficulties in Greece and above all sabotage by Makarios there must be absolute secrecy about substance, but he agreed it would probably be impossible to prevent public knowledge of fact talks themselves were underway. Secretary said he thought it should be possible to maintain secrecy on substance.
In course of discussion Secretary reiterated advice he had given Isik that above all contact must be maintained and participants must not be easily discouraged. Over a period of time new ideas might emerge. Assured Costopoulos that he believed Isik genuinely desired to keep things quiet on island, something which was essential to make lengthy talks possible.
Greeks mentioned Inonu press statement supporting present Turkish Cabinet in relation to Cyprus issue. Costopoulos himself volunteered that this seemed to show Turks really meant business. Secretary concurred.
Secretary asked about reaction to set of "agreed principles" we had submitted to them and to Turks./5/ Almost exactly as Isik had done yesterday,/6/ Costopoulos replied most of points were acceptable but he felt there should be some additions. Also remarked that some points seemed in conflict with UNSC resolution of March 4. Secretary pointed out that if Greece and Turkey could agree on anything, they would certainly get unanimous endorsement from SC. Costopoulos asked whether our idea was that agreed principles should be published once understanding reached with Turks. Secretary said no, that idea was to give two parties a common basis to build on and enable them to launch negotiations on the easier rather than the most difficult issues. Jernegan suggested, however, that if agreement could be reached there would seem to be definite advantages in publishing, since a great many people in Greece and Turkey and elsewhere must be anxiously looking for signs of hope. Palamas replied problem would be adverse effect publication would have on Cyprus. Finally, Costopoulos suggested he could talk to Isik about principles tonight. Secretary agreed but said he did not think too much time should be spent on this at present moment since first essential was to get agreement on procedures.
/5/Reported in Secto 2 from London, May 12. (Ibid.)
/6/Rusk reported on his conversation with Isik in Secto 9 from London, May 13. (Ibid.)
With further reference to danger of violent action on either side, Costopoulos said we must keep in mind terribly important humanitarian aspect. If Turks attacked Cyprus whether by land or by bombing, Makarios would proceed to kill all Turkish-Cypriots and Turks would retaliate by killing all Greeks in Istanbul. Secretary again emphasized importance that there be complete calm on island. Costopoulos said during recent meetings in Athens Makarios had repeatedly promised GOG he would keep peace and abolish all measures directed against Turkish-Cypriots. He had also promised to refrain from initiating changes which would likely to provoke Turks: A) he will not carry out his plan to call new elections this summer when his present mandate runs out--instead he will continue in office without raising issue; B) he also agreed to refrain from appointing a pro-Greek Turkish-Cypriot minister, GOG having told him he must not bring a Quisling into his Cabinet.
Secretary suggested it might be useful for Turkish Ambassador Athens and Greek Ambassador-designate Ankara (both of whom are in London) get together this afternoon to see if they could smooth over some procedural difficulties before tonight's meeting. Costopoulos gave tentative endorsement to this.
Secretary asked if there was anything special USG could do to help negotiations along. Costopoulos indicated he did not want US participating, since that would be regarded in Greece and Cyprus as US interference and pressure. He made no concrete suggestion except to say that he hoped for continued close US interest and occasional help.
It was agreed that Pilavachi should meet with Jernegan tomorrow morning to report on how things go tonight. (Will be recalled Isik is seeing Secretary again tomorrow, at which time we can get Turkish version)./7/
/7/Telegram 5519 from London, May 14, reported that Pilavachi stated that the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had agreed on procedures for talks on Cyprus and provided details of concluding discussions between the Secretary and senior Greek and Turkish officials. (Ibid.)
Rusk
191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, May 28, 1965, 6:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis-TOG. Drafted by McCaskill, cleared in GTI, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
729. Embtel 1332./2/ What does Embassy believe is Archbishop's motivation in request for assistance in establishing GOC-GOT contact? Seems most likely he is intent on sabotaging GOT-GOG talks, thereby returning self to center stage. Recent reports from Nicosia and Athens indicate he strongly condemns Greco-Turkish dialogue, contending Cypriots must be allowed to decide future for themselves. Makarios knows Greeks want enosis with concessions while he obviously personally wants independence on his terms. He might figure best way achieving his goals would be to undercut Greeks by offering Turks independence which they find more palatable.
/2/Telegram 1332 from Nicosia, May 28, reported Greek-Cypriot hints that they would resume a dialogue with the Turkish Government. (Ibid.)
If he is sincere, he should consider having Kyprianou approach Eralp at coming session of UN or alternatively have Pelaghias or other FonMin official make approach through Turkish Embassy Nicosia. Considering fact USG strongly encouraged GOT-GOG talks, it would seem inappropriate at this time actively to aid in Makarios effort scuttle GOG effort. On other hand our position has always been Turks would some day have to talk to the Greek-Cypriots.
Makarios should also consider carefully impact his actions and statements over next several weeks on GOT's attitude toward him. For example, report he is "calling back" Galo Plaza has caused Turks to suspect more faits accomplis. Any GOC attempt try to have SC "endorse" or "approve" Plaza report, as recently rumored, would cause even further estrangement Ankara and Nicosia. If Makarios sees these as bargaining plays to increase pressure on Turks he is making same mistaken assessment Turks do when they threaten Greeks with force./3/
/3/In telegram 1338 from Nicosia, May 30, the Embassy responded that Makarios' primary objective remained either participating in talks on Cyprus' future or derailing any bilateral discussions that might endanger his interests. (Ibid.)
For Ankara: Would appreciate reading on possible receptivity to Kyprianou approach and what if any effect it would have on bilateral talks./4/
/4/In telegram 1742 from Ankara, June 2, the Embassy responded that the Turks might be receptive to talks with Kyprianou although not at the expense of their dialogue with the Greeks. (Ibid.)
For Athens: Would appreciate reading on possible reaction GOG to Kyprianou approach to Eralp and particularly USG involvement this effort./5/
/5/In telegram 1772 from Athens, May 29, the Embassy responded that a Kyprianou approach to Erlap would raise "deepest suspicion" among the Greeks. (Ibid.)
Rusk
192. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, June 1, 1965, 1225Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis; TOG. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
1779. Andreas Papandreou came to see me last evening.
He said his father's conversation yesterday morning with Turk Ambassador Tuluy had gone well. Although understanding reached during Costopoulos-Isik talks in London provided that Greek Ambassador Sgourdeos would discuss possibilities Cyprus solution in Ankara with GOT, PriMin had moved directly into the matter with Tuluy. According to Andreas (who had not been present himself), PriMin followed very closely line which PriMin had outlined to me last week (Embtel 1754),/2/ i.e.:
/2/Telegram 1754 from Athens, May 26, reported a conversation with Prime Minister Papandreou in which he restated his basic positions. (Ibid.)
(A) GOG prepared to discuss enosis, immediate or deferred;
(B) GOG prepared to give consideration to any reasonable system of protection for Turk minority;
(C) GOT security interests much better preserved by inclusion Cyprus in NATO as result of enosis. GOG and GOT both confronted by Slav-Communist pressures and would continue to have common defense interests even if NATO ceased to function;
(D) Question of Turk prestige is problem to be dealt with although it is subjective and not susceptible satisfaction on basis of logic or of right. GOG prepared to discuss this matter in effort to find bearable concessions which might assuage Turkish prestige. Exact nature of what such concessions might be was apparently not discussed.
Although no specific conclusions were reached, PriMin was pleased with Tuluy's general reaction. Tuluy at one point proposed an Urguplu-Papandreou meeting, to which Papandreou apparently replied that he is prepared to accept but wished to await prior measure of agreement.
I inquired whether any word had been received from MOD Garoufalias presently attending NATO Defense Ministers' meeting in Paris.
Andreas said Garoufalias had had conversation with his Turkish counterpart and had reported that latter seemed disposed to discuss question of enosis.
Andreas said he also wanted to apprise me of an important new development in Cyprus problem. On basis information he had received personally yesterday as well as information also received by Costopoulos two things are now clear:
(1) Makarios and GOC are not prepared to give any concessions to achieve enosis--"no British base, not even a pair of shoes". GOC will, however, mask its position by speaking loudly of unconditional enosis. Most Greek political leaders believe Makarios does not want enosis. This is a conclusion which he (Andreas) is coming to accept, but of which he is not yet irrevocably convinced since Makarios is a very clever politician. Although public opinion in Cyprus can be readily influenced, pro- enosis sentiment on the island is at the moment much less than it was six months ago.
(2) Makarios will call for Presidential elections by June 15.
I said I understood that Makarios had specifically promised during meeting of Crown Council not to take any action regarding elections unless his legal position were challenged by Turks (Embtel 1672)./3/ Andreas confirmed this and said this had been recorded in minutes of meeting. However, Makarios is basically apprehensive that once his mandate has legally expired his position will depend to a large extent on attitude which GOG would adopt toward him and he does not wish to make himself vulnerable to possible pressure from GOG.
/3/Telegram 1672 from Athens, May 8, reported discussions at the Crown Council meeting on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Andreas noted that Turkish reaction to elections might seriously jeopardize any prospect of successful GOT-GOG conversations and might even provoke military intervention by GOT.
Question of Makarios' policy was discussed yesterday during meeting of Cabinet Political Council (PriMin, Stephanopoulos, Costopoulos, Mitsotakis, Tsirimokos and himself. Garoufalias in Paris). During meeting PriMin declared his intention maintain present GOG course, to continue talks with Turks, and to break openly with Makarios if need be. PriMin transmitted long message to Makarios. Andreas acknowledged that in face this situation GOG might wish to accelerate discussions with GOT. In any event, he emphasized it is very important that substance GOG-GOT conversations be kept highly confidential and protected from premature disclosure to Makarios.
Comment: Position attributed to Makarios by Andreas does not seem surprising as moment of serious GOG-GOT conversations approaches and in light Nicosia's recent reports including Belcher's conversation with Makarios.
Andreas' own position is, however, somewhat obscure. As Dept aware, Andreas is widely considered to have close and sympathetic relations with Makarios and to have played an important role in rejection of Acheson plan last summer.
In this connection Costopoulos commented to me recently that inasmuch as Andreas was also present during my conversation with PriMin on May 26 regarding GOG Cyprus policy, substance conversation had probably been reported to Makarios. In short, while I believe Andreas was factually accurate, I am not entirely certain whether he is basically supporting Makarios or GOG at this juncture.
Anschuetz
193. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 10, 1965, 4:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by McCaskill and approved in S and U on June 28.
SUBJECT
Cyprus
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary NEA
Charles W. McCaskill, Officer-in-Charge, Cyprus Affairs, NEA/GTI
Cyprus Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou
Ambassador Zenon Rossides, Embassy of Cyprus
Andreas Frangos, Counselor, Embassy of Cyprus
After an exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary informed Mr. Kyprianou that he hopes there will be no trouble in Cyprus since we have enough trouble elsewhere. Mr. Kyprianou responded that he doesn't think there will be any. He continued that he expects the Security Council meeting to be very short and quiet. Kyprianou understands that the SYG favors a 6-month extension of UNFICYP; and while he sees some psychological disadvantage in such an extension--because people looking for a settlement will assume that nothing will be forthcoming for six months--on balance he feels that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and that the 6-months extension will be passed./2/
/2/U.N. Security Council Resolution 206 (1965), adopted unanimously on June 15, extended the mandate of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for 6 months. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 512-513.
Kyprianou said that the GOC is doing its best to maintain peace. No major incidents have occurred for some months. The GOC has been trying to normalize the situation in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca and things have been improving in those districts. The Limassol incident and other isolated incidents are accidents. There have been other isolated incidents instigated from the outside. In Limassol, the Turkish employees of Greek factories have been returning to work recently.
The Secretary asked about the economy of the island. Kyprianou said that it is not bad. Tourism has been off, but UNFICYP has taken up the slack in tourism. He said that when some people had suggested cutting down the numbers of UNFICYP, he had countered by saying that the number should remain the same since UNFICYP expenditures are important economically to Cyprus.
Mr. Kyprianou stated that the GOC has not objected to the Greek- Turkish dialogue despite its strong belief, as a matter of principle, that the Cypriots should be allowed to decide their future for themselves, and that no solution should come from the outside. Makarios does not object to the talks if the subject is enosis. If the subject is not enosis, however, the GOC does not see how Greece and Turkey can negotiate, since they cannot negotiate for an independent Cyprus. Cyprus itself would have to be brought into these discussions. After all, it is an independent country, recognized by the United Nations. Mr. Ball said that Foreign Minister Costopoulos had made the point to him in London that Greece could only discuss some form of enosis.
Kyprianou said the Greek Cypriots can never accept any solution involving any form of partition, whether outright partition or some settlement leading to partition. The reasons for this are twofold: 1) the Greek Cypriots feel very strongly against partition and 2) the presence of Turks in Cyprus would be the beginning of a new Cyprus problem. Continuous frictions resulting from partition or cession of any part of Cyprus would lead to other hostilities.
Kyprianou then asked if the Turks are really prepared to consider enosis. Mr. Ball and Mr. Talbot said the Turks apparently would consider several solutions, including enosis. Kyprianou said the Greek Cypriots feel that enosis must take place but that it must be "outright union" of all Cyprus. What will satisfy Turkey, which needs compensation for reasons of prestige? The Cypriots have considered 1) strong guarantees for the minority, and 2) some form of demilitarization similar to that in the Dodecanese islands. The Greek Cypriots are looking for ideas so long as they do not involve territorial cession. He added that the Greek Cypriots regret that the Mediator is not continuing since he could fill the gaps which might occur, for example, if the Greco-Turkish talks break down.
The Foreign Minister said that Makarios had asked him to ask whether we are now willing to tell the GOC in confidence that we favor one solution or another, and then work with the GOC to implement that solution. If, for example, we favor enosis, talks outside the Greek-Turkish dialogue could be started. Since the Greeks and Turks are now discussing enosis among other things, GOC-USG talks would not be anything the other parties do not want. He remarked at this point that only enosis will provide a lasting solution, while all others will lead to other problems. The Secretary then asked if the GOC had had consultations with Turkey. Mr. Kyprianou replied that they had not.
The Secretary said the starting point must be that conditions on the island give diplomacy a chance. Nothing should be allowed to get in the way of talks. This goes further than just people killing each other, and extends to the whole situation. He wondered if diplomatic channels might quietly dig up clues for other settlements. He does not see any formal role for the US at this time and asked Mr. Ball what he thought. Mr. Ball replied that Mr. Kyprianou is asking that if we think of anything, we should discuss it with the GOC. Our experience has taught us that the US label has definite disadvantages to both sides. The Greeks and Turks in London both thought a US role would not be helpful at this time. Based on our experience, any American role would tend to impede acceptance rather than facilitate it. The Secretary added that our role had not produced much thus far.
Kyprianou said his suggestion is really that the GOC and the USG work together. He does not believe anything will come from the Greek-Turkish talks. The GOC believes that more would come from GOC-USG talks on the basis of a solution. If the solution is independence, there is not much the US can do. If the basis is outright enosis, the consultations would be helpful. Consultations would not commit or hurt anyone. Mr. Talbot raised the question whether talks with the Turks would be worthwhile. Kyprianou replied that no direct contacts between the GOC and the GOT or the GOG and the GOT will provide a formula. He said that he felt that GOC-USG informal consultations would be the only talks that would produce results.
The Secretary then said that the removal of Turkey's objection to enosis is of joint interest to both Greece and Cyprus. Has Cyprus discussed this fully with Greece? Kyprianou replied that it has but only up to a point, adding that if everybody was not in such a hurry for a settlement, things might be easier.
The Secretary said that he would like to point out that there is a difference between talks and negotiations. In preliminary talks, it has been useful oftentimes to have no agenda, with nothing listed and nothing excluded. In the course of this kind of discussion, a solution can sometimes be found. How would Kyprianou feel about this sort of approach? Kyprianou replied that such talks could be useful with us or the British. However, it is a question of the Turkish mentality, and the Turks are always ready to look with suspicion upon every Cypriot suggestion. The Secretary said that he did not necessarily mean GOC-GOT talks. He merely meant that oftentimes parties to a dispute are able to iron out differences through this informal type of meeting. He cited the Chamizal dispute with Mexico as an example, saying we had found a solution to a problem that had been in existence for fifty years through this approach. He cited as another example his talks with Gromyko in Berlin, when the informal talks actually revealed that there were no grounds for negotiations. He cited the technique as useful, however.
In answer to Mr. Kyprianou's suggestion, the Secretary said that channels of diplomacy between us are always open. We are always glad to hear any suggestions the Cypriots might have, and will pass along any ideas and suggestions we might have. He asked Mr. Ball if he had any ideas on this subject. Mr. Ball stated that he would like to give some thought to this to see what we might come up with. He asked when Mr. Kyprianou planned to leave New York, and said that he would get in touch with him before he leaves. The Secretary said again that what happens on the island is very important to a settlement. He said specifically that the removal of fear from the island is a basic ingredient to any settlement.
Kyprianou then said that the Archbishop had asked him to ask what objection the US had to missiles on Cyprus. (He said he could not use the word "objection" in public, but could do so in this meeting.) The missiles are defensive rather than offensive, he said. In view of this, what objections would we have. The Archbishop is under some domestic political pressures to bring them in, since everybody knows that the GOC has bought them.
The Secretary said that he would speak very frankly. The military advantages of this missile are not very great. Any low-flying plane could easily knock them out. On the other hand, the political disadvantages of bringing them in are very, very great. The Secretary said that the Archbishop should look at this from the very sophisticated military point of view and weigh this against the heavy political disadvantages.
Kyprianou then asked why objections arose if the missiles were not very dangerous. The Secretary replied that they are politically stimulating and they increase tensions. He could see no advantage at all for Cyprus to have these missiles. He said that he could not see how Cyprus could want union with a NATO country and have Soviet missiles. Mr. Ball then said that our original difficulties lay in having NATO trained personnel also being trained to man Soviet missiles, since it was possible that they would reveal information about NATO missiles which should not be revealed. He reiterated that politically it would be very bad and that tensions would be created by the missiles.
The Secretary said that this would also create some difficulty for us with Congress. He hoped Kyprianou would urge Makarios to look at this in the most sophisticated and detailed terms with regard to what the missiles mean to Cyprus militarily and politically.
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