1. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, November 25, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 39, Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Houghton and Davies.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan

There is attached a telegraphic memorandum from Ambassador Symmes [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/

/2/Dated November 24 and addressed to Assistant Secretary Battle.

Ambassador Symmes is concerned that one of the first matters of business which the King will take up with him when he returns to Amman November 26 is to ask what further response the USG may have made to his request for arms. The Ambassador is certain that Hussein feels that the passage of the U.K. resolution/3/ was facilitated by his own diplomatic efforts. In addition, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for a political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to reports reaching our Embassy, has been generating pressure on the Government to resupply equipment lost during the June war. Ambassador Symmes believes that the November 21 incidents, with the bombardment of the Karama refugee camp and the Israeli air attack, will heighten this pressure. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out, he could quickly become so frustrated that he might decide to go to the Soviets for arms.

/3/Reference is to Resolution 242, adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) For documentation relating to the adoption of this resolution, which outlined the basis for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

The Ambassador reports that the Embassy expects within the next day or so a list of those items whose delivery the Jordanian military command considers absolutely essential.

The Ambassador concludes his message by stating that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship./4/

/4/In telegram 74860 to Amman, November 25, the Department responded that the question of arms for Jordan was under intensive review, but in view of the complexity of the problem it was impossible to predict an outcome. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) On November 27 the Embassy reiterated the pressing need for a positive response to the Jordanian Government's request for a recommencement of arms supplies to Jordan. (Telegram 2395 from Amman; ibid.)

Comment:

We subscribe to the Ambassador's analysis of the pressures which are working on the King to procure arms to re-equip his Army and the likely consequences if we are not in a position to help him. As soon as we have received the list of items which the Jordan Army considers absolutely essential, we will recommend to you a course of action with regard to the shipment of arms to Jordan. In the meantime, we intend, as an interim measure, to query the King as to the status of his efforts to obtain some of his requirements from European sources in the event that we might be able to facilitate his efforts. The Ambassador would make clear that in so querying the King we were trying to be helpful and in no way indicating that we had decided not to supply arms to Jordan.

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 25, 1967, 2218Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.; cleared in substance by Harry H. Schwartz and Richard B. Parker; and approved by Rodger P. Davies.

74858. Ref: Tel Aviv 1611./2/

/2/In telegram 1611 from Tel Aviv, November 24, Ambassador Barbour reported that Prime Minister Eshkol asked whether the U.S. position on military supplies for Israel remained as stated by Battle on October 6. (Ibid.) Documentation concerning the position taken by Battle on October 6 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

1. You may inform Eshkol that status Weizman request remains as conveyed to GOI representatives here. We continue actively to staff out request within USG but unable say at this time when our internal procedures will be completed. With respect to additional A-4's, Eshkol may be assured that we are aware of special lead time problem on

Douglas A-4 production line and are taking this factor fully into consideration. More generally, we are sensitive to Israel's need retain adequate defensive capability and remain convinced that Israel retains sufficient margin of safety for foreseeable future to permit orderly completion of thorough and deliberate analysis Weizman request which we are still in process of making. Our decision to unfreeze sizeable backlog of orders for parts and components, to give continuing case by case consideration to new pipeline requests, and to confirm delivery of A-4's under 1966 contract--a decision which was not politically easy for us--should reassure GOI of our continued sympathetic view of Israel's security requirements. FYI. SIG is scheduled consider Near East arms policy, including Weizman request, week of November 27, and we hope have decision one way or other, at least with respect to additional A-4's, soon thereafter. JCS say that, with arrival 48 A-4's already promised, Israeli military superiority over any combination of Arabs will be assured for three to five years, even without additional 50 Mirages from France. Israeli MilAtt here has conveyed some sense of urgency about A-4 add-on request, largely related to fact Douglas Aircraft must soon make decision about future production line programming. On other hand, MilAtt fairly relaxed about other components of Weizman request. In addition, he has indicated Israel no longer pressing for M-113 APC's approved May 23 and wishes instead early USG approval for GOI purchase of used APC's from European surplus stocks for cannibalization purposes. We are now giving active consideration to this request as well as to pending IDF orders for Piper Cub aircraft and $11 million in additional tank parts. End FYI.

2. Following is for your guidance should Eshkol raise Nasser speech./3/ While speech does not augur well for early progress toward political settlement, we have never felt progress would come easily and assume GOI has not thought so either. It is not without precedent for Near Eastern political leaders to strike hard line public bargaining pose and remains to be seen how much of what Nasser said about settlement terms is for bargaining purposes. This should become clearer once UN Special Representative becomes active./4/ Meanwhile, we do not discount potentially serious implications of Nasser speech--particularly references to Suez Canal, withdrawal terms, and military preparations--which, at very least, will make job of UN Rep more difficult. At same time, it important to bear in mind that main purpose of speech appeared be to boost domestic morale in context of somber review of enormity UAR military defeat in June. On future course of Arab-Israel problem there are number of ambiguities and contradictions in speech which could, if Nasser chooses, leave door open for some compromise. For example, he (a) describes UN resolution as "insufficient" but does not reject it, and (b) while speaking of need to prepare for new military round, acknowledges possibility that political settlement may make this unnecessary. In latter connection, possibly significant is Nasser's statement that "We believe that reaching a sufficient degree of strength may be a substitute for using it in fact." Given past experience, we are not inclined take comfort from any of this. At same time, we assume GOI will agree it would be mistake to assume on basis one speech in essentially domestic context that Nasser's position completely inflexible and that he is irretrievably launched on path to new war. Negotiating process has dynamic of its own which must be allowed develop before any final conclusions are reached.

/3/Reference is to the State of the Union message delivered by President Nasser to the UAR National Assembly on November 23. The speech was summarized in telegram 1015 from Cairo, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 UAR) Excerpts from this speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 619-620.

/4/Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, called on the UN Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist the effort to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement" in accordance with the principles and provisions of Resolution 242. (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967)) On November 23 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the appointment of Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, as the Special Representative. (UN doc. S/8259)

3. Re present state of UAR military preparedness, we prefer base our judgment on what we know to be case and not on such ambiguous, unsubstantiated and contradictory statements as were contained in Nasser's November 23 speech. For example, while he says in one place that "the real power of our armed forces exceeds the real power prior to the start of the battle," he says in another that "our armed forces have restored a considerable part of their military strength" and that "we must realize that we cannot achieve everything all at once." In context, Nasser's comments about his armed forces make clear that he envisages and is preparing his people for a fundamental and long drawn-out process of reorganization and rebuilding. Again, we do not discount potentially serious implications of this, but we see in it no basis for altering our assessment of present relative military strengths in area and time factors involved which, in our judgment, remain in Israel's favor for foreseeable future.

Rusk

3. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, November 27, 1967, 1730Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

1638. Ref: State 74858./2/

/2/Document 2.

1. As expected, in meeting with me today, PM Eshkol began by referring to Nasser speech of Nov 23. He likened Hussein-Nasser relationship to see-saw, with Hussein making encouraging noises in world capitals only to have his efforts frustrated by warlike pronouncements by Nasser. He described speech of Nov 23 as dagger in back of cause of peace. Eshkol said he had hoped with some confidence that Six-Day War would be followed by real peace in Middle East and he still hopes so but with considerably less confidence. The "superlatives" of Nasser's expression did not augur well. In any event, Israel must be careful and remain on guard.

2. Israeli military capability is adequate on ground. "Center of gravity" is the Air Force and there Israel is very vulnerable. Without repeating details, which had been given by Gen Weizman, Eshkol mentioned only that effective fighter strength now is some 90 planes, and they are no "spring chickens."

3. PM Eshkol said he is pessimistic about getting the 50 French Mirages. In any case, even if he gets those, his estimate is that Israel will be in a ratio of one to three in light of Soviet replacements to Egypt, worse if Algerian reinforcements should be forthcoming, and this only after arrival of last of 48 A4s which not scheduled until 1969. He thinks this ratio is too dangerous for Israel to contemplate with equanimity.

4. PM noted he aware US desire not become sole Israeli supplier and GOI also would prefer have more than one source. But, with French out of picture, US is only one to which Israel can turn. He has thought of alternative of building planes here but expense and time involved such a project make it most unattractive.

5. In circumstances, Eshkol wishes make most earnest plea for two steps by US: A) Agree to provide 27 more A4s and 50 Phantoms and B) expedite delivery 48 A4s already agreed. He urged we make this

decision with minimum delay, although he appreciated processing through governmental machinery of US magnitude time consuming. He noted Gen Weizman's report that his representations had received most cordial and sympathetic hearing, for which GOI grateful. But, he begged in most eloquent terms he could muster that GOI also get the hardware.

6. I gave Eshkol full substance State's most helpful reftel (obviously without FYI section). He made no particular comment, except to reiterate his growing doubts as to Nasser's intentions. I also urged that, despite his present uneasiness about the attainment of a peaceful settlement, he should not abandon hope of success at the end of what would be a hard road. He agreed. Further, I remarked that as the events of May and June receded in peoples' memory, Israel will have to give increasing attention to her image in the world. Her position as the victim of an attempt by her neighbors to annihilate her becomes less credible the longer she sits in her present posture as an occupying power in large areas. She must exercise the "magnanimity of the victor" in her own interest. Eshkol concurred, reminding me that I had once commented that Israel is now the power in the Middle East and has additional responsibility in the search for peace. He concluded that all this is dependent on Israel having real security, to which his present requests are directed.

FYI. Various readers of this message will recall that this air force imbalance has given me concern since the Soviet replacement program to Egypt began, and I had several occasions to mention it when in Washington recently. I do not take issue with our military experts' conclusion that for some time to come, Israel will be superior overall in military capability to any likely combination of powers which may be ranged against her, and this probably whether we make the additional 77 planes requested available or not. But I submit that, if the Israelis themselves do not think so, their increased nervousness will be likely to make them at worst tend toward more adventurous courses to avoid possibly imaginary Arab efforts to exploit such imbalance, and at best more difficult to persuade to take steps involving increases to their security risks, which may be necessary if progress is to be made toward final peace. Also, despite expert assessments, I would like to see from a strict consideration of US interest in stability in the region, that additional margin of safety to be provided by these airplanes in the hands of responsible (also could read, non-Soviet) Israelis. Accordingly, as heretofore, I continue to endorse these requests and urge US agreement as soon as possible.

Barbour

4. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson dropped in to see me this afternoon to chat about the Middle East and told me the following:

1. While seeing his Arab friends in New York, he found the Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad and Dr. Kahouli disappointed that we have not moved to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo, as have the British.

2. When he pointed out that Arthur Goldberg had told Riad Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him in Washington, Riad had said that he wanted a more explicit invitation and some assurance that the U.S. was in fact willing to move forward toward normal diplomatic relations.

3. When Kahouli raised the question of whether President Nasser should write to President Johnson and asked how such a letter could be delivered, Bob Anderson said: Why not deliver it in Cairo via Don Bergus? The response was: He is only a clerk. How can a Presidential message be delivered through a clerk?

4. Kahouli then asked if Anderson on his next trip to the Middle East (which is soon--to Iraq on sulphur) could stop in Cairo. Anderson said flatly: No.

5. Kahouli then said: If I delivered a letter for President Johnson to you in Beirut, would you receive it? Anderson told him: I would receive it, but only as a messenger boy. That is how it was left.

6. I asked Bob what he thought the Egyptians would do about acknowledging that we were not involved in the war and reparations. He said they took the view that their official newspapers have already published in Cairo the fact that we were not involved and it would be very difficult for them to go further. As for reparations, they would be made when diplomatic relations were established, but not immediately, because they were terribly short of money. Bob Anderson's view was that this could be the first issue we raised after diplomatic relations were established.

7. Bob showed great sensitivity to the fact that we must do absolutely nothing to interfere with UN Representative Jarring and his contacts and negotiations in the Middle East.

8. Bob underlined his view that we are likely to have to deal with Nasser for some time; that he believes from his long personal discussions that Nasser has learned a painful lesson; and that it is in our national interest to establish relations with him soon.

9. His mission to Iraq is to get American firms involved in exploiting the biggest sulphur deposits in the world. A personal letter to the Iraqi President from de Gaulle had been sent urging that French firms take the contract. Bob is reasonably confident that his more experienced firms will win out.

I talked with Luke Battle, who is very doubtful that Nasser will in fact send a letter to you via Anderson; although a resumption of diplomatic relations is obviously much on their minds, and should be on ours also.

Walt

5. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Houghton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)/1/

Washington, November 29, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Houghton and Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/ARN and cleared by Davies.

SUBJECT
Arms for Jordan

Ambassador Symmes' Position

We strongly urge that you discuss the problem of Jordan arms at the SIG meeting scheduled for November 30. Ambassador Symmes has urgently recommended that we make available to Jordan certain military equipment which the Jordan Army considers essential. In support of his request, the Ambassador points out that it will be indispensable to Hussein in continuing to work for political settlement to have his Army solidly behind him. The Army, according to the Embassy, is not pressing for full replacement of equipment lost last June, but is seeking reassurance that the King has a plan to obtain certain priority items. The Ambassador believes that the November 21 incidents with the bombardment of the Karama Refugee Camp and the Israeli air attack will heighten Army pressure on the King. The Ambassador fears that if the King becomes suspicious that we will not be able to help him out he will quickly become so frustrated that he might go to the Soviets for arms. The Ambassador further argues that our willingness to lift our embargo on arms for Jordan and to exert efforts to help Jordan obtain arms from other suppliers may soon become critical to our relationship. King Hussein informed the Ambassador on November 28 that the Jordan Army leadership was pressing him very hard and stressed that the need for him to take some action was "becoming a matter of days."

Jordan Requirements

The Ambassador has discussed Jordan's requirements with General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, who maintains that the list which he gave Colonel Jordan last August represents the Army's current minimal essential requirements. Ambassador Symmes and the Defense Attachˇ have come up with a sanitized version. It includes items from the Khammash list which they consider least likely to cause us problems. They make clear, however, that the sanitized list does not meet Jordan's complete desires nor it requirements. The Ambassador does believe that the revised list would meet Hussein's main need to hold the loyalty of the Jordanian Army and at the same time would avoid serious embarrassment at the forthcoming Arab Summit, reportedly scheduled around the beginning of December.

A detailed list, which we estimate would cost approximately $9 million, is enclosed./2/ The main elements of the list are as follows:

/2/Not printed.

(1) 106 mm recoilless rifles with truck M151A1C.

(2) Ammunition primarily for small arms and antiaircraft with some light artillery and antitank ammunition.

(3) Communication equipment, including 340 radios and 1,000 telephones.

(4) 40 2-1/2-ton trucks. M35A2.

(5) Aerial target drone system and ancillary equipment.

(6) Automotive, weapon, and communication spare parts and medical supplies.

Discussion

Our short-term stake in Jordan is clear. Hussein has taken the initiative and leadership on the Arab side in seeking a settlement with Israel. He can probably do this only with Nasser's support. Dubious as the prospects for a settlement are now, they may well become nil should Hussein fall or be forced into a more radical posture. To a large extent he has staked his lot on working with the West and particularly the US. Consequently he is seeking arms from us not only because he needs them but also because of the tangible evidence of US support which the supply of such arms would give him. There would be a gap between the time of our informing him of our willingness to supply him arms and the delivery of these arms. The announcement itself, however, would tend to strengthen Hussein's position vis-a-vis the Army as well as bolstering his position vis-a-vis the radical Arabs. It would have a stabilizing influence in Jordan at the time the UN Special Representative begins his important mission.

He has been trying since last June to secure arms from the US. He was given in August what a reasonable man could interpret as a US commitment to supply him arms. He asked again when he was recently in Washington. Jordan is the only Eastern Arab state which considers it has legitimate arms requirements and is making little or no progress in meeting them. It is difficult for Hussein to justify to his people his continued reliance on the West. Those who have worked with the Soviet Union can more convincingly prove the benefits from their association.

Our position in Jordan has declined since the war. The Embassy reports increasing frustration and bitterness by the Jordanians against the US. The Jordanians consider our Near Eastern policy discouragingly under the influence of the Zionists and the Israelis. Nonetheless we still have resources in Jordan but their strength is waning. The pattern of our relationship is being steadily whittled away.

The few arms which Ambassador Symmes recommends we provide/3/ could help arrest this trend. The quantity is small and could hardly constitute a threat to Israel or alter the arms balance in the area. The Joint Staff considers the ammunition requested as minimal in both quantity and type. The most deadly item, the 106 mm recoilless rifle, is primarily an anti-tank gun and lacks the protection needed for offensive deployment. The arms requested are replacements for a portion of the arms lost in fighting and not additions to Jordan's arsenal.

/3/Some of this equipment would be sold to the GOJ and some items could be provided under the MAP as previously scheduled. [Footnote in the source text.]

We shall encourage the GOJ to seek European suppliers for some of its requirements particularly in the heavy weapon and aircraft fields. We do not think we should do so for this list. As a matter of fact, for some of the items such as spares it is not practical. In general, procurement of this type of ground equipment from West European sources would create further problems for the Jordanian Army as its training, maintenance facilities and tactical doctrine are now based primarily on US weapons. More important, however, is the impact that a refusal to carry out our previous commitments would have on USG-GOJ relations. A ruler in Hussein's position has an obvious need for a reliable source of external support--both economic and military. If we tell the King that he is on his own and should shop for weapons wherever he can obtain them from Western sources, he will feel that we are opting out of the role of external supporter. The USSR has offered to take over this role and there is a real danger that the King, under pressure from Nasser and the radical Arabs, may decide that Soviet sponsorship, with all its drawbacks, is the best of the options left open to him. The actual weapons involved are of less significance than the symbolic value to Hussein and to his Army of our continued willingness to play the role of supporter.

Recommendation

The only valid reason why such small sales cannot be made available is because the Zionists and Israel, unless otherwise persuaded, can cause difficulties in Congress and elsewhere if we send any arms to Jordan.

We think that our own interests in this matter are of sufficient importance to justify a difference of opinion with the Israelis and their domestic partisans here. We strongly urge that we go ahead on arms for Jordan. If you agree, we suggest (a) that you consult again with Congress and (b) that Mr. Katzenbach or Rostow inform the Israelis. It should be made clear, however, that whereas we would endeavor to persuade Western Europeans to supply arms to Jordan, we, in our own interest, should continue to provide small quantities ourselves. Our rationale would be the strengthening of Hussein's position to permit him to proceed on the path of settlement with the Israelis and to maintain his moderate pro-Western position.

We recommend that:

(1) You raise the issue of Jordan arms along the lines discussed in this paper and seek the SIG's concurrence in your taking the necessary steps to enable us to release the arms requested by Ambassador Symmes.

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 4, 1967, 2338Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Henry Precht in NEA/IAI and Atherton, cleared by Joseph J. Sisco and Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown (IO), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, London, Jerusalem, Paris, and USUN.

79148. Subj: Discussion with Comay on Refugees.

1. At GOI suggestion as follow-on to Secretary's discussion of refugees with Eban October 23,/2/ Comay had lengthy conversation December 1 with Battle, Sisco and other Department officers. Discussion of UNRWA debate tactics reported septel. Detailed memcon being pouched./3/ Highlights follow:

/2/This conversation is summarized in telegram 58735 to Tel Aviv, October 24, scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

/3/A memorandum of this conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv as an attachment to circular airgram CA-4218, December 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, REF ARAB)

2. In general, we were reassured by Comay's presentation of Israeli tactical approach. With exception attitude on new refugees, their thinking on delicate pre-settlement period conforms to ours. Comay repeatedly stressed GOI belief refugee problem could and should be solved and importance it attaches to overall political settlement for achieving this objective.

3. New Refugees--In response to our inquiries and arguments re return of post-June refugees, Comay indicated that for all practical purposes movement from East to West had stopped for time being. Although family reunification scheme could help (and Comay attributed poor performance to GOJ), substantial movement of refugees must await movement on political front following progress of Jarring's contacts. (Comay will also have GOI responsibilities for negotiations with Jarring.) Comay gave customary GOI line on refugee return, detailing August and September operations and asserting that, for reasons of family ties, income sources and political uncertainties, bulk of refugees did not really wish to return.

4. GOI Activities During Pre-Settlement Period--In addition to ascertaining GOI thinking on refugee planning, object our discussion with Comay was to forewarn against statements or activities which could prejudice chances for settlement. Comay cited careful GOI contingency planning for eventual refugee solution but said there would be no formal, public announcement of master plan. GOI thought such plan would have dramatic and for GOI beneficial public relations effect but also knew publicity would cause adverse Arab reaction seriously damaging chances for settlement. Neither would GOI undertake any specific projects which would similarly jeopardize negotiations with Jarring.

5. GOI concern during interim period would be to promote economic well-being of refugees. Comay mentioned stepped-up vocational training as non-controversial program which would prepare refugees for better life in situ or elsewhere but which would not arouse Arab fears. Refugees would benefit from 100 million pounds being budgeted for civilian administration in occupied territories in current GOI fiscal year ending March, 1968. Comay emphasized that GOI had moved quickly to restore normalcy in occupied areas and had developed effective cooperation with UNRWA with only minor difficulties arising mainly from security requirements, i.e. restricted movement of Arab personnel in Israel.

6. Long-term Refugee Planning--Comay said GOI was drawing up recommendations from studied conducted by various technical teams (water, land, economics, etc.) for presentation to Cabinet in near future. Perhaps early next year GOI could have contact with US experts. GOI recognized, however, that long-range plans for refugees could not be divorced from question of political future of area. Even within GOI, opinions were divided on such questions as what size, shape and future borders of Israel should be. GOI waiting to see what its options were. It could make no decisions until these were clearer. Meanwhile, it was doing its homework to fill gaps in its knowledge of refugees and of economic potential of occupied areas. It realized that what it could do on its own to solve refugee problem was limited not only by economic factors but by political and juridical considerations as well. When time came, GOI would be prepared cooperate to fullest extent in finding solution to refugee problem, but unable say now what this might involve. Comay made point of emphasizing that, notwithstanding appeal of West Bank from sentimental and security standpoints, GOI had made no decision to incorporate area in Israel, and it was mistake to draw general conclusions to this effect from specific actions taken by occupation authorities for local reasons.

7. Without commenting on specifics of GOI planning, we emphasized that these and other elements of any meaningful refugee solution must come in context of general settlement. Comay agreed and said refugees should in GOI views have "top priority" in settlement. We noted important contribution which well-staffed GOI refugee plan could make to settlement and Comay agreed it would be useful and important approach Jordan with proposals on refugees when negotiations under way.

8. Comay emphasized GOI working hard on planning and aware US also developing ideas on refugees. He expressed great willingness exchange views with us on preliminary, non-committed basis.

Rusk

7. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 4, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 53, December 1-10, 1967. Secret.

SUBJECT
Nasser's November 23 Speech and the Mood of the Arabs

Ten days after Nasser's November 23 "State of the Union" speech, it's worth reflecting on where it leaves us.

Speech Consistent with Khartoum

The Israelis see the worst in it. Eshkol described it to Barbour as a "dagger in the back of the cause of peace" (and then went on to stress his need for more aircraft). Foreign Minister officials--some more relaxed than others--see it as bearing out their interpretation of the Khartoum meeting that Nasser's ultimate aim is war.

Politically conscious Arabs from New York to Saudi Arabia interpret it as a "moderate" speech consistent with Nasser's effort since Khartoum to keep the initiative away from extremists. They all say it "didn't slam any doors." A few lump his harsher statements with Israel's as a prelude to bargaining.

Everyone (including Federenko) agrees that Nasser soured the atmosphere, but Arabs and Israelis alike agree that the speech did not depart from Nasser's position at Khartoum as he has interpreted that position to both King Hussein and Robert Anderson.

This is borne out by two subsequent official UAR clarifications which slightly soften the initial hard impact of the speech in our press:

--The official text of the passage on "never" allowing Israel to pass through the Canal indicates that the following qualifying sentences were lost in applause: "Passage through the Canal is an indivisible part of the original Palestine question. It is not part of the problem of eliminating the effects of the aggression." In the official text, the word "never" becomes "will not." Whatever Nasser actually said, official UAR policy still links the Canal to a refugee settlement.

--Nasser's official spokesman on November 26 qualified Nasser's statement that there could be no "peace" with Israel by saying he had not rejected a peaceful settlement but only a "peace treaty." The Israelis put no stock in this distinction, but the Egyptians have carefully maintained it since Khartoum and seem to think it increases their flexibility in arriving at a settlement.

Khartoum Position: A Two-phase Strategy?

The main argument over Nasser's position, then, boils down to interpretation of the position he took at Khartoum, not of the 23 November speech.

The Israelis say their reports on Khartoum show a two-phase strategy: Nasser's long-run objective remains the destruction of Israel. Their short-run aim is to get Israel out of occupied territories. They can't push Israel out by force, so they're ready to make marginal political concessions to get their land back. At the same time, military preparations continue for a future second stage-war against Israel. They quote Hussein at Khartoum: "Once the Israelis withdraw, we will return to our previous ways."

We agree that Nasser at Khartoum took to the political track because he has neither the military nor the economic power to get the conquered lands back by force. But our transcript of the Khartoum conference reveals no consciously conceived two-phase plan. In fact, the radical leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization tried to force the leaders there to focus on solution of the overall Palestine problem, and they literally shouted him down. They insisted that the only subject they were discussing was how to get the Israelis out. They talked abut rebuilding military strength, but mainly so they don't have to negotiate flat on their backs and in order to use force eventually if political means fail.

The truth about Khartoum, I think, is that Nasser hasn't really thought beyond Israeli withdrawal one way or another. There was almost no talk at Khartoum about the "lasting peace" we talk about. And the Israelis are probably right in fearing that leopards don't change their spot. But for the moment, we don't think they're talking about a second phase, if any.

The same, incidentally, is true of the Israelis. Yaacov Herzog, Eshkol's Chef de Cabinet, told me two weeks ago that Israeli leaders are deeply divided over whether they should risk a political settlement, if the right terms can be negotiated, or sit tight on their expanded boundaries and rely for survival on the added military security they provide. He says he won't know for sure what Israeli strategy is until the Cabinet votes on a specific proposal (though he thinks "peace" will win).

Operational Significance

There may be small comfort in saying that Nasser for the moment is so preoccupied with Israeli withdrawal that he's not focusing right now on longer range objectives. But there are two important operational points here:

1. No one should trust Nasser. He broke his word to us last May. He's trying to recoup his losses at the lowest cost. His main objective is to be Mr. Big in the Arab world, and anti-Zionism will continue to be his one reliable rallying cry. He honestly believes we're to knock him off and would happily see us cut down to size--even though he knows he needs our power in the area to push Israel back and to hold the USSR at bay and preserve his freedom.

2. But no one should assume that Nasser is so irrevocably committed to a two-phase strategy that no reasonable deal is possible.

a. Some Israelis would like an excuse for not having to face up to the tough decisions they'd have to make to achieve a real settlement.

b. Some Americans assume that, since the odds seem against a settlement, we shouldn't invest too much more in pressing the parties--especially Israel in an election year--toward a settlement. They believe realism suggests we wash our hands of the whole process as much as possible now that the UN representative has the ball.

The danger in working exclusively from this assumption is that we would give up an honest effort to build something on the President's June 19 foundation. It's one thing to be on our guard against the worst in both the Arabs and the Israelis and to assess our chances realistically. It's another to decide that we should fold our tents with all the consequences for our interests in the Middle East.

Hal

8. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 6, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

At my request, our Hal Saunders did these two thoughtful memos on:

--the choice of ahead in the Middle East;/2/

/2/Saunders sent a memorandum on this subject to Rostow on December 5. It was a covering memorandum for his assessment of the meaning of Nasser's November 23 speech, and essentially summarized that memorandum. (Ibid.)

--the meaning of Nasser's Nov. 23 speech./3/

/3/Document 7.

My view is: the Arabs are still confused, humiliated, looking for revenge in part of their minds. But they have no long-term plan. Therefore, we must:

--struggle for an Arab-Israeli settlement:

--then follow through with policies to strengthen moderate Arabs so that, with the passage of time, the attractiveness of economic and social development gradually, slowly overtakes the passion for revenge.

Walt

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, December 6, 1967, 1350Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Moscow, London, and Tel Aviv.

2530. Subject: Arms for Jordan. Ref: State 79171./2/ Amman 2519/3/ and 2528./4/

/2/Telegram 79171 to Amman, December 5, informed the Embassy that the question of resuming the supply of arms to Jordan was under active high-level discussion. The question would have to be explored with Congressional leaders, however, so a decision was not imminent. The Department instructed the Embassy to try to persuade the Jordanian Government to be patient. (Ibid.)

/3/Not found.

/4/In telegram 2528 from Amman, December 6, the Embassy reported that King Hussein was being pressed by the Soviet Union to continue a military dialogue begun during the King's recent visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union planned to send a military delegation to Amman to explore Jordan's military requirements, and the Soviet Ambassador in Amman had told the King that his government was prepared to supply Jordan's arms need at bargain prices and under favorable terms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)

1. By prior agreement I stayed on with King Hussein following Senator Ribicoff's audience for a brief discussion of arms situation. Arms question had already come up in general way during meeting with Senator.

2. I said I was pleased His Majesty had had opportunity mention Jordan arms requirements to the Senator, who had seemed quite sympathetic to Jordan's needs as described by the King. I had been concerned, however, to learn through EmbOff on 4th (Amman 2528) that Soviet economic survey mission scheduled to come to Jordan later this month would, at Soviet request, include three Soviet military officials. I could appreciate sense of frustration felt by His Majesty. I felt obliged nevertheless to say I personally believed presence in Jordan of Soviet military, if it became known, would tend prejudice our efforts gain approval for resumption of U.S. arms shipments to Jordan as well as for our general efforts in support of Jordan. I had noted Jordan press article that morning stating that Soviet survey mission would not arrive until after first of year. I hoped this was true because it would allow time for USG to arrive at what I believed would ultimately be favorable decision on resuming some arms shipments to Jordan.

3. His Majesty responded that he was not sure when Soviet mission would arrive. It might be before end of year. Soviet Ambassador in informing him only a few days ago of mission's coming had stated mission would include three senior military officials but that latter would not be identified as such in order to avoid embarrassing Jordanian Govt. King said he had been taking line with Soviets that he still intended obtain his arms from usual sources. Nevertheless, he had not felt he could tell Soviet Amb to delete three military from survey mission. For one thing, Soviets had been taking very moderate line recently. They were supporting U.N. resolution in talks with Jordan and had stressed Israel's right to existence. Soviet Amb had also spoken of Soviet efforts to dampen Syrian extremism. He considered Soviets, despite some outward appearances, had been playing a generally constructive role with regard to Arab-Israeli problem. This factor also led him to feel he could not tell Soviets not to send mission at this time or not to bring military personnel if they did. On other hand, it was his intention to see that Soviet military only looked around in general way and that they did not get into any specific discussion of Jordan's requirements. This was understood, he emphasized.

4. I commented that His Majesty was, of course, best judge of GOJ interests in this respect. Some of us, however, still have suspicions about Soviet motives in the Near East. Only in last few days Soviets had been making noises of willingness to discuss some form of arms limitation in area; yet with Jordan they were pursuing what could only be considered a significantly new arms supply role in Near East. Although Soviets more cautious and seem to recognize danger of escalation of Arab-Israeli incidents, some of us still believe they will pursue their spoiling operations in Near East wherever possible. I personally was suspicious enough of their motives to wonder if they could be counted on to keep presence in Jordan of three military personnel quiet.

5. Conversation concluded with my telling His Majesty I had new word from Washington indicating high level USG officials fully appreciate urgency GOJ requirements and actively reviewing matter. I was therefore hopeful of a favorable decision on Jordan arms shortly after Congressional action is completed on foreign aid appropriation bill. I thought this could be before Christmas. King seemed to appreciate these assurances. He said earlier in morning he had spoken to assembled senior JAA officers to tell them he expects soon to be able to provide them with specifics regarding military equipment supplies.

Symmes

10. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/

Washington, December 7, 1967, 0122Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Arthur R. Day, cleared by Sisco and Brown in UNP, and approved by Battle. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Algiers, Khartoum, and Aden, and repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

80712. Deliver to Ambassadors at opening of business. Subj: UN Representative Jarring Mission.

1. Timing of departure from NY to UN Rep Jarring following consultations there with SYG and Staff, parties and others, including USUN, not yet definite due to complications related to projected Arab Summit. However, he will probably proceed to area within next week or two. His headquarters will be in Cyprus.

2. Jarring faces formidable difficulties. Issues themselves are so numerous and complex that even with generally cooperative spirit from parties, it is not to be expected that agreement will come quickly on any problem. In addition, of course, there is danger that either or both sides will be so intransigent as to bring negotiations to stalemate.

3. In light these difficult circumstances, we have considered what activity on our part might be useful in improving chances Jarring's success and have concluded that US approaches to parties concerning general US attitude would be useful. Prospect of new Arab Foreign Minister and Summit meetings provide additional reason for us to urge moderation and flexibility on Arabs at this time, since stand meetings take will probably have important influence on progress of Jarring Mission. Action posts should therefore unless they see serious objections seek opportunity to discuss our current views with appropriate host govt official. Posts should make it clear we are making similar approach to Israelis./2/

/2/The Embassy in Tel Aviv was instructed on December 9 to urge the Israeli Government to be as forthcoming as possible in dealing with the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 82248 to Tel Aviv; ibid.)

4. In making any approaches it is very important that posts avoid giving any impression that we are directly involved in Jarring's mission or seeking to impress our views on him concerning either his methods of operation or substance of his discussions. It will be for Jarring to carry on substantive negotiations with parties. Our purpose at present should be to urge that all parties extend fullest cooperation to achievement of a peaceful solution. FYI. At later stage, depending on developments, we will have to consider whether and how we should support specific proposals. There may well be a time, as when issues have crystallized into clear bargaining situation, when diplomatic support of US and others may be necessary to bring parties to agreement. In such cases we will be prepared to act in accordance with Amb Goldberg's Nov. 22 pledge in SC./3/ End FYI.

/3/In his November 22 statement before the UN Security Council, Goldberg pledged U.S. support for the Special Representative and urged other nations to make a similar pledge. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 617-618.

5. Approach should draw on following:

(a) SC res,/4/ which is best possible in circumstances, provides opportunity to set in motion a peace-making process with which both sides can in good conscience cooperate. Res is balanced and nonprejudicial to positions of any of parties. Its adoption culminated most difficult period during which it often appeared that effort to find means of progress toward a settlement would end in complete stalemate. Opportunity provided by Jarring's mission may well be one-time chance, therefore, since it would appear most unlikely that same or similar conditions as those which made possible agreement on SC res could be recreated at any future time. That opportunities, once lost, do not return has, as Arabs know too well, been one of lessons of past twenty years; it could well be so again if present opportunity missed.

/4/Reference is to Security Council Resolution 242.

(b) We consider SC res entirely consistent with policy of USG as set forth by President Johnson in June 19 statement/5/ and by Ambassador Goldberg in statements in UN since then. We are prepared, therefore, to support the UN's efforts fully. As Ambassador Goldberg said in SC Nov. 22: "The Special Representative will need all the help and support he can get--both from parties and from international community. I have already given my Government's pledge on this score--and I wish to reiterate it again today--a pledge to this Council and to parties concerned that the diplomatic and political influence of USG will be exerted in support of efforts of UN Rep to achieve fair and equitable and dignified solution so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility."

/5/In a speech before the Department of State Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, President Johnson outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East which the United States would support. See Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1967, pp. 31-34.

(c) Res itself only provides framework of principles for peace-making efforts. Success in that effort will depend ultimately on parties themselves--spirit in which they receive and work with UN Rep, willingness to reach accommodation, and respect for others' vital interests and legitimate grievances. Need for good will on both sides extends beyond negotiations themselves to general posture and actions of parties. Policies and actions leading to mistrust and tension in area can be just as detrimental to chances for success as positions taken in negotiations themselves. Posture assumed and policies embraced by govts at Arab Summit very important in this regard.

(d) Res will not bring instant peace. We do not expect any early or easy success. There is no question of expecting immediate acquiescence by any of the parties. But we do urge all of them to avoid talking intransigent positions, either in private or public, which could close doors to settlement that may now hopefully be opening.

(e) US has no blueprint for settlement. We continue to believe that, in final analysis, secure, just and lasting peace must rest upon agreements between the parties, whatever form they make take or whatever modalities are used to reach them (i.e. direct negotiations or some form of intermediary). It is only the parties in the last analysis who can determine whether just and lasting peace can be achieved through a settlement which will endure.

6. In view of Arab moderate leaders' helpful role in period leading up to adoption SC res, posts should as appropriate show appreciation for assistance rendered by host govts; Embassies in Arab countries not directly involved should encourage moderate leaders to work toward objective that UN Mission receive fullest possible cooperation from states directly involved.

7. FYI. When Jarring comes to area, posts should leave to him initiative in contacts. If he should seek help, they should provide all appropriate assistance in furtherance his mission, referring to Dept for guidance any requests about which they may have some question. He will probably not initiate formal contacts, although we would not expect him to avoid casual contact with American or other officials whom he might meet at social affairs./6/

/6/There is extensive reporting from Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Beirut on Jarring's initial efforts to promote a settlement in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Jarring's efforts through December are summarized in Document 30. Jarring's initial efforts are also summarized in the report Secretary-General Thant made to the UN Security Council on the Jarring Mission on January 5, 1971. See Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. VIII, U Thant, 1968-1971.

Rusk

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 9, 1967, 0136Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, USUN, London, Moscow, Paris, and Cairo.

82331. 1. Ambassador Harman called on Assistant Secretary Battle December 7 to present GOI study/2/ updating data and rationale for Israeli aircraft request presented by General Weizman in September. Summarizing highlights of study, Harman made following points:

/2/A copy of this study was given by Harman to Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze when he discussed the issue with him on December 8. A memorandum of Harman's conversation with Nitze is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, 333 Israel. The study is ibid., OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 452 Israel.

A. Study points up seriousness of Soviet resupply of Arabs in terms of quantity, quality and strike capacity of Arab airforces. For example, UAR, Syria, Iraq and Algeria now have 550 fighter aircraft and 62 bombers against total of about 155 for Israel;

B. Concept of joint air operations against Israel now incorporated into Arab planning, and Israel must assume it would in future face coordinated Arab air attack; and

C. Arab air bases have increased in number and have been rendered less vulnerable to attack.

2. Harman said that, while Weizman had made clear his request looked to future and not based on fear of imminent attack, latest information on Arab capabilities, coupled with increasingly bellicose Arab statements, now gave request added sense of urgency. Any indications of Israeli weakness would encourage attack. Israel therefore needed additional aircraft to provide credible deterrent or, in event irrational Arab actions in face of such deterrent, to assure its survival. Further factor was French arms policy which not only deprived Israel of aircraft it had already contracted for but, if latest press reports re lifting of French embargo for Iraq were correct, indicated Iraq might get planes originally intended for Israel. Harman said two schools of thought existed in Arab world, one favoring resort to force and other urging moderation. Israel needed strength to convince Arabs that force would not work. This would bolster moderates and contribute to success of Jarring mission.

3. Battle asked if Israel was convinced French would not deliver on Mirage contract. Harman said he feared this was the case. In any event Israel must now base its planning on assumption it would get no aircraft from France. In response further question from Battle, Harman said Israel had found no possibility of obtaining Mirage aircraft through third countries. Further disturbing factor was new info that Soviets to supply Arabs all-weather MIG-23's in 1968.

4. Harman stressed that Weizman request looking toward inventory of 250 modern aircraft by late 1968 had shaved margin very fine. That request had assumed French would deliver, and failure receive Mirages would thus aggravate already serious situation. Harman said he detected tendency in USG to overrate Israeli ability and hoped we would not give Israel benefit of too many doubts. In response Battle comment that we based our assessment on past Israeli performance, Harman said that previous success had come from knocking out Arab airforces on ground. Arabs were aware of this and now planning accordingly. Fifty planes could literally make difference between life and death of Israel.

5. Battle commented that we shared Israeli concern about Soviet resupply and other activities in area and were watching them carefully. We did not believe Soviet resupply had brought Arab forces above pre-war levels or had altered their basic nature. Views might differ on relative strengths of Arab and Israeli forces and we might not agree with Israeli assessment, but we remained sensitive to Israel's security needs. Weizman's request was receiving urgent consideration and we hoped to have reply soon.

6. Battle said we were particularly concerned about arrival of Soviet bombers in Egypt and about Soviet airlift of equipment to Yemen. Re former, we had no indications that bombers to remain in Egypt permanently, but if such visits became a pattern this was nevertheless a serious development. Harman asked whether we had considered raising this question at high level with Soviets. Battle said we had not. On other hand, we had raised arms control problem in general with Soviets on number of occasions. We were not discussing this subject with Soviets at the moment but wouldn't rule out possibility should right moment come.

7. Re Yemen, Harman thought situation difficult for Soviets whose only access was by air. He speculated that advantage lay with those who had strength on ground and thought Royalists therefore might have upper hand. This was factor which various forces in Yemen should be able to exploit.

8. Turning to new subject and emphasizing that he knew Israeli views and did not expect Harman to comment, Battle said Israel should know that we still had question of arms for Jordan under consideration. We had not reached decision, and if we did decide go forward, it would be on modest scale. We had evidence, however, that Soviets were prepared to provide Jordan anything it wanted. Situation in Jordan was extremely delicate and we would need to come to decision in next few weeks. In response Harman's question whether Jordan exploring France as source of supply, Battle said there had been some talk of this but to best our knowledge it had gotten nowhere and French had in fact made no offer to Jordanians.

Rusk

12. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson/1/

Cairo, December 9, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to President Johnson by James Birdsall on December 18; see Document 21.

Dear Mr. President:

I take this opportunity to extend my best wishes to you and your family.

At this time which is sacred to both our people I feel that good relations should exist between our people.

I have sent a special message through Mr. Birdsall. I trust you will receive it in the spirit which I send it.

With highest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jamal Abdul Nasser

13. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, December 10, 1967, 0915Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The Spanish Government assumed protection of U.S. interests in the United Arab Republic following severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic on June 6. Rostow transmitted the text of this telegram to President Johnson on December 10 in White House telegram CAP 671037 along with the following assessment: "With the Russians trying to take over from Nasser in the Yemen, it is, indeed, possible that he wants to get close to us to keep independence from Moscow." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68)

1136. 1. Birdsall/2/ saw Nasser for over two hours last night and I debriefed him this morning.

/2/James Birdsall was a lawyer who practiced in New York and had developed contacts in the United Arab Republic in his capacity as attorney for ALCO Products. His contacts in Egypt were facilitated by the Geneva representative of ALCO, a Mr. Siddiqui, who was Pakistani. In October 1966 Nasser invited Birdsall to Egypt to discuss his desire to improve U.S.-UAR relations and his belief that the United States was determined to overthrow his government. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 341. Birdsall's visit to Cairo in December 1967 was again at Nasser's invitation. (Telegram 78791 from Cairo, December 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

2. Birdsall says he was given "formal message" by Nasser to be delivered to no one except President Johnson. (Nasser told Birdsall that not even his Foreign Minister aware Birdsall's presence Cairo.)

3. From Birdsall's subsequent long and rambling conversation feel fairly sure about contents of "formal message." Nasser believes that Russians are increasing their pressure on him and that in absence any ties with USG he increasingly powerless to resist. Nasser hinted at strong Russian pressure re use of Alexandria, possibly involving permanent fueling facilities and barracks for Soviet naval personnel. Nasser also complained about magnitude of Sov concentration in UAR armed forces.

4. Nasser said he willing accept non-belligerency with Israel with all that implies. If Israel will pay just and adequate compensation to Palestinian refugees, Nasser will exchange Ambassadors with Israel.

5. Nasser was quite contrite for the grave mistakes he made in May and June, and acknowledged that Egyptians had been soundly defeated, mostly because they did not know how to use Soviet weapons. Nasser also expressed regret for past speeches he made accusing U.S. of "war of starvation" and so forth, indicating some of these statements had been made to please Soviets.

6. Nasser wishes resume diplomatic relations with the United States. He wants some time to consult with other Arabs but feels he can encourage other Arab states which broke relations he has no influence whatsoever.

7. Nasser said he fully understood that there no question resumption any form U.S. economic aid to UAR for foreseeable future.

8. Re big lie, Nasser made ingenuous statement that he had never accused USG of military participation in June war. He claims that all he did was quote Hussein directly on this point. (Comment: If that is case, why did UAR break relations with U.S.?)

9. Birdsall leaving Cairo today for London and plans return New York December 14. He will upon arrival request meeting with President Johnson. His thesis will doubtless be that USG cannot afford stand idly by in face of Soviet takeover of UAR and ultimately other Arab states in Eastern Mediterranean.

10. Recommendation: I would hope that if all possible President Johnson could receive Birdsall if only for a few moments before turning him over to White House or Departmental advisers./3/