Washington, March 29, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on March 30 under cover of a brief memorandum recommending that the President read it. Rostow noted a third possibility not mentioned by Saunders that could alter developments significantly in the Middle East: the fall of Nasser; but Rostow added: "I don't believe a U.S. policy can be based on that hope." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Next Step with Israel-Jordan

The problem in a nutshell is this:

--We agree that terrorism is a threat Israel has to do something about.

--We think Israel's effort to end terrorism by military attacks won't work. If they keep going down this track, we see only a rising spiral of attack and counter-attack ending in all Arabs at the summit rejecting a political solution and committing themselves to a guerrilla war against Israel. There's evidence now that the Israelis are beginning to think this way too, although they feel they must respond to terrorism somehow and don't yet see an alternative.

--The only persons who can stop terrorism from Jordanian territory are the Jordanian government. The problem, therefore, is to convince Hussein to stop it or--if he's already convinced but unable--to create conditions which strengthen his hand enough to crack down. We disagree with the Israelis that their military attacks strengthen his hand.

--The alternative we see is to get Jarring's peace talks on the road. If Hussein can show he's getting somewhere his way, maybe it's not too late for him to call the terrorists off, or stop them by force.

--One of the main obstacles to getting Jarring's negotiations started is Israeli inflexibility. One of the main reasons for Israeli inflexibility is the fact that the Cabinet has not taken a formal position on the terms for a peace settlement; Eshkol fears breaking up his coalition but we have assurance that they'll make up their minds the moment there's a glimmer of Arab willingness to talk.

--The difficulty with this is that the Arabs aren't likely to talk until somebody assures them there's a workable deal possible at the end of the track. This is what all the haggling over whether Israel accepts the UN resolution is about.

What all this adds up to is the conclusion of some of us that we should now urge Eshkol to bite the bullet and make the limited move necessary to give the Arabs the assurance they're looking for. Eshkol would give away nothing of substance; he would risk a Cabinet crisis, possibly for limited gains. But the risk of doing nothing looks a lot worse to us.

The alternative is to let force play itself out. The argument for is that only the Israelis will decide to bite the bullet when the pressure of terrorism builds up. The argument against is that we're in a worse position every time Israel strikes back and there's a real danger of the UN Security Council voting sanctions against Israel-with us having to decide whether to vote for, abstain or veto. More important, Israel is in a worse position if we don't stop the guerrilla spiral before the Arabs commit themselves to it.

The debate was brought to a head today in State when Luke Battle tried to clear a response from the President to Eshkol's last message. Arthur Goldberg felt it was too tough for the President. Luke, while fully understanding the President's concerns, feels that any message we send ought to lay out what we see as the serious consequences of Israel's current course.

My own feeling is that if we decide to do nothing to deter the Israelis from further retaliation it ought to be because we've decided consciously to let force play itself out a while longer. We shouldn't do nothing just because State can't work out line of action it feels the President can approve.

I don't believe there's any point in just sending another Presidential message for Eshkol to disregard. If we approach the Israelis this time, it ought to be with the purpose of working out with them a way to get Jarring on the tracks. I think the only way to do this would be to send someone like Mac Bundy with the most serious words from the President for three or four days of talk in Jerusalem. This need not look like pressure at all. The main focus wouldn't be to restrain them. It's just the only way I can see at this time to decide where we and they are going, and the only place to do that is where Eshkol and his Cabinet are.

State is considering this idea this afternoon.

Hal

128. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 29, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel, 3/1/68-4/30/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on April 1.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Israeli Minister Evron

Evron came in on March 29, at his request, to share his observations from his quick trip to Jerusalem. As usual, our conversation was tabbed as strictly personal and off-the-record. As can be imagined, it dealt mainly with the March 21 Israeli attack on Karameh and Israeli thinking in the aftermath.

I began by asking him what the Israelis see at the end of their current course of gradually escalating terrorist raids and retaliatory attacks. Although the results of a military review of the Karameh attack have not been finished, Evron indicated that the Israelis were not necessarily satisfied with that sort of attack as the best means to counter terrorism. He said that they would experiment with other tactics, "such as today's" (at the moment the air and artillery attack south of Lake Tiberias was going on). He also indicated, "in the utmost confidence," that the Israelis are building a "fence" from the Dead Sea to Lake Tiberias. (This is the reason for the Israeli request for a large number of anti-personnel mines which he hoped we might free quickly.) Concluding this line of discussion, he was quite ready to admit that these counter-attacks would not stop terrorism.

When I said I did not see how the Israelis could expect to stop activities based on land which they do not consistently control, he agreed that the main problem is to convince Hussein to do the job. When I said I did not believe that Israel's counter attacks would do that either, he disagreed, but he did not argue as strongly as he usually does when he is convinced of what he is saying.

I suggested that, if the military track did not promise a solution, it seemed to me this was all the more reason to get into negotiations. He suggested that more flexibility was needed before that could happen. Then telling him I wanted to ask a very indiscreet question, I asked whether Israel was denied the flexibility necessary to begin negotiations by the fact that the Israeli Government had not yet made up its mind what its position would be. I said it seemed clear to me that what the Arabs were seeking in all this haggling over whether Israel did or did not accept the UN resolution was some assurance that there was a deal at the end of the road. I realized that Foreign Minister Eban had, through us, passed the word that the Arabs would find Israel ready to negotiate generously, but it was clear that this was not convincing to the Arabs in the current atmosphere. Would an Israeli Government decision now on its negotiating terms enable some such assurance to be made?

Evron answered quite readily, thoughtfully and not emotionally. He said, first, that the moment there was a "glimmer" of Arab willingness to come to the table, the Israeli Government would "make up its mind in a moment." He said emphatically that the greatest single impression he had brought away from Jerusalem this time was the overriding desire for peace. Having felt this in his early talks there, he asked Eban whether he was right and Eban confirmed his view that everyone is "fed up with all this bloodshed."

Second, however, Evron said he had been considering for months the question of whether Israel should stake out its position before negotiations to encourage them. He said he did not believe this was the right procedure. But his main point was that, in international negotiations, one never lays his cards on the table before negotiations begin. He did not push the usual Eban line about willingness to negotiate being a necessary sign of an Arab change of heart, although this omission may have been simple oversight.

At the end of our conversation, he confirmed that he had described to Eban that questioning of the US-Israeli relationship going on in Washington that he had heard from me before his departure as well as from Harry McPherson. We had both told him that an increasing number of people were more and more troubled over whether this relationship would ever become a two-way street. Secretary Rusk had asked the Israeli Government for certain actions in Jerusalem and on refugees, and his questions have been ignored. We have advised against retaliation, and our advice has been ignored. Evron said he had arrived in the Foreign Ministry the morning that Ave Harman was giving his final impressions of the US-Israeli relationship. On the basis of Evron's report and Harman's comments, Eban at the Cabinet meeting which made the final decision to go ahead with the Israeli raid on Karameh, described this change in the Washington mood to the Cabinet. Evron felt that this had made some impression since both Minister Begin and Allon had asked Evron later whether what Eban said was true.

Evron at one point during this conversation said that one of the ideas that had occurred to him personally--and he said he had not heard this mentioned in Israel at all, so it was strictly personal-is whether now is not the time for Israel to begin thinking again seriously about a separate Palestinian entity. Hussein is so weak that perhaps only the Palestinians can take the lead. Already there are new economic relationships growing up between the towns of old Israel and the former West Bank of Jordan. Evron felt that the Palestinians were beginning to see the economic and other advantages of peace and, if they could be adequately organized, might be just the ones to stand up and take the lead in a settlement that Hussein might or might not join later. Evron did not seem to be suggesting a permanent separation of the West Bank from Jordan, but simply a settlement that could be worked out now as a first step in what might become a full settlement with Jordan later on when that was possible.

Comment: Two reflections stand out in my mind after this conversation. First, although Eppie made clear that he had not had time for full talks with the Israeli military after the attack on Karameh, he seemed to confirm that there is some second thinking going on about the effectiveness of Israel's current force. Second, there is obviously a great deal of concern about the American relationship and I wonder whether we might not have more effect on Israel's course than we now feel possible.

H.S.

129. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, April 1, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
The President's Decision and the Near East/2/

/2/The reference is to President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election, which he announced in a nationally telecast address from the White House on March 31. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, p. 476.

Our main problem, as you said this morning, is to see how we can use the President's new position to finish as much unfinished business as possible. In the Near East, the main job is how to make concrete progress toward the President's vision of last June 19. With the President's new freedom from politics, I'd suggest that we may be able to use the uncertainties of this period to good advantage in Israel.

Two new factors are obvious:

1. The President is now more free of Israeli pressure. We shouldn't discount his strong personal determination not to let Israel down, so we have to exclude any dramatic shift in our position. But it's worth considering what we might do now that we couldn't have done last week.

2. The President has nothing to bargain with beyond next January. Whatever we do must not depend on committing the US beyond January 1969, except for military sales which a new Administration would be bound to honor or a financial commitment (like desalting) with Congress behind it.

On balance, I believe the President's increased freedom may be more important than his loss of leverage. His ability to bargain with US support was neutralized by domestic politics. Now he can play on uncertainties about his successor.

Two possible courses spring to mind:

1. Use the President's increased freedom of maneuver to bring pressure on Israel and begin re-balancing our position toward the Arabs. No successor will have such freedom to create public doubt that Israel can count on us in a Soviet-backed effort to get Arab territory back, curtail our support in the UN, tamper with tax exemption for Israel bonds or whatever else might occur to us.

2. Use the President's friendship to advantage--he may be the best friend Israel will have in the White House for some time.

I favor the latter because (a) I don't think the President would want to pressure Israel and (b) because we've never fully and systematically put his friendship on the line in a tough effort to change an Israeli position. Now, if ever, is the time to try. The Israelis are already nervous about approaching the limits of our tolerance, and they might respond to the thought that they might get more support from us now than later.

One other factor has to go in the hopper: There's not much the President can do on the Arab side. He is tabbed as too pro-Israeli, and our leverage there will increase only as we show we can move Israel.

Putting these elements together, I think our best bet is to concentrate on changing Israel's position by persuasion-rather than pressure-enough to give Jarring a real chance. That's where the President's influence is greatest.

If we take this course, we must be sure that doing something soon is better than letting Mid-East forces play themselves out. I must say I don't take much convincing on this point. It may already be too late for Hussein and Nasser to negotiate and the next Arab summit may commit the Arabs to guerrilla war instead of political solution.

We want Israel to do two things:

1. Signal "ready." One of the big obstacles to Jarring's getting started is the Israelis' position that the Arabs must come to them. In part, Eshkol is hiding behind this position to avoid the Cabinet crisis that forcing a decision on peace terms would precipitate. The question is whether an Israeli Cabinet decision now would inject enough new flexibility into the picture to get Jarring going--whether a hint to assure Hussein and Nasser that there is a deal at the end of the track would get negotiations going.

The answer, of course, hinges on whether there's something at the end of the road for Israel. No one can guarantee that the Arabs will--or can--seriously negotiate anything beside withdrawal. But no one can argue that Israel has given them a fair try, and it's hard to see how Israel can lose while it sits on the Suez Canal and the Jordan River.

2. Show tactical flexibility. The time has come to try to move them a short step back from their absolute position on direct negotiations and from the notion of a package settlement all at once. The President last June 19 specifically did not endorse direct negotiations; nor did he rule out settlement in stages, and Secretary Rusk spoke to Eshkol on this point at the Ranch.

What this adds up to is doing something concrete about what we've been talking about for weeks without result-increasing Israeli flexibility. Maybe we have a chance to cut the Gordian knot now. The point is that the Israelis are "shook" over the President's decision. Rabin told Ernie Goldstein, "We've had it." So while the President doesn't seem to have much to bargain with, the urgency of getting Israel's security position in order (50 Phantoms) in the next few months may enhance what he does have. We can't expect to bargain with airplanes for Israeli withdrawal, but now may be the time to shoot our wad on a marginal Israeli shift that might be enough to get negotiations going.

Now we come to an action proposal:

1. A special emissary to loosen up and pin down the Israeli position. Harry Symmes has proposed retired ambassadors like Holmes, Yost or Jernegan. But all of these are too "Arab" to cut any ice in Jerusalem. If we are to build on the advantages in the President's new status, we need someone who can go as the President's man and represent his pro-Israel side. (We've mentioned Mac Bundy as filling this bill.)

2. The line he would take would be to argue out the consequences of each possible course to persuade the Israelis that the consequences of retaliation and sitting tight are dead-ends. That being the case, pressures in the US are mounting to re-balance our position toward the Arabs before it's too late. That will also be an obvious task for the new President. With London, Paris and Moscow backing away from Israel, it will be dangerous for Israel if the US starts backing away too. Therefore, if Israel will shift its position enough to give negotiations a fair chance, we'll consider meeting Israel's aircraft needs now. This approach would combine a big carrot with a gentle stick urging only a marginal shift in Israel's position.

All of us have a deep sense of foreboding that the Arabs will soon be locked into a guerrilla war that none of us will know how to stop. If the President wants to make one last effort for peace, now is the time. It may already be too late, but the effort won't cost him anything. If we're going to do it, let's do it now and let's send someone like Mac Bundy with the best possible credentials.

Hal

130. Editorial Note

In a study of the Israeli nuclear program, Avner Cohen drew upon the recollections of physicist Edward Teller and the testimony of Carl Duckett, a former CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and explored the question of whether Israel had become a "nuclear-weapon state" in 1968. Teller told Duckett that his contacts in the Israeli scientific community led him to the "personal opinion" and "conjecture" that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons. Teller was a consultant with the CIA and his views informed a National Intelligence Estimate, which Duckett said was drafted by the CIA, that drew the conclusion that Israel had nuclear weapons. (Israel and the Bomb, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pages 297-298, 421) Duckett testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1978 that he took the estimate to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and Helms told him not to publish it. He said Helms later told him that he had taken the matter up with President Johnson and Johnson had instructed him: "Don't tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara." (Inquiry into the testimony of the Executive Director for Operations, Vol. 3, Interviews, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Security Archive Collection on Non-Proliferation, #26090) No such estimate has been found.

131. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 4, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Middle East Problem

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached letters to Prime Minister Eshkol and King Hussein./2/

/2/There is no indication of the President's reaction to either of Katzenbach's recommendations. The draft letters are ibid. The proposed letter to Hussein was not sent. For the President's letter to Eshkol, see Document 134.

2. That you agree in principle, subject to a final recommendation regarding timing, to send a personal representative to Tel Aviv for intensive talks with Israeli representatives, and possibly to Amman and Cairo. Some suggested names of prominent private persons from which a representative might be chosen are included in the following memorandum.

Background

We are deeply concerned over recent developments in the Middle East which are affording the Soviets the opportunity to exploit the situation: the pattern of provocative terrorist activities countered by substantial Israeli military retaliation; the increased status which the Fedayeen seem to have achieved as a result of these developments; the inability of Hussein to deal with this matter and the apparent weakening of his regime; the decline in sympathy for Israel and growing doubts about its peaceful intentions; the inability of Jarring to get a dialogue going between Israel and the Arabs resulting from a rigid Israeli posture and the hardening of the UAR attitude.

In light of the foregoing, we have concluded we must make a more direct effort to arrest and reverse these trends. Our efforts with the parties concerned to take measures to bring greater stability to the cease-fire areas and to begin talks under Jarring's auspices have not been successful. I believe it is now urgent that we raise these appeals to a higher level. We have indications that many Israelis are as concerned as we about the present course of events, and such an effort would strengthen those calling for a reappraisal of Israeli policies, particularly with respect to terrorism. We have therefore recommended to you the early despatch of the attached letters to Eshkol and Hussein.

In addition, it would be highly desirable for you to send to Israel, perhaps some time next week (depending on the results of Jarring's continuing efforts), an individual who could speak frankly to the Israeli Government regarding recent trends and to explore with them possible steps which could be taken to reverse these trends. The principal short-range purpose of such a trip would be to try to indicate to Jarring a willingness to formulate acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution in such a way that it at least provides Jarring the opportunity to continue his efforts both in Amman and Cairo. While it is problematical that this would get talks started, it would at least help place the onus for failure on the UAR rather than Israel. More broadly and fundamentally, such an emissary could try to get across to the Israelis the immediate need for some gesture on their part, at least to Jordan, which will be an overt demonstration to the Arab world of a continuing Israeli interest in a political settlement. This would bolster Hussein. As a follow-up to your discussions with Eshkol, your emissary could also explore with the Israelis their concrete ideas about a settlement.

The U.S. emissary would not take over the mediation effort of Jarring. He would support Jarring's efforts, and we would ask Ambassador Goldberg to explain this to the Secretary General so that there would be no misunderstanding.

Our hope would be that such an emissary would also find it desirable and opportune to discuss matters in Amman and Cairo, though we would not wish to make any final recommendations to you in this regard until we know the results of discussions in Tel Aviv. Since it would be desirable to include Cairo on the itinerary, we believe the individual selected should be a private person in whom you have confidence rather than a government official. We have three possibilities in mind in the following order of preference: McGeorge Bundy, Robert Murphy, George Ball. Ambassador Goldberg feels, and we agree, that the emissary should have some ostensible reason for the visit other than the actual purpose. In this respect, McGeorge Bundy would be especially suitable since his foundation affairs could quite naturally take him to the Near East./3/

/3/In an April 5 memorandum to the President, Walt Rostow discussed the proposal to send a personal representative of the President to Israel. He proposed McGeorge Bundy, whom he cited as "everyone's top choice." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69)

Ambassador Goldberg concurs.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

132. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 5, 1968, 9:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 70, 4/1-5/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

Recognizing that the approach to Eshkol in the letter previously submitted to you/2/ was too general, Nick, Gene, and Luke Battle have produced a formulation which comes to bear much more precisely on an urgent operational question. The language which Eban said he could accept when Jarring gave it to him on March 10 if Hussein had accepted, is at Tab A./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 131.

/3/Not printed. The key passage in the formula passed by Jarring to Eban on March 10, which is bracketed for emphasis in Tab A, indicates that in order to achieve a settlement the contending parties "intend to devise arrangements under my auspices for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution."

The variation desired by Hussein to make it easier for him with Nasser involves the substitution for the bracketed passage (Tab A) of the phrase "their readiness to implement it." The Jordanians indicate they would try to go with the Jarring text even if the Israelis do not accept the phrase. Goldberg suggests it as an additional phrase. Goldberg and State believe in any case that the provision in the next sentence of the phrase "promoting agreement in achieving such a settlement" covers the Israeli position.

In any case, this draft merely urges Eshkol to "consider" this variation of language. The reasons your intervention at this point is regarded as critical are twofold:

--there is an honest judgment that if we fail on this round-now that Hussein has indicated that he is prepared to accept the Jarring March 10 formulation--the Jarring mission will fail and we face a very bleak prospect;

--the conviction that Eshkol simply will not move unless you personally take a position. He has ignored one intervention after another by Goldberg and the Secretary of State.

I have read the critical passage to Abe Fortas, who now thinks that your intervention might make sense since it is sharply focused on a particular question.

Walt

Letter cleared/4/
No
Call me

/4/The President checked this option.

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, April 6, 1968, 0229Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Atherton and Battle, and approved by Davies. A copy was sent to the White House for Saunders' information.

142978. 1. At luncheon April 2, Evron raised with Davies Israel's request for sizable quantities US anti-personnel mines (requests total 400,000). He said Defense had told General Geva request blocked by NEA. Evron said mines urgently needed in conjunction with security belt being constructed to inhibit infiltration along sensitive areas of cease-fire line.

2. Davies said he unfamiliar with case but gave personal reaction that since USG has taken strong public position critical of Israel's military reprisal policy, he favored cooperation in measures to provide alternates. Evron suggested if it would help that he would seek assurances mines would be used only in connection this project. Davies said it would be embarrassing if mines of U.S. origin were to be used in countermeasures on East Bank.

3. Davies later telephoned Evron to say suggested assurances would be helpful in expediting final decision.

4. FYI--Evron later complained to White House staff that Department exacting condition which implied lack of trust and which would be resented in Jerusalem. Davies telephoned to express surprise to which Evron responded he had had second thoughts relating solely to the form in which assurances conveyed. When Davies said he had in mind oral assurances, Evron replied that he authorized to state mines would be used solely in connection border-sealing project. End FYI.

Katzenbach

134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, April 6, 1968, 0516Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, cleared in substance by Atherton, and approved by Walsh. Repeated to USUN, Amman, and Cairo.

142988. 1. Please convey following message from President to Prime Minister. Begin Message. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have considered your message of March 22/2/ with two thoughts uppermost in my mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 123.

2. I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action across ceasefire lines does not deter the type of terrorism you face, but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment.

3. We both recognize, I am sure, that true security for Israel lies only in peace.

4. I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the Jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the situation resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military actions-especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan.

5. I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need to reverse the present trend--a trend which carries the risk not only of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another round of general hostilities, as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring Mission. We wish to see every possible step taken to minimize these risks.

6. There is very little time. There is still, however, an opportunity for an active strategy of peace.

7. I have just learned of Ambassador Goldberg's discussion with Ambassador Tekoah of April 5./3/ I believe that we must seize the opportunity presented by King Hussein's visit to Nasser, and the King's apparent willingness to urge acceptance of the formulation which Ambassador Jarring gave the Israeli Government on March 10. I understand that Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Jarring at that time that your Government could accept this formulation. I urge you most strongly to make your acceptance clear to Ambassador Jarring. The King believes it would greatly enhance the possibility of his success with Nasser if you could also agree to a variation in wording/4/ which Ambassador Goldberg set forth to Ambassador Tekoah. I hope you will be able to consider such a variation in language, as necessary.

/3/Goldberg's meeting with Tekoah was reported in telegram 4488 from USUN, April 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/The language proposed by Jordan stipulated not only acceptance of Resolution 242 but also a readiness to implement it.

8. This may be the last chance for the Jarring Mission, and for peace.

Lyndon B. Johnson End Message

Katzenbach

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, April 7, 1968, 0131Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on April 6, cleared by Popper, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN.

143077. 1. Cairo for Bergus. With Israeli acceptance formula presented by Ambassador Jarring in his discussion in Jerusalem March 10, and King Hussein's apparent readiness to accept this approach (Amman's 4238),/2/ King's success in obtaining Nasser's acceptance now becomes of major importance in determining whether Jarring Mission is to succeed or fail. We have informed London of these developments through British Embassy and requested that Beeley consult with you soonest on what actions can be taken with the UARG in support of Hussein's position. You should apprise him of latest developments as soon as possible. In addition, suggest that you or Brommell see Hussein or, if not possible, pass word to him discreetly on results of our intervention with Israelis with view to having him make strongest efforts to obtain Nasser's acceptance. We have been reluctant to get out in front of Jarring, but issue is at such critical juncture every effort must now be made to move parties toward some form of negotiation leading to implementation Security Council resolution through agreement as required by para 3, SC Resolution. Clearly, if Nasser now reneges, responsibility for lack of progress will be on Egyptians. In light your 2055, you may wish to make this point apparent in further discussion with Muhammad Riad./3/

/2/Telegram 4238 from Amman, April 5, reported that King Hussein was prepared to try to obtain Nasser's acceptance of the proposal presented by Jarring in early March. (Ibid.)

/3/On April 6 Bergus and Mohamed Riad discussed the impending meeting between Nasser and Hussein. Bergus indicated that the United States was pressing Israel to accept a formula relating to Resolution 242 that would be acceptable to the Arab states, and urged that Nasser and Hussein should avoid any action detrimental to the Jarring Mission. (Telegram 2055 from Cairo, April 6; ibid.)

2. Amman for Ambassador Symmes. If in addition to action being taken in Cairo you deem it important pass Israeli reaction to senior GOJ officials, you authorized to do so.

Katzenbach

136. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, April 8, 1968, 1214Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN.

4252. Dept pass Cairo. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: 143077,/2/ 3214./3/

/2/Document 135.

/3/Telegram 3214 from Tel Aviv, April 6, reported Eban's request that Hussein be informed in Cairo that Israel had authorized Jarring to convey Israel's acceptance of the formula put forward by Jarring on March 10, and Israel's willingness to send representatives to a meeting between the parties under Jarring's auspices. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Bergus reported from Cairo on April 7 that Hussein left Cairo before an assurance relating to the Israeli acceptance of the March 10 formula could be conveyed to him. Bergus did convey such an assurance to Mohamed Riad. (Telegram 2060 from Cairo; ibid.)

1. Summary: King Hussein called me and Emboff to Palace evening 7th for briefing on Jarring talks with Nasser. Only after several hours of difficult discussion had he obtained Nasser's agreement even to consider accepting the Jarring proposal. Catch now is that Nasser insists Jarring must come up with some alternate phraseology to substitute for "I have invited the two govts to meet with me for conferences" on March 10 proposal. Jordan and UAR therefore will try to get Jarring to develop his own proposal along lines "I plan to meet with representatives or delegates of the parties in New York." Nasser is adamant that meetings can be held only in New York and must be lowest key possible. Abdul Munim Rifai stayed behind in Cairo to join with UAR FonMin Riad in meeting with Jarring on 8th.

2. King said his April 6-7 meetings with Nasser had been longest and most arduous he had ever had with any leader. Jordanians had expected some difficulties in these discussions but were stunned by Nasser's opening position which was totally negative to concept of any peaceful solution. As far as Jordanians could see this position was shared by all of Nasser's advisers. Nasser had begun by saying flatly that Jarring Mission could not succeed, that only military solution was feasible and that UAR military was therefore preparing for that solution. Nasser repeatedly said Egyptian people would not stand for the humiliation of dealing with Israelis through Jarring in terms of latter's present proposal. Nasser in fact considered Jarring's present formula as "an American trick." He indicated to the King a greater mistrust of US policy than ever and stressed he is unwilling to resume diplomatic relations with the US. According to Nasser he had just turned down opportunity to restore relations and would continue to do so.

3. Nasser told Hussein that six other Arab states have stated to him they have not accepted the SC resolution and oppose a political settlement. The six are Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Kuwait, South Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Nasser said Faisal through Omar Saqqaf had just urged him to agree to announce failure of the Jarring Mission. Hussein observed parenthetically to me "Your friend Faisal is more opposed than anyone to peaceful settlement."

4. King probed Nasser for indication to when UAR would be ready to take Israel on militarily, if Nasser seriously meant that the military alternative was the only one available to the Arabs. Nasser said he would be ready "before eighteen months had lapsed." King then countered with question how UAR proposed to help Jordan militarily since Israeli attacks on Jordan are occurring right now. Nasser replied unfortunately he was in no position to give any help. Jordanians thereupon reminded Nasser he had told them he felt personally responsible for loss of West Bank and was prepared to do anything possible to help King recover his lost territory. King pressed this point home with comment "Now you say no political solution and yet you cannot help us militarily." King said he pointed out to Nasser that whether UAR liked it or not Jordan did not intend to continue to bear alone the brunt of Israeli military attacks and would call for assistance other Arab states, specifically UAR. Thus, King continued, UAR would become involved militarily against Israel but once again in circumstances where Israelis would be dictating the time and place. This would undoubtedly mean another disastrous defeat for the Arabs. King observed he thought this stage in discussion had been turning point in his efforts to get Nasser to consider accepting Jarring proposal. The two delegations thereupon settled down to review Jarring's formula.

5. To Jordanians' surprise Nasser passed over the "to devise arrangements" phrase without hesitation. This was point on which GOJ had expected most trouble. King said he had reserved as his fallback position insertion of phraseology "readiness to implement" but found this was unnecessary. Nasser balked only at the penultimate sentence of Jarring's formula and stated that call for meetings in way Jarring proposed was "impossible".

6. Jordanians' first thought was that they must then begin all over again with their argumentation. They pointed out that the meeting with Israelis under Jarring's auspices was whole object of exercise. Nasser countered with statement if he accepted Jarring's "I have invited the two govts to meet with me for conferences," there would be a "revolution in Egypt tomorrow." Nasser stated that Cyprus as meeting place was out of the question. Jordanians then suggested possibility of New York as meeting place. Nasser was intrigued with this idea and, overriding the objections of some of his advisers, said he could accept this and added New York would be the only place where UAR could meet.

7. It was clear to the Jordanians that they had pushed Nasser as far as was possible. They felt at conclusion of discussions Nasser would stick to his position even though this put him in opposition to some of his advisers including Mahmoud Riad who throughout the meetings was particularly rigid and outspokenly anti-American. Nasser and Hussein agreed that Abdul Munim Rifai would remain in Cairo to meet with Jarring and Mahmoud Riad on Monday April 8. They would explain difficulty of "inviting the two govts" and would urge Jarring to develop a substitute phrasing of his own. Nasser indicated for example that he would not object to Jarring saying he had "arranged to meet with representatives (or delegates) of the parties in New York." Nasser also agreed with Hussein that such meetings by no means need to be confined to permanent UN representatives of the countries involved. What he could not accept was a reference to "govts" or "conferences."

8. Hussein said he was convinced Nasser both fully intends to proceed with "indirect talks" with Jarring and recognizes that talks are necessary "to devise arrangements for implementations." Hussein said as far as he is concerned he will send Abdul Munim Rifai and or Dep PriMin Ahmad Touqan, together with other aides, to talk in New York and will be prepared to move as fast as possible. Jordan's al-Farra would not be GOJ representative.

9. After reviewing the foregoing, King Hussein said "This really is our last chance. You must persuade the Israelis to keep quiet and to go along with whatever Jarring proposes in place of the present invitation to the govts." The King kept saying that "there will be talks and they can be broadened later if we can only get the meetings started." He also said that although Nasser and he remain adamant against proceeding to a formal peace treaty, they had discussed various formulas through which permanent and secure guarantees of a peaceful settlement could be established. The King recognized the problem of proposing changes in the present proposal. For that reason, Rifai and Riad would not propose any specific language to Jarring but would explain the problem and try to stimulate him to come up with language of his own that would solve the problem for the Arabs and at the same time be acceptable to Israel as Jarring's own ideas.

10. Comment: We consider results of Hussein's talks to be encouraging. They were not conclusive in terms of getting final agreement from Nasser to Jarring's formula but we believe nonetheless we are within reach of getting talks started. We leave to other addressees whether there would be benefit in giving GOI run down on Hussein-Nasser talks until it is clear what Jarring intends to do next. He may need pushing from U Thant or Bunche if we are to have any quick action. Because of Jarring's less than activist approach to his mission we recognize that proposed revising of penultimate sentence in his formula may risk considerable delay and even Israeli rejection.

11. As far as Jordanians are concerned, it is clear to us they are ready to assume all risk involved in substantive negotiations and will take the lead in expanding the scope of the talks as quickly as possible.

12. We have increasingly deep reservations about Jarring's ability to carry through the job successfully and believe he will need careful monitoring and prodding. For this reason we see positive merit in meetings in New York which outweigh the objections USG has hitherto maintained to this venue. In any case, from what Hussein says there is no alternative to New York.

Symmes

137. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

CA-7122

Washington, April 8, 1968, 3:04 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Precht; cleared by Wiley, Wehmeyer, and Day, and in draft by Bovis and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, London, and Jerusalem.

SUBJECT
Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories

REF
Tel Aviv 2722, A-716, Jerusalem A-176/2/

/2/Telegram 2722 from Tel Aviv, March 1, reported on a question-and-answer session in the Knesset on February 26 during which Eshkol answered questions dealing with Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, and discussed the negotiability of Jerusalem. (Ibid.) In airgram A-716 from Tel Aviv, March 29, the Embassy reported on the growth of six Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights area. (Ibid., REF ISR) Airgram A-176 from Jerusalem, March 6, reported on an Israeli settlement developing at a former Jordanian Army installation on the Dead Sea. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

We have noted press and posts' reporting that the GOI is under increasing pressure to authorize and facilitate the establishment of civilian settlements in the occupied areas. Existing settlements in the Golan Heights, Sinai, and at Etzion were justified by the GOI as para-military encampments serving security purposes. Recent reports (Tel Aviv A-716) indicate that these settlements are taking on aspects of permanent, civilian, kibbutz-like operations and some are, in fact, civilian kibbutzim with Nahal covers. Thus far, we have no information on the establishment of settlements by the 17 groups which Prime Minister Eshkol announced in the Knesset February 26 he had approved. While there was no suggestion in his statement that these groups would be associated with Nahal, we note that the groups filed applications with the GOI and it seems probable they are non-Nahal.

Although we have expressed our views to the Foreign Ministry and are confident there can be little doubt among GOI leaders as to our continuing opposition to any Israeli settlements in the occupied areas, we believe it would be timely and useful for the Embassy to restate in strongest terms the US position on this question.

You should refer to Prime Minister Eshkol's Knesset statement and our awareness of internal Israeli pressures for settling civilians in occupied areas. The GOI is aware of our continuing concern that nothing be done in the occupied areas which might prejudice the search for a peace settlement. By setting up civilian or quasi-civilian outposts in the occupied areas the GOI adds serious complications to the eventual task of drawing up a peace settlement. Further, the transfer of civilians to occupied areas, whether or not in settlements which are under military control, is contrary to Article 49 of the Geneva Convention,/3/ which states "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Finally, you should emphasize that no matter what rationale or explanation is put forward by the GOI, the establishment of civilian settlements in the occupied areas creates the strong appearance that Israel, contrary to the principle set forth in the UNSC Resolution and to US policy expressed in the President's speech of June 19, does not intend to reach a settlement involving withdrawal from those areas.

/3/Reference is to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949. (6 UST 3516, TIAS 3365)

Rusk

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, April 8, 1968, 2348Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Wiley and Houghton on April 5; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Amman.

143620. Ref: Tel Aviv 3159;/2/ Amman 4199./3/

/2/The Embassy reported on April 2 that it had responded to requests from the Foreign Ministry for an assessment of the internal situation in Jordan. Embassy officials had indicated that they had no information to confirm press reports that the collapse of the Jordanian Government was imminent. (Telegram 3159 from Tel Aviv; ibid.)

/3/In telegram 4199 from Amman, April 4, the Embassy noted, in response to a request from the Embassy in Tel Aviv, that offering assurances to the Israelis that Hussein's government had reserves of strength might not have the desired effect in light of the fact that the Israelis had excellent sources of intelligence of their own to assess Jordan's internal situation. (Ibid.)

1. We fully concur in Embassy Amman's 4199 and are becoming deeply disturbed by continuing evidence that elements in GOI seriously considering possibility of toppling Hussein as means of somehow improving current situation for Israel. We have particularly in mind statement made by chief of IDF naval intelligence reported Tel Aviv DAO 0626/4/ (para 1A) and report in Tel Aviv 3146/5/ that only one-third of opinion in Foreign Ministry is opposed to "solutions" involving the toppling of Hussein. We fail to see how the departure of Hussein could do anything other than put prospects for peace further in the background. We are further concerned that Israelis do not seem to have received message that regime's survival is important to US interests quite apart from interests of Israel. Given nature of our relationship with GOI, we believe that we are entitled to Israeli consideration of these interests.

/4/Not found.

/5/In telegram 3146 from Tel Aviv, April 2, the Embassy reported that information obtained from the Foreign Ministry indicated that a debate was taking place within the Israeli Government as to how to deal with the terrorism problem and the Jordanian Government. The telegram indicated that the weight of opinion within the Foreign Ministry inclined toward doing whatever was necessary to keep Hussein on his throne as the best hope of containing the terrorists, but others in the Israeli Government advocated the overthrow of Hussein. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68)

2. You may inform Fonmin officials that we believe King Hussein is still in control of the situation in Jordan, but that recent Israeli reprisal actions have made his task of maintaining internal security much more difficult. You should also inform them that the US Government is becoming increasingly concerned over indications that Israel may be contemplating further military actions against Jordan as such actions will only weaken Hussein and further augment the prestige and support for the terrorists among the Arab population.

3. You should also emphasize that preservation of Jordanian regime is a major US interest. We believe he still represents the best prospect for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. In addition, Hussein is important to our overall position in the Arab world and his fall or further weakening would likely have most unfortunate repercussions for our interests throughout the area. We trust that the Government of Israel will realize that the relationship existing between our two countries justifies our expectation that Israel will respect our interests even when Israel may not think them identical with its own.

Rusk

139. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders and John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, April 9, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Comment on Amman 4266/2/

/2/Telegram 4266 from Amman, April 8, reported on a message the Jordanian Government had just received from Israel. A personal message from Eban to King Hussein, also intended for Nasser, it indicated that Israel was eager for a settlement with the Arab states, and felt that fedayeen activities made it imperative that the settlement be reached quickly. Eban stated that if a settlement was not reached during April, Israel would have to resort to force to resolve the Fedayeen problem. Eban added that the only way to achieve a settlement was through direct contact between Israel and the Arab states. He offered assurances that Israel was prepared to discuss border and security issues in a positive manner. Israel was prepared to be flexible on the issue of Jerusalem, but could not contemplate divided control of the city. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

It's hard to know exactly what to make of the attached secret message from Eban to Hussein and Nasser. We can't even be sure that this third-hand account is completely accurate. The substance of the Israeli position as reported contains nothing new. The interesting aspect is the fact that they seem to be putting on some pressure now.

Whatever else one reads into it, it's an ultimatum-direct negotiations now or we'll attack-softened somewhat by the line that the politicians may be losing control in Israel and this may be the Arabs' last chance for some time to get the kind of forthcoming deal Eban can offer.

Why should Eban apply the pressure now? From other Israelis we have the impression that they'd rather sit until the Arabs come to them. Possible explanations:

1. There is a serious debate going on over how to stop terrorism, and Eban and other moderates may have bought enough time from the hard-liners to give negotiations one final try. Eban probably does feel it would be disastrous for Israel's hard-liners to gain the upper hand, but if he can't stop terrorism the peaceful way he may not be able to hold out against those who urge the military solution. While it sounds quite uncharacteristic for Eban to admit that terrorism is having an unsettling effect in Israel, he is still speaking from a position of strength since the alternative he poses is further use of force.

2. The situation may not be so neat as that described above, and this may be just one of several simultaneous attempts to explore a new tack. We know they are considering such things as seizing part of the East Bank, working directly against Nasser and Hussein, an $80 million fence on the Jordan, dealing directly with the Palestinians, and a wide variety of military answers to terrorism, three of which have been tried in the past month. It would not be surprising if they were to make diplomatic use of these to try to precipitate negotiations. They'd have nothing to lose, except that an ultimatum of this sort may do more harm than good if poorly presented.

3. Or they may be afraid of us and this may be their way of pressing the Arabs to talk on their terms before we push them to change their terms. They're alert enough to know by now that a lot of people here are beginning to talk about "partial solutions" and "last chance for peace." They also know that American public opinion against our "pro-Israeli" policy is slowly coming to life.

Except for the insight it provides if other evidence fills out the picture, there's no immediate operational aspect to this message.

John
Hal

140. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, April 9, 1968, 1204Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 8 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, London, and USUN.

3252. Israeli independence day parade. Ref: Amman's 4270./2/

/2/Telegram 4270 from Amman, April 9, reported Jordanian Government concerns that a proposed Israeli independence day parade scheduled for May 2 through Jerusalem would lead to serious repercussions in the Arab world if it went as planned through east Jerusalem. The Embassy suggested that an effort be made to persuade the Israelis to cancel or reroute the parade. To that end the Embassy proposed that UN Secretary-General U Thant be encouraged to issue a statement deploring the proposed parade as likely to increase tensions in the area and complicate the efforts being made to promote peace. The Embassy further suggested that the Department issue a statement expressing a similar position. (Ibid.)

1. While I am aware that the content and the route of the Israeli independence day parade will very likely arouse negative reactions among Arabs, I question whether the proposals set forth in reftel are best designed to protect our own interests in the matter. A USG public critical position is very likely, I believe, to contribute only to blow the whole matter up still further without positive return for us or anyone else. The fact is of course, as ConGen Jerusalem has been reporting for weeks, that Israeli plans and preparations are very far advanced indeed, and that any intervention on our part would stand no chance of effecting a major change in the spectacle./3/ I urge that we make no public statements on the parade and that if there are queries we limit ourselves to a reiteration of our position on Jerusalem. I wonder in any case on what grounds we could object to a military parade being held in occupied territory by the occupying forces.

/3/The Consulate General in Jerusalem confirmed this judgment in telegram 1163 from Jerusalem, April 11. The Consulate General felt, however, that it was important for the United States to express its opposition to a parade it judged was inappropriate and unwise. (Ibid.)

2. I have not received an invitation to the parade yet and it is possible that the GOI, knowing well our views, will not tender one. Naturally, if I am invited, I do not intend to participate.

Barbour

141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, April 9, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Exploration with Evron

As you suggested, I broached with Eppie the question of how the President might make a major effort for a Middle East settlement, explaining that this was a purely personal and private conversation. I started with the notion that some Israeli indication that a decent settlement is at the end of the track is necessary to get negotiations going. We talked about the validity of this premise and about how far the Israeli Government might go in sending such a signal.

Our conversation was most revealing. I believe the answer, in short, is that the Israelis are waiting till Nasser falls and aren't anxious for any US initiative that hurries them toward peace before that happens. Eppie musters all sorts of reasons--some sensible, some marginal--but this is what I think it boils down to.

To me, this means that we have to make our own judgment and then set out with all our energies to change the Israelis' minds (probably via an emissary). To do this, we have to have a convincing answer to their arguments that (a) Nasser can't or doesn't want to negotiate peace; (b) they can't negotiate a settlement with a schizophrenic; (c) Nasser must go before other Arab governments can be free to pursue their own interests in a settlement.

The choice before us is between (a) letting forces play out as they are with an occasional tactical prod to keep Jarring in motion and (b) playing for a substantial shift in Israel's tactical position on the assumption that such a shift would get serious negotiations started. So far, while everyone is uneasy about our present course, no one has made the hard final judgment that would shift our approach to leaning hard on the Israelis. We came close last week but were diverted by the seeming break on the Jarring front. I will be doing a separate memo to you and Luke on this. For the moment, here's how my conversation with Eppie went:

Eppie doubts--"with real regret"--that any kind of Presidential initiative or Israeli compromise now would get negotiations started. He believes the Arabs will choose to wait for President Johnson's successor. Any sign that we were urging compromise now would lead the Arabs to believe that pressures are building up on the US to push Israel into a more flexible position. Any sign of change in our position would encourage the Arabs to believe that the President's successor would have to start at least from that point and that greater compromise would be possible later. He pointed out how unanimously the Arabs view the President's Vietnam proposal as a sign of weakness and failure.

He further believes that the Arabs have all the signals they need from Israel-that the main obstacle to negotiation is that the Arabs themselves aren't ready to negotiate. In the way of signals, he cited particularly Eban's 12 February interview with Haaretz. Having said that much, the Israelis believe any more signs of compromise would be signs of weakness in Arab eyes.

Eppie is playing with a new idea. He believes that feelings of Palestinian separatism are growing stronger right under the surface on the West Bank. Since he doubts that King Hussein is a free (from Nasser) agent in negotiating a settlement, he wonders whether Israel

shouldn't start with a settlement negotiated with the Palestinians and then let them determine their own relationship with Jordan.

I suggested that, even to do this, Israel would have to make up its mind on the shape of a final settlement. He asked what we had in mind. I told him we had not drawn any lines on the map. I said that our main concern was that Hussein get back a big enough portion of the West Bank to call it a settlement and a significant role in Jerusalem. He hinted that the Israelis are thinking about a substantial modification in the old armistice line, pushing it eastward at least as far as the heights that run down through Nablus past Jerusalem and Hebron (looks like 15-25% of West Bank area). In Jerusalem he spoke of Jordanian administrative custodianship of the mosque area and, at most, a corridor of access to the old city.

I said it sounded to me as if he advocates our standing back and letting events take their course. He denied this. He feels that there is already substantial Arab reason to believe that an eventual military solution would be possible because we have stood back. He harked back again to the idea that our greatest mistake in 1967 was to continue our suspension of arms shipments while the Soviets were rearming the Arabs. The Arabs do not believe we are firm in denying the area to the Soviets or in opposing the radical Arabs. In his view, we have never even made it clear that the Sixth Fleet will remain in the Mediterranean as long as it is needed. This American wishy-washy-ness is, in his eyes, the greatest encouragement the Arabs could find to believe that a military solution will become possible someday. It's the old line of making Israel so unbeatable that the Arabs will be forced to their knees.

Far from advocating our simply letting events take their course, he proposed a policy of "active passivity." He saw three things that could be done:

--Nasser should be eliminated. "There are plenty of things you could do." He claims that we continue to help keep him afloat by acquiescing in Western European and IMF programs to reschedule UAR debts. He believes we have dropped our conditions for resuming relations and are now encouraging Nasser to think that he can place conditions on resumption.

--Aircraft for Israel. The Arabs must be certain that the military balance will continue to favor Israel.

--We must make clear that we are going to stand firm against the USSR. "You should hear what even your friend, the Shah, says about your policy." He deeply fears that the mood in this country is to pull out.

I summed up by suggesting that the US could follow one of three courses:

(1) We could sit back and let local forces play themselves out.

(2) We could keep hands off the Jarring process but become more active in creatin