| Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967-1968 -Return to This Volume Home Page Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 152 through 178
152. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 26, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent this memorandum to the President on April 26 with an attached note summarizing the conversation. (Ibid.) PARTICIPANTS Israeli Ambassador Rabin on March 20 had asked Mr. Rostow "at Prime Minister Eshkol's request" about the status of our decision on Phantoms as discussed at the Ranch. Mr. Rostow, on the basis of memos from Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler, and Mr. Helms, reported to the President where staff work stands and asked permission to tell Evron informally. Not wishing to provoke a strong reaction in Jerusalem, Mr. Rostow with the President's approval passed the information informally in order to give Evron and Rabin a chance to decide how to handle it with their own Government. Mr. Evron came in at 5:00 p.m. yesterday to hear this report. Mr. Rostow, speaking very precisely, told him the following: 1. Secretary McNamara had determined that the President could decide as late as December 31, 1968, and still begin delivering Phantoms in January 1970 at the production-line rate of about 4 per month. 2. General Wheeler, after discussion with General Hod and his team, had determined that US training can be done beginning January 1969 provided the Israelis do preliminary training (English, electronics basics) in Israel. 3. Mr. Helms has reviewed the intelligence exchanges [less than 1 line of text not declassified]. There's no major disagreement on numbers. We interpret these numbers differently with Israel taking the gloomier view. However, Mr. Helms sees no new evidence that would change his estimates. Mr. Rostow also said that we had carried out our intention, discussed at the Ranch, to approach the Soviets with the following results: --We've made two serious approaches. --The Soviets say they're willing to discuss arms limitation after Israeli withdrawal. --We have never assumed that a direct Soviet answer was the only possible response. We have always assumed that the only Soviet response might be a de facto slowdown of shipments. We are watching this closely. Mr. Evron in response said he knew his government would be quite concerned. One of the things General Wheeler at the Ranch had said the US would specially watch was France's decision on the Mirages. Not only have the French still not delivered them, but they have signed a contract with Iraq. Iraq, from this deal alone, will end up with more Mirages than Israel now has in its inventory. Evron admitted that Soviet shipments to the Arab countries at the moment seemed to have leveled off and that absorptive capacity is a limiting factor. However, he said, noting that he could not be exact, that Israel has information that the training level of Egyptian pilots had increased to something like 50-100 a year. In sum, Evron felt there were elements in the situation which called for an earlier decision than waiting until the end of 1968. He conceded that it is technically accurate to say that the President's option will remain open until the end of 1968, but he noted that there are both "psychological and political" elements in the situation which make an earlier decision desirable. In fact, he felt that a public decision was called for, although he did not press that. He then spelled out his notion that the Arabs will only negotiate when they are thoroughly persuaded Israel is so strong that no military solution is possible. In conclusion, he said he could only tell us that the continued uncertainty would worry Jerusalem and urge a prompt decision. With that subject covered, Mr. Rostow turned to the broader subject of a political settlement, emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally. He felt a tremendous sense of foreboding and saw the area teetering between the breakup of Jordan and the prospect some day of a bigger war. He felt that "what we and the Israelis owe to our grandchildren transcends hardware." He felt it is absolutely essential that the Israelis give some encouragement to King Hussein to negotiate a settlement. He realized that Nasser seems unwilling at the moment to go that route, but Hussein is grasping for any straw that would permit him to negotiate a bilateral settlement. Mr. Rostow felt that what is necessary is for the Israelis to give Hussein some glimpse of the kind of settlement they might expect on the West Bank, but particularly in Jerusalem. Mr. Evron agreed that Hussein is desperately trying to persuade Nasser to give him the blessing for making his own settlement. Hussein--and here Evron cautioned the utmost sensitivity-is using the West Bank notables to try to persuade Nasser to give Hussein a free hand. He did not disagree with Mr. Rostow's line, although he did indicate that there already is communication through the notables with Hussein. In conclusion, Evron reiterated his argument that a decision on the Phantoms now would both increase Eshkol's maneuverability with his own government and would give Hussein further evidence with which to convince Nasser that the political solution was the only one possible. H. H. S. 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, April 27, 1968, 1130Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. 4555. Subj: Sandstorm. Ref: USUN 4785./2/ /2/Telegram 4785 from USUN, April 26, reported on an Israeli appreciation of the situation in the Middle East, as conveyed by Permanent Representative Tekoah. Israel saw the UAR as intransigent and waiting for a more favorable opportunity to achieve a settlement on its terms. Israel viewed Jordan as potentially more flexible, and Tekoah indicated that Israel would continue to explore the possibility that Jordan might adopt an independent policy. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 1. Reftel and other recent messages on Israeli thinking about Jarring Mission give more than hint that GOI may now concentrate on making separate arrangements with Jordan. I would not be surprised to find they will seek contacts with Hussein during his forthcoming visit to Europe. We have already reported signs that some members of the Jordanian "establishment" may be considering separate talks with Israel. 2. For all of reasons set forth in Amman 3770/3/and 4119,/4/ I think we must be extremely careful in how we use (or acquiesce in Israelis using) this last asset for a peaceful settlement because if a separate peace effort should blow up, Hussein and Jordan will stand to lose everything. Israel will only have lost another move in its chess game with the Arabs. /3/Document 109. /4/See footnote 3, Document 126. 3. I therefore think our own interests in the Middle East require: (A) That we obtain a clear and enforceable bilateral understanding with Israel on what we consider a minimum floor for Israel to offer Jordan for negotiations, with understanding Israel might have to give more in actual bargaining with Jordan. This will be essential in case of Jerusalem aspect of problem. (B) That we give careful and detailed consideration to politico-military contingencies that might arise and be prepared to move firmly and definitively (1) to underwrite any mutually acceptable arrangement Israel and Jordan might reach, or (2) to assist GOJ in maintaining public order and security particularly if efforts reach separate agreement should fail, and (3) to prevent any outside interference that might be threatened or undertaken by other states in the area. 4. Jordan and Israel may move to separate talks without our knowledge. Such talks could fail, and it would then be too late for us either to help influence the parties to final agreement or to protect Jordan and our Middle Eastern interest from the blowup that may ensue. 5. Foregoing ideas were developed in greater detail in Amman 3770 and 4119 which I hope will be reread in conjunction with this message. Symmes 154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 27, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret. SUBJECT We are taking a fresh look at the present situation in the Middle East in light of the continuing differences between the Arabs and Israelis which have made it impossible for Jarring to get talks started and with a view to seeing whether we can recommend to you additional steps to give effect to the policy objectives of your June 19, 1967 speech. However, we have a more immediate short-range problem in the Security Council which begins Saturday to consider the problem of Jerusalem at the request of Jordan. Israel is holding an Independence Day parade which violates provisions of the Armistice Agreement/2/ and previous UN resolutions by introducing military forces into Jerusalem beyond those permitted in the Agreement. /2/Reference is to the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Transjordan signed at Rhodes on April 3, 1949. The Jordanian objectives are threefold: (a) to get the Security Council to call on Israel to cancel the Independence Day parade of May 2; (b) to reinforce the Armistice Agreement framework, which is an anathema to the Israelis; and (c) to mobilize Security Council opinion against Israeli unilateral measures in Jerusalem which in the Jordanian view amounts to de facto annexation prejudicial to any ultimate settlement. Jordan has requested our support. (We persuaded Eban to say at the United Nations last summer that Israeli administration of Jerusalem is not an annexation, but municipal administration by the occupying power.) There are basically two approaches we can take in the Security Council. First, on the assumption we cannot develop sufficient common ground between the United States and Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, we could decide not to try to influence the Jordanians. In these circumstances, they would develop a resolution which would certainly go beyond what the United States could support. We would abstain in the vote, as we have on the two past General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, while restating in the Council the basic principles of our policy in essentially the same terms as in the past. Such a result would not disturb Israel too much since it attaches more importance to the United States vote than to the Security Council result. Israel would disregard such a resolution. It would go ahead with the parade and refuse to alter measures already taken in Jerusalem extending its control. Such a United States abstention would be exploited by the Soviets against our position in the area; it would further disillusion and weaken King Hussein; it would be played by the Arabs and his own people as another example that the King's friendship with the United States is not paying off for him; it would further aggravate the difficulties which have prevented Jarring from getting a dialogue started. We believe, and Ambassador Goldberg concurs, there is a second approach which should at least be tried even though its chances of succeeding are slim. Second, we would have Ambassador Goldberg meet with the Jordanians and probably the Pakistanis to see whether agreement can be achieved or a resolution based on the attached principles which are consistent with our present policy on Jerusalem. We would have to vote "yes" on the resolution if it stayed within the limits of these principles, and we would have to give the Jordanians this assurance at the outset of the Security Council discussions. Ambassador Goldberg wishes in the first instance to make a major effort to convince the Jordanians to limit the resolution to principle 1: A Call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension and make the Jarring Mission more difficult. This would be consistent with past policy. Ambassador Goldberg would also be given discretion to support principles 2 through 6 in a Security Council resolution if he thought it would be helpful. The reason we are being so gingerly about principles 2 through 6 is not because they are inconsistent with our policy but because an indication to the Jordanians of a willingness on our part to discuss them could lead to touchy and intricate political and legal issues being raised in the Security Council resolution. Israel is particularly anxious to avoid references to the Armistice Agreement in a resolution since their objective is to replace the unstable Armistice Agreement framework with a durable and stable peace by means of a negotiated settlement. We share this objective. We would leave it to Ambassador Goldberg's judgment as to whether and when to inject principles 2 through 6 in the discussions. We agree with him that we should not support a resolution that has the effect of bulwarking an Armistice Agreement system that has proved unworkable in the past. If we succeed along these lines we would avoid being isolated, it would be helpful to our position in the area, and it would help maintain an atmosphere in Jordan in which Jarring could continue his efforts. Both Eban and Jarring intend in the next ten days to concentrate in particular on the possibilities of Israeli-Jordan talks, since the recent hardening of the UAR position makes early progress in Cairo unlikely. As you know, Jordan and Israel are close together on Jarring's approach while the UAR has thus far been very negative. You should be aware there will be Israeli grumbling with this second approach. There will also be some domestic reaction in certain quarters, but it should be manageable since the recommended course does not involve any sharp change from past policy. We have long agreed to disagree with the Israelis on Jerusalem. We could balance this somewhat by reaffirming strongly the five principles you stated on June 19, 1967. The fact is that the Israelis have acted very badly on this Jerusalem matter and have put us in a position of near isolation in the United Nations which in turn is having adverse repercussions on our overall position in the area. Those favoring a settlement in Israel would be strengthened by our position. Recommendation: That you authorize Ambassador Goldberg (a) to proceed along the above lines in the knowledge we would vote "yes" if the resolution is consistent with the attached principles; (b) to include a frank discussion with the Israelis, as well as the Jordanians, so that they understand our position clearly. Dean Rusk Enclosure PRINCIPLES CONCERNING JERUSALEM 1. A call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension in an already inflamed situation and make the Jarring Mission more difficult. Other Principles if Desirable 2. Unilateral actions by any of the states in the area cannot be recognized as governing the international status of Jerusalem. 3. Issue of Jerusalem should be considered in the context of a settlement of all the problems arising out of the June conflict. 4. A satisfactory solution for Jerusalem must take into consideration the religious, economic, and political interests at stake, including those of Israel and Jordan. Its future status must be worked out in consultation with all parties having an interest in the special character of the city. 5. Israel is obligated to observe the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem, as it is in the other occupied territories. 6. Pending a settlement, Israel should refrain from actions in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem which are prejudicial to the future status of the city or which impede progress toward a settlement. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, April 28, 1968, 1707Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Priority. The text of a Presidential message was received from the White House for revision as a letter from Secretary Rusk. The telegram was approved by Rusk and Davies. Repeated to USUN and Geneva. 154625. 1. Please deliver following message to Foreign Minister Eban from the Secretary. "Dear Mr. Minister: We have in the past discussed the dangers to mankind of a further spread of nuclear weapons. The current resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly will have the opportunity in this respect to take a major step by endorsing a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the strong feeling of my government that the General Assembly should endorse the treaty and ask that it be opened immediately for signature by as many countries as possible so that it may enter into force at the earliest possible date. To assure prompt and widespread support for the treaty, parallel action will be necessary on the part of certain nations and groups of nations which have an understandable desire to assure themselves that their neighbors will also adhere to the treaty. The Middle East is clearly an area which stands greatly to benefit from the enhanced security which this treaty will provide. In this area, parallel action by Israel and the Arab states will be required for such a benefit to be realized. The Government of Israel, which, as the most technologically advanced state in the Middle East, has made clear its intention not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, is therefore in a position to assure that the treaty will effectively encompass the nations of the Middle East. That is why I urge, Mr. Minister, that your government as early as possible in the General Assembly make clear its readiness to join in supporting the treaty at the resumed United Nations General Assembly session. This, I trust, will shortly be followed by an announcement that Israel is prepared to sign the treaty. As you know, we are keenly aware of the many problems you face in assuring Israel's security. We recognize your concern over the buildup of conventional weapons in the states surrounding Israel. I can assure you again, as President Johnson told Prime Minister Eshkol in January, that we will press every opportunity to achieve satisfactory limitation of shipments from the Soviet Union. I can also repeat what the President said in January about our determination to keep Israel's needs under active and sympathetic review. In that context, I believe this treaty is crucial to the ultimate security of Israel. While we will work to limit the conventional arms race or keep it in appropriate balance, it is absolutely essential to prevent that race from leaping into weaponry against which Israel cannot be defended. The consequences of its use in your country would be catastrophic. Because we do not expect any Arab nuclear capability in the foreseeable future, Israel's objective must be to prevent, insofar as is possible by political arrangements, the transfer of such weapons to its neighbors. While the gains to Israel through adherence to the NPT would be vital, the only cost to Israel would be self-denial of the questionable deterrent of an unknown nuclear capability. However, I must also tell you that I consider this treaty to transcend even these crucial national issues. Its potential contribution to the safety and survival of all mankind--as well as to the survival of each nation large or small--is so great as to compel its separate consideration. I am confident that Israel will not ignore the worldwide significance of this act. I hope, therefore, that the United States can count on your government's initiative in supporting this treaty in the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk." Rusk 156. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 30, 1968, 6:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Exdis. A notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:45 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk has approved instructing Ambassador Barbour to ask Prime Minister Eshkol for another visit by US experts to the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. Our last visit was in April 1967. Eshkol has acquiesced in periodic visits every 12-13 months, although he has never been enthusiastic. The visit this year is more important than ever. Up through last spring, we were reasonably confident that the Dimona reactor was being used only for research and that the Israelis were making no attempt to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor used fuel elements from France which had to be returned to France when used. Late last year, however, there were indications that Israel was processing ore obtained without safeguards from Argentina. This could be to make their own fuel elements so they wouldn't have to depend either on France or on safeguarded material. We have no evidence that Israel has facilities for separating significant amounts of plutonium from irradiated fuel--the next step toward weapons production. But our experts say that last winter's activity could portend a decision to build such a plant. They estimate it would be only two years from that decision to Israel's first weapons test. Eshkol's response to our request could be an important clue to his intentions (though his political difficulties with the visit will also play a role). Secretary Rusk has already sent the message we showed you urging Israel to support the NPT./2/ Eban's staff says Israel won't make up its mind till toward the end of the year. This visit to Dimona will provide another avenue for reminding them that we're serious about opposing their going nuclear. Since Barbour will be making this request without reference to you, I should think this would carry minimum risk for the time being./3/ /2/See Document 155. /3/President Johnson approved Rostow's recommendation. Walt 157. Letter From the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 30, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. No classification marking. The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the following communication from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol to His Excellency the President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson:-- "Dear Mr. President: "On receiving your letter of April 6,/2/ I gave Ambassador Barbour a full explanation of my views on both of the subjects you raised. The activities of terrorist organizations, openly encouraged by Arab Governments, present grave problems for our security. It is axiomatic that the solution does not and cannot lie in giving them free rein or impassively suffering their assaults on life, limb and property in Israel. No government could ever be expected to accept such a course. We are adopting various methods to cope with this terrorist campaign, bearing in mind the considerations which you have explained to me. We are also doing our best to secure international understanding of our dilemma and of the motives and necessities which govern our response. In the last resort our responsibility for the lives and security of our people must be overriding. /2/See Document 134. "In response to your message of April 6, I acted promptly to reassure Jordan in connection with Ambassador Jarring's efforts. My impression is that King Hussein is aware of our attitude on this matter, but is inhibited by Nasser from moving ahead. The fact is that Ambassador Jarring's conference proposal for meetings with our government was accepted by Israel, rejected by the U.A.R. and has not been accepted by Jordan. "The critical state of the Jarring Mission is thus due to Cairo's attitude. We have made every reasonable attempt to promote a negotiated settlement. We offered a broad agenda for discussion. We agreed to negotiate on all the matters included in the Security Council Resolution within the framework of the establishment of a permanent peace. We stated that the boundaries are negotiable in peace talks. We accepted the procedure suggested by Ambassador Jarring in the hope that his presidency of a peace conference would give assurance to the U.A.R. and Jordan and ensure an equitable procedure as well as an agreed neutral venue. Nasser's response was to reject all these openings, to insist on our commitment to return to the June 4 situation, for which there is no international authority whatever, and to reiterate that he wished to 'implement' a Security Council resolution while rejecting its central principles--namely, peace, agreement and recognition. His public utterances as well as the views conveyed to Ambassador Jarring make it clear that he is not seeking an honorable and peaceful settlement with Israel. "On April 23, Ambassador Jarring told Foreign Minister Eban that by 'implementation' the U.A.R. means unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces in the first place to the June 4 lines. This is the very proposal which you, Mr. President, through your official spokesman, have described as a prescription for the renewal of hostilities. Nasser's attitude is dictated by the negative principles of the Khartoum Conference: no peace, no agreement, no recognition. His policy is thus to refuse all progress towards peace, to accumulate armed strength, and to bide his time until he is in a position to renew his aggression which he unsuccessfully organized in 1967. This policy is totally opposed to that which you, Mr. President, proposed on June 19, 1967. So long as the U.A.R. policy is so sharply contrary to yours and ours, I doubt if any formulation can bridge the gap. There has to be a will for peace, and the test for such a will is readiness to negotiate. "The question which we are now exploring is whether Jordan is willing, on its own account, to discuss a settlement with us. We are energetically seeking to clarify and promote this prospect. I do not know yet if it is a realistic one. I have myself had several talks with Palestine Arab leaders who wish Jordan to take a positive step. We are also trying every means including the good offices of Ambassador Jarring to bring about meaningful negotiations which, as Secretary Rusk wrote to Minister Eban on February 13, are the crux of our problem. Despite disappointment, it is important that Ambassador Jarring remain available in the coming weeks while efforts are under way to clarify the possibility of a Jordan-Israel negotiation. King Hussein seems to be oscillating between two pressures--that of Cairo and the terrorist movements which desire to escalate the present tension, and that of his own objective interests. He has not always acted in his own true interests, as we all learned last June. "The central cause of the deadlock created by Cairo is Nasser's intention to launch a successful war as soon as he is ready. So long as he believes this, he will not allow any peaceful process to mature. It follows that our principal aim should be to diminish his belief in the prospect of Israel becoming weak. We come back to the fact that the balance of strength in the coming months is the critical issue. Is it not a matter for further action and concern? This issue is immediate. It is Nasser's conviction that he is in the process of overtaking Israel's armed preparedness that leads him to refuse negotiation and to work for the frustration of the Jarring Mission. As we survey the Middle Eastern scene, we cannot forget for a moment the threat to Israel's very existence which developed overnight last May and June against all the prevailing estimates at the time that Nasser would not and could not raise the tension in the area for some years. "The matter which we discussed in your home in Texas last January has thus become very acute. When we spoke of the Phantom aircraft, you said that you would make a decision on the matter, one way or the other, during the course of 1968, in the light of developments, if necessary, even within the next few months. At the same time, you requested a review of the requirements for the training of personnel and information on the latest date on which you could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantoms and for Israel to be in a position to fly them in January 1970. "On the broad Middle Eastern level, you told me that you were investigating Nasser's posture and situation, the Soviet role, and the French policy on the supply of 50 Mirage aircraft ordered by us. "I hear that these three questions have now been clarified with disturbing results. Nasser has refused peace and opted for war preparations, with his eyes fixed on a growing decline in Israel's deterrent power. The Soviet Union has rejected all approaches designed to induce restraint in arms supplies to Arab states. The U.S.S.R. is certainly not promoting attitudes of peace. The French Government, to our deep regret, has made it clear that we have no reason to expect delivery of the Mirage aircraft. Moreover, they have lately decided to supply Iraq with 50 Mirage aircraft. In these circumstances, Nasser's policy of refusing peace and preparing for a new round of war derives a certain rationality from the concrete prospect of a changing balance in air strength. The postponement of a United States decision on the Phantoms now becomes very grave. The decision is vital on logistic grounds, but it is even more urgent for political and psychological reasons which affect the immediate prospect of a peaceful accommodation. "May I submit, Mr. President, that it is vital your decision be made now. May I urge that the 50 Phantoms be supplied from the middle of 1969, and not from the beginning of 1970, in batches of 8 to 10 a month and not of 4 to 5 a month. Training arrangements should be replanned accordingly. We wish to avoid another war just as ardently as we wanted and tried to avoid the last one. If we are to succeed, our deterrents must be credible, and if deterrence fails, our strength must be adequate. An American decision of this kind, far from disrupting any attempts at peacemaking, would by demonstrating the futility of further war, give the peace effort the stimulus which it is now objectively lacking. I do not believe that we shall get peace unless we move to foreclose the other alternatives. "Mr. President, I write to you on the eve of Israel's 20th anniversary. Israel came into being against the background of the destruction of a third of our people at the hands of the Nazis. In the twenty years of its existence, it had to fight three wars for its survival. Throughout this period only the maintenance of the minimum arms balance has saved it from destruction. I appeal to you on behalf of my people to grant us the weapons necessary to prevent further war and to encourage the process towards peace which though it tarries will-with God's help-surely come. "In conclusion, Mr. President, may I send you my fervent wishes for the success of your statesmanlike effort to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia and to the world. History will salute your efforts and bless your toil." "Yours sincerely, Levi Eshkol Prime Minister" "Jerusalem 30 April 1968" The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity of renewing to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration. Y.R. 158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 1, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Nodis. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Rabin called on Mr. Rostow to deliver a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Eshkol to the President./2/ He had delivered the letter to the State Department earlier. /2/See Document 157. The Ambassador stated that since the June War, the USSR has almost completely rearmed the Arabs, and in some cases they have more and better equipment than before the war. In addition, the French have agreed to deliver Mirages to Iraq. Not only have the French refused to deliver previously promised Mirages to Israel, but Israel has received nothing from other sources. Logic does not govern in the Near East--even in Israel--and war could break out at any time. Therefore, Israel needs an immediate decision on Phantoms. Mr. Rostow said that he had already read the letter. Because an agreement between Israel and Jordan appears to be one of the few hopes for peace, we are puzzled by Israeli activities, especially in Jerusalem. They can only make it harder for Hussein to conclude a separate peace. The President is very concerned about the long run prospects for Israel if peace proves impossible. Ambassador Rabin said that Israel must be in a position to defend itself. In January it was agreed that the Arabs would be able to resume hostilities in eighteen months, so even the proposed Phantom delivery schedule would have the first aircraft arriving six months too late. Mr. Rostow corrected the ambassador, saying that it was agreed that the Arabs might be in such a position in eighteen months. The Ambassador continued that Israel is doing its best to make it possible for Hussein to negotiate, but that he was unable to resist pressure from Nasser. He could say with assurance that Israel's Jerusalem parade had not affected Hussein's ability to negotiate. When Mr. Rostow said it affected the political atmosphere Rabin said that the strengthening of Prime Minister Talhouni in the recent cabinet shuffle was far more significant in limiting Hussein's freedom of action. The Ambassador returned to his main point: As the Arabs see Israel growing weaker, they become less inclined to make peace. Israel is weaker now-relative to the Arabs-than it was in June. The question, he said, is how finely a nation can cut its margin of security when its existence is at stake; "I'm sure your margin is far wider." Mr. Rostow promised to send the letter to the President immediately. John W. Foster 159. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 1, 1968, 1246Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 2275. 1. Knowing full well Russians would be giving UAR their version Sisco/Dobrynin lunch (State 154986),/2/ I telephoned Mohamed Riad of FonOff this morning offering to brief him. Offer was accepted with alacrity. Mohamed took extensive notes of conversation. /2/Telegram 154986 to Moscow, April 29, summarized a luncheon conversation that day between Ambassador Dobrynin and Assistant Secretary Sisco. The conversation ranged over a number of UN issues and focused on the Jarring Mission. Dobrynin indicated that the UAR continued to tell the Soviet Union that the principal difficulty in getting peace talks started was Israeli unwillingness to agree to implementation of Resolution 242. (Ibid.) 2. At conclusion of conversation I said I wanted to say a few words on my own and could assure Mohamed that I was entirely uninstructed in the premises. I viewed events of the last few weeks with increasing concern. UAR seemed to be walking trance-like down ever diminishing corridor of labyrinth from which there seemed no practical exit. I was frankly fed up with stale slogans, accusations that my government was practicing deceit and UAR tendency hide behind sterile phraseology. If this was true in case of myself, who was personally committed to improvement of US-UAR relations, Mohamed could imagine effect on others in USG who did not feel so personally involved. I would not be at all surprised, I continued, if Jarring were getting equally fed up with GUAR attitude and tactics. 3. I had been extensively briefed by McCloy on his conversation with President Nasser. I had noted with interest Nasser's statements which envisaged a process whereby various instruments respecting cessation of belligerency, withdrawal, etc., were arrived at and then put in escrow until whole package was ready for simultaneous implementation. Perhaps this did not represent any basic change in UAR position but it did have some refreshing nuances and implicit recognition that some kind of negotiating process was essential. Mohamed referred to FonMin's three proposals re implementation of resolution after Israel had agreed to implement. I said this was all very well but it was negative, stale and sterile. It seemed to me that if someone in GUAR could say to Jarring what Nasser had said to McCloy, it was just possible Jarring would have some new elements to work with. I recalled that in absence any real progress, it quite likely Swedish Government would be inclined ask UNSYG release Jarring return to his normal diplomatic duties. 4. Mohamed undertook to convey foregoing to his Minister. 5. Mohamed said Nasser had highest regard for McCloy and had thoroughly chewed out both FonOff and Fawzi's office for almost letting his visit to Cairo fall between stools. Bergus 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, May 1, 1968, 2359Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and USUN. 156687. For Ambassador. In a private meeting, Ambassador Rabin told Under Secretary Rostow that he hoped to have something tangible to report about private talks with Hussein within a week. Thus far the contacts have been preliminary. FYI. Rostow had suggested to Evron several weeks ago that we thought the time might be approaching for Israel to make secret contact with Hussein. In view of reports from Amman of Jordanian interest in such talks, and indications that there was motion on that front, we had been carefully studying your telegrams on the subject, and considering various contingencies. We prefer to wait until asked before offering our good offices. End FYI. Rabin also gave Israeli evaluation of recent Cabinet changes in Jordan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In sum, Israelis believe King sought to dismiss Talhouni, who refused to resign. Cabinet changes stem from Hussein's backing down before Talhouni threat. GOI reads changes as replacement of key officials loyal to King by men primarily connected with Talhouni. Rusk 161. Letter From President Nasser to President Johnson/1/ Cairo, May 1, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter was sent through the UAR Interests Section of the Indian Embassy in Washington. According to telegram 2280 from Cairo, May 2, the text of the letter was sent by Nasser to all chiefs of state represented on the UN Security Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US) Dear Mr. President: I have the honour to convey to you my deep appreciation for the position you have taken by supporting the Resolution of the Security Council on April 27, 1968,/2/ which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the Military Parade which it intended to hold on May 2, 1968. /2/On April 27 the Security Council discussed a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan protesting the proposed Israeli parade through East Jerusalem. A resolution proposed by the Delegations of India, Pakistan, and Senegal, which called upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade scheduled for May 2, was adopted unanimously. (UN doc. S/PV.1417) I have no doubt that your position was based on your disapproval of the actions taken by Israel in the City of Jerusalem and its refusal to comply with the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on July 4, 1967/3/ and upon your conviction that such an action by Israel is an illegal act. This illegal act on the part of Israel has its adverse effects on the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary General aiming at the realization of the peaceful settlement of the serious crisis in the Middle East which resulted from the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the people of Palestine on June 5, 1967. /3/Reference is to Resolution 2253 (ES-V) in which the UN General Assembly registered its disapproval of measures taken by Israel affecting the status of Jerusalem. (UN doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V)) Israel's defiance of this Resolution which you have supported and which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, and Israel's declaration of its intention not to implement that Resolution is a grave matter which seriously affects the prestige of the United Nations and its effectiveness, and in fact its future as an international organization set up for the maintenance of peace and justice. Israel's persistence in its defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly underlines its insistence on pursuing the policy of force and the imposition of the fait accompli resulting from aggression to realize territorial expansion and perpetuate the disregard of the rights of the people of Palestine. I would urge you, Mr. President, to exert all efforts to compel Israel to respect the resolutions of the United Nations, the organization which we all strive to strengthen, and thus insure the preservation of its prestige and the increase of its effectiveness and at the same time contribute to checking any further deterioration of the situation in the Holy City and the Middle East./4/ /4/Rostow passed this letter to President Johnson on May 2 under cover of a note in which he observed: "It gives us an opening for a response at a critical moment." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic-Presidential Correspondence) May I take this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration. Gamal Abdel Nasser/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 162. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 2, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies on May 6 and approved in S on May 7. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Ghorbal said he had been instructed to deliver a letter from President Nasser to President Johnson either to the President or the Secretary as expeditiously as possible. (A copy of the letter dated May 1 is enclosed.)/2/ In response to the Secretary's questions, Dr. Ghorbal said he was not certain whether the text would be published and that he had no instructions other than to deliver the letter. Mr. Davies said we understood from Mr. Bergus that letters from President Nasser to the heads of government represented on the Security Council would be published the following day. /2/Document 161. Dr. Ghorbal asked permission to make a few comments on the Arab-Israel situation. The ten months since the war and the five months during which Ambassador Jarring sought solution represented a long and agonizing period for peoples whose lands were under harsh occupation. The United States had a great interest in peace in the area and Arab governments looked to it to exert its influence to force Israel to accept and implement the U.K. resolution. The Secretary commented that invariably other governments felt we had greater influence in third capitals than we actually had. It puzzled him that when governments could discount U.S. influence in their own capitals they ascribed such power to the U.S. in other capitals. It would be refreshing if for a change a government would say "What should we do in the U.S. view?" Dr. Ghorbal said the Secretary was deeply mistaken if he felt the U.S. lacked influence in Cairo. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, words and actions of the U.S. were taken most seriously. He noted that in the days immediately following passage of the U.K. resolution his government had taken the position that Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories was a prerequisite to further action. The fact that his government changed its position to view the package as a whole could be attributed to U.S. efforts in Cairo and Washington. The Secretary asked whether the U.A.R. was cooperating fully with Ambassador Jarring and had accepted his proposals. Dr. Ghorbal said that he believed he could answer affirmatively. The U.A.R.G. had suggested three possible venues for discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices: the Security Council, discussions in New York with Ambassador Jarring, or specific proposals for implementation by Jarring with the various governments. The Secretary assured Dr. Ghorbal that President Nasser's letter would be transmitted immediately to the President and would be duly considered. 163. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel 3/1/68-7/31/68. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT /2/See Document 157. Ambassador Rabin has just delivered to me the attached letter from Prime Minister Eshkol. He supplemented it with a strong pitch for making our decision on Phantoms now. State and Defense will have to staff this carefully since it reopens the whole Phantom decision. Secretary Rusk asked that he meet with you before a Phantom decision is made. However, I promised to pass this to you immediately and wish to add some purely personal views. Eshkol's letter replies to yours of April 6./3/ In brief, he argues that Israel has "made every reasonable attempt" to facilitate a political settlement (most of us would not agree) and that the UAR is the main obstacle (true). He says that Israel is investigating fully the chance for a bilateral settlement with Hussein, but he does not know yet whether this is realistic. (In fact, Rabin was pessimistic.) Finally, he argues that Nasser will turn to political settlement only when he is convinced that he has absolutely no hope of a military victory. He urges that we begin delivery of the Phantoms in mid-1969 at the rate of 8-10 a month. /3/ See Document 134. I agree with Eshkol and Rabin that Israel's security margin is thin. Our intelligence people are probably right in estimating that Israel could handle any Arab threat at least through 1969. But with the French refusing to deliver Mirages and literally no other suitable source of supply left but us, I can understand why Eshkol is worried about seeing our decision held up when delivery is still a year off at best. Moreover, he faces real political pressures in his Cabinet to exert maximum pressure on us--a point Eppie made yesterday when I called, at your instruction, and told him pressure on the President was most unwise. I also agree that Nasser no longer seems inclined to reach a political settlement. Hussein (and McCloy) say Nasser's internal base is too shaky to permit it. Some think he might have moved if the Israelis had been more forthcoming with Jarring in January; but we'll never know whether our not pushing them harder then lost a major opportunity. (I doubt this because I have come to the reluctant conclusion that Nasser is constitutionally incapable of settling down to peace.) This raises two questions: --whether we should now do all in our power to bring about an Israel-Jordan settlement--the next possibility; --and whether our aircraft decision could play a role. Although he asked not to have his name associated with it, Evron has hinted twice to Hal Saunders and me that if we strengthened Israel (with Phantoms) Eshkol might be able to stick his neck out farther in reaching toward a political settlement with Hussein. Theoretically, it might be possible to use the Phantoms to bargain for enough of a marginal shift in Israel's position to improve chances for a settlement with Hussein. We could not expect Israel to give up anything major, and we could not guarantee success. But it is at least worth considering whether any US move would help. Some of us believe that it would improve chances for a settlement with Hussein if Israel would: --commit itself via a Cabinet decision to withdraw from most of the West Bank in the context of a Jordanian settlement and permit Hussein a civil as well as religious role in Jerusalem (Eban unhelpfully told Jarring Jerusalem is not negotiable; although there is some reason to believe that Israel might, in the end, be more flexible); --let Hussein know of this decision; --back off from its insistence on direct open negotiations and a formal peace treaty, at least at the beginning of negotiation. I have been trying for several weeks to get State at least to judge whether these or any other such steps are worth our pressing on Israel. Nick Katzenbach is completing a review this Friday. So far, the State Department seems so divided that no concrete recommendation seems likely to emerge. Yet almost everyone agrees that positions are hardening and another round of fighting--perhaps with Soviet involvement--seems the most likely outcome. I must also report that some responsible people feel it would be a major mistake to decide now to sell Phantoms. They point out that the Arab-Israeli military balance is no less favorable for Israel than it was last June. They also point out that Soviet arms shipments have leveled off and that our Phantom decision would risk pushing the Soviets into additional shipments and ruin our best chance of getting a grip on the arms race. (You will have a paper from General Wheeler tomorrow and one from us.) It will take State and Defense some days to review again all elements in the Phantom decision. I feel strongly, however, that we are approaching-if we have not already passed-a critical period in realizing our hopes for a political settlement. You may wish, therefore, to consider a special meeting to go over this whole situation and, in particular, to hear argument on three points: --should we press Israel to make a maximum try for a settlement with Hussein? --should we relate the Phantoms to such an effort, as Evron suggests? --if so, should we send a special emissary to Eshkol to put the proposition? Walt Set up a meeting /4/None of the options is checked. 164. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to President Johnson/1/ CM-3275-68 Washington, May 3, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary McNamara. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on May 3 under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that "the JCS remains relatively complacent about the balance even after taking into account the French decision on the Mirages for Israel." (Ibid.) SUBJECT 1. In response to the query posed by Walt Rostow, I am providing you my assessment of the relative military balance between Israeli and Arab forces now and 12 to 18 months hence. 2. At Enclosure A/2/ is a summary of present and projected Israeli and Arab equipment inventories. Except for aircraft, the Israelis probably have as much equipment now as at the beginning of the June war. The Soviets have not delivered fighter aircraft to the UAR since September or October of last year which places Egypt about 65 fighters short of the pre-war level. Deliveries to Syria and Iraq have increased those countries' inventories above the pre-war level. Soviet arms shipments to the area are now continuing at about the pre-war level and no new-type materiel is known to have been delivered. Including total deliveries to date, the Arabs are at about 75% of the pre-war level. Eighteen months from now, Israel will have an aircraft inventory 15% to 20% above pre-war levels while the Arab inventory will remain essentially at its pre-war strength; however, a greater disparity in high performance aircraft numbers to the detriment of Israel will develop. Ground equipment inventories on both sides will remain at approximately pre-war levels. Israel's relative naval capability will have improved due to the addition of guided missile patrol boats. /2/Not printed. 3. Our previous estimates on the Arab-Israeli balance have accounted for not only equipment levels, but the qualitative superiority of Israeli forces in such areas as training, intelligence, logistics, motivation and morale, and leadership. In these areas, the Israeli forces are still far superior to the Arabs and will remain so in the months ahead. In addition, the territory the Israelis control places them in better defensive position than they previously occupied, and they now have more combat-seasoned personnel. The Arabs do not currently possess the capability effectively to operate or maintain Soviet equipment. The Soviets, through their training and advisory efforts, (see Enclosure B)/3/ are attempting to improve the situation but face many drawbacks such as educational deficiencies and poor morale. The Soviets believe that at the present rate of progress, it will take the UAR at least until the Spring of 1969 to achieve any significant degree of combat readiness. No major qualitative improvements in Syrian capabilities are expected over the next 18 months. /3/ Enclosure B, not printed, is a 1-page assessment of "Soviet Training Assistance to the Arab Bloc." 4. While we note increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, it is our conclusion that the Soviets wish to avoid any direct involvement which could lead to a widening of a resumed Arab-Israeli conflict or confrontation with the United States. In this connection, there is still no Soviet air in support of their Mediterranean naval forces. A miscalculation on their part cannot be discounted, but we believe that Soviet efforts would be limited to materiel and advisory assistance such as we have seen in the past. In February we exchanged information on the Middle East situation with the Israeli Director of Intelligence. While there were several differences, we were in general agreement on our assessments of Arab capabilities and Soviet activity in the area. We plan to continue this intelligence interchange and any significant new developments will serve as basis for a joint reassessment of the Israeli position. 5. A significant factor in Israel's growing imbalance of high performance aircraft, mentioned above, continues to be delivery of 50 French Mirage V's. Although France is continuing in effect an embargo on these aircraft, there are indications that there is a fair chance that Israel will eventually get delivery. The French have now agreed to sell 54 Mirages to Iraq; however, the delivery of these aircraft, not scheduled to begin until late 1969 or early 1970, would not affect the relative balance in the period under discussion. Non-delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel handicaps Israel's air-to-air capability now and in the future as discussed below. 6. At Enclosure C/4/ is a comparison of the current and projected high performance aircraft (MACH 2) capabilities of Israel and those Arab states likely to participate in a resumption of hostilities. This disparity in high performance aircraft inventories is the principal cause of Israel's concern. The comparison shows that the inventory of these aircraft for the contiguous Arab states will increase over the next 18 months by close to 70% (230 to 390) while the Israeli capability of 55 Mirage IIIs remains relatively constant. Thus, Israel would be handicapped in the battle for air superiority unless early bombing attacks on Arab airfields were exceptionally successful. Arab experience last June is not likely to allow the Israelis the degree of success in destroying aircraft on the ground that they enjoyed at that time. If Algeria's capability of 29 aircraft by the end of the estimate period is added to the Arab total, numerically, Israel would face a potentially unfavorable ratio of about 8 to 1. This raw ratio must be adjusted by the aircraft ready status, 50% to 70% for the Arabs versus 80% to 85% for the Israelis, and the qualitative factors such as skill, leadership, and command and control mentioned above. Delivery of the French Mirages to Israel would reduce the unfavorable raw ratio to 4 to 1 with further balance being approached through use of the same adjustment factors. /4/Not printed. Harold Saunders also prepared an assessment of "The Arab-Israeli Air Balance" on May 3. His conclusions closely paralleled those put forward in Wheeler's memorandum, although he put the projected ratio between Arab and Israeli high performance aircraft by mid-1969 at 3 to 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68) 7. Considering all these factors, it is my judgment that Israel currently, and probably for the next 18 months, has the capability to defend itself effectively against the Arab forces. This judgment is based on an estimate that the outlook for significant overall improvement in Arab military capabilities, despite Soviet assistance, is only poor to fair. The most imprecise element in this judgment is the relative high performance air strength, hinging in part on actions by the French. Even here, the time at which an imbalance would become critical, in the event of a continued French embargo, allows us to continue to withhold a decision on additional aircraft sales to Israel until late this year. A decision can be made as late as 31 December 1968 and delivery of F-4E aircraft started in January 1970 at the rate of approximately 4 per month from production presently scheduled for the USAF. This would get the F-4E aircraft in the hands of the Israelis at approximately the same time Iraq would receive Mirage aircraft. Necessary training could be commenced as late as 1 January 1969 in order that Israel would have a capability to maintain and operate the aircraft upon delivery. 8. I consider that we should keep the matter of numbers of high performance aircraft in Arab inventories under continuing review. Should the USSR or other sources provide additional high performance combat aircraft to the radical Arab states during the next 6 to 12 months, should deliveries of such aircraft be expedited, or should the French definitely back out of their agreement to provide 50 Mirages to Israel, the relatively favorable forecast set forth above would be invalid. Earle G. Wheeler 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, May 3, 1968, 1202Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Repeated to USUN and the Mission in Geneva. 3562. Ref: State 154625./2/ /2/Document 155. 1. In meeting with FonMin Eban on May 2 I took occasion stress importance US attaches to NPT as indicated by Secretary's message to him of April 29, and urged that GOI give full support toward endorsement of treaty in GA and that Israel announce its preparedness to sign treaty. 2. Among others, I used argument that this problem transcends other issues that Israel has everything to gain in being forthright in supporting treaty and nothing to lose by doing so. Adverting to position advanced by some responsible Israelis that uncertainty as to Israel's intentions in a nuclear field constitute a deterrent to the Arabs and that consequently Israel's interests dictate that it be one of the last and not one of the first to sign, I said this seemed entirely fallacious argument to me. It inconceivable that Israel with its history would ever contemplate using a nuclear bomb and that consequently the deterrent of uncertainty was greatly diminished. On the contrary the risks of uncertainty are high and to achieve Arab renunciation of the nuclear threat the best tactic would be for Israel to be the first to endorse and sign the treaty. In any event if such tactic did not lead to Arab response the favorable political effect for Israel in the councils of the world would be very great. 3. Eban acknowledged importance of the matter and his appreciation that Secretary's message confirmed our determination to do everything we can to obtain support. He |
