179. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)/1/

Washington, May 21, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, NSSM 81. Secret. Copies were sent to Davies, Atherton, Sober, Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin, and Katzenbach's Executive Assistant Philip B. Heymann. Saunders also sent a copy to Walt Rostow under a May 21 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VI, Memos, 8/67-7/68)

SUBJECT
An Updated Look at Phantoms

In the last two months, there have been at least five new studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance and its relation to our Phantom decision. After going over these new papers, I did the attached summary to bring together their main conclusions. Since I intended this mainly as a summary that would not go beyond recent papers, I hesitated to add the last section on policy questions. But I succumbed to temptation and tried to wrap them up too.

What this seems to add up to is the Israelis have some legitimate basis for concern. I don't see how, on the basis of our own studies, we can flatly dismiss their concerns. What we do is a big question, but it might help us as a start to be absolutely clear about the nature of their problem as our most recent round of studies presents it.

You suggested a meeting soon to go over this, and I think that would be a good idea. Perhaps something like the attached could serve as a chopping block in sharpening our conclusions on where we stand.

Harold H. Saunders/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment/3/

/3/Top Secret; sensitive.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI AIR BALANCE

On the basis of several recent studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance, the following seems to be the USG's current view:

I. Israel has no problem in 1968.

A. Arab and Israeli inventories of combat aircraft are in just about the same balance as before the June war.

B. Despite intensified training, the UAR forces will not complete their general reorganization until the spring of 1969. Even then, we judge it unlikely that overall combat-readiness will go beyond that of June 1967.

C. Even Nasser and the USSR seem to be thinking in this time frame.

D. The Israelis are quick to point out that their present boundaries provide far greater security than their pre-June 1967 borders. Their aircraft are closer to Arab targets, and they would have additional warning and defensive room to meet an Arab attack.

II. While we estimate that the overall balance in mid-1969 will remain at least as favorable to Israel as it was in June 1967, elements of uncertainty begin to creep in:

A. Will France deliver Mirages? Our estimates assume so. But the Israeli Ambassador in Paris, after talking with Pompidou, claims that there is no chance of French delivery, and lower level information we have suggests that a change in the embargo is possible but not envisaged. The point is crucial. If France does not deliver, JCS judges that an "unacceptable" ratio of high-performance aircraft (e.g. Mirages or Phantoms) would exist. By end of 1969 the Arab-Israel ratio in this category will have risen to 8:1. If either France or the US delivered 50 planes in this category, the ratio would remain 4:1. If both delivered, it would fall below 3:1. The ratio in June 1967 was about 4:1, and that remains the ratio today. It is impossible to say at what precise point the ratio becomes dangerous, but JCS judges that continuation of an 8:1 ratio over any period would be "unacceptable."

B. What will be the Soviet aid pattern? Our estimates of the future balance are based on the fact that there is no evidence that the USSR intends to go substantially beyond pre-June levels in building up Arab equipment inventories. Those estimates assume that, once war losses are replaced, the Soviet program in the UAR will return to a normal flow of deliveries for replacement and modernization within roughly the present force levels. However, that assumption is subject to change. Our intelligence studies point out that, given the cyclic nature of the Soviet arms aid program, new arms agreements are expected to be concluded this year as deliveries under existing agreements are completed. A new round of arms discussions began in March when Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visited Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo. Until results of these talks become known, we cannot be sure about the extent of modernization over the next 12-18 months.

C. Will Arab forces expand in size? We have no evidence that the UAR is significantly expanding its pool of trained manpower. However, Ambassador Rabin says that the UAR is now increasing its total number of pilots at the rate of 50-60 per year. In addition, we know that the increase in the number of UAR airfields and hardened targets will spread any Israeli attacking force thinner.

D. What is the offsetting effect of the sharp improvement in Israel's attack capability? In the field of medium performance attack aircraft (e.g. Skyhawks), the ratio will drop over the next 18 months from 3.1:1 today to 1.7:1, and this purely numerical ratio does not reflect the fact that the 88 Skyhawks will have increased Israel's bomb-carrying capacity and gained range and payload advantages. To what extent this would offset a possible increased Arab advantage in high performance aircraft is unclear. But it is clear that the Phantoms with their dual attack and interceptor capability would not only affect the ratio in high-performance aircraft but would further increase Israel's advantage in attack aircraft.

III. This seems to add up to the conclusion that, if Mirages are not delivered, Israel beginning sometime in the last half of 1969 will at least face an unacceptable ratio of high-performance Arab aircraft. In addition, Israel will be unable to support and maintain US aircraft to reduce the ratio until about 18 months from the time of a US decision to provide them.

A. As noted above, the ratio of high-performance aircraft by October-November 1969 would, by our estimates reach about 8:1. Despite expected deficiencies in Arab performance, JCS considers that high a ratio unacceptable. Thus, Israel would be handicapped to some degree--our papers don't examine the extent in detail-in the battle for air superiority unless early attacks on airfields were exceptionally successful. It seems unlikely that the Arabs would allow the same degree of success that Israel achieved in June 1967.

B. Israelis would not be fully trained to support and maintain Phantoms until about 18 months from the date of decision to begin training. A cadre of Israeli personnel could be trained within 13 months, provided they already had English language and basic electronics training. However, that program would provide only a marginal capability since another 6 months would be needed to bring other personnel up to a level where they could function on their own. The six-month gap could be bridged by USAF or contract technicians if necessary.

IV. These conclusions do not differ much from Israeli conclusions, and Israeli intelligence estimates do not differ greatly from ours. The main difference is in interpretation. The Israeli judgment comes from measuring these conclusions against three objectives:

A. Not only to be militarily stronger than the Arabs but to be able to defeat quickly and without suffering much damage in return. The Israelis are convinced that if their own armed forces were badly defeated or if their small country suffered serious physical damage, it would mean the end of Israel as a state. Their objective seems to be to have enough strike aircraft available to incapacitate Arab air forces on the ground while minimizing Arab counterstrikes even from widely dispersed Arab bases.

B. To modernize their air force. In maintaining clearcut military superiority, air power is crucial. Eshkol's request for Phantoms is not based on a desire just to increase the size of his air force. It is based on a projection of what kind of air force he believes Israel needs 2-5 years hence and assumes some modernization. This accounts for some difference in our judgments of Arab-Israeli ratios because we count all aircraft now in Israel's inventory; the Israelis assume that some older planes will have been retired (and that the French Mirages will not be delivered).

C. To possess an absolute deterrent. The Israeli philosophy of peace is that Israel must be so strong that the Arabs will realize they have no prospect whatsoever of winning back their lands by force.

V. The policy questions for us are how large a margin of security we want Israel to have and how Israel's strength affects other interests:

A. Israel's security. Given Israel's objectives, they see their margin becoming too thin by mid-1969. They point out that their margin was uncomfortably thin in June 1967, yet they won a decisive victory with virtually no damage to Israel proper. Even if Arab aircraft are better dispersed in hardened revetments and on better alert, that only means by our estimates that Israel will need more time and perhaps suffer greater losses in gaining air superiority. What losses are too great?

B. Political settlement. Given Israeli tactics, they believe they can only achieve peace when the Arabs recognize their unmistakable military superiority. We assume that most of the Arabs will refuse to make peace as long as it looks like abject surrender. It may also be true that Israel would be more willing to risk compromise if it were sure of its strength. But the reverse is possible-that greater strength could encourage the hawks who seem insensitive to Arab psychological and political needs. Now that the US appears to be Israel's only source of supply would assurance that our door is open be an important factor in increasing Eshkol's flexibility?

C. Arms limitation. Given the longer range purpose of limiting the arms race, we are leery of improving Israeli capability too sharply, especially now that Soviet shipments have levelled off. However, it is possible to argue-and CIA estimates-that the USSR will go on modernizing Arab forces, even though there is now no indication it intends to go substantially beyond pre-June levels in building up Arab equipment inventories. If we provided Phantoms, could we justify our decision in terms of modernization (given, for instance, the unavailability of French aircraft) after having told everybody it would be escalation?

D. NPT. We and the Russians both want Israel to sign the NPT. Israel's near-term security concern is not with the threat of nuclear weapons but with the possibility of an unacceptable imbalance in conventional arms. Meeting Israel's concerns on this point relates both to our guaranteeing Israeli access to needed conventional weapons and to limitation of Soviet shipments to the Arabs. It may also relate marginally to the atmosphere for peace talks and to Israel's desire for an absolute deterrent. Is there any sort of sophisticated trade-off in this area?

180. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 23, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 1-6. Secret.

Mr. President:

I am increasingly concerned, as I know you are, about the continuing delay in moving the Middle Eastern problem toward a more permanent solution. Israel seems to be saying that they will not discuss the substance of outstanding questions with Ambassador Jarring in the absence of face to face discussion with its Arab neighbors. Further, it has refused to act with restraint in Jerusalem and has not even made such a token gesture as withdrawal from the Saudi Arabian islands of Tiran and Senafir.

Israel's Arab neighbors, for their part, seem unwilling to talk seriously about the substance of a permanent settlement and are resting upon periodic propaganda exercises aimed at both Israel and the United States in such forums as the Security Council.

Meanwhile, the influence of the Soviet Union in such key countries as Egypt, Syria and Iraq continues to grow at the expense of our and other Western interests. You are familiar with the arms problem in the area and the refusal of the Soviet Union to discuss the matter seriously with us prior to Israeli withdrawal.

I have been trying to think of some way in which we could get this problem off of dead center--a situation filled with danger.

One possibility would be that we and the Soviet Union discuss this matter secretly and in complete detail-putting together a package which the two of us would then try to impose upon the countries of the area. I do not believe that this would work. I doubt that we and the Soviets could agree simply because their and our interests are in direct conflict. I doubt that the two of us could impose a result upon the countries of the area. We failed to restrain Israel last June and there is serious question as to how far the Russians could go with, say, Egypt and Syria.

Another alternative, which appeals to me, is that we ourselves get into a more serious dialogue with both Israel and its Arab neighbors in an effort to find a basis for a settlement with which both sides could live. This would mean asking someone, very privately, to be in touch with both sides on your behalf on a more serious basis than we have yet attempted. There is some difficulty in having the same individual talk both to Israel and to the Arabs because such a person might be looked upon merely as a conduit to the other side and would not be treated with complete frankness. This suggests that we might ask two highly competent Americans to try to see what could be done-one talking with Israel and the other talking with the Arabs.

It seems to me that Arthur Goldberg would be a good person to carry on serious talks with Israel after he leaves his present UN post. I have reason to think that he would be willing to do so. He is a tough-minded man and a superb negotiator and would be trusted by Israel even though points of real disagreement may come up.

As for the Arabs, my mind turns to one of the following (in order of preference): David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, John McCloy and Robert Anderson. I would put Robert Anderson higher on the list except for his private interests in the area.

You might wish to give this idea some thought in order that I may discuss it with you at your convenience.

For your information I am attaching a summary which I asked Luke Battle to prepare of all of the suggestions which we have made to both sides in the Middle East./2/ In thumbing through this, you will note that we have been very active in our efforts but that our advice thus far has been largely ignored by both sides. We have had some limited response here and there but the record indicates that both sides have been very stubborn up to this point./3/

/2/Dated May 21; not printed.

/3/Rostow sent this memorandum to President Johnson on May 23 under a covering memorandum in which he indicated that he was inclined to agree with Rusk's suggestions. (Ibid.)

Dean Rusk

181. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, May 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Anti-Infiltration Devices for Israel-Background

Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when terrorism was mounting, we launched a program with the Israelis to test a number of electronic anti-infiltration devices. Now the Israelis want to buy some.

About three months ago, the Israelis submitted a purchase request for Munitions Control clearance to purchase 400,000 anti-personnel mines. They told us these were to be used in connection with a security "fence" along most of the Jordan River between Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea.

Defense is now going ahead with the anti-infiltration devices, so Wally Barbour's concern in the attached telegram/2/ is largely taken care of. However, the problem of the mines remains. Unfortunately, there is both a substantive and an emotional side of the problem.

/2/Reference is to telegram 3810 from Tel Aviv, May 22, in which Ambassador Barbour urged approval of the Israeli request for anti-infiltration devices. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR)

The substantive aspect is that Defense Department has vigorously resisted doing anything for Israel which makes the current cease-fire lines seem more permanent. While recognizing this point, State believes it is important enough to avert cross-border clashes that, on balance, it would go ahead and help build the Israeli "fence". When State asked the Israelis for more information about the nature of the barrier they planned, Evron and his counterparts in Jerusalem flew off the handle because they feel we're questioning their good intentions or infringing on their sovereignty. They have refused us any more information and State is trying to figure out where to go from here.

We do consider the mines to be in a different category from the devices because the devices are definitely a follow-on part of an earlier program agreement. However, State's position may soon prevail even on the mines.

Hal

182. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 29, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IX, Cables and Memos, 3/68-5/68. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Atherton, Deputy Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy James E. Atkins, and Davies. Saunders sent an advance copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow on May 24 under cover of a note that reads in part: "Here's Bill Brewer's speculation on what the Israelis are up to on Tiran island." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Israeli Actions and Motives with Respect to Tiran and Senafir

In view of your interest in the Tiran/Senafir issue, you may find of interest the following comments which indicate both how Israeli actions have evolved over the past year and what may lie behind Israel's keen interest in this question.

Israeli Actions

Information from both the Saudis and Israelis suggests the following chain of events with respect to Tiran and Senafir since the June War:

--During, or immediately after, the fighting the Israelis landed on Tiran. They either captured members of a small Egyptian contingent which had recently occupied the island or confirmed that the contingent had fled. We believe the Israelis then withdrew. When Ambassador Barbour toured the channel in a launch from Sharm al-Shaykh early in July, he saw no evidence of the occupation of Tiran by the Israelis or anyone else.

--In late July or early August, 1967, the Israelis seem to have reoccupied Tiran. The Saudis so reported to us, expressing deep concern. We therefore approached Israel. On several occasions in our discussions of this subject during October, 1967, senior Israeli officials themselves confirmed that their troops were occupying Tiran. One top official used the term "garrison" (Tel Aviv's 1290, 1311 and 1370 of October, 1967)./2/

/2/Dated October 24, October 25, and October 28, 1967, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN)

--USG efforts to encourage the Israelis quietly to withdraw were countered by GOI attempts to extract maximum specific concessions, through us, from the Saudis. Ambassador Eilts was eventually successful in inducing King Faisal to assure us privately that he has no plans to militarize Tiran or to use it to impede freedom of navigation into Tiran Strait. You conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Eban by letter dated January 17, 1968./3/

/3/See Document 47.

--The Israelis responded negatively, seeking further binding written undertakings from SAG which would be underwritten by the USG. You expressed disappointment over the Israeli position to Ambassador Harman on February 8 and again pressed for Israeli withdrawal./4/ Harman promised to report your concern to Eban.

/4/See Document 75.

--There has so far been no formal reply from Eban either to your letter of January 17 or your oral comments of February 8.

--The Saudis complained to us in April about possible Israeli occupation of neighboring Senafir. We took this up in Tel Aviv on May 7. On May 17, our Embassy was told that regular patrolling has been carried out on Senafir island as a matter of routine since the six day war by small units as on Tiran island. Following publicity on this issue in Israel on May 19 (State 167501),/5/ I called in the Israeli Charge on May 24 to express our continuing concern. He provided an identical response to that given us in Tel Aviv (State 170918)./6/ I pressed the Charge as to whether the islands were in fact occupied, but he said he would have to request guidance from his government.

/5/Dated May 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-6 TIRAN)

/6/Dated May 24. (Ibid.)

Possible Explanations for Israeli Action

Probably there is no single guaranteed explanation for the increasing interest which Israel has shown since last summer in these two fly-blown islands. But we may speculate with some precision as to what may lie behind their actions. Israel has for a decade attached even greater importance to free passage through Tiran than through the Canal. The Aqaba route is vital for Israeli trade with Africa and Asia. More importantly, it is Israel's lifeline to oil.

This vulnerability was early recognized by Egypt. In 1955, Egyptian boycott regulations on Suez and Tiran traffic laid down that transit would be refused only to Israeli flag vessels and petroleum cargoes destined for Eilat. When the Egyptians reoccupied Sharm al-Shaykh in May, 1967, it was Nasser's suggestion that petroleum shipments would again be stopped that most threatened the Israeli economy.

Some years ago Israel constructed a small 16" pipeline to move its crude imports (which originated in Iran) to the Haifa refinery. Little of this crude was re-exported. However, preliminary construction has now begun on a 42" transit line from Eilat to Asqalon. We believe that this decision, which seems to have been taken last summer, has greatly increased Israeli interest in the absolute security of the Tiran channel.

The pipeline is to have an initial capacity of 20 million tons a year to be increased to 50 million a year (one million barrels/day) in a second stage which would provide additional pumping facilities. Such quantities could originate only in Iran. In fact, at present, they could originate only with the Consortium, but all major Consortium companies have extensive interests in the Arab world and have told us privately they would not use the Israeli line. They could sell some oil at the export terminals to independent companies who could use the Israeli line but such sales are only a small portion of total Consortium sales and they could not fill the line, unless, of course, additional markets west of Israel were to be developed.

There remains only the National Iranian Oil Company. At present it has access to only a few thousand barrels of oil a day. Theoretically the NIOC could take royalty oil in lieu of payments but the net return to Iran would be much less than at present and this seems an unlikely development. However, Iran has a barter deal with Rumania (although no oil has yet been shipped) and the Shah has told Ambassador Meyer of his plans to embark on large scale trading with other Eastern European countries. Assuming Eastern Europe is willing to buy oil shipped through Israel (a not entirely warranted assumption), Iran would be able to make profitable sales only by getting oil from the Consortium for prices slightly above cost. And it was this point which all Consortium companies refused to concede to Iran during the negotiations this spring. If Iran intends to proceed with the project, the Consortium will face a very serious new problem with the GOI. Also, it could become difficult for Consortium owner companies to justify to some of their consumers any outright refusal to participate in what could be described as legitimate commercial transactions. There are, in short, many unanswered questions. But Israel is going ahead with the line.

There would seem at least three good reasons why Israel would wish to develop such commerce: (a) hope of profit; (b) desire to replace Suez as an oil artery, thus reducing Egypt's regional and world importance and increasing Israel's; and (c) interest in developing closer relations with Eastern Europe and, hopefully, the USSR, insofar as the oil's destination might be Communist countries. On this latter point, the sole remaining substantial portion of the Diaspora is Russian Jewry. Those Israelis who oppose withdrawal from the present ceasefire lines no doubt see this group as the one sure source of population required to balance the increasing numbers of Arabs within Israel. While this would be a very long-term proposition and is speculative at best, the desire to introduce a note of Communist dependence on Israel could well be an additional factor in Israel's pipeline project--and hence in its attention to Tiran and Senafir.

Whether or not the last point is valid, there may well be one further reason for Israel's interest in these islands. Jarring conceivably may work out a settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors which would include Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. But Israel has made public its intention to remain on Tiran and Senafir until a peace settlement is reached. This could well mean a peace settlement with Saudi Arabia. Since no such settlement is even under discussion, the Israelis may well calculate that their chances of a long stay on Tiran are better than at Sharm al-Shaykh.

Conclusion

To sum up, Israel's renewed interest in Tiran and Senafir seems gradually to have broadened since last summer. Basic security, economic and psychological motives are now involved. In the light of Faisal's assurance to us, and Saudi military impotence, we continue to believe that withdrawal would be in Israel's overall interest. Reference to "routine patrolling" rather than to a "garrison" may suggest that some rethinking along these lines is going on. Because of our important interests in, and past assurances to, Saudi Arabia we will continue to do everything we can to accelerate this trend./7/

/7/Telegram 18695 to Jidda, June 19, reported Assistant Secretary Battle's discussion of Tiran Island with Ambassador Rabin that day. Battle acknowledged Israel's promise to evacuate Senafir Island and expressed U.S. belief that Israeli occupation of Tiran was unnecessary in view of King Faisal's assurances that Saudi Arabia would not militarize the island. Rabin responded that Israel was sensitive on the Tiran issue since a hostile presence on Tiran-"even three Fatah with machine guns"-could close the strait. Therefore the Israeli position was that the Tiran issue had to be part of a larger settlement package. (Ibid.)

183. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, May 31, 1968, 2300Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Memos, 3/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

CAP 81204. King Hussein is again worried by rumors of an imminent Israeli attempt to seize territory on the East Bank in northern Jordan from which some terrorists operate. He has asked Ambassador Symmes for a statement "from the highest authority in USG" of our present attitude toward the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan./2/

/2/Symmes reported this request in telegram 5084 from Amman, May 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

We do not believe Israel plans such a move, although we can never rule out an attack against terrorist bases. We don't know why Hussein is being fed these rumors, but it may be an effort to keep him uneasy about trying to deal with Israel. Or it may simply be normal operation of the Arab rumor mill.

Although we do not believe these rumors, we do think it would be a good idea to restate assurances we have given him before as a background for possible negotiation with the Israelis. This, rather than current rumors, may be what is really on his mind in making this request, and we want him to know that our position remains as we described it to him last November.

The one element in this message that would be new is our saying we would oppose any acquisition of territory beyond present cease fire lines. We have not had to face that, but I cannot believe even the Israelis would expect us to sit back quietly if they tried to take new territory across the Jordan River.

Nick Katzenbach recommends that Ambassador Symmes be authorized to convey urgently the following oral message from you to Hussein:

"Your apprehensions concerning future sanctity of Jordanian territory have been brought to my attention. I wish again to assure you, as I did in my letter of February 11,/3/ that it is our policy and our interest to continue our close relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As Ambassador Symmes has indicated to you, we have made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel our policy toward the continued independence and integrity of your country. From our talks last November, you know of our position on the ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Jerusalem. You should also know that we would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease fire lines. I recognize that Your Majesty has sought to prevent use of Jordanian territory to mount acts of violence across the cease fire line and urge that continued efforts be made to prevent these actions which promote instability and are an impediment to progress toward peace. I wish also to assure you that we are continuing our efforts to bring about a just settlement in the Near East which is, after all, the only solution to the problem about which we are both concerned."

/3/See Document 77.

Approve
Disapprove/4/

/4/Neither option is checked. A handwritten note by Jim Jones apparently records the President's response: "Talk about this Tues [June 4] if it will wait." Another note by Jones indicates that he passed this message to Bromley Smith.

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/

Washington, June 4, 1968, 0042Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 LEB. Secret. Drafted by Houghton on June 3, cleared by Battle and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Harry W. Shlaudeman, and approved by John P. Walsh in S/S. Also sent to Jerusalem, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, and USUN.

175618. 1. Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, accompanied by the Lebanese Charge Soleiman Farah and Lebanese Ambassador to London Nadim Dimeshkie, called on the Secretary on June 3./2/ The following summary of the talk is based on an uncleared memo of conversation, is FYI, Noforn, and subject to change on review.

/2/While in Washington, Boutros also met with Eugene Rostow on June 3 and with Walt Rostow and Joseph Sisco on June 4. A memorandum of the conversation between Boutros and Eugene Rostow is ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Boutros' meeting with Sisco was reported to Beirut in telegram 176147, June 4. (Ibid.) A memorandum of the conversation between Boutros and Walt Rostow is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lebanon, Vol. I, Memos, 2/65-1/69.

2. The Foreign Minister explained that he had come to discuss two related problems: (a) that of the Lebanese-Israeli border, and (b) the general problem of an Arab-Israel settlement. (The conversation, however, was limited to the first problem.) The Foreign Minister explained that since June 1967 the Government of Lebanon had been concerned by a number of "threatening statements" by high ranking Israeli officials with respect to Lebanon's southern border. More recently, the Israelis attacked a Lebanese village on the pretext that commandoes from Lebanon had caused incidents in two Israeli villages. He wished to make clear that the Lebanese Government had taken a firm stand against the commandoes. Commando training was not permitted within Lebanese territory, and the Lebanese Army had done its best to control transit of commandoes from Syria. The Lebanese Government, however, could not completely insulate its borders to commandoes. The Israelis should be aware that the initiative and responsibility for commando activity belonged to the Ba'ath Party of Syria or those who support the Ba'ath and not the Lebanese Government. In any event, the GOL could not accept the principle that the Israeli Government had the right to attack Lebanon simply because one or two incidents within Israel may have resulted from commandoes slipping through Lebanese security arrangements.

3. The Foreign Minister could not believe that Israel considered Lebanon a threat to its security. He stressed that the Lebanese southern border was the only armistice line where practically no incidents had occurred since 1949. The border was recognized both as an international border, a cease-fire line, and an armistice line. In addition, Lebanon was not involved in the June 1967 fighting.

4. Despite all this the Israelis after the June war repudiated the Lebanese-Israeli armistice agreement. The Foreign Minister thought he could at least understand the rationale for the repudiation of the Jordanian and UAR armistice agreements. He could not see logic, however, in the repudiation of the Lebanese agreement. It was in this general framework, that Lebanon could only interpret Israeli actions and statements as indicating some Israeli design upon southern Lebanon. For a time the GOL thought of taking the matter to the Security Council but it finally decided that the Foreign Minister's trip was a better answer. Certainly an attack by Israelis on Lebanon would be in nobody's interest as it could easily result in the disintegration of Lebanon as now constituted, lead to the loss of that country to the Western world, and induce a radical political trend which could only cause trouble for Israel. In view of the importance of this matter, the Foreign Minister felt that Lebanon had the right to ask the United States as a friend and major power to take a position on this matter and to use its influence with the Israelis.

5. The Secretary addressed himself first to the policy question. He made clear that the United States supports the present southern border of Lebanon and attaches great importance to the preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. Furthermore, we accepted without qualification GOL assurances of its non-involvement in terrorist activity across its southern border. However, as the Lebanese Foreign Minister had pointed out, others might well be operating from Lebanon territory. The Lebanese Government should make quite clear that it opposed as a matter of public policy terrorist activity. The Foreign Minister replied that the GOL did not recognize or deal with commando organizations as political entities, and it would continue to do everything to interdict and control terrorists. The GOL, however, could not publicly oppose the activities of commandoes because what the Israelis called terrorism the Arabs call resistance. Those involved were people who were trying to regain their homes and were acting in somewhat the same fashion as the resistance movement in Europe during the last war. He emphasized again that the GOL would not give the commandoes assistance and would continue to try to prevent them from using Lebanese territory.

6. The Secretary suggested that the strongest position the Lebanese Government could assume was to object to the abuse of its territory by any organization or state. The Secretary continued that we had had a good deal of experience in Vietnam with infiltrators and realized the problems which the Lebanese Government was experiencing. We were opposed not only to the raids but also against retaliation of those raids. We had made our position on retaliation clear in a number of UN resolutions. We had a special interest in Lebanon and would see if there were anything further we could do with respect to the problem the Minister raised. The Secretary went on to say that the fundamental problem was that terrorist activity inspired retaliation and that the two in tandem prevented the prospect of peace.

Rusk

185. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 4, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton.

SUBJECT
Sandstorm: Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State
Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, IO
Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director-Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs
Hon. Itzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Nissim Yaish, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

During a discussion of other matters, Ambassador Rabin alluded to the question of Israel-Jordan peace talks.

Rabin said that Nasser had given Hussein a green light to go further than the UAR. Nasser had said, however, that Hussein could make no agreement affecting Jerusalem without the approval of the Arab world since Jerusalem belonged not only to Jordan but to all Arabs.

Rabin continued that the GOI had good information about the thinking of King Hussein and his entourage. Israel was committed not to discuss this matter in detail and he was therefore limited in what he could say. He could tell us, however, that Hussein was ready for a peace treaty through secret, direct negotiations under cover of the Jarring Mission. There was an argument in Israel as to whether Hussein could be relied upon. Government policy, however, was to maintain the Jarring Mission while trying to make progress secretly with Hussein.

Elaborating on the foregoing, Rabin said that Israel's official public policy was as set forth in Eban's four points: (1) Face to face negotiations, (2) Agreement on the issues, (3) Conclusion of peace treaties, and (4) steps to carry out the agreements set forth in the treaties. All Israeli Government spokesmen would hew to this line but their purpose now was to advance secretly toward an agreement with Jordan. This cover was necessary in view of the basic differences between Hussein and Nasser. Israel knew what kind of settlement Hussein wanted and there was hope in Israel for a settlement with Jordan. There was no more talk of overthrowing Hussein. All key members of the Israel Cabinet agreed that "everything will be adjusted to this policy."

In response to Mr. Rostow's question whether Prime Minister Talhouni would support King Hussein on this course, Rabin said he thought so-providing Nasser concurred.

Mr. Sisco asked how Israel planned to keep the Jarring Mission alive in the interim. Rabin said that Tekoah would seek to enlist Jarring's cooperation, explaining why negotiations with Jordan made this necessary. In this connection Rabin indicated that Israel was thinking in a time frame of about another six weeks./2/

/2/Walt Rostow summarized the Israeli policy on negotiations with Jordan in a June 4 memorandum to President Johnson. In light of this information, which he noted was confirmed from sources in Jordan, "we have been standing down on any effort to become more active on the fringes of Jarring talks." He added that Hussein might ask the United States to intervene with the Israelis on substance at some point. (Ibid.)

186. Editorial Note

By mid-1968, prospects for the UN-sponsored Jarring peace mission had clearly become very limited. The Johnson administration looked therefore to a renewal of secret contacts between Israel and Jordan as offering a more promising basis for a bilateral agreement, which might lead to a more general Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The United States encouraged and followed the progress of the contacts between May and November 1968. President Johnson's Special Assistant Walt Rostow kept him informed about the progress of the talks. In a June 27 memorandum to the President, Rostow stated, "Whether we take a Middle East initiative depends, in fact, on whether Israel-Jordan talks work out." Thus far, he said, the situation was "not hopeful," but the talks were "not yet broken off." In a September 30 memorandum, Rostow described the secret contacts as "the best hope" for peace. In November the Israelis proposed an agreement based upon the "Allon plan," which posited Israeli control over the West Bank, while returning political control of some two-thirds of a demilitarized West Bank to Jordan. However, it soon became apparent that King Hussein was increasingly skeptical that Israel would offer peace terms that he could accept, and he eventually broke off the talks. It was also clear to U.S. policymakers that only the United States could pressure Israel to accept a peace settlement premised upon its withdrawal from occupied Arab territory.

187. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 4, 1968.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (Helms) Files, Chrono 1 Jan.-31 Jul. 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk.

SUBJECT
Jordan-Israel Secret Negotiations

1. The secret Jordan-Israel talks in London covered the period between 4 May 1968 when Hussein had his first meetings with Eban and 16 May 1968 when Khammash had the final meeting with Israel Chief of Staff Barlev. Following these, Hussein stopped briefly in Paris for a meeting with General DeGaulle. By the last week in May, Hussein was back in Amman [3 lines of source text not declassified].

2. [7 lines of source text not declassified] Hussein's preoccupation with the danger of a major Israeli military action which would destroy the moderate Jordan state has been reflected in Embassy reporting.

3. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Eban agreed at the end of the London talks that he would report to Eshkol and the Cabinet Hussein's reaction to the Israel proposal for a settlement described by Eban in London and Hussein's own counter-proposal. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. [11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. General DeGaulle, after hearing Hussein's appraisal of the Middle East situation, told Hussein that if Hussein's statements reflected the realities, the prospects for an early political solution were dim and the threat of a major confrontation involving the Great Powers in the Middle East within the next two years was real. Hussein did not discuss his Israeli contacts with DeGaulle and DeGaulle's earlier offers to mediate were not renewed.

Richard Helms/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, June 4, 1968, 2027Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Houghton and Davies on May 31; cleared by Atherton, Popper, Handley, Katzenbach, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN. A record of a June 4 luncheon meeting with the President indicates that President Johnson also cleared the message. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968)

175876. Ref: Amman 5084;/2/ 5170./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 183.

/3/On June 4 General Khammash informed the Embassy that King Hussein was very concerned about the Israeli artillery and aerial attacks in the Irbid area that morning and wanted to know if there had been any response to his question concerning the U.S. attitude toward the integrity of Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Please pass to King Hussein following oral message from the President: Your apprehensions concerning future sanctity of Jordanian territory have been brought to my attention. I wish again to assure you, as I did in my letter of February 11,/4/ that it is our policy and our interest to continue our close relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As Ambassador Symmes has indicated to you, we have made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel our policy toward the continued independence and integrity of your country. You should also know that we would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease-fire lines. I recognize that Your Majesty has sought to prevent use of Jordanian territory to mount acts of violence across the cease-fire line and urge that continued efforts be made to prevent these actions which promote instability and are an impediment to progress toward peace.

/4/See Document 77.

2. I want also to assure you that we are continuing our efforts to bring about a just settlement in the Near East which is, after all, the only solution to the problem about which we are both concerned.

Rusk

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, June 6, 1968, 1959Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Battle and Sisco, and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to USUN.

177706. 1. During Rabin's June 4 call at Dept (septel), Under Secretary Rostow expressed pleasure with Israeli payment of Liberty/2/ death claims and with GOI statement in UN on NPT./3/

/2/Documentation on the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

/3/On May 29 Israeli Permanent Representative Tekoah spoke in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on the draft non-proliferation treaty being considered by the General Assembly. Despite a number of unresolved Israeli concerns about the draft treaty, Tekoah indicated that in recognition of the importance of the treaty, Israel would vote in favor of it. (UN doc. A/C.1/PV.1576)

2. Re NPT, Rabin said he wanted to convey central point of GOI thinking on this matter. Israel believed it would be a mistake in present situation to make clear to Arabs that they faced no Israeli nuclear threat. If Israel removed the question mark from this issue, it would remove a factor which Arabs must now consider in approaching a peace settlement. Problem was therefore a psychological one rather than question of whether or not Israel should have nuclear weapons.

Rusk

190. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

London, June 10, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department by British Ambassador Patrick Dean.

I have asked Pat Dean to deliver this message about the Arab/Israel situation because I am much concerned about the way events may move during the next few weeks both on the ground in the Middle East and also in New York. The very sharp exchange of fire on 4 June across the Jordan and the subsequent call for a Security Council meeting have underlined the ominous dangers which confront us all. I have in mind also that although the 21 May Security Council Resolution on Jerusalem/2/ did not set a deadline for the Secretary-General to report back to the Council on its implementation, events could easily cause Arab pressure to build up, perhaps very suddenly, for a return to the Council on this issue, particularly as we can presumably rule out any hope of the Israelis doing anything which could even remotely be represented as compliance with the Resolution. All too soon, therefore, we may be confronted with a call for sanctions against Israel, which would involve difficult and dangerous decisions for both our countries. In the circumstances, I attach the greatest importance to our exchanging views with each other and to our trying as far as possible to keep our ideas on how to proceed closely in line. There is the further point that we can expect an approach from Mr. Malik to Lord Caradon following up my agreement to Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that the Russians and we should keep in touch on the Middle East. To avoid any possibility of these talks being exploited by the Russians adversely to our common interest, it seems highly desirable that we should make sure that we are working broadly on the same lines with you before matters of substance come up in any Anglo-Soviet meetings in New York. Another reason for our getting together soon is that Mr. Jarring indicated to Lord Caradon in a recent talk that he is now thinking in terms of consultation with the permanent members of the Security Council.

/2/On May 21 the UN Security Council considered a letter from the Jordanian Permanent Representative protesting actions by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem in contravention of UN resolutions. Pakistan and Senegal introduced a resolution deploring Israel's failure to abide by the resolutions relating to Jerusalem, and declaring that all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13-0, with the United States and Canada abstaining. (UN doc. S/PV. 1426)

In these circumstances, it seems to me that it would be timely for us to exchange views on the Arab/Israel situation at an early opportunity. Our presence together in Reykjavik on 23 June for the NATO meeting might, if you would agree, provide a suitable opportunity for us to do this. If you agree that this would be helpful, I think it would be desirable if senior officials on both sides could go over the ground first, so that the main problems likely to arise during the next phase can be identified and possible ways of handling them can be reviewed as a basis for our own discussion. I should propose to ask Sir Denis Allen to go to Washington to discuss these problems with your people in the State Department and with representatives of our two U.N. Delegations during the latter part of the week beginning 17 June.

I should be grateful if you would let me know what you think about this./3/

/3/A note attached to this message by Executive Secretary Benjamin Read indicates that Secretary Rusk told Ambassador Dean that he agreed to the proposal for U.S.-British talks on the Middle East.

191. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, June 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Where We Are in the Middle East

Basically we are standing down for the moment to give Israel-Jordan negotiations a chance. This was Arthur Goldberg's recommendation, and it is our instinct here.

However, we are not putting all our eggs in that basket. We are quite aware that the Israelis may be painting a rosier picture than their own negotiating position warrants. Negotiations may come to naught, or at least come hard up against a substantive impasse which Hussein may ask us to break.

Nick Katzenbach is slowly readying the basis for our moving in if we're needed. I'm bootlegging this to you for background, so we'll need to wait for State's formal recommendation. But the approach includes these elements:

--Secretary Rusk's dual emissaries. Goldberg is top candidate for Jerusalem. Extensive staff work is now putting together a collection of what Israeli officials have told us about terms of a settlement, and what we now consider satisfactory terms. These would provide the basis for proposing our own terms as a means for provoking a definitive Israeli response if necessary.

--Taking the line with the Israelis that we will not veto any Security Council effort to impose a settlement provided the terms seem fair and if Israel's main objection is absence of direct negotiations. We haven't refined this yet, but the purpose would be to put the Israelis on notice to make the most possible of whatever negotiating process is available.

We will be meeting Monday to preview the position we'll take with Sir Denis Allen Thursday (preparation for Rusk-Stewart talk). It's possible this might come up at next Tuesday's lunch.

On Phantoms, we have pushed staff studies to the next level, and Luke has called a meeting next Wednesday. Meanwhile, Paul Warnke will have to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next week, and we are working on his line.

Hal

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, June 15, 1968, 1755Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-LEB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Houghton; cleared by Day, Popper, and James H. Bahti; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Beirut, and repeated to London, Amman, Jerusalem, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE.

184194. Subject: June 15 Lebanese/Israeli Border Incident. Ref: Beirut 10174 and 10177, 10178./2/

/2/Ambassador Porter reported, in telegram 10174 from Beirut, June 15, that Prime Minister Yafi was concerned about the Israeli shelling of a Lebanese border village near Houle on the morning of June 15. The Israelis claimed to be returning fire from the village but Yafi stated that his government had no knowledge of terrorist activity in the area. Yafi asked that the United States exert pressure on Israel to refrain from inflaming the border situation. Telegram 10177 from Beirut, June 15, reported that President Helou was convinced that the border incident was part of an Israeli effort to set the stage for further action against Lebanon. In telegram 10178 from Beirut, June 15, Porter recommended issuing a strong U.S. statement expressing concern about the apparently unprovoked Israeli attack on a Lebanese village. (All ibid.)

1. We are disturbed by what appears on basis Beirut reports, to be unduly aggressive and somewhat "trigger happy" response of Israelis to alleged terrorist incidents near Lebanese-Israel border. We particularly concerned in context Ambassador Rabin's statement to Under Secretary Rostow and Assistant Secretaries Battle and Sisco on June 4 (State's 177707)/3/ that as result direct contacts with Lebanese, "Israel knows GOL doing its best control terrorism." Embassy should urgently approach GOL requesting full explanation of background of incident and stating our concern. In so doing, you may draw as appropriate on contents State's 182501/4/ as well as on reftels. You should emphasize that while we fully appreciate Israel's problem with terrorism we feel their approach to terrorism on the Lebanese border will only make more difficult GOL's efforts to enforce controls and could lead to serious internal problems in Lebanon which in neither our or Israeli interest. We most strongly urge GOI that before taking military action it should avail itself of Lebanese continued offer to meet either in ILMAC or otherwise under UN auspices (Beirut's 9528)./5/

/3/Dated June 6. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/4/Telegram 182501 to Tel Aviv, June 13, instructed the Embassy to emphasize U.S. belief that Lebanon was trying to interdict terrorist activity from Lebanese territory. The United States strongly urged Israeli restraint in response to isolated terrorist incidents along the border. (Ibid.)

/5/Telegram 9528 from Beirut, May 24, reported on the efforts of the Lebanese Army to prevent infiltrators from crossing the border with Israel. (Ibid.)

2. You should also inform GOI that we are approaching Lebanese and once again underlining the importance of their continuing make utmost effort to interdict fedayeen within their territory.

3. For Beirut. You may inform GOL of our approach to Israelis but stress once again difficulties we face in restraining GOI as long as terrorist incidents occur. You may also reaffirm your statement to Michel Khoury (Beirut 10177) that USG following situation closely. Re Embtel 10178 we appreciate point you make regarding value of US public statement for Lebanese internal situation as well as our own position in Lebanon. Do not believe USG should commit itself publicly on incident however in absence of better information as to what might have provoked Israeli action.

Rusk

193. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, June 16, 1968, 1421Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos, 6/68-1/69. Secret; Sensitive.

CAP 81328. Herewith full text of Bergus' rationale for U.S. invitation to Riad to come to Washington./2/

/2/The telegram quoted is telegram 2679 from Cairo, June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. Parker visit has given us opportunity re-canvass GUAR views re Jarring Mission, peaceful settlement, et al from Presidency, FonOff, Heykal and others. What we hear from Egyptians, what we hear from Jarring, and what we hear from Israelis adds up to a pretty depressing picture of stalemate.

2. Egyptians, feeling they have one-upped Israelis by May 9 exchange with Jarring, are now making fairly energetic efforts gain increased public support in world capitals, but even they realize that this is a long-term process of limited value. Whether or not they believe that time is on their side, they are certainly acting as if they thought so.

3. Israelis evidently remain convinced that Arabs will in time be forced by their own interests make peace on Israel's terms and in manner prescribed by Israel.

4. Russians have more than recovered from illusory "defeat" inflicted upon them by June war. Their politico-military position in Egypt is excellent, better than anything they ever enjoyed before, better than politico-military position of US vis-a-vis Israel or any Arab state. Russians can call the tune as to what military assistance will be furnished and manner in which it will be used. Russians probably have effective veto over any possible major UAR offensive action. Russians now have military and intelligence facilities in UAR greater than they ever dreamed of two years ago.

5. Wish re-emphasize point that Russians are now out of the arms race so far as need to compete with Western suppliers is concerned. Their position here so solid that they would no longer feel constrained respond in kind to increase in number or sophistication of Israel weapons by more deliveries to Israel of American hardware. In such eventuality our guess is that Russians would have little difficulty persuading UAR that Egyptian interests required even more Soviet presence and direct Soviet capability on Egyptian soil, in Egyptian airspace and in Egyptian waters, rather than more Russian weapons.

6. We believe that this trend of growing Russian influence is not irreversible. If we believed to the contrary, it would be our duty recommend direct confrontation with Soviets in Middle East before things get irreparably worse and contagion spreads. But we remain convinced that once UAR's rational and irrational fears of Israel began to be allayed, Egyptian nationalism would reassert itself to point of limiting Soviet military presence and influence here.

7. If this line of reasoning has any validity, it follows that an early and equitable settlement of Arab-Israel problem is a supreme national interest of the United States. It means US must play more vigorous role in promoting such a settlement for two reasons:

A) Despite logic of our position that parties to dispute must play leading role in settlement, fact is that after one year it has become evident that they incapable of doing so. US is thus far unable to provide necessary catalyst. As Secretary Dulles put it on August 26, 1955: "Both sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution. But neither has been able to find that way. This may be a situation where mutual friends could serve the common good. This is particularly true since the area may not, of itself, possess all of the ingredients needed for the full and early building of security and well-being." (underlining ours)/3/

/3/There is no underlined text in the quoted telegram.

B) A settlement clearly promoted by the United States would be a historic diplomatic triumph with lasting benefits to US throughout the area and in many other underdeveloped regions. We would have produced something which the parties themselves, the Soviets, the British, the Western Europeans, the non-aligned states, the United Nations were incapable of providing.

8. We firmly believe that the US has the substantive ideas and the diplomatic gifts to promote such a settlement. As to substantive ideas, there are file cabinets of documents dating back from the "Operation Alpha" days of 1954-1955 to the summer of 1967 as to what could be done. We are either unduly modest or self-deceptive if we say USG doesn't have the capability of devising a just and equitable settlement.

9. As to tactical capabilities, we will confine our remarks to Egypt. Egyptians continue in touching, if exaggerated, belief that only US can produce settlement remotely acceptable to them. Our diffidence to make the effort is read by them as sinister intent. Their attitudes toward USG are now comprised of suspicion, distress and, paradoxically, considerable loneliness; we believe a tactical gesture from US would go far toward promoting some basic rethinking throughout GUAR and instill new readiness examine substantive problems involved in settlement (boundaries, refugees, Gaza, Suez, and Aqaba) ab initio.

10. We believe one useful tactical measure would be to invite UAR FonMin Riad to Washington for talks on nature and substance of equitable settlement. This has a great deal to commend it. For one thing we think Egyptians would leap at the opportunity. Privately they would be highly gratified. Publicly they could sell a Riad trip to Washington to their own public opinion and that of the other Arab states as a continuation of UAR efforts "explain" Arab position in foreign capitals.