Washington, August 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 8/1/68-12/12/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 8 at 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Letter from Prime Minister Eshkol

Ambassador Rabin today delivered the attached message from Prime Minister Eshkol./2/ It is mainly an answer to your note which Ambassador Ball carried to Eshkol./3/ However, it reiterates the familiar Israeli view that Nasser does not want a real peace and that one reason he refuses to face reality and settle with Israel is that he still thinks he can win the arms race. This leads Eshkol to hope there will soon be a favorable decision on Phantoms.

/2/Attached was an August 5 letter from Ambassador Rabin to Secretary Rusk conveying a message from Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson.

/3/See Document 212.

Since Eshkol seems to pass over rather lightly the prospects for progress through Jarring in the near future, we may recommend a quick response to this letter. The danger we want to avoid is that the Israelis will feel they've placated us now in their talks with Ball and won't follow up seriously. If there is to be any progress the Israelis will have to begin talking substance with Jarring.

Eshkol's jab in his final paragraph at our Jordan arms program/4/ is hard to understand except as a general reminder that he's keeping his eye on us. Our program is just as we explained it to the Israelis after you approved it. We can't believe the Israelis really see it as a threat.

/4/Eshkol expressed concern that Jordan's rearmament would prove to be more formidable than anticipated and that King Hussein's interest in a final peace settlement would be correspondingly weakened.

New subject.

Just for your information, Rabin in a separate note/5/ has requested twelve more Skyhawks. These would be added to the end of the present production line before it is modified to put out a new model for our Navy. The Israelis want these mainly to cover normal attrition over the life of the planes. With the original 48 and the 40 more you released after Eshkol's visit, this would bring their total to 100. We will have a recommendation for you later.

/5/Not found.

Hal

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, August 7, 1968, 1844Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley, cleared by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beirut, USUN, and London.

216436. 1. Ambassador Sharaf of Jordan called on Assistant Secretary Battle on August 6 and expressed his deep concern that the continuation of the present trend of events would make it increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his close relationship with the United States. He said that the recent Israeli air attacks had created a strong public reaction in Jordan. Almost all Jordanians believed United States could prevent such attacks if we wished to do so. In fact, the air raids had been carried out partially with US Skyhawk aircraft which had been delivered to Israel after Israel had occupied Arab territory in June 1967.

2. The Ambassador said that Jordan had accepted the November 22 resolution in toto even though the resolution had included almost all of Israel's objectives. Jordan had done so in light of US assurances that the USG would use its full weight to support the resolution. Unfortunately the Israelis had blocked the implementation of the resolution by arguing over modalities of agreement and the United States has not used its influence with Israel to bring about an agreement. The Arabs therefore concluded that the USG is retreating from its assurances, both in respect to our support of the UN resolution as well as our earlier assurances on territorial integrity for the nations of the Middle East. In addition to all this, the Ambassador continued, USG is now attempting to balance a few sporadic acts of resistance carried out by individual Arabs in the occupied territories with the calculated and destructive air raids carried out by the armed forces of Israel in the heartland of Jordan. The obvious disproportion between the provocation and the response has made the US posture appear insincere to the Arab world. United States actions are creating a situation in which it is increasingly difficult for King Hussein to justify his relations with the United States, and in fact, such ties are becoming more dangerous for the King in a "concrete sense".

3. Mr. Battle said that he could dispute many of the specific points made by the Ambassador but this ground had been covered many times. He was now more interested in hearing any ideas the Ambassador might have on how the trend of events could be reversed. Ambassador Sharaf replied that despite our protestations the US could use its leverage on Israel. We had done so in 1957 and we could now withhold arms shipments. Both Dayan and Eshkol have said that they do not care about the rest of the world as long as the United States continued to back Israel. The US could also show more balance and understanding for the Arab position in the statements made by USG leaders. Even the Vice-President had recently made statements favoring the delivery of Phantom-jet aircraft to Israel.

4. Mr. Battle pointed out that the situation in 1967 was different from that in 1957. The rights and wrongs were clearer in 1957 and the failure of the arrangements negotiated at that time were a major reason for our present difficulties. It is also a fact that many observers could see a causal relationship between Arab terrorism and Israeli reprisals. Our position on both has been clearly stated and we still believed that the November 22 resolution and the Jarring mission offer the best opportunity to check the present unhappy course of events. Ambassador Sharaf said that he was afraid that the Israeli rigidity on negotiations and their policy of armed reprisals would soon make the November 22 resolution irrelevant.

5. Ambassador Battle pointed out that the USG found both the Arab and Israeli positions on modalities to be unrealistic and asked why Jordan resisted the stationing of UN observers along the ceasefire lines. Ambassador Sharaf replied that Jordan did not trust Israel and believed that the Israelis wished to convert the ceasefire line into a permanent boundary. In any case, UN observers would not answer the real problem. The real problem was how to implement the Security Council resolution. The three "noes" of the Khartoum conference were a necessary concession to Arab public opinion and provided the framework which made Arab acceptance of the November 22 resolution possible.

6. Ambassador Sharaf ended the conversation with a plea that USG at least make some gesture indicating a greater understanding of the Arab position as we have already gone far down the road towards severing meaningful contact with the Arab world. The United States' abstentions on the UN Jerusalem resolutions had probably hurt US prestige more in the Arab world than our arms sales to Israel.

Rusk

233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 8, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, 4/68-1/69. Secret; Nodis. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on August 9 at 1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Ball's Report on Middle East Trip

We have already described for you the results of Ambassador Ball's Mid-East talks, so you do not need to read his long report (attached)./2/ However, you may wish to read the main personal conclusions which are scattered through his report:

/2/A 12-page report on the trip from Ball and Sisco to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, dated August 6, was attached.

1. Some movement on the part of Israel is perceptible. However, without substantial and continuing pressure from the United States on both the Israelis and the Arabs, the Jarring Mission is not going to produce any significant movement toward settlement.

2. Unless compelled to move affirmatively either by events or external pressure the Israeli government is quite ready to live with the present situation of neither peace nor war for an indefinite time.

3. King Hussein desperately wants a settlement since he has lost half his country and is under terrible pressure; however, his freedom of action is severely limited not only by the Palestinian Arabs who constantly threaten him, but by the UAR.

4. Nasser is in a weak position and will almost certainly take no initiative toward a settlement. While the UAR economy is a shambles he continues to live off a dole from the Saudis, Libyans, and the Kuwaitis, which he can probably continue to exact so long as the Canal remains closed.

5. King Faisal is driven by religious passion, and deeply preoccupied with the protection of the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem. Hussein must certainly consult Faisal on any Jerusalem settlement, and, if not satisfied, Faisal would try hard to persuade Hussein not to go ahead. Ambassador Eilts believes, however, that if Hussein were to accept a settlement, even though it fell short of what Faisal would like Faisal would grumble but do nothing about it.

6. Kosygin told Jarring recently that he wants a political settlement. While the prevailing "no-war, no-peace" situation is not unattractive to the Soviets, we should not take this for granted--particularly in view of their interest in opening the Suez Canal. It seems doubtful that we can deflect the Soviet Union from its one-sided support of the Arabs, but we should at least make an effort, if for no other reason than that 100 countries will expect us to do so.

In addition, Ambassador Ball reports that the UAR and USSR are under great pressure to see the Suez Canal opened, as are the British, Italians and French to decreasing degrees. Regarding our interest, Ball concludes: "We should make a study in depth to determine our position with regard to the opening of the Canal. If that study should show--as it well might-that our interests are best served by keeping the Canal closed--thus frustrating Soviet strategic ambitions and raising the cost of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam--then we should be quite tough-minded in not joining in efforts to separate this issue from an overall settlement, in spite of the continuing expense to our British, German and Italian friends. Alternatively, if the study should show that these strategic considerations are only marginally important, we might make a real effort to trade our support for the reopening of the Canal for Soviet support of an acceptable final settlement of the Middle Eastern problem."

Jarring begins his next round of talks by meeting Eban in London August 9. We have urged Eban to show enough new flexibility so that Jarring will tell the Egyptians he is ready to start talking about substantive issues. Our objective is to pave the way for serious talk when the U.N. General Assembly meets in late September.

Hal

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, August 9, 1968, 0900Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, London, Jidda, Jerusalem, Cairo, and USUN.

4847. Subj: Jarring Mission: Jordanian comments on Eban's points. Ref: State 215386./2/

/2/Telegram 215386 to Tel Aviv, August 5, instructed Barbour to convey to Eban Rifai's comments as reported in telegram 6014 from Amman, Document 227. In doing so, Barbour was instructed to urge Eban to make the most of the opportunity presented by his impending meeting with Jarring in London to help Jarring get the negotiation process going. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

1. I saw Eban Aug 8 at his office in Jerusalem and gave him full rundown on Rifai's comments as contained in Amman 6014, adding additional points made in reftel by Dept. Noted, of course, Amb Symmes conversation with Rifai was prior Aug 4 raid.

2. Eban said it was certainly helpful to have this report of Symmes talk with Rifai. Welcomed indication that Rifai remains of the same disposition as in May when he expressed desire to find way for Jordan and Israel to meet under Jarring's chairmanship. Thought this willingness on Jordan's part was most important thing that has come from Jarring Mission. Eban thought there should be no further American approach to Jordan until he, Eban, had seen Jarring. He would ask Jarring to tell Rifai that if the Jordanians find a way to meet with the Israelis under Jarring's chairmanship they would then not any longer hear generalities about Israel's position but specifics. Whether GOI could give them anything more specific before such a meeting, however, would depend. If a meeting such as Rifai envisaged with Jarring present could be arranged, then the speed of progress would increase by geometric proportions, so speedily as to bear no relation to the pace of progress up to now. He would ask Jarring to tell Jordanians, however, that if they want detailed GOI views it must be done in a situation in which Israel can also obtain Jordan views.

3. Eban went on to say that the current situation on the frontier might be said to offer great obstacles to negotiations. Certainly it was hard to try to make peace with a country which maintains anti-ceasefire organizations on its territory. Some members of GOI say that Jordan should be required to take strong action against El Fatah before Israel would be willing to negotiate, but the GOI is ready to proceed without this. Nevertheless, relationship of GOJ to El Fatah is an important element. One alternative would be to say that the local security situation is an obstacle which must prevent negotiations from the point of view of both sides, but another, which he thought more realistic, would be to disassociate the two. Noted Jordan had not yet said that security situation would influence peace moves.

4. His feeling, Eban said, was that if Israelis got around a table with Jordanians there would be a great deterrent on both sides against security situations which might adversely affect negotiations and both countries would take pains to avoid them. Said he would do everything to get Jarring to work for a meeting at UNGA because this would be the first time since Jarring's appointment for the Foreign Ministers to be together under one roof. The speed of liaison would be immensely improved, with Jarring able to go from room to room to make meeting arrangements rather than have to fly from country to country with attendant delays. Whatever Jarring does for next month to keep pot boiling will be fine, but his aim should be for a meeting at GA.

5. Re UAR, Eban said he understood Jarring had not officially transmitted his questions since he found El Kony frustrating to deal with and preferred to keep questions for direct talk with Riad. Eban said GOI estimates Egypt in state of ideological immobility. Result of GOI's questions would not be to make progress towards peace but to show who is responsible for lack of progress. If the primary goal cannot be attained at least the secondary one can. As long as the UAR-

Jordan ideological gap remains, with one refusing all of the things to which the other agrees, he did not see how progress could be made.

6. I told Eban we certainly agreed that next step is between him and Jarring. Since he had mentioned question of El Fatah, I had to say again that we deplore both El Fatah and GOI moves, and regard GOI response as unfortunate. I added for myself that I was sorry to see that Israel found no response to infiltrators but offensive military force on a scale all out of proportion to the infiltration. Eban replied that it was important to meet infiltrators on the ground but also important to pursue them to their home bases. Failure is what influences them most, and they will be emboldened if they can maintain their bases with immunity on the acquiescence of GOJ. Even if it could not entirely prevent Fatah operations, GOJ could at least create conditions to make them hard.

7. I told Eban that GOI puts enormous efforts into offensive military tactics. I wondered if they were prepared to take the same sort of risks in the search for peace. Eban replied that the parallel was not valid because their efforts on the peace front get no reactions from the other side.

8. I believe conversation gave Eban a good understanding of how strongly we feel that opening towards substantive talks represented by Rifai's comments should not be lost. At same time, basic situation seems to remain that Jordan wants specific proposals before it will sit down with Jarring and Israelis, while Israelis say they cannot get down to specifics until they are actually sitting around a table with Jarring and GOJ. In spite of this difference, I think there is room for Jarring to maneuver and to seek to extract a little from each side to meet the needs of the other with the hope that, as Eban says, the final steps to bring them together can be taken when they are at the UN.

Barbour

235. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant (Jones) in Texas/1/

Washington, August 12, 1968, 1444Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret.

CAP 81937. Please hold this Hal Saunders memo for me, but show to the President if, in fact, Robert Anderson or any other private individual should seek to get in touch with the President on this sensitive issue.

"I would not bother you with this except that the President may be approached on this subject. The American company involved has engaged Robert Anderson as a 'consultant.'

The Israelis are trying to press Standard Oil of Indiana to cut back operations in UAR oil fields in the Gulf of Suez off the Sinai or to take Israel into partnership on any expansion of production. Production in this major field is increasing steadily, so the Israeli request amounts to pressure to deal Israel in or stop normal growth.

The State Department Legal Adviser says Israeli occupation extends to the water's edge of the Sinai but not into the Gulf of Suez. He says there is little question about continued UAR sovereignty over the Gulf's underwater oil. More important, oil advisers are seriously concerned about the implications for our oil interests throughout the area-not to mention our political position-if Arab governments felt that we were now willing to stand aside and let Israel use an American company to consolidate its conquest of the Sinai.

State believes the Israelis are just seeing now much they can get away with and intends to advise Israelis strongly to drop the idea. But we probably have not heard the last of this."/2/

/2/Telegram 218916 to Tel Aviv, August 10, instructed Ambassador Barbour to see the highest available official in the Foreign Ministry to convey the deep U.S. concern about proposed Israeli actions with respect to oil in the Gulf of Suez. (Ibid.) Under Secretary Rostow took up the issue with Ambassador Rabin on August 12, stressing the potentially explosive character of the issue raised by Israel with respect to the El-Morgan oil field being developed by Standard Oil of Indiana. Rostow noted that the United States did not accept the Israeli legal justifications for their position, and added that, at a delicate and crucial stage in the Jarring Mission, Israeli pressure on this issue could intensify doubts about its interest in a peaceful settlement and its long-term intentions with regard to the Sinai. (Memorandum of conversation, August 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rostow Files: Lot 69 D 196, EUR Chron, August 1968) Battle also discussed the issue with Rabin on August 15, in the company of the Department's Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker. Meeker outlined the U.S. legal position in opposing Israel's assertion of rights in the Gulf of Suez, and Battle stressed the adverse political consequences. (Telegram 222928 to Cairo, August 16; ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 GULF OF SUEZ)

236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/

Washington, August 14, 1968, 2334Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret.

CAP 81991. Secretary Rusk has had the following memorandum from Katzenbach, Ball, Battle and Sisco on the resolution pending in the Security Council on the recent Israeli retaliation raids on Jordan. The Secretary hopes to discuss this with the President by phone Thursday morning at the President's convenience.

"1. The attached resolution is substantially the same as that adopted by the Security Council in March following the Israeli raid on Karameh. This is the case despite the fact that whereas there were general and well-documented prior incidents which provoked the Karameh raid, the same cannot be said for the present situation. The incidents that preceded the Israeli air raid on Salt were of a relatively minor character which could be expected in a situation where there is military occupation of territory. Tekoah (Israel) has made no real case in the Security Council concerning the prior provocations to this latest raid, and we nevertheless have succeeded in injecting balance in the resolution even though the Israelis have made a weak case. The fact of the matter is that this latest Israeli raid was a preventive raid rather than one that was sparked by any prior serious incident. Moreover, it is all the more embarrassing to us that evidence indicates that the Skyhawks we gave to Israel were involved.

2. We have worked very hard behind the scenes in order to make the text more balanced than in any of its earlier forms. We have succeeded in two principal ways: (A) the sponsors, pursuant to our pressure, have eliminated any language which might form the basis for future sanctions against Israel; and (B) while the text condemns the Israeli counter raid, it also makes explicit reference to the prior acts of terrorism.

3. Friendly members of the Security Council, after concerted and extensive efforts on our part (UK, Canada, Denmark, Brazil and Paraguay) have helped us achieve this result. They have concluded, as we have, that this is as well as we can do on any text. They are prepared to support the text, and we would be isolated if we were to stand out by abstaining. This would have adverse effects on our overall position in the area and give the Soviets an opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage.

4. A U.S. abstention would encourage the Israelis to feel that there were no restraints regarding similar future raids and that it could disregard entirely the views of the Security Council.

5. Last March Israel put the best face on the Security Council resolution by stressing that both the prior terrorist raids and the Israeli counter action were criticized by the Security Council. They discounted its importance in Israeli public opinion, and we can expect the Israelis to play it essentially the same way this time. Our informal discussions with the Israelis indicate they expect condemnation and a resolution similar to the one adopted last March, and that this result they would not find greatly disturbing.

6. We do not expect the adoption of this resolution to have any appreciable effect here at home. We have had no expressions of concern from the Jewish community, and there has been little interest in our press in the SC proceedings. The editorials on the latest incident in our papers have been balanced and have linked the provocations with the counter action, so that I do not anticipate any major press problem.

7. Our affirmative vote would be coupled with a statement by George Ball in the Council which would stress that the SC resolution applies both to the prior terrorist raids as well as to Israeli counter action. George has already made such a speech in the Security Council, but it would be worth repeating.

Draft Resolution

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721, S/8724,/2/

/2/UN docs. S/8616 and S/8617 are both dated June 5. S/8616 is a letter from the Jordanian Permanent Representative calling on the Security Council to consider Israeli aggression against Jordan in the Israeli raid on Karameh, and S/8617 is a letter from the Israeli Permanent Representative rebutting the Jordanian charges and holding Jordan accountable for terrorist activity against Israel. UN docs. S/8721 and S/8724, dated August 5, were again letters to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel with similar charges and counter-charges following the Israeli air raid on Salt.

Recalling its previous Resolution 248 (1968)/3/ condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire,

/3/Adopted on March 24. (UN doc. S/RES/248)

Observing that all the massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of Resolution 248 (1968),

Considering that premeditated military attacks of this kind seriously prejudice the achievement of peace in the Middle East, and that all violent incidents and other violations of the ceasefire should be prevented,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 248 (1968), in particular its paragraph 2 which condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the ceasefire resolutions, and paragraph 3 which deplores all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the ceasefire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

3. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 248 (1968);

4. Warns that if such actions were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution;

5. Calls for full cooperation with the Secretary General's Special Representative."/4/

/4/The Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution on August 16. (UN doc. S/RES/256 (1968))

237. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 14, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
Ball Mission Down the Drain?

I may be guilty of over-dramatizing, but the Barbour-Eban and Eban-Jarring meetings last Thursday-Friday seem to confirm that the flexibility we thought Ball found in Jerusalem was just a sop the Israelis threw us. I'm attaching the cables which describe the post-Ball Israeli position in detail./2/

/2/The attached telegrams were telegrams 4842 and 4847 from Tel Aviv, both August 9, and telegram 220328 to Tel Aviv, August 13. For telegram 4842, see footnote 3, Document 230. For telegram 4847, see Document 234. Telegram 220328 transmitted to Tel Aviv an account of the August 9 meeting between Eban and Jarring in London, as conveyed to Sisco by the Israeli Embassy. In discussing the possibility of direct contacts between Israel and Jordan, Eban indicated that Jordan could not expect to receive any further clarification of Israeli territorial assurances without engaging in direct talks. Sisco noted that this was at variance with the impression he and Ball had received in Tel Aviv. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Ball's understanding was that the Israelis would exchange real substance through Jarring. Eban now says the generalities he's passed are all the Jordanians are going to get, at least through Jarring, until they meet directly. Nor did Eban give Jarring anything encouraging to take to Cairo, as we suggested he do.

Joe Sisco has already reacted, and State has instructed Ball and Barbour to react similarly. This is a fair start, but I think we ought to arrange a small explosion. If we let them get away with this without more than a passing comment, we can write off right now most of the progress Ball achieved.

I am trying to stir State to sharpen and broaden its expression of dismay so the Israelis will get the point. Luke will do so with Rabin and will suggest Nick Katzenbach follow suit. He also agrees that we should include this theme in the President's reply to Eshkol, but that's still a few days off. If Eppie were here, I'd suggest you call him, but I guess we've lost that channel for the moment. Anyway, you can keep this theme in the back of your mind-the Israelis are slipping away from the position they took with Ball.

Hal

238. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, August 16, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Syria, Vol. I, Cables and Memos, 4/64-10/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
The Situation in Syria

You asked what is going on in Syria. Although much of our information comes from poor sources, we can see the general outlines. What we can't judge is the relative strength of the contending groups. The people in Damascus could be over-reacting to a largely imaginary threat, or they could be one step from defeat.

The coup in Iraq a month ago, which brought a right-wing Baath government to power, encouraged the exiled Syrian Baathists in Beirut and frightened the radical Baath rulers in Damascus. Damascus is taking the reports of plotting in Baghdad and Beirut seriously. We know that there is plotting, but we don't know where it will lead or how much support the plotters will get from Iraq.

To counter the threat, Damascus has cracked down--we aren't sure how much--on potential opponents in Syria. One result has been an increase in suspicion within the government and a decrease in domestic support.

The crackdown--rather than coup plotting--was probably the reason the former Army Chief of Staff fled to Beirut, and this could also be the reason the Syrian pilots flew to Israel but it is more likely that they just got lost.

Because most of the plotters are in Beirut, the Syrians have tried to put pressure on Lebanon. Their main effort was a transit tax which hurt the Lebanese, but also hurt the Jordanians, Saudis and Kuwaitis. The major result so far has been an increase in Syria's isolation in the Arab world.

The Syrian rulers have never been popular, but most Syrians don't think the alternatives to the present regime are much better. If the exiles try to seize power, they will find neither popular support nor popular opposition. The only question is whether they are strong enough to seize key positions in the government. The answer to the question is in Baghdad and Damascus. Our sources are in Beirut and Amman. If the exiles win, Syria is likely to be less radical, but it would still be among the Arab extremists.

Our main concern in all this is the effect on Jordan. There are indications that the plotters hope to overthrow Hussein as well as the Syrians. The Jordanians believe that Hussein is becoming increasingly vulnerable, and that our "pro-Israeli" policies contribute to radical strength.

John

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, August 17, 1968, 0124Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, USUN, and Moscow.

223116. You will have received London's 11823/2/ as a supplement to State's 222134/3/ as well as USUN's 6213/4/ reporting Ball's luncheon session with Gohar, et al at which no new ground was broken. We suggest you draw on following in your discussion with Mohamed Riad:

/2/In telegram 11823 from London, August 14, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office the text of three questions that the United Arab Republic had asked Jarring to pass to the Israelis. The questions, which were conveyed to the Foreign Office by the UAR Embassy, read as follows: "A) Is Israel ready to accept four-power or SC guarantee of overall area settlement along lines of November 1967 SC resolution? B) Would Israel withdraw its troops 30-40 kilometers from Suez Canal in return for unrestricted passage of Israeli cargoes through canal if this arrangement were regarded as one stage in putting entire settlement package into effect? C) If it were also regarded as simply one stage in an overall settlement package, would Israel be ready to withdraw from Gaza strip in favor of a UN administration?" (Ibid.)

/3/In telegram 222134 to Tel Aviv, August 16, Barbour was instructed to try to find out if the three UAR questions had been conveyed to Israel and if Israel had answered them. If not, Barbour was instructed to ask the Israeli Government to consult with the United States before doing so. The Department explained the necessity for a more specific U.S. role in helping to influence the substantive exchanges between the parties in order to "encourage positive and constructive responses." (Ibid.)

/4/Telegram 6213 from USUN, August 16, reported on a luncheon meeting that Ball, Sisco, and Buffum had on August 12 with Ghorbal, El Kony, and Gohar of the UAR. Ball offered his impressions on the Jarring Mission, based on his recent trip to the Middle East, and tried to draw out the UAR officials on prospects for negotiations. The meeting was described by the Mission as "not particularly fruitful" with the UAR representatives cleaving to established positions. One point that emerged from the discussion was that the UAR representatives denied that there was anything to the article written in The New York Times on August 12 by Eric Pace purporting to describe new UAR proposals for a peace settlement. (Ibid.)

1. We have been primarily responsible for getting some flexibility in GOI position; they now in process of exploring substance indirectly and we are continuing urge them to be as flexible and forthcoming as possible. We believe process of posing questions represents a good start, but it must be built upon, not only with additional questions but further and fuller explanations by all parties of their substantive positions. (In this connection, you should seek to ascertain just when UAR conveyed three questions reported in London 11823 and what UAR understanding is as to whether Jarring will put them to Israelis.)

2. We think time has long passed for any of the parties to stick to doctrinal rigidities. We hope that UAR will respond fully and constructively to questions Jarring has posed to them, and not limit themselves to countering with questions of their own. While we have no intention of blueprinting substantive replies to be made by respective parties, we believe it would promote progress if all parties, including UAR, could begin to clarify their positions in more specific terms re key elements of Security Council resolution.

3. For example, a positive reply by UAR to question of whether it prepared in context of a peace settlement to put a complete end to state of belligerency with State of Israel would be helpful. At best, we would like UAR to respond with a categoric "yes," coupling such affirmative reply with indication of willingness to embody such an obligation in binding commitment with Israel not with some third party as SC. SC endorsement of any agreement would obviously be very useful, but it is not a feasible substitute for a binding undertaking between principal parties. UAR could be reminded that when they say they accept SC Res of Nov. 22 from A to Z as a package, para. 3 calls for "agreement."

4. A further example can be cited re second question: recognition of political independence, territorial sovereignty and integrity of Israel. Again we feel that if in fact UAR is interested in a fundamental settlement then it must begin to indicate now that it is willing to consider a binding commitment between GOI and UAR. This would be clearest indication that UAR had in fact adopted a live-and-let-live policy, and is willing work out a modus vivendi with Israel. Is UAR ready for this? Statement on its part that "it accepts SC resolution of November 1967" are useful, but have become part of doctrinal rigidity which has contributed to impasse. What is required is indication of UAR willingness to enter into binding understanding with GOI on crucial point of this kind, as required by para. 3.

5. Similarly, distinction which UAR has been trying to make between freedom of passage of Israeli cargoes and Israeli flag ships strikes us as unrealistic and casts doubt on UAR willingness to achieve a fundamental settlement.

6. In short, we feel you ought to smoke out Riad on specifics. We suspect you will not get very far. We recognize UAR has been conveying piece-meal reactions to specific points in resolution which in our judgment have been designed largely to improve UAR position tactically and publicly. Answers or lack of answers or partial answers by UAR will help clarify whether their reaction is primarily tactical for public relations purposes or whether in fact they want to come to grips with the elements of a fundamental political settlement in accordance with SC Res. In this connection, we have had this week two New York Times articles by Eric Pace./5/ At the time of the Ball luncheon with Gohar (August 13), we inquired whether there was anything to August 12 article and got only quick denials from all three UAR representatives present at the luncheon. We feel you ought to get across to Riad our feeling that positions adopted by UAR to date have been primarily for public relations purposes rather than a serious attempt to face realities of a settlement. We say this not in sense of trying to make a judgment as to which of the parties is responsible because there has been plenty of rigidity on both sides. But we feel there is genuine opportunity to test real intentions of parties, and that it is a matter of high urgency to prepare the way for constructive exchanges among Fonmins in New York.

/5/On August 12 Pace, citing "well-informed Arab diplomats," reported that the UAR was prepared to accept a settlement that included internationalizing the Gaza strip, waiving past demands for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, and demilitarizing the Sinai peninsula. In another article on August 15, Pace cited "highly placed Western diplomats" as revealing that the UAR was pressing for a peace settlement based on "declarations of peace" that would be endorsed by the UN Security Council, and separately by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

7. We note also that UAR has been very careful in avoiding any indication as to whether Foreign Minister Riad intends to be present in opening days of the General Assembly. This too, in our judgment, will be a test. Rifai of Jordan obviously wants to go there, but we detected caution on part of GOJ in absence of knowing what UAR is going to do. You might explore this point as well.

8. With reference to UAR statements of "acceptance of the SC resolution" and its insistence GOI has not, fact of matter is all three have accepted resolution, but each has expressed its acceptance with its own reservations. UAR, for example, has accepted SC resolution, but it does not draw attention to fact that acceptance is subject to reservation that it interprets SC resolution to mean withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-June lines. Jordan has probably been most categoric in acceptance of resolution, though it too has expressed its reservations. And Israel is also on record as accepting resolution within context of its own reservations. (Tekoah's May 1 SC statement, reaffirmed publicly by GOI Cabinet on June 23.)

9. Finally, a simple statement to Jarring from UAR that it is willing to try to achieve a "binding agreement with Israel" in accordance with SC resolution of November 1967 would certainly move things forward. You may wish to explore this also on personal basis.

Rusk

240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, August 17, 1968, 0129Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco on August 16, cleared by Rockwell and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, London, USUN, and Moscow.

223117. For Barbour.

1. You will be seeing Rafael on Aug 18th, and we hope he will be able to give you additional information regarding three UAR questions (State 222134 and London 11823)./2/ You should feel free to discuss possible GOI reply along lines FYI section of State 222134.

/2/See footnotes 3 and 2, Document 239.

2. In addition, we believe it is important that you get across to Eban upon his return our concern that flexible approach he described to Ball and Sisco in Israel be maintained./3/ You will recall that Eban made clear in those conversations a willingness to explore substance indirectly, and this was reflected in questions posed to UAR and Israeli ideas passed by Ball to GOJ re possible shape of a settlement. We understood clearly, though there was no time period put on it, that indirect process would be pursued seriously in hopes that it might set stage for serious explorations in the opening days of the General Assembly, including possibility of joint meetings, most likely in presence of Jarring. We have expressed concern to Israelis here and in New York that reports of Eban's Aug 9 conversation with Jarring indicate a less flexible posture than we were led to believe existed. We want to be specific in this regard. Reports are that Eban told Jarring that while Israel remained flexible, "Jordan cannot have specific clarification of Israel's intentions without some kind of direct contacts." (This is precisely as Argov reported it to us here, see State 220328.)/4/ This sounds to us like direct negotiations again becoming an end in itself. If this is a correct report, Eban statement is all more distressing in circumstances where he had available Jordanian response as contained in paras 3 and 4 of Amman 6014/5/ in which GOJ invited specific GOI territorial rectification proposals and reaffirmed willingness to "enter into joint meetings (with Jarring present) if it finds there are substantive matters that can profitably be discussed."

/3/Under Secretary Rostow also stressed this point in an August 17 meeting with Ambassador Rabin. (Telegram 223182 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

4See footnote 2, Document 237.

/5/Document 227.

3. We feel it is untenable for GOI to take view it unwilling to be more specific unless there is direct contact. We therefore want you to press Eban to keep substantive dialogue going by being directly responsive to Jordanian request for more specificity. We realize this might entail difficult decisions on which Israeli Cabinet divided. But we are reaching watershed, and parties must begin to face up to realities. We felt ideas Ball and Sisco conveyed to GOJ on behalf of GOI were useful starting point. While Rifai's response has certainly a number of elements which are unacceptable to Israelis, nevertheless GOJ has said explicitly that it is willing to get together in joint meetings with Jarring present if it finds there are substantive matters that can be profitably discussed. We therefore urge that Eban respond more specifically to GOJ during his next discussion with Jarring.

4. While we have no intention to blueprint what GOI substantive reply ought to be, it should be possible to formulate answer in more specific territorial terms as it relates to West Bank, possibly coupling this with a renewed indication of a GOI willingness to discuss such new specifics at joint meetings under Jarring's auspices during opening days of the General Assembly.

5. You might tell Eban our judgment continues to be Hussein wants to make a settlement, but that he needs more specificity from Israelis and reassurance that a deal he can live with is possible if he is to make decision for joint meetings with them in New York.

6. We hope therefore you can have a full discussion with Eban and press him hard on this matter./6/

/6/Barbour was also instructed to remind Eban that he had said that by early August he would provide the United States with an assessment of the prospects for progress in the channel that Eban had referred to as the "Jordanian flirtation." (Telegram 223140 to Tel Aviv, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)

Rusk

241. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/

Cairo, August 19, 1968, 0915Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN.

3193. 1. In Aug 17 conversation with Mohamed Riad, I waited until he had completed briefings on Jarring visit and Vinogradoff conversation (septels) before touching on some of the points in State 223116./2/

/2/Document 239.

2. First of all Mohamed denied that three questions discussed between UAR Embassy London and UK FonOff had any status within GUAR. Only questions GUAR had put to Israel via Jarring were those raised by FonMin Riad on Aug 17./3/

/3/According to a briefing given to Bergus by Mohamed Riad on August 17 of a meeting held that day in Cairo between Foreign Minister Riad and Jarring, Riad had asked Jarring to convey four questions to Israel: "A) Did Israel intend to implement resolution and withdraw to June lines? B) In light of many statements of Israeli leaders re annexation of Arab territory would it continue to be Israel policy to annex territories or would Israel renounce that policy? C) What, in opinion of Israel, are secure and recognized boundaries? D) Did Israel intend to implement UNGA resolution 1947?" (Telegram 3192 from Cairo, August 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

3. As was to be expected, Mohamed expressed resentment at our tarring GUAR with brush of doctrinal rigidity. He said acceptance Nov 22 res represented basic and fundamental UAR policy decision. He noted mention of "20 year state of war" in question put by Rafael to UAR through Jarring. UAR understood Israel's concern was that UAR only interested in "removing traces of aggression" i.e. returning to pre-June 5, 1967 situation. This definitely not case. GUAR had, and would continue respond with categoric "yes" to question as to whether UAR prepared in context peace settlement put complete end to state of belligerency with Israel.

4. Mohamed said Jarring was of opinion that "agreement" called for in Nov 22 res did not have to be agreement between parties. Jarring felt, according Mohamed, that agreement between each party and SC coupled with pledge by each party before SC would fulfill requirements of para 3 of SC res.

5. As to live-and-let-live and modus vivendi with Israel, Mohamed said GUAR prepared give binding pledge, to be guaranteed by SC, on each and every element in Nov 22 SC res.

6. I said UAR position on Suez Canal, i.e. differentiation between Israel cargoes and flag not understandable. If UAR meant what it said re readiness terminate state belligerency with Israel, then there no basis for any kind of discrimination against Israel flag. Either you had belligerency or you didn't. It didn't come in packages of varying size. Mohamed said agreement which UAR envisaged would culminate in total implementation of SC res. Same agreement which opened Canal to Israel cargoes "as a first step" would also spell out circumstances in which state of belligerency would be terminated and Canal opened to Israel flag.

7. I mentioned denial of Kony, Gohar, and Ghorbal of Eric Pace NY Times story of Aug 12. Mohamed said GUAR stood on FonMin-Jarring Stockholm conversation which remained its firm position. (Mohamed also said Gohar had been greatly impressed by Ball.)

8. As to proposition that UAR, Israel, and Jordan acceptance of Nov 22 res exists subject reservations each party, Mohamed said UAR content leave this to Jarring to determine. Jarring felt he had acceptance of all three to first two paragraphs of his March-May formula.

9. When I talked about possible UAR readiness tell Jarring that it willing to try to achieve a binding agreement with Israel, Mohamed said words "with Israel" were the ones that created the problem. This recalled Washington conversations in which Dept officials had talked about Egypt's having to "sign on the dotted line." He reverted to proposition that UAR agreement with SC would fulfill terms of Nov 22 res. He kept saying, "Jarring not only accepts but advocates our viewpoint," "Jarring volunteered agreement with us on this," etc.

Bergus

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, August 21, 1968, 0205Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bahti (NEA/IAI), cleared by Day, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Moscow, and USUN.

224669. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: Tel Aviv 5004./2/

/2/Telegram 5004 from Tel Aviv, August 20, reported on Foreign Minister Eban's reaction when Ambassador Barbour taxed him with following an inconsistent policy, as Barbour was instructed to do in telegram 223117 to Tel Aviv. Eban "responded vehemently expressing surprise and resentment" that the United States had concluded on the basis of insufficient facts and faulty understanding that Eban had gone back on the policy he had outlined to Ball and Sisco of Israeli willingness to deal indirectly on substance with both Jordan and the UAR. Eban insisted that Israeli policy had not changed and that he had outlined the policy precisely in his conversation with Jarring in London. (Both ibid.)

1. Israeli Min Argov called to convey to Asst Secty Battle following oral communication:

Begin Text:

The FonMin is surprised by the assumption expressed by US officers that there has been any change in the position which he and his colleagues outlined to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco in Jerusalem. There is not the slightest justification or foundation for this assumption. In his conversation with Amb Jarring in London on Aug 9 Mr. Eban gave an account of Israel's views on the Jarring Mission in terms which were identical verbatim with those expressed to Amb Ball in Jerusalem. Indeed he read the relevant part of the Protocol of the Jerusalem talks. It is disturbing that a totally inaccurate view about a change of position should have been propagated within the US Administration, and even outside.

Israel's position remains precisely as stated to Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco. We do not believe that binding engagements will be reached and signed on the basis of obstruction and refusal to meet. On the other hand our belief in the principle of normal negotiation does not exclude the preliminary exchange of views and clarifications through Jarring and otherwise of some of the main principles involved in the establishment of peace. Thus we have tried to initiate a dialogue with the UAR on the juridical and political implications of the term "just and lasting peace." We shall try to maintain this dialogue and to avoid a diplomatic vacuum. This principle applied to Jordan as well. We have noted Jordan's reported willingness to hold joint meetings with Israel in Jarring's presence. On the other hand Jordan wishes to learn Israel's approach to the problem of "secure and recognized boundary." As was said to Amb Jarring we are ready to clarify our conception of this point to Jordan through various channels and procedures well before the opening of the GA.

FonMin Eban has very recently ascertained that these opportunities have not been affected by recent frontier clashes. It is however essential that the utmost discretion be maintained on Israel's efforts to diversify its methods of informal communication and that what was said to Amb Ball be taken on trust. Israel did not share the view expressed in April that the Jarring Mission was in danger of early liquidation and we do not now believe it impossible to carry the mission on to the UNGA when greater possibilities of meaningful communication may present themselves. End Text.

2. Battle said he would see that Amb Ball and Asst Secty Sisco were apprised of the message. He emphasized, however, that important thing was that Jarring have clear understanding GOI position. Argov asked if we believed Jarring had different view of GOI position than that given Ball and Sisco by Eban. Battle said this was our impression. From what we understood, Jarring seemed not to see degree of flexibility in GOI position that Ball and Sisco had believed existed following their talks with Eban. Battle urged that Israelis see that Jarring fully understands their position in this respect.

3. Argov asked whether matter now cleared up. Battle said he couldn't say that it was, as neither he nor Argov present at Ball-Sisco-Eban talks. We would be in touch after matter discussed with Ball and Sisco.

Rusk

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/

Washington, August 30, 1968, 2131Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Robert P. Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared by Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Eddison, Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia Maurice J. Williams, Murray and Colonel Bradburn (DOD/ISA), Seelye, Senior Regional Adviser for Regional Affairs in NEA John Buckle, Battle, and Claus W. Ruser of the Senior Interdepartmental Group; and approved by John P. Walsh.

230885. Joint State/Defense/AID Message. Subj: Jordan's Internal Defense. Ref: Amman 6263./2/

/2/In telegram 6263 from Amman, August 22, the Embassy reported that King Hussein and his advisers had asked the United States to consult informally on measures to strengthen Jordan's internal security arrangements. The Embassy noted that the Fedayeen constituted a growing threat within the country. (Ibid.)

1. Embassy authorized to respond to Jordanian overtures for more substantive discussions of problems of Jordan's internal defense. Begin FYI. Jordan's potential qualification for internal defense assistance will be subject to mid-September SIG meeting. Discussions should not be postponed on this account. End FYI.

2. Public Safety Assistance. Believe it important early in discussions with GOJ to make clear stringency of USG funding situation and hence likelihood that any acquisition of PSF equipment or commodities would be on purchase basis. In this connection you may wish to call attention to deep cuts in FAA authorizations and current high levels of Jordanian foreign exchange reserves. You may also wish to refer to substantial grant assistance previously provided under public safety program which has not yet been fully utilized by PSF. At this stage discussions should be limited to Jordanian requirements under various contingencies that may arise in coming months.

3. Other Internal Defense Assistance. Following represents our current thinking. We agree that most immediate threats to GOJ are popular rioting and fedayeen action. In controlling these threats additional equipment and manpower may be less important than improved training and deployment of personnel and equipment assets now available to regime. We also believe that it is not unreasonable to assume that in certain circumstances the regime may be required to reduce its static border defenses in order to deal with internal disturbances. The forces available for internal security cited in reftel, twelve battalions or equivalent totaling over 6,000 men, should represent an effective security force without additional increases. Should these not prove adequate in any given situation, redeployment of other forces would be normal and expected next step. We assume that some of equipment we now delivering (e.g. APCs) will be made available for internal security forces.

Rusk

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, September 4, 1968, 1130Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and CINCSTRIKE.

6463. Subj: The Fedayeen problem and Jordan's internal security. Ref: State 230885 (Notal)./2/

/2/Document 243.

1. On third I told King Hussein the Embassy had been authorized to engage in working level substantive discussions of Jordan's internal security problem. I therefore wanted to have a general discussion with him before our working levels got into details. I wanted him to know we regard the Fedayeen problem as a primary cause of incidents between Jordan and Israel. These incidents place strains on US-Jordanian relations, and they create an impossible climate for progress toward a peaceful settlement. Perhaps even more important, the Fedayeen pose a real threat to the integrity of the Jordanian regime itself. Beyond that, the Fedayeen groups almost inevitably could be counted on to create disorder when and if some tangible progress toward a peaceful settlement was achieved and publicized. We therefore want to do all we can to help Jordan deal effectively with the Fedayeen problem both in the short and long term. Our discussions with his people would be for the primary purpose of determining Jordan's requirements. I had to make clear I was not promising grant aid. In principle, we would expect Jordan to purchase material it needed. We would determine how we could best assist Jordan's own internal defense efforts. I added that I assumed he would have no objection if I kept the British Ambassador generally informed of our efforts. I asked the King what general strategy he had in mind especially with regard to the timing of his efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem.

2. Hussein proceeded to review the Fedayeen problem in general terms pointing to the differences between the present situation and the situation before the June war when he had been able generally to control Fedayeen activities in Jordan territory. In connection with more recent developments he went over the ground covered in NJA-7030,/3/ Amman 6371, 6368, 6426,/4/ and other recent Embassy reporting. He said he is now due to have another meeting with the Fedayeen groups. He is holding off on this meeting until he has assessed the results of FonMin Rifai's tactics in the Arab League Council meeting. (He mentioned parenthetically that the formation of the Eastern Arab Command, which has now been formalized, was from his standpoint important as a means of asserting a degree of control over Fedayeen activities in Syria and Iraq.) See NJA-7040./5/

/3/Not found.

/4/Symmes reported in telegram 6371, August 28, that Foreign Minister Rifai had been instructed by King Hussein to seek the approval of the Arab League Council for Jordanian efforts to control the Fedayeen. In telegram 6368, August 28, Symmes reported that Prince Mohammad, acting as Viceroy in his father's absence from the country, had told him that Jordan planned to seek the support of other Arab countries in its efforts to control the Fedayeen. Telegram 6426, August 31, reported on Symmes' meeting with Foreign Minister Rifai prior to Rifai's departure for the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo. Symmes, encouraged Rifai to pursue his stated intent to seek the Council's support for Jordanian efforts to deal with the Fedayeen problem. (All in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

/5/Not found.

3. The King said he is confident that the army is loyal to him and, if required, would be able to deal with the Fedayeen. He has issued new orders to insure that army units take even stricter measures to control Fedayeen irregular activities in the Beisan area. In his view the Israelis could not expect perfection from him and his forces any more than they were able to get it from their own in suppressing Fedayeen activities. (I stressed to him during this part of our conversation that we see Fedayeen activity against civilian settlements in the Beisan area as the chief irritant to the Israelis and that I could not emphasize too much our hope that the Jordan army would exert greater control over the Fedayeen in this region. I commented that the Israelis seemed able pretty well to defend themselves in other parts of the ceasefire line. The vicious circle could be broken if some means could be found to prevent or significantly to diminish the Fedayeen attacks on Israeli civilians across the old ADL. We do not question the need to improve public security capability for coping with the Fedayeen, but on the old ADL front the problem seemed to be the army's responsibility. The King acknowledged this point and said he had issued new orders to the JAA in this area.)

4. The King said he wanted to make it clear that his plans for improving the capability of dealing with the Fedayeen and internal disorder generally were based on public security forces rather than the army for specific reasons that he proceeded to explain. Psychologically speaking, it was impossible for him to give the army an internal security mission when troubles were taking place along the frontier, the Israelis remained in occupation of the West Bank, and generally hostile Israel-Arab confrontation existed. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan and the situation in Syria also made it important for him not to divert the army from its primary mission of defense from outside aggression. While he recognized that if Fedayeen incidents diminished there would be less threat from Israel, the psychological difficulties he had described would remain for some time to come. Therefore, he must rely on public security forces as distinguished from military forces in order to deal with the Fedayeen and other internal security problems. In the event of GOJ's moving toward a peaceful settlement with Israel, the Fedayeen would probably seek to promote internal disturbances in protest. Mobile Bedouin police forces had proved themselves over the years the best means of dealing with this kind of security problem. He said he would like for Embassy officials to discuss the requirements with General Ma'an Abu Nuwar and other officials under Abu Nuwar. He stressed, however, that the mobile Bedouin forces would be separate from the police although under Abu Nuwar's over-all control.

5. The King said he thought it would be important for me to stay in touch with the British Embassy on this matter and he thought coordination between the two Embassies would be helpful.

6. With regard to timing, the King says he does not anticipate an immediate confrontation with the Fedayeen. On the other hand, he must be prepared to move if his tactics at any moment should provoke outright confrontation. The optimum solution, in his eyes, would be agreement from the other Arabs to order all Fedayeen forces supported from the outside to place themselves under his control. This would enable him to clamp down on Fedayeen activities, assuming that there could be some progress toward a peaceful settlement. In the latter circumstance, he would be able to deal effectively with any Fedayeen confrontation with his control measures and would have the blessing of the other Arab countries. He regards it as unlikely, however, that the other Arabs will agree at this stage to this kind of control. Depending on how FonMin Rifai's tactics come out in the Arab League Council meeting, he intends to visit Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAR to persuade them to agree to his asserting control over the Fedayeen in Jordan. He anticipates a real problem with Saudi Arabia. He observed that the Saudis at present are subsidizing Fatah on condition they not coordinate with any Arab govt, including Jordan.

7. Comment: I did not take issue with the King on the somewhat contradictory elements in his thinking, primarily because I was encouraged by these further signs that he has been trying to get a grip on the Fedayeen situation. A good deal of what he said was, as will be obvious to the Department, in the thinking aloud category. I will of course keep in touch with his thinking as it crystallizes further, and adopt my tactics with him accordingly. Meanwhile, we will explore Jordanian requirements at the working level.