| Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967-1968 -Return to This Volume Home Page Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 303 through 326 303. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, November 4, 1968, 1902Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68. Secret. CAP 82679. Herewith Eban's meeting yesterday with Secretary Rusk. 1. In mtg with Secretary Nov 3, Eban said Government of Israel defining its position on territorial question vis-a-vis UAR in "functional" rather than geographical terms. GOI position would be governed by security including shipping through Straits of Tiran. While dealing through Jarring with UAR in tactical phase, Israel would make clear expansion not its purpose and that troops would be disposed according to secure and recognized boundaries and security arrangements. 2. Eban said substantive position Israel would take if UAR willing to talk peace. He wanted US and US alone to know re Sinai, it all comes back strongly and sharply to Sharm el-Sheikh, the focal point of two wars. Israel could not accept something which might mean Israel would once again have to send men out to open Straits. Israel would want arrangement enabling Israel to be in Sharm el-Sheikh in order to protect Israeli shipping, with direct communication between Eilat and Sharm el-Sheikh. Rabin added: "Direct land communication." Eban said he had not discussed this in juridical terms; control of territory without sovereignty had been factor in Japan-USSR and Japan-US agreements and in Cyprus settlement. Eban said especially if UAR asked for enclave positions for one reason for another, Israel would want to be there and in direct land communication with Eilat. 3. Eban said what UAR might propose would be another matter, but Israel would not want to prejudice matters before negotiations begin. Therefore, Israel will give functional not territorial definition. Israel does not think UAR has right to stop Israel from asking for this; they can say no and then talk. This all Eban could say on Sinai. It was functional statement relating to security and navigation (in Tiran), but functional requirements could have territorial implications. Eban said UAR doesn't raise question of Gaza, but he thinks they understand they not coming back to Gaza. 4. Secretary said he thought what Eban outlined on Sinai non-starter. Alternative was in direction of improved international arrangements which were workable. Eban said UAR hadn't suggested that or anything else. Israel's experience with UN and any arrangement with veto unsatisfactory. Secretary said it important that there not be veto. He could understand Israeli dissatisfaction with arrangements to date, but Israeli presence would be point of infection such that there would be tension thereafter and hard to see how there could be peace. Wiggins said international presence would have to be such as to be terminated only by action of Security Council. Eban said he didn't see if local sovereignty said international presence should terminate what country, including US, would stand against it. Secy referred to arrangements in Panama Canal and Okinawa where local sovereignty modified. Eban and Rabin said Israel ready to have such treaties. 5. Eban said no point in going into this in detail now since not in negotiating situation. It necessary to hear what UAR would propose. Secy reiterated that as far as US attitude concerned, he had to put in reservation about Sharm el-Sheikh idea: US does not feel it could support that under present circumstances. 6. Israelis asked that foregoing be very tightly held. 304. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, November 4, 1968, 0720Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Beirut, London, Cairo, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 7323. Subject: King's request. Sitrep No. 5. 1. King Hussein telephoned Emb officer who at home owing curfew to state following: (a) he is trying hard to "clean up the mess";/2/ (b) requested that US promptly inform Israelis that Fedayeen organizations may try diversionary moves by causing incidents on ceasefire line; advise Israelis be patient because he, Hussein, cannot have too many things on his plate at this critical time. (c) King also urged that all parties move forward as promptly as possible today in New York to secure Israeli acceptance of Nov resolution. /2/The domestic crisis began on November 2 when a crowd of demonstrators attacked the U.S. Embassy in Amman on the anniversary of the signing of the Balfour Declaration. A number of windows in the Embassy were broken, one vehicle was damaged, and the U.S. flag was torn down. Police and security units dispersed the crowd. (Telegram 7315 from Amman, November 2; ibid.) On November 3 the Jordanian Army arrested 70 members of the Tahir Dadlan Fedayeen group and held them responsible for instigating the attack on the Embassy. (Telegram 7321 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) Heavy fighting between Fedayeen units and the Jordanian Army broke out following the arrests. (Telegram 7322 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) The Embassy reported that, in addition to the arrests, the government informed al-Fatah leaders that no uniformed Fedayeen would be permitted in Jordanian towns, that all Fedayeen organizations would be interdicted from firing across cease-fire lines, and that any infiltration operations into Israel or occupied territory would have to be coordinated with the Jordanian Army. (Telegram 7328 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) On the afternoon of November 4 the Embassy reported that most Fatah leaders and PLO leader Yasir Arafat were cooperating with the army in an attempt to defuse the situation. (Telegram 7333 from Amman, November 4; ibid.) 2. Fact that King personally made these requests can of course be cited. Symmes 305. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 4, 1968, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Literally Eyes Only. Mr. President: Herewith an account of latest secret Israeli-Jordan exchange:/2/ /2/[text not declassified] (Ibid.) --top level meeting postponed until Nov. 19; --strong Jordanian arguments for simple Israeli acceptance of November Resolution/3/--which they should do. /3/King Hussein asked that President Johnson be informed that he was doing everything he could to bring about peace. He felt that Israel's public acceptance of Resolution 242 was critical to the peace process, and he asked that President Johnson use whatever influence he had to get Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to convey Israel's acceptance of the resolution to Jarring during the current discussions at the United Nations. (Ibid.) I do believe it is not impossible we can move the Middle East around the corner in the weeks ahead--if we try very hard. Walt 306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 4, 1968, 2-2:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office at the Pentagon. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side United States Side Ambassador Rabin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Hart, in which Hart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart./2/ "We put in it what we thought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft)." Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that "in principle, the answer is yes" with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to get agreement on how we proceed but not go into details. /2/See footnote 2, Document 298. Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United States' position. The President agrees in principle to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security, but precisely because we are interested. Heretofore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased. Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-4 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States. Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation "under unusual and compelling circumstances"; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances: (1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles, (2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons, (3) that Israel will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement at Dimona as a precedent that might be required here. Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that Israel is on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability. This development would seriously and adversely affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area. (Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not seem particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli nuclear and missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.) Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles and nuclear weapons) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. "I don't have anything to add to my Government's position." Rabin said he was asked to draft a Memorandum of Understanding which he had done and which we have. Rabin said that "if you wish to suggest changes or additions to that memorandum you of course may do so." Rabin remarked that, when he saw Secretary Rusk on Sunday, the Secretary said that the American acceptance in principle "did not mean that we accept your draft Memorandum of Understanding." Commenting more generally, Ambassador Rabin said that Israel did not come to the United States for military equipment when it could go elsewhere; with other governments Israel did not have the problem of "conditions" that it has with the United States. In any case, we do not see, said Rabin, that your selling us 50 Phantoms changes things appreciably. Mr. Warnke said that it is not just 50 Phantoms, but 50 Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks plus the great variety of other equipment that Israel is requesting that makes the policy we are entering upon a distinct change from our prior policy. Nevertheless, the United States is interested in doing what is necessary to assist Israel. Opinions vary on how best to do this but our goal is the same. It is for this reason that we are so concerned with Israel's missile and nuclear plans and intentions and this is why we need to "up-date" your assurances to us on these matters. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that we would prepare by tomorrow for his review a revised Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the kinds of assurances we require. Mr. Warnke asked if there were other questions that Ambassador Rabin would like to speak about today. Ambassador Rabin said that he would like to call to our attention the current Israeli intelligence appreciation of the build-up of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria. He said that the figures General Weizman had presented us in September 1967 had proven to be entirely too low. The inventories that Weizman had projected for those two countries by 1970 had in fact already been exceeded on 1 November 1968. The Ambassador undertook to provide details separately./3/ Rabin went on to say that a number of technical terms needed going into, for example, Israel would like a certain number--the more the better--of F-4s delivered in the first half of 1969 (he later put the number at 25 aircraft). He attributed the urgency to "what was happening on the other side." Rabin said that they would like credit arrangements if possible, preferably on the same terms as the first Skyhawk sale (10 per cent down, 3-1/2 per cent interest, 10 years repayment). Rabin said they would like the F-4E configuration generally, but wish to include in the 50 aircraft 6 RF-4Es. Ambassador Rabin and General Hod asked if they could begin discussions on the F-4E with the Air Force. Mr. Warnke said he would inform them when this was possible. /3/Rabin subsequently provided a comparative chart of Arab air forces, under cover of a November 4 letter to Warnke. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Arms, 10/1/68-1/20/69) 307. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, November 5, 1968, 1650Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Amman. 7571. Jarring Mission. Summary: In meeting with Wiggins last night Jarring said he expects written Israeli reply today and in addition piece of paper for Jordan. Thought Israeli reply would not go far enough, said Arabs would continue to insist on Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw from "all" Arab territories; said Riad intended to reply very promptly; thought Riad and Rifai both then likely to return home for consultations, would not break talks off but was doubtful if they would come back; feared protracted period of diplomatic stalemate (several months) would result during which military engagements likely to increase in area; said new factor of Syrian participation in settlement had been introduced (presumably by UAR); and expressed concern at greater rigidities in situation he had experienced with all parties yesterday. While expressing above views he also indicated he did not believe situation had come to an end, and gave no indication he intended to throw in towel himself. Jarring listened carefully but made no commitments to our suggestions (a) that key effort now was to assure UAR reply contained some substantive comments on UAR position, and (b) that he might consider putting forward questions to parties himself, possibly with suggested answers, as next round of negotiating process if this one comes to an end. Did say he would speak to Sovs again today (with view to their help in keeping Fon Mins here if possible and in encouraging constructive UAR response). 1. Jarring asked to see Wiggins yesterday afternoon after talking to Eban, Riad and Rifai because things were "not very good." Arrangements made to meet late last night after respective dinners. Sisco and Pedersen accompanied Wiggins. 2. Jarring had talked to all three Fon Mins yesterday and was concerned with rigidities he had detected and probability early departure Arab Fon Mins accompanied by extended diplomatic stalemate and danger increasing military incidents in area. 3. He said his conversation with Eban had been cordial, and he believed Eban was doing his best. Eban had promised written reply today/2/ and also to deliver paper for Jordan as well. Nevertheless, Jarring knew Israeli reply would not be satisfactory to Arabs. Eban had not talked of "functional" approach to Jarring but had said Israel would express its interests in Sinai as being security and "guarantees" of freedom of navigation in Straits. He had left it to Jarring to "guess" what guarantee they might require, which he did not intend to do. From conversation with Riad he was clear UAR would oppose any "guarantees," while saying UAR would be willing to commit itself to freedom of navigation. Eban had also spoken of connection between withdrawal and secure and recognized boundaries. When queried whether Eban had used word "withdrawal" Jarring said yes, but when he had told Tekoah at elevators they must use it in written reply, Tekoah said they would have to speak of "disposition of forces." At our urging Jarring said he would make another effort on this directly with Eban. Jarring said Arabs had clearly shifted emphasis from implementation to withdrawal, and from "all" Arab territories. He felt though that they might accept Israeli statement of willingness to withdraw "in principle." /2/The text of the Israeli paper handed to Jarring on November 5 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7582 from USUN, November 5. The Israeli position outlined in the paper was in essence as presented by Eban to Rusk on November 3; see Document 302. 4. Jarring said Rifai was particularly discouraged and in a difficult situation. He did not want to return to Amman to have to make a public report of no progress. On other hand he had been sitting here with little to do. If Riad returned Rifai would be in even more difficult situation. Jarring thought he could then stay here only if King told him to do so. 5. Jarring said he had urged Riad to hold any reply to Israeli note until after his consultations in Cairo (in context Riad insistence on returning) with hope this would produce more considered reply. Riad made clear he would reply to Israeli note promptly and before he returned./3/ /3/On November 6 Wiggins, Sisco, Buffum, and Pedersen met with Foreign Minister Riad to urge that the UAR view the Israeli paper in the most positive light and respond accordingly. They pointed to the specific Israeli reference to withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries and also noted the Israeli emphasis upon security as the governing principle relating to the question of withdrawal. Riad was inclined to dismiss the Israeli paper as another "Israeli maneuver," but agreed to consider returning a substantive reply. Riad indicated that he was planning to return to Cairo on November 7, but that did not mean that the UAR was breaking off the talks in New York. He said that the UAR wanted the Jarring Mission to continue and would cooperate with Jarring to that end. (Telegram 7604 from USUN, November 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) A UAR paper, addressed to Jarring and handed to him on November 7, indicated that the UAR found nothing in the Israeli paper to move the search for a peace settlement forward. The UAR took the position that Israel still refused to implement Resolution 242 and was actively attempting to integrate captured Arab territory into Israel. Until Israel was prepared to withdraw from all captured Arab territory, the UAR did not see that peace was possible. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7628 from USUN, November 7. (Ibid.) 6. Jarring also said it was clear in last few days that Syria again being brought into picture by Arabs as part of settlement. He did not speculate why but obviously regarded this as complicating factor. 7. Again expressed view Israeli Govt would not give him any details on their boundary ideas, though as victors it should be their obligation to make first move on this, because of Cabinet divisions and because any statement on UAR front would require shortly thereafter statement on Jordanian border. 8. Wiggins told Jarring we had been making major effort with Israelis. We did not know any more than he did about Israeli position at this point. We would have liked to see them more forthcoming on boundaries and on res. UAR military operation on Canal on 26th had been highly unfortunate complicating factor which had interfered with Cabinet discussions and Eban's effort to get more negotiating room. Sisco added that Arabs should of course understand that Israel would not put forward its final position at outset. Jarring replied that Arabs accepted that US was making serious effort with Israelis and felt this was change from earlier US attitude. Question was whether results would be enough. 9. Pedersen commented that we now seemed to be faced with situation where whatever influences could be used on Israeli reply had been expended. While Eban written document would not meet Arab views it was likely to go some distance beyond last document, and the two together would contain considerable amount of substantive statements of Israeli views. To keep issue moving it was now critical to influence UAR reply to include not just a new demand for Israeli views on withdrawal but as much substance as possible. Otherwise it would be most difficult to make any further progress in Israel. Suggested Rifai, who had been helpful to get final para in last UAR reply, might be helpful. Jarring indicated this was general intention behind his effort to get Riad not to reply right away. Said he expected Israeli reply to "accept" res along lines March 10 formula and to include something on implementation and agreement, with emphasis on latter. Still felt Arabs would insist on Israeli commitment to withdrawal. 10. Sisco raised question of next steps if current round of written exchanges came to end through deficiencies of Israeli reply and another unsatisfactory UAR reply like last one. For example, had Jarring thought about possibility posing questions himself to both UAR and Israel, possibly also with suggested answers. Key issue to Israel was nature of permanent peace; this might be put to UAR. Key issue to UAR was boundary and withdrawal; this might be put to Israel. Jarring said he had of course thought about this possibility a lot. In fact he had put number of questions in past but not formally. Indicated he would think about matter, though did not commit himself. 11. Wiggins asked whether Jarring had seen Sovs recently, indicating they might be helpful in encouraging Riad to remain in New York and/or responding constructively to Israeli paper. Jarring said he had not talked to them in last few days but agreed they might be helpful at this point and indicated he would ask to see Semenov. 12. At conclusion of meeting Wiggins expressed continued concern about critical nature of present situation and about Jarring's assessment of current state of mind on both sides. Jarring then assured Wiggins he had asked for early meeting in order to share his concern. Stressed he did not believe Riad would "break off" talks with him, but repeated his concern rather was that situation could go into protracted diplomatic stalemate for several months, which would be hard to break, and that consequences in area would be increased violence and military clashes. He felt, for instance, that UAR reaction to Israeli success in recent retaliation more likely to be to hit back itself than to make more determined effort for settlement. He did not refer at all to possibility he might himself throw sponge in. Wiggins 308. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 5, 1968, 2:10-2:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Second Session." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side United States Side Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that what he had done was to set out in a Memorandum of Agreement the points discussed yesterday./2/ Mr. Warnke then passed the memorandum to Ambassador Rabin to read. /2/A copy of this undated draft is ibid. Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading the memorandum said: "As I understand it you put three basic conditions to the sale of F-4s." Mr. Warnke said that the word "understandings" would perhaps be more appropriate. Ambassador Rabin said "I prefer to put it in my words: First, Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles; second, we will not acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons; and third we would sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. You also ask to make inspections, making a fourth condition." Ambassador Rabin asked: "Is this the official United States position, that without these conditions we do not get Phantoms?" Mr. Warnke: "That would be my recommendation." Ambassador Rabin said he was not in a position to give his Government's answer. Mr. Warnke said we understood that. He would like to say that the words of the memorandum were his. It is the assurances we seek, not the form. Ambassador Rabin restated that he could not give his Government's position, but that his reaction was: "I don't believe Israel is going to accept conditions within a Memorandum of Understanding about selling the Phantoms. We were told more than once that there would be no conditions--at least not these kinds of conditions." The Ambassador then added, haltingly: "It would be a pity--all these conditions on paper--just for 50 Phantoms." Mr. Warnke said that he did not consider what was being discussed was "just 50 Phantom aircraft." He said that if we sold these 50 Phantom aircraft to Israel, our position would have changed markedly to one of the principal supplier of arms to Israel and he thought that the significance of this change is something that should be thought about very carefully by the Israeli Government as well as by our own. It is of great importance to Israel on the one hand and it is of significance to the United States on the other because it means that the security of the United States is more closely involved in the area. It is this larger matter which should be considered concurrently with the assurances for which we have asked. Ambassador Rabin said that it would be possible to have discussions on each of the items. But he again said, as his personal reaction, that "to have these conditions just for selling of 50 Phantoms, I don't think it is right." Mr. Warnke repeated that the Department of Defense would consider any other form which would give us similar assurances that Israel would care to propose. Ambassador Rabin asked for time to study the memorandum more carefully. He asked also whether, in the meantime, it would be possible for Major General Hod to talk with the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Warnke said that he had spoken with Mr. Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, who agreed to arrange for a F-4E briefing for General Hod and would expect a call from Hod tomorrow. Mr. Warnke said that we had drafted the Memorandum of Agreement so that Israel could see clearly the things that trouble us. Whether the assurances we receive are contained in separate documents or whether we come to separate understandings is, to our way of thinking, irrelevant. We feel we must know what missile and nuclear developments are going on in the Middle East. These vitally affect the national security interests of the United States. There has been a long and strong relationship between our two countries. We must have mutual trust and confidence. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Nitze or Mr. Schwartz./3/ /3/Warnke sent a memorandum following this meeting to Secretary Clifford in which he described Rabin's reaction to their conversation as "disturbed." Warnke recommended that Clifford inform President Johnson and Secretary Rusk about the nature of his two exchanges with Rabin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1) 309. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 8, 1968, 6:10-6:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Third Session." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side United States Side Ambassador Rabin began the conversation by asking whether Mr. Warnke had changed his mind with respect to the assurances we had requested of the Israeli Government. Mr. Warnke replied in the negative. Ambassador Rabin, saying his words might not be diplomatic, read from a prepared talking paper/2/ as follows: /2/Rabin left a copy of his talking paper with Warnke. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1) "I wish to address myself first to Article 3 of your proposed Memorandum of Agreement. I am now in a position to confirm that my original personal reaction upon first reading this paragraph--namely, that it is completely unacceptable to us--is indeed my Government's official position. We have come here for the purpose of purchasing 50 Phantoms. We have not come here in order to mortgage the sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms. Furthermore, I wish to state that we consider Article 3 to be in the nature of a very major condition precedent to the sale of aircraft and it is therefore not acceptable to us also as a matter of principle. My Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extraneous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sale of 50 F-4 aircraft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Most recently, 28 October 1968, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to Israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now. "Accordingly, I should like to propose that Israel's assurances in connection with the theoretical question of the use of the planes for the delivery of nuclear weapons remains as submitted to you in our original proposal, namely, that the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircrafts supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier. I am also authorized to reaffirm, in this connection, that it is Israel's long-standing policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Assurances to that effect can be incorporated into the agreement. "May I also comment on the Preamble to Article 3 and state that the Government of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an opinion on what constitutes an endangerment of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive prerogative of the Government of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to subsection 2 of Article 2, the Government of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on what is or is not a major tenet of U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Government. "This is my Government's position and the only basis on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment--in this case, 50 Phantoms." Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Memorandum of Agreement is an exact wording of the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding,/3/ and therefore adds nothing new. He reiterated that Israel did not believe that they were qualified to comment or to make judgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassador Rabin also thought that Article 5 on secrecy was not even as favorable as the paragraph on secrecy in the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was "more mutual." Rabin said, however, that this was not a major point. /3/For text of this memorandum of understanding, dated March 11, 1965, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185. (At this point, Ambassador Rabin passed to Mr. Warnke a copy of the Government of Israel's statement which had been given to Ambassador Barbour on 28 October 1968./4/ Mr. Warnke glanced at it, confirmed that we already had a copy, and returned it to Ambassador Rabin.) /4/See footnote 2, Document 292. Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said that, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Mr. Hoopes. Mr. Schwartz explained that Mr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israeli requests to Mr. Warnke, but, because Mr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Mr. Hoopes' memorandum./5/ /5/Not found. Ambassador Rabin said: "So there we are." Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference." Mr. Warnke said he would like to take issue with two points raised by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What Israel does with strategic missiles and nuclear weapons affects the national security of the United States. "It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them." Second, the assurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, an invasion of sovereignty. All international agreements impinge on absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements. Mr. Warnke said that however these negotiations come out he has felt that this dialogue has been useful. "I have felt it was important to get across to you how we feel about Israel's acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits cancellation of the contract by the United States for 'unusual and compelling circumstances.' To me, if Israel goes ahead with its missile and nuclear programs this would involve that paragraph; and while I can not speak for the next administration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance remains the same." Ambassador Rabin said: "I can understand you would like to have assurances about the way your hardware is going to be used--not as a nuclear weapons carrier." But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to inspect in our country. We were very careful not to use the word "inspect" with respect to Dimona. We see in the two words quite a difference. The word "visit" means you are a guest in our country--not an inspector. Mr. Warnke said: "I would be prepared to accept an amendment to our memorandum substituting 'visit' for inspection." Ambassador Rabin said: "We have an agreement today." Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, but that applies only to Dimona, not to the sites where missiles are being produced" (nervous laughter from Israelis). Ambassador Rabin asked: "What do you call strategic missiles in the Arab-Israeli context?" Mr. Warnke replied: "Those capable of reaching the Arab capitals." Rabin agreed, saying: "At least we have the same definition." He also commented that the missiles "would not reach all the Arab capitals." Mr. Warnke observed that the F-4 aircraft would be part of Israel's total defense environment; that they would be used, as the General well knew, to protect strategic missile sites as well as other possible targets. It is the totality of Israel's defense that we are involved in; it is not just a question of aircraft. Ambassador Rabin said: "You are only selling arms. How do you feel you have the right to ask all these things?" Mr. Warnke said: "I think I do. Otherwise I wouldn't bring it up." Ambassador Rabin said: "We have promised not to carry nuclear weapons and that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." Mr. Warnke replied: "We will think about what you have said and talk with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze. I will talk with you again tomorrow." 310. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 8, 1968, 11:10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 104, 11/5-8/68. Secret. Mr. President: You will be interested in this Soviet approach in the wake of Eban's memorandum./2/ /2/A note on the memorandum indicates that telegram 7630 from USUN, November 8, was attached. Telegram 7630 reported on a November 7 conversation between Ambassador Buffum of USUN and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov. In his analysis of the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East, Semenov put a positive reading on the latest Israeli position (see Document 302). Semenov agreed with Buffum that the next step was to persuade all parties to the conflict to give Jarring more to work with while seeking to maintain an atmosphere in the Middle East that was conducive to negotiations. Semenov also suggested that in approaching the next phase of the Jarring Mission, the United States and the Soviet Union should begin a systematic exchange of views on the key problems involved in a settlement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR) A more extensive record of this meeting was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-2600 from USUN, November 8. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Under Secretary Rostow took up Semenov's suggestion in a luncheon meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on November 8 when they discussed prospects for the Jarring Mission at length. (Telegram 269827 to Tel Aviv, November 9; ibid.) Despite contrary noises in the press, I do believe that, if we put our shoulder to the wheel, we have a chance of turning the corner in the Middle East in the next several months. Quiet collaboration with the Soviet Union in getting behind the next phase of the Jarring mission could be important and useful. Interestingly enough, our people have been discussing in the last few days how to weave U.S.-Soviet consultation into the next stage of the Middle East peace effort. W. W. Rostow/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 311. Draft Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 9, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Harry Schwartz. SUBJECT Ambassador Rabin came to see Mr. Warnke last night and flatly and rather brutally rejected our request for assurances with respect to strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. He read from a talking paper,/2/ a copy of which he left with us. This is attached. The Memorandum of Conversation is attached./3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 309. /3/Document 309. The background for the Israeli performance, as I understand it, is as follows: On November 7, Secretary Clifford and Secretary Rusk met with the President on this subject./4/ As recounted by Mr. Clifford to Mr. Warnke, both Secretaries argued with the President in favor of insisting on additional assurances from the Israelis on the grounds [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] that nuclear weapons in the Middle East were extremely dangerous for the national security of the United States. The President apparently said that he had promised the F-4s without any conditions, and that was his position. He did not even wish to accept Mr. Rusk's position that we had at least to obtain the same assurances that we had previously received from the Israelis in connection with the A-4 negotiations. /4/According to the President's Daily Diary, this was a luncheon meeting with the President which also included Generals Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library) Mr. Warnke was in Germany at this time, returned to the Pentagon at 5:00 p.m. on November 8, and was told of the President's position by Mr. Clifford just before the Israelis arrived. When Ambassador Rabin and his colleagues walked into Mr. Warnke's office just after 6:00 p.m., it was abundantly clear that they had been told of the President's position and of his instructions to the Secretaries of Defense and State. 312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, November 9, 1968, 0111Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye, Paganelli, and Jones; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Davies, and Harold Saunders; and approved by Katzenbach. 269779. Subject: Your Audience With King Hussein. Ref: Amman 7393./2/ /2/In telegram 7393 from Amman, November 8, Symmes cabled that he intended to seek an audience with King Hussein at the earliest opportunity. He asked whether the Department had any guidance for him with regard to the following issues: "1. Next steps for the Jarring mission? 2. Internal defense. 3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. 4. Possible Arab summit conference in November." (Ibid.) Following may be used by Ambassador in audience with King Hussein: 1. Next steps in Jarring Mission. Re Jarring Mission, you may draw as appropriate on telegrams reporting developments in New York. Suggest you state that, while there has not been as much progress as we had hoped for, we think indirect exchanges between parties and various bilateral conversations have been very useful. Most important thing at this stage is to maintain and accelerate what momentum has developed and keep Jarring exercise going. In this connection we pleased that, although Rifai and Riad leaving New York both have indicated they and govts intend continue cooperate with Jarring. Jarring seems determined make no move that would jeopardize continuation his mission. We plan continue maintain closest contact with Jarring and parties. You may also repeat assurances given King in New York Nov. 1967 concerning territorial aspects of settlement, including point that U.S. prepared support return of West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. In discussing foregoing, you requested ascertain from King his views re ways in which Jordan might justify Israel's security requirements on West Bank. What formula would GOJ be prepared to accept? For example, would GOJ accept proposition of joint GOJ-GOI patrols perhaps made up of security police rather than military? Assure King that you are only making informal probes on this subject and that you are only seeking his preliminary views./3/ /3/Ambassador Symmes met with King Hussein on November 9 and made the points and offered the assurances authorized in paragraph 1 of this telegram. Hussein expressed gratitude for the reassurances, and said that with respect to exchanges with Israel, there was not much that Jordan could do unless Israel came forward with enough substance to justify proceeding to the next steps. (Telegram 7409 from Amman, November 11; ibid.) 2. Internal Defense. You may reassure King of our desire be as helpful as possible re strengthening GOJ's internal defense capability. In this connection you may wish mention inter alia our intention dispatch on TDY specialist in riot control, our continued willingness assist in training, and our readiness sell and expedite shipment of equipment which GOJ may wish purchase from U.S. King might be advised to order needed equipment promptly view lapse of shipping time. FYI. Appears to us that the ball is now in GOJ's court. AMC's message No. 38135 and DA message No. 884553/4/ gave Embassy information on price and availability of various items of equipment for use by security forces. We await GOJ response in wake your further consultations. We note parenthetically that the GOJ has not yet responded to price and availability quotations which UK provided expeditiously in August (London 13887)./5/ End FYI. /4/Neither found. /5/In telegram 13887 from London, October 29, the Embassy reported that it had received from the Foreign Office a list of the items that made up the final element of the arms procurement package that Saudi Arabia was prepared to finance for Jordan. The arms were to be purchased from British sources. Major items included 100 Centurion tanks and 100 105-mm "up-gunning" kits. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 3. Possible interest of Hussein in visiting U.S. for talks with President-elect. You should not raise subject but if Hussein expresses interest in visiting U.S., you should indicate that you will seek advice from Department on question of visits to President and President-elect in period prior to inauguration. FYI. Mr. Nixon's wishes on receiving foreign dignitaries prior to inauguration not yet known. End FYI. 4. Possible Arab Summit Conference in November. If King seeks your advice re convening of Arab Summit, suggest you seek discourage such a move at this time. You might note tendency of most past Arab summits to adopt extreme Arab positions and point to risk that Summit decision in context Arab-Israeli problem likely reduce Arab negotiating flexibility in connection Jarring effort. FYI. We propose you not make too strong a case against convening Arab Summit since this, after all, is King's business, not ours. He may have his own strong views and, if so, we would not wish make an issue out of this. We recall Hussein's desire over past several months to convene another Arab Summit conference for purpose of renewing mandate for Arabs to seek political solution to Middle East crisis. We also recollect that Hussein hoped to use such a conference to achieve Arab intergovernmental coordination on bringing fedayeen under control. We seriously doubt that an Arab Summit would achieve these laudable goals. We fear that another summit at this time is more likely to harden Arab public positions on an approach to a settlement with Israel, thereby further reducing Hussein's and perhaps Nasser's negotiating flexibility at this particularly critical juncture in Jarring mission. Hussein, of course, must make his own decision on pros and cons of calling for the convening another Arab Summit. We note that other Arab leaders, particularly King Faysal, have consistently opposed convening of another Arab Summit. End FYI. Rusk 313. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 9, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. At about noon Walt Rostow told me that Abe Feinberg had told him that the morning meeting with Paul Warnke on F-4s had gone well./2/ He believed the discussions would be concluded on or by next Tuesday. Although there are now no preconditions to the sale, the Israelis are prepared to reaffirm their pledge not to be the first in introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East and to pledge not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons. /2/No other record of this meeting between Warnke and Rabin has been found. Rostow told Feinberg that the Israelis should realize that Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and he have a deep sense of foreboding that Israeli policies could lead to a nuclear tragedy. Feinberg, in response, said he agreed that Israel should not go further down the nuclear road. He urged Walt to recommend to the President that he heavily emphasize the gravity of this issue when Prime Minister Eshkol visits Washington. John P. Walsh/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 314. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 10, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Parker. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Parker asked if he could interpret President Nasser's congratulatory message to President-elect Nixon/2/ as a sign the UAR wanted to resume relations. Muhammad smiled and said he did not know. Ashraf said the ball was now in our court. Muhammad said he hoped that if there was progress towards resumption it would not be derailed again. He then confided that the UAR had been moving towards resumption last February but had changed its mind because of remarks and actions of Ambassador Goldberg, who had given complete credence to the Israelis but had refused to believe anything the Egyptians said. He referred specifically to Ambassador Goldberg's acceptance of the Israeli contention that the Egyptians were insisting on withdrawal first in spite of Egyptian assurances to us to the contrary. /2/The text of the congratulatory message sent by Nasser to Nixon on November 7 is ibid., POL 15-1 US/NIXON. Mr. Parker said there had been a good deal of confusion as to the Egyptian position because of the elliptical statements issuing from the Egyptians themselves. He himself had gotten into trouble with the Egyptians for pointing out that Jarring apparently thought they were insisting on withdrawal first. He had only been trying to do a service by pointing out that there was a communications failure. All he had succeeded in doing was making people mad, but he had been vindicated when Jarring subsequently told Mahmoud Riad he understood the UAR was still insisting on withdrawal first. Ambassador Goldberg could certainly not be blamed if he reported what the Israelis told him. He also reported what the Egyptians and Jordanians told him. Phantoms Ashraf raised the Benjamin Welles story in the November 7 New York Times/3/ again and asked for a fuller explanation. Mr. Parker said the Welles story was not accurate. The Department's spokesman on November 7 had said negotiations on the Phantoms were still continuing. This was correct. He would not try to mislead them; Israel would get the Phantoms sooner or later. But the terms of the deal were still under discussion and no agreement had been reached, nor had any decision been taken as alleged by Welles. Ashraf asked where Welles had gotten the story then. Mr. Parker said he believed it had come from someone in the aircraft industry. /3/Citing "responsible American sources," Welles reported on November 7 that the United States had agreed in principle to sell Israel 58 Phantom jet fighters. Ashraf asked whether the last sentence of the article, which referred to the possibility that delivery could be expedited if conditions in the area warranted, was not really the most important thought in it and the real reason for its appearance at that particular juncture. Mr. Parker explained that newspaper stories were usually written in discrete groups of paragraphs so that they could be cut down to fit available space without destroying the completeness of thought. The least important paragraphs were usually at the end of the story. Jarring Mission Muhammad said that he had told Mr. Sisco one should not exclude the possibility (laa yistaba'ad) that Foreign Minister Riad would reply to the seven points of the Secretary. Mr. Parker said he had understood that Muhammad had said categorically that the Foreign Minister would be replying. Muhammad said he hoped he would be, but could not be quite that categorical. 315. Editorial Note President Johnson met with President-elect Nixon at the White House on November 11, 1968, to provide him with a briefing on foreign policy issues. Included in the meeting were Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, General Wheeler, CIA Director Helms, and Walt Rostow. Rostow described the situation in the Middle East as "very delicate," and Rusk noted that Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol was "fighting for his political life." Rusk added that the crux of the problem was that the Arab states thought that Israel was interested in territorial expansion and Israel thought that the Arabs were interested in exterminating Israel. Rusk also told Nixon that he would have to face the problem of how to keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East. If the Israelis developed nuclear weapons, Rusk felt the Soviet Union would respond by putting nuclear weapons into Egypt. President Johnson said that he had hoped to get the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel had not yet agreed to sign, approved before he authorized the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. (Meeting Notes, November 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Nixon and Transition) The issue of Israel's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty came up again in a November 24 telephone conversation between Walt Rostow and Robert D. Murphy, who was advising President-elect Nixon on foreign policy issues. Rostow told Murphy that he had a message for Nixon from President Johnson. The Johnson administration was negotiating the sale of the Phantom jets with Israel and was trying to factor into the sale as much "nuclear restraint" on Israel's part as Israel would agree to. The United States was pushing Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To that end, President Johnson was considering calling a special session of Congress at the beginning of December devoted to the issue of the treaty, which would have the effect of putting additional pressure on allies, such as Israel, which had not yet signed the treaty. Johnson felt that Nixon's endorsement of calling such a special session was important, and implied that he would only go forward with Nixon's endorsement. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 24; ibid., Murphy, Robert D) Murphy replied on Nixon's behalf in a telephone conversation with Rusk on November 29. Murphy said that Nixon felt that until he succeeded to the presidency the management of the effort to win approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was President Johnson's responsibility. Noting that Nixon had problems with members of his own party on the issue, Murphy said that Nixon would not take an active part in the debate over the treaty, nor would he express hope of ratification in a special session. (White House telegram CAP 82813 from Bromley Smith to President Johnson in Texas, November 29; ibid., Nixon and Transition) 316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, November 11, 1968, 1857Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Atherton, Davies, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Rostow also cleared the telegram with President Johnson. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, November 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting, 11/1/68-1/20/69) 269999. 1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol: 2. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month,/2/ and secondly, to raise with you again a subject that has become of increasing importance to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration. /2/On November 12 the Israeli Embassy informed the Department that Prime Minister Eshkol had been advised by his doctor to defer the U.S. trip scheduled for November 25. The Embassy indicated that Eshkol hoped to make a brief trip in December to meet with the President. (Telegram 271424 to Tel Aviv, November 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ISR-US) Walt Rostow sent a memorandum to President Johnson on November 13 informing him of Eshkol's change in plans and inquiring about a suitable date for an Eshkol visit in December. The President responded with a handwritten note on Rostow's memorandum that reads: "Let's Forget Visit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68) As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task. My deep concern on this subject was expressed to you personally as long ago as June 1964. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy--an irreversible tragedy--if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems. Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 28./3/ We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons. /3/See footnote 2, Document 292. I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters when we talk later this month. It will be good to see you here. You are welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk 317. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 12, 1968, 3:30-4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Fourth Session." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Israeli Side |
