Tehran, November 20, 1968, 1240Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 107, 11/19-22/68. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Walt Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on November 20 under cover of a memorandum in which he concluded that Nasser appeared to be under conflicting political pressures and unable to decide or to lead. But, Rostow noted, there were some factors that seemed to be operating in the direction of a settlement in the Middle East. (Ibid.)

7379. For the Secretary from Robert Anderson.

1. While I was in Cairo discussing with United Arab Airlines the acquisition of eight Boeing planes, President Nasser asked me to come to his house on Monday. We talked about three hours. Gist of what Nasser said was:

A. Nasser was more anxious than ever to have some kind of peace because he thinks that if war should come again there would be vast destruction on both sides. He said he would not be alone in the next round.

B. Nasser said he was not entirely free any longer to act as independently as before and as each day passed he probably would be less free. In order to emphasize his loss of freedom, he said, first, he had to listen to the Soviets and, second, if he was going to continue to get financial support from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya, he had been told that he had to abide by the Khartoum agreement which in effect said there would be no negotiation and no declaration of non-belligerency. (Donor countries would welcome pretext to discontinue their aid to UAR.)

C. Nasser thinks King of Jordan is in a much weaker position after his confrontation with Fedayeen and he believes that in showdown Iraqi troops in Jordan would oppose King and favor King's younger officers. If this took place there would probably be a collapse of King's government with both Iraqis and Syrians trying to participate in the remains.

D. Finally, Nasser said he now has "factions" in his country which make it more difficult to make independent decisions even inside his country. He stated that if for any reason he should be replaced in Cairo, any successor would be dictated to by the army and the army would be less inclined to any peaceful settlement than he is.

2. For foregoing reasons, Nasser feels that there is a sense of urgency about achieving peace. On other hand, he reiterated his old statements that under no circumstance can he have direct negotiation, either secretly or openly. He insists he has to have a timetable and some kind of a map that would show what boundary adjustments are being contemplated before he can "do a selling job" even to his own people. He believes that if any move of his is termed to be capitulation, he will lose support of the army and without the army he would lose his own control of the country.

3. I asked Nasser if he didn't think a major part of his trouble was a lack of communication both with Israelis and with countries like ours. He agreed but said he could not figure out a way to establish communication with Israelis, first, because he didn't trust them and, second, because if he made an agreement with some part of Israeli Government they would be undercut by other political segments in Israel who are competing in next spring election.

4. Nasser expressed great confidence in Jarring and stated he does not intend for Jarring Mission to end on his account. He feels, however, that something more is going to have to be done than Jarring's simply carrying messages between two parties. He did not make any specific suggestion as to how this could be done except to say that he needs more definition from Israelis so as not to agree in effect to a program of Israeli expansionism.

5. Nasser was obviously pleased to receive a reply from President-elect Nixon. He talked about possibility of this being some excuse to resume diplomatic relations with United States providing there was some statement from new administration which would offset statement during campaign of maintaining Israeli arms superiority. Nasser also has under consideration writing a letter expressing his views to President-elect Nixon.

6. I am going to be back in Cairo within next ten days in connection with financing of Boeing planes. Nasser stated he might ask me to bring a letter from him to President-elect Nixon.

7. There is considerable amount of details that took place in long discussion which I have not tried to incorporate here but which I will convey fully to appropriate people upon my return, which should be toward end of this month. In view of fact that I am going back to conduct discussions re airplane financing, if you have any suggestions I will be here in Tehran until late Saturday or Sunday and would be grateful to receive them.

8. One further thing of some significance. In a talk with Hasan Abbas Zaky he stated he wanted to tell me confidentially that Nasser was under pressure from two sides, one to secure immediate peace and other to continue arms development and training. He said that in view of Ali Sabri's heart attack and absence of some other people who are not so interested in peace, next two or three weeks are going to be crucial in decisions which Nasser makes. Abbas Zaky stated that he is among those who believe that peace is indispensable for Egypt and is urging President to go as far as he can to secure peace.

9. I was unable to see Don Bergus after receiving this information and have therefore not passed any of above on to him.

Meyer

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/

Amman, November 20, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis; Sandstorm. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:26 p.m.

7548. Ref Tel Aviv 6152,/2/ Amman 7409./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 326.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 312.

1. Since I had assumed our position on territorial assurance for Hussein was already well known to Israel (I understood we had immediately informed Israel what we told Hussein in November 1967) and particularly in view of State 270935/4/ and 272847,/5/ Eban's statements on "unpopulated areas" reported in Tel Aviv 6152 are somewhat disconcerting. When I saw King Hussein on November 9 (Amman 7409), I read to him the following sentences from the memorandum on the "U.S. position as presented to Hussein on November 6, 1967." "The United States, as a matter of policy, does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up. For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latroun salient, the USG will use its influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with Jordan's position on Jerusalem, nor do we agree with the Israeli position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel."

/4/Document 320.

/5/Telegram 272847 to Tel Aviv, November 16, informed the Embassy about a telephone conversation on November 15 between Sisco and Argov of the Israeli Embassy. Minister Argov called "to unravel mystery" of the seven-point program for a peace settlement he had heard Secretary Rusk had put forward. In the course of explaining that there was no separate U.S. peace program and that the points made by Rusk in his conversation with Riad were merely restatements of long-established U.S. positions, Sisco noted U.S. concerns that Israel was defining its security concerns with respect to Jordan not in terms of minor rectifications of the pre-war border, but in terms of a significant acquisition of Jordanian territory. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

2. The territorial assurances that we have given Hussein are manifestly inconsistent with any proposal that would place "certain unpopulated areas of West Bank" under Israeli sovereignty or jurisdiction. The relevance of "unpopulated areas" to "minor border rectifications" is, of course, another moot point. (Incidentally, the Jordan Govt's 1961 maps on the "distribution of population" and "population density" show very graphically that the only "unpopulated areas" on the West Bank lie along the present ceasefire line between Israel and Jordan. These maps are in vol. 4 of the GOJ Dept of Statistics "First Census of Population and Housing" published in April 1965. A similar graphic representation of the population complexion of the West Bank is shown on "The Population of the West Bank by Settlements, November 1967," published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 1967.) As I read para 1 of Tel Aviv 6152, Eban seems to be saying that Israel has suggested to Hussein some kind of variation of the Allon plan, which we have already indicated is unacceptable in principle both to US and to Jordan. What Eban appears to be asking of Jordan is certainly "significantly" different even if not "violently" different from the territorial assurances we have given Jordan.

3. I do not know what the Israelis may have proposed to Jordan beyond the generalities occasionally passed on to us by Eban and others, nor do we know Hussein's reaction to any specific territorial proposals Israel may have made. The King and senior GOJ officials continue to take the line with me that the Israelis have never been specific with them about territory and I, of course, have not probed them regarding this matter. Nevertheless, because of the territorial assurances we have recently reiterated to Hussein, I would strongly doubt that he would feel he should entertain seriously any Israeli proposal that either specifically or in principle provided "certain unpopulated areas of West Bank to remain as Israeli territory." I am convinced that anything like that is a non-starter with the King. Even if he accepted it, I do not believe he could bring along other Jordanians with him.

4. I am certain that the Dept is well aware of the foregoing. I review the matter primarily to underline my hope that we will be very firm in letting the Israelis know (1) we intend to stand by the territorial assurances we have given to Jordan and (2) our expectation that they will proceed as soon as possible to give the Jordanians acceptable territorial specifics as part of a peaceful settlement.

Symmes

329. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 22, 1968, 1:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. X, Memos, 6/68-11/68. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 2 p.m.

Mr. President:

If true, this report of Israeli position on Jordan and Allon plan is pretty grim news; and it is probably true.

The following cables report parliamentary debate-indicating Israeli politics getting rough./2/

/2/A list indicates that telegrams 6154, 6186, and 6191 from Tel Aviv were attached. Telegram 6154, November 19, described a debate in the Knesset on November 18 on a speech made by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan calling for the economic integration of the occupied territories into Israel. Telegram 6186, November 21, reported that Dayan and four other members of the Cabinet had taken the position that the Allon plan did not go far enough in incorporating the occupied territories and that its adoption by the Cabinet would lead to their resignations. Telegram 6191, November 21, reported on additional sentiment in the Cabinet in favor of economic integration of the occupied territories. Debate on the issue in the Knesset remained sharp. All of these telegrams are ibid. and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR.

Walt

330. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray and approved by Warnke. The meeting was held in Warnke's office. The memorandum is marked "Fifth Session."

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Israel--F-4 and Advanced Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

Israeli Side
Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government's reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Embassy on 19 November 1968)./2/ He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as "quite awkward." Rabin said that the awkwardness was "not because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded.

/2/A copy of this draft memorandum of understanding is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1351, Chronology of F-4s for Israel, 10 Oct 68-5 Sept 69, Folder 1. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Secretary McNamara cleared it with the President.

Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: "It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute 'unusual and compelling circumstances' and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement." Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. "There is no precedent. It creates something that I don't believe that exists anywhere." Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel, and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is.

Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. "I believe you and what you have said." It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 agreement now and later feel compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel were to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph.

Ambassador Rabin said he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. Mr. Warnke said: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?"

Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, represents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings--that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft. "Why do you want us to do this?"

Minister Argov said: "We feel we are on parole." The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph.

Mr. Warnke disagreed that there was a "presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Rabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. "There is no such thing as a standard contract." Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts.

Ambassador Rabin, somewhat apologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), "my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: "I send you a letter, you send me a letter."

Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassador Rabin said he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. Harriman and Mr. Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: "You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador." Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the Harriman Mission, which was a different matter.

Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there are different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached)./3/

/3/Not printed.

Mr. Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years.

General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassador Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1968 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major supplier; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under review in light of the situation in the area.

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply.

Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israel proposal with Mr. Clifford. Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rabin if he wished to sign the letter. Rabin did.

Ambassador Rabin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the "technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rabin said: "Everyone has his own superiors." Rabin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement.

Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 aircraft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a Letter of Offer. Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone.

331. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson

Washington, November 23, 1968, 3:35 p.m.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Arab-Israeli Private Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

332. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 26, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Israel, 452 (Sen). Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
F-4 Negotiations with the Government of Israel

On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter/2/ in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel./3/ Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power.

/2/Document 333.

/3/Rabin's November 22 letter to Warnke requested the sale of the aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts, and other related services. The letter reaffirmed Israeli commitment not to be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons, and agreed not to use any U.S.-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel)

Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of opinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Rabin had noted in our last conference on Friday, neither of us was responsible for the content of the other's letter.

I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which Israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of Israel from the restrictions of its announced policy.

Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Middle Eastern powers and asked again if I thought this paragraph should remain in the letter. I said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said "all right."

In response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate letter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with me at the end of the week with regard to the delivery schedule. I said that I would be free to see him on Friday.

Paul C. Warnke

333. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)/1/

Washington, November 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 452.1 Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Murray.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968,/2/ requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act/3/ and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952./4/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 332.

/3/Reference is to Part II, Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424)

/4/TIAS 2675; 3 UST 4985.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its longstanding policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965,/5/ that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier."

/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 185.

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968./6/ Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

/6/The fifth paragraph of Rabin's letter stated that Israel understood that the United States reserved the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services at any time prior to delivery.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction./7/

/7/As initially conveyed to Rabin, the last paragraph read: "It is understood that your letter of 22 November 1968 and this letter in reply together constitute an agreement between our two governments." Rabin objected in a telephone conversation with Warnke on November 27 that the proposed last paragraph of Warnke's letter implied that Israel agreed with the U.S. interpretation of the circumstances that would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons. Warnke agreed to substitute a "bland" concluding paragraph that did not carry such implications. (Memorandum of conversation, November 27; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, NESA Chron)

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

334. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, November 27, 1968.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 11, Folder 240, MFR. Secret. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on December 2.

SUBJECT
Near East South Asia IRG Meeting
Wednesday, 27 November 1968
Arab-Israel Action Paper

1. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia met 27 November 1968 to discuss a draft paper on the Arab-Israel problem designed to highlight action matters with which the new national administration may be faced during its first 90 days in office./2/

/2/Not found.

2. The circulated draft stated there was little prospect that in the near future much progress would be made toward an Arab-Israel settlement. This conclusion was not challenged by anyone at the IRG meeting.

3. The draft went on to outline three alternative policies which the United States Government might follow given the impasse. Very briefly these were: (a) put real pressure on Israel to negotiate an agreement consistent with the reasonable meaning of the words of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution; (b) publicly support such a settlement in order to improve our position with the Arabs, but do not bring pressure on Israel to go along, thus virtually ensuring that no progress would in fact be made; and (c) continue as at present to back the Israeli position while urging Israel to be more flexible in both procedure and substance.

4. Assistant Secretary Hart expressed the opinion, which was generally supported by the IRG members, that a better format than presenting "alternatives" would be to explain our present posture and then outline progressive "steps" which might be taken to increase the prospects for an Arab-Israel settlement. He felt our present policy included many points of difference with Israel which should be mentioned, while admitting that in spite of these differences we are putting no meaningful pressure on Israel to change its stand where we disagree with it. The "steps" open to us all lead in the direction of withdrawing the blank check which Israel now holds from us, in order to move Israel toward a reasonable implementation of the Security Council resolution. An early one would be to advise Israel privately that if no progress is made toward implementation we would support some form of mediation or arbitration. Making a public statement to this effect would be a further step. An ultimate drastic step would be our actual active participation in an international effort to interpret and compel compliance with the Security Council resolution.

5. Procedurally, it was left to Assistant Secretary Hart to re-work the circulated draft along the lines he favored. This will go to Under Secretary Katzenbach and possibly be on a future SIG agenda.

6. The White House representative on the IRG/NEA, influenced by recent policy decisions in regard to aid to Biafra, favored a recommendation that the Arab refugee problem be cut loose from the rest of the Arab-Israel confrontation, and that we try to make progress on this issue as a separate matter. The general consensus was that the humanitarian aspect of the Arab refugee problem was completely subordinate to international political considerations, and that this was not a practical proposal. I expect, however, that the paper which eventually goes to the Under Secretary may contain some reference to this proposal, perhaps presenting it as a step which we might consider taking.

David H. Blee/3/
Chief, Near East and South Asia Division

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Blee signed the original.

335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, November 30, 1968, 0127Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies and Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, and USUN.

280027. 1. Believe it would be desirable for you to have a chat with Eban prior to his December 2 meeting with Jarring, making clear you doing so on instructions. In view of the number and detailed discussions we have had with GOI in recent days, and fact that they are clear as to what our position is in relationship to Jarring Mission and our desire to make progress, we leave to your discretion how best to get across to the Israelis our continuing feeling that they should put forward positive posture in this next round. In the course of your conversation, you might make clear that for our part we have been pressing both USSR and UAR with a view to trying to get Nasser to be more explicit on concept of peace, which of course is of primary interest to GOI.

2. From Sisco's conversation with Tekoah in New York on Tuesday,/2/ we have the impression Israelis very relaxed-much more relaxed than we are-regarding Jarring's willingness to serve for an indefinite period. We are pleased that he is having another round in the area and apparently plans further discussions after Christmas vacation in Moscow. While Jarring is no longer talking about wanting to sign off in the next weeks, our distinct impression is that he will not stay on indefinitely in circumstances where prospects for progress are very bleak.

/2/November 26.

3. Anything you can get of a specific character regarding where matters stand on Jordanian side of settlement would also be helpful to the Department./3/

/3/Telegram 280086 to Tel Aviv, November 30, amplified Barbour's instructions. Barbour was instructed to stress to Eban that if the UAR did not soon make a positive response to Jarring, Jarring would be under strong pressure to take an initiative himself. In those circumstances, the United States viewed it as important for Israel to make suggestions to Jarring about the initiative he might exercise. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Rusk

336. Notes on Meeting/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 12:30-1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room, December 4, 1968, 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. No classification marking. Prepared from a tape recording by either President Johnson's secretarial staff or by his staff in Austin after the President had left office and begun research for his memoirs. The tape recording the notes are based on is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings. The notes have been corrected to accord with the tape recording. Secretary Rusk's comments were preceded by a discussion unrelated to the Middle East. The tape recording picks up Rusk's briefing at the point indicated.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ON MEETING IN THE
CABINET ROOM

FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT
Secy Rusk, Clifford, Smith, Fowler, Udall, Freeman, Cohen, Boyd, Atty Gen. Clark, Amb. Wiggins, The Vice President, PMG Watson, Under Secy Robert Wood sat in for Secy Weaver, Chairman Macy, Art Okun, Director Zwick, Bromley Smith, Charles Maguire, DeVier Pierson, George Reedy, Joe Califano, Harry McPherson, Ernie Goldstein, Harry Middleton, Bill Blackburn, George Christian, Tom Johnson, Jim Jones and Larry Temple, Charles Murphy and Amb. Averell Harriman

Secretary Dean Rusk said:

"It is an expression of an intention which is to a considerable extent understandable, and an attempt to emphasize to the Arabs that the continuation of these terrorist raids is not profitable and could lead to a buildup of hostilities. We will continue to do everything we can, and get others to bring their influence to bear to reduce these incidents, because it makes it more difficult to get an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement will follow.

"The possibilities of a peaceful settlement are being fully explored by Ambassador Jarring. I wish, Mr. President, I could report more progress on the part of his efforts. He is now in the Middle East talking currently with the Governments of the States directly concerned to see if he can get some sort of movement by both sides to move us closer to a peaceful settlement."

The Secretary added that for a long time there had been an obstacle on the procedural points. He said Israel has insisted upon talking directly with the Arab Governments in a direct negotiation face-to-face. He noted that the Arabs have indicated they would not do that and would only negotiate indirectly or discuss these matters indirectly in the Security Council or with Amb. Jarring.

Secretary Rusk said that in recent weeks Israel had taken two important steps. On the one side they have actually taken up with Amb. Jarring various points of substance having to do with a peaceful settlement, opening the way for indirect talks which the Arabs apparently have been saying they want to see.

Secretary Rusk continued:

"We are disappointed that the Arab side has not been more responsive to this change in attitude on the part of Israel. It has not been willing to talk seriously with Ambassador Jarring about the particular points of substance more than you have heard thus far.

"Secondly, Israel has now been talking about the need for a contractual settlement of the situation and has taken the emphasis off the term 'peace treaty.' This should open the way for a somewhat less formal arrangement, which would nevertheless bind all the parties but would be more congenial to Arab sensitivities. Again, that has not met very much response."

The Secretary said that along with this issue there was the deep feeling among many Arabs that Israel is bent upon territorial expansion and similarly a deep feeling on the part of the Israelis that the Arabs are bent upon the destruction of Israel. That deep emotional commitment on both sides obviously gets in the way of a peaceful settlement.

The Secretary said:

"I think it is fair to point out that there are internal political problems on both sides. Some of the Arab leaders may well feel that if they take a dramatic step toward peace, they will be subject to assassination, and it may well be true that they do face such a problem. And there are internal debates going on in Israel today which make the position of the Prime Minister very difficult if he should translate dramatic moves toward peace on his side. So we may have one of those situations where the parties feel internally too weak to be wise. Unless there's some unusual experience in diplomacy, that does complicate the situation."

Secretary Rusk commented that fortunately, Amb. Jarring was going to serve further and is going to continue his efforts but that we needed the help, however, of the other powers, including the help of the Soviet Union. He reported that just yesterday Pravda issued a statement which was highly polemical in content, which associated Israel with the imperialist forces, which are supposed to be the bugaboo in the communist world. He said it did, however, point to Soviet support for the November resolution in the Security Council and support for Amb. Jarring's mission.

Secretary Rusk said we would hope that although outside powers cannot settle this situation among themselves in the positive form, we could hope that all outside powers, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and others would bring [all?] their influence to bear that they could on the parties, to try to get the parties to be more cooperative in Ambassador Jarring's movement toward peace.

He said:

"So, Mr. President, we have the short-run model of trying to find ways to reduce these acts of terror and violence along the cease fire lines.

"We must try to get additional muscle behind Ambassador Jarring's mission so we can draw a reluctant people on both sides more toward a serious peaceful solution because the Middle East not only is inflammatory in its own right in terms of its own territory, but because of many circumstances, including its geographical location, it is an area which could be inflamed depending upon whether the great powers could be engaged or highly involved with each other in a most dangerous fashion. We will continue to work for that just as hard as we can."

[Here follows discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

337. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Parker.

SUBJECT
Seven Points

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, U.A.R. Interests Section, Embassy of India
Mr. Richard B. Parker, Country Director for NEA/UAR

Mr. Parker said that the UAR Foreign Ministry had given Don Bergus the text of the UAR's comments on the Secretary's seven points on the morning of December 4./2/ He could tell Dr. Ghorbal on a personal basis that the Department, including the Secretary, had found the response most disappointing. Not only did the Egyptians insist on an irritating and counter-productive rehash of everything since Genesis, but they had not responded in a frank and open manner. In his presentation of November 2, the Secretary had made an important and far-reaching initiative. He had committed us to a position which our friends the Israelis had not liked and which would have entailed considerable difficulty for us in terms of implementation. The Israelis had recently assured us that the Egyptians would get us off the hook by responding negatively. Their forecast had been amply justified by the document we had received that morning. If the Egyptians wanted us to help them, they would have to learn something about dealing with the United States Government. The sort of foggy replies that the Egyptians specialized in only succeeded in irritating people.

/2/The text of the UAR's response to the Secretary's seven points was transmitted  in telegram 4047 from Cairo, December 4. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) In his comments Bergus noted that UAR policy remained focused on the demand for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory. (Telegram 4051 from Cairo, December 4; ibid.)

Dr. Ghorbal said we would have to understand in the first place that the prologue reciting Israeli misdeeds was an essential expression of deep and bitter feeling on the part of the Egyptians. Their territory was occupied. They had a long history of injustice at the hand of Israel and they could not disregard this or set it to one side. Mr. Parker said that on the previous day Dr. Ghorbal had been searching for a word to describe an action which produced a result contrary to that desire. That word was "counter-productive". This was the term which should be applied to the prologue.

Dr. Ghorbal went on to say that the Egyptian response was not really an answer to the seven points, but rather an amplification and a reaffirmation of what Mahmoud Riad had already said on November 2. As Dr. Ghorbal had said earlier, Mahmoud Riad had given his response on November 2. The Americans had chosen not to accept it as definitive. Riad had now reaffirmed it. The Americans kept getting the Egyptians to make concessions while the Israelis made none. Then they proceeded from the new position of the Egyptians and asked them to compromise further instead of asking the Israelis to move. There were some things the Egyptians could accept and others they could not. The US could not, in any event, expect the Egyptians to set forth in a document of this sort, which might fall into the hands of anyone, a position more forthcoming than that given by Riad. It would also have to understand the atmosphere in which this response was drafted. While, on the one hand, the Secretary had been very fair and forthcoming in his statements to Riad, he had also made much of the fact that American leverage with the Israelis was limited. Mr. Parker had subsequently informed Dr. Ghorbal that the seven points were not a peace plan but were rather a statement of the sort of position we could support. Mr. Parker had also said that we could not guarantee Israel's acceptance. Indeed, the Israelis did not like the seven points. All the while, Eshkol and Dayan were making bellicose statements about the retention of territory, the consolidation of the Golan Heights and other territories into Israel, on the inevitability of war, etc. We could not expect the Egyptians to put their hands in ours, given these uncertainties.

Mr. Parker said that we had made what seemed to us a reasonable offer. We had delineated the position we could support, a position which was not unfavorable to Egypt. If the Egyptians had accepted it wholeheartedly, we would at that moment be working in an effort to get it accepted by the Israelis. The Egyptians were always asking us to put pressure on Israel, but they were not willing to make it possible for us to use what leverage we had.

Dr. Ghorbal and Mr. Parker proceeded to examine the Egyptian reply point by point. With regard to the indivisibility of withdrawal, Mr. Parker noted that the Secretary had proposed as an eighth point an understanding that Egypt's acceptance would be with the understanding that the problems of the other Arab states and Israel would be regulated in a satisfactory manner. It was, of course, difficult to visualize any settlement which returned the Golan Heights to Syria given the fact that Syria refused to cooperate with Jarring or to accept the November 22 Resolution. In these circumstances, did the UAR response mean that if all other issues were taken care of and the sole remaining issue was Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and the Israelis refused to withdraw, the UAR would not go to settlement? Dr. Ghorbal said that was correct. Egypt could not settle with Israel as long as Arab territory beyond what Israel already had before June 1967 was occupied. Mr. Parker commented that Egypt was likely to forfeit a settlement over this issue.

On termination of belligerency, Mr. Parker noted that the language of the Egyptian response seemed to mean that termination would come after withdrawal. Was this the intent? Dr. Ghorbal said he understood the response to mean that termination of belligerency and withdrawal would be simultaneous.

As for the navigation issue, Mr. Parker noted that the response tied free navigation to the resolution as a whole and not just to the refugee issue. This was a better formulation than the earlier Egyptian position.

On the question of refugees, Mr. Parker said the UAR response was unclear. The Secretary had made a specific proposal. The UAR had replied in general terms that it accepted the UN resolutions on the subject. This was not news, nor was it responsive. Given the fact that both Dr. Fawzi and Salah Gohar had commented to foreign ambassadors that the Secretary's proposal regarding refugees was unacceptable, we suspected this response was a rejection. Dr. Ghorbal said he did not think this was the case. He believed that the UAR was at the moment consulting with Palestinian leaders as to what they could accept. Until those consultations were finished, the Egyptians could not commit themselves to any detailed understanding on the issue. We should interpret the present response as keeping the door open and meaning that the UAR did not reject the Secretary's proposal, which after all, was not contrary to the UN resolutions.

Mr. Parker noted that the UAR rejected a permanent UN presence at Sharm Ash-Shaikh. We could not expect the Israelis to settle for less, if indeed they would accept even that. The idea that the Israelis would accept a temporary UN presence which the Egyptians could recall when they felt like it, as they had done in 1967, was unrealistic. Both we and the Israelis had to have reassurances that the Straits would be kept open and neither of us trusted the Egyptian word in this regard, given past history. Dr. Ghorbal said that we should stretch our imaginations on this problem. What we wanted was freedom of navigation, not a UN presence. In a climate of peace, a satisfactory arrangement should be possible. Egypt, however, could not alienate for eternity a part of its territory, no matter how remote or how unimportant as real estate. We should stop talking about a permanent UN presence and start thinking about some arrangement which would give satisfactory assurances to both sides without derogating from Egyptian sovereignty. Mr. Parker suggested that if the Egyptians had any ideas in this regard they should bring them forward.

Mr. Parker noted that the UAR also rejected the concept of signature of the same document. This presumably was because Egypt rejected sulh (reconciliation), in accordance with the Khartoum formula, although it was now talking of peace (silm), at our urging. Signature of the same document was a symbol of sulh, just as the handshake was a symbol of reconciliation in any ceremonial sulh. The Egyptians should realize that without sulh there would be no silm. If the Egyptians wanted to get the Israelis out of their territory, they had better start thinking about sulh.

Dr. Ghorbal said that we should be ingenious enough to find a way to get around the question of signature. The Arabs simply could not sign the same document with Israel. They could, however, sign identical documents on the same day, both of which could be registered immediately with the UN and published simultaneously side by side, both committing the two parties to the same things and having the binding force of contracts. Signature on the same piece of paper should not be blown up into an obstacle to agreement. Mr. Parker commented that it was this very inability of the Arabs to sign that same piece of paper which convinced the Israelis that the Arabs were not prepared to offer meaningful peace.

338. Information Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. XI, Cables and Memos, 12/68-1/69. Secret. A handwritten notation indicates that the memorandum was received at 4:12 p.m.

SUBJECT
(1) Israeli Raids on Jordan
(2) Message from King Hussein/2/

/2/See Document 341.

Before he left this morning, Walt asked me to send you our latest reading on the Israel-Jordan fighting today.

The Israelis say their Sunday commando attack in southern Jordan was a direct response to terrorist shelling of Israel's Dead Sea phosphate works, but that may only have been the last straw following the Jerusalem bomb explosion last week.

Today's attack, however, was directed mainly at the Iraqi troops who have been supporting the terrorists logistically and who themselves opened fire for the first time on Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley last night. The Israeli embassy here says Israel just couldn't sit still any longer without encouraging more such attacks.

Eban has asked Wally Barbour to transmit a message from Eshkol to the Jordanian government, saying that the Iraqis were the target and that Israel had no intention of widening the action./3/ Rabin's deputy here called me to say the same.

/3/This request was reported in telegram 6361 from Tel Aviv, December 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

This will probably delay Jordan-Israel talks. Even the Israelis who are concerned about that argue that they have no choice if they're just not going to roll over in front of the terrorists. But with Jarring beginning another round in the area-he saw Eban Monday and goes next to Cairo-the Arabs can't help but assume the Israelis don't care. It's clear that they put short-term security above all.

Hussein alludes to this Israeli attitude in his message (attached),/4/ written to you before the attack on another subject-your wire explaining your go-ahead on negotiating the Phantom deal with Israel. He expresses sharply his disappointment with our policy, but given his feelings, the message is restrained.

/4/Not attached. The text of King Hussein's letter to President Johnson, dated November 30, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 7684 from Amman, December 2. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) The signed original of the letter was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-513 from Amman, December 5. (Ibid., POL 15-1 JORDAN) Ambassador Symmes provided his assessment of King Hussein's letter in telegram 7774 from Amman, December 6. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US)

Hal

339. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 4, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S/S on December 10.

SUBJECT
Reports of Israeli Plans For Settlements on Golan Heights

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Assistant Secretary Parker T. Hart, NEA
Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, IO
Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies, NEA
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director, NEA/IAI

During a conversation primarily on other subjects, Mr. Hart referred to recent press reports that Israel planned to establish new settlements on the Syrian Golan Heights, allegedly to accommodate some 15,000 settlers. Such reports could only be interpreted as pre-judging the question of sovereignty over areas presently occupied by Israel, and we therefore trusted that these reports were erroneous.

Ambassador Rabin said that, when Under Secretary Katzenbach had set forth the US position on Israeli withdrawal, he had not mentioned the Golan Heights. Mr. Hart replied that we were talking about the principle of the non-acquisition of territory wherever it might be.

Ambassador Rabin noted that Israel had already established Nahals, which he described as military-agricultural settlements, on the Golan Heights and asked why we were raising this question now. Mr. Hart said that reports of new settlements carried implications of a permanent Israeli presence which was inconsistent with efforts to make progress toward peace.

In response to Ambassador Rabin's comment that this issue could be tested in negotiations if the Syrians would negotiate, Mr. Hart said that he inferred from the Ambassador's comment that the future of the Golan Heights was negotiable. Rabin replied that the Government of Israel had made clear everything was negotiable except Jerusalem. He could not say, however, what Israel's position with respect to the Golan Heights would be. Meanwhile he saw no reason why Israel should not do what it wished to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining the territories under its control so long as Israel acted within the context of military occupation and abided by the Geneva Conventions.

Mr. Hart said we saw a difference between Israel's utilizing the resources of occupied areas on the one hand and establishing permanent settlements on the other. Mr. Davies added that reports of permanent settlements tended to confirm Arab suspicions that Israel did not intend to withdraw; this could make the Arabs less willing to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring. Ambassador Rabin disagreed, saying that in his view the Arabs would be more eager to negotiate the more they saw a danger that they would not get their territories back.

340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, December 5, 1968, 0137Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Atherton, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Jerusalem, USUN, and Cairo.

282248. 1. Assistant Secretaries Hart and Sisco called in Ambassador Rabin afternoon December 4 to make following points re recent Israel-Jordan cease fire incidents:

(a) We are asking both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors to convey urgently to their governments our concern over recent cease fire violations./2/ We see risk that escalating situation will get out of hand.

/2/Hart made a similar presentation to Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf on December 4. (Telegram 282251 to Amman, December 5; ibid.)

(b) Without assessing blame, we look to both governments to observe cease fire.

(c) We are aware of problems that terrorism and shelling of civilian centers cause for GOI. To avoid jeopardizing peacemaking efforts, however, we are urging parties to exercise utmost restraint. Latest Israeli air operation strikes us as dangerous over reaction.

(d) At same time we recognize problem Iraqi operations from Jordanian territory cause for Israel and will stress to Jordanian Ambassador need for GOJ to assert control over Iraqis and Fedayeen.

2. Rabin said he would report foregoing promptly. At same time he wanted to explain how GOI views situation. Israel had accepted cease fire on assumption that it would be mutually respected. By entering agreement with Fedayeen organizations November 16, GOJ had assumed responsibility for Fedayeen activities. According Israeli information, GOJ understanding with Fedayeen groups provides inter alia that latters' operations against Israel would be coordinated with GOJ.

3. Rabin continued that Iraqis were in Jordan in division strength consisting of three brigades and had artillery units positioned in northern sector. Israel had evidence that Iraqis had initiated shelling of Israeli settlements December 2 along 25 mile front from Tel Qazir to Beisan Valley. This had been preceded by more limited shelling of settlements December 1, to which Israel had responded in limited fashion with 15 artillery rounds against Irbid plus shelling of known Fedayeen concentrations. Following further artillery bombardment of Israeli settlements December 2, Israel had used aircraft against Iraqi positions near Irbid and subsequently against Iraqi positions and other installations on larger scale December 4. Rabin stressed that IDF had sought to concentrate latest strike only on Iraqi military targets; neither town of Mafraq nor Jordanian airfield had been attacked and there were no overflights of Amman. Israeli Air Force had ignored two Jordanian Hawker Hunters which had been in area at time but had not attempted to engage Israeli planes.

4. Rabin added that as Israeli success in stopping terrorist infiltration had grown (he claimed 85-90 per cent of infiltrators now killed or captured), Fedayeen as well as Jordanian and Iraqi military had resorted increasingly to cross river shelling. As result latest Israeli action he thought Iraqis would think twice before provoking further incidents. Neither side wanted major hostilities and he did not believe situation would get out of hand as we feared. Israel could not tolerate shelling of civilian settlements, however, and unless cease fire was observed by Jordanians, Iraqis and Fedayeen there would be further incidents. Israel wanted to avoid "too much" escalation. Experience had shown, however, that use of "more than normal force" could calm situation for a time.

5. Rabin noted that, while Israel had never requested UN observers on cease fire line with Jordan, it was GOJ not Israel which had refused to accept them. In response to query whether Israel would accept observers if Jordan agreed, Rabin said GOI had never believed UN observers could bring tranquility. Nevertheless Israel had accepted observers on Syrian and Egyptian cease fire lines when UARG and SARG had done so.

6. Sisco informed Rabin that we expected press inquiries to which we would reply that (a) we had expressed our concern about cease fire violations to both Israeli and Jordanian Ambassadors and (b) we had asked GOI and GOJ to observe cease fire scrupulously.

7. For Tel Aviv: Ambassador should seek early opportunity to reenforce foregoing approach at appropriate level GOI.

Rusk

341. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Jordan, 8/1/68-1/20/69. Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
King Hussein's Reply to the President's Message

Transmitted as an enclosure is King Hussein's reply/2/ to the President's message of October 11./3/ As you will recall, the occasion for the President's message was our announcement to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. The message was designed to reassure the King that these negotiations in no way prejudiced USG support for the Jarring Mission or for Jordan.

/2/See footnote 4, Document 338.

/3/See Document 277.

The King is obviously very upset with the proposed sale of Phantoms to Israel. His sharply worded reply to the President reflects the great strains placed upon him during the past months. A principal thrust of the King's reply is that alleged Israeli intransigence and alleged United States' passivity in the face of this intransigence impedes a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Other points made by the King include: (1) the proposed Phantom sale directly contradicts our profession of support for the Jarring Mission; (2) Jordan has suffered from Israeli military actions since the June 1967 war, particularly from aircraft supplied to Israel by the United States; (3) Jordan's marked military inferiority to Israel requires a military quid pro quo for Jordan to offset the Phantoms; (4) the United States' commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan continues to be violated by Israeli occupation; (5) U.S. actions and positions on the Middle East problem are making it difficult for Hussein and other moderate Arabs to justify their close ties with the United States.

Our Ambassador in Jordan has a continuing dialogue with the King and there is no need for a further response on the part of the President. A signed copy of the letter has been sent by pouch.

Dirk Gleysteen/4/

/4/Gleysteen signed for Read above Read's typed signature.

342. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Beirut, December 5, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edward P. Djerejian and approved by Ambassador Porter. The memorandum is Enclosure 1 to Airgram A-1505 from Beirut, December 13.

SUBJECT
The Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi
Governor William W. Scranton/2/

/2/Former Governor of Pennsylvania Scranton visited Lebanon on December 5 as part of a six-nation fact-finding tour of the Middle East undertaken on behalf of President-elect Nixon. His other st