Washington, February 10, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. III. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Your 6:00 p.m. Appointment with Secretary Rusk on OAS Summit Preparations

Secretary Rusk wishes to discuss what he should say about the Summit meeting at Buenos Aires in view of the wide inter-agency disagreement on what our part of the Summit deal should be.

We are asking the Latin Americans to:

-take the plunge on economic integration;
-modernize their agricultural and educational systems;
-forego expensive military equipment.

These steps involve tough political decisions. What we are prepared to do to help is critical to their willingness to take the decisions. The success of the Summit hinges on this interplay.

Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz have recommended this package as our part of the deal:

1. Express willingness to ask Congress for up to $300 million for Latin American integration adjustment assistance, to be contributed over a period of years and on a matching basis after the Latin American Common Market treaty is negotiated.

2. Approve asking Congress in this session for an authorization and appropriation in FY 1968 of $300 million for replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations, i.e., $50 million more than you have already approved for authorizing legislation for FY 1968.

3. Indicate an intention to ask Congress to increase our Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by $100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and (an average of $200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated need and adequate self help).

4. Consider modifying tying arrangements for our capital project loans (but not program loans) to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin Americans negotiate a Common Market Treaty. This would shift the tying from the present individual country basis to a

regional basis. The balance of payments effects would not be appreciable.

/2/ Not attached, but the table is attached to another copy of this memorandum. (Ibid.)

Treasury-Joe Fowler opposes Recommendations 1 and 4 of the package. I don’t believe he is sympathetic toward economic integration. He feels that if integration adjustment assistance is necessary, the Inter-American Bank should handle it, and by increasing our contribution (as per Recommendation 2) we would meet our responsibilities. On Recommendation 4, he agrees that the balance of payments effect will probably be small, but he fears adverse psychological effects on our balance of payments posture.

AID-Bill Gaud is strongly opposed to Recommendation 3. He fears that an increase of this dimension in the Alliance will most likely result in the Congress granting it at the expense of other areas.

BOB-Charlie Schultze prefers not to mention a specific amount for integration adjustment assistance in Recommendation 1. On paragraph 2, he favors seeking authorization only in this session, leaving the issue of whether to seek a supplemental appropriation this year or next January to be decided later.

Latin America stands at a crossroads. Over the next few years population increase, growing urban unemployment and agricultural backwardness could, at present rates of modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. If the Latin American Presidents are willing to establish a Common Market and make a major effort to boost agriculture and improve education, the region during the 1970’s could attain a level of "take-off" for self-sustained growth which would promote social and political stability and dependence on US public financing.

The issue boils down to whether you wish to exploit this historic moment to get the Latin Americans to move boldly on integration, and thereby put your stamp on it, or whether you prefer to let nature take its course. The pressure of events can be expected to move the Latins gradually toward integration over the next 15-20 years. And we can take our chances on the present rate of growth under the Alliance keeping the hemisphere a step ahead of social and political troubles.

I favor the Gordon-Linowitz package because:

-I believe you should take advantage of the historic moment.

-If we make our part of the deal any less, I doubt whether the Latins will be willing to make the commitments we want.

-The package is so structured that financial commitments on integration and the untying of aid will not come into play for another 18-24 months after the Latins have negotiated their Common Market Treaty.

/3/ According to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting on OAS summit preparations was evidently rescheduled for February 11 (Johnson Library); see Document 45.

Walt

Washington, February 11, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting 4/67, Chron. 4/1/66-3/13/67. Secret. Drafted by Bowdler. A copy was sent to Rostow. The memorandum indicates the meeting began "at approximately 1:00 p.m." and was held in the President’s office.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary Rusk

Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon
U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States Sol Linowitz
Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. William Bowdler

/2/ Reference is to the Third Special Inter-American Conference and the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held in Buenos Aires, February 15-27 and February 16-26, respectively. Documentation on both is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-72: Lot 67 D 586, CF 122 through CF 133; and the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Third Special IAC and Eleventh MFM Bilateral Papers, 2/67. Also see Document 46.

On the Summit meeting he described what we expected the Latin Americans to do in negotiating a Common Market. We would help them by contributing $300 million over a period of years for integration adjustment assistance after they negotiated a treaty. The Secretary mentioned that the Europeans might be persuaded to contribute the remaining $125 million which we made available to the European Monetary Agreement members.

Mr. Gordon pointed out that the $123.5 million left was being considered for possible use in supporting a world-wide agricultural diversification fund. We need a decision on which project it should be used for, assuming we can get the Europeans to relinquish their claim. The President asked Secretary Rusk and Mr. Rostow where the $125 million should be put. They both recommended the Latin American Common Market. The President told them to proceed on this basis.

Secretary Rusk next brought up the replenishment of the IDB/FSO (Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations). The President asked whether any or all of the $300 million contemplated was in the FY 1968 budget. A quick check with Budget Bureau Director Schultze revealed that none had been included. Following further discussion of the amounts required by our Summit package and the inter-agency disagreement on its elements, the President said that he wanted Congressional approval before he made a commitment of the magnitude contemplated. He directed that a joint resolution be prepared, separate from the AID bill, which would place the Congress behind the Summit offer. Secretary Rusk could test the willingness of the Latin Americans at Buenos Aires to assume the commitments we want. If he finds a basis for the Summit, then we can use the time between the Buenos Aires meeting and the Summit to put the joint resolution through.

WGB

Buenos Aires, February 19, 1967, 0312Z.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 3 IA. Secret; Nodis.

3192/Secto 26. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from Secretary.

We have now reached the point where the opinions of all countries are in and it is possible to report general agreement that there should be a summit conference and, indeed, that a failure to hold one would have a very negative effect throughout the hemisphere. I have seen all the FonMins personally and have encountered only the friendliest reactions to you and to the US. There is general understanding of the burdens we are carrying these days and real appreciation for the personal attention which you have given to Latin American affairs and to the Alliance for Progress despite your many other problems.

/2/ Rusk headed the U.S. delegation in Buenos Aires until February 21, when he was replaced by Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker.

I have tried to be very realistic with my Latin colleagues about what they should expect from the US. On the subject of integration I have insisted that this is their decision. I have emphasized that if they were to move toward integration because of the possibility of modest amounts of help from the US they would move for the wrong reasons and integration efforts could not succeed. They understand fully that we must consult with the Congress before making commitments and that, in such consultations, we must have specific information on what our friends in Latin America really intend to do. We cannot have them come up with some meaningless phrases involving the word "integration" and expect that we will come forward with substantial additional assistance. It would take the Congress only ten minutes to prick any such bubble and ask for specifics. Somewhat to my surprise, I am beginning to feel (after a full day’s discussion today) that they really are quite serious about integration. They seem to recognize that rapid modernization will pass them by unless they enlarge their markets among themselves and open up the possibilities provided by the internal American market for US and the enlarged European Common Market.

Again in the direction of realism I have stated quite simply that they must compete with the rest of the world for private investment, that private investment cannot be commanded by US or anyone else but must be attracted by them, and that if they fail to attract it they cannot expect the same investments to come through the public sector at the taxpayer’s expense.

I have also tried, in personal conversations with ministers, to remind them that a meeting of Presidents is an informal meeting at the highest political level and is not an occasion to resolve every trivial issue which twenty governments might have in mind. Some of the nervousness about the need for "adequate preparation" arises from an unrealistic view of what Presidents will do when they get together. You will not wade through stacks of black boots but will share your political and other problems with each other and give direction to the grand strategy of the hemisphere. My impression is that the FonMins will greatly simplify the recommendations they make to their Presidents. From our own point of view, it seems to me that the principal benefit to come from a summit meeting is the enlistment of public interest in the hemisphere, in the successes and prospects of the Alliance for Progress and in your own personal commitment to what happens to ordinary men and women. Our own people have been hearing almost nothing else but Viet-Nam, President de Gaulle and China, and hemispheric affairs have dropped somewhat into the background. We will need this public attention as a defense against Congressional assaults on the Alliance for Progress.

Outstanding among the FonMins have been Mexican, Chilean, Argentine, Brazilian and Colombian colleagues. It is a great relief to find Chile in a cooperative mood and I have no doubt this reflects the growing personal relations between you and President Frei. Tony Carrillo has been a stalwart friend.

I have emphasized in talks that we are not pressing for a summit meeting if there is any reluctance on their part. Their response has been one of alarm that we might lose interest. I think they realize that they are competing for the attention of the American people with many other problems and that it is in their interest to find a way to dramatize hemispheric cooperation.

I have tried to keep our Congressional delegation involved as much as possible although private meetings of ministers have limited their participation. They came, understandably enough, with considerable skepticism about whether the Latin Americans really mean business on integration. It is a skepticism which I myself shared. But if our Latin friends demonstrate that they mean business and are prepared to take some additional tangible steps, I think our Congressional friends will be both surprised and impressed.

/3/ For texts of the resolution of the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics and the final act of the Third Special Inter-American Conference, see Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1967, pp. 473-476. The amendment of the OAS Charter-the so-called Protocol of Buenos Aires-was adopted on February 27, becoming effective 3 years later upon ratification of two-thirds of the member states.

Rusk

Washington, March 6, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. II. Confidential. The memorandum is an uninitialed copy; a handwritten note indicates that it was "sent via wire to Ranch." According to the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson was at his Ranch in Texas, March 2-6. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Meeting the Latin American Experts on the Summit

I met yesterday at my home for lunch with Milton Eisenhower, Adolf Berle, Tom Mann, Jack Vaughn, Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz to discuss the Latin American Summit.

We had a useful three-and-a-half hour session reviewing the Summit package and joint resolution, discussing the focus of your speech at the Summit and examining some new ideas which you might advance.

These are the highlights:

-All thought that the Summit package was well structured to get at the root of Latin America’s basic development problems.

-All agreed that time was running short in Latin America and the moment for decisive action was now. The Summit offered a historic opportunity for the Latin Americans to make the necessary political commitments and for you to redefine US policy.

-All agreed that we should encourage the Latin Americans to move rapidly down the path of economic integration as the single, most important step they can take to speed up the development process and transform economic and social situations. Our help should be closely geared to their performance.

-Milton Eisenhower stressed that the Summit gave you the chance to dramatize at the highest level that our relation with the Latin Americans is that of junior partner and that while money is important and we will help, it can only be a supplement to their own commitment and action.

-Adolf Berle focused on the trade issue, pointing out that if meaningful help for the LDC’s does not come from the Kennedy Round negotiations, we may have to think in terms of extending regional preferences for Latin America.

-Jack Vaughn observed the need to come to grips with the birth rate and the urban slum problem, but all recognized the difficulties in doing anything meaningful at the Summit in these two areas.

On themes for your Summit speech:

-Milton Eisenhower suggested that in emphasizing economic integration you point to the dramatic shift in policy which this represents for us. Historically, we have discouraged it. Only in the last ten years has our thinking shifted. You would be the first President to give it a major thrust forward.

-Adolf Berle said you should point to the progress made in recent years in strengthening democracy and getting governments to work for the people as never before.

-Both Eisenhower and Berle urged that you stress that the US is not in the business of building empires but wants to help others in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, to build up themselves. Berle had an excellent quote from Seneca about there being no possibility of lasting friendship except between equals.

In the realm of new ideas, the group thought we should examine these areas:

-speeding up a satellite communications system for Latin America;
-help in promoting educational TV;
-development of research libraries on microfilm;
-cooperation in development of "food from sea" resources;
-development of protein concentrates for child-feeding programs; and
-computerized access to information, perhaps drawing on NIH’s development of an electronic library in medicine.

Washington, March 7, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting, Chron. 4/1/66-3/13/67. Confidential.

MEMORANDUM FOR
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary of the Treasury Barr
AID Administrator Gaud
Budget Director Schultze

/2/ According to the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson held a meeting on March 1, 5:42-6:50 p.m., "to discuss plans for Latin American Summit meeting." The attendees included Rusk, Sayre, Linowitz, Gaud, Rostow, Bowdler, Under Secretary of the Treasury Joseph W. Barr, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Winthrop Knowlton. (Ibid.) No other record of the meeting was found.

So that the participants in the meeting will have the same understanding of the decisions made by the President, I recapitulate them as follows:

The President approved obtaining Congressional support for the United States providing standby resources through the IDB to be matched by the Latin Americans for integration adjustment assistance to facilitate the transition to a fully functioning Latin American Common Market once appropriate steps have been taken by the Latin Americans toward progressive establishment of such a Market. The President agreed that in discussions with Congress an order of magnitude figure of 1⁄4 and 1⁄2 billion dollars, to be furnished over a period of years (probably not beginning until 1970), could be used.

Under Secretary Barr observed that Congressman Reuss is not in favor of economic integration and can be expected to oppose adjustment assistance. The President asked Secretary Barr and Ambassador Linowitz to speak with Congressman Reuss in the light of the Buenos Aires meeting decisions.

The President directed that authorization for 3 years and appropriation of $300 million for the first year be sought during the current session of Congress.

The President agreed to increase Alliance for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by $100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and an average of $200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated need and self-help.

He expressed a preference for obtaining a specific Congressional commitment for the full amount, but agreed to be guided by what Congressional leaders think should be done about the Summit package price tag in the Joint Resolution. (See paragraph no 5.)

In response to Budget Director Schultze’s observation that a

substantial portion of the increase for education and agriculture would necessarily be for projects with a high local cost component, the

President said that he understood this and wanted the funds to be made available for sound projects in the two sectors with this understanding.

The President agreed to modify tying arrangements in our loan policy toward Latin America with respect to project, but not program or local cost, lending to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin Americans begin major steps toward a Common Market and with subsequent tying to the US through the Special Letter of Credit procedure.

Under Secretary Barr asked that Treasury’s opposition to the modification be recorded.

/3/ Attached but not printed.

The President also directed that State brief the Council for Latin America on the resolution and get them to sell it to key Congressional members such as Dirksen, Hickenlooper and Ford. In response to Ambassador Linowitz’s inquiry as to whether he would be willing to receive the Council for Latin America group when they meet in Washington next week, the President replied that he would if he were in town.

With respect to the text of the draft joint resolution, the President accepted Secretary Rusk’s recommendation that the paragraph on Europe be deleted.

The President expressed a preference for including a global cost figure for the Summit package in the final operative paragraph. He thought the Congress would also want to specify what it was agreeing to and would not be satisfied with amounts expressed only in hearings. But he agreed that Congressional leaders should be sounded out on this point. He is prepared to go the way they recommend.

WR

Washington, April 4, 1967, 8:35 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Sol Linowitz, Tape F67.11, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

President: Sol, how are you?

Linowitz: I’m fine, Mr. President.

/2/ In a special message to Congress on March 13, President Johnson presented a proposal to increase support to the Alliance for Progress and asked Congress to show its support by approving a joint resolution before the Punta del Este conference. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 318-324. Although the House approved a modified version, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the resolution on April 3, opting instead for its own resolution by a vote of 9-0. A spokesman for the administration subsequently called the Senate resolution "worse than useless." The President went to Punta del Este without a formal expression of Congressional support. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1967, pp. 331-333)

Linowitz: Yes, sir. There were only nine men in that Senate who said that.

President: Yeah, but they’re the ones that are leading it, and they have more-We couldn’t get anything but a zero on our end of it. They wouldn’t either stand up or-So I told Morse that I thought that he ought to talk to Mansfield who is out in Montana and hold it up until he comes back.

Linowitz: Yes. He’s not due back till the end of the week though.

President: And I had much rather see it just-I don’t see anything to be gained by bringing it out and having a mean debate. I don’t think that-

Linowitz: I agree.

President: I don’t think that you can get anywhere that way. And I think then we-It will destroy our ability to make any real commitment, but we can see how far they want to go.

Linowitz: Yes, sir. The only question, sir: there was talk of the possibility of getting the committee to reconsider. Do you think that-

President: I don’t believe they’ll do that. Fulbright’s an adamant man and I do not believe we can beat the chairman of the committee any more than you can beat the President on who he’s going to appoint as his appointments secretary. He’s just got that authority, and he’s got that position, he’s got that power. And this is a gesture to the Congress that a President would ask them to express themselves. Most Presidents don’t ask them-they’ve done it two or three times-but it’s generally they go on and make a commitment and treaty and send it up and negotiate without any resolutions or anything. Now if they don’t want to be consulted, I think our public position can be: we sought to consult them, we were ready to put on our hearings. We’ll know next time if we submit something, we ought to submit it by putting the amount in it and asking just for an authorization. And I thought that if we’d bring Tom Mann and Jack Vaughn and Adolph Berle and Milton Eisenhower and David Rockefeller and all these folks in for the hearings that we’ve been having up there-just arguing back and forth, and they could give the positive aspects of it-I would have thought that it would have been better, but our people didn’t think so. So-

Linowitz: Did you know that I put that actually to both Morse and Hickenlooper and both of them said that it would be a mistake.

President: Yes. Well-

Linowitz: So-I think they were wrong. I agree with you, sir, that it would have been helpful to build us a stronger record.

President: Yeah, then they could have-Fulbright couldn’t have said that we hadn’t had a hearing and we didn’t, we hadn’t presented our case. Well anyway, I don’t want us to get crossways, so I have told Mike Manatos to try to talk to Mansfield, so you ought, you and

Linowitz: That’s right.

President: If they pass it, it won’t have any more effect on the conference or on me than it would to just stay in the committee and then it would have to go to conference committee.

Linowitz: At the press conference yesterday I read the latter part of your message in which you talked about your having the executive authority to do this but you wanted to go having first consulted with the Congress-and that’s exactly what you did.

President: Yeah. Well, now we’ve done that.

Linowitz: The record is clear.

President: We’ve done it. So I would try then to get a hold of our friends or talk to Morse and anyone else on the committee that would be friendly, I guess Hickenlooper-

Linowitz: Yes, sir.

President: And just say: "Now it appears to us we don’t have

/4/ A recent intelligence assessment judged that "the risk to President Johnson during the course of this trip will be slight-though greater than was the case with his visit to Mexico a year ago." (SNIE 98-67, "Security Conditions in Uruguay," March 23; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, O/DDI Registry)

Linowitz: Well, you know, sir, that we’ve been in close touch and-On the assumption that you’ll be arriving at 11 in the morning: there isn’t any problem that anybody can foresee before you get out of Montevideo and to Punta del Este. I agree with you that this action they’ve taken-you notice they did that to the Brazilians too. It’s just troublemakers who are hoping, I think, exactly what is happening will happen: that is people will begin to get a little worried about it. I think these, the people there don’t, the Communists there don’t want to have this conference. They think it’s not going to do them any good, and I think they’ve-We probably will get more of this, a few here and there. But from what I can gather-and I’ve been in touch with Hoyt down in Montevideo and I’ve talked to the Uruguayans here on a regular basis-if we work it as we are now planning, arriving around 11-because I guess Frei is coming in at noon and you’re coming in at 11-we’ll be out of there and into Punta del Este before the lunch hour and before any of these people are even around. So I think that’s going to work out all right. We’re at least keeping an eye on it, sir.

President: Good. I would do that. I told them to take whatever people they needed. They want to borrow some military people to [wear] civilian clothes over there. And I sure think we ought to watch that very, very carefully.

Linowitz: Yes, sir, I agree.

/5/ Reference is to Richard M. Nixon’s trip to South America, April-May 1958, when demonstrators in Lima and Caracas showered the Vice President with spit and stones. For documentation on the trip, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. V, pp. 222-248.

/6/ On April 1 Johnson hosted a barbecue at his Texas Ranch for Latin American Ambassadors to the United States and the OAS, and other guests. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)

Linowitz: Well, I do. I wish I had done better for you up at the Senate.

President: Well, we just can’t do that. That’s not you; that’s not you and I don’t think it’s me. I think Fulbright is very unhappy because he wasn’t Secretary of State, and he was this way with President Kennedy, and I had to nurse him all during the Bay of Pigs. I had him down and worked with him because he couldn’t, and then he took the position that we ought to bomb Cuba out, just the opposite of what he’s doing now.

Linowitz: Well, I can’t help the feeling that I let you down there, sir.

President: No, no. Not at all. No, we just haven’t got that situation. And I think that this will have rather serious repercussions on our whole aid program. My judgment is they just don’t have the votes there for aid this year. That’s what I’m afraid of. I think yours is the most popular of all, and if you can’t get them to commit on yours, why I don’t know what’s going to happen with the others.

Linowitz: I think that’s true. There’s one other thing, sir. I do, upon reflection, I do believe that Fulbright has chosen the worst possible place at which to take his stand.

President: Yes, I do too.

Linowitz: I just think that this was-if we could have picked a battleground, an issue on which we could say "this is how we ought to proceed, this is what we’ve done, this is a case we can make"-I don’t think we could have picked it better than this one, and that’s the one he chose to make an issue on.

President: That’s right. Now how do we get that line drawn over the country?

/7/ Arthur O. Sulzberger, publisher and president of The New York Times.

/8/ James B. Reston, associate editor of The New York Times.

President: Well, I think that’s very good and I think that’s quite important. I think you ought to point out to Frankel that this barbecue thing was not a great elaborate deal that he pictured yesterday. He said five hundred people, four or five hundred people: we had a hundred and four, I think.

Linowitz: Hell, he was down there. I saw him at the press briefing yesterday and I said: "where did you get your nose count?"

/9/ Reference is to two conferences on Vietnam in Manila (October 1966), and Guam (March 1967).

Linowitz: May I just say, sir, two things. First, if I might suggest, I think it’s awful important not to convey the suggestion that you didn’t have, and that you don’t have, full authority to speak as President on what you would like to do when you get there, and that this isn’t interfering at all with that. What you had hoped to do was to go down there and say "not only I but the Congress gives you this assurance." That all you can do now is say "this is what I would like to have accomplished, but, of course, I’ll have to go back and see if Congress will go along with me." Is that appropriate to say that that’s the difference in the two?

President: Yes. Yes. Yes.

Linowitz: Because it seems to me, that one of the things that the aginners may now try to do is say this has cut off, or tried to cut off, your own executive authority, which is nonsense. And that’s the other side that troubles me a little bit, that the "worse than useless" phrase has created the impression that it’s really put a damper onto your authority to go there and do whatever you think is right. And I just think that would be inconsistent too.

President: OK. All right.

Linowitz: OK, sir.

US/MC-14

Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 6 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 IA-SUMMIT. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in the White House on April 28. The memorandum of conversation is part 3 of 3; for parts 1 and 2, see Documents 540 and 541. According to George Christian, the meeting was held at Leoni’s residence in Punta del Este. (Press statement, April 11; Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) President Johnson attended the Punta del Este Conference April 11-April 14.

SUBJECT
Cuban Subversion in Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS

The President assured President Leoni that we are equally concerned with Venezuela about the matter of communist aggression. We have been gratified by Venezuela’s actions against Cuba. We support Venezuela’s position against Cuba in the OAS. We believe that measures against Cuba by the OAS need even more tightening up. We would also hope that Venezuela will have suggestions for further moves in this direction. We will welcome all the noise that Venezuela can make about Cuba in the OAS.

/2/ Dr. Julio Iribarren Borges, former Director of Social Security, was assassinated on March 3.

/3/ For further discussion of this matter, see Document 541.

Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 13, 1967, 1 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 US. Confidential. Drafted by Reigersberg and Fisher on April 18 and approved in the White House on April 26. The memorandum is part 4 of 4. The full text of all four parts is in telegram 182377 to Quito, April 26. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Regarding the Alliance for Progress

PARTICIPANTS

/2/ Arosemena suggested that the Alliance for Progress must adjust to meet the economic realities of 1967; the terms required for assistance were unacceptable-the borrowing country was forced to contribute funds "above its capacity." Arosemena also questioned why the United States "should be so concerned with democracy in a noble but distant country such as Viet Nam," when democracy was so obviously in need of support in Latin America. An English translation of Arosemena’s address is ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70 D 247, POL 3 Summit Conference.

The President said he had hope that the Latin American presidents would give him arguments which he could use to convince members of Congress of the importance of aid to Latin America. In his own speech, he had promised assistance in such fields as educational television, marine research, research on production of fish concentrates for food, and promotion of science and technology. The United States had increased its contribution to the Alliance for Progress by 35% in the last three years, but a recent request for additional funds had been turned down in Congressional Committee. He repeated that he needed arguments to try to change the views held by some United States Senators who appeared to be as difficult to convince as was the President of Ecuador, but that tonight he had fewer arguments to get the Foreign Aid Bill passed than he had twenty-four hours ago. U.S. press headlines tonight would probably make things more difficult and would probably compel the President of the United States to go back to his country able only to tell his people that in spite of everything it is still a moral obligation to support foreign aid.

The President discussed the historical background of the Summit Conference, indicating that while initially he had been reluctant to attend, he felt that his presence here would give new thrust to the Alliance for Progress. What really disappointed him was that, after being told in Washington that he was trying to do too much for the Latin Americans, in Punta del Este some had said that he was doing too little.

President Arosemena stated that he was very pleased to have met President Johnson personally, and that he felt that he was a different man from the kind of person Latin America thinks he is. He had felt that the President was a very human, practical, and compassionate man who faced many problems and many difficulties. It was not Ecuador’s intention to cause any difficulties for anyone. He suggested that Latin Americans must get to know President Johnson as he had and that many American Senators, including Senator Fulbright, should come to Latin America so that they could share the burden which was now carried solely by President Johnson. He further stated that people in the United States erroneously feel that Latin Americans do not pay enough taxes, while the Ecuadorean Government collects as many taxes as possible; if it collected any more, it might destroy the country.

After referring to the cost of the war in Viet Nam, to the increase in Alliance for Progress funds, and to his attempt to get more public and private funds channelled toward Latin America, the President emphasized that both he and the Ecuadorean President really worked for the same objectives, namely, to help the poor and hungry people.

President Arosemena said that he wanted to help, but that he had to face problems in his own country. He stated that he wanted President Johnson to go back to the United States with the support and backing of 300 million Latin Americans, and that this could be achieved easily by just adding two or three sentences to the Presidential Declaration. He stated that no U.S. monetary commitments would be necessary, and that the inclusion of these two or three phrases would give President Johnson the unanimous support of Latin America. He added that the Latin American presidents were really on his side, although they did not have the courage to come out and say so. He felt that, if he would sign the present Declaration, he would not be able to go back to Ecuador because his people consider the document a step backward from the Punta del Este Charter. While President Johnson had proved to him that the Alliance for Progress had been more vigorous in the last three years and had provided more funds than in any previous period, unfortunately, Latin America was not aware of this; the people did not know this, and they should be told.

President Arosemena asked President Johnson to help gain approval for adding a couple of sentences to the document so that he too could defend the Declaration as a worthwhile document. He suggested that the President could justify these additions before United States Senators by pointing out the advantages of preventing a popular upheaval rather than have to put one down after it got started, and also by the fact that United States loans are not really gifts, but rather down payments on an insurance policy aimed at protecting the hemisphere against communism and avoiding having the United States face a "gigantic Cuba" south of its borders.

The President once more referred to the highlights of his speech and to his personal pledge to assist the Latin American countries. He noted that the schools, classrooms, roads, highways and bridges that have been built are physical evidence that much is being done.

Assistant Secretary Gordon stated that every President and Foreign Minister attending the meeting agreed that the program for the future was a step forward and not a step backward from the Alliance.

The President said he could not understand how the programs which he had outlined in his speech could be interpreted as stagnation. He suggested that the President of Ecuador should consider a hypothetical situation in which Ecuador would have to assist the poor people of the United States, and in which after taxing humble Ecuadoreans heavily to obtain the assistance to send to the United States, the Americans would express their dissatisfaction and their President would say in a public meeting that assistance from Ecuador was insufficient, was slow because of red tape, and therefore was unacceptable.

President Arosemena stated that all he wanted was a slight change in the document and asked the President whether two sentences from his speech to the Summit Conference could be included in the final

Declaration. This would satisfy Ecuador’s requirements and provide for unanimity.

/3/ According to an attached handwritten note, much of the last paragraph was inserted by Solomon, reflecting his "annoyance at having been saddled by LG[ordon] with the dirty work." (Fitzgibbons to Carroll Brown, April 24; ibid.) No record of Solomon’s meeting with Arosemena has been found.

Washington, April 17, 1967, 7:44 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 7 IA SUMMIT. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eaton, cleared by Sayre, and approved by Gordon.

176889. Subject: Summit Assessment. From Gordon.

/2/ The documentary record of the Punta del Este Conference is ibid., Conference Files, 1966-1972: Lot 67 D 586, CF 151 through CF 162; Washington National Records Center, RG 59, ARA/IPA Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item 31, Meeting of American Presidents-1967; ibid., ARA/OAS Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item 50, Meeting of American Presidents-1967; and Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Punta del Este, 4/12-14/67.

2. Ultimate results of Summit decisions will not be known for number of years and will depend upon degree of implementation of actions agreed at Summit. However, we consider Summit meeting and Declaration signed there definite successes. Our reasons follow.

a. When President Johnson agreed a year ago to join with Latin American leaders to explore proposed Summit meeting, we saw meeting as opportunity for:

(1) Agreement on a few significant, concrete actions which, building on experience and achievements of first years of Alliance for Progress, could result in needed accelerated economic and social advances in future.

(2) Re-emphasis on cooperative approach, under which Latin American initiative and self-help would be stressed at same time that U.S. would reassure Latin America on its concern and assistance.

(3) Strengthening of personal relations among leaders of Hemisphere.

/3/ For text of the declaration, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 673-685, or Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1967, pp. 712-721. Arosemena refused to sign the declaration, the only attending Latin American head of state to so refuse.

(1) A stronger, broader, and much more specific Latin American commitment to a Common Market than seemed likely when process began.

(2) Increased attention to multinational projects which will facilitate integration.

(3) Increased emphasis and better focus on two lagging but key sectors of the development process-agriculture and education.

(4) A special emphasis on science and technology which grew stronger as the preparatory process progressed, and culminated in a commitment to an Inter-American Science Program including several specific points.

(5) A useful (although not as strong as we had hoped for at one stage) statement on limitation of military expenditures.

(6) From the U.S., most importantly, (a) agreement to increased assistance in support of the greater Latin American efforts; and (b) in a major new trade policy departure, willingness to consult carefully within the U.S. and with other industrialized countries on generalized trade preferences, for limited time periods, by all industrialized countries in favor of all developing countries.

c. As stated above, all signatory governments (except Trinidad and Tobago) were deeply involved in preparatory process and final Declaration is truly inter-American document.

d. Personal relationships developed among Presidents during Summit were in almost all cases very satisfactory and should be helpful in future.

3. While reactions of other delegations to Summit varied in degree, all but Ecuador seemed agree that meeting had on balance been clear success. President Frei was most categorical and emphatic in so stating. President Diaz Ordaz made statement which probably most nearly expressed consensus when he said that while all might have wanted more from Summit, negotiators had achieved what was possible, and what they had achieved was a substantial advance. Arosemena’s negative position was not supported by any other Latin American President.

4. Press reaction to the Summit from within the U.S. has been strikingly and almost uniformly favorable. From reports we have had thus far, press reaction from Latin America has been uneven, perhaps reflecting to considerable extent lack of understanding of full meaning of decisions reached at Summit. In particular, many Latin journalists apparently failed to appreciate significance President Johnson’s statement on point 2(b)(6) above.

/4/ For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 446-449. For other statements made during the conference, see ibid., pp. 442-446 and 449-451.

6. You may draw on the foregoing assessment as you deem useful in both official and private contacts.

Rusk

Washington, May 12, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret.

Mr. President:

The Venezuelan security forces report that they have captured a guerrilla infiltration force coming from Cuba. They claim 12 prisoners (4 of whom are Cuban), the boat and outboard motor in which they landed, US $10,000 in 50 dollar bills, and quantities of ammunition and other supplies. Interrogation of the prisoners reveals that another landing from Cuba can be expected in the next few days.

CIA is trying to verify these reports. If the information is fully borne out, there will be a strong-if not stronger case-for OAS action against Cuba than there was following the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela in 1963. The 1963 incident led to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July 1964 which applied diplomatic and economic sanctions against Castro.

The resolution of the Foreign Ministers also contained this warning:

/2/ For full text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 328-334, or Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1964, pp. 181-182.

/3/ The President wrote the following instruction at the bottom of the memorandum: "Why don’t we provide leadership quietly now. L"

Walt

Washington, May 15, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Bowdler File, Vol. II, 2/66-7/67. Confidential.

Walt-

I met this morning with State and CIA to review the latest information on the Cuban landing in Venezuela and to see how we can provide some "quiet leadership".

The facts in the case are as I described them in staff meeting this morning, except that CIA thinks the second rubber raft foundered and did not make it back to the mother ship.

/2/ In telegram 6016 from Caracas, May 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 CUBA)

comment. The incident must be acutely embarrassing to the Venezuelan Communist Party which has been trying to resume the "via pacifica" line.

As of this afternoon, the Venezuelan OAS Delegation had taken no action to call for a meeting of the OAS Council to ask for collective action. This probably means that the Venezuelans are still debating whether to move in the OAS or the UN.

In considering the forum for OAS action and the measures which might be taken, the group concluded:

1. The only forum where meaningful obligatory action could be taken is a Meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty. This was the body which acted in 1963-64.

2. The OAS Council, under the special authority given to it by the 1962 MFM, could investigate the incident and make recommendations to governments. But this is an untried authority and it is doubtful whether the governments would want to use it in this case.

3. Use of armed force against Cuba-to blockade Cuban ports, to intercept and search Cuban ships on the high seas, or to overthrow Castro-is out of the question.

4. The measures which might be considered are:

-to condemn the Castro regime for its continued intervention.

-to establish a blacklist (OAS would do this) of trading and shipping entities and vessels which engage in significant new transactions with Cuba and agree that:

(1) no governmental contracts be awarded to listed entities;

(2) listed vessels be denied governmental or government-financed cargos;

(3) OAS member countries apply any other restrictions against the listed entities and vessels which their laws permit, and

(4) require commercial concerns in OAS member countries to observe the blacklist in their operations.

-to call to the attention of those governments supporting AALAPSO Cuba’s aggressive activities and ask them to withdraw their support of the Organization.

-to press Mexico to break all ties with Castro.

/3/ Bowdler forwarded the Department memorandum to Rostow on May 16, noting that "it parallels what I put in my memo to you yesterday." (Memorandum from Bowdler to Rostow, May 16; Johnson Library, National Security File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68)

/4/ May 16; no substantive record of the meeting has been found.

WGB

Washington, May 17, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister yesterday announced President Leoni’s decision to call for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider the problem of Cuban support for guerrilla movements in the hemisphere. The Venezuelans have as yet taken no formal action in the OAS. Their OAS Ambassador has been recalled to Caracas. We assume that he will return with orders to ask the OAS Council to convoke an MFM.

/2/ Transmitted in telegrams 6069 and 6070 from Caracas, May 16 and 17; attached but not printed. Also in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, OAS 5-2 and POL 23-7 CUBA, respectively.

You will recall that the 1964 MFM approved mandatory sanctions: break in diplomatic relations and suspension of trade and sea transportation. All have complied except Mexico.

State is taking a look at possible additional measures:

1. A strong condemnation of the Castro regime.

2. An OAS blacklist of trading and shipping entities and vessels which engage in significant transactions with Cuba.

3. Authorization for OAS member states, acting individually and collectively, to stop and search Cuban flag ships (or ships without flag) in the Caribbean suspected of acting as mother ships for Cuban-sponsored infiltration teams.

1. Prevail upon Mexico to comply with the 1964 MFM decision and break all diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

2. The United States and Latin American countries having relations with the Soviet Union to impress upon the Soviets the gravity of continued promotion of subversion by Castro.

The blacklist and stop-and-search measures raise many serious problems which need careful analysis before we sign on. State is engaged in this analysis.

In the meantime-as you will see from Bernbaum’s cable-we continue to help the Venezuelans as you promised President Leoni we would.

Walt

Washington, May 31, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Secret.

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

Yesterday I learned that the Venezuelans were about to make a formal request for an MFM to consider the Cuban case.

In checking with ARA I found that they still had not sorted out where they wanted to go because of differences inside the Bureau and with E and EUR. I told Sol Linowitz and Bob Sayre that they had better alert Foy Kohler-whom the Secretary had tapped to follow up on this one-and ask him to resolve the differences. Getting the Secretary into an MFM without knowing where we are headed is a helluva situation.

/2/ Kohler convened the meeting "as a follow-up to the Secretary’s instruction" that "he [Kohler] work out a coordinated Department position." (Memorandum for file, May 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967-69: Lot 72 D 33, Venezuelan Complaint (Cuba))

These are the highlights of the meeting:

1. Sol reported that the Venezuelans are determined to proceed with a call for an MFM under Art. 39 of the OAS Charter-probably today. They claim practically unanimous support for the convocation, but do not have the faintest idea where they want to come out beyond appointing a group to collect all the evidence on Cuban intervention.

2. Kohler noted that we are now committed to an MFM and must proceed on this basis.

3. It was agreed that we could support these measures in the MFM which would find generally wide acceptance among the Latin Americans:

a. Condemnation of Cuba for its aggressive activity.

b. Better enforcement of existing OAS sanctions approved in July 1964.

c. A renewed appeal for cooperation by friendly non-member countries in restricting trade and shipping with Cuba, and a call on countries actively supporting Cuba (the Soviets, etc.) to reassess their position in the light of Cuban subversion.

d. Action by all OAS Members to deny bunkers and government cargoes to ships in the Cuban trade. The US is already taking this action.

e. Improvement of surveillance and intercept especially in the Caribbean, search, and seizure of suspicious Cuban and unidentified vessels within a 12-mile zone, permitted under international convention, and search and seizure of such vessels outside the 12-mile zone if there is specific information of subversive intent warranting such action.

/3/ Kohler reached a decision before meeting Rusk: "I have mulled this matter over since that [May 31] meeting, trying to lean over backwards to understand the frustrations of ARA and of the Latin American countries. However, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the proposed economic sanction is not feasible." (Memorandum of record, June 1; ibid., ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Cuba, 1967)

5. Kohler made a strong point of the need for the Latin Americans to take the initiative in convincing the Europeans that they should restrict trade with Cuba. It was agreed that one action the MFM might take is to select 3 or 4 prominent and effective Latin American Foreign Ministers to go to Europe to discuss the Latin American concern over mounting Cuban intervention and the desire of the OAS for the European governments to curtail their assistance to Castro, particularly in credit guarantees and Iberia’s flights to Cuba. If the Europeans responded to this initiative, fine. If not, the OAS might consider a recommendatory blacklist.

6. As things now stand, this seems to be the sequence of contemplated action:

a. Venezuela will ask that the MFM be convoked initially at the ambassadorial level to appoint a committee to make a study of Cuban intervention in Venezuela, and other places (e.g., DR, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala) if the governments so request.

b. The study when completed would be presented to the MFM at the ministerial level.

c. The MFM would:

-denounce Cuba for its continued intervention.

-call upon the Europeans to cooperate with the measures approved by the MFM against Cuba in 1964.

-appoint a committee of Foreign Ministers to go to Europe to explain OAS concern and OAS desire for their cooperation in restricting assistance to Castro as long as he continues to promote subversion.

d. Depending upon the response of the Europeans, the MFM would reconvene. If their response is affirmative, no additional OAS action would be taken. If negative, the MFM might:

-apply the blacklist.

-deny bunkering facilities to ships calling at Cuba.

WGB

Washington, June 1, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66-12/68. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba

The Venezuelans today asked for an early Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider their complaint against Cuba.

The convocation is under the OAS Charter rather than Rio Treaty. The essential difference is that a Charter MFM is limited to recommendations, while a Rio Treaty MFM normally takes mandatory measures.

Venezuela chose the OAS Charter track because it can count on almost unanimous support for convocation. This is not the case if they moved under the Rio Treaty.

The OAS Council meets on Monday, June 5, to act on the Venezuelan request. The first step will be to convoke the MFM at the ambassadorial level. A Committee will then be appointed to go to Venezuela (and other countries which have cases against Cuba) to examine all the evidence. The MFM at the ministerial level will meet after the Committee completes its report.

Venezuela has no clear picture of what it wants the MFM to recommend. Part of its difficulty is that there is little more that can be done against Castro of an effective nature short of armed force, which is out of the question. Another problem is the general unwillingness of the larger Latin American countries to apply additional economic pressure against countries trading with Cuba.

State is still sorting out what meaningful collective action can be taken. What is needed is a keener sense by the Latin Americans that Cuban subversion is a common problem and that they should be taking the lead in: (1) publicizing Cuban interventionist activities, (2) bringing pressure on the Western Europeans to curtail their trade with Cuba; (3) forcing the Soviet bloc to define its position and (4) strengthening their internal security forces to liquidate the guerrillas at the incipient stage. What is called for, in effect, is a collective security self-help effort by the Latins.

We will be trying to move them in this direction, making clear that they can count on our shield against overt Cuban military action and our support in developing their security capabilities.

Walt

Washington, June 2, 1967, 10 a.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by Bernbaum and approved in S on June 5.

SUBJECT
Cuban Intervention in Venezuelan Affairs-OAS

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler-G
Mr. Anthony M. Solomon-E
Ambassador Maurice M. Bernbaum

Following a discussion of Venezuela’s petroleum problem, the Secretary turned to the question of the U.S. position in the OAS on Venezuela’s complaint against Cuba.

Mr. Kohler said that he had come to the conclusion that the idea presented by ARA for the establishment of a list of firms doing business with Cuba to be utilized by the member states of the OAS in denying government contracts to such firms was not feasible. It was his impression based on Mr. Solomon’s views that the potential costs to U.S. policy and U.S. interests were too great to justify the limited benefits which might be derived.

The Secretary then asked whether this would apply to the blacklisting of vessels touching at Cuban ports. Mr. Solomon said this was not a point at issue since such action was already taken by the USG and would merely represent a generalization of our policy. He explained that our policy involved the denial to such vessels of bunkering facilities in U.S. ports as well as government cargoes.

The Secretary then referred to OAS action involving the search of suspicious vessels outside territorial waters. He suggested in this connection the desirability of establishing a Caribbean Security Committee made up of countries bordering the Caribbean Sea. He thought that this would involve specifically the countries directly threatened by Cuban intervention without involving the South American countries more remote from the scene as well as Mexico. It was agreed in the ensuing discussion that this would have the great advantage of creating an organization which could facilitate and implement search procedures.

Ambassador Bernbaum then outlined a program which had been discussed the previous evening by Ambassador Linowitz, Ward Allen and others interested in the problem and which had been described earlier in the morning to Robert Sayre. This provided for the following measures:

1. An OAS denunciation of Cuban aggression in strong language.

2. Strong criticism of Soviet responsibility through assistance to Cuba making its actions possible and appealing to the Soviet Union to assist in solving this problem.

3. An appeal to friendly countries to assist in the efforts of the OAS countries to protect themselves against Cuban aggression by not encouraging or facilitating trade with that country.

4. The establishment of a high level committee, possibly made up of a selected group of foreign ministers to visit the European countries concerned and possibly the Soviet Union to make known the Latin American concern over the problem and to request collaboration. The results of this trip would be reported back to the MFM. In addition there might be behind the scenes agreement on the action by all OAS Chiefs of State to call in the Ambassadors of the European countries, Soviet Union, Canada and Japan to emphasize the appeal made in the OAS Resolution.

Further steps to be taken by the OAS would be applied in the event of the failure of the mission during its talks in Europe and other areas and would be the subject of further action by the OAS upon the submittal of their report. At that time there would be taken up various punitive measures such as (1) Generalization of U.S. policy toward vessels touching at Cuban ports to the other OAS countries; (2) The pressure on Spain to discontinue its air services to Cuba; and (3) Other appropriate and feasible measures.

Mr. Kohler said that he agreed with this program, particularly in the sense of making known to the Soviet Union the concerted feeling of the OAS countries. He felt that the Latin Americans had been far too weak and delicate in their approaches to the Soviet Union which he thought would be far more sensitive to such pressure than they apparently thought. He also agreed on the desirability of a widespread publicity campaign to make known the Latin American position.

The Secretary thought that this kind of program including the establishment of a Caribbean Security Committee would be useful. He did not, however, want the OAS action to be of such a nature as to create the impression that the United States was about to embark on an important punitive program against Cuba. He thought that we already had too many problems in our basket at the present time for such a policy to be adopted now. It seemed to him that a policy of this nature could be envisaged after a few more crises involving Cuba. The Secretary also wanted to know whether the proposed action by the Chiefs of State would be mentioned in the Resolution. Ambassador Bernbaum said that this might best be done behind the scenes. The Secretary agreed. He then asked whether the Ambassadors concerned would be called in by the Presidents en masse or individually. Ambassador Bernbaum thought that this might best be done individually. The Secretary then said that since a decision of this kind would involve President Johnson he thought it best for him to consult with the President before giving the green light. He wondered whether it might be possible for President Johnson to be exempted from this requirement by utilizing language such as "the highest feasible levels". Ambassador Bernbaum said that Foreign Ministers in Latin America did not have the prestige and weight of the Secretary of State and that it might therefore be desirable to arrange for the Chiefs of State in Latin America to do the job leaving the way open for the Secretary of State to do it in Washington. This produced some laughter and was left at that.

Washington, June 24, 1967, 1939Z.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret.

CAP 67582. As you requested, I had a good meeting this morning with CIA, State and DOD on the whole guerrilla problem in Latin America.

This is the boxscore:

To understand these figures it is necessary to appreciate that each organized guerrilla can tie up 10-20 government soldiers. We do better in Viet-Nam only because of airpower, mobility, firepower, etc.

These are some further insights into the situation in each country:

Bolivia:

We have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the fragility of the political situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement. The active band numbers probably 50-60 but may run up to 100. CIA believes that "Che" Guevara has been with this group. There are indications that six other bands, totalling 100-200 men may be organizing in other parts of the country. President Barrientos is hard pressed in coping with the active band. If other fronts were successfully opened, the situation could get out of hand. The 17-man mobile training team we have in Bolivia expects to have another ranger battalion trained by September 1.

The active movement has 8 top Bolivian Communist Party leaders in it who were trained in the Soviet Union. The owner of the farm which the guerrillas used as their training camp belongs to a man (Roberto Peredo) who visited Moscow in 1966. We know of six Cuban military officers in this band. We also know that they have radio contact with Cuba using the same procedures taught by the Soviets.

Guatemala:

The guerrillas are divided into two organizations. The FAR-250 men-has the backing of Castro. Last summer when President Mendez Montenegro took over, the guerrillas were making steady progress. With the death of FAR leader Turcios and strong pressure by the Guatemalan military. The guerrillas have been scattered and are on the defensive.

In September 1966, Mexican authorities uncovered an arms smuggling channel to Guatemalan insurgents. Documents found showed that over 4000 weapons had been sent. A Cuban Embassy officer was caught red handed passing money to the smugglers.

Venezuela:

This is Cuba’s primary target. After 1963 the guerrilla movement came to a virtual standstill while the Venezuelan Communist Party debated whether to pursue the peaceful or violent approach. The party split and Douglas Bravo led the activist faction into resumed guerrilla activity. Since mid-1966 his group (150-250 men) and the MIR group (100 men) have stepped up their campaign. Leoni responded by organizing 9 new ranger battalions which we are helping to train and equip.

Soviet-manufactured AK-13 weapons have been captured in Venezuela from guerrillas known to have landed from Cuba in July 1966. The boat and motors used are known to have come from Cuba. In May 1967 a Cuban/Venezuelan group landed from a Cuban fishing vessel. The Venezuelans escaped into the mountains, but two Cubans were captured and two killed.

Colombia:

There are two guerrilla units operating, one responsive to Cuba and the other to the USSR. After a long inactive period, they resumed operations last February. So far the operations have consisted of sporadic hit-and-run raids. The Colombian armed forces, which are well-trained and disciplined, are putting pressure on them. President Lleras has moved quickly to improve intelligence collection, strengthen coordination between services and mount social programs in guerrilla

areas. There is no Cuban presence in Colombia, but there is hard evidence of Colombians being trained in Cuba. The guerrillas do not represent an immediate threat to Lleras.

Dominican Republic:

There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities.

Ecuador and Peru:

Cuba tried to start guerrilla activities in these two countries about two years ago. The movements were quickly put down, but they remain as potential trouble spots. Cuba continues to train nationals from both countries.

I have collected a full folder of background material which you may want to review.

/2/ According to a June 24 note, the President told Jim Jones to "hold this, I want to talk to him [Rostow] about this tomorrow." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Latin America Miscellaneous 1967)

Rostow was in the delegation that met Johnson on June 25 for the second Glassboro meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily

Diary) No evidence was found indicating whether Johnson talked to Rostow about Cuban subversion at Glassboro.

W.W.R.

President Johnson raised the issue of Cuban subversion in Latin America at the Glassboro Summit with Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. According to the official record of the afternoon session on June 25, 1967, the President said "he wished to inform Mr. Kosygin of an extremely important matter. He said we had direct evidence of Cuba’s encouragement of guerrilla operations in seven Latin American countries. This was a form of aggression and was dangerous to peace in the Hemisphere as well as in the world at large. He pointed out that

Soviet-manufactured arms coming from Cuba had been seized in Venezuela in July 1966 and in May 1967, with seven Cubans having been captured in this latter incident. He also wished to point out that on March 13 of this year, Castro openly stated his support for this type of activity. The Government of Venezuela had stated its determination to put an end to such operations. Our Ambassador to the OAS and some of his colleagues from the Organization were now investigating in Venezuela the evidence of those activities. The President emphasized that he therefore strongly felt that Castro should be convinced to stop what he was doing. Mr. Kosygin did not comment on this statement." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US) For the complete memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV, Document 235.

That evening Johnson gave former President Eisenhower the following account of this discussion with Kosygin: "[I] told him there were 6 or 7 hot spots; that they’re using Soviet material, Cuba was; that we caught a bunch of them the other day in Venezuela; that they were giving us hell in the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, and Bolivia, and half a dozen places; that this is a very serious matter, Soviet equipment and

Castro-trained people." Johnson said Kosygin "ought to realize that we thought this was very serious and we were going to have to take action-the OAS was going to take action." The President then asked Kosygin for a response. According to Johnson’s account, Kosygin "said he couldn’t comment now, but he was leaving for Cuba tomorrow, and he would bear these things in mind in talking to them. Acted like he was a little upset with Castro. Didn’t say so." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 25, 1967, 9:44 p.m., Tape F67.13, Side A, PNO 1) An uncorrected transcript of the conversation is ibid.

Washington, July 6, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

/2/ A memorandum of the meeting, drafted by Bowdler, is ibid.

This time we examined the adequacy of current DOD, CIA and AID/Public Safety (police) programs in the seven countries with active or potential insurgency movements.

Our conclusions were:

This is our most serious problem, not because of the size of the guerrilla movement, but the weakness of the security forces and fragility of the political situation. Given Bolivia’s limited capacity to assimilate our assistance, we should for now:

-press forward with the training of a second Ranger Battalion, and develop an intelligence unit to work with the Battalion.

-expand our police program in rural areas.

-start contingency planning for dealing with a situation which Barrientos can no longer control.

President Lleras Camargo is concerned and working for better coordination and action by his security services. We have good on-going military, intelligence and police programs. We agreed that:

-DOD would review equipment needs of the armed forces in the light of CINCSO’s recommendations.

-Covey Oliver would consider a modest expansion of the rural police program.

With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good progress in our internal security programs. No additional measures by us are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police. Covey Oliver will ask John Crimmins to make the pitch.

There is no active insurgency, but this is a good time to help the Ecuadoreans improve their grossly deficient rural police. Covey Oliver will work out an expanded program with AID/Public Safety.

Mendez Montenegro has tackled the insurgency problem with energy and has accomplished a good deal. He has welcomed our assistance and we have responded with additional help on the military and police side. Our present programs look about right. A modest increase in our rural police program is warranted and Covey Oliver will pursue this.

There is no active insurgency. The security forces have demonstrated their ability to handle insurgent bands in the past. Our current programs are adequate.

We have done what Leoni asked you for at Punta del Este: to expedite delivery of equipment for 9 new Ranger battalions. [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] Additional support for the National Guard (police) in rural areas is needed and Covey Oliver will work this out with AID/Public Safety.

/3/ Documentation on the IRG/ARA Counter-Insurgency Subgroup is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IRG/ARA, 1966-68: Files: Lot 70 D 122.

-keep a close watch over Cuban insurgency trends throughout the hemisphere.

-review individual country situations and requirements.

-expedite decisions on increased assistance, as necessary.

/4/ Copies of the letter and subsequent replies are ibid., ARA Files, 1967-69: Lot 72 D 33, Military/Security Policy.

From the review which I have made, I am convinced that at the present level of insurgency in Latin America, the important elements of the equation are:

1. For the most part, the institutional base for internal security in Latin America is primitive. The opportunities we have to build it up vary with the local officials in power. We must be alert to every chance given us to advance the building process.

2. If the President of the country is concerned over the problem and willing to act, the armed forces will back him and, with our assistance, they can produce impressive results. This has been the case in Guatemala. We hope to repeat it in Bolivia.

3. The cost to us in furnishing "preventive medicine" assistance is small, but our Ambassadors and their country teams must understand the key importance of "preventive medicine" and exploit every opportunity which presents itself.

4. The "Establishment" in Washington must be geared to keeping a continuous review of the problem and acting quickly on assistance requirements.

Walt

Washington, September 7, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Vol. I, 1/64-8/68. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/ A joint meeting of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market was held in Asuncion August 28-September 2. Additional documentation on the meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ECIN 3 LA, ECIN 3 LAFTA, and ECIN 3 CACM.

Bill Bowdler met with Covey Oliver and his Latin American Common Market experts to review the results of the Asuncion meeting which the press has reported as a failure.

Two things emerged:

-until we have a fuller picture of what took place at the LAFTA (South American countries, plus Mexico) session, where we do not have observer status, it is premature to draw conclusions about the lack of success at Asuncion and what country was responsible.

-despite inability of LAFTA to reach agreement on the first try on certain key issues, interest in the economic integration movement has not slackened and the timetable agreed at Punta del Este has not been irretrievably upset.

We had hoped the Asuncion meeting would agree on three major issues:

-programmed tariff reductions among LAFTA members.

-preparations by LAFTA members for a common external tariff.

-mechanism for joint LAFTA-CACM exploration of gradual merger into a Latin American Common Market.

Up until the last two days of the meeting, it seemed that agreement would be reached on the first two points based on a compromise formula which would give the poorest countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) free access to the markets of all the other LAFTA members in five years.

At the last moment, Peru asked to receive similar treatment as the poor countries. The other LAFTA members balked, and Peru’s continued refusal to drop its request worked as a veto. This, in turn, seems to have triggered a veto by Paraguay of other decisions relating to programmed tariff cuts and preparations for a common external tariff.

We do not know why Peru took this inflexible position. It had not been enthusiastic about a common market from the start, and recent financial problems probably compounded its fears about competition from other countries. Significantly, none of the big three-Argentina, Brazil, Mexico-opposed the concession to the poor countries. They would have been harder to turn around than Peru.

Disappointing as the results were, it is important to look at the Asuncion round in perspective:

-the meeting showed that most of the LAFTA countries are prepared to move rapidly toward a common market.

-LAFTA gave its blessing to the formation of an Andean subregional group (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile) which plans to reduce trade barriers among themselves at a faster pace than provided in the President’s timetable.

-at the joint LAFTA-CACM meeting the Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend annual meetings to consider acceleration of execution of the Punta del Este decisions and decided to establish a Coordinating Committee to study on a priority basis five key aspects of the merger of the two groups.

-the Meeting of Presidents envisaged an 18-month period or more for the Latin Americans to negotiate all the specific arrangements leading toward a common market.

-LAFTA members, while disappointed at the inability to reach agreement on all issues, do not look upon the meeting as a failure. This is reflected in public statements by the Argentine and Colombian Foreign Ministers.

-the European economic integration movement faced several complex negotiating sessions before basic obstacles were removed.

To keep the momentum of the movement going, two things must be done:

-get Peru turned around.

-have the LAFTA Foreign Ministers renew negotiations as rapidly as possible, preferably before the second quarter of 1968 which they have set for their next meeting.

Among the opportunities we will have to use our influence with the LAFTA group are:

-the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington on September 22-23 to consider Venezuela’s complaint against Cuba.

-the World Bank and Fund meetings in Rio de Janeiro in mid-September. Tony Solomon and Don Palmer (Covey Oliver’s Common Market man) will attend.

-a special CIAP meeting in Rio at the end of September to consider the financial aspects of economic integration.

-Tony Solomon is going to Peru after the Rio Bank-IMF meeting to address a group of Peruvian businessmen. He will speak on the advantage of economic integration. He will also be able to talk to Belaunde about the Peruvian attitude.

-We may help Peru overcome its integration fears by supporting the Andean subregional group, with necessary adjustment assistance if they take specific action cutting tariffs among themselves.

/3/ The President wrote the following instructions on the memorandum: "Let’s follow these carefully & keep me informed. L"

Walt

Washington, September 7, 1967, 2151Z.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67-9/67. Secret. James R. Jones, Assistant to the President, wrote the following note on the telegram: "9-7-67. Sent copy to Christian & he might leak it."

CAP 67764. This lively memorandum to me from Covey Oliver on counterinsurgency developments in Latin America will give you some satisfaction.

"As you know, we and the Latinos have our ups and downs in the counterinsurgency business. But I want to call to your attention an unusual series of successes which have taken place in three Latin American countries during the past few weeks. They are particularly significant in that they follow close on the heels of the militant and optimistic pronouncements by Castro and his fellow Latin American revolutionaries at the recent Havana meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO).

1. Bolivia:

A. An important cache of passports, signal plans and other documents was discovered by a Bolivian Army element. Inter alia, the documents provide solid evidence that Che Guevara earlier this year was in Bolivia operating with the guerrillas.

/2/ Documentation on the subsequent capture and death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna is in Documents 170-173.

2. Venezuela:

In early August, Venezuelan police learned that the principal action arm of the Communist subversives in Caracas was a 50-man terrorist unit called Strategic Sabotage Command. Since that time, the unit has been ‘decapitated.’ The commander was captured and his four lieutenants killed in a series of police raids. A roundup of the lower echelons is now underway.

3. Nicaragua:

On August 12 the Guardia Nacional began a sweep of an area of north central Nicaragua on the basis of fragmentary reports of guerrilla training camps. Insurgent basecamps were located and we estimate that in a subsequent series of firefights at least 14 Castro-oriented guerrillas were wiped out. The survivors are reported fleeing the area on an ‘every-man-for-himself’ basis.

The situation in Guatemala continues to improve, while in Colombia there have been no significant contacts between government forces and insurgents recently.

All in all, while one swallow doesn’t make a summer, August 1967 has been a vintage month for the COIN forces in Latin America."

Washington, September 25, 1967, 4 p.m.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Organization of American States, Vol. II. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

/2/ The final plenary sessions of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States were held in Washington September 22-24. Documentation on the meeting is ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9/22-24/67; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966-1972: Lot 68 D 453, CF 212 and CF 213.

On all counts, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers went well, within the limits of what we thought possible.

The basic resolution was approved 20 to 0, with Mexico abstaining.

/3/ Attached but not printed. For an excerpt of the Final Act, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 648-652; the text of the final act of the meeting, including the "basic resolution," is in Department of State Bulletin, October 16, 1967, pp. 493-498.

-a strong condemnation of Cuba for acts of aggression in Ve