Volume Summary
(This is not an official statement of policy by the Department of State; it is intended only as a guide to the contents of this volume.)
Since 1861, the Department of State's documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States has constituted the official record of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States. Historians in the Office of the Historian collect, arrange, and annotate the principal documents comprising the record of American foreign policy. The standards for the preparation of the series and the general deadlines for its publication are established by the Foreign Relations of the United States statute of October 28, 1991 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). Volumes in the Foreign Relations series are published when all the necessary editing, declassification, and printing steps have been completed.
The documents in this volume are drawn from the centralized indexed files of the Department of State and the decentralized Bureau, Office, and other lot files of the relevant Departmental units. The editors also made extensive use of Presidential and other papers at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, as well as recordings of President Johnson's telephone conversations. In addition, the volume includes records of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Almost all of the documents printed here were originally classified. The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, in concert with the appropriate offices in other agencies or governments, carried out the declassification of the selected documents.
Summary
Dominican Republic
In January 1964, the U.S. intelligence community characterized the Dominican Republic as rife with instability and one of Latin America's least prepared countries for representative democracy, but the intelligence analysts also predicted that "the leftists pose no serious threat to seize control" and that "[f]or the immediate future at least, the present regime, in one form or another, may be able to hold on to power for an indefinite period." (1)
President Johnson's close advisers, however, were not so sanguine. Their immediate and overarching concern was to prevent the Dominican Republic from becoming a "second Cuba." Citing "a deterioration in political and economic conditions which could lead to a Castro-type takeover," White House Special Assistant Ralph Dungan recommended more than simply reacting to the fluid situation as events occurred. (2) After eight weeks at post, the new U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., underscored this state of crisis. Bennett reported extreme economic misery and proposed a number of financial measures to temper the harsh effects of the widely unpopular austerity program instituted by the ruling Triumvirate's head, Reid Cabral. Bennett also pushed for a full-scale implementation of the Alliance for Progress program in the Dominican Republic as the first step in creating a climate conducive to a return to constitutional and representative government. (5)
The Johnson administration, however, was careful not to align itself too closely with any of the more prominent Dominican leaders, both past and present: Reid Cabral's administration was "erratic"; the exiled Juan Bosch--the first democratically elected President who had been ousted in 1963--exhibited leftist leanings; and Joaqu?n Balaguer, President from 1960 to 1961, was too colored by his association with the late dictator Trujillo. (11, 14)
In early 1965, Johnson's advisers on the Dominican Republic became increasingly concerned over the activities of deposed President Juan Bosch who was exiled in Puerto Rico. Believing Bosch was "anti-American" and "grossly abusing his status as a political asylee on our shores," Bennett warned Thomas Mann, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, that Bosch was attempting to "rouse the military against Reid." (18) Mann's response was to take no action, yet he predicted presciently that Bosch's "only chance to regain power probably lies in some kind of upheaval within the Dominican Republic." (19) On April 25, Mann's prediction was nearly proven correct: Reid resigned under pressure from a mixed military group aligned with Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party. (21)
The next day, President Johnson turned to his trusted friends Mann and future Supreme Court Justice, Abe Fortas, for advice. Fortas long had an interest in Latin America and maintained close contacts with key Hispanics in Puerto Rico. (22, 23) Fearful that Communist elements were infiltrating the new government and taking advantage of the "constitutionalist" rebels who supported Bosch, Johnson and his advisers worked quickly to prevent a "second Cuba." The first step was to support the "loyalist" Dominican military. (24)
Three days after the ouster of Reid Cabral, the Johnson administration concluded that the conservative loyalist troops were ill-equipped to fight successfully against the leftist constitutionalists who were swiftly gaining ground. The conflict endangered American citizens residing in Santo Domingo. On April 28, 1965, Bennett requested the immediate landing of U.S. Marines in the capital city. (32) Believing that the "judgment of those on the spot" ought to be followed, Mann, McGeorge Bundy and the President agreed to Bennett's request. (31) When Johnson briefed congressional leaders on the decision to intervene militarily, he was careful not to play up the threat of Communist expansion and emphasized instead humanitarian objectives. (35) Privately, however, Johnson was convinced (unlike some of his advisers) (48) of an impending Communist takeover and energetically sought to prevent this "disaster" from happening. (38, 39, 40)
After sending in the Marines, President Johnson focused on "legitimizing" the operation. He rigorously sought CIA evidence of Communist infiltration and asked the Organization of American States (OAS) to contribute troops to an international peacekeeping force in an attempt to temper growing international criticism of the unilateral U.S. action. (44) At the same time, however, Johnson instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to be prepared to "take the island," told Secretary of State Rusk to have it "take on the right color," (42) and instructed U.S. Information Agency Director Carl Rowan to spearhead an aggressive international public relations campaign to frame the intervention in a positive light. (54) To coordinate all these efforts, Johnson ordered the establishment of a task force chaired by Bundy to "study the situation every day." (49, 55)
The administration simultaneously took other steps to increase the chances of reaching a peaceful resolution. The U.S. Embassy encouraged the establishment of a cease-fire and an "international neutral zone of refuge" (later called "international security zone") to protect the various embassies in Santo Domingo. (52) OAS Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, President of the Council of American States in April 1965, called the Council into session to clarify the reasons for the armed intervention. Abe Fortas employed his contacts in Puerto Rico to begin discussions with Juan Bosch and Joaqu?n Balaguer. (55, 66, 67) Lastly, President Johnson began consultations with former President of Venezuela R?mulo Betancourt (56) and with other Latin American leaders to consider an interim commission or a trusteeship government to run the Dominican Republic until the election of a new president. (57)
From May to August 1965, U.S. officials in Santo Domingo held intense negotiations with all the Dominican factions. When the OAS disapproved of the idea of an interim commission, the Johnson administration pushed for the establishment of a "provisional coalition government." (63) In mid-May, Johnson sent Bundy with a team of experts to the Dominican Republic to negotiate a settlement based on the coordinating theme "constitutionalism si, communism no." (76-79) But the Bundy team's insistence that Communists be deported, interned, or separated from the Dominican community ultimately stalled the negotiations. Dominican presidential candidate of the constitutionalists, Antonio Guzm?n, refused to consider the forced departure of three leading rebels. (86, 89, 90, 94, 96)
With the failure of the Bundy mission to reach an agreement, the Johnson administration prepared to transfer more of the responsibility for the negotiations over to the OAS. On June 2, the OAS adopted a resolution that established an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of two Latin American ambassadors and Ellsworth Bunker, to negotiate a deal. (103) Bunker received instructions to help establish an interim government as soon as possible. He in turn proposed that it be legally authorized by an "Institutional Act" which would delineate the interim government's administrative prerogatives and functions. (105)
By the end of June, the Ad Hoc Committee proposed a solution to the crisis. It recommended in part general elections for the President and Vice President of the Dominican Republic to be held no earlier than six months but no later than nine months from the present date, and the establishment of a Provisional Government. (108, 109) Throughout the month of July and well into August, negotiations centered on the contents of the Institutional Act, the naming of Garc?a Godoy as President of the Provisional Government, and the composition of the armed forces high command. (114-120) Finally on August 31, members of the constitutionalist government, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the Government of National Reconstruction signed the Act of Dominican Reconciliation which indicated their acceptance of the Provisional Government under Godoy. (127, 128)
Perceiving a Communist threat to the fragile Godoy government, the Johnson administration in September 1965 approved the establishment of a special informal committee "to handle the Communist problem," and pushed hard for an agreement from Godoy to take appropriate action to protect against Communist infiltration. (129, 130) But Godoy's actions in this regard proved to be less than satisfactory. The U.S. Government wanted him to "redress the balance" and to curb the widespread impression that the constitutionalists and their extremist allies enjoyed "the best of it" since the installation of the new government. (138)
In December 1965 and early 1966, President Johnson and his advisers turned their attention to the June 1966 Dominican presidential elections, and agreed to set up a covert election operation for their favored candidate Joaqu?n Balaguer. (150, 152, 155, 157) Meanwhile, in Santo Domingo, Bunker and Bennett continued to work with Godoy on the departure of military leaders who were considered to be extremists. (153, 154, 156, 159)
In March 1966, the Johnson administration grew concerned over Juan Bosch's threat to boycott the elections because of what he perceived to be a "systematic campaign of violence " against his followers. Bunker and others in the administration believed it was essential for Bosch to remain in the race if it was to be "meaningful and acceptable" to as many Dominicans as possible. (162) The administration considered giving covert funds to Bosch as well, but this plan was not adopted. (163) Opinion polls showed Balaguer clearly in the lead and assured of victory. (165) The problem became how to dispel the allegation that the United States favored Balaguer and was secretly funneling money into his campaign. (168, 170, 172, 173) A decent showing by Bosch would dispel some of these charges.
On June 1 Balaguer won the presidential election with 57.09 percent of the vote while Bosch captured 39.17 percent. With the favored candidate in office, Johnson instructed the new Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Hugh Crimmins, "to push a strong self-help line with Balaguer." President Johnson did not want "the political and economic consolidation of Balaguer's government to stall for lack of necessary U.S. support." (179) The U.S. offered a $40 million assistance loan and other forms of economic aid for this effort (185, 186), but as 1967 began signs of increasing political polarization worried the Johnson administration. To help the Balaguer government counteract this polarization, the Johnson administration considered additional types of economic assistance as 1967 progressed. (193, 195, 199) On May 11, 1967, Johnson approved a special deficit allocation of sugar to the Dominican Republic (201) and in December a $30 million assistance package. (207)
U.S. policy during 1968 continued to emphasize economic assistance to bolster the Balaguer government. The U.S. pushed for development loans and grants (210) and once again approved a special deficit allocation of sugar to the Dominican Republic. (214) In spite of these efforts, the U.S. conceded that "political stability is not firmly established and its continuation is far from certain" (212) but did not foresee an "acute crisis looming." (218) Instead, it believed the odds were better than even that the Balaguer government would survive through the 1970 presidential elections. (216, 220, 221)
Cuba
President Johnson continued the Kennedy administration's anti-Castro policy with the ultimate goal of replacing Castro's government with one more acceptable to the United States. For the short term, however, the United States sought to block Castro's campaign of subversion in Latin America, to weaken Soviet influence in Cuba and Latin America, and to isolate Cuba economically.
The United States Government seemed to have very little direct influence on Castro's Cuba. There was virtually no direct contact or communication between the two governments, except for a few formal protests transmitted by the Swiss in Havana or the Czechs in Washington. Much of the U.S. diplomatic effort went towards getting allies to pressure and weaken Castro through a concerted campaign of allied trade sanctions against and isolation of Cuba. Under Secretary of State George Ball's speech before the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on March 23, 1964, (255) provided a definitive statement of U.S. policy toward Cuba: the loss of Cuba to communism was not just a loss to the United States, but to all free nations because it had created a beachhead of communism in Latin America. Ball called for a policy of economic denial to Cuba supported by all of the Western alliance. However, repeated and persistent U.S. initiatives with Western leaders were ineffective (241, 284, 285), and the trade embargo sprang many leaks. For example, the British sold buses to Cuba and the French sent locomotives in early 1964.
The United States program of covert harassment against Cuba also proved ineffective. In a meeting at the White House on April 7, 1964, (259) the Johnson administration agreed to suspend CIA-sponsored sabotage raids pending further review (they were never resumed by Johnson), but decided to continue the collection of intelligence, covert propaganda actions to encourage resistance, cooperation with other agencies in economic denial operations, infiltration of dissident elements inside Cuba, and indirect economic sabotage outlined by the CIA-prepared paper of June 8, 1963. (Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI, Document 346) The administration also debated the value of non-CIA controlled autonomous sabotage operations (it was decided to shut down the last of these operations, Manuel Artime?s, on March 4, 1965). (296, 298) The overwhelming view of U.S. Government officials, especially in the Department of State, was that the covert actions were almost completely ineffective and merely complicated U.S. efforts in the Organization of American States (OAS) to take strong action against Cuba. Furthermore, the United States did not want to do anything that might provoke Castro to shoot down a U-2 overflight reconnaissance plane trying to verify that Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons were not reintroduced into Cuba. The Soviets were strongly believed to have handed over control of the SAM missile sites in Cuba in April or May 1964, and such a shoot down became a real possibility.
The United States convinced the OAS to adopt a series of measures against Cuba in the Final Act of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on July 26, 1964, including suspensions of diplomatic relations, trade, and transportation between Cuba and all OAS member states. Following a strong warning to Cuba about not interfering with U.S. overflights delivered through the Czechs (with the assumption that this information would also come to the attention of the Soviets) (250, 253, 256), there were no incidents or crises over reconnaissance during the rest of the Johnson presidency.
The Johnson administration arranged a refugee airlift and repatriation of American citizens from Cuba beginning in December 1965, which continued into the 1970s and eventually allowed approximately 120,000 refugees to leave Cuba. The difficult issues of the hijacking of U.S. airplanes to Cuba and the problems of U.S. citizen travel to Cuba are also covered in the Cuba compilation. (308)
Any initiatives to improve U.S.-Cuban relations proved short-lived and fruitless. Friction and hostility between the two governments were manifest from the beginning of 1964 with Cuban fishing vessels and Guantanamo water shutoff incidents (228-238) leading to Castro's declaration to a foreign journalist in February 1968 that "our quarrel with American imperialism is total and insurmountable" and "we have no contacts with the U.S. and have no desire for any." (324) A July 15, 1968, draft National Policy Paper (NPP) (322), prepared by the State Department?s Policy Planning Council Working Group on Cuba, proposed a series of incremental reciprocal improvements in relations with Cuba. However, this change in policy was opposed by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs and other influential officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and in the National Security Council. The NPP on Cuba was never formally processed for approval because it was decided that the issue should be considered by the new administration. (322) Policy towards Cuba at the end of the Johnson administration continued in much the same vein as it had begun in January 1964.
Haiti
Although the Johnson administration continued Kennedy's aversion to the brutal Duvalier dictatorship, President Johnson and his advisers felt they had no choice but to try to live with the Duvalier regime as long as there was no viable alternative to his dictatorial rule. The basic dilemma that confronted Kennedy also confronted Johnson: Duvalier's rule was repressive and corrupt, but there was no one yet able to take his place.
The U.S. Government's policy goals for Haiti were stability, continued alignment with the West, and most importantly continued opposition to the Communist camp, especially to the lure of nearby Cuba under Fidel Castro. The Johnson administration continued Kennedy's program of identifying and secretly fostering potential Haitian successors to Duvalier among the Haitian exile community. This interest was one of the U.S. Government's main concerns relating to Haiti during this period because Duvalier was ill much of the time, and because there was always the possibility that he might be assassinated or overthrown. The United States was unwilling to precipitate his downfall, fearing that it would create a power vacuum leading to anarchy, or even worse, a pro-Castro Communist takeover. Instead, the United States improved its intelligence by identifying individuals and groups acceptable to the United States as the nucleus of a potential successor Haitian Government. (360)
The problem was how far the United States should go toward accommodation with Duvalier. An internal Department of State paper of April 23, 1964, recommended: "The United States is now faced with the prospect that the Duvalier regime will continue to rule Haiti for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances it is in the U.S. interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of mutual accommodation." (329) The United States sought to improve the economic and social life of the Haitian people without providing assistance that would prop up Duvalier's regime. (352, 357) During the Johnson administration U.S. economic assistance to Haiti began to slowly increase, after having been virtually eliminated during the Kennedy administration. A Malaria Eradication Program was strengthened, and programs to encourage tourism were instituted. The U.S. Government continued to prohibit budget-supporting assistance or any other economic aid that could be easily pilfered by the corrupt Duvalier regime. (327, 328, 329)
There were several exile invasions of Haiti during 1964-1968. In each case the United States was an interested observer, but did not support the operations. U.S. law enforcement officials moved against Haitian exiles who launched their attacks from U.S. soil. (331, 334) The Johnson administration also continued to try to frustrate Duvalier's efforts to buy arms in the United States or other countries. (332, 333)
There was one area in which U.S. policy towards Haiti took a new initiative. On April 22, 1965, 303 Committee principals approved the use of Haitian exiles to broadcast radio programs in Creole to counter Communist propaganda from Radio Havana.
Guyana
In 1964, U.S. policy towards British Guiana was heavily influenced by the Cold War fear that Cheddi Jagan, the elected Prime Minister of the United Kingdom's colony of British Guiana, was an avowed Marxist who would create "another Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere if the colony were granted independence with Jagan in power. In October 1963, Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, convinced Jagan and the other Guianese leaders at the London Constitutional Conference to accept an electoral system based on proportional representation, new elections to be held before formal independence, and the convening of another constitutional conference following the elections to settle any remaining constitutional issues and to fix the date for independence. Furthermore, the British Government refused to lower the voting age to eighteen.
Such decisions spelled political trouble for Jagan who enjoyed virtually all the support of the East Indian population (the fastest growing segment in British Guiana and soon to be the majority). Anti-Jagan political leaders and parties combined their efforts to defeat Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) candidates in the pre-independence election. Also in 1964, British Guiana underwent a period of civil strife with violent labor disputes in the sugar plantations and killings and assaults in the villages and towns. Jagan asked the British to postpone the elections, allow him to form a coalition government, and send a special emissary by Washington to try to improve his relations with the Johnson administration, all to no avail. (381, 384)
The United States exerted continual and strenuous influence upon the British Government to suspend the constitution, to impose direct British rule, to assume control over internal security and the police, and to maximize U.S.-U.K. cooperation against Jagan. (371, 385) The United States persuaded the British to prevent the entry of personnel, funds, and arms from Cuba into the colony for Jagan's benefit, and assisted in this effort. The U.S. Government also convinced the British to hold the elections as soon as possible after the U.S. election, despite efforts by Jagan with the British Governor and, after October 1964, the new Labor Government, to get them postponed. (380, 387)
Jagan believed with good reason that Washington's opposition was one of his main problems. While these diplomatic efforts were underway, the U.S. Government acted on a covert political plan to defeat Jagan by funneling secret financial support, campaign advice and expertise, and other assistance to the two main opposition parties, Linden Forbes Burnham's People?s National Congress (PNC) and Peter D'Aguiar's United Front (UF). (370) Realizing that Burnham, as the leading Afro-Guyanese politician, was Jagan's most able and by far his most popular opponent, the U.S. Government focused its efforts on him and the PNC. (391, 414) The U.S. Government supplied anti-Jagan films and publications, cut almost all aid to British Guiana, and refused all of Jagan's overtures for high-level meetings with U.S. officials, hoping to undercut his prestige.
Burnham and the PNC won the December 1964 election. With the pro-American leader in power, the United States, with British approval, provided assistance to Burnham, his party, his political allies in the United Front party, the police, the unions, and on the country as a whole. (403, 405, 423, 433) Presidential Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Consul General (later Ambassador) Carlson, and the small group of officers in the Department of State and the CIA formed a management group determined to keep Jagan out of power. With Burnham in office and in control, they encouraged the British to grant independence sooner rather than later. (411) After independence was granted by the British in May 1966, the country took the name of Guyana. The United States supplied economic assistance for road building and other development projects, and it also provided food assistance. When political disputes and personal animosity between Burnham and Peter D'Aguiar of the United Front threatened the anti-Jagan front, U.S. officials worked to keep the two parties allied and the government together until the last days of 1968. (407) The United States again provided financial support and electoral expertise to get Burnham reelected in 1968. (419) Burnham met with President Johnson and other U.S. Government officials several times during this period after formal independence in May 1966. (420, 426)
Even though East Indians became the majority group in the country and despite friction between Burnham and other members of his coalition, the PNC won the elections in December 1968 and Burnham was returned as Prime Minister. Part of Burnham's success was based on the use of absentee overseas Guyanese voters, a plan of which the United States was aware and did not oppose. (419, 421, 422)
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