U.S. Department of State

On January 6, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk forwarded to President Johnson the Department's first "Items for Evening Reading." Four days earlier Benjamin Read, State Department Executive Secretary, had notified all Assistant Secretaries of State that "Items for Evening Reading" would be forwarded to the President each weekday, Monday through Friday, based on items that they thought "should be brought to the attention of the President that evening because of their foreign policy importance and possible political or news impact." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, President's Evening Reading)

The President's State Department Evening Reading File at the Johnson Library contains 1- to 2-page reports (usually titled "Items for Evening Reading" through late 1966 and "State Department Activities Report" thereafter) for most weekdays from January 1964 through mid-December 1968. Many copies are marked with an indication that the President saw them. According to a memorandum to the President from National Security Council Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, March 31, 1966 (Document 165), the report was sent to the President about 8 p.m. each weekday. On December 11, 1967, Read forwarded updated guidelines to the Assistant Secretaries of State, stating that the evening reading was "intended to give the President in highly compressed form significant and timely information on foreign affairs and the Department's activities" that was "not readily available from other sources." Besides substantive matters, the President was interested in public relations activities and important Bureau meetings with members of Congress, special interest groups, and media representatives. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Memos File: Lot 72 D 372)

Washington, January 16, 1964, 1:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins, Tape F64.06, Side A, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues other than foreign relations.]

President: Now let me ask you this. They tell me that we shouldn't send a Negro to an African country as an ambassador. Is that true?

Wilkins: The Africans have strenuously denied it when we have confronted them with it. I don't know whether it's true or not. All I can say is that diplomatically they have said no. Some of them have been vehement in denying it. Others have said this is silly. And I don't know exactly how they feel about it. I would say that if you made a uniform practice of assigning Negroes--or such Negroes as you had--to African countries, they would resent it. You understand.

President: I agree with that. But we've got'em in Scandinavia and we've got'em in other countries, and what I want to do is enlarge 'em a little more. They don't have their twelve percent. Now I'm not a percentage man, but if we can find some of the top people in this country--I mean you take either of the [unintelligible] would be wonderful ambassadors to some country, but top men. I would like to get'em up to where they are at least in walking distance of the rest of us.

Wilkins: Exactly.

President: I can't do it though if I've got twenty or thirty Latin American countries and thirty-odd African countries and they're just barred because somebody says so. Now I thought it was the Negro community in this country that was objecting to it.

Wilkins: No, they wouldn't object like the Africans would object if it became a uniform policy. I don't believe they would object. The Africans are the ones.

President: We've got one in Sweden now, and Goodman, on my Scandinavian trip, a Negro. So I'm going to try to have one or two, and you might get one or two of the most outstanding ones that you know in the United States. You ought to have me a list of that. You better just go to work, and if you want Whitney Young or somebody, get some real outstandingly--the worse job I can perform is to name one that's a failure.

Wilkins: That's true. That's very true, and I agree with you one hundred percent.

President: And I don't know this field as well as you do. I'm going to rely on you, so you get four or five of the top ones that are like Bob Weaver or like Carl Rowan.

Wilkins: Very good, Mr. President. In the meanwhile I'll make additional inquiries among the Africans.

/2/President Johnson was considering naming Carl Rowan, then Ambassador to Finland, to succeed Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency. Murrow stepped down on January 20 and Rowan was appointed his successor on February 27.

Wilkins: Very good, I'll do that. I'm home today doing a little paperwork because Mrs. Wilkins is not well and I want to be with her. I didn't want you to think I wasn't in my office cause I'm loafing on the job.

President: Give her my regards. Tell her I hope it's nothing Lady Bird gave her to eat that made her sick.

Wilkins: Not a chance of that. Thank you so much. I'll try out Rowan, I'll check on the African nations, and I'll get you a list.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues other than foreign relations.]

During a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Rusk that began at 9:25 p.m. on January 20, 1964, President Johnson revealed that he had offered Mary Lasker the Ambassadorship to Finland but she had turned it down. He then stated that "I want to get some real outstanding woman in this country pretty soon, so you think of that," concluding that "I want to get that pretty soon before these women run me out." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape 64.12, Side B, PNO 2) At a midday news conference on January 25, the President announced that he expected a report the following week from his Cabinet officers regarding women in government service. Johnson stated that "you are going to find more attractive, capable women working for this government than you ever saw before." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, page 232) That evening the President had the following discussion with Under Secretary of State Ball during a telephone conversation that began at 6:29 p.m.:

President: "Now are you all going to get some good woman for me over at the State Department in a relatively high position?"

Ball: "Yep, we're working on that one."

President: "They're going to ask me for a report in about 2 weeks, and I want to get one in each Cabinet place that you can call your top woman, so she can [go] out and brief these women."

Ball: "Right."

President: "And you just get a good one. Now I know you got Katie Louchheim, but I want a real outstanding woman. I want a George Ball or a Dean Rusk."

Ball: "Well, we're working on it right now, and this one we have very much in mind."

Johnson then discussed with Ball the possible appointment of Aline Saarinen as Ambassador to Finland. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, Tape 64.08, Side A, PNO 4)

The President pursued the issue of appointing women to positions in the Department of State during a telephone conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Mann that began at 7:10 p.m. on February 3, 1964:

President: "Have you got any good women that you can appoint as an ambassador? Haven't you got some woman that you can make an ambassador to Latin America? Don't you know somebody that you've kind of brought up other there or raised? Haven't you got some attractive, able, smart Spanish girl that you can put in one of those places?"

Mann: "I don't have anybody able in the Latin American Division. Well, I don't know of any women that I can recommend now but I'll--"

President: "Well I'm going to recommend some. If you don't I'll go back and get some of these Mexicans I taught down there in Cotulla, at that school, and get you one. Cause I'm going to appoint some women. You better come up with one or two."

Mann: "We'll come up with some." (Ibid., Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mann, Tape 64.10, Side A, PNO 5)

In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on women in the State Department, February 18, 1964, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett stated that "while there are more women in upper-level jobs in the State Department than in any other government agency, the Department is giving high priority to increasing the number of women in key positions, as requested by the President," a claim for which Crockett then provided details. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, Secretary-1964-Mr. Crockett's Book Copies) Crockett gave the memorandum to Rusk for use at a Cabinet meeting that began about 4:30 that afternoon. On March 4, 1964, President Johnson announced the appointment of women to a number of positions in his administration, including Katharine Elkus White as an ambassador, the first of four women to be named ambassadors during the Johnson administration. White served as Ambassador to Denmark from April 4, 1964 until September 9, 1968.

While at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on March 28, the President again raised the issue of appointing women as ambassadors during a telephone conversation with Rusk that began at 3:35 p.m. CST:

President: "Have you got any women ambassadors in mind?"

Rusk: "We've got one who is a Foreign Service officer we're hoping to put to you in a few days. We're working on that further."

President: "What's her name?"

Rusk: "Gee, I don't have it in front of me. I'm out here at the--"

President: "Call and give it to me when you come back. I don't guess we can say anything about it. Sure wish we could though. Look at it and see what country you've got her in mind for, and I might even give a hint that we'll have another one or something like that. I need something and I haven't got anything from the Department. You call me back around 5:30 or 5:15 [EST] or something. Bye." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 64.21, Side A, PNO 43) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Rusk called the President back at 4:21 p.m. CST, but no record of the conversation has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) At 4:30 p.m. CST the President opened his news conference at the LBJ Ranch and announced that "we have named, or planned to name, as Ambassador, Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts, who is a Foreign Service Officer of the first class." The President then announced the appointment of women to several other positions in the administration. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pages 425-426) Margaret Joy Tibbetts was appointed Ambassador to Norway on July 31, the second woman ambassador to be named by Johnson. She served until May 23, 1969.

Washington, January 25, 1964, 12:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Mann, Tape 64.07, Side B, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of Panama.]

/2/Mann began his new assignment as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on January 3, 6 days before student demonstrations led to the crisis in Panama.

Mann: Well, you said you didn't want another Texan there. Marlin would be. Trouble with Marlin is he's Chairman of the Board of Pan American Sulphur.

President: Well, couldn't he get out of that and resign it and give up his interest?

Mann: He could but he'd be attacked and so would you.

President: All right.

Mann: He's one of the great guys [but it depends?] on your political judgment.

President: He would be. What else can we get.

/3/Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Colombia.

President: I want to get some man I know in Mexico that's my friend, that is looking after me, that's my manager, that's damned able, and I want him to understand business, and I want him to be young and attractive. I want him to be a Sargent Shriver type.

/4/January 24.

President: Okay.

Mann: So, there's still Colombia, but if you want somebody you know personally--you don't know Freeman.

President: No, I don't.

Mann: We'll eliminate him, but he's good, and he would be loyal to you.

President: Well don't you know somebody that I know that's good, like Marlin?

Mann: Well, I really hesitate for you--

President: I'm not talking about Marlin. I'm talking about somebody of his same qualifications, that's got his appearance.

Mann: Let me then try. I'll talk to Marlin and see if we can't cook up two or three names for you.

President: Do that.

Mann: Probably be from Texas. That wouldn't bother you?

President: No, but I'd rather get some other state--California might be good.

Mann: I think a young lawyer with good political instincts is what you want.

President: What about a Mexican?

Mann: Well, I wouldn't recommend that to you.

President: We got a hell of a good Mexican out there that's head of finance department, California.

Mann: Well, you know him. He has a couple of strikes on him. The Mexicans don't like what they call pochos, that means--

President: Okay. All right. Mexicans won't take a white man. I don't, goddamned if I can understand that.

Mann: Well, it's a--

President: Okay, that's all right. You go on and get me a good one. But get me one. I want to help 'em. We've been miserable to the Mexicans. I want you to get some in your department. If you know any smart ones, you hire some--the Alliance for Progress--you don't have to go to Puerto Rico.

Mann: We could hire him up here, and that would be easy. If you got a fellow you want hired up here--

President: Well, but hell, he gets more than you do. He gets $23,000 a year.

Mann: Well, everybody gets more than we do, but--

President: You find some way for [Johnson asks an aide for the name] Lueveno--Danny Luevano. He's the head of finance in the state of California, and they say he's a damned able citizen. He's coming in next week and I'll send him to see you.

Mann: All right. Fine.

/5/On February 29 Johnson announced the appointment of Daniel M. Luévano as Assistant Secretary of the Army. On March 4 Johnson appointed Freeman to be Ambassador to Mexico.

Washington, January 30, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-1. Confidential.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

Because we may have to be dealing with a continuing series of fast-moving foreign developments. I would like to have an early review of our procedures for anticipating foreign crises.

/2/For the Department of State response, see Document 7. The Director of Central Intelligence's response is Document 198. Secretary McNamara reviewed the Department of Defense's crisis anticipation procedures in an April 15 memorandum to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 277)

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates President Johnson signed the original.

On February 11, 1964, National Security Action Memorandum No. 281 was issued under McGeorge Bundy's signature, stating: "In keeping with his responsibilities for the coordination of foreign policy, the President has today vested in the Secretary of State the responsibility for the promulgation of certain National Policy Papers. Procedures and standard outlines for this series will be circulated promptly by the Secretary of State." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 281) The Secretary's ensuing procedures defined National Policy Papers as "comprehensive, authoritative and unifying statements of US policy" to which statements of policy and strategy in other country documents "will be brought into conformity." (Procedures and Annotated Standard Outline for National Policy Papers," June 17, 1965; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, General National Policy Papers)

A draft of NSAM 281, prepared by Walt Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, had first been forwarded to Bundy by State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read on January 7, 1964. According to Chester Cooper, who was in attendance, Bundy indicated at his staff meeting on February 5 that he would try to get the NSAM through, "but it was clear that there was not much interest in this project in the White House these days." It was pretty much a question of "doing something" for Rostow, continued Cooper, rather "than any firm conviction that this is a high priority activity." (Memorandum from Chester Cooper to Ray Cline, February 5; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80-R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos, 1964) Earlier, in a January 7 memorandum to Bundy, National Security Council Staff member Robert Komer had raised several questions about the draft NSAM, among them: "Might this new procedure, especially if publicized, lead people to conclusion President is delegating to SecState his foreign policy responsibilities and doesn't intend to take a very active role himself?" At Bundy's request, expressed in his February 11 memorandum to Rostow, the Department incorporated language into the procedures specifying that the President could initiate National Policy Papers, that the White House staff could participate in their preparation, and that the Secretary of State would satisfy himself that each paper reflected the President's purpose and policy. Komer's and Bundy's memoranda are at the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 281.

Washington, February 14, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-1. Confidential. Drafted by Grant G. Hilliker (S/S) and Read on February 11 and cleared by Rostow (S/P), Allen Evans (INR), and Thomas Stern (O). An attached February 12 memorandum from Read to Secretary Rusk reads in part: "Bromley Smith has advised me that the President's purpose in this NSAM exercise is not to produce a major overall revision of existing procedures, but rather to obtain a briefing on existing procedures, and he has so advised Defense and CIA." Secretary Rusk initialed his approval on this memorandum.

SUBJECT
NSAM #277--Anticipation of Foreign Crises

/2/Document 5.

/3/Addressed to the Assistant Secretaries of State; not printed.

/4/Not printed. In a February 11 memorandum to Read, Allen Evans offered comments on an earlier draft of this memorandum, which has not been found. He suggested the language in the first two sentences of this paragraph to make clear that the "Global Alert List" was "made up not from contributions by the geographic Bureaus, but from materials put together entirely within INR itself" as well as other minor changes. All his suggested revisions were incorporated into the final text of the memorandum printed here.

More generally, however, it is clear that our ability to anticipate crises rests on the continuous alertness and efficiency of the Department as an organization. Many officers and offices play important roles in this process. As you know, the Secretary considers the country desk officer the focal point for the identification of important policy implications of unfolding events. It is for this reason that he wishes to up-grade the desk officer's status. When crises develop with little warning, the Operations Center in the Secretariat puts into effect carefully worked out procedures for alerting the Department. These procedures tie in to the White House Situation Room, the National Military Communications Center and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary's daily staff meetings, including both intelligence briefings and consideration of operating problems, are used frequently to flag possible crisis areas. Many other devices are used for the same purpose, but it would not seem desirable to prolong this memorandum with a detailed discussion of these procedures and practices.

The Secretary of State has reviewed this memorandum and has advised me that he would be available to discuss these problems and to provide additional information and suggestions if desired.

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates McKesson signed the original for Read.

Washington, March 26, 1964, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers. Secret. Drafted in the Policy Planning Council. The time of the meeting is taken from Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) No list of the participants at the meeting has been found. Before the meeting, a Policy Planning Council paper, "Foreign Affairs Contingency Planning," December 5, 1961, which had been discussed with the Secretary in late 1961, was distributed with the suggestion that a "brief review" of the paper would "be helpful" in preparing for the meeting. (Memorandum from Stephen M. Block (S/S-O) to Carol Moor (S/S-S), March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers)

SUBJECT
Anticipation of Foreign Crises

[Omitted here is a distribution list.]

This meeting was called for the purpose of launching a new round in the Department's continuing efforts to improve its performance in the anticipation of foreign crises.

The Secretary said that this is one of the most important matters before us. This has been brought about by the increasing pace of events during the last twenty years.

We have involved here two different kinds of exercises. The first is of the short-term, watch committee type, i.e., an alertness to the Bloc, troop movements, and "time bombs already fused". This area is under reasonable control.

The second area involves looking ahead to determine what kinds of crises will be confronting us, and endeavoring to limit their adverse effects. Check lists of actions we might take in order to influence the situation in the direction of US interests, before some of these things happen, would be useful.

We need to examine the anatomy of these problems and to determine the subsidiary questions which each involves. Detailed plans should not be drawn for specific events not yet known, but rather should focus on issues likely to arise.

The pace of events has a very important bearing on the way we operate. Education before the event is essential, especially where quick decisions will have to be made.

The Secretary lives continually under "the shadow of the missing factor." That factor may be the decisive one so that there is a need to consider every important aspect of a problem. This may, however, result in a paralysis of decision. To help to avoid this, we need to select out the controlling factor, the most critical, important element, and proceed with it. The controlling factor, for example, may be the simple fact that "we cannot afford to let 'X' country do a certain thing.''

Overly rigid contingency planning is to be avoided. What we want is a kind of check list of the factors to be taken into account should the crisis come. Intelligence priorities may be affected. We may wish to select for intelligence coverage, things which may not now look particularly urgent.

This is not an exercise which S/P should exclusively undertake; it is primarily the work of the geographical bureaus. This work should be heightened and systematized. Much work has already gone forward, but there continues a real need for an S/P monitoring role.

The criteria for the selection of problems for anticipatory planning are most important. These include a balancing of the importance of the problem, the probability of the crisis and when it is expected, and the resources available to study the problem.

It was suggested that not enough use is made of our chiefs of mission in this work.

Our orientation has been too much in terms of specific countries, and there has not been enough attention to regional problems.

There is need for a more "institutional" approach to problems. We should attempt to build institutions to solve our problems. AID, it was urged, has a role in this process which is often overlooked. Many political officers regard aid as primarily useful as a bribe rather than as an institution building device.

Another observation was that we do not adequately consider general trends and those problems which are cross-regional as, for example, the conferences of the non-aligned and Afro-Asian nations. Our thought processes seem less effective in this area.

More effort also should be spent on what is happening and on what our tactics should be, particularly in Latin America.

Our contingency planning was also said to be too apocalyptic, as for example, our tendency to focus on such events as the demise of some key figure. In addition, our approach is too negative. We should likewise focus on situations whose effects are good for our side.

Since a great deal of our foreign policy emanates from speeches of the Secretary, there should be more pre-discussion of these speeches.

The Secretary said he found the brief "intelligence notes" of INR to be very useful and suggested that these be distributed to the bureaus.

The Secretary felt in the future his morning staff meetings might be used more frequently for policy discussions instead of concentration on bits and pieces of day to day information.

Washington, April 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. II. Secret.

/2/In a March 25 memorandum to Planning Group Members, Rostow indicated that he wanted to discuss the NPP program at a meeting on March 31 and appended a list of 11 NPPs to be completed in FY 1964 and 20 possible NPPs for FY 1965, out of which he anticipated doing 16. (Ibid., NSAMs, NSAM 281) In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, March 30, Gordon Chase reviewed NSC staff reaction to Rostow's proposed list for FY 1965, noting that both Klein and Forrestal were non-believers in NPPs. (Ibid.)

I'm perhaps unduly influenced by past experience in how the bureaucracy tends to inflate and pervert an exercise like this. First, there is the presumed need for regional symmetry (let's have a comparable number of papers from each area, so that none will be slighted). Second is the matter of keeping all the S/P types at their typewriters. Third is the inevitable agency or bureau desire to use these papers to resolve their own special problems. Fourth is the concomitant tendency for NPPs, like their predecessors, to cover the waterfront and deal with every aspect of a country policy, large or small.

All of these tendencies are naturally at work in the NPP exercise. Yet if we permit them to dominate it, we will have another paper mill. Instead I envisage an NPP as a timely analysis of the type of problem area which would benefit from a searching look at major alternatives, presented in a form which would maximize the likelihood of top level attention. If so, we can use the NPP to move policy forward. Otherwise, it becomes rather pro forma regurgitation of the conventional wisdom or an exercise in futility.

For example, a paper on China policy could provide an essential vehicle for review of critical options, but I doubt that the time is now. Better to start this paper in October for completion in January 1965, when the question might be ripe. Readjusting our policy toward Pakistan also seems to me the type of question on which a thoughtful analysis would pay dividends. What we should avoid, by contrast, is doing papers on issues which are not yet ripe for top level discussion (although even abortive efforts may on occasion have real educational value). Nor do I think that the "planners" can profitably tackle questions which are either largely operational or so sensitive politically that the planner's input gets lost in the melee.

The reason I'm harassing you this way is my fear that the NPP exercise may run off the tracks if we're not careful. It still has to justify itself to all the skeptics. It will only do so if it avoids the errors of past such attempts. To avoid these will require a good deal of your own personal attention and, I'd argue, that of the Planning Group too. This simply can't be done if we overload the circuit.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, April 20, 1964.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63-Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Taylor initialed the memorandum adjacent to the date.

SUBJECT
Daily White House Staff Meeting, 20 April 1964

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.

[Omitted here is material on Laos, South Africa, and the reduction in fissionable material.]

The government faces a basic dilemma with respect to the policy papers. If they can be used as campaign fodder, that is not good; and everyone feels they will be leaked if they have potential political value. On the other hand, it would be equally unwise for the White House to send the word out that no one is to do any thinking for the next year.

/2/In his report on Bundy's staff meeting on April 17, Chester Cooper stated that "there was a brief discussion of the National Policy Papers in general and the South African and Nationalist China papers in particular. Bundy and others on the Staff are just beginning to realize that the White House has a very considerable stake in the policies kicked around in this series." (Memorandum to Cline, April 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80-R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos, 1964)

This dilemma was openly recognized at the meeting, and some discussion resulted on ways to deal with the matter. There was general agreement that it would be very useful, and indeed almost necessary, for the government to focus on policies and programs for use by the government in 1965. These papers would, of course, be useful to either the same or a new Administration. Cooper would handle this problem by setting small study groups to deal with particular problems. He was virtually the only one, however, who believed such work could be kept secret. Amory suggested that perhaps the groups like the Council of Foreign Relations could be useful. Bundy, who believed that the Council suffered essentially from the same inhibitions as the government in either getting a small group together or in keeping the discussion secret, preferred a more informal approach. He is thinking in terms of isolating some problem areas, e.g.--Cuba, East-West trade, perhaps China--for discussions among selected individuals. He wants problems that seem manageable and people that are knowledgeable. He asked the staff for any suggestions on either that they might have.

Brubeck made an interesting point when he said that what often starts out as a new look at an old policy often ends up with the people who support existing policy being provided another opportunity to get a restatement. Bundy added that not only was that true, but that for most high level people in government, you could tell what door they would come out of by watching which one they went in.

/3/Undated but attached to an April 17 memorandum by Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 1)

WYS

Washington, May 4, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80S-00004A, National Policy Papers; Procedures, 1961-1969. Secret. Prepared by [name not declassified] of CIA's Directorate for Plans.

SUBJECT
Meeting at Department of State--4 May 1964--to Discuss National Policy Papers

OFFICIALS PRESENT
CIA:
Mr. Helms
[name not declassified]

/2/Joseph A. Yager, a member of the Policy Planning Council, and John W. Ford, Executive Secretary of the Council.

The meeting was called at the request of Mr. Rostow to discuss National Policy Papers.

Mr. Rostow suggested that the completion of a given National Policy Paper would be a good time to review the CIA ops program in that area with the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau, insofar as such program supported the National Policy Paper. Mr. Helms agreed to this since this is in accord with our present procedures.

Mr. Rostow also suggested that at the time of the completion of a National Policy Paper, it would be a good opportunity for complete stock taking of our (CIA-State) position in this area. Mr. Helms agreed and said that we have been doing just that in the Clandestine Services with annual operational program reviews and believed it was a good idea.

/3/For a fuller discussion of the Comprehensive Country Programming System and its relationship to National Policy Papers, see Document 22.

Mr. Helms agreed that we would cooperate but did not expect the Comprehensive Country Programming System to surface our personnel or operations. Mr. Rostow assured him that this was not the intention, and that security would be preserved.

Mr. Rostow said that in the National Policy Papers there is some concern about the mention of the Agency (CIA) by name, but he saw no problem here. Yager or Ford said that James Critchfield referred to USIB Agency in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] papers but that working groups were using a formula paragraph suggested by CIA members.

Mr. Rostow saw no reason why this could not be worked out satisfactorily. Mr. Helms agreed.

[name not declassified] said that CIA had agreed on a position which either [name not declassified] or Mr. Cooper would discuss with Mr. Ford or Mr. Yager at a later date. The position, briefly stated, is that CIA actions would be outlined only in covert annexes but not in the main paper.

[name not declassified]

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates [name not declassified] signed the original.

Washington, August 7, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Administrative. No classification marking. Bellows was Vice President of Olin Mathieson Corporation and a part-time consultant to the Department of State. Sherman was a member of the White House staff during 1964, first as Executive Assistant to Ralph Dungan and then as Assistant to John W. Macy. In an April 23 memorandum to Rusk, Crockett stated that his office had undertaken a study, under Bellows' direction, of the role and level of regional bureau desk officers. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, Box 32, Secretary-1964-Mr. Crockett's Book Copies) In a March 9 memorandum to Crockett, Management Planning Staff Chief Richard Barrett reported that he had discussed Olin Mathieson's "Management by Objectives Philosophy" with Bellows and that he was convinced it would work in the Department. (Ibid., MS 74-45, Name File 1965 'B,' BA to BK #2)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You have stated that in your judgment the organization of the Department involved excessive "layering," that the position of the Office Director seemed to be unnecessary, that the position of desk officer was too low in status and rank, and therefore probably in competence; and that as the corollary of all this--if not indeed the result--reaction time in the Department is too slow and problems are not adequately anticipated and dealt with.

/2/Rusk met in his office with Bellows and Sherman at 3:05 p.m. on June 17, 1964. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

To begin with the regional assistant secretaries have assumed that they do their job best when they bother you least. Stated thus simply it would seem to be a proper assumption, but it has meant that communication between yourself and your regional assistant secretaries has been relatively poor--in both directions. Without assessing how much ferment there may be in the Department, it is nonetheless clear why much of it does not reach you and why you should be able to say that you have "no feel for the unfinished business of the Department." Other administrative arrangements may be contributing to this relative isolation, including particularly the fact that the executive secretariat is operating on inherited instructions which we suspect serve to protect you more than to inform you.

Second, the regional assistant secretaries appear to have differing views--and largely different from your own--as to the nature and extent of their authority in the totality of foreign affairs. The extent to which they are responsible for the execution of policy as well as its formulation is unclear to them and especially so when the resources or staff of other agencies are material to the action.

One of the most significant by-products of this ambiguity is a tendency of subordinate staff to negotiate rather than to accept responsibility for decision and action. We are not, of course, suggesting precipitate action and no consultation; but it is axiomatic that negotiation to the lowest common denominator and the current practice of consensus through excessive clearances will erode the quality and timeliness of action. We believe that this supports your judgment that the Department works on the wrong things, broods too little, is unimaginative and slow in its responses.

/3/Rusk testified before Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, on December 11, 1963. An abridged version of his testimony was published in Senator Henry Jackson, ed., The Secretary of State and the Ambassador: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pages 110-129. The full version appeared in Administration of National Security: Staff Reports and Hearings Submitted to the Committee on Government Operations by Its Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Eighty-Eighth Congress, United States Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 386-412.

To these ends, we respectfully offer these recommendations:

1. We believe you should consider meeting regularly and individually with each of the five regional assistant secretaries.

These sessions should provide an informal but intensive review of activities, emergent problems and probable courses of action of concern to you and to that Assistant Secretary. Consequently these sessions should be long enough and often enough to provide a timely and common understanding and a sharing of points of view.

2. We believe it would be fruitful if you would direct that a re-examination be undertaken of all executive staff meetings to establish their purpose, agenda, frequency and necessary attendance.

It has been suggested to us that the formal executive meetings are of unequal value and the purposes to be served are unclear.

3. We recommend that you direct that a reappraisal be undertaken of the role and procedures of the Executive Secretariat.

It appears to us that the Executive Secretariat is operating on inherited procedures which do not reflect your needs and which may not be expediting the work of the Department.

We believe also that you will not get the optimum service and value from the Executive Secretariat unless the Executive Secretary is in a confidential relationship to you.

1. The regional assistant secretaries need to be told explicitly that you expect them to take the initiative in carrying out the responsibility that the President has placed upon you and the Department for "the framing and execution of the foreign policy of this country;" that you are looking to each of them to act on this premise and that you will support them when they do so.

2. To make clear that the regional assistant secretaries are the line officers of the Government for foreign affairs, we believe you should clearly establish their role as the line officers of the Department.

Once your position on this matter is established with clarity and emphasis, steps could be taken to realign the specific functional authorities and organizational units of the Department so as to promote this concept and we recommend that studies to this end be undertaken at your direction.

3. It would be most helpful if you could direct that a study be made of alternative ways of stabilizing the assignment of authority of those senior officers between you and your regional assistant secretaries so that corrective actions could be taken when the proper opportunities arise.

At the present time the delegation of responsibility from you to the regional assistant secretaries is impaired by the changing and informal assignments of authority to senior officers on the Seventh Floor.

If steps are taken to improve communication and the personal exchange of ideas between yourself and your principal subordinates, and if the line responsibility of the Regional Bureaus is firmly established, the specific views which you hold with regard to the way the Department should manage its affairs will be more widely understood and followed. To achieve this you should at the proper time make clear that:

1. You will accept an answer of "I don't know" occasionally if it is then followed by responsive action.

2. Clearances should be restricted and that you expect the action officer to proceed after a reasonable effort to obtain the proper clearances.

3. Knowledgeable and concerned officers should be present at top-level meetings irrespective of their rank or position in the hierarchy.

Respectfully yours,

Everett H. Bellows
Edward L. Sherman

Washington, November 9, 1964.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, Box 32, untitled folder. Confidential. Under a covering memorandum to Rusk, November 9, Crockett stated that his memorandum was essentially the same as a November 6 draft given to Ball, which was attached.

It seems to me that the opportune moment has now arrived for serious consideration on a number of management issues. I think we have a rare opportunity to put forth to the President some concrete proposals which should greatly enhance the effectiveness of the foreign policy operations of the Executive Branch.

Just this past week, a couple of major issues have arisen which once again highlight the difficulties encountered by the Department in trying to force conformance by other agencies to its policy guidance. These issues concern the staffing of certain overseas posts. The Assistant Secretaries responsible for the areas involved were frustrated by their inability to move other agencies in the direction of reducing or eliminating their representations. This, as you well know, is an old story, but I believe should not be left unsettled for too much longer.

In an effort to improve the effectiveness of our policy operational guidance I have a number of proposals that I would like to bring to your attention. If they appear to have merit, they all need to be completely staffed out.

I would like to have your approval to proceed on the studying of several specific recommendations intended to achieve the following objectives:

a. Provide Secretary sufficient time and staff resources to enable him to perform primary function of leadership and policy direction to all foreign affairs activities.

b. Provide Under Secretary sufficient time and staff resources to enable him to be "alter ego" to Secretary and to perform role as "operating head" of Department.

c. Reduce to minimum number of officers reporting directly to Secretary and Under Secretary.

d. Transfer to maximum extent operational responsibilities from staff officer to operating bureaus.

e. Restructure regional bureaus in order to reorganize work-load of regional bureaus to reflect recent foreign policy developments and insure adequate direction.

f. Reorganize and strengthen S/S to provide better information flow.

g. Improve consular operations by abolishing SCA.

At your convenience, I am ready to discuss some of the specific recommendations I have in mind.

a. I would like to develop a Presidential message which would in essence give the Assistant Secretaries greater jurisdiction and control over the programs of other agencies. We find ourselves in the intolerable position of having provided Ambassadors with certain authorities which they can theoretically apply at the post level, but for which they cannot get equal support from the Assistant Secretary responsible for that area.

/2/For text of the May 29 letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347. See Document 19 for a summary.

3. State-AID Relationships

Although this area is part of some of the ideas discussed above, it might be useful to view it as a unique and separate matter. Some discussions have already been held concerning the desirability of requesting Congress for permanent authority for the AID program. One of the possible avenues for such action would be to incorporate in the organic act authority for development programs. We should also keep in mind the possibilities of Chairman Rooney being assigned responsibility for Congressional review of the AID 1966 appropriations request. Should this come about it would mean that Mr. Rooney and his subcommittee would be reviewing appropriations requests for the Department, USIA, and AID. It is logical to assume, I think, that in making such a review the subcommittee will be interested in analyzing the activities taken by one agency in comparison with similar activities taken by the two other agencies. I know, for example, that Congressman Bow has always been critical of what he considers to be the duplicatory and overlapping administrative organizations of State and AID.

In reviewing the State-AID relationships there are a number of specific issues that should be scrutinized.

a. The integration of some AID functional offices with their State counterparts--starting perhaps with the areas of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations.

b. The desirability of further back-to-back or integrated desk operations.

c. The desirability of appointing more Ambassadors as AID Mission Directors.

d. The role of an Under Secretary (or Deputy Under Secretary) for Economic Affairs, if such a position should be established.

e. The desirability of delegating to the other Assistant Secretaries, authority similar to the one now possible to Mr. Mann.

/3/Presumably the six papers included in a report, "Aspects of Organization and Management of Foreign Affairs," November 9, 1964. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, Box 31)

Washington, December 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. 5. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Statement Requested at Cabinet Meeting November 19, 1964

Your request, at the Cabinet Meeting of November 19, for new proposals and tough-minded reforms provides a particularly appropriate starting point for a brief outline of some of the more significant ideas we have been developing. Certain of them may be cited as accomplishments on which we shall build as a continuing operational matter. Others are of a magnitude which requires phasing over a relatively long period. The latter, for the most part, are of a type which should be peaked in 1965 at the start of a new cycle of accomplishment.

At the outset I would emphasize again that the State Department (excluding AID and the Peace Corps) does not carry out large scale operating programs such as are found in most departments. The conduct of foreign affairs is improved as institutional arrangements are made more effective, as manpower is better deployed and utilized, and as the information basic to decision-making is more complete, accurate and immediately available.

Given the unique nature of the Department's responsibilities, I am satisfied that we have pursued, during the past four years, a comprehensive, hard-hitting and consistent attack on inefficient, out-dated and marginal operations. This has included increasing productivity in passport and consular activities, closing marginal posts, automating routine processes, trimming publications and reports requirements, and the like. We estimate that improvements of this kind have made it possible to reprogram some $4.5 million.

Efforts to interest other countries in sharing the cost of cultural exchange activities have been similarly successful. Agreements have been negotiated with five countries and are now pending with three others.

Throughout this period I have personally maintained a policy of avoiding substantial increases in personnel. Indeed, despite the increased number of independent countries with which we now maintain diplomatic relations, and the growing complexity of foreign affairs, the Department's employment has remained stable.

Against this background of solid progress and with necessary support and resources, we can be confident of solving the larger management problems that still require action. High on this list is further modernization of our world-wide telegraphic and voice communications facilities. We also have much to do to strengthen and tighten security protective measures domestically and overseas.

With respect to our public services, the Department is drafting legislation to extend the period of validity of passports. This will save manpower, and, perhaps more importantly, make things simpler and more convenient for the taxpayer.

In cooperation with the other foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget we have begun a comprehensive study of the information needs, current handling processes, and filing and referral methods in State, AID, USIA, and ACDA. The study constitutes the initial effort in the design and development of a modern system for managing the flow, dissemination, storage and retrieval of information essential to sound and timely decision-making.

At a number of posts in Africa we have combined administrative organizations which serve State, AID, USIA and other post elements. This program of consolidation is being expanded to other regions, with special focus in the coming year on Latin America. We have invited Defense to participate in planning for a single administrative organization at each post to include full support to military service missions and attachés.

State, Defense and the Budget Bureau have joined in a study of the role of Defense representation at our embassies. We should now move aggressively to examine the larger question of total United States representation overseas, including the specialized missions, services and representatives of other agencies of Government. I view this as a most difficult task, but one which is too important to be ignored.

This leaves one final matter I should like to bring to your attention at this time--the need for completing the development of a strong, simplified foreign affairs structure. In 1961 when AID, the Peace Corps and ACDA were created, there was clear affirmation that the Secretary of State has positive leadership responsibility for foreign affairs operations. Your own decisions with respect to policy and program leadership of activities affecting Latin America have had a profound influence on foreign affairs management.

These two basic organizational developments have most certainly strengthened the conduct of foreign affairs. However, there continues to be more committee and liaison arrangements, more meetings, more collateral clearances, and more parallel operations than are acceptable in a world where timely, well-considered action on matters of foreign policy has become a vital necessity. I will have specific recommendations to further strengthen and unify the organization for your consideration shortly.

/2/Not further identified.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

During a telephone conversation on December 10, 1964, Under Secretary of State George Ball and McGeorge Bundy discussed a number of appointments under consideration by Secretary of State Rusk. Bundy indicated that the President was "in favor of finding fresh faces for Embassies" and wanted "to get some people who are his own-to have the same fresh look as happened four years ago." (Memorandum of Conversation; Johnson Library, Ball Papers, People & Positions III) In a December 13 memorandum to the President, Rusk recommended candidates for five positions that, "apart from finding an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, [were] the most urgent personnel problems in the State Department": Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Ambassadors to Indonesia, Spain, and the Netherlands, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Rusk particularly emphasized the importance of filling the third-ranking post in the State Department with an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs rather than an Under Secretary for Political Affairs, noting that, among other things, it "would make it possible for George Ball to free himself from a great deal of inter-departmental economic business so that he could spend all of his time as my alter ego on the whole breadth of State Department problems." Rusk recommended John Leddy for the post. (Ibid., National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 5) Ball and Rusk met with the President from 1:05 to 2:25 p.m. on December 20 to discuss the appointments, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Washington, December 31, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Under Secretary Ball-1964. Confidential. Drafted by Ball.

SUBJECT
How the State Department Operates

/2/December 20; see Document 15.

Special Characteristics of Department

1. The most striking aspect of the Department is that it deals almost entirely with policy and negotiations. Except for its consular activities (passports and visas) and its cultural exchange program, it has no significant operating functions. AID, USIA, the Peace Corps, and the Disarmament Agency are separate entities, but receive policy direction from the President through the Secretary of State.

2. The State Department does not run armies or administer large spending programs. Its main responsibility is to recommend and administer foreign policy as the arm of the President. It does this by daily contacts with foreign governments through 293 posts abroad (111 embassies, 66 consulates general, 86 consulates, 17 consular agencies, 6 missions, 5 special offices, and 2 legations) and about 75 international organizations, and by constant discussions between 115 foreign embassies and legations and the Department in Washington.

3. Because the Department has no significant operating functions, it has one of the smallest budgets of any of the statutory departments. Because the Department is primarily concerned with policy, it has far more "field grade" officers than privates.

4. In spite of the vast growth of its responsibilities, the Department has kept a tight check on expansion. Although the United States maintains relations with 50% more countries than in 1952, and maintains a commensurate number of additional posts around the world, the State Department has approximately the same number of employees it had twelve years ago (15-16,000).

5. Most of the problems that concern the Department never reach the attention of the public. Those that do get into the newspapers are, for the most part, situations where the governments concerned have failed to prevent a controversy. The great bulk of the Department's business does not come to public attention. For example, in 1963, US Government representatives attended 548 inter-governmental meetings on a great variety of subjects; of these only 105 were ever named by The New York Times.

Structure of Department

George Ball and I operate on the basis that the Under Secretary is my alter ego. We organize our schedule so that one of us is present in Washington at all times. (During the past three years, there have been only a very few days when this has not been the case.) We each deal directly with the Assistant Secretaries.

1. The heart of the Department consists of five regional bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Secretary of State:

Bureau of African Affairs (Mennen Williams)
Bureau of European Affairs (William Tyler)
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (William Bundy)
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Phillips Talbot)
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Thomas Mann)

2. In theory, each regional Assistant Secretary is a Secretary of State for his area. Subject to my broad direction, he gives the necessary guidance and makes the decisions that do not require the personal attention of the Secretary or of the President. The strength and effectiveness of the State Department depends very largely upon the competence and skill of the five regional Assistant Secretaries.

3. Other bureaus of the Department play essential but more specialized roles. United Nations problems are, for example, handled by the Bureau of International Organizations, headed by Harlan Cleveland. Foreign economic policy is directed on a day-to-day basis by the Bureau of the Economic Affairs, headed by Griffith Johnson. The Bureau of Congressional Relations is obviously basic to the success of the Department, and the same thing can be said of the Bureau of Public Affairs, now headed by James Greenfield.

1. The third officer in the Department--the second Under Secretary--may, under the law, be designated either as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs or Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

2. This post was originally created to make a place for Will Clayton as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. After the lapse of a few years, it was subsequently reestablished to provide a place for Douglas Dillon in the same capacity.

3. There are, I think, strong reasons for restoring this post to its economic origins.

4. The Department of State must of necessity provide central direction for economic policy. Not only are our foreign economic and political policies intertwined, but each of the other interested Departments (Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor) represents only a special sector of the economy.

5. During the eleven months that George Ball was Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in 1961, we were able to initiate a number of major economic programs--the Trade Expansion Act; the International Cotton Textile Agreement; the approval of the legislation creating the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the expansion of the functions of the Development Assistance Committee to provide an effective instrument for coordinating national programs of foreign aid. There has been no Under Secretary for Economic Affairs during the last three years however, and, as a result, the Department has not shown the same leadership in foreign economic policy.

/3/On March 11, 1965, the President appointed Under Secretary for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman to the position of Ambassador at Large and appointed Thomas Mann to the position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (the post held by Alexis Johnson and now temporarily by Ambassador Thompson) has no major line responsibilities.

He performs the highly important task of relating foreign policy to our military and security operations around the world. He works in constant collaboration with the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies.

1. Mr. Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, is the man who, in one sense of the word "runs the Department." He has charge of administration and all operating functions.

He has prime responsibility, for example, for the offices issuing passports and visas and for the administration of security. He also has over-all supervision of personnel matters. The Department is peculiar in that it not only has Civil Service employees, but also a Foreign Service that administers itself with some measure of autonomy-subject, of course, to my overriding authority.

2. As the senior officer in charge of administration, Mr. Crockett has primary responsibility for personnel matters. In this capacity, he exercises considerable discretion in the assignment of officers to posts overseas and makes recommendations with regard to the filling of ambassadorial assignments.

Handling the Department's Business

1. The Department conducts most of its business with foreign governments through its posts abroad, but the key decisions concerning this business are made in Washington. Only in Washington is it possible to develop our policy toward a particular country in light of all the factors that may bear upon it.

2. The Secretary and Under Secretaries direct and control the Department in a variety of ways:

a. The Secretary holds a staff meeting every morning. Each bureau chief reports on the problems of principal current interest and receives the advice of the Secretary and other principal officers.

b. The Secretary and Under Secretary meet throughout the day with the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs on specific problems of special current importance.

c. The Under Secretary meets each day with one of the regional Assistant Secretaries for a full review of the work of his bureau.

3. A significant portion of the Department's affairs is handled through telegrams to and from the field. The Department now sends on the average 1,000 telegrams a day, and receives 1,300. In addition, there is a regular flow of letters, airgrams, despatches, etc. Of the telegrams sent by the Department, the vast majority are cleared at the bureau level. Only a small proportion require clearance by the Secretary or Under Secretaries.

4. The most important telegrams sent by the Department pass through the Secretariat, which is the nerve center of the Department.

5. Telegrams may reach the Secretary or Under Secretary for clearance for any one of several reasons:

a. The relevant Assistant Secretary may decide that a particular matter is of sufficient importance to be brought to the attention of the Secretary or Under Secretary who may, in turn, wish to obtain the decision of the President;

b. The problem may concern several bureaus that have different views as to the policy to be followed;

c. The Secretary or Under Secretary is actively following a particular matter and has indicated a desire to see outgoing messages; or

d. The head of the Secretariat, Ben Read, decides that, for any one of a number of reasons, a particular message should be cleared at the top level.

Proposed Reorganization of the Department

1. With the beginning of your new Administration, I propose to adjust the structure of the Department to make it more responsive to present-day problems.

/4/The changes proposed in points 2 and 3 were not implemented.

a. The Bureau of Western European and Atlantic Affairs would include:

*Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey are now part of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, but, in my view, properly belong in a new Bureau of Western European and Atlantic Affairs. Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and each has recently been negotiating an associate membership in the European Common Market. Neither of these states is Arabic-speaking and each has a strong desire to be treated as part of Western Europe.

b. The Bureau of Eastern European and North Asian Affairs would include:

*Under present arrangements, Red China is being handled by an Office in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. This means that there is no single focus in the Department on the problems of the Communist world. In view of the tensions between Russia and China, there are real advantages in charging one bureau with attention to this central issue. The split countries--Korea and Viet-Nam--would, however, remain in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

3. I also plan to transfer the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) together with Libya, from the Bureau of African Affairs to the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. These four countries are almost as much a part of the Arab world as the United Arab Republic. They should be treated as such.

/5/See Document 29 regarding implementation of this proposal.

5. None of these changes will require the addition of personnel. While one new regional Assistant Secretary will be added, I propose to make this slot available by eliminating the position of Assistant Secretary for Administration. With the exception of legislation to eliminate the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and the position of its Administrator, no new legislation will be needed to carry out any of these changes.

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, January 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
The Organization of the Department of State

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a paper on this subject. I have written with complete frankness, and perhaps with a certain presumption. On the other hand, I have probably watched the Department as closely as anyone outside it for the last four years, and I have been so careful to avoid comment to others that the temptation in reporting to you is irresistible.

2. The Department of State probably has more talented men incompletely used than any other department of government. There are all sorts of reasons for this weakness--the cautious and slow-moving personnel policy of the Foreign Service, the premium which is placed on safety and the avoidance of error, the mindless proliferation of committees and clearance processes, the inhibitions imposed by Congressional Committees which have not been properly cultivated, the inescapable difficulties of tension with other competitive departments, the tendency of all the rest of us to blame the State Department for the misbehavior of 120 other countries, and the Department's own dangerous tendency to see other nations, not the USA, as its preferred clients.

3. Yet with all these disadvantages, the fact remains that there is a great opportunity for effective management within the department which has been lost by default in the last four years. This is the product of the interlocking character of Dean Rusk and George Ball.

4. No man can have all the qualities of an ideal Secretary of State. Dean Rusk has more than his share. He has complete integrity and loyalty. He has discretion and experience. He is a master of exposition, both with diplomats and with Capitol Hill. He has the personal confidence of Committees of Congress and of representatives of foreign governments to a degree not matched since George Marshall, the man he most admires.

5. But he is not a manager. He has never been a good judge of men. His instincts are cautious and negative, and he has only a limited ability to draw the best out of those who work with him. His very discretion seems like secretiveness in his dealings with subordinates; it is a constant complaint in the bureaus that even quite high officials cannot find out what the Secretary himself thinks and wants. This same concern gives great trouble to administrators like Bob McNamara and to Ambassadors like David Bruce.

6. Moreover, the Secretary has little sense of effective operation. He does not move matters toward decision with promptness. He does not stimulate aggressive staff work. He does not coordinate conflicting forces within his own department. The most notable example may be the course of the Department's policy on the MLF. He has never approved of it but he has never taken control of it.

7. George Ball does not complement Dean Rusk's weaknesses, although he has outstanding qualities of his own. He is a brilliant lawyer, a lucid and persuasive draftsman, and a formidable debater. He has a sharp, if erratic, eye for talent. He serves the President and the Secretary with zeal. He is a man of honor. But like many lawyers, he is a lone wolf and does not use the departmental staff effectively. He spends an excessive amount of time with the press. His judgment is jumpy. He is self-confident to the point of breeziness, and he constantly reaches for more administrative authority than he knows how to use. Unable himself to administer the department, he has consistently made it impossible for anyone else to do so.

8. The third-ranking member of the department, Averell Harriman, is probably the one man of the first magnitude on the 7th Floor. On world affairs he has courage, insight and force (though in domestic politics he is often foolish). He is fanatically loyal to the Presidency, and would wish nothing more than to be President Johnson's most effective diplomatic instrument. Moreover, he has an outstanding record for picking colleagues. But he is 73. He was never very flexible and now he is becoming both rigid and unpredictable. Moreover, he no longer has the strength to discharge continuous operational responsibilities. And unfortunately he and Dean Rusk are quite unable to communicate with each other.

9. The rest of the Presidential appointees of the Department of State are a varied group. A new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs is essential. A new man for Europe is also needed. New leadership is wanted in international economic affairs. The Department still has not found the right Congressional Liaison officer. The Department needs a replacement for Abe Chayes as top lawyer. Most of all, the Department needs an "old pro" to fill the job Alex Johnson had as Deputy Under Secretary; Tommy Thompson hates it, does it very indifferently, and ought to go back to his real job as the best Kremlin-watcher there is.

10. On the other hand, the South American, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern Bureaus are led in different ways with competence and clarity. The Policy Planning Staff under Walt Rostow and Henry Owen needs more guidance from above but has the talent to become a major engine of initiative and imagination. The Cultural Affairs department under McPherson has too much luck to last. Public Affairs is well handled by Greenfield. Bill Crockett needs guidance and leadership but is good at his daily grind and very good with Rooney. Harlan Cleveland is the best UN staff officer since Dean Rusk. Tom Hughes is the best Intelligence Director ever.

Part Two: Possible Solutions

11. You have made it clear to everyone that you wish to keep Dean Rusk. There are excellent reasons for this, at least in the short run. Moreover, if you were to choose a successor it would be important to recognize that administrative energy and effectiveness might not be the first things you would look for. On any possible successor you would be insisting on many of the qualities which Rusk has and which are rare.

12. Nevertheless it is essential to recognize that as long as you have Dean Rusk it will be very difficult for you to organize the Department of State around or under him. It cannot be done at all--and should not even be tried--except through men in whom he himself has real and justified confidence.

13. I make this very strong point because of the history of confusion and failure in the Department of State when a President has tried to move around his Secretary to the No. 2 man. Hoover sometimes went past Stimson to Castle. Roosevelt often went past Hull to Welles. In the Kennedy Administration there was trouble when Bowles tried to have policies of his own.

14. Even though your own intention is never to do business that way, it is of the utmost importance that any arrangement that is made to tackle the management problem in the State Department be one about which the Secretary himself is genuinely content. This will not be easy. What makes it hard is that any solution will involve a deep disappointment to the understandable ambitions of George Ball. The Secretary has a proper and real affection for George, and I fear that he will find it very hard indeed to believe that it is right and necessary to make arrangements that will hurt George.

15. Yet the absolutely essential requirement if any change is to work is that the Secretary should choose a man who shall be responsible directly to him--and specifically not to George--for the political and administrative management of the Department under his direction (in military terms, a Chief of Staff). Such an arrangement is conceivable through the use of the third-ranking job in the Department, but only if George Ball were specifically confined to the economic side, and if the arrangement were spelled out in writing and published to the Department. Otherwise the necessary authority simply could not be concentrated and used.

16. I do not know whether George Ball would consent to stay in such an arrangement, and I am honestly uncertain whether in fact it would be best from your point of view for him to go or to stay. From the immediate point of view of any man who might be asked to do this job, it would certainly be preferable to accept the immediate pain of his departure in the interest of long-run effectiveness. If that were done, then the new man should be given George's job, and still another man should be found to be Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

17. Even aside from the problem of George Ball, I do not know whether there is a man whom you and Dean Rusk can agree on and to whom you can persuasively offer the confidence and the authority that a man would have to have for this assignment. The sooner you can find him the better. Every decision that is made before he is found will be a decision which would be better for the long-run effectiveness of the Department if he had sat in on it. Moreover, until you get this man, I think you will continue to find that the personnel recommendations of the Department of State are slow and uncertain and spotty. You and the Secretary need to begin the reconstruction of the Department as soon, and as near the top, as possible.

Part Three: What Change Might Accomplish

18. What specific reforms are possible in the Department of State under stronger leadership?

19. First, we must recognize that the great international problems do not yield to departmental management. What the Department can do is to analyze the problems, develop alternative courses, offer choices, signal opportunities, and execute decisions. The President and the Secretary must make the decisions. Management cannot transmit to the troops decisions it does not receive--it cannot and it must not try to usurp the responsibilities which the Constitution and people have placed elsewhere. Thus, in Vietnam the basic policy must be the President's.

20. Within this limitation, many important improvements should be workable with proper preparation in the Department and around the Government and on the Hill--and with the President's support.

(1) Most important of all, the Department can be given a sense of direction and self-confidence and pride and energy--all the things which leadership and direction and zest can communicate.

(2) As a fundamental part of this effort, the personnel policies of the Department of State can be gradually shifted in two directions: toward more rapid promotion of outstanding men, and toward a substantial and continuing reduction in the size of the enterprise. If the Department of State could be cut in half, and if half of the money saved were used for deserved salary increases, there would be a real diplomatic revolution of quality and energy in that agency. Nothing like that can be done overnight, but work can begin.

(3) The Department can be imbued with a sense that it is responsible to the President for the advancement of the national interest broadly construed. At present its influence is low in many quarters because it does not dare to think in terms of the effective coordination and harmonization of all the interests and concerns of the President's government. It too often defends only the immediate diplomatic interest--very often that of a complaining foreigner. It should have a larger view of its role. I am confident that in general the other great departments will welcome such a generous and broad assertion of the State Department's role, because such an assertion would enlarge their own effectiveness and their own work. One of the great qualities of Alexis Johnson was his understanding of this general proposition--and no Foreign Service officer is more admired in Defense and CIA. It needs support from higher up.

(4) The Department can and should expand the good missionary work which Dean Rusk has done for himself as an individual on Capitol Hill. The Congress prefers strength to weakness as long as it is combined with courtesy and good faith. Much of the Department has been a frightened punching-bag since Joe McCarthy's time. There is no need for Dean Acheson's arrogance, but there is great need for intense and self-respecting attention to changing the Department's posture on the Hill.

(5) A good Department of State can and should assume more responsibility than it has had in recent years for giving timely information to the President. President Kennedy wanted all this work done right under his own control, and my own office has tried to meet that interest. Moreover, in a measure the President's own staff can be expected to have a more intimate sense of his immediate interests than the Department of State. But there is really no reason why the State Department cannot do as well in keeping in touch with the President himself as Bob McNamara does with most of his important Pentagon problems. If my office is a bottleneck or a constraint on such activity, its own habits ought to be revised.

(6) Finally, the Department can and should do a very much better and stronger job of explaining American policy to the Government, to the world, and to the American people. The Secretary needs both staff support and policy urging on this point. He should be pressed by both his President and his Department to a more vigorous role.

McG. B.

Washington, January 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Eyes Only. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Mann

/2/Mann's successor as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

/3/Edward G. Miller. Jr., was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs June 1949-December 1952.

/4/McGeorge Bundy.

The President asked Mr. Mann about ADELA and Mr. Mann explained what this was and said that Senator Javits and Pete Collado of Standard Oil had worked hard on this. Mr. Mann said that Pete Collado was a very able fellow too but the trouble is that he is identified with Standard Oil. Mr. Mann also mentioned Mr. Spaeth. He asked the President to give him an hour or two. The President said he would give him all day.

The President asked Mr. Mann if he had any idea who could be put in Alex Johnson's spot. Mr. Mann said he was thinking that if the President wanted to move him, he could move him into that spot rather than Harriman's. The President asked which spot was the biggest and Mr. Mann said the Harriman job is the biggest. Mr. Mann said that it would have to be worked out with the Secretary and Ball exactly what they would want Mr. Mann to do.

The President asked Mr. Mann what needed to be done to have a perfect Department and Mr. Mann said that he would be most useful in either the Johnson or Harriman job if he could get away from day to day things and spend a couple of months boning up on what is going on and trying to look at trends and policies and maybe talking with the Assistant Secretaries to get their views--not getting involved in the day to day operations. Mr. Mann said that he really believed that the reorganization or strengthening is not needed upstairs but rather at the Assistant Secretaries level. He explained that the Secretary does not have time to keep up with his Assistant Secretaries and their views and problems. Mr. Mann said he was convinced that the answer is finding people capable for the Assistant Secretaries and letting them run their Continents and only go to Secretary on necessary matters. The President asked if this was not what the Secretary was doing, and Mr. Mann said yes but that he thought this might be improved.

The President asked Mr. Mann what the Johnson job is and Mr. Mann said in the past it has been the principal point of contact with Defense and CIA and essentially he assists the Secretary for those two Departments. He said the Harriman job has varied very much with personalities and that Harriman is sort of an advisor. Mr. Mann said he thought this was something that the President should talk to the Secretary about, how this job can be most helpful. The President said he had a high regard for the Secretary and wanted to save him. Mr. Mann said he agreed completely with this.

Mr. Mann told the President that he thought he would have to find out how the Secretary and Ball feel about the number three slot and how they felt the person could be the most help.

Mr. Mann told the President about his belief that we must put a price tag on actions backed by foreign governments that lower the prestige of our country.

Mr. Mann told the President that he felt that a big problem might be lack of communication over here and suggested that it would be extremely useful if the President could sit down with the Assistant Secretaries and tell them his ideas and views.

The President asked Mr. Mann what we were going to have Harriman do and said he wanted to be an Ambassador At Large.

Mr. Mann said he had a high regard for Harriman and although he is garrulous and vain, he understands the Commies and he understands power and the importance of power. He said if the President could use him as a fellow to look around the world and come up with ideas he thought this would be useful. Mr. Mann said he would try to find something for Harriman if he were President, because Harriman could cause a lot of trouble on the outside. He said that was really the reason that he thought maybe he, Mr. Mann, could move into Johnson's job rather than Harriman but that in that case Johnson's job would have to be redefined.

The President said he would give thought to it and in the meantime would start a check on Eddie Miller. He asked Mr. Mann for Miller's law firm and Mr. Mann said we would have to call the information over. The President asked that he give it to Mr. Valenti who is at the hospital.

Washington, January 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, WH Memos. No classification marking. Drafted in O/MP on January 24.

/2/Not further identified.

/3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347.

Presidential concern over the role of the Ambassador as a Chief of Mission began at least as early as the latter days of the Roosevelt Administration and has continued through each succeeding administration. The basis for this concern has been the President's need for direction and coordination of the variety of overseas programs and activities that emerged during the post-war years both as necessary ingredients of twentieth century diplomacy and also as logical and legitimate extensions of missions that prior to the war could and were for the most part carried out by domestic agencies without the need of permanently assigning personnel abroad.

The body of doctrine resulting from Presidential concern with the role of the Ambassador in this regard is voluminous and has sometimes been contradictory and frequently ambiguous.

One central trend, increasingly apparent in the last few years, is the need for strong executives with clear authority to oversee U.S. establishments abroad. This management need to assure effective and efficient conduct of all U.S. activities abroad is sometimes confused with the traditional diplomatic concept of the Ambassador as the personal representative of the President. This concept has diminished in practical significance in various parts of the world. In contrast, the Ambassador as a strong executive, with backing from Washington, has grown in importance.

The letter issued by President Kennedy is the latest and probably clearest and strongest affirmation of this doctrine of Ambassadorial executive authority. Its effect was to elevate the Ambassador from chairman of the "Country Team" (a term never adequately defined and of dubious managerial usefulness) to the man in charge of enunciating the following precepts:

1. As a matter of personal authority and responsibility, with full support of the President when needed, the Ambassador as personal representative of the President is in charge of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission and is expected to supervise all its activities.

2. Agencies outside the State Department have the right to communicate directly with and appeal to their Washington offices but have the obligation to keep the Ambassador fully informed of their activities and to abide by his decisions until both he and they are advised to the contrary.

3. The Ambassador has virtually total disciplinary authority over individuals in the diplomatic mission, including the right to order the departure of any member.

4. The Ambassador's channel of communication to the President is through the Department of State (a fact which, by interpretation, gives the Department the responsibility of backing the exercise of the Ambassador's authority over representatives of other agencies and of acting for the President when he so wishes).

Underpinning these precepts of Ambassadorial authority is the definition of the diplomatic mission to include all official U.S. personnel within the host country except for military forces under the command of a U.S. area military commander. Even in this case, the letter directs the Ambassador to assure exchange of information and, when necessary, to request a decision by higher authority when he believes military activities have an adverse effect on our foreign relations.

The Kennedy letter, by implication, placed a special responsibility in the Department of State, for the authority of the Ambassador will have limited effect in its practical exercise unless it is generally understood by all concerned that when issues arise which require resolution in Washington, the Ambassador can look to a source of backing and support. Except on those issues on which the President chooses to act, that source is logically the Secretary and the Department of State, provided that the President wishes the Department to carry out this particular role.

In addition to this responsibility, related foreign affairs planning and coordinating functions were also assigned to the Department when the National Security Council Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board were abolished at about the time the Kennedy letter was issued.

The Department of State was not equipped to assume these tasks readily. However, we have developed techniques and procedures through which the Secretary, the Regional Assistant Secretaries, and the Ambassadors can, in fact, control the overseas programs and activities of the various agencies. I do not mean to imply by the use of the word "control" the usurpation of agency head authority or meddling in day-to-day business, but rather critical managerial influence over program and personnel levels and evaluation of performance and accomplishments--in short, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy.

Two enterprises--the policy planning process that produces comprehensive and detailed strategies for the U.S. effort in selected countries (as well as other policy documents) and an information system designed to produce meaningful data on all U.S. operations (policy-directed and otherwise)--have been under development for the past two years. The capability for controlling U.S. overseas activities which these two enterprises can provide is based on concepts and techniques similar to those Secretary McNamara has used in asserting his authority over the disparate planning, programming, and budgetary systems of the three military service departments. The Defense Department programming system went through a ten-year developmental period, starting in the Rand Corporation, before its installation by Secretary McNamara.

The results of recent assessments of the policy planning process and the information system and their potential usefulness for the control of foreign operations are being communicated to the Secretary this week as a basis for discussion upon his return to Washington.

I mention all this (1) to demonstrate that, despite what you may read in the papers, the Department has been attempting to carry out its responsibilities in this area, and (2) to underscore the importance of the doctrine on the role of the Ambassador as a strong executive as an underpinning for the entire effort.

I am confident that the President will wish to associate himself with this doctrine and perhaps expand and clarify it, especially with regard to the role of the Department as the logical backstop in the Washington community.

One final note. The role of the Ambassador as the chief executive of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission has become reasonably well established and is, by and large, accepted by all of the Federal agencies operating overseas. We still have problems, of course, with getting individual Ambassadors to exercise the full scope of their authorities and responsibilities. In addition, we lack the same kind of clear delineation and enunciations of the role the President desires the Department to play in carrying out the executive function in Washington. There is a very real possibility that the progress made to date can be eroded and dissipated if in his proclamation the President does not make it absolutely clear that he has examined and agrees with the existing doctrine. You may be sure that agency personnel will compare his statement with those of his predecessors and will interpret any apparent omissions as retraction and retreat. This, in my judgment, should be the minimum standard for judging the new letter. Should the President decide that his interests would be served (and in my judgment they would) by expanding the concept with regard to the role of the Department of State, and making more specific the means by which the President wants the Ambassadors to exercise their authority, so much the better.

/4/Attached but not printed.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/6/Not printed. In a January 25 memorandum to Rostow, Hughes, and the executive directors of the geographic bureaus, Crockett requested suggestions for revisions of the Kennedy letter. As of February 5 only one bureau had replied and that to the effect that no change was in order. Hughes responded to Crockett in a February 8 memorandum that he believed the letter "should stand, be reaffirmed, or reissued as nearly as possible as it is," a position that reflected a memorandum to him of February 5 from his Deputy Director for Coordination, Murat Williams, who contended that the letter's authority was "stronger if it stands as a continuing charter, rather than something to be rewritten with each Administration." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, PFIAB Materials, 1963-1965) In a memorandum to Busby, July 15, 1965, Crockett again discussed "what might and might not be said in a presidential letter to our Ambassadors." (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book) However, such a letter was never sent by President Johnson; see Document 130.

Washington, January 26, 1965, 6:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Coversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Mann

Mr. Mann called the President to tell him that he had talked to Bill Moyers and the Secretary and Mr. Ball, and he thought that everybody was in agreement and was waiting for the President's decision. Mr. Mann said he thought that he ought to tell the President that he was going up to New York to do a little work on coffee tomorrow and then tomorrow night he would be leaving with Secretary Ailes and his group to try to get the sea level canal talks going in Colombia, Nicaragua-Costa Rica and Panama. He said he would be back on Tuesday.

The President said this was all right and asked what talks Mr. Mann had had with Secretary Rusk.

Mr. Mann said he talked to him this morning and also to Mr. Ball and he gathered that he would have Economic Affairs, if that was what the President wanted.

The President said he did not know about economic affairs. He said this was a title. He said that he wants somebody in there that can help him with the Assistant Secretaries and get his ideas across and get the policy planning group working. The President asked if they had made it clear that they wanted Mr. Mann in the Number Three place and Mr. Mann said he thought so. He said that State Department statutes say that two people can't be doing the same job and there is the political job and the economic job. Mr. Mann said he thought himself that they are indivisible and he did not think that a title determined what anybody did. He said that you just can't have two Under Secretaries and that it has to be for political affairs or economic affairs. Either one. He said he thought that the main thing was to have the President and Mr. Rusk and Mr. Ball have a clear understanding of what they want him to do and the rest will take care of itself.

The President told Mr. Mann to figure out what had to be done. Mr. Mann said he did not think that a title is very crucial whether it is economic or political affairs. He said one of the things he will have to be following is economic policies and these two are really indivisible. He said he thought we could have an understanding with Crockett and that he would work with him and with the Assistant Secretaries. He said perhaps it would be easier to go in on the economic title. He said it would not inhibit him in any way.

The President asked if Mr. Mann had talked about his successor and Mr. Mann said that he had mentioned to Bill Moyers that he thought the most political fellow who would have the best chance of getting along would be Jack Vaughn. Mr. Mann said he had been unhappy about him a year ago but he thought he has done a superior job. He said he has shown courage and also good political instincts. He said he has an excellent staff over here and he thought he had a liberal image and he might even be able to convert Schlesinger. He said it might work out fine-he is smart, young and active. He said it took 12 hours a day in the office so you have to have somebody who can go about 16 hours a day at full speed and he thought that Vaughn combined all of the qualities. He said we would lose a little in Panama because of his personal relations.

Mr. Mann said that Mr. Moyers had somebody in the Peace Corps he thought could take Vaughn's place and Mr. Mann thought this would be an easier chasm to cross than Brazil.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 18.

/3/Vaughn was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on March 11, entered on duty March 22, and served until February 28, 1966.

/4/February 2.

Washington, January 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John Macy, Box 693, State Dept-General-1965. No classification marking. Along with his duties as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Macy served as President Johnson's chief talent scout for Presidential appointments. Scanlon and Clinton were members of the staff that assisted him in that responsibility, the latter serving as Macy's Executive Assistant. The personnel files created in discharging that responsibility are at the Johnson Library.

/2/Not found.

[Omitted here are similar discussions of African-Americans in the Peace Corps, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.]

Washington, February 12, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, ORG 1, CCPS. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Comprehensive Country Programming System

/2/Attached but not printed.

I have added to the statement the following comments for your consideration:

The idea of developing detailed U.S. policy statements (National Policy Papers) for a country has had only limited acceptance by our own bureaus and by other U.S. agencies.

Some of our bureau officers still think of planning as "busy work" to be suffered with during the process and then to let lie unused.

Some of our Embassy officers still think of planning as an inevitable but useless Washington exercise with little if any relevance to the real problems they face.

Some of our Assistant Secretaries and their deputies still don't discern the value of having broad goals and lines of action when these plans don't contain the answers to their daily crises.

But plans, even if fully accepted, do not in and of themselves produce action for programs, or measure effort, or establish priorities, or evaluate accomplishments, or even guarantee their use at all.

Almost two years ago, Walt Rostow and I began to focus on the real shortcoming of the planning concept, i.e. plans won't result in action unless a means is found to make them "action forcing." Bureaus, other U.S. agencies, and our missions must not be able to put them safely away in a drawer and forget them.

We were determined to find a means of translating plans into programs.

For only if this were done would plans (National Policy Papers) become, as we hoped they would, vital guidelines for determining the purpose, the size, the content, and the priority of U.S. programs in a given country.

The National Policy Papers (plans) as presently written first set forth a number of U.S. policy goals or objectives for a given country. The plans also contain lines of action that set forth the things the U.S. establishment in the particular country should undertake.

While the National Policy Papers are formally cleared with every agency involved before being approved by you, the papers themselves provide no means of forcing agencies to do anything about the plans or to make any commitment of budgets or programs for the attainment of goals suggested in the plans.

At this juncture, it is apparent that each U.S. agency can pretty much pick and choose among the various goals and lines of action for those things they wish to undertake, or in fact, for all practical purposes, ignore them all in planning, budgeting, and executing their programs.

There is simply no mechanism to ensure compliance within the planning process itself--nor, for that matter, to even find out the extent to which there is, or is not, compliance with the objectives and lines of action.

By a Program we mean the things that agencies put money, people, and other resources into in order (presumably) to accomplish some ascertainable U.S. objective.

Walt and I believed that we needed some means of relating the existing programs of agencies and the activities of their people to the goals and lines of action of the National Policy Papers.

We believed that we needed some means of relating the establishment of new programs in a country to the policy paper.

We believed that we needed some means of relating both old and new programs of each U.S. agency in a country to each other's programs.

We believed that we needed some means of comparing agency programs in those cases where two or more agencies claimed their programs were carrying out the same or a similar objective.

In short, we believed we needed a system for inventorying the quantity of effort and resources each agency had at its disposal in a given country and for comparing that inventory to the goals and the lines of action called for by the National Policy Papers.

And thus the Comprehensive Country Programming System was born.

CCPS was designed to provide the information required to ascertain whether or not anything was actively being done to carry out the National Policy Papers--the objectives and their lines of action.

It is called comprehensive because it encompasses the total U.S. effort--all the activities and all the programs in a given country. It sweeps across agency barriers and agency lines. It is not State Department bound.

It is called Country because it first measures all of the things (policy related or otherwise) that are actually being done by U.S. agencies in a given country.

It is called a Program because it puts together similar activities of the various U.S. agencies into broad program categories in order to compare them to each other and to relate them to the goals and the lines of action of the National Policy Papers.

It is called a System because it systematically aggregates like activities undertaken in any given country and support of any given plan.

In the first place, the system in and of itself doesn't do anything. It is like a set of business books. They don't do anything. They provide information and insights that astute managers can use in order to ask questions and to make decisions and to evaluate results. That is all that is claimed for CCPS.

What the system does do is provide information that the Ambassador and the Regional Bureaus can use to ask deep and searching questions about their operations; questions about what people are doing with their time; questions about the things that no one is doing anything about; questions about the reasonability of the plans themselves; and questions about the kinds and quantity of resources that are in a country to do the job.

It does measure the effort (dollars, materials, and people) committed to each line of action.

It does show up gaps and duplication in the application of resources.

It does raise questions of priority.

It does raise questions of reasonability of the objectives.

It does provide an information bridge between plans and programs that for the first time permits the planners and the operators to communicate with each other in a meaningful way.

It does show ($ and people) what each U.S. agency is expending in a country in order to accomplish each NPP goal and each NPP line of action.

It does show those goals and lines of action that are receiving little or no resources.

It does show the goals and lines of action where there are program duplications between agencies.

It does show the goals and lines of action where there may be too many resources being applied.

It does enable the Ambassador and Regional Bureaus and other agencies to consider the re-assessment of our objectives or a re-adjustment of our resources when the two are out of harmony.

It does give Ambassadors the answers to such questions as:

What are the U.S. programs?
What are their relationships to each other?
Where is the effort being applied?
What U.S. objective is the effort supposed to be accomplishing?
What priorities are agencies giving to their programs?
What are people spending their time and effort on?
When will an objective be accomplished?
When will resource levels be changed?
When will programs stop, start, be increased, or decreased?

By providing this kind of information, it enables the Ambassador to ask questions of how and why, to evaluate techniques and performance, and to make qualitative judgments on people and programs.

In the course of installing the system in 23 countries during the past 13 months, we have seen many times the things that happen when people begin to think about what they are doing and why.

/3/Not found.

/4/Dated December 19, 1963; an extract is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, Document 309.

After comparing what people were doing with what the paper said they should be doing (as shown by CCPS), Ambassador Korry made a series of recommendations both with respect to the paper and the activities of the various agencies in Ethiopia. As a result, the Ethiopia paper has been re-written, the office of the Agricultural Attaché has been abolished, and the Pentagon is continuing to struggle with a recommendation to reduce the military attachés.

/5/Not found.

A similar process is now going on in Guatemala where the Ambassador has been looking at agency activities in support of an Internal Defense Plan. As a part of this study, Ambassador Bell asked agency and section heads to rate lines of action contained in a two-year old paper on a five-point scale ranging from "important and being carried out" to "unimportant and should be dropped." Ratings from some 15 units on 20 of the 40 lines of action ranged from 1 to 5 with no apparent correlation among reporting units. The Guatemala paper is now being re-written.

In fact, every one of the 23 installations has demonstrated in one way or another that plans don't become real until they are applied, that they aren't apt to be applied unless someone or something forces them to be, and that all individual effort benefits from being related to a higher purpose or objective.

The National Policy Papers give substance to the principle that the Secretary of State is the President's principal instrument of coordination and of leadership in the field of foreign policy.

The Comprehensive Country Programming System gives further substance to this same principle by providing a means for ensuring that the programs and activities of the other agencies as well as the State Department are indeed in harmony and in furtherance of those policy papers (NPP).

Until we developed the Comprehensive Country Programming System there was no means by which an Ambassador or a Regional Bureau Assistant Secretary (or Desk Officer) or the Secretary of State, or the President, or the Bureau of the Budget, or the Congress could plan for, discuss, or evaluate the total U.S. effort in a single country. Such planning and evaluation as occurred was done piece-meal by program or by agency, i.e. AID, Peace Corps, USIA, Military, State, etc.

There was no means for looking at the whole U.S. program for a single country.

The Comprehensive Country Programming plan is designed to show the total U.S. program in a country and thus to give the Desk Officer, the Assistant Secretary, and you a chance to ensure that agency plans and programs, budgets, and resources are in harmony with the country policy objectives and courses of action that you have signed off on for a given country.

2. Following our meeting, we hold similar discussions with the regional Assistant Secretaries on a common approach to planning and programming.

/6/In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 68, Frederick Mosher and John Harr describe a February 1965 meeting on CCPS that Crockett had with Rusk alone, during which Rusk indicated "he was concerned that any effort in the programming field for the Department not be 'naive and overcomplicated.' He told Crockett that he had decided to convene a committee of five ambassadors to study the system and advise him what to do about it." However, according to Mosher and Harr, pp. 68-75, the committee, chaired by Ambassador Bunker, held only one meeting and never submitted a report, and programming efforts in the Department soon became focused on implementing the study mandated by the President on March 25, the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (see Document 33). Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library indicates that the Crockett-Rusk meeting on CCPS may have taken place on February 24. For a description of Crockett's first meeting with Rusk on CCPS, which took place a year earlier, possibly on February 5, 1964, according to Rusk's Appointment Book, see Mosher and Harr, pp. 54-55.

Washington, February 17, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume I [2], Box 6. Secret.

Mac--

[Omitted here is discussion of an upcoming March 8-11 conference at the Ministerial level with the United Kingdom on Africa.]

/2/Reference is to Harriman's role in the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) after the impending announcement (March 11) of his transfer from the position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Ambassador at Large. President Johnson suggested this new position for Harriman as early as late 1964. (Memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, November 30, 1964; ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7, Box 2)

/3/In the margin next to this paragraph, Bundy wrote: "I'd like to play this very open with no firm commitment to Harriman."

We have managed to put a little new life into this exercise and I'm inclined to feel it could still be useful if we gave it a new hunting license. There's little doubt that USG has not yet focused enough on preventive aspects of counter-insurgency. The Group provides a useful hortatory forum for this purpose. But we either ought to give it a bigger (though still advisory) mandate or gradually close it out. Until we decide, I'd suggest encouraging Harriman to stay on.

RWK

According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation on February 24, 1965, between President Johnson and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, the following discussion took place:

"Mr. Mann said that on the subject of organization, he had had a talk with Ball and has begun work on how we can pull the Department together and get a better communication at the Assistant Secretary level and also make better recommendations to the President, both on the best men inside the Department and the best ones outside. He said that he was going to have lunch with Mr. Ball and Mr. Macy tomorrow. The President said that he should pull Crockett in on all these meetings that he can. He said that he should tell them that he likes Crockett and respects his judgment." (Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ)

Washington, February 26, 1965, 10:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Mann

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated issue.]

Mr. Mann said that he thought we were making good progress on the organizational front. The President said that he had told the Secretary last night that from the point of worldwide affairs he was superb, in Congress even better and with the press he was wonderful, but that he wanted Mr. Rusk to let Mr. Mann take over the Assistant Secretaries and see that they give the President some ideas and implements and get him some good appointments and get some good men in there. The President said that we would look around and see what the business council recommends, and the Chamber of Commerce and labor. He said he thought we should mix these people up.

Mr. Mann said that we have two concrete plans: 1) daily meetings with the Assistant Secretaries and to take as much time as necessary, in Mr. Ball's office. He said we will go into the whole thing and let them know that it will be their responsibility to handle relations between their part of the world and the US and get the job done. He said we are also going to set up in the next day or so a mechanism to find some talent for the President and that he hoped to bring Macy into the deliberations over here, where he had all the information at hand. Mr. Mann said we could get Mr. Merchant and others to suggest the good people inside and then get some good people from the outside.

The President suggested Gene Black when he comes back and also Bob Lovett and that Dave Bruce could come in for consultation. He said if we can pick up one or two more around of that general type and meet with them and get together a list of all the people we have--a couple of hundred--where they can look at them and decide. The President said Mr. Mann should concentrate on people who would be available--like he himself had been available.

The President said that we had to get Johnson men. He said that the people over in State are saying the wrong things to the press--that we are going to fail, etc. Mr. Mann said he thought this was a minority but agreed that they were saying the wrong things.

[Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated matter.]

Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Mann

The President called and suggested that Mr. Mann should, on his own and with no reference to the President, suggest to Mr. Ball and the Secretary that the Assistant Secretaries be called in and told about the seriousness of leaks and how the President felt about them. The President said they should do that right away and then in a week or so he will meet with the Assistant Secretaries and tell them how he regards this whole matter as their responsibility.

/2/Reference is to the lead article in The New York Times on March 1.

/3/February 26.

/4/The white paper, a Department of State report entitled Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam, was released on February 28. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, pp. 404-427. The New York Times reported on the white paper in its lead article on February 27.

/5/Presumably a reference to a report concerning the Multilateral Force (MLF) and/or the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF).

The President reiterated how strongly he felt about this and emphasized that he wanted each and every press person visited or talked to listed and what was said summarized.

/6/March 6.

Washington, March 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 105. Confidential. Attached but not printed is a second memorandum from Mann to Valenti, March 2, explaining how a news reporter may have learned that Assistant Secretary of State Harry McPherson would be going to the White House on temporary assignment. Also attached but not printed is a note from Valenti to the President, March 3, that states: "Tom Mann sent these over. You might want to see them."

Mr. Valenti:

The Secretary and Mr. Ball have decided to rearrange their meetings with the senior officers of the Department.

One feature of the new arrangement is that Mr. Ball will meet twice each week with the Assistant Secretaries for geographic areas and a very few other key officers. The reduced size of the meeting should make for better security. And this in turn will make it feasible for Mr. Ball to speak frankly to the Assistant Secretaries about assuming their full responsibilities.

The first of these meetings will be held today.

We are considering ways in which we can get a better control of State Department officers' contacts with the press. As soon as we have explored the various possibilities and the Secretary has reached a decision, we will let you know.

Tom