U.S. Department of State

Washington, March 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Robert Cox (O/MP). Crockett forwarded a copy of the letter to Rusk under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which he noted that Helms had been advised of his correspondence with McGhee. (Ibid.) For CIA's reaction to Crockett's letter, see Document 220.

Dear George:

I was pleased to receive your letter of February 152 concerning the role of the Ambassador in the planning and direction of CIA activities. The questions you raised are indeed timely.

Background. To provide a context for my answers, let me refer to some of the historical background. You will recall that the extent of Ambassadorial authority has been a matter of concern to every President since the United States embarked upon complex multi-agency foreign operations during the 1940's. The last five Presidents have each affirmed the authority of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission over all U.S. programs except those carried out by the unified and specified military commands. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on May 20, 1940 wrote:

"? The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in a foreign country is the officer of the United States in charge in that country under whose supervision are coordinated the activities there of all the official representatives of the United States?

/2/Not found.

On January 13, 1949, a Hoover Commission Task Force on Foreign Affairs--consisting of two former Assistant Secretaries of State, Harvey H. Bundy and James Grafton Rogers, with the advice of former Secretary of State and War Henry L. Stimson--reported:

"In 1939 the principle that all United States employees abroad should be responsible to the ambassador or minister in a particular country was recognized by the consolidation of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments' overseas service with the Foreign Service?

"The presence of separate missions abroad, each with its own head, is confusing to the foreign governments and weakens the effectiveness of United States representation. Coupled with the present tendency to send other official and unofficial emissaries abroad, it is distinctly detrimental to the conduct of foreign affairs by the United States.

"The establishment of a single American spokesman for all United States activities in a particular country can be accomplished without the assumption by the State Department of responsibility for the various operational tasks involved. These special operational tasks? can be separately administered in Washington, but it is both impractical and dangerous for them to have spokesmen and operators abroad who are not responsible to the American ambassador or minister for supervision and coordination. If the operational task should ever transcend the regular diplomatic job in importance, it may be desirable to make the head of the special mission the ambassador for the duration of the particular program."

/3/Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs: A Report with Recommendations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 120-121.

On April 5, 1951, President Truman wrote to Secretary Acheson:

"The Secretary of State, under my direction, is the Cabinet officer responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations, and will provide leadership and coordination among the executive agencies in carrying out foreign policies and programs. . .

/4/Not found.

President Eisenhower, on July 24, 1956, sent instructions to all Chiefs of Mission, which stated:

"The representatives of all United States agencies in each foreign country are subject to the supervision and leadership of the Chief of Mission in connection with any of their activities which in his own judgment affect relations between the United States and the country to which he is accredited?

/5/Department of State Circular 58. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, Box 14, #98-Coordination in Overseas Missions)

President Kennedy wrote to Chiefs of Mission on May 29, 1961, as follows:

/6/ Brackets in this and the following paragraph are in the source text.

"You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in [country]. I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment?

/7/Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347.

The Ambassador and CIA Coordination. To my knowledge, there is no hidden exception or reservation to the Kennedy letter. It applied, and applies, to all agencies, activities, and programs attached to U.S. Missions. Moreover, the entire fabric of Secretary Rusk's relationships with President Kennedy and President Johnson over the past four years has demonstrated consistent Presidential determination that all American employees abroad, except command troops, will be responsible to the Chief of Mission, not only for their personal conduct, but for the efficiency and economy of their activities and the relevance of those activities to American foreign policy.

My staff and I have carried on a dialogue with CIA, at the Deputy Director level and below, over the past two years on the subject of integrated planning and direction of Agency activities in the field. CIA maintains that Chiefs of Mission now have access to most field program information and recognizes the Ambassador's responsibility for over-all program coordination and direction within his Mission.

/8/Not found.

Situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This background leads me to submit the following comments with respect to the specific questions raised in your letter.

1. The Chief of Mission's authority and responsibility under the Presidential letter of May 29, 1961 not only permits but requires him to supervise the CIA operations and programs in the country of his assignment and to coordinate those operations with the activities of the other components of his Mission.

2. This responsibility clearly requires that the Ambassador have access to program information at any level of generality, in any detail, and in any format he considers necessary.

3. My discussions with CIA/Washington indicate that top officials here recognize these principles and, if pressed, are prepared to authorize field personnel to furnish such information as the Ambassador may request.

4. The Helms June 23, 1964 memorandum is a reflection of the Agency's recognition and acceptance of the authorities and responsibilities conferred on the Ambassador by the President's letter.

5. There is no new authority beyond that expressed in the President's letter.

6. To my knowledge no Ambassador has yet fully exercised the authorities enunciated in the President's letter.

7. With respect to your question about your authority to take action, I believe that the President's letter and the statements of his predecessors make it clear that you not only can but must "take action" any time you believe the activities of a U.S. agency jeopardize the interests of the United States. At the same time, I think you would be well advised to reserve drastic action to the most serious situations, and to communicate your judgments concerning ongoing programs in the form of budgetary recommendations which, as you know, are subject to appeal and review in Washington before they take effect.

8. With respect to your question concerning involvement in CIA budgetary processes, the foregoing supports an affirmative answer.

9. I would suggest the following review procedure for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

a. Request and assemble program data using the CCPS format. This should be a relatively simple process in view of the claimed similarity between the Agency's country operational program and CCPS.

b. Conduct formal review sessions with the senior CIA executive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the purpose of: (1) relating CIA program activities and resource inputs to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy; and (2) evaluating CIA programs in terms of efficiency, economy, priorities, and possible gaps and duplications when juxtaposed with other U.S. programs. This should lead to your quantitative and qualitative judgments of both activities and resource levels, including staffing.

c. Unless you feel this information reveals a situation requiring immediate action, request the CIA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to reflect your decisions in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] next budget submission.

d. If at any point the CIA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] informs you that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] cannot abide by your decisions, make your own recommendations to the President through Secretary Rusk.

Throughout the review process the Department and CIA would have a joint interest in protecting CIA program data by using prescribed special classification and communication channels and by not expanding access to this data. The data should not therefore be included in the CCP book, but should be set out in a properly classified and controlled annex to the book. There should be no objection to one member of your personal staff working with you and the CIA component to relate program data to the CCPS grid and to assist in interpreting and reviewing it.

I assure you that the Department and I will support any efforts you undertake to exercise the authority assigned to you by the President. If you think it would be helpful, I will inform CIA at the Deputy Director level of your concerns and your intentions. But you should recognize that no official in Washington has as strong a mandate for supervising overseas programs as you have been given. I would, therefore, urge that you take the initiative in this matter and use our support if it becomes necessary.

The matters you have raised are of concern to many Chiefs of Mission. The Department welcomes your inquiry and offers all possible assistance.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, March 11, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Lot 68 D 323. No classification marking.

/2/The "O" area refers to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

As you will recall, last December you approved the assignment of Dwight Porter as Ambassador to Lebanon, and the abolition of the position of Assistant Secretary for Administration.

Upon approval of this recommendation, I initiated a number of studies to analyze the present practices of the administrative area of the Department and to recommend new approaches to our organization and operations in light of the abolition of the Office of the Assistant Secretary.

/3/Attached but not printed.

/4/Crockett did not meet with Rusk on March 13, but he may have briefed Rusk and Mann during a meeting the three men had in Rusk's office on Tuesday morning, March 16. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

The first section of the paper describes the major objectives we intend to achieve in the new organization. The first objective is to institute a new management technique called "Management by Objective." In very superficial terms this method will enable me to establish certain operational targets to be met by each of the operating areas, together with a system of reporting and monitoring established to measure progress of operators in meeting their targets.

Other objectives are new to governmental administration. We have separated planning from operations, and deliberately structured the organization to produce competition in the planning phase and to eliminate competition in the operational activities.

/5/The "A" area refers to the Bureau of Administration, which was abolished together with the position of its head, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

We have stressed elimination of supervisory layers both to reduce costs and to increase responsiveness (and incidentally will be able to abolish about 250 to 300 positions in the "A" area alone).

We have elevated the personnel and budget functions to a higher level in the organization-to a level immediately responsive to me--in order to give them appropriate status and permit greater control by the Department's leadership.

The second section of the paper deals with the details of the new organization. Briefly, "O" would be composed of 9 major units (compared with today's 16) as follows:

Current: (with no changes at present)

1. Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

2. Office of Protocol

3. Office of Communications

4. Office of Security

New:

5. Office of the Director General (operation of foreign affairs personnel system and Department's own personnel program)

6. Office of Budget and Compliance (budget preparation, and monitoring Departmental operations to insure conformity with stated policies and guidelines)

7. Policy and Plans Staff (development of administrative goals and policies and long-range plans to utilize technological innovations)

8. Office of Operations and Services (routine administrative services)

9. Community Advisory Services (improvement of Foreign Service image in U.S.)

The third section discusses the functions we propose to assign to the Regional Bureaus. These shifts are again designed to reduce the number of decision points required in carrying out a function. The activities included are those that I believe should be under the control of the assistant secretaries to increase their management flexibilities and to achieve a cadre of personnel with deep regional knowledge and expertise.

/6/In a memorandum to Rusk, March 25, requested by Rusk "during our meeting last week," Crockett compared "the present personnel system with the proposed one," highlighting "some potential benefits that other Departments might derive from the new system." (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, Secretary, Jan-June 1965)

The basic objectives for the new personnel system and organization are:

1. Creation of a single, integrated and unified foreign affairs personnel system, operating under the general policy direction of the Secretary of State, sufficiently broad to meet the needs of all foreign affairs agencies.

2. Participation by all user agencies in policy development through membership on the Board of the Foreign Service.

3. Consolidation of common personnel functions under the Director General who would operate the system to provide the manpower requirements of all participating foreign affairs agencies-a Foreign Service of the United States.

4. Recognition and support of the separate missions and special needs of operating agencies (including regional bureaus and Washington offices) through delegation of maximum authority over utilization of personnel to operating agencies, within broadly stated career plans for each officer.

5. Improved personnel management in participating agencies by the development and installation of an effective manpower planning and utilization system designed to balance individual interests and skills with current needs of the operating agencies and the long-range interests of the United States.

Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80-B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast Meeting--18 Mar 65

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

2. Reviewed in considerable detail my personal concern over U.S. inability to combat counterinsurgency. I stated that it was apparent to me that the Soviets, under the umbrella of the nuclear stalemate and the Chinese Communists as well, would pursue an aggressive program of political action, subversion and insurgency in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. I said there were abundant indications that Moscow was moving in this direction, which in reality was an implementation of their publicly announced policy and that Communist China was doing likewise. I said that neither the United States nor the Free World were properly organized to combat this sort of thing.

With respect to the United States, the problem touched the area of responsibility of almost all the departments, i.e. State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. No one department could do it all, and furthermore some departments now were charged with responsibility which they could not discharge properly. As an example I felt AID, charged with internal security, were not motivated in that direction but on the contrary were more interested in raising gross national product, standard of living, etc. Therefore they were inclined to put internal security, police training, etc., at a very low priority and while this had been arrested somewhat by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], he was forced to fight his way at every turn of the road. The Embassies could do a great deal but not the entire job; the military assistance groups could do conventional training but they were notoriously poor at anti-guerrilla activities, etc.

/2/Presumably a reference to National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, January 18, 1962. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 68.

I gave many examples, i.e., saving Venezuela in '63, communication warnings about impending events in Panama, the election in Chile, the developments in Brazil, etc., all of which had been carefully husbanded by either the Special Group CI or the Special Group (303 Committee). I referred to Mr. FitzGerald's efforts to get approval of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and, while all agreed, weeks had been consumed securing interdepartmental approval of a rather simple telegram of instructions to the field.

3. The Secretary was very sympathetic to the purposes of my talk. He asked if Mr. Gaud would be a good Special Group CI Chairman and I replied affirmatively but stated he must be properly located in the chain of command in State. At this point I said that I felt State must have a strong Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs to serve as its authoritative voice in both Special Group forums.

4. I then turned to the necessity of encouraging and exhorting our Allies both in Western Europe and in the Far East to help. I said that I thought this was so important that we could make almost any kind of a concession to our European friends in such fields as nuclear weapons, Polaris submarines, etc., if it would resolve our differences and put us on a common front in dealing with this problem which we would all be required to face over the next 10 or 20 years. At this point Rusk said that he shared my views and my concern and agreed that we must organize both internally and with our Allies. He asked if I would prepare a memorandum outlining my views in a form which he might use in May in address to the North Atlantic Council of Foreign Ministers.

/3/Not further identified.

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80-B01285A. Single Copy; No Distribution. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast--18 Mar 65

/2/ In a New York Times column on March 21, James Reston praised Rusk for being "a superb witness on Capitol Hill" and "a good negotiator" but criticized him for "not running a planning agency but a fire brigade. He has little time for the over-all strategy of foreign policy, because he is dealing most of the time with the tactics and politics of whatever emergency some other country produces in Vietnam, the Congo or Indonesia. Meanwhile, Mr. Rusk has not mobilized the talents of his department. He is remote from many of his most creative associates, and has left them in doubt about what he wants and expects from them."

2. I raised the question of his future, and when he indicated interest in academic life, I brought up the Presidency of the University of California. Rusk seemed interested but only after an extended period of rest and relaxation. I did not pursue this question very far; I intend to discuss it with the Regents of the University when I go West.

3. Rusk then raised the question of my successor and intimated there has been some discussion of General Taylor coming in for a short period. I explained to Rusk that this would be very bad indeed, and retraced some of the difficulties that Taylor has had in the past, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I said that while I knew Taylor well and favorably, I thought the President could make no appointment that would be more harmful to the Agency than the appointment of Ambassador Taylor as DCI.

4. I then mentioned my discussion the evening before with Mac Bundy in which Mac raised the point of Max Taylor as an "out" for the President, stating that the President was in a difficult position with Max because "he could not get along with him or could not get along without him." Rusk said this was not at all true, that Taylor had specified and had received an absolute commitment from the President that he would serve as Ambassador to Saigon for one year and one year only and that the President had absolutely no problem with Taylor.

/3/Secret; Eyes Only; Personal; No Distribution.

5. I indicated my concern to Rusk over the qualifications of Assistant Secretary of State Vaughn to successfully handle Latin America. I based my views on my observations of Vaughn's conduct in Panama and the extraordinary statement he made to the Chiefs of Station meeting at Isolation. I told Rusk I brought the subject up merely to alert him and warn that in my opinion much of the good work accomplished in the last year or year and a half would be undone by Vaughn unless he was given very strong supervision and guidance by Rusk, Ball and Mann. Rusk indicated he had nothing to do with the appointment, inferred, but not mentioned, that the appointment was made by the President.

Washington, March 18, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book. No classification marking.

Dear Buzz:

/2/Not found.

I have been involved in this problem for almost 15 years, 7 years here in the Department and 8 years abroad as an Administrative Officer. I have seen the State Department make repeated efforts to consolidate administration in the field for the purpose of reducing over-all cost to the taxpayer and improving over-all efficiency. None of these efforts have really achieved more than monetary success. Why? Because the other agencies involved don't want to lose their own independence and the people involved don't want to lose their kingdoms.

At the present time, we are like a candy shop offering our products (administrative support) to our customers (U.S. agencies) around the world. Instead of having a single, total package of administration, we permit them to come in and shop, some taking this service and some taking that and most of them not ever agreeing to the final price.

We have some 10,000 people around the world who are paid from the services we render to other U.S. agencies and we must bear the overhead of supporting these people out of State Department appropriations until we know whether or not an agency will finally agree to pay its bill. In most instances they take the service and then chisel on the cost.

Administration around the world is characterized by duplication, inequitable practices and policies among agencies, special privileges for the people of some agencies, public wrangling over bureaucracy, payments, costs, delays, and no thought for really saving money for the taxpayer.

In this 15-year effort we have had lip support from the Bureau of the Budget and virtually no support from the Congress. The General Accounting Office has repeatedly pointed out the waste and the duplication to no avail.

To somewhat the same extent, the substantive areas have the same problems of proliferation of responsibilities, duplication of efforts and, therefore, excessive staffing. There have been repeated studies and task force reports pointing up the "problem"--even pinpointing the specific locations and the specific over-staffing. But the results (correction of the problem) have been minimal.

I certainly do not have the answers to these difficult problems, if in fact answers exist. But I do know that the lack of clear definition of agencies' missions (in military terms) and the lack of clear-cut authority to deal with them are two basic reasons for proliferation and excessive staffing. Where there is no guidance and a vacuum, everybody tries to fill it.

/3/In an April 28 memorandum to Bill Moyers, Crockett forwarded a collection of staff papers on various aspects of Department of State reorganization. The papers proposed creation of a Department of Foreign Affairs that would incorporate AID and USIA. (Johnson Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book)

Sincerely yours,

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and the typed initials below.

P.S. For the most part the above remarks do not apply to USIA, where our relationship has been close for the last 10 years.

W.J.C.

In a statement made to the Cabinet on March 25, 1965, and released to the press the same day, the President instructed Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Kermit Gordon to review U.S. overseas programs in 10 to 15 countries, on a country-by-country basis. The goal, he stated, was to "make certain that our people abroad and the money we spend abroad are used to achieve maximum support of the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, page 318.

The President's directive resulted in the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), an in-depth review of all U.S. programs in each of 13 countries using the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System. The Department explained the procedures of EROP in airgram CA-12444, May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1) Secretary Rusk endorsed EROP in a letter of May 28 to the Chiefs of Mission of the 13 countries chosen for the review (Document 39). In a June 12 memorandum to the President, Rusk and new Bureau of the Budget Director Charles Schultze reported on the status of EROP, noting that "each Chief of Mission has been instructed to propose a comprehensive program encompassing all United States agencies and activities in his country for fiscal year 1967." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Executive Review of Overseas Programs)

A report documenting the "results, conclusions, recommendations, and evaluation" of EROP was prepared in the Department of State's Office of Management Planning in October 1965. The report recommended that "a foreign affairs programming system be established under the direction of the Secretary of State" and "that planning and programming procedures continue to emphasize country rather than agency or functional programs as the initial entity for program review and evaluation." (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, October 1965-Executive Review of Overseas Programs) On December 3 Richard Barrett, Director of the Office of Management Planning, drafted a memorandum to the President from Rusk and Schultze (Document 49) that reviewed EROP and incorporated the recommendations of the October report. However, the Bureau of the Budget and other agencies disagreed with the recommendations, and the memorandum was never forwarded. For an extended discussion of EROP based on first-hand experience, see Frederick Mosher and John Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pages 74-114. During 1965 Harr was a member of State's Management Planning Staff and then Deputy Director of the Office of Management Planning. For reaction to EROP on the part of officials at the embassies involved in the review, see Documents 104 and 113. For the Central Intelligence Agency's reaction to EROP, see Document 234.

Washington, April 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, ORG 8. No classification marking. Concurred in by Thomas of ARA. Copies were sent to Ball and Mann. The memorandum indicates it was seen by the Secretary. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the State Department and the Bureau of Latin America in AID were combined in March 1964 (see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, Document 10. Crockett's memorandum is based on a study entitled "Critique of the Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs," prepared by the Office of Management, Department of State, in January 1965. Fifty State and AID officers were interviewed for the study, of whom "few expressed serious doubts regarding the usefulness of combined operations." The critique pointed out, however, that the effectiveness of combined organization in ARA could be "attributed, at least in part, to the unique combination of responsibility in Mr. Mann for the Alliance for Progress as well as for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with Latin American countries"; and the critique submitted recommendations for "important and significant improvements that must be made" if the combined organization were to become "fully successful." (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs)

SUBJECT
A Critique of the Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs

We have completed a review of the combined State/AID organization for Latin American Affairs (normally called Back-to-Back). The review concluded that the experiment achieved worthwhile results such as:

--Decisions can be made more quickly. The capacity exists and many officers find that decision-making time has been shortened.

--State and AID now speak to U.S. Missions with one voice.

--Side-stepping responsibility by buffeting issues between State and AID is stopped.

--Joint approach permits better coordination.

--State and AID personnel are better informed through greater exchange of information and attendance at common staff meetings.

--Manpower is used with greater flexibility.

--Issues are more comprehensively and sharply presented for decision by senior officials.

--Personnel perspective, understanding, skills and interests are broader.

--There is less memo writing.

/2/In 1966 Gladys Rogers (O/SP) and Harry Fite (AID) conducted a survey of the combined organization and produced an 82-page report. Rogers forwarded the report to Crockett under cover of a January 3, 1967, memorandum in which she stated that "briefly, the consolidated geographic offices are working out very well indeed [but] the consolidated administrative office has encountered more complex problems and has a long way to go yet." (Ibid.)

Washington, April 26, 1965, 8:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape F65.10, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

President: Hello?

Rusk: Mr. President?

President: Yes, sir.

Rusk: I've looked and thought about this Dick Gardner thing more. I'm not prepared in view of the checking that I've done to cash that blank check you've offered me so I'll drop that. I do want to get Patricia Harris, but she's not the person for that particular post. We need somebody with a lot of foreign affairs experience in that, whether professional or non-professional. But I would like to get her in a top spot over here. I'm trying now to find out what we can offer her, but I'll be in touch with you again about that.

President: Why don't we make her ambassador to one of the, ah, Luxembourg?

Rusk: Well--

President: What I've been doing is talking to these women and I want to move them up--women and Negroes.

Rusk: Well, one thing, for example, if she were our deputy legal adviser, she'd do a lot more work and be more help to us than she would as ambassador to Luxembourg.

President: Yes, but it wouldn't have the, ah, the honor and the standing and the status and the glory that all the Negroes want. And the women.

Rusk: Well, let me look at it but--

President: I don't want to send her to Jamaica. But I want to send her to some Scandinavian country or Luxembourg or--

Rusk: Right, well, let me--

President: Something like that.

Rusk: She's got fantastic background.

President: She's got excellent, and she's a good administrator and I thought that's what you wanted at Geneva?

/2/Roger W. Tubby was Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva with the rank of Ambassador; W. True Davis, Jr., was Ambassador to Switzerland in Bern.

President: All right, now has he--

Rusk: I'll work on this question.

President: Has he not done a creditable job?

Rusk: Well, he's done a creditable job but he hasn't made use of the opportunities there.

President: Now, he didn't have much foreign affairs experience, did he?

Rusk: No, he was here for about 2 years, 2-1/2 years, before he went over there. But he hasn't done the job we wanted him to do.

President: Well, let's see if we can't move some ambassador out of some of these places, move him there, then move some of these people into some of those places.

/3/Patricia Roberts Harris was appointed Ambassador to Luxembourg on June 4, 1965, presented her credentials on September 7, and served until September 22, 1967.

President: All right.

Rusk: All right.

Washington, April 27, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Org 1, General Policy. Limited Official Use. Filed with the memorandum are five 1964 memoranda concerning relations between the Departments of State and Commerce: Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack Behrman to Crockett, March 6, 1964; Crockett to Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., June 6, 1964; Roosevelt to Crockett, June 16, 1964; Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges to Rusk, June 16, 1964; and Crockett to Rusk, October 22, 1964.

SUBJECT
State-Commerce Relations

Although I realize you are burdened with the task of acquainting yourself with a host of operations and problems, there is one subject I would like to bring to your attention at this time-the general relationship between the State Department and the Department of Commerce and between the Foreign Service and the American business community.

Traditionally, the Bureau of Economic Affairs has neither been deeply concerned about the modus vivendi between State and Commerce nor about the quality of services offered by our posts to the American businessmen seeking or developing markets abroad. It is imperative that your Bureau's interests in these areas be intensified.

1. State and Commerce--The history between these two agencies and the question of who has what responsibilities abroad has undergone a host of bureaucratic permutations. Suffice to say that in the past few years Commerce strongly insisted upon, and we grudgingly agreed to, a separation of the commercial function from the general activities of the economic sections of our posts. The creation of a commercial specialist program included a complex effort to develop officer specialists in commercial activities, to give them status through the use of appropriate diplomatic titles and to ensure that these officers were able to deal directly with the Department of Commerce.

/2/Not found.

Therefore, we were somewhat surprised when Commerce reversed its position early this year. The new stance was that commercial and economic work were inextricably related, ergo, Commerce had to have a major interest in the operations of the Economic sections and in the choice of economic officers.

Hodges, of course, departed the scene and Connor probably does not intend to take on this bureaucratic problem until he is firmly in the saddle.

This problem bears directly upon you and your bureau since if Commerce is successful in this new bid you may very will find yourself the head of a bureau with limited responsibilities in foreign economic policy.

2. The Commercial Operation Overseas--Although it is difficult to evaluate many of the complaints businessmen raise about the lack of cooperation from our posts abroad and the general ineffectiveness of our commercial officers, there is no doubt in our mind that our commercial services are little more than surface gestures and that our commercial officers, for the most part, are engaged in amateur activities.

And it is not just our fault. Commerce has failed to establish priorities for our people and has not come through with professional backstopping. The various bureaucracies within Commerce demand and thrive upon a multitude of reports, surveys and lists so that our officers are primarily involved in a paper production.

What to Do

We are moving on a number of planes to meet with and resolve the problems outlined above.

(a) We intend to take the initiative from Commerce and urge them to establish a list of priorities for commercial activities overseas. Marginal activities, despite their benefits or traditions must be discarded. We have to get younger, more vigorous officers involved in commercial activities. We need to get them out of the routine of trade reports and into the streets where they can develop primary contacts. They need the time, impetus and encouragement to professionally analyze the problems and prospects for American business in their country.

(b) We have to foster a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the entire Foreign Service towards business. We are approaching this through exchanges of personnel with industry, through meetings and through publicity within the business communities.

Recently we have begun to establish systematically liaison with the major business groups (NAM, BCIU, etc.). We now use the BCIU as the vehicle by which newly appointed Ambassadors meet with the chief executives of major corporations with interests or potential interests in their country of assignment.

In a real sense, and more so today than ever before, the responsibility for commercial activity is diffused throughout the Embassy and is a major burden of the Ambassador. We are beginning to encourage our officers to proudly use American products and to aggressively seek markets for American products-in the same manner and with the same intensity that our British, French and German colleagues do.

(c) Your Bureau must begin to identify itself more closely with economic and commercial officers, to look after their interests, to ensure their professional development, to make them feel they have a Washington base that speaks their language and understands their problems.

I suggest that you meet with and use the energy and talents of Benjamin Weiner, who has the somewhat opaque title of Director of the Office of American Business Services. Ben is assiduously cultivating the business community, and will serve as a point of contact and irritation between State and Commerce.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Crockett signed the original.

/4/April 30.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Washington, April 28, 1965, 9:55 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, People & Positions III. No classification marking. Drafted in Ball's office.

/2/McGeorge Bundy telephoned Ball "on the QT" to discuss Leddy 3 hours later. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., as is a memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Macy regarding Leddy on April 30. The President appointed Leddy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs on June 4.

Ball said he had known him intimately for 20 years and he thought him the best in his field. He is the best in foreign economic policy but he has never had any real European political experience but he understands the background and he is sensitive to all of the problems. He is competent and would do a good job. Ball said he did not know whether he would take it or not because he might not feel himself sufficiently on top of the political question.

Moyers thought he seemed to have an abundance of natural talents, and that he seems to have been very active in the economic field and it seems to Moyers, the economic field in Europe will be one of our serious problems. Also he "knows the crowd back here". Ball said Leddy knows the government thoroughly and he knows the issues thoroughly. He is lacking in experience in the political field.

/3/Presumably Robert Bowie's Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

/4/Presumably a reference to Marshall Shulman, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

/5/This paragraph is a "continuation" of the memorandum and was prepared by a second drafter.

Washington, May 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, PER 1. No classification marking. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 502-504. An identical letter was sent on May 6 to the President of the Senate, Vice President Humphrey. The background and fate of the measures discussed in the President's letter are described in John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 84-93; and in "The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson," vol. II, chap. 2D, "Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System," prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the Department of State's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning. (Johnson Library, Administrative Histories)

Dear Mr. Speaker:

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 44-50.

/3/E.O. 11219. (30 F.R. 6381; 3 CFR, 1965 Supp.)

/4/The House passed H.R. 6277 (the Hays bill) by voice vote on September 9. Crockett noted in a September 27 memorandum to Macy, however, that "the Congressional Record for that day records the stiff opposition our supporters faced from those who represented unions and veterans' groups, and we may expect this same opposition when the bill is brought up in the Senate," which considered the bill during 1966. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book) Crockett testified in support of the bill before a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 19, 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 1131-1135. The Hays bill failed when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations tabled it on September 15, 1966. No further action was taken either on the Hays bill or the list of USIA officers proposed for FSO status. In 1967 USIA submitted a new bill, providing for a career service comparable to the FSO corps, that became law in 1968.

I urge the Congress to enact amendments to the Foreign Service Act this year. I say "this year," so that the Secretary of State and I, and the other officials, can get on with the task of providing the very best personnel system we can produce for foreign affairs.

Our ability to seize the opportunities and to use our vast resources to further the aims of the United States foreign policy must in large measure rest on the dedication and capabilities of people involved in our foreign activities. In no other area of governmental activity is it more vital to our national interest to develop and retain a corps of well-qualified men and women. It must also attract the outstanding youth of today so that tomorrow's work will be in capable hands. The new system we seek to establish will be based on the following principles:

(a) There will be a single Foreign Affairs Personnel system, broad enough to accommodate the personnel needs--domestic as well as overseas--of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, and to cover appropriate personnel of other agencies engaged in foreign affairs.

(b) This system must be fully responsive to Presidential requirements and the changing conditions in our foreign relations.

(c) Although certain basic policies and perquisites will be applied to all members of the system, full recognition will be given to the differences between the various categories of personnel and their respective conditions of service.

(d) The heads of the participating agencies will be responsible for implementing personnel policies and for the management control of their own personnel.

(e) Free interchange of personnel among the foreign affairs agencies and between these agencies and the other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch will be sought.

(f) Maximum flexibility will be sought in the assignment process to enable management to meet unique requirements and crisis conditions with efficiency and at a minimum cost.

(g) Increased coordination with the Civil Service system will be provided by closer liaison with the Civil Service Commission on various personnel activities.

(h) Appointments, promotions and selection-out of personnel will be based on the principle of competitive evaluation.

To carry out these principles, legislation is needed to do a number of things. Among these are:

(1) Provide a new category of professional career officers who would serve in the Foreign Service without time limitation, primarily for service in this country. This category should be called Foreign Affairs Officers. They should have personal rank and be subject to the same merit principles with respect to appointment, promotion, and selection-out as the other categories. Provision should be made for Foreign Affairs Officers of classes 1, 2, and 3 to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and those of classes 4 through 8 to be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary of State when directed by the President.

(2) Provide a transitional period of three years during which civil service employees of the foreign affairs agencies may decide to become participants in the new system without screening and without loss of compensation. Those who do not wish to participate will be assisted in obtaining suitable employment in other Government agencies. But after the transitional period the dual Foreign Service-Civil Service personnel systems of the foreign affairs agencies would be ended, and only the unified Foreign Service would apply. The Secretary of State will be responsible for its overall management.

(3) Eliminate restrictions on the periods of service of Foreign Service personnel in the headquarters of Government agencies.

(4) Reduce the requirements regarding length of service in other Government agencies prior to establishing eligibility for appointment into the Foreign Service officer classes 1 through 7.

(5) Eliminate present restrictions on reappointments of Foreign Service Reserve officers.

(6) Permit extension of selection-out and severance pay provisions, now limited to Foreign Service officers to all officers and employees of the Foreign Service.

To meet the present-day realities of service abroad, legislation also is needed to provide important changes in benefits available to Foreign Service personnel. These have been made necessary by trouble-spot situations of service, such as in the Congo or in Viet Nam. It is only right that we properly and compassionately look after the men and women whom we must send to such places to do our Government's business. These changes are:

--Amendment to the Annual and Sick Leave Act to permit continuation of employees in duty status if they incur injury or illness arising from a hostile act in line of duty or stemming from the fact that they were located abroad.

--Amendment to the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act to permit increasing the differential from the present limit of 25% to a limit of 50% when an employee is assigned duty in a foreign area where there is unusual danger of injury directly due to hostile activity.

--Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, Section 911, to permit the payment of travel expenses of employees and dependents when warranted by extraordinary conditions, or circumstances involving unusual personal hardship.

Representatives of the Department of State, the Civil Service Commission, and others are prepared to explain the Administration's position on this measure and to help in any way they can.

Sincerely,

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original.

Washington, May 28, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Attached is a memorandum from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration to Rusk, May 25, indicating that the same letter was sent to all 13 Chiefs of Mission participating in the Executive Review of Overseas Programs. For background on EROP, see Document 33. According to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, p. 84, Rusk himself proposed sending this letter during a planning meeting on EROP with Crockett and Barrett in April.

Dear Luke:

You have probably received by now extensive guidance for the Executive Review of Overseas Programs, which I recently discussed with Kermit Grodon. I am writing you to emphasize the fact that the President attaches considerable importance to the project and has a strong interest in its success. I share his view fully.

Two basic factors underlie both the concept and procedures of the Review. The first is the belief that the Chief of Mission, because he is in charge of the U.S. Mission in the country to which he is accredited and because he is in close and continuous contact with all of the programs and activities of the Mission, has a unique capability in the Executive Branch to assess the effectiveness of those programs and activities and assure their efficient management.

The second factor is that the Chief of Mission is the representative of the President. As such, he has special responsibilities that are not limited to the Foreign Service establishment, but rather extend to the entire U.S. Mission. His concern and perspective, therefore, must be as broad as his responsibilities. He must understand the purpose of and need for activities of domestic agencies in his country and scrutinize them with the same objectivity that he applies to the activities of the community of foreign affairs agencies.

These were the principal factors that led to the decision that the initiative for this project should be given to the Chief of Mission and that his recommendations for a comprehensive U.S. program for fiscal year 1967 will provide the foundation of the Review.

The scope and requirements of the Review make it a demanding and difficult task for you and your staff, particularly in view of the necessarily tight schedule, but I am sure that you will give it the priority attention it needs.

Sincerely,

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

At 1 p.m. on July 9, 1965, President Johnson telephoned Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to discuss the appointment of Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., an African-American, to replace Harry McPherson as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. The President wanted McPherson, who was in the Oval Office during the telephone call, to join the White House staff. The conversation was recorded in the White House on a dictabelt but, due primarily to a problem with the dictabelt, some of Fulbright's comments are unintelligible. The conversation began as follows:

President: (aside to McPherson) "Harry, get over there on the phone. Bill, this problem, I've got the man now that you want to specifications, but Harry tells me that you don't want him, that you've got some question about him, and hell, I'm going to have to let you select him if you won't take my man."

Fulbright: "Who are you talking about?"

President: "I'm talking about the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Robert W. Kitchen, Jr. He was born in Brunswick, Georgia--"

Fulbright: "Oh yeah, he [McPherson] told me about it, yes."

President (apparently reading from a dossier): "He received his A.B. in economics from Morehouse."

Fulbright: "It occurred to me that--"

President (still reading): "He received his M.S. degree in business from Columbia. He got a Ph.[D.] degree at Columbia, an honorary Doctor of Laws from Chapman, California. He served in the Navy. Became Assistant to the Treasurer of Hampton Institute. He joined the Agency of International Development. He's been the head of many task forces, including the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Africa, First International Conference on Adult Education in Rome, Task Groups on Administrative Procedures in Cairo, Task Group on Community Developments in Bangkok. He received the highest meritorious service award for his work. His duties as director of the international training--he teaches international training at Howard University. He is married, has a daughter age 13, and here's what the analysis shows on him--that we've been thinking of him as Assistant Secretary of Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. He's been directing a program which in most respects is more complex and challenging as that of the educational and cultural operation in State. The comments we've received on his performance universally indicate that he does an outstanding job. He has a well-earned reputation for being an innovator and a doer. I'm personally acquainted with him and found him always to be imaginative and perceptive and diligent."

President (speaking on his own rather than reading): "Now here's what I can do. I can work with this fellow. And I don't believe that folks like Rooney can turn down this Negro that's able and can testify and do his job. Now Carl Rowan is going to leave the USIA, and go out and write, in journalism. And when he does, I want to announce this fellow as going in as Assistant Secretary, because the State Department just won't let any Negroes work over there."

Fulbright: "Well, Mr. President, you know whatever you want you can do--"

President: "No, I can't do it here. I'm not going to do anything that you don't want. But you wanted me to pick the best man I could, and Harry said, well, you said 'they're gonna have two Negroes.' Well, they're not. Just going to have--not going to have any if we don't name this fellow. And I'll use him as my front and I'll do the rest of the work, with your help."

Fulbright: "Well, I don't know--I know I would be accused of bigotry if I didn't approve him."

President: "No, you wouldn't be accused of anything. Nobody would even know you'd been talked to. Now you and I don't deal that way. If you don't want the man, we just don't want him. If you want the program, I think this is the best thing we can do. But whatever you want, you get, as far as I'm concerned."

Fulbright: "Well, of course, that's what bothers me is that, you know, very few of these countries that we have [unintelligible] are Negro countries. I don't know how he would go down in the most important countries at all. A very delicate subject, but it's very delicate here at home. What struck me the other day when he mentioned it was that both of our--USIA and the cultural programs and the visits [?]--after all we are not predominantly a colored nation."

President: "Not at all. But the USIA man is leaving. And he has done a good job."

Fulbright: "It never occurred to me that they were outstanding in the cultural field in this country. I mean, after all they're not. The big [?] universities are not predominantly colored."

President: "No, but Bill, we have 120 Ambassadors and we only have two Negroes. We have a dozen Assistant Secretaries of State. We have a dozen Assistant Secretaries."

Fulbright: "I happen to think this is a hell of a lot more important job than anything the ambassadors do--"

President: "That's right."

Fulbright: "--that deal with 48 countries."

President: "But I'm talking now--we've got all the Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries and we don't have one. And this fellow--"

Fulbright: "I wouldn't object at all if you made him Secretary of State for that matter, but I have a rather personal interest in this post [unintelligible] in a bad way--"

President: "That's right. And I think this is the best prepared, best equipped, best trained man we have. Because he's dealing in the international field. He's forgotten more about it than Harry ever knew. Hell, he's [McPherson's] a Tyler, Texas boy. But this fellow is dealing in this work now in all the country."

The President again reviewed Kitchen's credentials and the conversation continued.

President: "Now where in the hell you got a man equal? Harry, you tell him what you think about it. You can find anybody that even comes close to him, I'm willing to take him on merit."

McPherson: "Senator, he's already been running the AID program, and they've got more foreign students here than we do. I suppose he goes to 60 universities a year. I know he's been to all 2 or 3 hundred of them--"

Fulbright: "Harry, the AID and the military programs are not the same [unintelligible] at all."

McPherson: "No, but what I'm trying to indicate is that they're the nearest approximations of them." (Fulbright's comments, made simultaneously, are unintelligible.)

Fulbright: "It's not just handling a lot of people. He's supposed to have some standing with the people we deal with. The main purpose of this is to have people with [unintelligible] and the personality to get along with the major foreign countries. If they don't cooperate, well there's no hope for us. We can't just force a national program on them."

McPherson: "I know that."

Fulbright: "I don't know the fellow. I'll be very glad to meet him."

After further conversation, Fulbright agreed to see Kitchen on July 12. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator Fulbright, Tape FMISC.04, Side B, PNO 1) The portions of the conversation printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

In September 1966 the President appointed Charles Frankel to be Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. That same month, Kitchen became Agency for International Development Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York City.

According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation on July 15, 1965, between President Johnson and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann, the President asked Mann for the names of people for the position of Representative to the United Nations. "Mr. Mann said he could think of people who could do the job, but he thought they were needed more where they were. He added that off-the-cuff he would say Secretary Wirtz and George Ball. He explained that he really thought Mr. Ball was needed in the State Department and said that he made 90% of the decisions that had to be made. Mr. Mann told the President that the Assistant Secretaries have been weak in decision-making. He said that he thought this would improve greatly with the new appointments (Leddy and Hare)."

Later in the same conversation, "the President asked about Secretary Rusk and whether he would be interested. Mr. Mann said he doubted it and besides he felt that we all need Secretary Rusk in his job where he is now. The President asked Mr. Mann who it was that keeps roughing him up trying to get him to resign." Mann responded that "just between the two of them, George Ball had told him that he and Rusk were satisfied that it came from [Arthur] Schlesinger and [Richard] Goodwin and that crowd. The President said it may come from Schlesinger. Goodwin denies it."

Mann then "asked to have time to think about it some more. He said that he really felt that Rusk and Ball were needed here. He said that he felt that Ball is basically loyal to the President. He said that he will not always agree but he does get decisions made. He said the Secretary was a cautious man and does not make quick decisions." (Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ)

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Limited Official Use. Internal evidence indicates that the paper was prepared in July or August 1965 although it contains no drafting information. Handwritten notations on the paper indicate that the original was sent to Mann, with copies to Ball, Deputy Executive Secretary John Walsh, S/S Staff Director Herbert Gordon, and S/S Assistant Staff Director Jeanne Davis.

IMPROVING STATE DEPARTMENT FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP IN MATTERS OF MAJOR USG CONCERN

There have been significant changes in the method of conduct of foreign relations and in the demands placed on the State Department during the 20 months of the Johnson Administration. The Department has had to learn to operate with long-sustained, serious crises in SEA and elsewhere which take a substantial percentage of the time and thoughts of top officials. Military matters have required increasing attention. The NSC apparatus, which used to initiate a variety of foreign policy demands and initiatives, has become much less active. The Department is clearing far fewer matters with the White House staff than was the case before November 22, 1963. In short, a greater premium is now placed on effective, independent operation of the Department at all levels.

None of these changing requirements has led to responsive changes in the Department's method of handling its business. This paper contains several suggestions for improving the Department's ability (1) to cope with key problems--at the bureau level, at the seventh-floor level, and interdepartmentally; and (2) to respond better to the President's needs.

There is no disagreement with the view often stated by the Secretary that primary responsibility for the proper handling of foreign affairs must rest with the bureaus and the regional Assistant Secretaries. From the point of view of the 7th floor, however, it would seem fair to say there is increasing concern about the ability of the bureaus to fulfill their responsibilities under present circumstances. At least three main points of criticism can be cited.

(1) The Assistant Secretaries and other bureau officers do not seem to be bringing to the attention of the 7th floor the major issues on which high-level information and attention is most needed in a consistent and timely fashion.

(2) With one or two notable exceptions, the Assistant Secretaries do not appear to be exerting sufficient leadership among their counterparts in the other agencies dealing with national security problems.

(3) The bureaus do not seem to be organized in such a way as to assure satisfactory handling of other affairs when seized with a major crisis which occupies most of the time of the Assistant Secretary.

One method of improving the Department's leadership position in foreign affairs and of promoting more systematic consideration of major problems would be to set up interdepartmental regional policy committees in each of the bureaus under the chairmanship of the respective regional Assistant Secretary.

In addition to the desired representation from the bureau itself, other functional bureaus and offices within the Department would attend when problems to be addressed affected their areas, and the Secretariat line officer for the bureau would be present to report the proceedings to the four principal officers of the Department. The Assistant Secretary would have full authority to limit the invitations to essential participants and unnecessary "professional meeting goers" would be excluded.

Members would include, as the problems to be dealt with would dictate, the Assistant Secretary's counterparts from AID, USIA, ISA and CIA, and, as appropriate, representatives of Peace Corps, Treasury, Ex-Im, Commerce, Agriculture and HEW. Every effort would be made with seventh-floor assistance necessary to get the high-level counterparts from other agencies to attend regularly, and to combat the usual committee tendency to permit progressively lower-level representatives.

The regional Committees would have jurisdiction over any and all aspects of US policy toward the countries covered by the bureaus, although subjects such as counter-insurgency and covert action policies would probably be better handled in subcommittee or small executive committee in the discretion of the Assistant Secretary. The bureaus would be directed to bring up for consideration in regular meetings of these Committees on a systematic basis the most significant short- and long-term policy problems confronting the USG in the area. The Assistant Secretaries would be asked to give the Committee process their close, personal attention and supervision as a matter of high priority. Advance agendas and timely records of action would be required.

/2/Not found.

NEA has attempted to coordinate interdepartmental problems in its area by fairly regular weekly luncheons including the Assistant Secretary, the regional Administrator of AID, the USIA Near East Deputy Director, and the Deputy Director of ISA for Near East Affairs. In addition a staff meeting has been held weekly to which other agency participants are invited, and send relatively junior representatives. These informal contacts, useful as they undoubtedly have been, cannot be considered an adequate substitute for a regular recognized forum for interdepartmental consultation and decision, where the hardest problems can be addressed systematically, differences of view presented and cooperation sought. When the Assistant Secretary has had a crisis to deal with or is absent from town, coordination has suffered, and the reporting back from the weekly luncheons has left much to be desired.

FE lacks any established interdepartmental machinery, other than the Vietnam Coordinating Committee, and in recent months the Assistant Secretary has negotiated most important interdepartmental business personally on an ad hoc basis. The lack of a broader forum is said to have increased unnecessarily our difficulties in obtaining government-wide cooperation in such controversial areas as our economic relations with Japan and the increasingly difficult problems with Indonesia. Obviously, the existence of the everyday crises in SEA has made far more difficult the handling of other affairs.

In European matters as well, interagency regional policy machinery is completely lacking, and there is no systematic organization for handling the numerous complex issues affecting Defense, Commerce and other agencies of government.

Regional policy committees would be expected to function in time of crisis in the area as well as in normal periods, and could keep a watch over other problems which might presently escape the attention of an assistant secretary preoccupied with a given crisis. Acting or deputy assistant secretaries would chair meetings in the necessary absence of the assistant secretary.

When confronted by a situation that might well develop crisis proportions, the policy committees would be directed to establish actual and standby interagency task forces to coordinate our policies towards the country in question and to serve as the focal point for requirements of and information needed by the 7th floor or White House. A full roster of operating task forces would be kept current at the White House and in S, U, M and G.

Summaries of the major items of business dealt with by the regional committees and task forces would be prepared after each meeting by the secretariat for the information of the principal officers. By this means it should be possible for the Secretary and the Under Secretaries to have a better grasp of what the bureaus consider to be their principal business and what they were doing about it, and to let them give more effective and timely policy guidance to the assistant secretaries. G would have special responsibilities in this regard and these are spelled out in the next section.

The Assistant Secretaries weekly individual and biweekly staff meetings with Assistant Secretaries would be utilized to seek guidance or approval for the actions of the regional policy committees in key areas and, as well, to keep the principal officers of the Department informed of major developments.

In summary, it can be said that the Department of State is missing a good bet in not exerting leadership through the means of regional policy committees in NEA, FE and EUR and in not making the other committees more broadly effective. Such committees could provide a powerful impetus for forcing important problems to the fore in a comprehensive and timely fashion.

Improvements in bureau operations should be accompanied by improvements in seventh floor conduct of business. Sustained serious crises have occupied an ever increasing percentage of the time of the Secretary and Under Secretaries, and utilization of their remaining time must be planned with increasing care.

Several problems can be identified:

(1) There is not enough information flowing to the bureaus from the principal officers. Decisions taken by them are sometimes learned about in the bureaus from contacts with counterparts in other agencies. Debriefing is rarely full or prompt enough.

(2) There is no systematic means of bringing seventh floor leadership to bear on problems which are beyond the competence of a single bureau because they require the cooperation of other agency heads or because they affect all or more than one region.

(3) Seventh floor knowledge of major bureau concerns seems spotty and sometimes even haphazard.

The last problem cited should be partially solved at least by regular receipt of summaries from bureau regional policy committees. It would be desirable to supplement this information flow to the top officers of the Department with summaries of major developments at the regular bureau staff meetings, which could be prepared by the Secretariat officers who already attend such meetings.

The first two problems cited could be tackled by the establishing of seventh floor machinery to help direct and coordinate the most important area and interregional problems.

The only existing seventh floor committees--the CI Group and the 303 Group--have jurisdiction limited strictly to counter insurgency and covert intelligence matters. The great strength of these committees has been their ability to attract the highest level of other departmental representation; their weakness--the leadership role they have taken away from the regional bureaus on matters not always requiring attention at the highest levels.

Ad hoc committees have been set up in the past, usually under the leadership of G, to wrestle with a variety of problems, but the desired high level of representation from other agencies has not been forthcoming, and there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the results.

On a number of occasions in the past leadership has been taken away from the State Department by the White House by the convening of meetings in the NSC area. Frequently these meetings have been convened prior to the development of a policy within the Department, much less before any effort has been made by the Department to coordinate policy on a government-wide basis.

It is recommended that a seventh floor State Coordinating Committee be established to deal with the most important problems requiring highest level inter-agency consideration. The chairmanship and membership on the State Coordinating Committee would be kept as flexible as possible to meet the widely varying demands which would be placed on the committee. Normally, however, the committee would be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the represent-atives from other agencies would include the AID, USIA and CIA Director or Deputy Director, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Assistant secretaries and area experts would be added as appropriate. US Ambassadors must be able to attend. When the nature of the problem warranted it, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Under Secretary or even the Secretary (if other Cabinet members were invited), would chair the meetings. G would have this responsibility normally, however, and it would be his primary responsibility to review regularly the reports of the Regional Policy Committee meetings to determine whether higher level consideration of problems was desired and to determine when other problems beyond the competence of any one bureau required such consideration.

The State Coordinating Committee would consider only problems of major import which could not be resolved at lower levels, by G in consultation with one or more assistant secretaries, bilaterally with another department, or by other devices. It would not meet regularly unless the importance of business to be considered required it.

In a major crisis the State Coordinating Committee might be asked to act as a top level task force, freeing the Cabinet level officers from many of the coordination problems they now face in time of crisis.

Staffing for the seventh floor committee would be done by the bureau whose problems were being considered. The Secretariat would coordinate staffing responsibilities when the problems fell within the jurisdiction of several bureaus. The Secretariat would also have responsibility under G's supervision to set agendas and circulate records of action.

Regular and appropriate dissemination of the records of action of the committee should go a long way towards meeting the urgent need of the bureaus for better information flow from above.

The proposals made above might be criticized as revival of the Operations Coordinating Board machinery in another form. The answer to such criticism lies in strict adherence to a few simple rules: (1) State responsibility for leadership would be retained, by a) chairmanship of the regional committees by State, b) provision of staffing services by the bureaus in State, and c) maintenance of the closest possible connection between committee deliberations and action processes; (2) Creation of ad hoc or country working groups with independent lives would be avoided by insistence on the informality and temporary existence of task forces; (3) Elaborate minutes or reports of meetings would not be required, other than those papers prepared to record decisions not otherwise incorporated in action papers or summaries written to inform the seventh floor of significant problems; and (4) Action would be completed and taken at the lowest possible level at which the agencies vitally involved could agree, except where the significance of the action required higher level approval.

The purposes of the several groups proposed in this paper should be clearly distinguished for maximum economy of effort: (1) The regional policy committees would be the only groups meeting on a regular schedule for wide-ranging discussion, as well as for consideration of specific problems which may or may not be reduced in advance to written form; (2) The task forces would meet, or work separately or as a group, only in the pursuit of specific tasks assigned by the parent regional committees or by the State Coordinating Committee, upon completion of which their affairs would be returned to normal methods of operation and coordination as soon as possible; (3) The State Coordinating Committee would meet only for the consideration of specific problems on which the agreement or disagreement of vitally concerned agencies would be clearly identified in advance and, normally, circulated in written form prepared individually or in a task force. Problems affecting only two or three agencies might be discussed in these bodies but would not normally become the business of the full group when decisions had to be made.

/3/The President proposed forming such a task force during a telephone conversation with Mann on June 5. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, June 5; Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ)

(a) Identify alternatives and contingencies

(b) Identify local leaders' actual potentials

(c) Identify the extent of Communist subversions and infiltration and means of coping with it.

It would be concerned with briefing the appropriate subcommittees on the Hill and undertaking appropriate consultation with other governments.

It is submitted that putting into effect the suggestions in Sections 1 and 2 of this memo would provide the best answer to the President's needs. The specific subjects which he has suggested for inclusion in "plans of action" would be part of the job given to the regional policy committees and task forces. When the urgency of the situation warranted, these plans of action and others on broader matters would be reviewed by the State Coordinating Committee at the highest levels of government.

Since the White House would be provided with current lists of task forces in operation, the President would be apprised at all times of the focal point of action and information on urgent problems, and would know which assistant secretary or senior officer was charged with primary responsibility. If desired, the records of action of the regional policy committees and State Coordinating Committee could be made available to him regularly as well to give a fuller grasp of problems which were being wrestled with at the top echelons of the Department.

If the State Coordinating Committee operated as outlined above, the President could be assured of far better coordination among the members of the National Security Community than now exists.

The new procedures suggested for the bureaus and seventh floor would permit far greater confidence that problems of highest priority were being handled systematically and at the appropriate level within the Department itself.

In 1965 the Department of State published Improvements in Administration, 1961-1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office). A revision of Changes in Administration, January 1961-January 1963, the report summarized progress toward achieving eight goals for improved administration established in 1961 by William Crockett, then Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, plus a ninth goal added in 1964. The nine areas of concern were: overseas posts; the Department of State in Washington; the personnel program; support of overseas personnel; logistic, communications, and financial support; basic organization; and the security program.

When forwarding a draft of the report to Crockett on May 18, 1965, E.A. Donovan, Chief of the Department's Administrative Support Division, noted in his covering memorandum that Crockett's original goals had been retained in the revised report even though "major emphasis for the past two years has been placed on strengthening the Department's and Ambassadors' leadership in interagency administrative matters and combining administrative servicing in Washington and field posts." (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, ORG 2)

Washington, August 18, 1965, 7:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. No classification marking. From 1:40 to 4:05 p.m. on August 19, the President met for lunch in the Madison Room at the Department of State with Rusk, Ball, Mann, Harriman, Goldberg, seven Assistant Secretaries of State, Chief of Protocol Lloyd Hand, and Valenti. (Ibid., Daily Diary) The Daily Diary indicates that Valenti kept notes of the meeting, which were turned over to Dorothy Territo of the White House staff, but the notes have not been found. Four months earlier, in a memorandum to the President of April 21, Valenti had proposed that the President go the Department of State to talk with "the assistant secretaries, their deputies, regional and area chiefs and some desk officers," in order "to counter-attack the swiftly-building myth that the President is bored with foreign affairs and doesn't enjoy foreign visitors." Valenti continued, "Let us show, visibly, the President's interest in the ideas, imagination and energy of State-as well as his support for State employees." The President, however, responded by checking "No" at the bottom of the memorandum. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105)

SUBJECT
Your Meeting at the State Department at 1:00, Thursday, August 19

You know better than anyone else what you want to say, but the following checklist may be useful:

1. The importance of unity in what we do.

You expect frank, private advice and counsel before decisions are made and full and unified support after they are made. This point is fundamental, because the best policy in the world cannot be put into effect if the people who carry it out are not for it all the way. Once you have made up your mind, you expect the entire Government to pull in the same direction.

Examples: Panama 1964, Ayub and Shastri 1965, and the Dominican Republic.

2. The importance of unity in what we say.

The press are continually trying to divide the Government against itself and we simply must not play their game. Any officer who is in doubt of any policy ought to keep his mouth absolutely shut. These men are the ones who have the responsibility not only for their subordinates, but for themselves. The higher the rank, the more damaging the leak. The Department of State--except for Secretary Rusk himself--simply does not have the kind of discipline in dealing with the press that a President must expect. (Incidentally, President Kennedy used to feel at least as strongly as you do on this point.)

3. The importance of respect for the United States.

We are not trying to throw our weight around, but we do not expect other people to take us and our help for granted.

Examples: Panama 1964, Pakistan and India 1965, Harold Wilson and Lester Pearson.

4. The importance of dealing fairly with those who deal fairly with us.

Examples: Panama 1965, Australia, Erhard of Germany, and, for that matter, the Soviet Union itself.

5. The importance of peace.

--Secretary Rusk's job in Vietnam.
--Ambassador Goldberg's job in New York.
--Everybody's job on disarmament.

My final thought is simply that no briefing paper is worth much for this meeting. The essence of it is that these people should feel at first hand the quality of their President and the flavor of what his State Department should be like.

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

At a breakfast meeting with Cabinet members and agency heads on August 25, 1965, President Johnson directed each agency to introduce an integrated Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). Once in operation, he stated, the system would enable each agency to identify its goals with precision, "choose among those goals the ones that are most urgent," and "search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at the least cost." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 916-917. On October 12, in Bulletin No. 66-3, the Bureau of the Budget issued instructions and set deadlines for establishing PPBS. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming & Budgeting, Box 70 Folder A)

Unlike the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System, which was a country-based system administered by State, PPBS was an agency-based system directed by the Bureau of the Budget. Each overseas agency, including the Department of State, United States Information Agency, Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, and Central Intelligence Agency, was instructed to prepare its own Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and submit the results to the Bureau of the Budget for review. The differences in the two approaches and the implications and consequences of those differences, which directly affected Documents 49 and 62, are discussed in Frederick Mosher and John Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pages 90-200.

Washington, September 14, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 277. Secret. A copy was sent to Yager (S/P).

SUBJECT
Politico-Military Contingency Planning

/2/The Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) was established in early 1965, following a proposal from Rusk to McNamara in an October 6, 1964, letter to create "a small State-Defense Working Group that would review existing contingency planning, establish an improved method of State-Defense coordination, and set priorities for the development of additional country studies." (Ibid.) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs chaired the committee; also represented were the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A chart showing the status of the CCC's work undertaken through May 1966 is attached to an information memorandum on Politico-Military Contingency Planning Pursuant to NSAM No. 277, May 11, 1966. (Ibid., S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Contingency Coordinating Committee) In a memorandum to McNamara, May 12, 1967, Rusk stated that he had recently reviewed the CCC's work and "concluded that constructive and useful work has been done in coordinating interagency planning to meet possible international contingencies. Cooperation in this matter between your staff, JCS, CIA and the State Department has been excellent." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-06423A, US Govt-Interagency)

2. At its last meeting, the Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) decided to initiate a more active phase of contingency planning. Having launched two initial studies earlier this year (Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute now undergoing field review, and Arab-Israeli Dispute in final drafting stage), the CCC has now recommended that two studies be undertaken in each geographic area (with the exception of EUR where most urgent contingency planning is carried forward by other planning media).

3. Perhaps the most important point in assessing the CCC's activities so far is that all participating agencies are solidly behind its efforts and have fully accepted State's leadership in working out contingency papers. The cooperation of the Joint Staff has been especially heartening. The J-5, General Spivy, has taken over from Andy Goodpaster as the CCC's senior JCS representative. Working on a purely military requirement to assemble crisis management data banks for virtually every country in the world, J-5 has agreed to synchronize with the CCC outlines and procedures to assure a maximum pooling of effort. Joint guidelines were worked out which should facilitate the development of forthcoming studies.

4. There is agreement among all participants that what is wanted in a CCC study is a document which has relevance to the situation at hand or anticipated; paper exercises must be avoided; the studies should be reviewed and updated as required. Ultimately, they are to constitute basic source and operational documents in the event a crisis actually arises. In order to enhance their usefulness as crisis management papers, the contingency studies will contain rosters of key senior staff people that currently work on a situation and who could on very short notice form a task force to assist the policy level.

/3/For text, see Document 5.

6. While the personal contact among representatives of agencies having primary responsibility for national security matters has been highly gratifying, any honest stock-taking should not slough over the fact that the process of preparing the studies so far has been slow, that the papers could be improved by providing more concise planning guidance, and that greater synchronization of political, economic, military and covert actions would be desirable. Particularly with regard to the first shortcoming, lack of speed, the military, especially the Joint Staff, are dissatisfied. Operational priorities and other requirements caused the State-chaired working groups repeatedly to exceed their original deadlines. One of the recommendations approved by the CCC is the appointment of a Primary Project Officer who would be held responsible for the timely production of the study, but it is clear from our past experience that interest and pressure at the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary level must be maintained.

/4/Attachments A and C are not printed. Attachment B was not found.

/5/Not found.

8. Attachment C is a memorandum from you to the Secretary, informing him of the progress made in Contingency Planning.

/6/Written in hand at this point is "Sent 9/23." The recommendation was approved on September 15.

Washington, November 5, 1965, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Candidate for Ambassador to the Dominican Republic

1. In your absence, I have taken it upon myself to coordinate a recommendation on this subject. I have done this because of repeated and increasingly urgent pleas from both Tap Bennett and Ellsworth Bunker that we find a replacement for Bennett soon. Bennett is very near the end of his rope down there, and Bunker tells me that he asks about his reassignment every time Bunker goes back. Bunker himself thinks it urgent on both personal and political grounds that Bennett be reassigned.

2. There is general agreement on the right place for Bennett: Portugal. The Ambassador there is Admiral Anderson, who apparently never misses an opportunity to make snide remarks about our Administration, and we owe him nothing. (Indeed, some of us think that President Kennedy was too kind to him when he sent him there in the first place.) Lisbon is a most agreeable place to live, and is regarded in the Foreign Service as a major step up from Santo Domingo. Tom Mann and Ellsworth Bunker are convinced that the Bennetts will be pleased.

3. I have spoken to Senator Russell about this, and he tells me that he wants whatever Bennett wants. He also says that he thinks this is a good time to make the change from the point of view of public attitudes. I asked him what other Senators should be consulted, and he said that there was hardly one he would trust to keep his mouth shut, but after some discussion he agreed it would be safe and wise to check with Hickenlooper, and I have a call in to him.

4. After reviewing a large number of names, I have concurrences from Rusk, Ball, Mann, Crockett, Vaughn, Vance, and J. Edgar Hoover on the nomination of John Hugh Crimmins of the State Department to succeed Bennett. Moreover, this concurrence is warm and enthusiastic among those who know Crimmins best, regardless of political preferences. Tom Mann and I, for example, are equally sure that he is the man we now need.

5. We have looked at many other names. Some of us like Tony Freeman, but Mann and Dean Rusk are doubtful. We looked hard at a very able man from the Harvard School of Education (a Gardner and Keppel product), but most of us doubt that you should pick a man without previous diplomatic experience. Some of us would like to send Jack Vaughn, but Tom Mann insists that he is indispensable where he is. Over on the liberal side, people speak of Ralph Dungan, but Tom Mann thinks that this would be a disaster. Tom himself has mentioned one or two senior Foreign Service Officers like Parsons and Albert, but a number of the rest of us think that the older men from the Dulles age, without Latin American experience, would be at least as disastrous as Dungan. To put it another way, the problem is to find a man of tested judgment and balance who has the confidence of all hands.

6. Crimmins is such a man. From 1961-1963, he was the Director of the Caribbean Office and in that position, he had a lot to do with the Dominican Republic. But he did not get "burned" by any specific political decision. He knows the players and they know him, but he does not arouse violent feelings.

7. Since early 1963 Crimmins has been the Cuban Task Force Director. In this job he has won an outstanding reputation as a man who can get things done and who can make sound and effective policy recommendations. Most recently, he has been the organizer of our preparations for the new wave of Cuban refugees and he has deeply impressed us again.

8. In a separate memorandum, you will see that Buford Ellington reports he did a splendid job on his most recent trip to Florida.

9. I think the press both here and in the Dominican Republic will treat the appointment of Crimmins as a sound and strong professional decision. I think neither the far left nor the far right will be able to land any punches on him at the start. His reporting from Santo Domingo will be clear, and your Washington assistants will know the mind of the man they are hearing from. I do not think we can do better--or indeed nearly as well with anyone else.

/2/Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

/3/Bennett was appointed Ambassador to Portugal on May 10, 1966, and Crimmins was appointed Ambassador to the Dominican Republic on June 27.

McG.B.

Washington, November 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. No indication has been found that the memorandum was signed and forwarded to Rusk, but at some point it was made available to Bromley Smith, NSC Executive Secretary. In Smith's files it is attached to a copy of a December 10 memorandum from Schwartz to Taylor, which refers to an attached draft of a reorganization plan. However, attached to the original of Schwartz's memorandum in the Taylor Papers at National Defense University is a different plan for reorganizing the Special Group that clearly is the plan to which Schwartz's covering memorandum refers. (Box 63, Folder II, NSAM 341 & Related Items)

127 U. Alexis Johnson recounted his role in the development of the SIG-IRG system in The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 398-401.

SUBJECTS
(1) Establishment of Interagency Regional Policy Committees chaired by geographic assistant secretaries
(2) Reconstitution of Special Group (CI) to form a broad based Seventh Floor chaired high level interagency coordinating committee

This memorandum recommends for your approval two levels of organizational moves designed to improve the Department's coordination and guidance to other agencies with foreign affairs concerns and to promote a more systematic handling of major policy questions. Messrs. Ball, Mann and Harriman concur in these recommendations.

/2/Dated November 5; not printed.

Approve

Disapprove

Discuss with U, M, G

/3/Attached but not printed is a November 1 draft NSAM reconstituting the Special Group and broadening its authority.

Approve in principle

Disapprove

/4/None of the options was checked under either numbered paragraph.

Washington, December 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Taylor Task Force Report. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett. The first page of the memorandum indicates it was not sent. The serious differences that developed between State and BOB over the draft memorandum's recommendations are described in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 108-114. The objections expressed by AID, Agriculture, and DOD are summarized in a memorandum from Barrett to Crockett, January 11, 1966. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, ORG 1)

SUBJECT
Report on the Executive Review of Overseas Programs

/2/See Document 33.

This Executive Review of Overseas Programs was conducted in 13 countries: Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, Greece, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of China.

This is to report to you:

(a) how the Review was carried out,
(b) the results of the Review, and
(c) the steps we intend to take to improve our capability to conduct regular reviews of this kind.

1. Each Ambassador was asked to examine in depth the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies represented in his country. Detailed State Department/Budget Bureau instructions required the Ambassador to identify the lowest priority activities in the mission and to recommend a total U.S. program which, in his judgment, was the minimum needed to carry out our objectives.

2. A programming system, developed experimentally by the State Department, was used by the Ambassadors for their review. This system collects and displays information on the activities of all agencies, country-by-country and in common manpower and dollar terms. The system thereby assists the Ambassadors and Washington managers in evaluating the level of each activity and its relationship to other U.S. activities in the country.

3. The recommendations of the Ambassador were then reviewed by the State Department, other agencies whose programs were affected, and the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Action decisions were then made and transmitted to each Ambassador for revision of field budget estimates.

Program reductions and administrative savings totalling an estimated $7.8 million in fiscal year 1967 were identified, resulting from cutbacks of activities and from management improvements, out of a fiscal year 1965 total of $425 million for all U.S. programs in the 13 countries, excluding major military and economic assistance.

These savings not only can permit allocation of our resources to higher priority needs, but also result in net budgetary savings. Many of these proposed savings are being realized by actions now being taken. Others will be reviewed in the context of the current budget reviews.

The following are examples of some of the major Ambassadorial recommendations:

--Ambassadors Bruce and Reischauer recommended organizational consolidation of U.S. scientific representation in London and Tokyo.

--Five Ambassadors recommended either a reduction or elimination of the Travel Service Program at a savings of about $289,000, on the grounds that the host government regulations are the main barrier to travel to the United States or that promotional activities of private firms are adequate.

--Eight Ambassadors recommended significant reductions in Military Attach? operations at their posts. Concentration of available manpower on priority intelligence requirements could save $300,000 annually in Germany, $700,000 in the United Kingdom, and $131,000 in Italy. Overall changes affecting the Defense Department's non-command overseas operations could save $2,900,000.

--Eight of the thirteen participating Ambassadors are taking steps to consolidate the administrative activities of the various agencies. Motor vehicle operations and communication facilities are being pooled or reduced. Personnel, fiscal, and general services are being standardized and consolidated. Estimated annual savings of $3,000,000 in these eight countries can be realized.

--Ambassador Bruce recommended a reduction of $361,000 in the United States Information Service program.

In sum we believe that the Executive Review of Overseas Programs will result in:

--significant savings

--better allocation of our manpower and money to high priority requirements and objectives

--more efficient management and organizational arrangements in our field missions

--a greater understanding of the relationships among our programs overseas and how they, in concert, can better contribute to achieving our objectives

--an enhanced capability of our Ambassadors to manage the total U.S. effort in the field.

/3/See Document 45.

1. Programming Systems for the Foreign Affairs Agencies. As a part of the planning-programming-budgeting system announced on August 25, programming systems for each of the major foreign affairs agencies are now being developed under Bureau of the Budget leadership. These systems will include the State Department, AID, USIA, CIA, and the Peace Corps. The agency programming systems will be designed to: (a) improve the allocation of resources among agencies as well as within agencies, and (b) to assist the Secretary of State and the heads of other foreign affairs agencies in the execution of their responsibilities. By programming agency resources by country, these systems will, along with enterprises outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 below, permit the development of an over-all Foreign Affairs Programming System.

2. Refining and Expanding the Country Programming System. The experimental country programming system developed by the Department is designed to assist the Secretary and the Ambassadors in carrying out their responsibilities for the management of foreign affairs by relating individual agency activities to U.S. policies and objectives on a country, regional, and global basis. This year's review indicated that the country programming system can be improved by eliminating certain features and simplifying others. The Department will modify the present system to incorporate both these improvements and to reflect changes made in the individual agency programming and budgeting procedures resulting from the effort described in paragraph 1. The revised programming system will be used to conduct country and regional reviews (similar to those conducted experimentally this year) beginning with the FY-1963 budgetary cycle.

3. Strengthening Foreign Policy Planning. Clear statements of the objectives and operating strategy of the United States with respect to other countries are an essential underpinning for judgments on the kinds and levels of programs we require overseas. They are needed specifically to provide guidance for the programs under paragraphs 1 and 2 above. The State Department will improve and expand the National Policy Paper program and promptly develop statements of U.S. policies toward individual countries not covered by that program.

4.

These three steps will enable us to:

--extend the benefits produced by this year's Review, and

--develop a fully integrated planning-programming-budgeting system for the foreign affairs agencies.

It is evident that the attainment of these planning and programming objectives in the field of foreign affairs will require the most intimate collaboration among the several foreign affairs agencies. For this reason, we recommend that the attached draft National Security Action Memorandum be issued.

Dean Rusk

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

/5/Confidential.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
Coordination of Foreign Policy

/6/See Document 6.

In the development and installation of processes, procedures, and systems necessary to control the implementation of such documents the Secretary will coordinate his efforts with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in order to insure compatibility of the foreign affairs programming system with the development of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system announced August 25.

Washington, January 19, 1966, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. The memorandum is marked with an indication that, together with the attachments, it was included in the President's Night Reading and that the President saw it.

Here is an important memorandum on the organization of this government for foreign operations which Max Taylor has prepared, pursuant to your instruction to him of last September. He has gone beyond the field of counterinsurgency, and I think he has produced a very constructive set of proposals. He has also done a very workmanlike job of clearing them around the government.

When you have had a chance to read his memorandum, I think you may want to talk with him directly, and I would be glad to join if you want me. It is quite possible that some new instructions along this line could be made to fit in very well with a plan to continue my office on a somewhat less visible scale. Max's plan in essence is to throw the responsibility at the State Department with enough White House participation to insure Presidential control and to keep other agencies from declaring their independence.

McG. B.

/2/Secret.

Washington, January 17, 1966.

Mr. President:

My letter to you has the general concurrence of Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Schultze, General Wheeler and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. Admiral Raborn supports the purpose of the proposal but is concerned over the implementation as it may effect his sensitive intelligence activities. If you decide to act favorably on it, I recommend that you take the following actions:

a. Approve the concept set forth in the letter.

/3/Attached to Taylor's letter were four annexes: (1) a paper entitled "Areas of Possible Deficiencies in Counter-subversion: Plans and Programs"; (2) NSAM 124, January 18, 1962, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 68; (3) a draft NSAM, "The Conduct of the Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas"; and (4) an organization chart, which is printed here.

c. Direct the Secretary of State to propose a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors.

d. Direct the preparation of a plan for explaining this project to Congress and the public.

e. Direct the Chairman, Special Group (Counter-insurgency), Governor Harriman, to take appropriate action on the matters raised in Annex 1.

MDT

/4/Secret.

Washington, January 17, 1966.

Dear Mr. President:

/5/The letter was written in anticipation of Taylor's becoming a Special Consultant to President Johnson on September 17. A copy is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder II, NSAM 341 (SIG) & Related Items.

/6/Documentation on the review, including committee reports, is ibid., Boxes 60-63, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 258, Special Group (CI).

At the outset, we agreed that the problem which we were examining was inaccurately described by the term, "counter-insurgency" which suggests primarily the military aspects of the final phase of a "war of liberation," and fails to emphasize the non-military preventive aspects of the problem. To avoid this pitfall, we have defined the purpose of our review as the evaluation of the adequacy of governmental policies, procedures, programs and performance for anticipating or coping with subversive aggression; i.e., the use of political subversion, sabotage, terrorist activities and guerrilla operations (singly or in combination) to overthrow a government which the United States has a cogent interest to maintain. It is considered that, in the normal case, the subversive aggression is likely to be Communist inspired and to receive support from sources outside the territory of the country under attack. A characteristic of such situations is that, by their critical or potentially critical character, they pose a requirement in Washington and in the field for a sharper focus of interdepartmental attention and for a closer coordination of interdepartmental efforts and resources than would be possible by adherence to normal governmental procedures.

Based on the foregoing statement of the scope of the problem, the committees completed their reviews and have submitted their reports to provide a basis for my recommendations to you. No effort has been made to staff them among the interested agencies of the government or to reconcile the occasional differences of view which developed between committee members or between committees. I have been guided but not bound by their conclusions.

This inquiry has developed many interesting facts bearing on the effectiveness of governmental programs dealing with what I shall henceforth call "subversive aggression" and its antidote "counter-subversion". There is no question but that a great deal has been accomplished since the establishment of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) in January, 1962, in developing means and procedures for defense against subversive aggression. However, there is considerable evidence that the missionary zeal of the early years has subsided to some degree and needs to be revived at a time like the present when the Communist leadership, particularly in Peking, is proclaiming a clear and serious intent to instigate further "wars of liberation" in such areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, after their anticipated success in South Viet-Nam. The evidence of their confidence in this technique gives us a strong incentive to review and revitalize our own programs, and to bring our procedures and resources into sharper focus on the problem.

The committees considered that they found numerous inadequacies in government performance in the fields of organization, training, resources and intelligence which they reviewed. Guided by their comments, I have cited in Annex 1 those areas in which deficiencies may exist which seem important enough to call to the attention of the responsible departments and agencies of the government. I shall limit my comments in this letter to what I believe to be the basic problem--the need to improve the executive direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. A short title for the problem might be "crisis prevention and management in overseas affairs", with subversive aggression regarded as a particularly important kind of crisis with particularly exacting requirements for prevention or management. Because of the intensity of effort required to prevent or cope with subversive aggression, it seems a reasonable assumption that procedures adequate for dealing with it will also suffice for critical overseas problems which fall outside the normally defined limits of subversive aggression and, thus, should meet the needs of crisis management in general.

/7/For text of Kennedy's statement on February 19, 1961, upon signing an order abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 104-105.

Overseas, the Ambassador, assisted by his Country Team, is reasonably well equipped to cope with his interdepartmental problems. A series of Presidential letters to Ambassadors, the last that of President Kennedy in 1961, have clearly established the responsibility of an Ambassador to oversee, coordinate and supervise all U.S. activities in his country, except those related to military operations. Although this authority does not make the Ambassador directly responsible for the success or failure in the aggregate of the programs of his subordinates on the Country Team, it is probably sufficient authority to guide the United States effort in normal situations. I have doubts that it is broad enough in countries seriously threatened by subversion. There is a strong case, I believe, to review the role of the Ambassador, at least in critical countries, with a view to making him the representative of the President with directive authority over all agencies and activities (less exempted military activities) in his country, subject to the right of appeal of his subordinates to Washington. In this capacity, he would be viewed as concurrently the representative of the Department of State for political and diplomatic matters and your representative as overall coordinator and general manager, responsible for the success of all United States activities within the limits set by the resources made available to him. As noted above, his present responsibility for these matters does not extend beyond overseeing, coordinating and supervising.

It would be comparatively easy to tighten up executive direction abroad; it is more complicated in Washington where only the President has full authority to adjudicate issues between the heads of departments and to assure the coordination and unity of their efforts. If the President and his senior advisers are to be protected from the distraction of relatively minor matters, there needs to be a filtration process at several points along the channel of responsibility reaching from the overseas embassy to the White House, for disposing of all interdepartmental matters not requiring the action of the next higher authority. If we are to disturb existing relationships as little as possible, it seems clear to me that the Secretary of State, acting as the agent of the President, should carry out this function of direction, supervision and coordination of overseas affairs (less exempted military activities) and should be responsible for the functioning of a coordination-filtration mechanism analogous to the Ambassador's Country Team both at the level of the regional Assistant Secretaries and just below his own level in the Department of State. I have deliberately added to the responsibilities of the Secretary the functions of supervision and direction in addition to coordination because of the firm conviction that decisive directive action must be encouraged--indeed insisted on--at all the focal points along the channel of responsibility cited above.

In establishing the coordination-filtration mechanism, the first area to consider for strengthening is that of the regional Assistant Secretary of State (and perhaps also the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs) who, with his supporting managerial apparatus, should perform the function of a wide-viewing radar, sweeping and surveying the area represented by the countries for which he is responsible. Working with the Ambassadors of his area, he should be constantly on the lookout for critical situations, anticipating their needs and verifying that adequate interdepartmental plans and programs exist and are being implemented in each of the countries of his responsibility. He should be quick to spot and report the symptoms of subversive aggression. In my opinion, to discharge those important duties he needs an interdepartmental committee composed similarly to the Country Team but with White House staff representation on which he could occupy a similar position to that of the Ambassador on the Country Team. He should chair this committee himself and have the authority to decide all issues before the committee, subject to the right of appeal of its members to higher authority. It is convenient to refer to such a chairman as an "executive chairman" and the authority implied by the title must be wielded aggressively if a committee like this one is to be effective.

At present, the Assistant Secretaries, generally speaking, do not have the assistance of such a committee which I shall tentatively call the Regional Coordination Group (RCG) to assist them in taking prompt interdepartmental decisions and actions. Thus, they must rely largely on ad hoc meetings and informal staffing procedures to achieve the necessary coordination.

Even if supported by an RCG, the Assistant Secretaries will always have some interdepartmental problems--a limited number, we would hope--which will have to be carried to the level of the President or of the Cabinet for resolution. Again, as a part of the screening process designed to protect the time of top officials we would like to have a mechanism to dispose of as many of them as possible short of the Secretary. I have found my greatest difficulty in reaching a recommendation on this point but have found the suggestion of a solution in the present functioning of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) mentioned above.

The strength of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) has been that, by the quality and seniority of its membership, quick and decisive interdepartmental action was possible on matters brought before it. Also, it has enjoyed the prestige of being a Presidential committee which can obtain White House directives as needed to carry out its purposes.

It is my view that the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) with a broader directive and a new name, perhaps the Overseas Operations Group (OOG), could be converted into an agency for supporting the Secretary of State in discharging his broadened responsibilities for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas affairs (less exempted military matters).

While it should report to the Secretary of State in his role as coordinator and director of overseas affairs, to retain the advantages of a Presidential link and to serve as a reminder of the Presidential nature of the function being discharged, it may be desirable that, like the Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors, the chairman be appointed by the President (although he could be concurrently an official of the Department of State if such an arrangement were desired). As in the case of the Assistant Secretaries, he should have the authority of an "executive chairman" over the OOG. In Annex 3, there is a draft NSAM which would effect the changes in Washington organization which have been described above. I have deliberately omitted from the draft any reference to the handling of sensitive intelligence matters which, by their nature, will continue to require special consideration and treatment. If, after appropriate coordination, such a NSAM is promulgated, I believe that a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors should be issued at the same time to set forth their duties and responsibilities under the new arrangement.

There is a related matter of sufficient importance to mention in this letter. It is the need for an agreed procedure for establishing and maintaining a list of "critical countries" for use in assuring the proper priority of attention by all agencies of government with overseas responsibilities. At present, there are at least three such lists kept in three different places, none of which bears the stamp of formal governmental approval. I would like the OOG to be charged with recommending such a list (after considering recommendations from Assistant Secretaries and the United States Intelligence Board) for the formal approval of the Secretary of State and with keeping it up to date thereafter. Obviously, the term, "critical country", will first require a careful definition if we are to avoid a dispersion of attention and effort over too many countries at any one time.

A short summary of the foregoing proposal (Annex 4) is that the President assigns responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State as his agent, who will be assisted in discharging this function by the Ambassadors and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State acting in an additional role separate from their functions as a State Department official; and that at these three levels there be established a strong interdepartmental committee on the Country Team model with an "executive chairman" having broad powers of decision and discretionary authority to settle all interdepartmental matters falling within his purview or capability. It assumes that the requirements for focusing concentrated interdepartmental attention on counter-subversion can be met by these arrangements which will, at the same time, be capable of dealing with other critical problems arising overseas which fall outside the definition of subversive aggression.

A final comment bears on what the proposal is not intended to do. There is no thought of injecting some kind of impersonal automaticity into the process of decision-making. It does not affect in any way the individual, statutory responsibilities of the key executive officers of the government but undertakes to facilitate their timely personal intervention through the use of the procedures proposed. For example, the President and his principal assistants such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense would have their personal representatives in attendance both in the Regional Coordination Group and in the Overseas Operations Group, serving as their eyes and ears and keeping them informed of the issues under consideration. Thus, they would be kept aware of the status of those issues so that they could intervene personally at any moment.

Another purpose which might possibly be inferred but which definitely is not intended is that this proposal is to make it possible in the future for the United States to take a larger share in the policing of the world. I am aware of Marshal Lin Piao's comment last September that one virtue of a proliferation of "Wars of Liberation" would be to pin down and deplete our forces and I believe that there is always a real danger of dissipating our resources in this way. Rather than encourage such dissipation, I would hope that the proposed procedures would give an improved selectivity to our choice of areas and issues and, hence, to the application of our resources.

/8/In a covering memorandum to the President, January 21, under which Bundy returned Taylor's proposal to Johnson, Bundy noted that Taylor would be coming in to see the President the next day. Johnson wrote on the memorandum: "No-Not on this I hope." (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG) According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Taylor and Bundy from 12:12 to 1:01 p.m. on January 24 "to discuss organization for crisis management." (Ibid.)

Respectfully,

Maxwell D. Taylor

/9/Secret.

(1) Carries out responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities (less exempted military activities) of the United States Government overseas.

(2) The Executive Chairman has the authority to decide all matters within the purview and capability of the Group or Team, subject to the right of appeal of members to higher authority.

(3) Includes an Executive Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Administrator AID, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director CIA, Director USIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (if the Chairman is not a State Department official). Representatives of other departments and agencies may attend on invitation.

(4) OOG has following duties:

a. Takes over counter-insurgency responsibilities of Special Group (Counter-insurgency) which it replaces.

b. Settles interdepartmental matters falling within purview.

c. Keeps "critical countries" list.

d. Assures effective governmental focus of effort on "critical countries" in accordance with extent of U.S. interest.

e. Keeps President informed through the Secretary of State on unresolved interdepartmental problems overseas.

f. Conducts spot-checks overseas and in U.S. of counter-insurgency and other interdepartmental activities.

(5) Executive Chairman is Regional Assistant Secretary of State and is concurrently the State member. Same departments and agencies are represented as on OOG. Duties of RCG include:

a. Assures adequacy of country statements of U.S. policy and adequacy of plans, programs, resources and performance to implement policy.

b. Watches for emergent critical situations-particularly for indications of subversive aggression.

Washington, January 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Gen Taylor. Secret.

Mac:

/2/See the attachment to Document 50.

/3/Counterinsurgency.

One gut problem is that C-I itself is so hard to define. Broadly construed, it could cover all sorts of threats, and the programs to deal with them cut across every inter-agency line. So locating action responsibility for dealing with C-I is peculiarly difficult, as is the problem of developing sensible, well-defined programs. I can feel for Taylor, and would buy his prescriptions (as far as they go), subject to the following comments.

1. In attacking the "basic" problem of how to improve the direction, coordination and supervision of activities designed to cope with what he has renamed "counter-subversion", Taylor suggests a prescription which seems to encompass crisis management and US overseas activities in general. The imprecise role he assigns the OOG (old C-I Group) can be interpreted as making it overall inter-agency body supervising just about everything. It may well be sound to strengthen SecState's responsibility for "supervision and direction," rather than just "coordination," of inter- departmental activities overseas. But this is a far broader question than that of supervising counter-subversion activities. It can raise inter-agency hassles with Agriculture, AEC, Interior, AID, and numerous others.

2. So the proposed NSAM needs rewriting to specify more precisely what the role of the OOG and its regional sub-groups should be. Are they to deal with all interdepartmental matters affecting overseas operations or just those with a counter-subversion aspect? Obviously, it is quite difficult to draw a line here, since it can be argued that almost any US overseas activity contributes in some measure to counter-subversion capabilities.

3. It is probably sensible to put the proposed OOG under SecState rather than in the WH. Logically, SecState should have this responsibility, and a better machinery for exercising it. But Taylor, you, and I know that putting this new machinery in State will not result in greater attention to the problem, but probably less. In fact, Taylor earlier told me that after six months this would become apparent, and the machinery could then be moved over to the White House. However, this thought fills me with no enthusiasm either.

4. Taylor skirts the question of who in State should be "Executive Chairman" of the new OOG. Charlie Schultze sees a possibility of combining this function with that of a new Under Secretary who would also be responsible for departmental administration, thus filling the function that Bowles and then Ball were supposed to fill.

5. The proposal for regional counter-subversion committees headed by State's Assistant Secretaries makes good sense. ARA already has one, and this should be duplicated elsewhere.

6. Taylor loves his list of "critical countries," which should get priority attention. Should this list include Vietnam, Laos, or even Thailand? My own view is that those countries where we already have active insurgency should be automatically removed from the list, and handled as special cases requiring drastic measures. In this case the new machinery's purview would be properly limited to countries where a greater preventive effort is required to forestall any Vietnams occurring in the first place.

7. I do not share Taylor's view that our organization overseas is relatively satisfactory, while the big problem is in Washington. As I watch them in practice, few of our ambassadors pay enough attention to counter-subversion and even fewer of their AID, MAAG, or CIA subordinates. So any new LBJ letter to ambassadors should not only strengthen the ambassadors' authority but give them a boot in the tail. By the same token, any new NSAM should not simply realign responsibilities, but also express the President's judgment that more effort is required both in Washington and abroad.

R.W. Komer

Washington, January 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Taylor Task Force. No classification marking. Drafted by Ball. Sent through Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to the President.

/2/The memorandum specified that each agency in the Executive Branch submit by January 22 recommendations for actions to promote more effective management, provide a more logical and efficient grouping of agencies and functions, eliminate duplication, improve coordination, abolish obsolete offices and functions, eliminate unnecessary restrictions on management authority, reduce expenditures, and promote economy. (Ibid.)

/3/See Document 50.

I entirely concur with the general lines of General Taylor's proposals and, if they are approved by you, I will do whatever is necessary to put the Department of State in the position to effectively carry out the increased responsibilities we would have to assume.

In addition to the measures proposed by General Taylor, we have other projects in train for strengthening our policy planning for overseas operations, including the installation of a comprehensive foreign affairs programming system designed to relate all the available resources of the Federal agencies operating overseas to national objectives.

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

Following a meeting on February 1, 1966, with Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary of State Ball, and General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy produced a new draft National Security Action Memorandum to implement General Taylor's report to the President of January 17, 1966 (attachment to Document 50). Bundy's draft underwent substantial revision during February following circulation to key officials and meetings organized by General Taylor. Among the many changes was the deletion of a clause in a February 11 draft specifying that the Senior Interdepartmental Group should "assure the best allocation of manpower and resources between geographic regions in accordance with approved foreign policy priorities and objectives, by use of comprehensive planning and programming techniques and other means," a deletion that soon troubled proponents of programming in the Department. (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG; Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pages 124-125) Texts of the drafts of NSAM 341 and related correspondence are at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E; at the Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG.

Washington, February 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams on February 14.

SUBJECT
Assuring the Equal Consideration of Minority Applicants in Outside Recruitment of Officers

I have today directed our Budget Office to require that requests to the Employment Control Committee for Outside Officer Recruitment be accompanied by an indication of whether minority applicants have been given equal consideration for the position in question. The purpose of this action is two-fold:

1. To encourage more consideration of minority applicants for the positions we have to fill and to urge bureaus to automatically include minority candidates in their talent hunt as soon as vacancies are known; and

2. To provide a basis for briefing the Secretary on equal employment opportunity, "as a fact and a result," in the Department of State.

The first point flows naturally from a statement the Secretary has often repeated:

"Key talent is located by a sort of chain of conversation-gossip, if you like. You get hold of people whom you know and you say, 'Do you know someone who can do this?' They get hold of someone else, and it is in this sort of informal chain of conversation that the most significant part of the talent hunt goes on. In this respect, the minority groups in this country are somewhat out of the circles of gossip. We must find some way to tie our minority groups into the realistic processes through which talented individuals are located."

As you know, in 1961 I created the Office of Employment Practices to help us locate qualified minority candidates for employment. Since that time we have scouted out hundreds of applicants, but only a relative few have been given any realistic consideration and even fewer have been employed. The Bureaus, as well as our central recruiters, should make better use of the reservoir of minority talent which is available. At the same time, the bureaus, through their own seeking out of candidates, should be more aggressive in finding and employing qualified minority applicants.

/2/Not attached, but see Document 66.

/3/Not found.

Through an accelerated equal employment opportunity program, we hope to substantially improve our minority employment record this year. We will also intensify efforts to provide better personnel support and services for our employees in the lower grades. To do this, however, we will need the support and cooperation of every bureau and every supervisor.

The Special Assistant for Employment Practices, Eddie Williams, is always available for consultation on minority applicants. I hope that you will take advantage of his expertise in minority recruiting and of the numerous files which he has collected.

I will keep you personally informed of our activities in the EEO field, and will continue to look to you for support and suggestions.