U.S. Department of State

Washington, March 1, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to Ball.

SUBJECT
Presidential Directive for State Department Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas

/2/Approved by President 3/2/66. [Footnote handwritten on the source text. For text, see Document 56.]

/3/In a March 4 memorandum to the President, Taylor reported that Secretary of the Treasury Fowler favored the new plan but was "concerned over practical ways and means of assuring Treasury representation on the Senior Interdepartmental Group when important fiscal matters are involved," while Secretary of Agriculture Freeman favored the plan but feared that it would create problems in Congress which would "arise from fear that all U.S. business abroad is being turned over to the State Department." Secretary of Commerce Connor favored the plan "without reservation." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E) In letters to Fowler, Freeman, and Connor, April 9, Rusk assured each Secretary that his representative would participate fully in meetings of the SIG and the IRGs when his Department had an interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG, Miscellaneous)

/4/See Document 58 for more information on the activities noted in this and the next paragraph in connection with the promulgation of NSAM 341.

I believe that the Department should be prepared to respond immediately following the approval of the NSAM in the following manner:

1. The issuance of a Departmental Order covering the required organizational changes.

2. A meeting by you with the Assistant Secretaries at which you would discuss what you expect of the bureaus with respect to implementation of the NSAM and the organizational changes.

3. If there has been a White House statement on the NSAM, a brief statement by a Department spokesman at the noon briefing outlining what the Department has done to respond to the President's directive.

Mr. Ball, Mr. Crockett, Joe Palmer, Ben Read and I have worked out, and I have discussed individually with each of the geographic bureau Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretaries, the major organizational change within the bureaus, which involves replacement of the present two levels of desk officers and Office Directors with the concept of "Country Directors". The concept is that, contrary to the somewhat limited scope of authority and responsibility of the now relatively junior "desk officers", all of the responsibility for U.S. Government affairs in a single country (or, in the case of minor countries, a small group of countries) would be focussed in a single senior officer (FSO 1 or 2) directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary. Everyone is in thorough accord with this change, which is in pursuance of your concept of reducing "layering" in the Department. The detailed papers on this are being prepared for your approval.

Washington, March 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs File, NSAM 341. Confidential. Taylor forwarded the NSAM to the President under cover of a March 2 memorandum in which he outlined the NSAM's "principal effects" and made several recommendations, including "the preparation of a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors to replace the President Kennedy letter of May 29, 1961." (Ibid., Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG) In a March 2 memorandum to Rusk, Bromley Smith indicated that the President wanted Rusk to prepare such a letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative) A draft was prepared (see Document 130) but never sent.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the United States Information Agency

SUBJECT
The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander and such other military activities as I elect as Commander in Chief to conduct through military channels. The Secretary of State will discharge this authority and responsibility primarily through the Under Secretary of State and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, who will be assisted by interdepartmental groups of which they will be executive chairmen, i.e., with full powers of decision on all matters within their purview, unless a member who does not concur requests the referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority.

Activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be interdepartmental matters in the meaning of this NSAM. If disagreement arises at any echelon over whether a matter is interdepartmental or not in the meaning of this NSAM, the procedure set forth herein will be invoked which permits a dissenting department or agency to appeal from the decision of an executive chairman to the next higher authority.

To assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels or by present established procedures, including those of the Intelligence Community, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) is established. The SIG shall consist of the Under Secretary of State, Executive Chairman, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group will assist the Secretary of State by:

a. ensuring that important foreign policy problems requiring interdepartmental attention receive full, prompt and systematic consideration;

b. dealing promptly with interdepartmental matters referred by the Assistant Secretaries of State or raised by any of its members, or, if such matters require higher level consideration, reporting them promptly to the Secretary of State for appropriate handling;

c. assuring a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the United States Government applies its resources;

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 68.

e. conducting periodic surveys and checks to verify the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

The SIG will meet in the Department of State regularly and specially at the call of the Chairman. The Chairman will be supported by a full time staff of personnel furnished on his request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG.

To assist the Assistant Secretaries of State, an Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) shall be established for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State. Each IRG shall be composed of the regional Assistant Secretary of State, Executive Chairman, and a designated representative from Defense, AID, CIA, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USIA and the White House or NSC staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. Meeting and staffing procedures will be patterned on the SIG.

The regional Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Executive Chairmen of the IRGs, will assure the adequacy of United States policy for the countries in their region and of the plans, programs, resources and performance for implementing that policy. They will be particularly watchful for indications of subversive aggression directed at the overthrow of governments in the region which the United States has a cogent interest to maintain, and, when such matters require higher level consideration, will recommend appropriate measures to higher authority for dealing with emergent critical situations in their regions.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, March 2, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312. Secret. A copy was sent to Moyers. According to a note attached to the memorandum the President told his secretary, Yolanda Boozer, at 9:45 p.m. on March 2: "Tell Bill Moyers to see me about this."

Vietnam Czar. Without barging too far into a matter with which I'm largely unfamiliar, let me point out the possible contradiction between the Taylor plan you just approved and the Vietnam czar concept.

/2/In a March 1 memorandum to the President, Taylor wrote the following regarding the appointment of a "Director of Viet-Nam Programs": "I would think it most desirable to relate the action on this matter to my proposal since Viet-Nam is the most important 'interdepartmental activity' we are conducting overseas. In my judgment, the designation of a Director can be made in consistence with the terms of the new interdepartmental organization but the two matters are so interrelated that they should be acted on at the same time." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E)

On the other hand, the more we downgrade the civil czar, the more difficult it is for him to crack the whip as is intended. Moreover, the harder it will be to get the right kind of talent.

Gen. Taylor hopes that this issue could be decided before we publicize the broader NSAM, lest the contradiction later be exposed. I doubt that this is sufficient reason to press you for an early decision, which in the last analysis should probably depend on the calibre of man you pick./3/

/3/The issue of whether to place the "Vietnam czar" in the State Department or the White House was discussed further by Chester Cooper in a March 5 memorandum to the President. Cooper opposed locating the position in the State Department and argued that, if it were assigned to State, it be placed directly under Rusk and not incorporated into Taylor's reorganization plan. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. IV, the attachment to Document 90. The issue was resolved with the issuance of NSAM 343, March 28, which located the position in the White House; see ibid., Document 102.

R.W. Komer

On March 4, 1966, the White House and the Department of State implemented an elaborate scenario to announce the issuance of NSAM 341 (Document 56) and explain its implications. Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Komer briefed the President on the scenario in a memorandum of March 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341) Department of State Executive Secretary Read briefed Secretary of State Rusk in a March 4 memorandum to which he attached draft comments and other material for use by the President, Rusk, and Taylor at a Cabinet meeting, by White House Assistant Press Secretary Fleming at a press briefing, and by Rusk at his meeting with the Assistant Secretaries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, Instructions and Authority for SIG Documents) For Rusk's remarks to the Assistant Secretaries, see Document 59. Congressional leaders were informed about NSAM 341 by letter and telephone. Presidential Administrative Assistant Mike Manatos' letter of March 4 to Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, is at the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FO. A memorandum of Rusk's telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons. Rusk told Fulbright that the White House was "sharpening the responsibility of the SecState and we would try to do a little more in Washington than in the field. This tightens up State's responsibility. It isn't earth-shaking but was being done in an effort to get a better job done."

The Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordination: New Duties and Procedures of March 4, 1966, a committee print issued in 1966 by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, includes six documents explaining NSAM 341, the first four of which are dated March 4: the White House press release; a transcript of the press briefing by General Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson; Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 385; Rusk's message to his colleagues in the Department of State and abroad; U. Alexis Johnson's article in The Foreign Service Journal, April 1966; and Taylor's Speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 31. Circular 385 and Rusk's message are also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 1128-1131. Newspaper articles and columns reporting and discussing NSAM 341 are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Public Statements/Press.

Washington, March 4, 1966, 3:05 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. No classification marking. Drafted by Read. An attendance list is ibid., Instructions and Authority for SIG Documents. In addition to the Assistant Secretaries, attendees included Mann, U. Alexis Johnson, Crockett, Harriman, Hughes, Rostow, and several other State Department officials. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room.

The Secretary advised the group of the President's action in assigning to him and to the Department of State additional responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the USG overseas. The President's action made explicit what had been implicit to date and made more clear the responsibilities of the Department.

The Secretary noted that the actions to implement this directive were principally (1) formation of the senior interdepartmental group, chaired by the Under Secretary which would become the principal policy supervision group. It would be responsible to call in other agencies seriously affected or needed to carry out the subject under discussion; (2) the interdepartmental regional groups chaired by the Assistant Secretaries; and (3) the institution of "Country Directors" be a focal point for interdepartmental leadership at the intrabureau level.

The Secretary said he had three principal comments he would like to make:

1. The machinery created by NSAM 341 does not affect existing statutory responsibilities, e.g., the responsibilities accorded to the Secretary of Agriculture in PL-480; to the Secretary of the Treasury for balance of payment problems and the Secretary of Commerce under the Export Control Act.

2. The Secretary urged the regional Assistant Secretaries to approach their tasks with a spirit of genuine leadership which fell well within the two extremes of simply following majority dictates and not becoming a martinet. The job would require a serious effort at persuasion if possible but precipitation of decisions if need be. The success of the entire venture would depend on the calibre of leadership.

3. The Assistant Secretary and Country Directors should do their best to comprehend the full range of the President's concerns and the entire USG involvements. The Department should accept as part of its responsibility making missions of other agencies such as NASA and Commerce successful. In the larger sense the mission of all USG agencies overseas have now become part of the mission of the Department of State. Each Executive Chairman and Country Director would have a duty to take into account the views of other agencies where they had a proper concern. Taking into account the entire USG interest is far more than simply promoting cordial, serene and peaceful relationships. The statutory responsibilities of other agencies would have to be taken into account and national interests pressed at the expense of good relations on many occasions.

The Secretary stressed that the success of the system will depend heavily on the non-geographic bureaus for ideas and support for carrying out the larger and more complex mission of the Department.

The Secretary stressed hope that the SIG, IRG's and CD's would do their best to anticipate crises better than we had been able to do in the past and would call on the Policy Planning Council for assistance as appropriate. He noted the importance of the planning function.

In the Secretary's view the conduct of foreign relations in the world would continue to accelerate and our success in the affairs of the Department in our ability to anticipate crises and our ability to act expeditiously in making decisions would be tested to the utmost. We should "clear the desks for action".

The Secretary said these moves would not affect his relations with the Assistant Secretaries.

He hoped that the Assistant Secretaries would try to stabilize opinion in their bureaus about the changes involved in setting up the Country Director concept in order to allay concern. No one would be out of a job next Monday.

In concluding his initial remarks the Secretary said that he did not want them to be interpreted as "watering down" the NSAM; rather they were intended to illuminate the leadership he hoped the Department would bring to its broader tasks, i.e., avoiding leadership by fiat or letting others run with the ball.

/2/Ball met with Lincoln Gordon on March 8 and with the four other regional Assistant Secretaries on March 9 to discuss SIG-IRG operations. Schwartz prepared briefing material, including major bureau suggestions for problems to be handled in SIG and IRG, and guidelines for Assistant Secretaries entitled "Dos and Donts." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous)

The Secretary stated that he would expect a higher standard of performance of the completed work to be done henceforth. Under Mr. Bundy's able tutelage the White House staff had given us a comfortable feeling that they might pick up our errors and now we must catch them ourselves, especially when drafting for the President we must make sure that our writing is better and improving our coordination with the other agencies and departments of the Government. Those interests must be taken into account.

The Secretary had found that where the State Department is prepared to take over the assumed leadership there is considerable inclination on the part of other departments and agencies to accept it, but we must earn that acceptance over and over.

The Secretary said he wanted the Assistant Secretaries to be aware of two commitments he had given to his Cabinet and other agency colleagues:

1. That the Department would welcome their initiatives in tendering to us new ideas and giving them serious consideration; and

2.--to the President: we would not let the new machinery conceal issues or important divergent views. We do not make our production that of the lowest common denominator but would clearly identify important alternatives.

Washington, March 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Ranch and to Joe Laitin.

Announcement of the NSAM 341 reinforcement of State's policy supervision responsibilities went quite well. There was one persistent area of questioning at the White House and State briefings, however, to which we should be alert.

/2/According to Raborn's memorandum for the record, at the Cabinet meeting on March 4 Fowler "asked about the position of NSC in relation to NSAM #341. The reply was that NSC would continue to function as formerly." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01284A, ER Files--DCI Meetings with the President, 22 Apr 65-30 June 66) At his regular morning meeting on March 7, Raborn was asked by L.K. White about the implications of NSAM 341. According to White's memorandum for the record, Raborn "said all top officials in Washington considered this a good move. It creates a decision-making body for U.S. overseas efforts and will permit more decisive work at the Washington level. Existing responsibilities of the various agencies and departments will not be impinged. It does not affect either the NSC or the 303 Committee." (Ibid., Job 80-B01676R, Morning Meeting Minutes, February 1966 thru May 1966)

The future role of the Bundy staff is of less consequence. It could be pointed out, however, that the White House will be represented on the senior group (SIG) by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and at the regional level by members of the National Security Council Staff.

This memo is to provide some sensible answers if you are harassed along these lines.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, March 7, 1966, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.12, Side A, PNO 4-5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of the resignation of Abba Schwartz and of Australian participation in the Vietnam War.]

/2/On March 7 G. Mennen Williams announced that he was resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He stepped down March 23. The two leading contenders for the position, both white, were Joseph Palmer II, Director General of the Foreign Service, and Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. In a March 3 memorandum to the President, Watson reported that he had met with Crockett and Palmer (whom Crockett had heartily endorsed in an attached letter of February 28) and had found Palmer "to be a Bill Crockett type: honest, forthright, and a Johnson supporter." Asked in the memorandum if he wanted Watson to move forward with Palmer's appointment, the President checked yes. (Ibid., Office Files of John Macy, Box 674, African Country)

Rusk: I think he would be, yes. I don't know whether he's spread the word or who's [inaudible].

/3/In a telephone conversation with President Johnson that began at 1 p.m. on March 14, Rusk stated the following regarding the appointment of Palmer versus Fredericks: "I understand from some of your colleagues that a good many people have been weighing in. The only person who's been in direct touch with me is Mrs. Bolton [Republican Representative Frances Bolton of Ohio], who, on the day that Mennen's resignation was announced, called me and strongly urged Wayne Fredericks. But I understand the AFL has now come in, and a good many businessmen as well as the Negro community. I don't have any information myself that Wayne has stirred this up, although if I had to guess I would suggest that maybe Mennen has been a little busy here in one or two places. But if you feel that there'd be some point in taking into account the Negro community and the AFL-CIO, it won't be all that much of a mistake-in other words these are names that were very close to start with." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape F66.12, Side B, PNO 3)

Rusk: Right.

/4/According to a memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Crockett on March 7, during which they discussed the issue of Williams' replacement, Crockett raised the question of "the pros and cons of a Negro for the area. Ball replied he was personally opposed to this and C said that Soapy was also." (Ibid., Ball Papers, People & Positions III)

Rusk: I would think that a Negro in almost any other post would be preferable. In other words, an assistant secretary of some other area as a Negro.

President: Well, but we haven't found any.

Rusk: Yeah, well--

/5/Presumably Clinton E. Knox, appointed Ambassador to Dahomey on July 9, 1964.

/6/Franklin H. Williams, appointed Ambassador to Ghana on October 20, 1965.

Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh.

/7/Robert Weaver, appointed Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1966.

Rusk: Well, I wonder if we can't make that statement to them in terms of his being Ambassador in Ghana. This is a pretty key place right now. And, I must say, he's been doing pretty well out there.

President: Williams?

Rusk: Right.

President: Well, we are. But, the ambassadors are no longer in the--they're good, but they feel like they are entitled to some assistant secretaries, too, you know.

Rusk: Uh huh.

/8/Democratic Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., from Michigan sent a telegram to the President on March 4 in which he said that Williams' successor was "a matter of extreme concern to those of us who understand the importance of our policies toward that continent. I am disturbed, however, that there appears to prevail a school of thought within the State Department which has reservations about a Negro serving in that role. It would certainly be unfortunate if several Negroes, whose training, experience and understanding eminently qualify them to hold the aforementioned office, were excluded from serious consideration." Diggs then listed some names for review. (Ibid., Office Files of John Macy, Box 694, Asst. Sec. for African Affairs)

/9/James M. Nabrit, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

Rusk: I think so. But, I must say, it's pretty close. It's between Palmer and Wayne Fredericks. Mrs. Bolton called me this morning, by the way, and urged that we give Wayne Fredericks serious thought. I think it's a pretty close business between the two of them. Let me talk further to George about it to see whether he has a clear preference between the two. I know he was very strong on Palmer at one stage. I think we'd lose Wayne Fredericks if we didn't make him this, give him this job. He's been around for 5 years now, in effect, waiting for it. But let me talk further to George and call you back.

President: Well, I think we could put him in an embassy. I don't much want to give it to him. It's a question of whether to give it to Palmer or somebody else.

Rusk: Right

President [consulting Diggs' telegram]: Here's George Carter, they suggest, Near East Peace Corps; John Davis, now they say he's good, American Society of African Culture; Dr. John Hope Franklin, University of Chicago; Robert Kitchen, member of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy; Dr. James Nabrit; Dr. James Robinson, they say he's good, Director of Crossroads Africa.

Rusk: Oh, James Robinson, I think, would be almost impossible on this job. I know him from foundation days and he's pretty far out.

President [reading selectively from Diggs' telegram]: "George

/10/This sentence in Diggs' telegram actually reads as follows: "As a matter of fact, all other things being equal, an American Negro could offer an extra dimension of considerable utility, somewhat analogous to the advantages of having John Gronouski as our Ambassador to Poland."

Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh.

President: There are some of the suggestions. Now, if we could get it and get by with it, without too much hell, I would sure be inclined to name Palmer, because I like the cut of his jaw, I like his loyalty, I like his experience, I like what he did in that Congo operation. I don't think he's going to get us involved too deeply in--

Rusk: Right.

President: I think he's got a caution that some of these other fellows haven't got.

Rusk: That's right.

President: Fredericks doesn't have it, does he?

/11/In a memorandum to the President, March 8, Komer strongly backed Fredericks' candidacy, stating that he regarded Fredericks "as a lot more toughminded" than Palmer. Moreover, Komer continued, "the answer to the charge that Fredericks is too 'African' is that this is the posture which is really in the best interests of the U.S. Though I have frequently had to badger Soapy and Fredericks to be tougher, I submit that their line is basically right, and that the proof of this pudding is in the eating--our African policy has been remarkably successful over the last five years for largely this reason." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2)

President: That's Fredericks?

Rusk: Yeah, that's right.

President: Now what about Palmer?

Rusk: No, Palmer's much more solid on that.

President: That's what I would think. That's the impression I have of the two.

/12/The President appointed Palmer Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on April 1, Fredericks remained as Deputy Assistant Secretary.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.]

Washington, March 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Rostow, Crockett, Barrett, and Robert T. Bonham on March 7 and forwarded to Ball by Springsteen, together with two draft documents implementing the proposal, for Ball's 3:30 p.m. meeting on March 7 with Crockett and Rostow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) A handwritten note on Crockett's letterhead attached to the copy of the memorandum in the Crockett Papers states: "These memos were prepared for discussion with the Secretary by WJC [Crockett], Rostow, Ball, [U. Alexis] Johnson, & Barrett. However, meeting did not take place. Rostow saw Sec privately Mar 8 and gave him copy of memo. Also subsequently sent Nodis telegram [to Crockett] from Panama [where Rostow was attending a conference]. However, Mar 9 meeting with BOB changed picture and agreement reached to work on experimental basis this yr. BOB was to send paper detailing understanding." In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 128-143, Mosher and Harr discuss the background and substance of the memorandum, describe the March 9 meeting with BOB, and print BOB's summary of what, from its perspective, was concluded at the meeting. The memorandum itself is printed on pp. 252-257.

SUBJECT
The Future of Planning and Programming

/2/Not further identified.

You have now been assigned additional responsibilities for the over-all direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of our Government overseas by the March 3, 1966 NSAM.

We propose the following steps as essential to rapid and effective implementation of the President's directive in the fields of national and regional policy planning and programming:

a. An acceleration in the NPP program through revision and streamlining of the methods and procedures used in their preparation and approval.

b. The design and prompt provision of authoritative interim policy papers for those countries where a completed NPP cannot be expected within the next six to twelve months and where we intend (as in the case of the Latin American countries) to establish foreign affairs programming.

c. The installation as rapidly as possible of a foreign affairs programming system in successive regions to complement the policy planning actions.

We have from the beginning recognized that we must examine the actual use of resources in each country and region before we can be confident that our efforts overseas are being sensitively related to established policies, objectives, and courses of action. For this reason we have been working for three years on a programming system that will display in a common language present and proposed uses of all U.S. resources in relation to official objectives and purposes.

Various versions of this system have been experimentally installed in thirty-two countries throughout the world, thirteen of which used the system as the basis for last year's Executive Review of Overseas Programs. On the basis of this experience, we have prepared further simplifications and improvements which we now believe give us a workable system.

Two problems confront us.

The first is the negative reaction to these continued efforts expressed to a greater or lesser extent by working levels in all the foreign affairs agencies except the Department of Defense. The second is a similar but much stronger response from the working level of the Bureau of the Budget.

Several of the foreign affairs agencies, notably AID and FAS, view our planning and programming activities as a potential constraint on their discretionary authority and a threat to their institutional autonomy. They point out that these inferred invasions are inappropriate so long as they are being held individually accountable for their programs by the President and Congress. While we can understand and to an extent sympathize with these concerns, we believe the issue has been settled by the President's directive which both establishes the responsibilities of the Secretary of State and provides a forum for resolving interagency issues.

/3/See Document 45.

It is perfectly clear to us that the programming system we envisage is a necessary complement to the various agency PPBSs. The analysis by the Bureau of the Budget of agency budgets and programs in terms of their specific functions cannot be intimately related to country and regional policies and cannot, therefore, meet our needs and responsibilities. A foreign affairs program must be built from the ground up, from individual country and regional policy objectives, and with full knowledge in each country of the role of each agency in fulfilling national objectives under the guidance of the Ambassador.

The working levels of other foreign affairs agencies are attracted to the more traditional Bureau of the Budget approach because it avoids the assessment of their programs in the light of all pertinent national objectives. They may also see in this approach a way of diluting the Ambassador's responsibilities for the orchestration of all country programs.

Ironically, the Budget Bureau's views represent a movement away from the tested and successful Pentagon approach that has placed the national defense above service interests and systematically arrayed service programs against specific national defense objectives. It is the essence of modern programming that the use of resources be related to objectives and purposes; not to agency functions.

In working level debates with the Budget Bureau, three major arguments are advanced against the Department's planning and programming system:

a. The NPPs are not sufficiently precise to provide a base for budget programming. The NPPs go further than any previous national policy papers in relating to policies and objectives to specific courses of action. They do not-and they should not-pretend to specify in full detail, aid, information, counter-insurgency, and other operational programs. They do, however, provide a single authoritative instrument for relating the use of resources in a country (or a region) to high priority tasks and thus help assure "a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the United States Government applies its resources." Put another way, the National Policy Papers were never designed to do the work of the various agencies for them, nor to do the work of the Bureau of the Budget in critically reviewing agency operations. But they do fill a gap which cannot be fulfilled by any other means known to us-a gap made vivid for us all in 1962 when we confronted a proliferation of uncoordinated national policy papers arising from the several agencies.

b. The Department of State programming system does not meaningfully array resource data, nor do foreign affairs programs compete for resource allocations. In part this is a reflection of the functional vs. purpose argument cited above. As we indicated there, the BOB's current approach to programming is to develop PPB systems for each major department and agency. In the foreign affairs area, this approach will result in vertical reflections of agency programs that are closely tied to the financial structure and the organizational and functional delineations of each agency. Our approach, on the other hand, has been to design a horizontal array of inter-agency programs closely tied to policy objectives and national purpose. We believe both views-the vertical and the horizontal-are desirable and will provide valuable insights into trade-off possibilities, alternative solutions to problems, and program gaps, overlaps and duplications.

The second half of the BOB contention, namely that foreign affairs resources are not competitive, in our opinion is simply not true. The authorized programs of the various agencies engaged in foreign affairs do offer alternatives and options when viewed from the standpoint of national objectives. An unfavorable U.S. balance of payments situation with a given country may be improved more by the visit of a trade mission or a trade fair than by the work of a U.S. Travel Service office. Successful negotiations to remove travel and currency restrictions may have more impact than either. Rural development in a given country may be more effectively and economically performed by Peace Corps volunteers than by AID technicians. Educational development may be more effectively accomplished by supporting local institutions than by financing study in the U.S. All three of these examples involve program decisions that cut across existing agency lines.

The problem is not lack of competition but rather the absence of techniques and mechanisms for identifying and resolving competition. Cost benefit analysis in defense relates resources to our ability to kill people. Foreign affairs does not provide any simple mathematical equilavent. A simple quantitative approach to student exchanges or, even, to agricultural credit, or other AID operations would be illusory. To say the problem of adjusting resource use to foreign affairs objectives is difficult-and requires wisdom and intimate knowledge of each country-does not mean that we are justified in abandoning our effort to feel our way towards a matching of resource use to country and regional objectives. An effort to manage foreign affairs resources by agency budgeting in Washington, without examining carefully their use in each country, abandons the problem; it does not solve it.

c. The absence of provable budgetary changes flowing from the experimental review of agency programs in last year's thirteen country exercise (EROP). This assertion is only partially true. A number of program changes are being made by the various agencies themselves as a result of Ambassadorial recommendations. It is true that the Budget Bureau (largely because of time factors) did not include EROP recommendations in their consideration of agency budgets. For example, the budget for the U.S. Travel Service was increased by some $1,700,000 despite firm recommendations for reductions totaling $350,100 from Ambassadors in four of the eleven countries in which the Travel Service operates.

It is fair to say that the missing element in EROP was an institutional mechanism that could effectively implement the decisions which resulted from the analysis of data collected across agency lines. The President's action creating the SIG and IRGs in each region solves that dilemma.

In spite of these differences, we believe we must maintain the closest possible cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget to insure that we achieve a maximum of reciprocal benefits and a convergence between the two systems. In fact, our system can provide each agency PPBS with such data as they may desire due to the built-in flexibility of the computer program.

To summarize: we have invested a considerable effort in the development of integrated planning and programming systems covering the entire foreign affairs spectrum, based, as a Department of State system must be, on country and regional objectives. These systems are now ready for full application. The prospect of such action is being opposed in some quarters on essentially bureaucratic grounds.

Our response is that we have learned much in the past three years. We know we don't have all the answers to an evolving and complex problem for which there is no precise precedent. We are convinced that the resolute carrying forward of the effort begun three years ago is a vital link in fulfilling your responsibilities under NSAM 341. We are equally convinced that an abandonment of these efforts now will go far toward gutting the essential purposes of that document.

We therefore recommend that you:

/4/Attached to the copy of the memorandum in the National Archives are (1) a draft letter from Rusk to heads of executive departments and agencies with significant operations overseas and (2) a draft circular telegram from Rusk to all diplomatic posts. The draft letter notified recipients that the Department was expanding its National Policy Paper program and moving forward with its Foreign Affairs Programming System, starting in Latin America. The draft circular conveyed a briefer but similar message.

2. Authorize us to proceed with our plans for the immediate installation of the foreign affairs planning and programming system in the Latin America region.

We respectfully urge prompt consideration of these recommendations. We believe the lead time permitting a review of the FY-1968 budget cycle from the Latin America region requires your decision by March 11, 1966.

Washington, March 7, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous. Confidential.

I am much gratified that as Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group you will be "carrying on other duties and responsibilities of the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) which has been abolished." I have been chairman of this group for the past three years and believe that real progress has been made in that field. We have learned from mistakes and know considerably more about the matters on which to concentrate. The problem requires constant and detailed attention to see that where local governments are under attack or potential attack our country teams develop sound and adequate plans and that these plans are promptly and effectively supported in Washington.

Viewing the world as a whole, with the exception of Vietnam, things have been going relatively well in recent years. This is partly due to foresight on the part of the United States, increasing awareness of the dangers on the part of local governments and heavy handedness by the Communists. The split within the Communist Movement has contributed to their difficulties.

Communist action follows two main courses: a) subversion, terrorist activity, leading to guerrilla action; b) political action of various types including efforts to develop popular or united fronts.

I think the most serious threat at the present time is in Thailand. In this case although much good work has been done, I feel that there is not as yet either a government or US program adequate to prevent the situation from spreading. Although the military and police programs are being given attention and are vital, the psychological and political programs have not been adequately thought through or implemented. As you know Peiping has announced that there will be a war of liberation mounted before the end of the year and the Communists are hard at work.

Charlie Maechling who has been my assistant and entire staff in this operation is assembling the papers in an orderly manner to turn over to Harry Schwartz whom I understand is to be your staff director. In passing, I might say it has been my feeling that the Committee of Assistants has been an effective body. Each Agency has wanted to get a job done before the subject hit the Special Group (CI) and we have found that this pressure has been a useful stimulus for needed action in Washington.

I am pleased that the Assistant Secretaries are to have a regional group as this is the level at which much of the work must be done. On the other hand, a number of matters are of Department-wide, Government-wide, and world-wide significance that cannot be dealt with adequately on a regional basis. Among those are the education and training of U.S. personnel going to the field, the police training program, labor and youth problems, etc. Overall, it is essential that the spotlight of the top side of government attention be given to these activities or else important or even vital matters get overlooked.

/2/Harriman apparently met with Ball on March 11, according to a March 11 briefing memorandum from Schwartz to Ball. (Ibid.) No other record of the meeting has been found. Documentation on the disposition of Special Group (CI) responsibilities, including implementation of the agreements and decisions reached at the key SIG meeting on July 26, are ibid., SIG Minutes and SIG Agendas, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Special Group (CI) Assignments to Other Departments and Agencies. A 10-page March 17 memorandum for the record, prepared by Harriman's assistant Charles Maechling, Jr., details the many principal subjects that were still pending before the Special Group (CI) at the time of its termination. (Ibid., Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), Memos and Misc. [I], Box 60) For the record of the agreements and decisions reached at the July 26 meeting, see Document 82. In a July 14 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders detailed how the IRG/NEA was going about handling "the old CI Group's business." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Interdepartmental Regional Group)

Washington, March 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Agency File, State Department, SIG, Memos & Misc, IV, Confidential. Drafted on March 9 by Major General W.T. Fairbourn, Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, J-5 (Plans and Policy) Directorate, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A "backgrounder," talking points, an agenda, and other material provided to Ball for this meeting are attached to a March 8 memorandum from Schwartz to Read. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative)

SUBJECT
First Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) held at 1500, 8 March 1966

1. Principals:

Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secy of Defense
Mr. David E. Bell, Administrator, AID
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State Dept
VAdm W.F. Raborn, Director, CIA
Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director, USIA
LtGen A.J. Goodpaster, OJCS
Mr. H.H. Schwartz, Staff Director, SIG

Attending:

MGen W.T. Fairbourn, J-5, Joint Staff
Mr. Frank A. Sieverts, Dep Staff Dir, SIG

2. Under Secretary Ball opened the meeting with the statement that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) would not be a place for casual conversation, but rather a group where hard decisions would be made. Every attempt will be made to keep down the paper work. He looks upon the SIG as having the function of being a "court of appeals," so to speak, from the decisions made by the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG). He visualizes that about 75% of the work will be done by the IRG and 25% of the work by the SIG. He considers that the SIG, while discharging the task of solving all interdepartmental problems promptly, should be selective in accepting problems. He noted that the SIG would take on functions of the Special Group (CI problems). He stated that he intended to organize no elaborate staff or complicated organization, but rather would start with Mr. Schwartz as the Staff Director and Mr. Frank Sieverts as his assistant. This staff would then be augmented when and as required.

3. He stated that an immediate requirement was for each agency to designate a point of contact for the Staff Director to commence his staff work. Later in the meeting, Major General W.T. Fairbourn was indicated as the point of contact for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Mr. Ball further stated that each Assistant Secretary of State would run his IRG and that the majority of decisions would be made by the Assistant Secretary of State on the IRG level. Each Assistant Secretary, as Executive Chairman of an IRG, would have one deputy. Mr. Ball hoped that principals would attend each meeting whenever possible. He stated that other interested agencies outside the SIG and IRG would be invited to sit in when matters under their cognizance were discussed.

5. Mr. Alex Johnson then commented on a departmental reorganization. He stated that Country Directors who would be senior officers (FSO-1 or 2) would be appointed for each country. The Country Director would provide a single point of contact within the Department for the Ambassador of each country. Mr. Johnson stated that each Country Director would relate himself to other agencies represented on the IRG, but that the Assistant Secretary of State's authority would not be delegated to the Country Director. He further stated that this would abolish the next higher level (Office Director) since the Country Director would report directly to the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. He visualized this reorganization as a gradual process with each bureau working out its own reorganization. However, each bureau would have a Secretariat in charge of IRG business. This Secretariat would have a point of contact with each agency sitting on the IRG.

6. After some discussion, it was decided that the SIG should meet each Tuesday at 2:30 p.m. The agenda and papers for each meeting would be prepared and forwarded to the principals by the close of business on the preceding Friday. IRG meetings would be coordinated with SIG meetings.

/2/Schwartz addressed Bell's concern about the referral of dissents from the IRGs to the SIG in a memorandum to Ball, March 9. (Ibid., S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344)

8. Admiral Raborn asked a question concerning 303 business. It was decided that 303 business would be processed outside the SIG. It was noted that there would be IRG decisions requiring 303 action. These actions would go the 303 route.

/3/Schwartz' recommendations were incorporated in SIG Memorandum #16 to SIG members, March 17, and agreed to at the SIG meeting on March 22. (Ibid., S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263)

/4/Official numbered SIG documents, including Records of Actions, Agendas, Memorandums, and Documents are ibid.

10. A discussion followed as to the relation of EROP actions to be taken. Ambassador Johnson stated that these would be considered separately from the SIG.

11. Admiral Raborn raised the question as to who would accomplish the unfinished business of the Taylor Committee. It was decided that this would be considered by the Staff Director, with the work being done at the IRG level wherever possible.

/5/See Document 63.

13. It was further noted that General Taylor had made seven proposals to the President in his recommendations. These will be considered by Mr. Schwartz and proposals made to the SIG with respect thereto.

14. Mr. Ball noted that any decision taken by the SIG should include a timetable for its execution.

15. With respect to the unfinished business of the Special Group, Mr. Vance raised the question of the Thailand problem, stating that in his judgment we had now reached a fork in the road with respect to Thailand-that what was needed was a population control program. He defined "population control" as being true pacification, similar to that accomplished by the British in Malaysia, noting such things as universal ID cards, dossiers on certain individuals, and an adequate police force. He noted that the question of a survey to Thailand was still not resolved. Ambassador Johnson stated that the matter of the survey in Thailand would be left to Mr. Sam Berger to decide, and that the Thailand problem would be referred to the appropriate IRG for recommendations to the SIG or a report with respect to what is being done.

16. Mr. Ball then raised the question of the new regime in Ghana. After some discussion, it was decided to ask the appropriate IRG for a policy statement with respect thereto.

17. The meeting adjourned at 1600.

W.T. Fairbourn

In telegram 1623 from Geneva, March 8, 1966, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, expressed his concern that his bureau was not represented in the new organization created by NSAM 341, even though it was "intimately involved in the substance of the work of all of the geographic bureaus." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 8) Earlier, in a March 3 memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Crockett, David Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, had raised much the same objection. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Senior Interdepartmental Group, 1966) In a March 10 memorandum to Crockett and U. Alexis Johnson, Popper elaborated on the "serious gap" in the new structure. "In modern diplomacy, there is an increasing tendency to engage the interest of the entire international community in crisis situations anywhere, through the UN or in other ways." Popper proposed the creation of an International Organizations Interdepartmental Regional Group. (Ibid.) In a March 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, Sisco seconded Popper's proposal and claimed the right to participate in SIG and regional group meetings when UN matters were under consideration. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) On March 18 Popper and William Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs met with SIG Staff Director Harry Schwartz and reached an agreement. An International Organizations regional group would not be formed, but IO would be included in regular IRG meetings when UN matters were under discussion and, as far as participation in SIG meetings was concerned, would be given the same consideration as all other bureaus. (Memorandum from Schwartz to U.A. Johnson, March 18; ibid.)

In a March 10, 1966, memorandum William Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, included the following figures on employment in the Department of State:

*Ambassadors are included in parentheses

(Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-287, WJC Book)

FSRs were members of the Foreign Service Reserve, temporary specialists given grades and pay identical to those of Foreign Service Officers but without tenure.

Washington, March 15, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-R01580R, SIG. Secret.

Under date of 8 March, the Clandestine Services sent to our field stations copies of NSAM 341 and background material pertaining to General Taylor's study and the implications of the establishment of Washington-level machinery to improve coordination and decision-making in the foreign policy field.

Advice to the field was that the statutory responsibilities of the DCI and the Agency are not affected; nor does the new machinery invalidate the NSCID's or the work of the 303 Committee in its review of our programs and projects.

Field stations were also advised that their relationships with the ambassador and other U.S. mission components remain unchanged.

LKW

Washington, March 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 600/S. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
White House/NSC Staff Relations with New Interdepartmental Committees

In response to your recent directive, the Secretary of State has established six interdepartmental committees to assist him in directing, supervising and coordinating U.S. activities overseas. A White House/NSC Staff member will sit on each of these committees. The existing White House/NSC Staff pattern is well suited to meet this new requirement without additional personnel.

/2/According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation that began at 9:40 a.m. on March 16, Moyers told Ball that the President was "trying to maintain his flexibility" on the question of McGeorge Bundy's successor and therefore "thought he would have someone just sit in and not be appointed" to SIG meetings. Ball responded that "he would be delighted to have Komer attend but thought the press would interpret this as a step toward further crystallization of the situation." (Ibid., Ball Papers, General II)

b. To date, the Assistant Secretaries of State have established five regional committees-Europe, Latin America, Near East, Far East and Africa. Five officers now on the White House/NSC Staff have been assigned to these committees. They are:

African Affairs--Ulric S. Haynes
European Affairs--Francis M. Bator; assisted by Edward Hamilton
Far Eastern Affairs--Chester L. Cooper (until his departure); assisted by James Thomson); Donald Ropa
Inter-American Affairs--William G. Bowdler
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs--Robert W. Komer; assisted by Harold Saunders; Ulric S. Haynes

Each officer will be responsible for ensuring that appropriate White House interest is reflected in regional group meetings. Each will serve as an information channel to the Special Assistant and through him, to you.

He will be able to follow interdepartmental problems at the Assistant Secretary level, alerting the White House to future problems, learning of departmental differences which at some later date may be referred by the Secretary of State to you for decision. He will be in a position to keep in close touch with situations in his region which may suddenly require your attention. He will advise the Special Assistant of problems he believes are not receiving adequate attention by the departments and agencies and recommend White House intervention, either through SIG or directly by you.

/3/In a memorandum for the record, April 18, Saunders outlined four principles that, at an NSC staff meeting that day, Rostow had suggested should guide NSC representatives at IRG meetings. These included: "generally, do not vote on controversial issues-unless we have a clear Presidential position"; "observe and report"; "open up options not being considered"; and "see that issues are moved up to the SIG and higher and not buried in the bureaucracy." (Ibid., National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG)

No additional personnel will be required to handle the new work resulting from the establishment of the regional groups. It is expected that these groups will simplify the task of the White House/NSC Staff member in some instances.

c. Many problems in the national security area will not, at least in the beginning, be dealt with by the new machinery. These problems, such as those involving only one department or agency, or functional problems, e.g., disarmament, will continue to require the attention of White House/NSC officers now handling them. Current assignments will remain unchanged until experience shows how the new interdepartmental system is working.

Conclusion: No change in the NSC Staff budget request for FY 1967 need be made to meet additional requirements on the Staff arising out of the establishment of the new interdepartmental committee structure.

Bromley Smith

Washington, April 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-5505, US Govt-Policy Planning Group. Secret. Prepared by Godfrey on April 26.

SUBJECT
Interdepartmental Planning Group Meeting

IN ATTENDANCE
Ambassador Thomson (State)
Henry Owen (State)
Walt Rostow (WH)
Francis Bator (WH)
John McNaughton (DOD)
Fred Weyl (DOD)
General Goodpaster (JCS)
Drexel Godfrey (CIA)

1. A meeting of what has for some years been an informal Thursday luncheon group, was called April 2 by the new chairman of State's Policy Planning Council, Henry Owen. Its purpose was to determine the group's future following Walt Rostow's departure to the White House.

2. Messrs. Owen and Rostow presented a well orchestrated proposal to turn the group into an active producer of interdepartmental long-range planning papers. Rostow revealed that he had secured the President's approval for such a metamorphosis.

3. There was considerable discussion about the risk of poaching on IRG territories. Bator stirred up a little silent outrage by remarking that some of the IRG's (he mentioned specifically the European) were not doing their jobs, but only counter-punching in already well developed situations.

4. It was finally decided that the group would concentrate on those long-range problems that did not fall properly into any one of the existing IRG's, those that overlapped IRG's, and those with built-in military considerations. It was also decided to invite representatives of Treasury, USIA, and AID to attend when they had relevant interests in the subjects under consideration. Rostow said that the President was deeply concerned lest situations develop on which little or no planning had been done in any systematic fashion.

5. Rostow compared the purposes of the new group with those of the old NSC Planning Board, but he indicated that he hoped it would not develop into such a formal institution. He remarked that he would, when the paper merited it, put issuances of the group before the President. Alexis Johnson urged that the SIG be spared consideration of most of the papers, but it was not at all clear what would happen to those neither worthy of Presidential consideration nor of reference to an IRG. There was a general concensus that papers which detailed the differences of view between departments would be more valuable than those which fudged distinctions in basic premises and conclusions. Rostow suggested that each paper should contain an inherent draft of a NSAM.

6. All Agencies represented were asked to produce three or four subjects for papers within two weeks when the next meeting will be held. Several proposals were made for immediate attention and accepted by the group for early attention:

"Long Term Trade and Commodity Policy"
"Nuclear Proliferation after India"
"Long Term Policy toward White Africa"
"Long Term AID Policy"
"The ABM Problem"

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, April 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. Drafted in Crockett's office. Copies were sent to Barrett and Sherman. Hitch met with Rusk, Lincoln Gordon, and a number of other Department of State officials in Washington on April 4 and 5 in connection with the possibility of his chairing a high-level advisory group on foreign affairs programming. Crockett informed Rusk by memorandum in late May that, before leaving Washington on April 6, Hitch told him "that he was not just willing, but very interested and anxious to help us develop a comprehensive and unified planning and programming system for foreign affairs." (Undated memorandum from Crockett to Rusk, drafted May 21; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder G, Papers Relating to NSAM 341) The Hitch Committee was formed in June. For more information, see Documents 75 and 80 as well as Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 146-157.

Linc Gordon is completely willing to try to program his region as an experiment this year. Somebody will have to work out program element list for him. He would be glad to consult on it but he can't do it. Think it important you and Rowen get together and join forces and work out common approach and program on that list. This is something that could easily then be applied foreign affairs-wide next year.

Mr. Crockett said did he think it is better to go regionally than to select some countries.

Dr. Hitch said yes, because country problem is only part of the problem. Only touches on the intra-country allocations and not inter-country allocations. If you do it for region, that gives experiment with both. This is one of your great problems in this programming that makes it different from Defense. Have to handle it both from country review and regional review end. Will be quite difficult problem. If you concentrate on three different countries, will not have any experience with that problem.

Mr. Crockett said BOB is filled with hostility. Don't know whether--can try but have tried in past and not achieved very much satisfaction.

Dr. Hitch said he called Rowen this morning and told him pretty much what he had just said--must get together with you and work out? Having two rival systems is too much.

Mr. Crockett said he couldn't agree more. Unless he has changed mind he sees no virtue in this system. This is part of our problem, whether we just go on our own or try to convert as we go. Dave Bell is another difficult one too. He thinks systems analysis ought to be an absolute integral part of the programming system. This is minimum of what he would buy.

Dr. Hitch said he has nothing against using a lot of systems analysis but it ought to be integrated--must get information first. He said Linc Gordon is, in effect, Asst. AID Administrator?

Dr. Hitch said he is coming to Washington next week to give lecture.

Mr. Crockett said he greatly appreciated his calling. He will move heaven and earth in this direction.

Washington, April 19, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Ideas for Foreign Policy: Inside and Outside the Government

You asked: how can we get more new ideas for foreign policy?

I propose the following program:

a) Each regional bureau of the State Department would be instructed to develop a group of outside consultants, along the lines of those used by the Treasury, AID, the Policy Planning Council.

b) These consultants would be used for two purposes:

(i) to initiate new ideas, as the spirit moved them;

/2/According to Saunders' April 20 memorandum for the record, Rostow explained to his staff that "the dual purpose of this group would be to do work in depth on concrete problems that the bureaucracy just does not have time to do and to look into matters that everybody knows are important but are a little farther down the road." (Ibid., Saunders Files, NSC, SIG IRG) In an April 23 memorandum to Rusk, Rostow indicated that the President had "reiterated his desire that the regional Assistant Secretaries develop new constructive proposals with the assistance of the best brains that can be mobilized from outside the Government." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 51)

c) Members of my staff would be instructed to ensure that these consultants were effectively used and their ideas followed up in the bureaucracy.

a) The Inter-Departmental Planning Group, which has met every week informally, should be converted into a group which would formally staff out problems which cut across the Departments; produce action recommendations; forward those recommendations to the Senior Inter-Departmental Group (SIG) or to other higher authority for decision and action. Starting this Friday the Inter-Departmental Planning Group will be considering a list of such possible planning problems and possibilities.

b) Members of my staff have been told that we shall be devoting a somewhat higher proportion of our time to generating ideas and planning proposals. They will each be submitting to me an initial list of such ideas and proposals. When we have screened them together I shall arrange to have those we select put into the governmental machinery at appropriate points.

c) Against this background, we shall try to use the influence of the White House foreign affairs staff to ensure that the work of the Inter-Departmental Regional Groups (IRG's) is not merely addressed to inter-departmental negotiation and debate of current operational issues, but also to planning against contingencies and for the creative exploitation of opportunities for forward movement.

I have reviewed the history of this group. I have concluded that they are not likely to be useful to you meeting as a whole, except under exceptional circumstances. They could be useful if broken into sub-panels, for particular occasions to examine specific major problems; for example

--Viet-Nam;
--major international monetary decisions;
--critical decisions on NATO;
--changes in China policy, should circumstances justifying such change arise.

The purpose of such sub-panels would be these: to render to you additional advice; to engage the support of influential citizens for major changes of direction in national policy.

/3/Entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade," dated December 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade)

4. The questions, therefore, are:

--May I raise with Secretary Rusk the proposals for outside consultants to be attached to each regional bureau?

/4/The President checked this option and wrote "Excellent." In a memorandum to Rostow, September 16, 1966, providing a status report on the State Department's foreign policy consultants, Moose reported that the list of proposed consultants was still undergoing checks by the State Department and John Macy's office. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos 1966) For information on the consultants' meetings, see Documents 111 and 125.

Disapproved

See me

--May I proceed with planning inside the government along the lines indicated in Para. 2, a-c?

/5/The President checked this option.

Disapproved

See me

/6/Written in hand below this paragraph is: "as outlined, see 1a."

Instruction awaited.

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, May 9, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74-28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams.

SUBJECT
Urgent Need to Increase Minority Group Representation at African Posts

/2/Not found.

"None of the foreign affairs agencies has adequate minority representation on its staffs. AID and USIA are better than State, but all are completely inadequate. We need to consider how we can improve this situation."

/3/Not found.

This is a problem which both you and I share, and I think we ought to start planning now on providing some remedy. One approach might be to focus on all positions we now have vacant in the African area overseas and for which we do not have presently qualified and available FSO's and FSSO's and give priority to finding, recruiting, and employing minority group candidates who can fill these positions. I would hope also that we might be able to utilize some of our promising Foreign Affairs Scholars at the R-8, R-7, or Staff Corps levels.

I have asked Eddie Williams to submit to you any files he feels are worthy of your personal consideration. I am willing to do all I can to expedite this matter; I would suggest that appropriate members of your staff rely heavily upon Eddie Williams in developing the names of additional candidates.

Washington, May 10, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Walt Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only.

You ask: Who are your candidates for the next Secretary of State?

The most important element in the answer is: with whom will you feel most comfortable?

The Secretary of State must be the most sensitive instrument of the President's interests and policy, plus all the other things he must be. All other considerations should be subordinated to your personal feeling in the matter: choosing a Secretary of State is a little like getting married.

Having said that, my first choice would be the team of:

Secretary: McNamara
Under Secretary: Clark Clifford

The job of Secretary of State is now so exhausting, it should be thought of as a team.

Alternatively, of course, Clark Clifford could be a great Secretary of State. He would need a tremendous work-horse as Under Secretary. My choice would be: Cyrus Vance, in that case.

Although he probably would not accept the job, I think Mac Bundy would be an excellent Under Secretary of State under a strong boss. From a quarter-century of knowing Mac-and liking him-I cannot yet recommend him as a Secretary of State.

Douglas Dillon would be my third choice for Secretary.

A fourth candidate crossed my mind-no more than that-Senator Gale McGhee. He has shown guts on Vietnam. He is articulate. But I simply do not know enough of his real fiber to judge whether he belongs on the list or not.

Although you probably can't spare him, Bill Moyers should be considered as Under Secretary with McNamara, Clifford, or Dillon.

If I have any further thoughts, I shall forward them.

Walt

On May 10, 1966, President's Special Assistant Rostow asked NSC staff members to prepare interim reports on a number of organizational and policy initiatives in foreign affairs, including the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. The report prepared by Edward Hamilton and Francis Bator is Document 75. In a May 18 memorandum to National Security Council Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, Harold Saunders reported on the IRG for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He stated that the discussions had been "meaty" with the "meetings devoted so far to major short-run issues." Assistant Secretary of State Hare had "indicated interest in discussing one or two longer term general issues, but we haven't yet." Saunders observed that "IRG/NEA has yet to sign off on any finished paper" and concluded that it was "not yet a decision-making forum." (Johnson Library, Agency File, State Department, IRG)

James Thomson reported on the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Far Eastern Affairs in a May 20 memorandum to Bromley Smith. He stated that "on the plus side, this IRG has surfaced some major inter-agency disagreements and misunderstandings which might otherwise have gone undetected for some time" but that "on the minus side, the IRG involves a considerable expenditure of executive time (up to 2-1/2 hours for each meeting) on items of business that could be dealt with more speedily via the telephone, lower echelon meetings, etc." In his summary comment, Thomson stated: "FE is a bureau in which a strong Assistant Secretary habitually takes the lead on policy and operational questions; the IRG is therefore only a supplementary device which he uses twice a month to aid and review issues that require no immediate action. The institution's future is doubtful." (Ibid.)

Washington, May 23, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, IRG. Confidential. For background to the report, see Document 74.

Organizational and Policy Initiatives--European and Economic Affairs

On the whole, the IRG for Europe is not a smashing success, but it has had its uses. The lessons of experience thus far are as follows:

1. The IRG is not much use in crises (either short or protracted), or with respect to the broadest European issues. These matters simply must be handled (a) by a very small group of very senior people, and (b) in a smaller forum--without AID, USIA, CIA, and non-OSD/DOD.

2. On smaller, more specialized issues--e.g., the proposed NATO Defense Payments Union--the IRG can be useful as a forum for discussion and for needling the bureaucracy into movement.

3. With John Leddy flat on his back, and NATO/France occupying topside attention, the IRG hasn't really had a fair test.

[Omitted here are brief discussions of the Planning Group, Formalization of Bureau External Contacts, AID, and Presidential Initiative--Canada.]

This is a two-front proceeding:

/2/Attached but not printed. The Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, known as the Hitch Committee, addressed these questions in its report to Secretary Rusk; see the attachment to Document 99.

To deal with these issues, Crockett and the BOB are proposing establishment of an Advisory Group to meet during the Summer and make recommendations to the Secretary in the Fall. The Group would be asked to develop a system which could be installed for the 1969 budget cycle. Present candidates for membership are as follows: Charlie Hitch (Chairman), Dave Bell, Henry Rowen, Alain Enthoven, Livingston Merchant, Ellsworth Bunker, Stewart Blake, Frederick Mosher, Rensis Likert, and Chris Argyris. They would be backstopped by a contract with Stanford Research Institute which would supply whatever technical help and staff support is necessary.

2. Practice. While the planning of an overall system proceeds, each agency (State, USIA, AID, Peace Corps) has, at BOB direction, tried pilot programming in a few key countries employing PPBS principles. Basically, this involves reassessments of programs with special emphasis on alternatives to present approaches. In general, the BOB conclusion (which we share) is that the methodology has not really taken hold. There are exceptions, but for the most part the products are distressingly similar to past budget justifications. (Surprisingly, the most notable exception is the Peace Corps, where it appears that a fairly rigorous re-thinking is taking place.) We have been and will continue to be involved in critiques, but our general conclusion is that real progress will probably await a new general system which will force the field posts to take the new mode of thinking seriously.

EH

FMB

During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk that began at 5:11 p.m. on May 27, 1966, the following discussion took place regarding a replacement for Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann, who had indicated that he planned to step down:

President: "I really want a good new person in Mann's place, but I haven't found one. What has been your thinking on it? Has it jelled any more?"

Rusk: "Well, I think the key qualification for a man on that spot is someone who is utterly loyal to you and to me. Now, in terms of running this Department and people familiar with it and government and that kind of thing and on the inside part of the job, I don't think of anybody better than or even comparable to Luke Battle. In terms of somebody who might help more on the public side and with some of these liberal Senators, we might be able to better that. This is one of the reasons I thought about our friend in the Philippines, Bill Blair. I would be interested in the name Gene Rostow, whose name has come up in different places."

President: "I only saw that in a column. Who originated it?"

Rusk: "I don't know. I don't know. Since I saw it in a column, I suppose that somebody's been talking about it around town. Nobody's spoken to me about it."

President: "Nobody has to me."

Rusk: "But George and I have talked about recruiting this fellow for some time. He is an able fellow. It wouldn't have been too easy while Walt was over in this Department to have two brothers at the top spots here, but he's an extraordinary able fellow, Dean of the Law School, you know, at Yale. So that's a new name and a fresh person here that would be, I think, well received by a lot of people. And he's helped us I think generally on our foreign policy problems. But I think that's something that-now the other possibility is to just leave it open for a bit until we feel out what you want to do about the number two spot and how that shapes up."

The President and Rusk then discussed candidates to replace George Ball as Under Secretary of State. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 66.15, Side B, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Washington, May 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 8. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a May 30 memorandum in which Rostow proposed additional talking points. On May 31 the President met in the Cabinet Room from 1:25 to 2:32 p.m. with the following Department of State officers: Assistant Secretaries, Acting Assistant Secretaries, Presidential appointees with the rank of Assistant Secretary, and officers with the equivalent rank of Assistant Secretary. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. During a telephone conversation with Rusk that began at 12:45 p.m. on May 28, the President indicated that at the meeting he wanted the Assistant Secretaries to "give me their area of the world and what the problems are and what the solutions are as they see them." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.15, Side B, PNO 2)

In your meeting tomorrow with the Assistant Secretaries you might wish to make some of the following points:

1) Your conversation with them is confidential. If anything is to be said to the press about it, you will do it yourself.

2) Presidential appointees represent the Administration--your Administration. As far as the Career Service is concerned, they have a major commitment to the full support of the Government of the United States. The people have elected the present Administration as its government. The British experience with the Civil Service and a Career Foreign Service illustrates a central idea of great importance: a professional service is not expected to be neutral, that is without loyalties; a professional service is expected to be loyal to the government of the day.

In your case, that loyalty is a two-way street. No President has relied upon or called upon a Career Service more than you have.

3) The duty of the Department of State is to represent the interests of the American people and the American Government. When we have major problems such as Viet-Nam, a balance of payments problem, or other matters of major national importance, our diplomacy must support United States interests in every possible way. We are the representatives of the American people and Government to the foreigner; they have representatives of their own to represent their interests to us.

4) There are some problems on which we must exact a high level of discipline from other governments if they and we are to achieve the desired results. Unless we are tough on food production, for example, the human race simply cannot feed itself over the next ten years. Unless we are tough on such matters as self-help and foreign aid, our resources will be wasted in a swamp. We should not be reluctant to be tough in order to get the job done-at least if we are to make any contribution toward the job. We cannot use American resources simply to create feelings of amiability toward the United States.

5) The Assistant Secretaries occupy a crucial position of leadership and judgment. They are the ones who know about the one thousand cables a day. They are the ones who ought to alert the Secretary of State and the President to oncoming crises. They are the ones who should spend twenty-four hours a day thinking about new ideas and new approaches to solve some of our problems. The Assistant Secretaries will be given full confidence but we expect them to occupy fully the horizons of their responsibility.

6) There is always a need for talented people. The Assistant Secretaries should be engaged in a constant search, inside and outside of Government, for people of talent who can help us do our job better.

7) The President does not have a single dollar or a single man which is not provided by the Congress and the American people. The Assistant Secretaries should not rely upon Douglas MacArthur to do their work in the Congress. Each one of them should spend a considerable amount of time and effort in cultivating and developing the support required in the Congress if our programs are to succeed.

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk's Special Assistant, Arthur Borg, signed the original for Rusk.

Washington, May 31, 1966, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966-. Confidential; Sensitive.

Mr. President:

One reason I have difficulty supplying you names for State Dept. 7th floor is this: I believe the new Under Secretary you are looking for should have a considerable voice in building the 7th floor team. That team should be well balanced between old professionals and first-rate, lively outsiders; but he should have an important part in the choice.

Therefore, you may wish to focus first on who this man is; and then, taking him into your confidence, go to work on rebuilding the whole top echelon with him.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 2, 1966, 9:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Extra-Sensitive. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

PARTICIPANTS
President Johnson
Mr. Mann

[Omitted here is discussion of the Dominican Republic and other Latin American issues.]

The President asked who is the best man for Mr. Mann's job, Alexis Johnson? Mr. Mann said he thought he may be on the theory that nobody can do an effective job unless he has the complete confidence of the Secretary, and he thinks Johnson has it. This job is an assistant to the Secretary and if someone is in who he doesn't select he will be out in left field. He said he thought the number 2 job should be a fellow that could some day take over and should be selected with more care than the number 3 job. Mr. Mann said he thought Cy Vance would be awfully good but didn't know if he could be spared. The President asked what job, and Mr. Mann said either one. The President said the ideal thing would be to move McNamara in. Mr. Mann said he thought McNamara would do a good job, but he mustn't jump too fast-rely more and more on staff. Mr. Mann said the Assistant Secretaries should be built up, get Congress to understand they are responsible-don't expect one man to keep up. He said he thought Bundy was good, and Gordon, the others kick up problems to the 7th floor. The President said he needed someone to take Hare's place, and Mr. Mann agreed. He (Mann) said he was not sure that Foreign Service Officers are the best people to select for Assistant Secretaries, he thinks you can get better judgment, better administration from the outside.

The President told Mr. Mann to come over to see him, come in some Saturday and they can talk.

CA-11929 Washington, June 7, 1966, 12:58 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett on June 4, cleared by Crockett, and approved by Ball.

SUBJECT
Planning and Programming in Foreign Affairs

Many Chiefs of Mission are acquainted with the Department's experimental work of the past three years in developing a programming system for the United States foreign affairs program. Others will become acquainted this year through involvement in the planning-programming-budgeting systems of each foreign affairs agency, being developed at the direction of the President and under the leadership of the Bureau of the Budget.

The issuance in March of National Security Action Memorandum 341, placing added responsibilities on the Secretary of State and the Department for directing overseas operations and creating the Senior Interdepartmental Group, provides added urgency to our need to make full use of such management tools as policy planning and programming.

Accordingly, the Department intends to take further steps during this year to improve the capabilities of the foreign affairs community in this field. The other foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget will participate fully and actively in this effort.

The first step will be to define the requirements for a foreign affairs programming system and its relationship to the planning-programming-budgeting systems being developed in each agency, as well as to address other key issues that will define the nature and scope of such a system.

The second step will be to develop the system and put it into operation at the earliest practicable date.

/2/The formation, meetings, and report of the Hitch Committee are discussed in detail in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 146-171. Mosher was a member of the committee. See also Document 99.

/3/The Interagency Working Group's first meeting on August 11-12 is discussed in a Department of State paper, Background Information, drafted August 18. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Foreign Affairs Planning System, 1966)

As we proceed with this work, the individual agency PPBS efforts will continue in selected countries and should receive your full cooperation.

Following the development and approval of a foreign affairs programming system, it will be installed region-by-region and will be improved as we gain experience in its use. We will start with Latin America and follow with Africa in view of the interest and request of Assistant Secretaries Gordon and Palmer. We hope to be able to proceed in Latin America for a full planning-programming-budgeting cycle for fiscal year 1969.

As these efforts proceed in those missions where Executive Assistants have been assigned, I urge their use to assist you in your review and analysis of mission programs and operations.

The content of this airgram should be discussed with your staff and representatives of all agencies at your mission. Concurrent discussions will take place with agency heads in Washington. Your own ideas and conclusions concerning the best means of developing and using these management tools and making them most effective will be welcomed.

A programming system for foreign affairs will permit the Department and other agencies in Washington to better support your efforts in each country and to become the means of giving increased scope and flexibility to the country team concept you are already effectively utilizing.

Over the next several years, virtually every Chief of Mission will become involved in these new developments in planning and programming. Your cooperation in this effort will be an important contribution to its success.

Ball
Acting

Washington, June 18, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-Under Secretary. No classification marking.

/2/Ball discussed his decision to resign in his memoirs, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 424-433. For additional information on the decision, see David L. Di Leo, George Ball: Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 156-158; and James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) p. 75.

Harry Schwartz, Executive Director of SIG, tells us that we should give utmost attention to finding a first class, dynamic, and uncommitted executive to replace George Ball. Schwartz suggested we consider the following profile:

1. The replacement should have all the generally desired personal and intellectual qualities that would constitute him as a first-class person.

2. The person should be dynamic and energetic-the work-load on Ball is enormous. One of Ball's main reasons for leaving is that he is bone-tired.

3. The replacement should be uncommitted and have no particular interest in any given region of the world nor any identification with particular causes (MLF, keep China in or out of the UN, increase or decrease our role in Viet Nam, etc.).

4. The replacement should be totally dedicated to being a Chief of Staff for the Secretary of State and be able and willing to do everything that the Secretary either will not do or is unable to do.

5. The replacement should have a clear understanding of how to be an effective modern manager.

Schwartz said that National Security Action Memorandum 341 laid down the framework for the establishment of SIG and gave to the Secretary of State and the Department of State the authority "to direct all foreign affairs" and authorized the Under Secretary of State to make decisions as Chairman of SIG. The need for the right kind of person to pull this off is paramount. We should only consider persons who meet the above profile.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, July 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66, Box 56. Secret. Drafted on July 28 by Harry H. Schwartz, SIG Staff Director.

PRESENT
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Chairman)
The Director, CIA
The Director, USIA
The Acting Administrator, AID
General Brown for General Wheeler, JCS
Mr. Yarmolinsky for Mr. Vance, Defense
The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The Staff Director
Treasury--Under Secretary Barr
O/FSI/NIS--Ambassador Kidder

/2/The agenda and attached analyses, comments, and recommendations for the consideration and approval of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which resulted from a survey made by Randolph A. Kidder, Coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar (NIS), at the request of Under Secretary George Ball, the SIG Chairman, dated July 21, are ibid. This package was attached to an undated transmittal memorandum from Schwartz to Bromley Smith and representatives of AID, CIA, USIA, JCS, and DOD.

/3/In a July 25 letter to Bromley Smith commenting on the recommendations, General Maxwell D. Taylor suggested this change. (Ibid.)

2) The language of paragraph 2 of the responsibilities assigned to the Department of State to be redrafted.

3) Paragraph 2 of the responsibilities assigned to DOD to include USIA among those agencies to be consulted.

4) In the responsibilities assigned to AID, paragraph 1, the report to be made by November 1.

/4/See last sentence of NSAM 341. [Footnote in the source text. NSAM 341 is Document 56.]

"Summary of Recommendations Listed by Action Responsibility", reflecting the changes mentioned above, is attached.

HHS

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED BY ACTION RESPONSIBILITY

/5/Tabs A-N are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), Memos and Misc. [I], Box 60. NSAM 177, August 7, 1962, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IX, Document 150. Tab J is a summary and discussion of Point 5, "Adequacy of Police Programs," set forth in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report (see footnote 3, Document 50).

/6/Document 191.

/7/See footnote 9 below.

/8/Not found.

/9/Tab I is a summary and discussion of Point 3, "Defects in Training," set forth in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report.

/10/Tab N summarizes the reports of Committees I-III and recommends follow-up action by agencies.

/11/For text of NSAM 119, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 65.

/12/NSAM 162 is printed ibid., Document 91.

3) Give special attention to the adequacy of police programs in reviews of regional and country requirements and programs; specifically determine the basic security objectives to be met through the police programs, taking into account their relationship to the objectives of military assistance programs. (NSAM 177--Tab D; Point 5--Tab J)

/13/NSAM 182 is printed ibid., Document 105.

/14/Not found.

/15/Tab III to Annex A is the Report of Taylor Committee I.

2) Under the direction of the Under Secretary of State there will be a consolidation and integration of the presently excessive number of policy, strategy, planning or programming papers now required of or sent to missions abroad. Such consolidated or integrated papers will include a section on "Internal Defense" for appropriate under-developed countries.

/16/This is a summary and discussion of Point 1, "Need for greater emphasis on the prevention of subversive aggression," in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report.

1) To review, with AID, the concept and application of civic action and report conclusions to the SIG by October 1. (NSAM 119--Tab A) Pages 100-103 of the report of Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A)

2) The responsibility for assuring progress in R & D for counter-subversion requirements lies with DOD (and CIA). DOD is to determine, in consultation with CIA, State and USIA (G/PM), (a) whether the military hardware needs for countering subversion are being adequately met and (b) whether drawing up a separate package for procurement and R & D as a way of assuring adequate budgetary support for counter-subversion needs is feasible and desirable. The DOD is to report its conclusions on those two matters to SIG by October 1 and to submit annual reports to SIG on new developments in R & D for counter-subversions. (NSAM 162--Tab C)

3) On the Chairman's request, the Deputy Secretary of Defense to insure that General Taylor's proposal relating to the attach? system be considered in the DIA's current review of attach? staffing. (Point 7--Tab L)

1) The responsibility for assignments of qualified counter-insurgency specialists with paramilitary skills to impending crisis areas remains with CIA and AID. (NSAM 162-Tab C)

2) The agency shares with DOD the responsibility for assuring progress in R & D for counter-subversion. (NSAM 162--Tab C)

/17/This is a summary and discussion of Point 7, "Intelligence to Support Countersubversion Planning and Programming," in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report; see footnote 3, Document 50.

1) To review with DOD the concept and application of civic action and report conclusions to the SIG by November 1. (NSAM 119--Tab A) Pages 100-103 of the report of the Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A)

2) Retain, with CIA, the responsibility of assignment of qualified counter-insurgency specialists with paramilitary skills to impending crisis areas. (NSAM 162--Tab C)

3) Submit an annual report to the SIG on the activities of the Public Safety Office. (NSAM 177--Tab D)

4) The problem of the adequacy of police programs including U.S. personnel to be referred to AID for action in consultation with G/PM. Regional reports to be submitted to the IRGs semi-annually. (Point 5--Tab J) Pages 60-75 of the report of Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A)

Washington, July 26, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966-. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Mr. President:

You asked for my views on State Department personnel. They are as follows:

1. The Rusk-McNamara combination is in many ways exceedingly attractive. Moreover, both men are of such character that it could be done. You may wish to explore it further. On the whole, however, I recommend against:

--We need Bob McNamara in Defense until we are over the hump in Viet Nam;

--It would be exceedingly difficult for Secretary Rusk to appear other than a lame duck, despite Bob's best efforts.

2. Assuming the Rusk-McNamara arrangement is set aside, our task is to build a 7th floor team which has two characteristics:

--It is comfortable for Secretary Rusk. This we owe him, given the burdens borne by the Secretary of State.

--It commands enough energy and cohesion to assure that the State Department is strongly led from the 7th floor even though the Secretary of State must be heavily engaged on the Hill, overseas, and over here in the White House.

3. I propose, therefore, that the Under Secretary be either David Bruce or Clark Clifford. On the whole, I lean to David Bruce if he would take the job, because he would not raise the problem of the succession to Secretary Rusk. However, given Bruce's age, I propose that the new Counselor, Robert Bowie, be made to work in tandem with Bruce, with special responsibility for managing the Senior Interdepartmental Group. This committee of Under Secretaries is not going badly; but it could be made a much more powerful instrument of initiation, coordination, and program budgeting in the government. Bowie could also take responsibility for overseeing the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, chaired by the Assistant Secretaries; he could be assigned to oversee new initiatives; for example, in East-West bridge building, Alliance for Progress, Africa, Asian regionalism, arms control, etc. His task here would not be to substitute for those bearing the operational responsibility in these fields; but to make sure that the hard-pressed bureaus really looked for and staffed out new ideas, whether they were generated in the Policy Planning Council, the White House, or outside the government. As I know from my own experience, the men on the 7th floor are generally so taken up by crises and operational duties that they must struggle for time to examine and stimulate new initiatives. There ought to be a man paid to do this. Bowie could also be liaison with us for NSC meetings. I propose, then, a Bruce-Bowie team to do the Under Secretary's job.

4. For the Alex Johnson slot, the best single man would be Foy Kohler. As you pointed out, this raises the question of who could succeed him in Moscow. I may be wrong, but I have tentatively concluded there is no Foreign Service officer in the Soviet field sufficiently mature now to take that post. I recommend, therefore, that if we wish to bring Foy Kohler home to take Alex Johnson's post, we go outside the government. My number one candidate would be Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia, who, aside from his scholarly stature, has had important practical experience during and after the Second World War in Soviet affairs. He is up to date, through his research and government advisory contacts. Moreover, he is extremely well balanced and level-headed about the Soviet Union. A second possible outside choice would be Professor Marshall Shulman of Harvard. I would rate Bill Bundy as second to Foy Kohler in this post.

5. In the other Under Secretary slot, I would take Luke Battle, if that is the choice of Secretary Rusk. I would keep Tony Solomon as the economic Assistant Secretary and not put an economic Under Secretary over him.

In general, I should point out that in Kohler and Bowie you would have two strong-minded men; but they would, I believe, work well with each other and the Rusk-Bruce team. Similarly, I think Luke Battle would work with them efficiently. There would be a problem, however, in sorting out their respective roles on the 7th floor. Here their common respect for David Bruce, as well as Secretary Rusk, should give you a fairly harmonious operation.

If you wanted Bob Komer in Bill Bundy's job, we could make Bill Ambassador to London or substitute Foy Kohler for Luke Battle in the old Tom Mann slot, putting Bill in Alex Johnson's.

As for NEA, here are three candidates in order of preference:

--Win Brown, able, well-balanced Ambassador in Korea.

--Joe Johnson, President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

--Tom Hughes.

Walt

In August 1966 the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett issued A Management Program for the Department of State consisting of 29 pages of text and a 75-page appendix. The introduction noted that there had been "a number of actions taken during the past five years to improve management of the Department of State and the leadership position of the Department in the foreign affairs community." The purpose of A Management Program was to review "what has been done, what has been started, and what is planned for the remainder of this fiscal year in the general area of 'management improvement.'" National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 10)

Part I of the text, "Leadership in Foreign Affairs," discussed the leadership roles of the Ambassador, the Department of State, and the Country Director, the role of positive administration and the administrative officer, the development of managers as leaders, national policy papers, and the foreign affairs programming system. Part II, "Department-wide Management Improvement," sketched 16 projects and programs instituted to improve management in the Department as a whole, such as Action for Organization Development (ACORD), a long-range organizational development program designed to increase managerial effectiveness and improve interpersonal relationships by applying the knowledge of the behavioral sciences to the workings of a complex organization. Part III, "O Area Improvements," focused on seven projects and programs primarily affecting the Office of the Under Secretary for Administration. The appendix included key documents, a discussion of "Management by Objectives and Programs," an index of State Department studies in the administrative area, and other material. In September 1966 the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration issued a very slightly revised version of A Management Program for the Department of State. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-28, Box 31)

Washington, August 4, 1966, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966-. Sensitive. The memorandum is marked with an indication the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Senior Economics People in the State Department

I hesitate to comment on your State Seventh Floor problem, especially since I do not know what the Secretary is recommending. However, I would like to flag for you one organizational matter, which has nothing to do with personalities.

I understand that the Secretary is thinking about shifting the No. 2 Under Secretaryship from the economic to the political side. If that is done, and nothing else is changed, the senior economics man in the Department would be Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Even with as strong and effective a man as Tony Solomon in that job, I am afraid this would put State at a great disadvantage in the inevitable bargaining with Commerce, Agriculture, Interior and Treasury, and also to some extent vis-?-vis the Congress, industry and labor.

Most international economic issues--trade, commodity policy, etc.--touch on the primary, and sometimes parochial, concerns of one of the major domestic departments. On serious issues their Secretaries become quickly and personally involved. State is handicapped by the fact that its top management is often quite properly preoccupied with foreign crises which cannot be shunted aside.

A full time economic Under Secretary in the Dillon, Ball, Mann tradition, can balance the scales. Also, having someone of Seventh Floor rank in the economic business can strengthen State's hand in dealing with the Congress, the business community, and the unions. You know better than anyone what yeoman service Tom Mann did on this front--I think he was much more valuable in that job than he himself ever realized.

I understand that George Ball has mentioned to you one possible solution. This would involve converting Alex Johnson's Deputy Under Secretaryship from political to economic affairs. I think that might well do the trick.

If that were done, I would vote for putting Solomon in that job. As you know, he is skillful, loyal, energetic and has worked very well with the rest of us on the economic circuit. Further, this would open up Tony's Assistant Secretaryship for another senior economic man. For that, it might be possible to keep Richard Cooper, now Tony's deputy, who is also absolutely first rate. Yale is literally forcing Cooper to return to New Haven this coming September. If we could tell Kingman Brewster that we wanted Cooper badly enough to promote him, it might be possible to get them to relent. It is even conceivable that Dick might be prepared to resign his professorship.

I do not know about the Secretary, but I know that George Ball and Solomon would be all for Cooper, despite his youth (32). So would Ackley, Schultze, Fowler (who recently tried to hire him), Deming, Komer (whom Cooper has helped on Vietnam), Dave Bell, Kermit Gordon, Walter Heller--and everybody else Dick has worked with.

/2/Walt Rostow wrote in hand below Bator's signature: "I concur. We must keep Solomon in State and effective."

FMB

Washington, August 4, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1-1. No classification marking. The same letter was apparently sent to all Country Directors. The text of the letter was included in the appendix to A Management Program for the Department of State (see Document 84), under the heading Country Director Doctrine. For information on the development of the Country Director system, see William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

Dear Mr. Eliot:

I have been asked by many officers to make clearer what the Country Director is, what is expected of him, and how he should operate.

I would like you and your staff to have the following thoughts on this subject. These thoughts reflect the Secretary's deep and personal interest in and support of the Country Director concept, as well as my own views.

The Country Director is not mentioned in the President's directive to the Secretary, but the need for the Country Director is implicit in the interdepartmental responsibilities placed on the Secretary and the Department. The Secretary spoke to that need when he referred to establishment of the Country Director position in his statement to the Department and the Foreign Service.

/2/For text of Rusk's statement on March 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 1128-1129.

First, the Department is clearly committed to action--with leadership responsibilities for insuring that programs of other foreign affairs agencies are not only well-conceived to carry our policy, but do, in fact, succeed in their purpose.

This broader action responsibility requires a Presidential point of view--a concern for the success of all U.S. agencies' missions abroad. The Department is not a competitor in conflict with other agencies, but the President's representative looking at foreign affairs across the board and across programs.

The Department has special responsibility for broad policy development and for sensitivity to the international political impact of U.S. actions. It must also take into account possible domestic effects of foreign affairs activities. But these responsibilities are not to be viewed as the specialized interests of one Department in competition with the specialized interests of other agencies. Rather, the Department's policy considerations must accommodate the totality of U.S. objectives, including foreign affairs operating programs, so that they are truly Presidential in outlook--not parochial and bureaucratic.

The Department must look outward for ideas. Officers at all levels should seek suggestions and ideas for foreign policies and programs from other agencies. They should urge their colleagues throughout the government to contribute to their thinking. Their antennae should constantly be out in search of the hitherto unexplored approach.

The broader responsibility of the regional bureaus requires them to make full use of the ideas and assistance of the functional bureaus and offices, which play vitally important roles in interdepartmental leadership. This is particularly necessary in the areas of policy planning, economics, public affairs, science and technology, cultural and educational affairs, international organization affairs and administration.

One more thing. Leadership does not imply stifling of important divergences of views. There is no justification for delay based on purely bureaucratic rivalries. There is, however, a great and over-riding need to ensure that divergent views of substance and importance be sharply identified and promptly submitted to higher authorities for decision. New organizational responsibilities may not be used to shield the Secretary and the President from controversy which can properly be resolved only at the highest level.

Against the background of these basic principles, the Country Director's reason for existence, his role and his responsibilities can be briefly outlined.

International relations are in large part carried out on a bilateral country-to-country basis.

It is at the country level that most crisis-related issues first become visible, at which interrelated programs must be developed for the most effective use of all government and domestic resources, and at which implementing action starts.

It is in the country context that the Ambassador and the field mission must be served and backstopped.

Informed, timely focus on day-to-day interdepartmental activities in the country context is necessary for timely accurate definition of major issues requiring action at the level of the regional bureau and the Secretary.

The Country Director thus is the essential block on which Assistant Secretaries, the Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Senior Interdepartmental Group build.

The Country Director, for assigned countries, must exercise the same leadership, foresight, government-wide overview and wisdom that the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries exercise at their levels and that the Ambassador exercises at the diplomatic mission.

To meet this challenge the Country Director must--

--have insight into and appreciation of the total range of the President's interest, concern and responsibility for all U.S. activities both at home and abroad

--appreciate the objectives and potentials of the entire spread of programs which implement foreign policy

--understand the meaning and techniques of leadership

--have a profound sense for timeliness and decisiveness in action, and for anticipating and heading off problems

--know the difference between serving as a focus of action in contrast to acting as a supervisory layer in a hierarchical structure

--be able to distinguish between decisions which should be made at the Country Director level, and those which can be made only at a higher level

The Country Director sees that the Ambassador's needs are served both within the Department and government-wide. He assures that the mission is fully supported in the full range of its requirements: policy, program, resources, operations and administration.

For example, the Country Director must--

--provide policy guidance on which operating agencies will base their programs

--insure that recommended programs of the various agencies are consistent with and support U.S. policy objectives and provide the most effective total use of proposed U.S. resources

--develop devices for ensuring interdepartmental implementation of decisions requiring interdepartmental action

--maintain continuing purposeful contacts with other agencies' representatives, and establish channels for prompt interchange of information on policies, country developments, potential crisis situations and similar matters

--marshall his interdepartmental team to meet IRG and SIG requests, and bring his detailed knowledge to IRG discussions when his assigned country is concerned

--maintain constant readiness on an interdepartmental basis to anticipate and meet crises, and serve as the base for crisis task force operations when necessary

It is for the Country Director to decide when to meet with other agencies' representatives or with members of functional bureaus; how to bring them into problems; what mechanisms to establish; how to inspire officers to work as a team. The essential is that he rise to the challenge of creating a Government-wide approach characterized by intelligence, imagination and timely action.

The Country Director must learn to think, act and provide leadership for his team in much the same sense as the Ambassador does for his.

I am certain that you personally realize how crucial the Country Director is to the Secretary's and the Department's new responsibilities. The way in which this concept evolves in the next months and years will depend on you, and on other officers assigned to Country Director positions. In the words of the Secretary, "no organizational chart can substitute for the abilities and attitudes of people."

In the period immediately ahead, my staff and I will welcome your frank comment and reactions. Particularly, let me know in what ways I can be useful in this effort.

Sincerely,

William J. Crockett

During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and investment banker Sidney Weinberg that began at 1:12 p.m. on August 5, 1966, the following exchange took place:

President: "I want you to think about all the men in this country you know that you would make Secretary of State if you were President. Now that's just a standard I want you to use, that's the criteria, because I need about a half a dozen men that are top flight in that field and I'd like for you to think about 'em."

Weinberg: "In the diplomatic field?"

President: "Yeah. They ought to be men, if they could be, between 50 and 60. Could be 40, and they could be 65."

Weinberg: "Preferably 50-60."

President: "They ought to be men that have traveled. If they could, it would be good if they had a language. If they didn't they ought to be good executives. They ought to be reasonably diplomatic, understanding people. They ought to have some grace and some culture and some background, and they ought to have some judgment. They should have been successes as business people or academic people or lawyers or bankers or something. I don't care whether they're Republicans or Democrats. I just want 'em to have integrity, to have judgment. Judgment's the most important thing a man can have."

Weinberg: "I agree with that, Mr. President."

President: "And I might put 'em in Under Secretary George Ball's spot. I might put 'em in Tom Mann's spot. He's the Economic Under Secretary. I might put 'em in Crockett's spot. He's the Deputy Under Secretary that runs the Department. He picks 120 ambassadors."

Weinberg: "I know him."

President: "And he gets the show on the road. I might put 'em in Alex Johnson's spot, which handles military, Defense, CIA. He is the Deputy Under Secretary. He's really the straw boss of the State Department. I might put 'em in Ambassador to France or to Moscow or some other place."

Later in the conversation Weinberg told the President: "I think if you used enough influence you could get Doug Dillon back if you wanted." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Weinberg, Tape F66.19, Side B, PNO 1 and 2) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

During a telephone conversation that began at 12:38 p.m. on August 8, 1966, President Johnson asked Douglas Dillon to accept an appointment as Under Secretary of State. In urging Dillon to take the job, Johnson stated "by the end of September we're going to try to remake that department over there, and I would hope very much that you could be in on it." The President went on to say: "in effect you will have two secretaries of state. I would like to select a third secretary and the fourth man in the department and a new personnel man and some of the other things that I could, but I would like to do it after I select you. I don't know what the Secretary's plans are. I have not asked him, Obviously I don't know. He has not stated them to me. I know he doesn't want to feel, I wouldn't think, that he would be leaving under any fire or anything. On the other hand, I know he had rather have you than anybody in the United States for this particular assignment." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Dillon, Tape F22.35, Side A, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Dillon declined the appointment during a telephone conversation with the President the next day. (Ibid., Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Dillon, August 9, 1966, 10:05 a.m., Tape 66.20, Side A, PNO 2)

Washington, August 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. Typed at the end of the memorandum is the following note: "Walt Rostow has seen, and agrees with this memo. CLS [Charles L. Schultze]."

SUBJECT
Management Responsibility of the Secretary of State

/2/Document 56.

--in surveying and managing our growing overseas operations, now conducted by many Departments;

--in insuring that U.S. programs effectively meet our interests and objectives in overseas areas.

My review of overseas programs in the 1968 Budget Preview has convinced me of the importance of having a top official of the Department to assist the Secretary full time in (1) managing the Department, (2) coordinating the foreign affairs activities of the several agencies, and (3) providing leadership to the interagency committees and procedures established under NSAM 341.

Specifically, as a next step in strengthening our foreign affairs operations, I recommend that the number three man in the Department (the Tom Mann job), who is titled in statute either "Under Secretary for Political Affairs" or "Under Secretary for Economic Affairs", be assigned to this management role. Acting for the Secretary, he would:

--manage the resources of the Department of State, with Foreign Service officers and other employees totaling 25,000, and an annual budget of $400 million ($700 million with reimbursements from other agencies).

--be responsible for the effective translation of policy decisions into action.

--direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental activities overseas as specified in NSAM 341. These activities include programs of economic and military assistance, food aid, the Peace Corps, and USIA, cost about $5 billion annually, and involve about 37,000 employees in addition to State's.

-chair the Senior Interdepartmental Group established by NSAM 341.

To be effective in this task, he will need a strong program review and analysis staff and a foreign affairs programming system which would relate agency programs in countries and regions. He also should be a main point of advice to the Secretary on programs and budgets for foreign affairs activities.

The recommendation assumes that the Secretary will continue to use the Under Secretary as his "alter ego" in advising the President, conducting diplomatic relations, and dealing with Congress and the public. I do not believe the Under Secretary can perform this demanding role and also give the necessary sustained attention to the management job I am proposing.

The Mann vacancy provides an opportunity to restructure the assignment as recommended herein and to find the right man to fill it. No legislation would be needed.

I believe the recommended assignment backed by the right staff and procedures would contribute materially to

--clearer and earlier identification of objectives and requirements in countries;

--more effective planning and execution of agency programs to meet total U.S. interest in a country, especially in insurgency and other crisis situations;

--better management of foreign affairs personnel, a critical resource, to improve quality and utilization among agencies;

--more effective operations at least cost, by eliminating lower priority activities and consolidating administrative support;

--reductions in the number of people abroad.

I believe that this proposal would be well received in the Congress and strongly supported in the executive branch. I recommend

--that you discuss it with Secretary Rusk and request him to plan for a restructuring of assignments;

--that the proposed assignment be the basis for selecting the Mann replacement.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Schultze signed the original.

During a telephone conversation with Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that began at 7:50 p.m. on August 11, 1966, President Johnson discussed the appointment of an Under Secretary of State and reviewed a number of possible candidates. Among the President's comments was the following: "This man has got to rejuvenate that Department like you have brought in at Justice-all different new men, young men, competent men, quiet men that don't spend all their time leaking but a good deal of it working. And then I've got to have somebody that's got some judgment. You have no idea how taxing and depressing it is to me-it just nearly breaks my spirit every day. If I have a conversation with the Secretary the damn thing is leaked and it's in the paper, and it's twisted. They just got no morale over there, and they got no imagination. They got no initiative. They got no ideas. You have to ask four or five times to get a report. I called you today on this thing, told you to look into two angles of it. Now I got my report and I can go on home. Sometimes I call four or five times to get things over there, and it's a serious thing."

Katzenbach indicated that he would be willing to undertake the position. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Katzenbach, Tape 66.21, Side A, PNO 1)

During a telephone conversation that began at 10 a.m. on August 24, President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk had the following exchange regarding the appointment of an Under Secretary of State:

President: "I'll tell you the most interesting possibility that we have had, aside from the Vance thing, which I kind of want to use as a fallback, kind of like you said about Bunker. We have Vance, for a while anyway, and we wouldn't have him very long over there, but we may need him as a fallback if we are unable to interest anyone else, under the circumstances. Now it looks to me like the best prospect we have-but I don't just know whether to gamble on the cities and the riots and everything else-would be Katzenbach."

Rusk: "Um-hm. Um-hm. Well as you know I'd be tremendously interested in him."

President: "I just think he'd be the best because everything he does he seems to do so well." (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.21, Side B, PNO 1) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.