U.S. Department of State

Washington, September 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 105. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert G. Cox of the White House staff. (Memorandum from Cox to Macy, September 1; ibid., Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-General-1966) It was handed to President Johnson by Macy during their meeting on September 1. (Memorandum from Macy to the President, September 19; ibid.) The paper indicates that the President saw it. Under cover of a September 19 memorandum, 2 days before Johnson announced his appointments to the three posts, Macy forwarded to the President a second list of suggestions consisting of 6 teams. Macy explained that the list was "based on the same general assumptions but with suggested names from outside of the government." (Ibid.)

Alternative Teams to Fill the Top Sub-Cabinet Positions in the State Department

1. Dean Rusk will remain Secretary of State for the foreseeable future.

2. The Under Secretary--Ball's replacement--will function as his alter ego and the principal coordinator of inter-agency efforts abroad.

3. The Under Secretary for Political (or Economic) Affairs--Mann's replacement--will be the principal management officer of the Department, the general supervisor of the regional and functional Assistant Secretaries and the administrative programs. He will be assisted by the two Deputy Under Secretaries.

4. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political (or Economic) Affairs--Alex Johnson's replacement--will be the direct supervisor of the regional and functional Assistant Secretaries. He will be the Department's principal director of substantive processes, including program planning, intelligence, politico-military affairs, and economic policy.

5. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration--Crockett or his replacement--will be the principal supervisor of administrative processes, including budgeting, personnel, inspections, communications, and logistics.

6. Since Secretary Rusk will remain, vacancies in the number 2, 3, and 4 jobs will probably be filled partly or entirely from inside the Government.

/2/Attached but not printed.

TEAM I

Specific assumption. The President wants to select a Rusk team, one that presents no problem of relationships with an heir-apparent, and one that has a strong link to the Defense establishment.

Ellsworth Bunker, Under Secretary.

Lucius D. Battle, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

John T. McNaughton, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

TEAM II

Specific assumption. The President wants a team that can bring maximum focus to our international politico-military affairs, that can work with Defense to bring the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion.

Cyrus R. Vance, Under Secretary.

William P. Bundy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (since 1961, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs).

TEAM III

Specific assumption. The President wants a team that can develop and implement a series of imaginative foreign policy initiatives, with emphasis on our relationships with the underdeveloped world-systematically putting to work our accumulated experience in economic aid, counter-insurgency, and military assistance as a single package of coordinated programs.

Paul H. Nitze, Under Secretary.

Ralph A. Dungan, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Alternate: James W. Clark, now Chief of Budget Bureau International Division.

Anthony M. Solomon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

TEAM IV

Specific assumption. The President wants to emphasize the continuity between his foreign policy and that of previous Administrations, using a prominent Texas diplomat, a Kennedy aide, and a seasoned Foreign Service officer.

George C. McGhee, Under Secretary.

Ralph A. Dungan, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic (or Political) Affairs.

TEAM V

Specific assumption. The President wants to appoint a team of mature professionals, men who understand the art of diplomacy and the world of politics.

W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary.

Ellsworth Bunker, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Alternate: Samuel D. Berger (former Ambassador to Korea, now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East).

Philip H. Trezise, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

TEAM VI

Specific assumption. The President wants to rejuvenate the State Department by appointing a team of young, dynamic activists who are compatible with Secretary Rusk and can build the kind of solid, responsive staff support that Rusk, as senior diplomatist and foreign policy advisor, needs.

Lucius D. Battle (age 48), Under Secretary.

William P. Bundy (49), Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

James W. Clark (43), Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Washington, September 13, 1966, 11:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Handwritten notations on the memorandum include the following: "recd 9/13/66, 12:17 p"; "from Pres' desk, 12/26/68"; and "From the President's middle desk drawer, 12/27/68."

/2/Presumably (see numbered paragraphs 4 and 5) the President proposed to McPherson appointing William Bundy, Lucius Battle, Edward Korry, and Cyrus Vance to top positions in the Department of State. The President may have presented the proposals to McPherson during one or more of their three telephone conversations on September 12. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Bundy, Battle, and Vance were all included in the alternative teams proposed to Johnson by Macy on September 1 (see Document 91).

1) They are all exceedingly competent. They are sharp and quick to the point of impatience with those who are not so quick.

2) They are all pros. They would move into their new positions without the need for handbooks on government organization.

3) They all support your policies in the areas of their competence.

4) Not one of them is identified with U.S.-European policy, U.S.-Soviet relations, or U.S.-U.K. relations. Bundy is exclusively Asia-oriented. Battle has been in Egypt, Korry in Africa. Cy has worked 5-1/2 years for a Department whose overwhelming concern (despite NATO policy problems and armament sales to Europe) has been Vietnam. I do not mean to suggest that they will be unable to master the problems of U.S.-European relations in time. But they lack extensive experience in the field now, and some editorial writers and columnists are bound to mark the absence of a senior man who knows the Common Market, pound, and NATO problems. A lot of people think diplomatic relations with Europe are the only ones that count. We don't think so; we are re-orienting our foreign policy interests toward Asia, and that is all to the good; but Europe cannot be ignored. It is infinitely more powerful and important than Asia, and will be for a long time to come. I am sure Cy is as smart as George Ball, and I am sure he will prove his equal in comprehension of Europe, given time. But as neither he, nor the other top appointees have a background of dealing with European problems, there will be a short-term gap, and we can depend on the European diplomatic circuit here to point it out to correspondents.

5) Finally, not one of the new appointments has a reputation for unorthodox thinking, or indeed for challenging the "conventional wisdom." I do not mean there should be a house pacifist on the seventh floor at State. But perhaps there ought to be somebody (or there ought to be thought to be somebody) who says "no" on occasion. Ball's reputation for doing this, deserved or not, was in my judgment a great asset to you. It made the doves feel their case was being made to you, and that even if you did not agree, the advice you received on the issues of war and peace did not come out of an IBM machine labeled Rusk Monolithic. Cy, Bill Bundy, and Luke Battle are able men with strong minds, but they are certainly not known for their tendency to dissent on policy. They are very, very, damned competent organization men. Do you need them, in order to show that all arguments on Vietnam are over and the only questions now are about how to beat China and the North? Maybe so. But coupled with a Secretary who almost is that policy himself, physically and intellectually, they will not seem to bring much intellectual ferment to a place that (whatever one feels about our foreign policy successes of recent months) needs a frequent shaking upside down by the heels so that all its blood does not go to its tail. Several officers in the lower echelons of State, several university people who deal with the Department, and a number of journalists who observe it say that it is like a morgue over there; in the language of the day, nothing's "happening." The possibility of something unorthodox, daring, and true, being said or done, seems quite remote. After these very intelligent men are appointed, I am afraid it will continue to seem so.

That may not be unfortunate. I rather think it is. In any event it seems sure that this choice--the benefits of quiet competence versus those of unorthodox imaginativeness--is involved in the new appointments.

Harry

Washington, September 16, 1966, 10:18 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.24, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. relations with the Philippines and China.]

President: I'm told that all the writers are getting ready to mob us because we don't--that you're basically oriented towards the Pacific area and other parts of the world instead of Western Europe, and the Jews and all of them think we're going to hell over there, and NATO and Lippmann and Fulbright and Mansfield--we're too much Asia. So we ought to have somebody in here that can kind of be known as Ball has been as the European man. Now I don't know we take this but we got to think about it. I thought about it a good deal yesterday. Do you think this might be a good combination? Consider the Katzenbach.

Rusk: Uh huh.

President: Number three: Rostow, Gene.

Rusk: Uh huh.

President: That would put two of you above him, and Katzenbach thinks very highly of him. He says he thinks this other story is exaggerated about his being too impulsive. Said he does have ideas and said we ought to be having ideas.

Rusk: Right.

President: And we need someone like that. He thinks he's very good. Said he ran a hell of a good law school.

Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh.

President: And, Kohler, if for no other reason, to give us some fresh--for the Alex Johnson thing--give us a fresh voice in there that's kind of in the Moscow. Then we might see if we couldn't shift Lodge to Paris, and Westmoreland to Vietnam, and Bohlen to Moscow, if he'd go there for a year or two. He's a very perceptive fellow and a hell of a good reporter and very experienced and I think that this crowd here that wants to play with Moscow so much is a little bit down on Kohler, and Kohler--I was quite impressed with him during the Berlin problem and I think he's a pretty good workhorse in that job. Defense likes him, CIA likes him, you like him. I think then, if we could take Katzenbach and Rostow and Kohler and then look for the good Hill man. If we can't find a good aggressive one that can make some headway, we might ought to give some thought to that fellow that married your secretary under the Republicans and check him out with Bill Fulbright again--

Rusk: Macomber?

President: Yep. [Inaudible] Somebody told me, some senator, that they considered him very good.

Rusk: Very quiet and very effective.

President: We might give thought to that. Now, what is wrong with this combination, as you see it, of Katzenbach, Rostow, and Kohler?

Rusk: Well, I'm very enthusiastic about Katzenbach. And, the sooner we could do that, the happier I would be. The Gene Rostow name, I think the only really negative comment I've had on that was from Dean Acheson, who feels that he's unpredictable and sort of unmanageable--that he had worked with Rostow before. I think it's Rostow's views about De Gaulle that has bothered Dean most of all. But--

President: What are his views on De Gaulle?

Rusk: Well, he seems to be pretty strong pro-De Gaulle, and thinks that we ought to follow the De Gaulle line, at least he's indicated that privately. But he'll take policy guidance on things like that. No, I think this is a combination. I wouldn't do the Lodge--Westmoreland thing right away. Kohler will be here within the next couple of days to be here for my talks with Gromyko, and I'll have a chance to talk about that with him. He was a little reluctant at the beginning, but now that he's been confirmed as a Career Ambassador, I think he'd probably be more relaxed.

President: He agreed to, though, didn't he?

Rusk: Well, he did agree if we wanted him to but he was a little resistant on it. However I don't think that will be a problem and he certainly is a superb operator as far as moving the papers through and staff work and things of that sort. He's a very efficient guy; one of the best organized men I know. We could run into a little flak. I think it's pretty much in the background of that incident about twenty years ago--about losing some secret papers. But I doubt that Bill Fulbright and Mansfield will be very enthusiastic about him.

President: No, they're not. But they thought he ran a poor embassy. But I think down in that spot, the fact that they've got somebody that's not just Vietnam in it, would give them a little hope.

Rusk: Right. And he certainly ran a very efficient Bureau of European Affairs when he was here in the Department.

President: That's what I'm told. Everybody tells me that, so, then you would consider favorably Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Macomber if we could work it out?

Rusk: Yes, yes I would.

President: Have you ever had any contact with Gene Rostow?

Rusk: No, I don't know him well. I've met him two or three times.

President: I wonder why you don't call him and ask him to come down to see you and just say--

Rusk: All right.

President: Now, somebody tells me that Ball has been urging him for number-two place and tells him that he's his choice to succeed him and stuff like that. That may upset him. But you might just say that you believe the President has made a commitment--

Rusk: Right.

President: Has some obligations to this other, but you would like to talk to him about his views and tell him you think it's very essential that men come in here like they go to Vietnam, and make a real pitch to him, and then if it looks good, call me and then I'll see tomorrow--

Rusk: [inaudible] Fine, let me get hold of him.

During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Walt Rostow that began at 5:39 p.m. on September 17, 1966, the following comments were made:

President: "I don't want a human to know this, but what I'm trying to do, I've made arrangements some time ago, if it works out, for Nick [Katzenbach] to resign as Attorney General and go in Ball's place and do most of the work up there testifying and just take on the committee. He's the best I've seen in the government for the Congress, and he wants Gene [Rostow] over there to handle Europe and handle a lot of other things, and he's the strongest man for him. I think that will relieve Rusk of a lot of the testifying, and I don't think he does that as well as he does other things in my judgment. I think Nick's the best we have in this government in that field. I don't know what the hell I'll do at Justice, but I've watched him handle these civil rights and I've watched him handle Jim Eastland and I've watched him handle Bill Fulbright and I've watched him handle all of them, and he's the best man on the Hill that we've got in the Cabinet, and then I think that puts all of them on a pretty high level when a Cabinet officer leaves the Cabinet to come into the State Department."

Later in the same conversation:

President: "Well, am I wrong in your judgment? Do you know anybody better in this town to take on these people than Nick?"

Rostow: "No, I really don't. He's sat in on a lot of foreign policy. He'll pick the issues up fast."

President: "But what I'm talking about--yes, that too--but I think that the issues and things, I think Dean and Gene can work on those a whole lot. But I think all this hell-raising every day about clearing these damn treaties and about discussing these things with Thailand with Fulbright, that's where our trouble's coming from, Walt."

Rostow: "Well, the one thing I'd say, sir, is that you mustn't expect the best lawyer we can send up there to make Fulbright happy."

President: "No, but I think that he can keep us out of trouble more than anybody--"

Rostow: "I think that's right."

President: "And I think they won't regard him as a great big hawk."

Rostow: "I think that's right."

President: "Mansfield told me he considered him one of the ablest men he'd ever talked to."

Rostow: "That's a good start. [inaudible] a new approach up there. I don't despair of anyone up there, really."

President: "Dean's a scholar and able man, and he didn't like to go up and waller around with those folks. Nick don't mind it much. Nick told me, he said that 'I just decided one thing, that they said I was a professor of international law, and I was a little sensitive about it. I just decided, by god, I wanted to show 'em I could get along with Jim Eastland.'"

Rostow: "That's what you've gotta do."

President: "That's what he told me. He said, 'I wanted to prove that I could do that to them.' And I think that's one of the important things about whether we save this situation or not, is whether we can keep those fellows on board a little bit. Don't you?"

Rostow: "Oh you bet. There's no doubt. And this is exactly, I think, all that Hanoi's got going for it--the possibility that we [inaudible], so that this is not just normal politics. This is fightin' war. So I just look forward to this." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Walt Rostow, Tape 66.24, Side B, PNO 2) The portions of the conversation printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Washington, September 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, FAPS. Secret.

SUBJECT
Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS)

REFERENCE
Letter from Deputy Under Secretary Crockett Requesting CIA Comments 2

/2/Attached but not printed.

2. Background:

FAPS represents a renewed effort by the Department of State to devise an overall program review system for foreign affairs agencies. It is a departure from the earlier effort known as the Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS) and the pilot scheme that evolved from it, i.e., the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), in that whereas State and BOB shared the sponsorship of the earlier effort, State itself appears to be carrying the principal burden on FAPS. Our involvement in the EROP exercise was basically counter-productive, a view that was shared by BOB. State was so advised, albeit in rather low key, at its conclusion in the fall of 1965.

3. The new factor present in FAPS that was absent in the CCPS/EROP effort is NSAM 341. It is the principal peg on which State will hang its renewed efforts to coordinate foreign affairs programming.

/3/Approved July 26, 1947; for text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 131-135.

/4/NSC Directive 5412/2, December 28, 1955. For text, see William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 146-149.

5. Alternate Courses of Action:

There are several ways in which we might respond to Mr. Crockett's letter:

a. ignore it;

b. prepare a response which indirectly, and by implication, begins to make a case for exemption of CIA from full participation in FAPS; this response would not make reference to exemption per se, but would merely cite the recognition in the NSAM of the special status of the intelligence community and the existing procedures for policy guidance and review;

c. request exemption for CIA in clear and unmistakable terms, either in a response to Mr. Crockett's letter or in a conversation by you with Mr. Crockett or between the Director and Secretary Rusk.

/5/Not attached. For White's reply to Crockett, see Document 97.

6. Comment:

We should not ignore the letter since it raises the fundamental issue of whether CIA identifies its activities and programs as "interdepartmental" and thereby makes them subject to FAPS review, or not "interdepartmental" and therefore to be excluded from FAPS review. It was something of a surprise for us to see this issue trotted out so early in the game. Given the fact that the Inter-Agency Group has met only once, and then only perfunctorily, it is difficult to predict with any certainty what the conceptual basis will be for a FAPS. The publication in early October of the "Hitch Report" will give us a better reading on what program review in a FAPS will involve. Our best estimate, based primarily on our interpretation of the deliberations of the two-day Inter-Agency working group held in mid-August in Easton, is that Mr. Crockett will try to have the Inter-Agency Group adopt proposals to establish an institutionalized staff program review capability under each regional Assistant Secretary of State.

Under the circumstances, the Director may find it impolitic to declare for CIA exemption in unequivocal terms at this time, in which event we should respond by indirection and thus retain our options on the manner and extent of our participation.

7. Mr. [name not declassified] has worked with John Bross, Larry Houston, and [name not declassified] in developing an Agency position. They have concurred in the attached reply.

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates FitzGerald signed the original.

At a news conference on September 21, 1966, President Johnson announced that he would appoint Nicholas Katzenbach to replace George Ball as Under Secretary of State. He also announced that he would appoint Eugene Rostow Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Foy Kohler Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, replacing U. Alexis Johnson. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 1045-1052. Appointed Under Secretary on September 30, Katzenbach entered on duty October 3 and served until January 20, 1969. The President made the Rostow and Kohler appointments on October 13, the same day he also appointed Ellsworth Bunker Ambassador at Large and Llewellyn Thompson Ambassador to the Soviet Union, replacing Kohler. Rostow entered on duty October 14 and served until January 20, 1969. Kohler entered on duty November 29 and served until December 31, 1967. Bunker entered on duty November 8 and served until April 11, 1967, when he became Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Thompson entered on duty January 23, 1967, and served until January 14, 1969.

Washington, September 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, FAPS. Secret.

Dear Bill:

/2/See Document 95 and footnote 3 thereto.

/3/Document 56.

As you are aware, our collection and covert action programs are discussed regularly in considerable detail with the various regional assistant secretaries throughout the year. These briefings are designed to ensure that these programs are not only responsive to U.S. policy needs but also compatible with other ongoing programs conducted by the Department of State or other agencies over which the Department of State has some cognizance. Similar comprehensive briefings are given by our Chiefs of Station to Ambassadors. As you will recall from the EROP of last year, these evoked very favorable comments from them. Additionally, significant covert action programs and activities are reviewed in great detail by the 303 Committee. Our programs are also given detailed review by the Bureau of the Budget. Other procedures and forums for policy guidance or review, such as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), similarly provide opportunities for review of our programs.

Concern for the protection of sensitive CIA overseas activities and programs is a continuing one. Indeed, this concern was the basis for the decision to create the 303 Committee and its predecessor, the Special Group.

Since the conceptual basis for a Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS) has not yet been established, I think it would serve no useful purpose for the Agency to go into the matter of defining what is or is not "interdepartmental" at this time. We note in this connection that the special status of the Intelligence Community was recognized in numbered paragraph 1 of NSAM 341. We would therefore prefer to withhold comment on the manner and degree to CIA participation in a FAPS until we have an opportunity to examine the concept and the concrete proposals flowing from it that may be generated by the Inter-Agency Group and the Hitch Advisory Group.

Sincerely,

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates White signed the original.

In a March 29, 1966, memorandum to the President, General Taylor proposed that implementation of NSAM 341 be reviewed about September 1. The President indicated that Taylor should raise the issue again in about three months. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Papers Relating to NSAM 341, Box 63, Folder E) Taylor next raised the issue in an October 3 memorandum to the President, stating that with the appointment of Nicholas Katzenbach as Under Secretary of State it would be "timely and helpful" to start the review soon in order to make the results available for Katzenbach's guidance. "Also, it would be timely to estimate the strength of this organization as State is presently considering the possibility of superimposing on it the planning, programming and budgeting of overseas activities." The President directed Walt Rostow to ask Katzenbach how he felt about it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341) Katzenbach proposed to Rostow that Taylor's review take place in November, but, according to a memorandum of Rostow's telephone conversation with Secretary of State Rusk on October 13, Rusk indicated that he "thought Nick and Gene Rostow and Kohler and Sec should have a crack at that ourselves first." Taylor's review was put on hold. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1)

Washington, November 3, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Hitch. Unclassified; Nodis.

SUBJECT
The Hitch Committee Report

/2/Both attached, only the letter is printed. Hitch met with Rusk on October 13 and presented a copy of his committee's report. In a briefing memorandum for Rusk's meeting with Hitch, October 13, Read recommended that Rusk get Katzenbach's views before agreeing to the report's recommendations. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1) In an October 20 memorandum for the record, [name not declassified] reported on a conversation with Robert Bonham on October 18, during which Bonham stated that, "as he understood it," Hitch considered his meeting with Rusk a "very successful one." Rusk "apparently had understood the thrust of the Hitch Report, appreciated the ins and outs of the problem and was prepared to act personally at an early opportunity to implement the recommendations in the report." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, FAPS)

I would, however, express two hesitations:

1. Making all due allowances for the fact that programmers talk in an alien tongue, I would have hoped for a report which was more illustrative, if only in a hypothetical way, to us laymen. And I would have hoped for something rather more elaborative. I suspect any decision to go ahead would have to be grounded in large measure on faith--and I am prepared to offer that faith now--but I would be more comfortable if there were some narrowing of the theological gap.

(This is said principally on the basis of the covering letter and not from the appended questions and answers. The questions evidently were intended by the Bureau of the Budget to be taken more seriously as a prod than for intrinsic interrogative purposes and it would be either unfair or irrelevant to gauge the committee recommendations on the basis of the answers it has contrived to a list of questions which appears to be, by and large, redundant and imprecise.)

/3/Merchant's involvement in the Hitch Committee is discussed in a September 29 note to Hitch from Fisher Howe, who had "talked at some length" with Merchant about the issue, telling him that his signature on the report was of critical importance to its acceptance among Foreign Service officers. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Hitch Committee File-Binder of Comments on Draft, Box 70, Folder C)

Neither of these hesitations is meant to diminish in the slightest my strong favorable inclination to the committee recommendations; it's just that I would like to know a bit more.

In summary:

1. I recommend, that we accept the recommendations of the committee in principle and tentatively agree to:

a. Move ahead immediately with the pilot installation visualized in paragraph 3 of the covering letter (especially in an effort to begin affecting the PPB plans of other relevant agencies before they are cast in concrete);

b. Organize the program, as the committee recommends, within the terms of NASM 341--that is, through the SIG-IRG mechanisms;

c. Provide the degree of high-level attention which the committee believes is mandatory by avoiding the creation of still another management or planning body in the O area, but instead by attaching it directly to my office to operate in concert with the SIG;

d. Begin seeking, immediately, a systems analyst of exceptional sophistication and skill--even Mr. Hitch if that is conceivable--to serve as the architect of the program and support him with whatever staff is necessary.

/4/Not found.

Preferably, this would be done with minimum technical language and might take the form of a step-by-step description of how the system would apply to a specific real or hypothetical decision.

I would strongly urge that the preparation of this paper not be permitted to derail our concern and that it be done as promptly as possible--within two weeks, if that is practical.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

/5/No classification marking.

Washington, October 5, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are pleased to submit the first report of your Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting.

We believe that a well designed programming system, including the necessary program planning and analysis, can provide you with a major tool for carrying out your responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of the foreign affairs activities of the U.S. Government. While a great deal of careful, step-by-step development will be needed, we see no technical obstacle to an integrated programming system within the federal government that will meet your requirements in the management of foreign affairs, while adequately providing for the diverse needs of other agency heads as well. In addition, we should like to offer a general recommendation that the State Department exercise the role in the U.S. foreign affairs community envisioned in NSAM 341 by assuming leadership in the early establishment of an integrated foreign affairs programming system.

/6/Documentation of the committee's activities, including background papers and comments by committee members on drafts of the report, are at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 70.

/7/Schultze's letter defined the "several major issues" in terms of ten questions and proposed that the Hitch Committee address them. Schultze stated that the principal issue, in his judgment, was "the relationship between the Secretary of State's needs and those of other agency heads in carrying out their respective responsibilities for management and program decisions." (Ibid., Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs, Planning, Programming & Budgeting, Box 70, Folder A)

/8/The attachment, Discussion and Recommendations on The Ten Questions Concerning The Foreign Affairs Programming System, is not printed.

In addition, we should like to offer the following suggestions as to the next steps to be taken following your decision to proceed with the establishment of a foreign affairs planning, programming, and budgeting system.

1. We believe that the key initial step to the successful installation of such a system is the selection of a qualified Director to develop the kind of professional analytic capability required and to guide the early evolution of the system. He should be placed at the head of a staff of analysts and programmers in the immediate office of the Under Secretary of State, who serves also as the executive chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

2. The development of the system should be an inter-agency effort under State leadership within the framework of the Government-wide requirements defined by the Bureau of the Budget. The other foreign affairs agencies should be solicited for inputs to the final system design. A start in this direction has been made through the several meetings of the Inter-Agency Working Group.

3. We have studied alternative schedules for installation of the system. One doctrine suggests a thorough, relatively slow approach hopefully requiring little future modification of the system once it is established. Another view stresses the desirability of sustaining the present momentum and the value of early application to the FY 69 budget review. We recommend the latter approach, and we further recommend that an actual pilot installation of the system (not a trial run) be made in at least one region, such as Latin America or Africa, as part of the FY 69 budget cycle. Included should be the preparation of program memoranda on specific countries and the region as a whole. Because of time constraints, work on this pilot installation should be started immediately.

4. We see the need for several simultaneous efforts of a technical nature, including (a) identification for inclusion in the system of those activities of the federal government whose primary function is the support of foreign affairs; (b) development of an integrated foreign affairs program structure; and (c) preparation of a detailed, time-phased development plan for the installation of the system.

5. To explore the question of how best to establish a management system of this kind in the foreign affairs environment, we have asked Dr. Chris Argyris to head a special subcommittee of the Advisory Group. He will study and report on a number of facets of this subject, including the need for training programs and seminars and ways to minimize internal resistances and generate positive support.

While the management of the technical tasks can and must be the responsibility of permanent staffs, we are willing to continue to serve in an advisory capacity if you so desire. The Advisory Group believes that it can usefully continue its examination of some of the foregoing matters, the problems assigned to Dr. Argyris' subcommittee, and other issues that are likely to develop as you proceed with the development of the system.

We fully realize that the tasks that lie ahead will not be easy. Accomplishing them will require the combined efforts of the major foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget. We feel that personal participation and involvement by you and your principal deputies is essential to achieve this objective, particularly to ensure cooperation of other agencies with the State Department. Indeed, we believe it important to emphasize that, contrary to widespread misunderstanding, the effective use of the programming instrument is not a simple administrative matter but calls for the most penetrating understanding of foreign policy and the foreign affairs process. It will challenge the most competent officers of the Department and Foreign Service. Your Advisory Group believes that it is worth the effort and that an integrated foreign affairs programming system can be a most useful tool in achieving the objectives of NSAM 341.

We want to express our pleasure in having the opportunity to be of assistance to you on this vital and urgent matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles J. Hitch, Chairman

Chris Argyris

David E. Bell

Stewart P. Blake

Ellsworth Bunker

John Diebold

Alain Enthoven

Rensis Likert

Frederick C. Mosher

Henry S. Rowen

Maxwell D. Taylor

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Davis forwarded the memorandum to Cater under cover of an undated note stating, "This is a non-memo." Under cover of a November 10 memorandum, Cater forwarded Davis' memorandum to Moyers, indicating that Davis had prepared it at Cater's suggestion after discussing "the problem of innovation in the State Department and, particularly, revitalization of the foreign services." Cater asked Moyers if the memorandum was "worthy of pursuit with the President?" There is no indication that it was brought to the President's attention.

A KATZENBACH COMMITTEE FOR INNOVATION AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

It is said that there are old bureaucrats and bold bureaucrats, but no old, bold bureaucrats. Some unkind soul has suggested that a foreign service officer experiences a change of life at 27. Fair or not, the State Department is the object of constant criticism for rigidity, conservatism, and pedestrianism. This is an increasing political problem for the Administration.

The new team of Katzenbach, Rostow and Kohler is an opportunity for initiative. Katzenbach has already shown interest in administering the Department, and in the people who work there. He is a fresh outsider, with a lot of prestige.

Katzenbach might assemble around himself a small staff or working group to examine ways to encourage initiative and innovation. A committee which included some bright outsiders, willing to devote full time to the project, might also be considered. Still further afield, foundation or other professional assistance might be invited. (For example, the newly formed Arthur Vining Davis Foundation is investigating how institutions can "stay young." It might be willing to put up a sum of private money to help in such a project.)

Regardless of structure, it would be important to have the new State team, plus Crockett, directly and responsibly involved.

The project might look for institutional levers to redirect the Department toward greater innovation, imagination, creativity, and freedom of constructive dissent. The key is people and attitude. Exhortation is not enough. Possible levers:

Promotion: Could the Performance Rating Report be revised to force the rating officer to expose the good, decent, ingratiating, dependable, conscientious officer as being no more? "Accuracy" and "dependability" are among the qualities listed for rating on the form. "Readiness to dissent" and "Innovations this officer has been responsible for" are not. The man of great peaks-and-valleys suffers in competition with the smooth, round stone. Besides the ratings, promotion process can be influenced through precepts to the promotion boards, instructions to foreign service inspectors, etc.

Assignments: It has been said of the Foreign Service that promotions are based on a man's dossier and assignments on his reputation. The assignment of men to jobs is a second key lever for redirecting the spirit and thrust of the Department. With determination and high-level support, personnel assignment policies could be enforced which would encourage innovation.

The Inspection System: The Katzenbach project might consider divorcing the inspection system from the regular Service. The senior inspector knows that in a few years he may be dependent on the goodwill of the Ambassador he is inspecting. Conversely, the inspector may simply be the grizzled old dog about to retire.

The Role of the Policy Planning Staff: Can its creative role be enhanced?

Non-Institutional Devices: A look at the devices worked out by the White House might provide some ideas--such as the confidential task forces. At the White House, speech writing is a major instrument of policy innovation.

The Clearance Process: The labyrinthine clearance process at State needs review. Perhaps advisory clearances, with authority to override vested in a country director, would be worth examining. Is there any way that the blocking of a cable in clearance can be made more onerous? Can the institutional odds be shifted, ever so slightly, against the inaction compromise?

The Career-Non-Career Ratio: Some jobs are too much a career preserve (e.g. the geographic desks) and some are probably not enough so (a year or two ago the Congressional relations staff had not a single Foreign Service Officer). The Foreign Service is too much shielded from the Congress, the press and the pressure groups. Assignment of Foreign Service Officers to other agencies--Defense, Commerce, AID, the Peace Corps, etc.--can only be made ineffective if the best officers are assigned and clearly rewarded for that service.

Rand: Rand may not be the answer for the State Department, but non-official satellite organizations of that general type might be explored.

These are only a few possibilities. Katzenbach and his men could do far better if they give the project some attention, determination, and time.

On November 18, 1966, James Marsh of John W. Macy, Jr.'s Staff telephoned Warren Christopher, lawyer and State Department consult-ant, to "ascertain under what circumstances and for what types of positions he would be available." When asked about the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, which William Crockett was expected to vacate soon, Christopher responded as follows, according to Marsh's memorandum for the record: "He said that, given the present leadership of the State Department, it was difficult to see how anyone could handle that post successfully. He believes that until the leadership at State (the Secretary and the Under Secretaries) is ready to correct the shortcoming of the Foreign Service, both as an instrument of policy and as a career system, no Deputy Under Secretary will be able to carry out his duties effectively. Further, Christopher stated that he was not convinced that the recent State Department appointments indicate any disposition by the President to see that these problems are faced." (Johnson Library, Office Files of John Macy, Box 693, State-General-1966)

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-R01580R, SIG. Secret. The report was forwarded to Helms by Clandestine Services Special Group Officer [name not declassified] under cover of a memorandum dated November 25, 1966. (Ibid.)

/2/Attached are memoranda from five CS Division Chiefs and the Deputy Director of Current Intelligence.

2. With regard to CIA--The IRGs have not been used, nor are they considered a proper body for the discussion of CIA operations. Nor are they used as substitutes for the weekly meetings with the regional Assistant Secretaries. The IRGs are, however, considered a unique forum where relevant intelligence can be brought to the attention of the policy-makers--particularly that intelligence dealing with communist penetration and subversion. Moreover, the IRGs keep the CS Division Chiefs informed on regional situations and USG operational problems, permitting CIA to identify, in broad terms, requirements and policy support for covert action proposals and to target its operations more selectively. Further, the IRGs provide CIA with a formal representation at a reasonable level in the councils where inter-agency problems and some foreign policy questions are reviewed.

3. In general--The IRGs are believed to be a useful instrument for the consideration of inter-agency problems and some short-term foreign policy problems. There is recognition that there are limits to what the IRGs can accomplish and that they cannot usurp the policy-making responsibility of the Department of State. At a minimum, however, problems considered by the IRGs--even those without measurable results--are believed to be better understood by the members as a result of the IRG discussions.

/3/No classification marking.

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Implementation in the Near East and South Asia of NSAM 341 Creating the SIG and the IRG

/4/Not found.

1. In terms of theory of organization and management, NSAM 341 offers a solution that is significantly better than any of the arrangements which have been used since WW II. In both intelligence and counterinsurgency matters it offers a distinctly advantageous arrangement for the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Role of the Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG)

a. In theory the IRG offers CIA:

(1) official representation at the regional level in USG foreign policy councils.

(2) a forum, a mechanism and the occasion (IRG meeting) to place before the IRG relevant intelligence.

(3) a forum for the timely consideration of evidence of communist subversion and penetration of friendly or neutral countries.

(4) an appropriate forum at the right level of the USG for consideration of The U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Program, i.e., counterinsurgency measures.

(5) a mechanism which permits and encourages a closer integration of the intelligence function into the formulation of foreign policy.

b. In practice, the IRG/NEA has:

(1) been the forum in which every significant short-term policy problem in the Near East and South Asia has been considered since the issuance of NSAM 341.

(2) provided a forum--unique in my ten years as a Division Chief of the Clandestine Services--for focusing the attention of policy makers on available relevant intelligence.

(3) provided CIA official representation in the policy-making councils for the Near East and South Asia.

(4) provided the Departments and Agencies represented on the IRG/NEA with an official channel for taking the initiative in proposing to the Assistant Secretary of State timely consideration of specific problems.

(5) provided a forum in which the CS Division Chief can establish, in broad terms, the existence of requirements and policy support for covert action proposal separately submitted to the 303 Committee. (Covert action operations and sensitive intelligence matters such as "facilities" have been alluded to but not discussed in IRG/NEA.)

3. NSAM 341 has, as a by-product, stimulated a high degree of cooperation between the CS Division Chief, who represents the Agency, and the elements of the Agency responsible for intelligence production. I am confident this can evolve into an effective arrangement, at the regional level, for ensuring that intelligence production is efficiently geared to policy making. It is inevitable that CIA will present, as we gain experience with the IRG, more integrated intelligence appraisals to the policy-makers.

4. We have not yet evolved within CIA an adequate arrangement for relating IRG activity to that of the SIG. This is partly attributable to the fact that NSAM 341 has not, at the SIG level, been vigorously implemented.

5. I am aware that the implementation of NSAM 341 has varied greatly in the different regions. Also, I have the impression that my decidedly positive views on the theory and practice of the provisions of NSAM 341 are not fully shared by my colleagues. I do, however, feel strongly that CIA, as an organization, can benefit by participation in and support of this organizational arrangement. If for no other reason, the IRG seems to me the proper customer for intelligence dealing with communist penetration, subversion, covert political and paramilitary actions and potential limited wars--the particular mission given the IRG in the final two paragraphs of NSAM 341.

James H. Critchfield

/5/Secret.

Washington, November 16, 1966.

SUBJECT
The Senior Interdepartmental Group

REFERENCE
Memorandum dated 26 October 1966, same subject

1. The undersigned believes that the European IRG is somewhat atypical in that it has only met a half dozen times since its formation. This can be explained in part by the protracted illness of Assistant Secretary Leddy which kept him out of the Department for many months. However, the more fundamental reason is probably the fact that the European IRG cannot function in the same way as other regional IRGs, namely as a decision-taking body.

2. The problems confronting the United States in Europe are in many ways different from those with which we are faced in other parts of the world. Europe is an area of developed cultures generally similar to our own, and for that matter much older than our own. We are allied with most of the governments concerned. There exist economic relationships in depth and in several instances the nationalities or groups of nationalities constitute important political minorities in the United States. The senior officials of our government are either familiar with the region by indirect exposure or by direct personal travel. Many of the leading European politicians and officials are personally broadly acquainted in Washington at the senior levels of our government. The European area is militarily stable, the United States maintains major military elements there and enjoys military base rights which are critical to U.S. national security.

3. Given the above circumstances, there are very few problems arising which require interdepartmental coordination and which at the same time are subject to the decision-making process or even the advisory process at as low a level as the Assistant Secretary. Rather, the great majority of significant problems are hammered out by extensive exchanges at the Secretary and Under Secretary level or even by consultation between the Chief Executives involved. Those issues which are left over for possible examination by the European IRG prove more often than not to be highly specialized and of interest to not more than two agencies among the membership of the committee.

4. Accordingly, the European IRG has not constituted an instrumentality assisting the solution of any of EUR Division's problems, nor has it appeared to be either a desirable or effective forum for the tabling of EUR-produced intelligence. Finally, EUR has not been called upon by the group to provide intelligence backup for any matter so far examined by the group. In short, EUR has not found the group a problem, nor has it gained any benefit from it.

[name not declassified]

Washington, November 28, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 1. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
The Hitch Report

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

Bill recommends that (1) we try out a PPBS for FY69 in Latin America, borrow personnel from other agencies after consulting in SIG, and that Mr. Hitch and his group be asked to continue in an advisory capacity. Bill also suggests that all five regional bureaus be canvassed to determine the most appropriate bureau for the initial experiment. I generally agree with these recommendations with the exceptions noted below.

(1) I see no useful purpose to be served by canvassing the regional bureaus on something which to most of them is both mysterious and malevolent, particularly as ARA is the obvious choice.

(2) I think that Mr. Hitch or some part of his committee such as Dr. Argyris should be asked to serve in the capacity of auditors in reserve rather than on a regular basis. In other words, when we have some ideas which would benefit from their counsel, we can ask for it.

/3/Office of the Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett).

(4) I believe it would be useful if we agreed--at least among ourselves in this house--that we are talking about a system which is to encompass only those countries where our relations are dominated by the transfer of U.S. resources. In general such a definition would eliminate Canada, Western and Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Communist China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It seems to me that a system where quantification is a highly important ingredient can usefully be applicable only to the less-developed countries to whom we give some sort of assistance. It is this assistance that can be broken down into programs which in turn, hopefully, can be better controlled by the foreign affairs command in Washington through the proposed FA/PPBS. Nothing I have been able to learn about the PPBS makes me believe that it would be helpful in handling problems such as Britain's chronic foreign exchange deficits, German offset, the reluctance of the Japanese to build up their armed forces, trade with Canada, the loosening of the Warsaw Pact ties, the Kennedy Round, etc. After all, the SIG/IRG system can be an extremely useful device in producing clear cut decisions on interdepartmental problems and disputes whether or not there is an additional system for analyzing and controlling the transfer of U.S. resources abroad.

(5) For the next 12 months it seems to me that the function of any central staff should be to assist ARA with its experiment and to draw conclusions and lessons from that experiment. I would not now set up a central PPBS staff beyond what is already in O to run some world wide machinery which may never come into existence. I do think, however, it is a good idea to borrow a few good personnel from other agencies to help with the ARA experiment.

(6) I do not agree with the belief apparently firmly held in O that country programs must be preceded by a national policy paper for that country. Such documents invariably take too long to produce and just as invariably are filled with statements about "political stability", "orientation to the West", "viable economies", etc. I would simply instruct the Ambassador to state in English prose and in detail the reasons why the United States should give any assistance to his country and to demonstrate how each and every type of assistance in any given amount furthers the interests of the United States. The review, alteration, approval or disapproval of his arguments by the Assistant Secretary or his Regional Group or the SIG or the President would become the policy of the United States toward that country in concrete terms. Further, at the end of the process those American officials could better understand our concrete policy than if they read it in a document with a hard cover.

(7) As a general proposition, and specifically with respect to the ARA FY69 experiment, I would ask the Bureau of the Budget to drop their requirement for a "spring review". Doing so would shorten the time period between the Ambassador's recommendation and Executive Branch final action by about five months and thus bring the Ambassador five months closer to reality.

Washington, December 30, 1966.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, Rpt. on Recent Trips to Eur & Latin Amer Regarding Prospective For Affairs Program-Budgeting. No classification marking. Adams was a management analyst with the FAPS Development Program in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. Adams' report and a similar one by Mosher (Document 113) "received considerable circulation within the Department and in other foreign affairs agencies," according to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, p. 177.

SUBJECT
Report on Recent Trips to Europe and Latin America Regarding Prospective Foreign Affairs Program-Budgeting

/2/Attached but not printed.

The purpose in conducting the interviews was generally to ascertain each Mission's experience with previous programming techniques, the attitudes of the personnel toward future programming efforts and the present methods for coordinating agency activities within the Mission. Particular attention was focused upon the nature of the decision making process implicit in country program development. Paramount consideration in this regard was given to the effect, if any, of NSAM 341.

Two comments seem appropriate on the Findings stated in this memorandum. First, little or no attempt is made to comment upon the Findings or to indicate any responses either Mosher or I made at the time to the statements used in support of the Findings. To have done so would not only unduly lengthen this memorandum but possibly convey the impression that the statements supporting the Findings were either unwarranted in their expression or dispelled by our responses. Whether or not such is the case is not germane. What is important is that the Findings are intended to reflect as accurately as possible whatever attitudes, impressions or statements were conveyed to us, as it is within such a frame of reference that any future foreign affairs programming must be conducted.

Second, more lengthy consideration is accorded the Findings in Latin America than in Europe. This is for two reasons: (i) more Missions were visited and more time was spent in those Missions in Latin America than Europe, affording a greater exposure in depth, and (ii) in terms of future foreign affairs programming, as this memoranda will indicate, Latin America is preeminent.

1. EROP experience was regarded in both Great Britain and Germany as failure, if not a disaster. Universal feeling existed throughout the Missions that in EROP the State Department put Ambassadors in an impossible position--requiring them to recommend curtailments in other agency activities and thereafter failing to support them and their decisions when chips were down. As a result, this exercise defined "programming" in minds of field officers as essentially a mammoth paper, data-collection operation used as an "administrative" device for budget-cutting, but in which the recommended cuts were eventually applied only to State and USIS.

2. Other agencies viewed EROP as solely a State Department exercise to limit other agency presence without an intense and thorough examination and understanding of the activities and programs of the affected agencies. No EROP hearings were conducted by Ambassador in Britain prior to the submission of his recommendations, but agencies were generally advised of Ambassador's recommendations; hearings were held in Germany, but agencies were generally not advised of recommendations. (Germany continues annually with a comparable field review, focused solely on efficiency and without complete CCPS data; CCPS efforts have been dropped entirely in Britain.)

3. Section chiefs and agency representatives in Great Britain found CCPS data of no use in assisting them in their operations, except in isolated cases where data was used to support pre-conceived notions.

4. Because the predominance of other agency activity is primarily not in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives but in service of domestic agency requirements and therefore principally concerned with overseas staffing levels, in Great Britain and France there is no State Department review of other agency program-budget proposals prior to their submission to Washington, except for a limited USIS review of essentially a budgetary and non-programmatic nature. Consequently, while Ambassadors are deeply concerned by the extent of U.S. presence in their countries, they feel unequipped to review program-budgets of other agencies because of insufficient knowledge of domestic agency requirements. This view of the Ambassador's inability to conduct an effective and knowledgeable program review is strongly voiced by the other agency representatives.

5. No Mission was found to be truly integrated with respect to non-State agencies. While widely used locally with reference to the relationship of other agencies to the Embassy, the term "integration" really meant the presence of "coordination" or, more often, "liaison", not State Department direction or management. For example, while in Paris the Office of the Scientific Attach? has reporting to it for coordinating purposes the representatives of NASA, AEC and NIH, no program-budg-et review or management activities with respect to these agencies are undertaken by this Office or the Ambassador. Thus, while coordination or liaison channels are established, other agencies tend to operate generally as independent "fiefdoms" in pursuit of their myriad activities.

6. Ambassadors and ministers feel generally that their primary mission is not to program, direct, and control U.S. operations abroad but to further general U.S. foreign policy objectives, which they consider are not programmable, and to establish and maintain effective relations between the two governments. Only a limited number of officers are directly involved in activities related to this described mission.

7. Any need for and an understanding of programming, i.e., rational relationship of programs and resources to objectives, is virtually absent. Due to the absence of large dollar programs directed toward attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives, no expression of need for programming is found. Consequently, and because of prior experiences, programming is generally identified with data collection, work measurement, efficiency studies, and budget cuts.

8. Most section heads and agency representatives (other than political and some economic officers) felt they could project programs some years in advance, but, because programs were largely of a service or reportorial nature, some were not convinced it would be worthwhile. The most favorable, but guarded, response to programming was where there had been no EROP experience, i.e., France. There a majority of Foreign Service officers interviewed tended to be favorably disposed to "country" versus "agency" programming.

9. There is a present absence of any systematic measurements of effectiveness to determine program composition in substantial non-State agency activities directed at local population. While this was noticeably the case with respect to USIS, it can be attributed also to the activities of USTS and, to a lesser extent, the agricultural and commercial trade fairs.

10. General feeling exists throughout the Missions that the structure of agency appropriations, White House domination and congressional committees is decisive in program budgeting, and that the State Department will never be able to direct foreign affairs programming through NSAM 341 or anything else. Moreover, strong cynicism and skepticism expressed that State Department would ever desire to assert such a leadership role, even if it could.

In the interval between our European and Latin American trips, there had begun to be developed within the Department a new concept of arraying programs against country objectives. While this concept was still in its early stages of development, in our Latin American interviews we sought to solicit responses to this new design. In summary form, this portion of our presentation included the following elements:

(1) Simultaneous submissions of proposed program by agencies to the Ambassador;

(2) Submissions to the Ambassador by agencies of proposed programs in an interagency adopted format which would array all agency proposed programs in common categories against commonly adopted U.S. objectives for that country;

(3) Recommendation by the Ambassador through State Department channels of the total U.S. proposed program within the aggregate agency budget guidance received in the field, but (i) allowing for Ambassadorial re-direction of proposed program composition within the limits of any agency's budget guidance, and (ii) permitting the Ambassador to recommend shifts of resources from one agency's proposed budget request to another agency's to support the total proposed program mix for the country;

(4) Reporting by the agencies through their channels the program composition approved by the Ambassador, first, for regional aggregation by their agencies in preparation for individual agency appropriation requests, and, second, as an appeal channel for agency field exceptions to the Ambassador's recommended program composition; and

(5) Absent a decision in Washington by any concerned agency to present an appeal of an Ambassador's decision on that agency's proposed program and budget to either the appropriate IRG or the SIG, the concerned agency would comply with the Ambassador's position on program composition in development of its appropriations requests.

1. In the two posts which had had CCPS experience, there existed a universal reaction against CCPS-type data. The criticisms generally fell into one of two categories: (i) the data collection excessively focused upon minutiae or (ii) was unrelated to budget dollars and, therefore, of little or no use. The feeling of lack of utility of CCPS data as weighed against the extensive time devoted to its collection, continues today to have an adverse influence upon attitudes toward any future programming effort. (This attitudinal concern is more expansively discussed hereinafter.) Ambassador Freeman did favorably comment upon the use of CCPS data on his arrival in Mexico City in familiarizing him with the activities of the Mission, particularly in comparing the activities of the seventeen Consulates.

2. The EROP experience in Guatemala caused strong resentment among affected agencies and increased doubts among State Department officials as to whether basic decisions implicit in any foreign affairs programming system would ever be made in Washington. Agency resentment particularly focused upon their being unable to present their own case prior to the Ambassador having reached his decision on the recommendations he would make regarding their activities.

3. Each Ambassador visited readily and forcefully acknowledged his role as manager of the U.S. foreign affairs community. They view themselves primarily in this capacity (as opposed to the more traditionalist view) and evidence a conscious effort in trying to increase their managerial capability. For example, Ambassador Dungan in Chile this year assigned to the four political officers a geographical region of Chile for which they are responsible to advise the Ambassador "how to oversee and coordinate" all U.S. operations in their respective areas. Specifically, he has directed these officers to investigate and make recommendations for guiding the programs and activities of other U.S. agencies. The Political Counselor expressed genuine enthusiasm on the part of his officers toward this new responsibility.

The Ambassadors presently conduct fairly extensive program and operational reviews, particularly in AID and MAAG and, to a lesser extent, USIS and Peace Corps. Hindrances toward more effective program review and, more importantly, direction include (i) limitations of time for Ambassadorial review between field program development and its submission to Washington, (ii) too extensive documentation in a format meaningful to the agency but considerably less so to the Ambassador, (iii) budget guidance constraints imposed by Washington agencies (particularly USIS) which inhibit field flexibility in program development, and (iv) Ambassadorial realization that any unresolved differences between himself and other agencies in the field over program composition will, with rare exception, be decided adverse to his position once they leave the field.

4. Other agency representatives acknowledge the leadership role of the Ambassador in program development and operation. Their greatest difficulty is reconciling the views of the Ambassador with guidance they receive from their agencies in Washington. This recognition of the Ambassadorial leadership exists, though to a lesser extent, even with those agency representatives whose activities may generally be characterized as foreign extensions of domestic activities and over which the Ambassador exercises little, if any, program review.

5. While agencies share a feeling of common purpose and ad hoc interagency working relationships frequently occur upon convergence of agency programs, there is no conscious effort nor formalized procedure for integrated program development. Agency review of other agency program proposals varies from Mission to Mission, but it is of a limited nature and nowhere is there a conscious effort for an agency to develop its programs in active coordination with other agency program development. During current year operations, of necessity, operational programs often dictate a degree of interagency coordination.

6. During current year operations there is extensive shifting of resources by agencies in which little or no Ambassadorial concurrence is sought. While this is true of all the foreign affairs agencies, it is particularly pronounced in AID. In that agency no "thresholds" have been established to determine when Ambassadorial concurrence is sought in reallocating resources from sector to sector or project to project. One AID Mission Director estimated that these shifts would amount annually to approximately forty percent of his three million dollar technical assistance funds.

7. All of the Ambassadors visited expressed extremely favorable responses to the described program-budgeting system and to the expanded management role of the Ambassador implicit therein. Central to this favorable attitude was the proposed ability to see all agency programs at the same time and acceptance by the agencies that, absent their taking affirmative action through the described appeal channels, an Ambassadorial decision adverse to their interests would be followed by the agencies in their program development.

8. With few exceptions, the attitude of other agency representatives interviewed was generally receptive to the described system. As one AID Director said, "It's long overdue." Or as another AID Director stated, "While this system would ultimately diminish the role of the AID mission, it is certainly in the best interests of the entire U.S. Mission." Such expressions of genuine receptivity, however, were conditioned upon allaying certain concerns and apprehensions hereinafter described. The clearest negative notes were heard from representatives of the Department of Defense. MAAG Commanders evidenced either explicit or implicit concern over the capability of an Ambassador, as compared with knowledgeable military personnel, to determine the degree and nature of military assistance to the host country. Implicit, but not expressed, concern existed with DIA personnel regarding the ability of an Ambassador to evaluate their field requirements necessary to meet the reporting and other requirements imposed upon them by their agency. While not found elsewhere in Latin America, in Brazil apprehension was expressed by the Peace Corps Representative that the described system presented a possible means for an Ambassador in the development of an integrated country program to distort the unique mission of the Peace Corps. Central to this expression of concern was the long standing view that the Peace Corps is not an arm of U.S. foreign policy and that the apparent intimate association with the Embassy inherent in the described programming system would run counter to this view.

9. Universal disbelief and cynicism exists throughout the entire U.S. Mission that the State Department in Washington will ever espouse the leadership role necessary to make any program-budgeting system in the foreign affairs community truly operational, NSAM 341 not withstanding. This attitude was unquestionably the single strongest one expressed throughout the visited Missions. It can be summed up in a question posed by one Foreign Service Officer, "You don't think this is really going to happen, do you?"

10. Strong resistance was expressed by all other agencies, as well as the Ambassadors, to any program-budgeting system which would impose yet an additional submission requirement upon the field. Because of the earlier State Department efforts, there is real apprehension among other agencies that any new system will be but another "paper-exercise" and would not supplant, but be in addition to, present program submissions. This attitude prompted one AID program officer to state in the following vein: "Unless this has utility to me and my agency, you will get my least experienced personnel working on this and the allocation of resources to objectives is liable to be pretty fictitious." The extent of present submission requirements imposed upon the field is illustrated by a recent study conducted by Ambassador Dungan in Chile which determined that thirty percent of the time of AID personnel was devoted to preparation of various submissions required by Washington.

11. There presently exists among all Ambassadors a lack of appreciation for the need of an analytical capability, either in the field or in the State Department in Washington, available to them in the development of their proposed program composition. Each Ambassador strongly resisted increasing his own staff beyond, at most, one additional officer. In contrast to the development of a State Department analytical capability responsive to their needs, the Ambassadors tended to prefer to rely upon the admittedly limited resources of the Country Team. This lack of appreciation for the necessity of a State Department analytical capability was perhaps one of the most disquieting aspects of our conversations with the Ambassadors. In marked contrast were the views of most AID personnel who were quick to realize that it was imperative that the State Department develop such a capability and that in doing so it would probably be at the expense of AID in drawing upon that agency's present analytical staff.

12. Because of the earlier programming efforts, the uncertainty of the implications of NSAM 341, the individual agency PPBS efforts, and a general lack of understanding of program-budgeting, certain general concerns and apprehensions in varying degrees of intensity will confront the inauguration of any new program-budgeting system. In addition to those already mentioned, the following seem pertinent:

(i) There exists a fear that current-year operations will become inflexible under a predetermined program composition.

(ii) Considerable apprehension was expressed over the role of the computer as a "decision maker," thus eroding the position of the Ambassador in the development of program composition.

(iii) Though seldom vocalized, implicit in many of the reactions to the described system was concern for retention of agency identity and apprehension over the prospect of agency competitiveness inherent in country-wide program development. Generally, however, there was little appreciation of the fact that interagency competitiveness would, as it does not today, occur in the program planning stages.

(iv) Limited concern was expressed regarding the susceptibility in any programming system of stress upon quantification to the detriment of securing objectives which, by their very nature, are not quantifiable.

(v) Considerable concern exists in the other agencies regarding the ability of the Ambassador and his staff to make knowledgeable decisions on program composition in highly technical areas.

13. With the exception of limited resources in AID, there exists no real field analytical capability nor is there any significant utilization of meaningful measurements of effectiveness in the development of program composition. The absence of meaningful measurements of effectiveness is particularly pronounced in USIS. One PAO stated that the selection of U.S. activities he sought to publicize was largely by hunch and ad hoc judgement wherein no measurements of effectiveness were employed.

This absence of measurements of effectiveness became the focal point of discussion at a dinner meeting of various agency representatives in one of the Missions visited. A frank and honest concern was expressed that we really don't know if all of our program efforts to date are achieving the affects we desire. The agency representatives present felt that the U.S. knew little or nothing about the forces, power structures, and institutions which really decided the course of the host country's people. This mutual expression of doubt as to the effectiveness of the entire U.S. effort in that country was not only revealing to all those present, but generated a high degree of receptiveness for the described country-wide programming system as possibly developing meaningful objectives and effective programs.

14. A majority of the Ambassadors visited viewed the role of the Country Director in the described programming system as the advocate for the Ambassador, not as an independent voice in the determination of program composition nor as an appeal point for an agency to reverse the Ambassador's decision on program composition. The one dissenting Ambassador felt that his Country Director should be independent to the extent that if he opposed the Ambassador's program composition he should voice his objections to the Assistant Secretary and, if necessary, the Ambassador would have to come to Washington to defend his position. This Ambassador, however, did not consider the Country Director as an appeal point for agencies to reverse Ambassadorial decisions on program composition.

The majority of the Ambassadors felt that the Country Director's objections to the Ambassador's program composition should, except in extreme cases, be expressed not to the Assistant Secretary but to the Ambassador for his consideration in program modification. They looked to the Country Directors to advise them on factors they may not have considered, as well as to furnish a Washington perspective on program composition. The question of the Country Director serving as an agency appeal point arose in one meeting with both the Ambassador and Country Director present. The Ambassador initially suggested that possibly the Country Director should serve in an appellate capacity. The Country Director voiced immediate objection and stated that he thought of himself as an advocate for the Ambassador, principally for two reasons: first, the appeal point concept would place an unbearable strain upon the relationship of the Ambassador and his Country Director and, second, the absolute necessity for an advocate of the Ambassador in the Washington forum. The Ambassador acknowledged the merits of the Country Director's arguments and concurred in his conclusions.

[Omitted here are: Section III. Recommendations; a partial list of persons interviewed; and an appendix that presents a "design mechanism for undertaking foreign affairs programming."]

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 71 A 4546, 381 1967 February. Confidential. An attached covering letter from Kohler to Vance, January 5, 1967, indicated that the draft paper was prepared in response to the SIG decision of July 26, 1966, to revise "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy," and asked for the early comments of the agencies that were members of the SIG. Regarding the July 26 decision, see Document 82. For other agency comments, see Documents 108 and 109.

U.S. OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 105.

2. This revised edition of the USOIDP has been prepared at the direction of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, and reflects developments that have occurred since 1962 in the U.S. Government's thinking and action in dealing with the problem of subversive aggression. It is a policy directive controlling on all U.S. Government agencies and personnel associated with the formulation or execution of U.S. programs in foreign affairs whether in the U.S. or abroad. The Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as other departments or agencies involved in foreign affairs programs, should assure it is read by all appropriate personnel in the U.S. or abroad who are associated substantively with the formulation or execution of U.S. overseas programs or who plan or conduct related training programs.

3. It is U.S. policy to anticipate and thwart subversive aggression designed to overthrow governments which the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain by stimulating and supporting programs of those governments for healthy political and economic growth, social progress, and internal security. The totality of these programs constitutes internal defense.

4. Subversive aggression is defined as calculated action initiated or supported by an external government or political organization to undermine or overthrow an established government by political or psychological subversion, agitation, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla operations, singly or in combination. Purely indigenous insurgency, free of foreign direction or support, is not subversive aggression. In making this distinction, the U.S. Government relies upon the intelligence community to provide information upon which sound political judgments may be made.

5. In the social and political environment that exists in the world today, subversive aggression represents a major form of conflict, equal in importance to conventional warfare. This is likely to present a threat to developing countries throughout the foreseeable future. The strategy of subversive aggression is attractive to communist powers because their objective of world domination is not reasonably attainable through nuclear or conventional warfare; because it involves minimum risks and requires relatively modest resource expenditures; and because the social and political ferment taking place in many countries presents exceptional opportunities to encourage popular unrest and to exploit human discontent. In addition, the tactics of subversive aggression are selective and flexible; they may consist merely of propaganda and minor sabotage designed to incite insurgency, or of organized terrorism and paramilitary operations on a limited or national scale, accompanied or unaccompanied by selective or wholesale kidnappings and assassinations. Subversive aggression, varying somewhat in its nature and the doctrine in which it is clothed, is thus a tool of importance for Moscow, Peking, Havana and other communist elements.

6. To forestall and overcome the threat that subversive aggression poses to developing countries, and thus to regional stability and to U.S. political and security interests, it is established U.S. policy to assist developing countries in their efforts toward removing the root causes of justified discontent among their people. To that end, U.S. programs should:

a. Support indigenous efforts for the creation of progressive societies and viable economies;

b. Encourage developing countries to initiate and pursue reasoned programs for political and social progress and economic growth;

c. Encourage governments and political organizations in developing countries to seek increasing popular participation in and support of indigenous political, economic and social programs;

d. Strengthen the intent and capability of developing countries to remain free of communist or other extremist domination, and contribute to the development of police and military establishments capable of maintaining law and order and internal security in support of legitimate government;

e. Cultivate in developing countries popular and official attitudes conducive to the development of free institutions responsive to indigenous aspirations and to the exercise of political rights by the people;

f. Develop to the extent possible the indigenous capability and purpose which, together with all forms of U.S. influence and assistance, will preclude situations requiring the intervention of U.S. combat forces to deny the success of subversive aggression;

g. Encourage other free countries and regional and multilateral organizations to participate in foreign assistance programs and collaborative actions to strengthen economic and social development and internal security in developing countries and to stimulate regional cooperation.

7. It is recognized there is no simple or universally applicable solution to the threat that subversive aggression may present at a given place or time. The particular conditions in each country must determine the nature of the activities and programs required to protect and advance U.S. interests. In addition, U.S. resources are not unlimited, and they must be applied carefully in light of the inhibitions and constraints inherent in local circumstances. The attitude and capability of the host government will be the most important factor in the success of any country program.

8. It is therefore U.S. policy that a united effort by all elements of the U.S. Government with overseas programs and operations be directed, coordinated, and supervised abroad by the Ambassador, and in Washington by the Secretary of State.

9. Each Ambassador, as the personal representative of the President, is responsible not solely for the coordination but also for imaginative planning, timely initiation, and effective execution of all programs needed to achieve U.S. goals within the country of his assignment. The Ambassador, working in conjunction with his Country Team, is responsible for:

a. Determining the nature of any latent or active threat that subversive aggression presents to the local government and to U.S. short and long term interests;

b. Identifying specific objectives that must be attained to reduce or eliminate this threat;

c. Recommending specific courses of action necessary to achieve such objectives.

10. Programs should be designed to stimulate the indigenous constructive forces essential to national development toward the fulfillment of popular aspirations. It is a primary function to encourage the government of a developing country to identify, mobilize, and apply indigenous resources in a manner which will suit the particular requirements of the country concerned. The local government should be made to understand that U.S. programs can only be ancillary and supplemental to indigenous programs.

11. In assisting the local government to focus its resources on constructive national development as its best hope for security in the long view, the Ambassador and Country Team should take special account of the critical sectors in the society, and of the impact that national development and the modernization process exert on these. The Country Team should have a conscious and coordinated plan for its members or their staffs to use as a continuing base of reference and, through program formulation and all Country Team action, to bring discreet influence upon these sectors. The latter include, among others, the civil bureaucracy; the military and police establishments; the business community; the informational and communications media; the intelligentsia; artistic and performing groups; teachers and professors at all levels of the educational system; youth and student groups at the primary, secondary, and university levels; religious leaders and organizations; labor unions; worker and peasant organizations; ethnic or tribal majority and minority groups; high, middle, and worker class spokesmen; foreign communities; and political parties of all complexion.

12. The Country Team, at the direction of the Ambassador, should also consider the extent to which the resources of U.S. business firms and philanthropic foundations may be applied in support of U.S. objectives. Many private U.S. firms and foundations engage in programs to improve social and economic conditions in countries abroad, but these often are not coordinated with the programs of other firms, the local government, or the U.S. Government. If the Ambassador considers it appropriate, the Country Team should encourage U.S. firms and foundations to ascertain whether their programs may lend themselves to coordination, and to expansion, in support of U.S. goals in the country. Whenever the Ambassador considers it appropriate, private U.S. firms and foundations should be encouraged to undertake collectively or on a coordinated basis projects that will identify them with popular improvements and aspirations.

13. In countries where the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain a government threatened latently or actively by subversive aggression, the Ambassador should examine periodically all programs of all U.S. agencies in the country to assure that they are mutually complementary, and that they include appropriate objectives and adequate courses of action to support U.S. goals. The Ambassador should review and approve all programs submitted by members of the Country Team to their parent department or agency. He should supervise the effective application of funds, personnel, and equipment used to implement U.S. programs in the country.

14. In formulating new programs for internal defense, the Ambassador and his Country Team should consider the following guidelines:

a. Subversive aggression depends ultimately upon gaining support of a significant part of the people if it is to succeed. Programs to anticipate and thwart subversive aggression should be designed to reduce popular discontent and to strengthen popular allegiance to the established government;

b. The world is undergoing vast and rapid changes through the expansion of medical and educational facilities; through the extension of communication and transportation facilities (permitting the exchange of ideas and culture and providing increasing access to and egress from hitherto remote areas); and through the phenomena of population growth, the trend toward intensive urbanization, and the restructuring of world population, with persons under 25 years of age in the majority. In many countries, historic tribal and similar group social structures are breaking down, and regulatory institutions that have governed individual and group conduct are being replaced by new institutions still in a formative stage. These include among others youth, student, and university organizations, labor organizations, trade and cooperative societies, cultural organizations, and governmental departments and agencies being created or improved to exercise the functions of sovereignty. In these circumstances, it is essential that the U.S. be identified as dedicated to constructive change and popular welfare, sponsoring stability through growth;

c. Internal defense depends upon the totality of policy and programs in a particular country. Programs to reduce popular discontent and to accelerate social, economic, and political development depend for successful implementation upon an environment of law and order, based on popular consent in matters of local concepts of justice and government, but this environment often is characterized by the political instability and social turbulence existing in many developing countries. Hence, it often is essential that such programs be supplemented by concurrent programs to provide an enlightened and dependable intelligence, police, and military capability to assure a political climate in which constructive national development may thrive;

d. Constructive national development requires the effective mobilization and judicious application of indigenous resources to remove the causes of popular discontent, to fulfill popular aspirations, and to secure the allegiance of the population.

15. The preparation of a formal Internal Defense Plan or other specific reporting may be required by the pertinent Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) or the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). If so, the content and format of such plans or reports will be specified by them. In any event, the objectives and courses of action that constitute internal defense planning should be reflected in regular program submissions by all posts at which there is an internal defense problem. Internal defense planning, where it is required, thus should be regarded as an integral part of the regular country program.

/3/Document 56.

a. To assure the adequacy of U.S. policy for the countries in their region;

b. To assure the adequacy of plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy;

c. To be particularly watchful for indications of subversive aggression directed at the overthrow of governments in which the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain;

d. To recommend appropriate measures to higher authority for dealing with emergent critical situations when these require consideration at higher level.

17. NSAM No. 341 provides for the Senior Interdepartmental Group:

a. To assure a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the U.S. applies its resources of personnel, funds, and equipment;

b. To carry out the functions and responsibilities previously attaching to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) which has been abolished;

c. To verify the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

18. In planning U.S. efforts to assist other countries in their internal security and constructive national development, the Ambassador and his Country Team and the responsible officials in Washington should consider courses of action that will:

a. Identify the U.S. with youth through programs to:

(1) Improve and expand the educational system;

(2) Support and strengthen moderate youth organizations;

(3) Identify and cultivate youth leaders;

(4) Expand vocational opportunities;

(5) Facilitate communication and contacts between local and U.S. youth groups and organizations;

b. Identify the U.S. with social and economic development through programs to:

(1) Expand low cost housing construction;

(2) Improve sanitation facilities;

(3) Reduce adult illiteracy;

(4) Encourage the construction of roads and communications facilities;

(5) Assure the development of independent and responsible labor and peasant organizations and leaders;

(6) Assist the operation and expansion of small business;

(7) Create or expand institutions to extend low cost credit;

(8) Contribute to increased agricultural productivity and diversification and to industrial development;

c. Identify the U.S with enlightened public administration through programs to:

(1) Assure an equitable tax and tax collection system;

(2) Encourage land reform and the distribution of land to the peasant population;

(3) Contribute to the development of the middle class;

(4) Train the civil bureaucracy;

(5) Create a professional career service capable of administering government efficiently and impartially;

(6) Stimulate and strengthen the executive, legislative, and judicial functions in countries where the institutional framework makes this appropriate.

19. Depending upon local circumstances, specific courses of action may be required to improve the capability of indigenous police forces as the first line of internal defense. These courses may involve:

a. Intelligence collection, especially at the village level;

b. Intelligence evaluation, dissemination, and coordination;

c. Border surveillance and immigration control;

d. Mob and riot control;

e. The prevention of crime and of juvenile delinquency;

f. The protection of the people and especially of village officials against terrorists and assassins;

g. The projection of an image to identify the police with the populace and its welfare.

20. The armed forces of a government constitute the means for protection against external attack and internal insurrection beyond the capability of civilian police to control. The existence of loyal and well-equipped, trained, and led troops, competent in internal security operations, constitutes an important deterrent against large scale terrorism or guerrilla warfare. An internal defense capability on the part of friendly armed forces, balanced with and complementary to that of the indigenous police forces, is regarded as an important element in internal defense planning, meriting U.S. support.

21. Consideration should be given to courses of action to improve the utilization of military resources. In many countries, the military establishment possesses equipment and skills representing a major national investment and resource. If in the judgment of the Ambassador local circumstances permit, it is imperative that actions be taken to assure the use of this resource in the nation building process if this can be done without detracting from the capability of the military to perform its primary defense function. Such actions may require flexibility in funding to permit mutual support of AID and DOD projects, and may take into account:

a. Military cooperation with social and economic agencies to perform civic action in:

(1) Adult literacy and vocational instruction;

(2) Construction of low cost housing and municipal buildings at the village level and in urban slums;

(3) The construction of roads and water and sanitation facilities at the village level and in urban slums;

(4) The extension of medical facilities;

b. Military cooperation with the police in:

(1) The collection and exchange of intelligence;

(2) The exchange of communications and transportation facilities, including air lift;

(3) The production of joint contingency plans identifying police and military roles and missions.

/4/Document 191.

23. The National Interdepartmental Seminar serves as the focal point of U.S. overseas internal defense and development training efforts. Personnel assigned to key positions abroad and who attend this Seminar are made aware of the need to include internal defense requirements in country programs when appropriate. Departments and agencies in Washington should take action to assure that all senior personnel attend the National Interdepartmental Seminar before assignment to key positions abroad. This applies especially to Ambassadors who are responsible for the supervision of multi-agency resources in a coordinated program to achieve U.S. goals in developing countries.

24. Departments and agencies with in-house training programs within the purview of the USOIDP and the Coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar should consult informally at their discretion to assure that official curricula are mutually complementary, and that in-house training programs reflect adequate and correct coverage of the USOIDP.

Washington, January 5, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State-Rusk. No classification marking. Drafted by Crockett. Copies were sent to Katzenbach, Steeves (DG), MacArthur (H), Lyerly (L/O), Hoofnagle (O/DG), and Stutesman (O/DG).

/2/For background on this issue see Document 38 and footnotes 1 and 4 thereto.

Macy said that he was strongly opposed to the establishment of separate personnel systems for the several Foreign Affairs agencies unless the overall authority of the Director General were clearly established to provide a unifying bridge as well as centralized personnel policy determination.

Macy believed that new legislation should be preceded by a study which would determine:

a. The kind of personnel system or systems required to fulfill the broad requirements of the government in the foreign affairs field (as opposed to parochial needs of individual agencies).

b. The kinds and number of jobs required.

c. The type of legislation required to obtain these people.

WJC

Washington, January 7, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt R. Rostow, Vol. 18. Confidential.

You asked me to look into the qualities of Mr. Idar Rimestad as replacement for Bill Crockett.

I find Rimestad has an excellent and consistent record as an administrative officer. In particular, he did distinguished work in three complex operations; the Moscow Embassy, the Paris Embassy, and setting up ACDA. There is every reason to think that he could do the housekeeping job at State with efficiency, and handle his relations well on the Hill. (In ACDA he had the responsibility of presenting a separate budget.)

[4 lines of source text excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift]

/2/Rimestad.

Therefore, I think we have found a good successor to Bill; but Secretary Rusk and Nick should be encouraged to set up soon the coordination of foreign affairs resources.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.