U.S. Department of State

Pasadena, California, December 31, 1963.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. No classification marking. Prepared by John McCone. The meeting was held at the Huntington Hotel.

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

/2/In a January 5 memorandum for the record regarding his meeting with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch on January 4, McCone stated: "The President agreed with Item #6 in the December 31 memorandum on the organization of his own staff and the reinstitution of some type of a Planning Board. He said that he had discussed this subject in some detail with Eisenhower and was convinced Eisenhower was right. He indicated an intention to discuss this subject with Mr. Gordon Gray." (Ibid.) See also Document 146.

The 521st meeting of the National Security Council took place on January 7, 1964. This was the first NSC meeting in 1964 and the second since Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency on November 22, 1963. The final meeting--the 594th--took place on November 25, 1968. Summary notes for 73 of the 75 NSC meetings during the Johnson Presidency, taken mainly by NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, are at the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Director of Central Intelligence John McCone's notes for NSC meetings prior to his resignation on April 28, 1965, are at the Johnson Library (John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President) and at the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI (McCone) Files). Additional notes for five meetings (July 27, 1965, January 29, 1966, September 13, 1967, June 5 and October 31, 1968) are in the Meeting Notes Files at the Johnson Library. Additional notes for nine meetings, taken by Assistant (and then Deputy) Press Secretary W. Thomas Johnson between July 1967 and November 1968, are in Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings at the Johnson Library.

Backup material for NSC meetings is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 (1964-1966) and Lot 72 D 318 (1966-1968). At the Johnson Library backup material for NSC meetings is located principally in the NSC Meetings File and the NSC Agency File (both part of the National Security File), the Meeting Notes File, and the President's Appointment File under dates of meetings.

Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's National Security Adviser from April 1966 to January 1969, discusses NSC meetings and the more general topic of "The Organization of National Security Affairs" under Johnson in The Diffusion of Power, pages 358-368. Additional information on NSC meetings can be found in David C. Humphrey, "NSC Meetings During the Johnson Presidency," Diplomatic History, 18 (Winter 1994): 29-45.

Washington, January 27, 1964.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63-Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only.

/2/McGeorge Bundy held regular (though not necessarily daily) meetings with his staff. In Bundy's absence, Bromley Smith chaired the meetings. General Maxwell Taylor's aide, Major William Y. Smith, attended the meetings and took notes August 1961-August 1964. His memoranda for the record are ibid.; copies are at the Johnson Library. Chester Cooper of CIA attended 45 staff meetings January 6-July 15, 1964, and summarized the proceedings in memoranda to CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline. The memoranda are at the Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80-R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964. Peter Jessup attended 24 staff meetings between January and June 1965 and provided CIA with information on each meeting orally, which CIA then put in a memorandum for the record. The memoranda are ibid., White House Staff Meetings 1965. On August 30, 1965, Jessup telephoned CIA and, according to the memorandum for the record, "apologized for not having reported more frequently, explaining that the White House Staff was rather disorganized, the situation was disjointed, and that there had been few Staff meetings." (Ibid.)

1. Bromley Smith presided throughout the meeting.

[Omitted here is material on several foreign policy issues and on Colonel Howard Burris' staff responsibilities.]

/3/Bundy was on vacation.

One major difficulty is that no one is moving in to take charge of White House operations. Neither Jenkins, Moyers, nor Valenti are really managing the President--or even parts of him, insofar as preparation for visits of foreign dignitaries and other affairs with foreign policy implications are concerned. The result is continued confusion and uncertainty. It looks as though this may last for some time, however.

WYS

On February 4, 1964, President Johnson held the first of more than 150 Tuesday lunch meetings with his senior foreign policy advisers. The discussion focused on U.S. policy in Vietnam. (McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the record, February 5, 1964; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. 1) No notes were kept of the meeting, nor, prior to July 1967, were notes normally made of Tuesday lunch discussions. From July 1967 to December 1968, Assistant (later Deputy) Press Secretary W. Thomas Johnson kept notes for about 45 luncheon discussions, which are located in Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings at the Johnson Library. White House Press Secretary George Christian and President's Special Assistant Jim Jones took notes at another six luncheons during the same period, which are located in the Meeting Notes File at the Johnson Library.

Agendas for Tuesday luncheons are found in a number of files at the Johnson Library but principally in the following locations in the National Security File: Bundy Files, Luncheons with the President; and Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, and Tuesday Luncheon--Suggested Agenda. Rostow's file on Meetings with the President also contains records of decisions made at some of the luncheons. Attendance at the luncheons is documented in the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library. Attendees normally included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the White House Press Secretary starting in 1966, and, starting in 1967, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and note taker W. Thomas Johnson.

Commentary on the Tuesday luncheons by participants and by those closely associated with the sessions is in Walt Rostow's The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pages 359-360; Dean Rusk's As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pages 519-520; and the oral histories at the Johnson Library by William P. Bundy, Richard Helms, Benjamin Read, Dean Rusk, Bromley Smith, and Walt Rostow. Additional information on the luncheons can be found in David C. Humphrey, "Tuesday Lunch at the Johnson White House: A Preliminary Assessment," Diplomatic History, 9 (Winter 1984): 81-101.

Washington, February 10, 1964.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 61-Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith.

SUBJECT
Daily White House Staff Meeting, 10 February 1964

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.

[Omitted here is material on foreign visitors and Panama.]

/2/Bundy spent Saturday evening, February 8, and most of Sunday at the LBJ Ranch before returning to Washington with the President by airplane on Sunday evening. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

On substantive matters, Bundy said he now had a much clearer picture of the matters the President wanted to handle directly and those on which the staff could have a freer hand. Rather than list them he said he would handle them as matters came up. He did say at the present time the President considered there were only two major crises: Vietnam and Cuba. These were explosive situations. The remainder of our current problems were difficult ones, but not of the same order of magnitude.

With respect to White House staff procedures, the President reiterated he was very pleased with the support he was getting. (At this point Bundy half-jokingly commented that it proved again how unnecessary he was, and he felt like leaving things in Bromley Smith's hands.) The President expects disagreements from his staff, and flaps. He knew the Bundy staff was different because there were no leaks and no sniping criticism. He wanted this to continue.

As to the type of function the staff performs, the President considers these necessary. He had talked with Rusk about it, who agrees. Rusk said he believed Bundy's staff performed a very important function for the President and that he and Bundy had learned to live with the backlash from various levels of government.

All in all, the LBJ ranch visit seems to have been very useful in that probably for the first time Bundy and the President talked alone on matters that will guide the NSC staff operations in the future.

[Omitted here is material on Venezuela.]

WYS

Washington, February 28, 1964.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63-Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith.

SUBJECT:
Daily White House Staff Meeting, 28 February 1964

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting.

[Omitted here is material on several foreign policy issues.]

/2/The President asked the Speaker to attend in place of the Vice President, whose office was vacant during 1964.

[Omitted here is material on the command and control system and the Kennedy Library.]

8. The President's Work Habits. Bundy said that experience has taught him that the best way to do business with the President is probably in writing rather than talking with him, as Bundy originally tried to do. The reason is that not only is it difficult to get to the President, but when one does it is usually at the end of the day when the President does not go into things thoroughly. At night, however, the President evidently works through his papers thoroughly. Bundy's suggestion was that the procedure most desirable now seems to be to write a brief explanatory memorandum with issues to be resolved and a recommendation. The paper should also leave space for the President to indicate whether he agrees or prefers something different or needs more information. Complicated issues, of course, cannot be handled this way, but Bundy feels a goodly number of things that the President must see can be.

WYS

Washington, April 14, 1964, 12:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F64.23, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of several foreign affairs issues.]

President: I never talk to Tom [Mann]. I haven't talked to Tom. I always talk to Rusk.

Bundy: Yup.

President: But, maybe I ought to talk to Tom more. Do you think I ought to?

Bundy: I think that when we get issues up, that Tom should be in where you and he can hear each other.

President: Oh yes, I think that's right with issues up. But I'm talking about--

Bundy: No, I think you ought to conduct your business either with Rusk or on a staff basis through my office. I think that's easier and more efficient really.

President: You know, it's mighty easy for me to call Mike Forrestal on say Vietnam, but I wonder what his boss thinks when the President's calling him every hour.

Bundy: It doesn't bother me, Mr. President.

President: No, it wouldn't bother you, but don't you think a boss ought to normally feel like that he's entitled to be on top of the job?

Bundy: Well, I think if it's something you want hot information on, Mr. President, you ought to call where you can get it fastest. When it's a decision or an organization problem, then I think-but I don't think you need any lessons on that. [Bundy laughs]

President: Well my judgment--I follow the charts pretty well, and I think a man that's sure of himself doesn't hesitate to have Komer sitting in here with me right now. He's not afraid Komer's going to get his job. But, I think the boss pretty well ought to deal with the other boss if he can.

[Omitted here is discussion of Walter Lippmann and relations with the press.]

Washington, April 29, 1964, 4:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. McCone dictated the memorandum on April 30.

SUBJECT
Discussion with President Johnson--Wednesday afternoon--29 Apr. 4:45 in his office

PRESENT
The President and Mr. McCone

/2/Not found.

President Johnson made the following comments:

a. With respect to the organization of the Executive Office, the holding of frequent NSC meetings, the supporting of NSC with an Operations Coordinating Board and Planning Board, President Johnson said he had never heard of the idea before. He said that Eisenhower had never mentioned it to him nor did he recall that I had ever spoken about it. He said he thought the NSC was functioning satisfactorily, that it met when important or critical issues required a meeting, that the staff work was adequate and he was satisfied. He said the only thing that Eisenhower proposed to him was the replacement of McGeorge Bundy with Gordon Gray.

/3/See Document 139 and footnote 2 thereto.

/4/In a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy that began at 5:22 p.m. on June 18, the President mentioned a report "raising hell about the way we reorganized [the] Security Council." Bundy responded: "Yep, this is straight Eisenhower. He feels this personally and strongly. It was an affront to him when we abolished the Operations Coordinating Board, and he's taken my hide off personally about it a couple of times." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape 64.34, Side B, PNO 3) The report mentioned by the President has not been identified.

[Omitted here are summaries of other subjects discussed with the President.]

The final NSC Standing Group meeting on record during the Johnson Presidency was held on April 30, 1964, to discuss Israeli requests for U.S. tanks. (Memorandum for the Record, April 30, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group) The Standing Group was established by President Kennedy to deal with planning and operations problems and met approximately 31 times during his Presidency. It was convened six times between December 1963 and April 1964. Documentation on Standing Group meetings is ibid. At the Johnson Library a small amount of material is contained in the National Security File, Agency File, NSC Standing Group. Additional information on the Standing Group can be found in Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Washington: National Security Council, 1988), pages 51-53.

Washington, July 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Press Office Files, Box 135, Bits and Pieces of Useful Information. No classification marking.

Reedy,

Rick Smith (NY Times) called saying he had been talking with you, Jack Valenti, Walter Jenkins about how the President works and how information flows to him.

He said he wanted to check with me on some specifics about the "Night Reading Envelope" that had been mentioned to him--

I told him I was on a "rush" and couldn't take a minute right then to talk--could I call him back.

FYI, the night reading comes about this way:

All day long papers come into the office to my desk, from various sources--from WH staff members, from Cabinet, from various Depts and Agencies, from mail, telegraph and from notes resulting from telephone messages and/or conversations.

All day, in the light of the day's program and demands on the President's time, I sift, sort and shift--taking in some items through the day and giving them to the President in person or putting them in various spots on his desk (spots having meaning as to urgency) and into my "stack" for consideration at end of day for night reading.

I try to keep the night reading from getting too bulky--sometimes hold items not requiring a decision or a response (nor needed as information for decision making) to a night when bulk is less, evening schedule lighter for example--I try to keep Monday nights' night reading lighter because of the early hour of the regular Tues Legislative Leaders b'fast and particularly so if there is a late evening event on Monday night.

Intelligence reports, position papers, reports that have tedious detail and need uninterrupted time for reading and study make up the body of the night reading envelope. And I try to lighten this "load" by putting in the thank-you notes, happy little items of information etc. that are good to go to sleep on.

In addition, items needing decisions for early the next day which have not been made today go in--each covered with a "brief" with a space for him to check his desired action to save him time from writing (since he has no secretary to dictate to when going thru his night reading).

Washington, November 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Some comments on Post-election Problems

/2/November 3.

The victory itself will be the culmination of 347 days of really extraordinary achievement, perhaps the most important set of accomplishments that any President has ever racked up in a period of less than a year.

(1) The country has been held together, with growing prosperity and unexpected civic peace.

(2) An Administration set up by another man has been taken and used with extraordinary little strain and friction.

(3) A large and precedent-shattering legislative program has been passed.

(4) A lot of small but tricky international tests have been met.

(5) A campaign of unusual meanness has been met by one of unusual breadth and generosity.

(6) The policies and prospects defined in the winner's campaign have much more breadth and quality on foreign and domestic issues than critics have yet noticed (although I hope Walter Lippmann may do a piece on our foreign policy Tuesday).

This overwhelming achievement will be seen for what it is after Election Day, and many people--both here and abroad--will have increasingly large expectations of future accomplishment. Insofar as these hopes give support and strength to your new administration, they give a solid base on which we have some time to build.

But the brightness of this achievement and the hopes it offers are threatened in a number of important ways, and the real purpose of this memorandum is not so much to celebrate what you have accomplished as it is to suggest some of the difficulties that must now be overcome.

The first problem is that while the victory may be very big, it will also be somewhat thin. A large part of the margin will be due not to us but to Senator Goldwater. Moreover, the very meanness of the Goldwater campaign has had as a consequence a certain clouding of the Presidency--a shadowing of the White House. And in the press, which has given us a degree of support unprecedented for a Democratic Administration, there is going to be backlash. It is foreshadowed in the Washington Star editorial of Sunday, and it is almost foreordained in the determination of newspapermen to be independent and critical. Reporters and publishers alike believe that they have been very generous to us during the campaign, and they are just waiting for a chance to even the score. This attitude will probably seem wholly unfair and inhuman to you, but I am sure it is a fact of our future life.

The second problem is that the White House needs to be organized for the long pull. Your miraculous performance in the last 11 months has been supported by literally super-human efforts by Valenti and Moyers--and by Jenkins until he cracked. This cannot go on for the long run. Moreover, great as the achievement has been, it has been sharply limited in the following ways:

(1) The legislative program was already in existence;

(2) There was an election year stand-down on major new initiatives, both domestic and foreign;

(3) The primary business of the Presidency was to legislate and to campaign, and these jobs were overwhelmingly the personal responsibility of the President himself. Not even Valenti and Moyers can go at the rate they have been going, and there is more to be done in the next six months than even they have been doing.

A third and more general problem is that of manning the Administration beyond the White House. Very few major appointments have been made in the last 12 months, and the morning of the 4th of November will bring a stirring toward change of many sorts. A number of men have stayed simply in order to help beat Goldwater; a number of others are ambitious for promotion which they may or may not deserve; still others have not done very well and ought to be changed. And all this is in addition to your own imperative need to get the men you want where you want them--which your victory will permit and your needs demand.

A fourth and still more general problem lies in the field of national security, in a set of major decisions which have been deliberately deferred. There are five big ones and a number of little ones. The big ones are: (1) Vietnam; (2) European policy--the MLF and the Kennedy Round and de Gaulle; (3) Cuba; (4) Nuclear spread, Red China, and the UN; (5) Foreign aid in all its aspects. The marginal troubles, any one of which could become explosive, include Cyprus, the Congo, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Article 19.

Taken together, these problems are very serious indeed, and my own judgment is that if we do not now take time to get organized and to make certain basic decisions about operations and policy, we could very easily make a mess of things at a time when a great many people will be waiting to jump on any mistakes.

Like other men I have views on these general problems; I think they are all tough but manageable. But my present point is that they need attention.

And the conclusion I reach is that you should take a very deep breath and walk around these problems, carefully and quietly, for about two weeks after Election Day. The country and the government will understand and expect a period of quiet and a period of preparation, and the people who have carried the major burden of the last months--Moyers, Valenti, Reedy--need time off almost as much as you and Mrs. Johnson do.

Since you are probably incapable of doing nothing--even for two weeks--my suggestion is that you should use this period to have very frank and private talks with the men you trust most, about the general business of organizing the Presidency for your administration. This is the job which we have not attacked in the last 11 months, and getting it right is absolutely indispensable if the Johnson Administration of 1965 is to escape the frustrations that overtook Truman in 1949 and Roosevelt in 1937.

The people who can help you most in such a process of reflection and planning are those whom you trust most, whoever they may be. There are two kinds of people on whose insight you can draw with particular advantage--those who know you best and those who know the Presidency best. Men who know both, like Clifford and Moyers, can be especially helpful.

What I think you might want to do is to set up a process by which the people you want to talk with are brought to the ranch at your convenience whenever you are ready to talk. I think most such talks should be with one man at a time, as far as possible. It's the only way for a President to get unvarnished and honest opinions. None of the men you want would object to coming in groups and then being interviewed as individuals. Occasionally there will be, as in the case of Rusk and McNamara and myself, people who need to come in a group for business problems and can be talked to separately at whatever length you want.

Such private conversations can also help your Cabinet and your staff more than you may think. Nothing is more important for them than to know as much as possible of your own desires and thinking--and these will be new and different, I am sure, after the election.

My fundamental point is simply that I think some such process of reflection and discussion is the one thing that is needed above all others--before you make final decisions about any of the great questions before you--and before you settle definitely on your own basic plans for manning the White House and the new Administration. If you take the time now, you can put together a team and a program that will be strong and stable and effective for the long pull. If instead we try to charge ahead with only what we have now, in the White House and in the Administration, we can expect sharp disappointments and failures, and even further crack-ups of overstrained individuals.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Washington, November 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of S. Douglass Cater, Memos to the President. No classification marking.

Recent interpretive stories in the press (Chal Roberts on MLF and Joe Kraft on Vietnam) suggest that you are not seriously engaged in foreign policy crises. The problem, I believe, goes beyond the press itself. There needs to be better visibility given to your role within government itself. Otherwise, those with axes-to-grind are encouraged to circulate their own policies as official.

That is why the National Security Council, despite the secrecy of its proceedings, has value in giving a partially visible face to Presidential involvement in policy making. Two benefits accrue from its regular use for reviewing problems and policies.

1. The press and public have evidence that all the principal sources of advice--including, particularly, the Joint Chiefs have been properly consulted. (The press is always quick to seek out and solicit news from any who feel neglected.)

2. A wider audience within government get at least an indirect view of the President at work.

I realize that formal meetings of the NSC are not always helpful to genuine decision-making. But during a period such as the present when you need breathing time to deliberate on the whole range of foreign policy, the NSC offers a useful forum for holding systematic reviews.

/2/In a follow-up memorandum to the President, December 26, Cater stated that he believed that Cabinet and NSC meetings "can be developed into more systematic instruments of Presidential business" than they had been under Eisenhower and Kennedy. "By holding the NSC on a regular basis, you can reduce press speculation over crisis sessions. Regular meetings, with serious agenda, can have beneficial effect in making your Cabinet members work as a team. I would recommend alternate weeks for the Cabinet and NSC." (Ibid.)

Washington, December 4, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Klein Memos. Secret. Prepared by David Klein.

As I see it, the NSC staff officer's function is to attempt to identify as early as possible those national security problems (within his area of responsibility) which require presidential attention, decision or action. As a corollary to this--and here there are hard and fast limits--he should try to convey to the appropriate sections of State and Defense (ISA), and sometimes AID, presidential thinking on issues with which they are concerned.

The staff officer has no independent authority. Operating under guidelines set by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy), he must insure that identifiable problems get to the President on time, that the issues are defined and the alternative courses of action posed in a way that facilitate presidential action. He must also try--and this, too, is under Mr. Bundy's direction--to insure that presidential wishes and decisions are carried out efficiently, expeditiously, and in the way the President intends.

The staff officer must be more than a paper shuffler and a transmitter of messages. He must have creative ideas of his own, injecting suggestions (with approval of Mr. Bundy) into the bureaucratic mainstream to stimulate ideas, thought, and projects of interest and import to the presidency.

By definition the staff officer must be a team player. This does not stifle initiative or opportunity for independent and creative thought. Indeed, because of the simple structure of the NSC and direct access to the Special Assistant this is encouraged. However, the staff officer must never forget where the responsibility for making policy resides and confuse his own views and prejudices with governmental policy.

Despite the relatively easy access to the President's Special Assistant, the staff officer must maintain a sense of proportion in dealing with the front office--staying in touch with it but not burdening it; keeping Mr. Bundy fully informed of all developments without taking up a disproportionate amount of his time or demanding unnecessary attention. Whether questions are handled by memoranda, telephone or personal discussion are matters of judgment, depending upon the urgency and complexity of the problem. The principal point is that if the staff officer is to be of any use to Mr. Bundy, he must help and not bother him.

It is incumbent upon the staff not to duplicate or poach on the bureaucracy, but to insure that the enormous resources of the bureaucracy are at the disposal of the White House. In this process it is important to avoid an easy pitfall in the bureaucratic game of playing on the physical and even intellectual gaps between the White House and the Executive Departments. That is a useless and counterproductive enterprise. The basic assumption must always be that all parts of the government are deeply interested in giving maximum help to the President, and that all the parts of the Executive Branch must be fully synchronized to accomplish this. People working close to the White House--this includes the NSC staff--have a special responsibility of focussing on problems in presidential terms. But this should not make for conflict with other parts of the bureaucracy, so long as the members of the governmental team understand their respective roles and recognize their complementary nature.

To be of maximum use to Mr. Bundy, it is important to have continuing and effective contacts with the operating officials in the Executive Departments concerned with our relations with Europe--in the Secretariat, the Politico-Military Affairs office, the Planning Staff, the European Bureau and the Intelligence and Research Section in State; OSD and ISA in Defense; Ray Cline's office in CIA; the Foreign Affairs side of the Bureau of the Budget; and the Public Affairs sides of State and Defense.

These people are knowledgeable and can be helpful. Indeed, only with their fullest support can the staff officer hope to remain on top of his situation, and keep Mr. Bundy abreast of foreign developments on a continuing basis. The fact of the matter is that the presidency must be fully informed at all times, and this requires the close and coordinated support of many people.

The importance of close working relations with the bureaucracy cannot be overstressed. But for this relationship to work, the staff officer must in turn be available to these people and, within the limits of propriety and discretion, be as helpful as possible to them.

This brings up an obvious but most important point which is that the NSC staff officer must not only have great integrity; he must also be absolutely discreet in his relations with other government officers and people outside the government. It is not sufficient to deal effectively with the substantive phases of one's work. It is equally important to protect and preserve the role and image of the presidency. There is no more sensitive area in government than that around the White House. And those privileged to work in its environs bear the greatest personal and professional responsibilities.

On all national security matters requiring presidential attention, the President must be aware of the issues under debate, the points of agreement and disagreement, the options open to him. The problems must be posed in their starkest reality, for only in this way can hard and necessary decisions be taken. This in turn requires that the President have the problems presented to him in the clearest and precisest form, with appreciation of the full range of views, as well as the rationale for them.

Staff work takes on many forms. It runs the gamut of routine presidential messages and papers to substantive state pronouncements of the greatest import. It requires preparation of staff studies and recommendations; directives to various parts of the government; presidential public and private statements. It calls for the organization of interdepartmental meetings to discuss problems of presidential interest and follow through actions. It entails setting up arrangements for meetings and discussions between the President and other heads of government and leading foreign and American dignitaries. There are also the very routine operations--which in practical terms mean relieving Mr. Bundy, and in turn the President, of trivia, but insuring that however trivial a problem may be, if there are Presidential interests, these will be fully protected.

But whatever the problem, whatever its importance, each must in some way come under the guiding hand of Mr. Bundy to insure synchronization and coordination with other presidential activities.

The area of endeavor is wide. The opportunity for initiative and creative enterprise is great. The satisfaction in contributing to the most important enterprise in government is enormous.

DK

National Security Action Memorandum No. 322, the 46th and last NSAM issued during 1964, was issued on December 17. Used to notify agencies of Presidential decisions and to require follow-up action, NSAMs were issued far less frequently during the next 4 years. Sixteen NSAMs were issued during 1965, 18 during 1966, 10 during 1967, and 4 during 1968. NSAM No. 371, October 18, 1968, was the last of the 39 NSAMs issued during the Johnson Presidency. Copies of NSAMs and supporting material are located at the Johnson Library (National Security File, NSAMs). Copies of NSAMs and some follow-up reports are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Follow-up reports dated from June 20, 1961, through October 21, 1964, are ibid., Lot 70 D 264.

Washington, February 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential.

SUBJECT
A Deputy or Potential Successor in my Office

Some weeks ago you asked me who should take over if, for any reason, I were no longer on this job, and I told you I had thought some about it. Since then I have thought some more, and I think I have some good suggestions.

1. The ideal man for this job is Bill Moyers. I do not know what his plans and yours may be, but I do know that he has an abiding interest and talent for foreign affairs. I believe that he would be extremely good at this job, and I think he would like it. Obviously he could not be spared at once from where he is, but if an assignment in this job were to keep him at your side longer than he might otherwise be willing to stay, it would be well worth considering.

2. Another possibility is Abram Chayes. He performed with great brilliance as Legal Adviser in the Department of State, and in the process he won the unreserved confidence of Dean Rusk, who had little or nothing to do with his initial appointment.

/2/During a telephone conversation with Ball that began at 5:25 p.m. on February 7, the President said that "Bundy's department should not replace the State Department. He [President] has a little feeling about the White House running Defense or State. The boss must say no when he feels no but Valenti should not be telling Harriman to be jumping the hoop. They are not over them but with them." (Memorandum of conversation, February 7; ibid., Ball Papers)

If you were to think well of the possibility that Moyers might move in here sometime, that would be my first preference. If not, I would like to think in terms of persuading Chayes or Hughes--or some third party that would suit you--to come in as Deputy in this office with a prospect of succession as and when a vacancy occurs. I have no present intention of quitting, but I doubt very much that it would be in your interest for me to go on here until 1973.

McG. B.

Washington, June 10, 1965, 6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape F65.47, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

President: One other thing. I've got to see Reston in the morning. He is very concerned about the narrowing of the basic decisions of government. Now our old friends are feeding some stuff out--where it's been, ah, it's too concentrated. In a matter of a decision like this this morning [regarding Vietnam], Mac [Bundy] says that the decisions or recommendations are made by these same people--the field people, the Joint Chiefs, the McNamaras and the Vances, and the Rusks and the Balls, the Bill Bundys and the Mac Bundys, and the President--that they've been making this type of decision all along. Do you have any people in your outfit that are contributing anyway or feel that they made decisions that they're not in on now?

McNamara: No, I don't think so, Mr. President. McNaughton contributed to this of course. And the Chiefs meet fully, they don't all appear before you but their representative does--

President: How does it vary from the decisions you've been making for years?

McNamara: Well, I don't think it does, and this is what I would--

President: That's what Bundy says.

McNamara: I'd be inclined to ask Reston, "who is it that you," Reston, "think's left out?" I don't know who's left out. I'll tell you two, maybe. One is the Office of Emergency Management Director, and I don't see what the hell he can contribute to it.

President: Well he'll be in here tomorrow [for the National Security Council meeting].

McNamara: That's right. He will be. That's right. But he is a statutory member of the NSC. And the other one is the USIA Director, and frankly I don't think he ought to be deciding whether we're at war or going to war.

President: The deployments--they will decide on what our policy is [unintelligible] participate but this is--

McNamara: This is a military deployment. Apart from those two, I don't know who it is that's left out.

President: Well, in our small groups, as I remember, our Executive Committee amounted to seven in the Cuban crisis, and I don't see that there are any people in the departments or any career people that are left out.

McNamara: Well, I think at times Chip Bohlen or Tommy Thompson were present--

President: Well isn't he there? Tommy's here quite often now.

McNamara: He's here quite often now, and an important point now is that George Ball and Dean talk to him beforehand and bring his views into the decisions. I don't see that's any different either.

President: He seems to be a man of impeccable integrity, though, and honor. I don't believe he'd be contributing.

McNamara: Oh no, oh I'm sure--

President: Some of them are contributing to it, though. Some of them are saying this to Scottie [Reston]. He went in and gave a big round to George Ball I understand earlier today.

McNamara: I'd just ask him who he thinks ought to be in the decisions.

President: Only one I know that might not be is the Attorney General. And he's not my brother. [Both McNamara and the President laugh.] So, but if there is anybody in your shop that you think ought to be, you know you're at liberty to bring them--

McNamara: There isn't anybody I think ought to be, and I don't think there's anyone over here who thinks he should be.

President: Do you know anybody that knows anything in the other place--

McNamara: No, no, I certainly don't.

President: Dominican Republic--we've had the Balls, we've had the Manns, and we've had the Martins. I think we might be over-advised but not under.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Washington, August 2, 1965, 6:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Organization of the National Security Staff

1. Once or twice you have asked me about the people who work on the National Security side here, and I have the impression that you may wish to know more about who they are and what they do. You may even think there are too many of them.

2. When I took over this job in 1961, there were 71 people assigned to the NSC/OCB. Currently there are 48 people, and the real reduction is greater still because a number of the present people are shared with outfits like the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

3. About one-third of these people (plus a CIA-supplied group of rotating watch officers in the Situation Room) constitute a classified message center for the whole White House and Executive Office Building. We handle all classified papers for the NSC staff, most of your own classified stuff, and also cable traffic for the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Science and Technology. This is a matter of keeping proper control and distribution of several hundred items a day. It is a service which we could turn back to the State and Defense Departments, and to CIA, but only at the price of losing our own grip on the flow of information.

/2/In a July 19 draft memorandum to the President, Bromley Smith stated that Bator was assisted by Edward Hamilton, on detail from BOB; Komer was assisted by Harold Saunders and Ulric Haynes, on detail from State; and Cooper was assisted by James Thomson, on detail from State, and Donald Ropa, on loan from CIA. (Ibid., Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron)

5. The remaining professionals are essentially liaison officers and monitors for specific agencies and offices--one (Bowman) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; one (Jessup) for CIA covert operations, one (C.E. Johnson) for the AEC and NASA; one (Bowdler) for Latin American Affairs; and one (Keeny, half-time) for military technology and disarmament. Finally, we have one FBI graduate (Ash) who does our security checks with one finger and uses the other nine to assist Pat Coyne in the work of Clark Clifford's Intelligence Board. (If Ash were not on the NSC payroll, he would have to be carried by the White House.)

/3/Bowman was on detail from DOD, Jessup on detail from CIA, and Bowdler on detail from State.

7. Man for man, I would not trade this staff for any other in Washington. Its one present weakness is that there is no all-around Deputy. There are a couple of ways of dealing with this problem, but they tie into State and Defense personnel questions. Perhaps we can discuss them at one of our Tuesday lunches soon.

McG. B.

Washington, September 14, 1965, 5:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Promotions in your National Security Staff

/2/In a March 15 memorandum to the President, which Bundy signed but decided not to forward, he proposed that Komer be made an Assistant to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, explaining that "I would like to make him a member of the White House Staff, while keeping his pay and administration in the National Security Council. This would end an anomaly which has troubled him and two or three of my other senior people ever since 1961--they work directly for me and at least indirectly for you, but their official standing is that of staff officers of the National Security Council, and unfortunately the term 'NSC Staff' has no real weight in the government. Actually, knowledgeable people already think of them as members of the White House Staff, or at least the 'Bundy staff,' and that is what I would now like to make official." (Ibid., Vol. 9)

2. The best reason for recommending Bob Komer is that I do not have to tell you anything about him you do not already know. After wartime service in combat intelligence in Italy, he joined the CIA in 1947 and has been a career public servant ever since. But he is a career serv-ant of a very unusual and energetic sort, as befits a graduate of Valenti's favorite business school. He has extraordinary range, and a steadily growing mastery of the processes of international politics. He is a tiger for work, and he has a temperament which allows him to bounce back easily when his advice is not taken. This makes him the kind of staff officer one dreams of and seldom finds.

/3/Washington Bureau Chief for the Baltimore Sun.

4. What is much more important is that he has the confidence of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, both of whom have tried to lure him away from the White House.

5. More important still is that Komer is enthusiastically loyal to you. He will give you arguments, but he will always do his energetic best to carry out your orders just as you want them executed. He will be still more effective in this latter task with the additional rank and visibility which this new appointment will give him.

6. Finally, and most important of all, Bob Komer is one of the handful of men in the Government upon whom you can rely for sound and prompt judgment in the event of a sudden crisis. He will instinctively alert the right officers and ask the right questions, and he will never hesitate to turn to you directly when he is in doubt. This set of qualities makes me confident that it is right to recommend him for an appointment which will make him the senior officer on this side of the White House when I am not here. In my judgment, it is highly important that there be such an officer here, and I believe Komer is plainly the best qualified man in sight. After this new appointment is made, I expect that either Komer or I will always be on the spot here, and I would expect him to be fully informed on the broad range of National Security issues so that he can always act for me in my absence. Komer is 44.

/4/Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury.

8. Bator has one disadvantage, which is that for personal reasons his family have been unable to join him in Washington. He therefore goes regularly for weekends to Massachusetts. He compensates for this disability by working morning, noon and night five days a week down here, and he has always been willing to stay over when there is any immediate economic issue to be dealt with. But there is a sense in which this arrangement, coupled with his relative lack of intense political experience, makes him more a staff than a line officer, and for that reason I think it important to distinguish his assignment from Komer's by the parenthetical word (Economics).

9. Finally, I should say a word about the administrative aspects of these appointments. Ideally, I would wish that the Deputy Special Assistant should have a salary in the range of Category IV, and a Deputy for Economics in the range of Category V. When Walt Rostow and Carl Kaysen held the Deputy's post they had the salaries of Assistant Secretaries, which would correspond to these categories. But neither Komer nor Bator is in immediate financial need, and there is no way to get such high-level appointments without putting their whole salaries directly on the White House budget, which I am reluctant to recommend. It is therefore my suggestion that their salaries continue to be paid, at the present GS-18 level, from the National Security Council budget, unless and until it becomes convenient to make a change. I am confident that this arrangement will be acceptable to them.

10. Both Komer and Bator have up-to-date security clearances, and neither has ever had any trouble whatever on this score.

/5/Attached but not printed.

McG. B.

/6/The President checked the first and third options. Moyers announced the promotions at his news conference on October 19. (News Conference #160-A; Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, October 19)

Speak to me

Have Moyers put out

Save for press conference

Washington, November 13, 1965, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary.

[Omitted here is a lengthy conversation on copper prices in Chile, concluding with a discussion of whom to send to Chile as an emissary.]

The President asked Mr. Mann what he thought of Rostow and Mr. Mann said he thought Rostow was useful to the President; had a liberal image, big head, the Latins love him. Mr. Mann said he thought by staying with Rostow we could keep him on the track. The President asked if he were a Johnson man and Mr. Mann said he never heard anything anti-Johnson. [2 lines of text excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift.] He was very close to Kennedy.

/2/McGeorge Bundy informed the President on November 8 that he had been offered the presidency of the Ford Foundation; see Document 159.

/3/November 16. Mann did not speak with the President on November 16, but he did meet with him alone in his office from 4:14 to 4:50 p.m. on November 15. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.

The President asked about Bill Bundy to succeed his brother. Mr. Mann said he did not know him well. He said he thought he was an opinionated fellow and he thought the President needed somebody who would do what the President wanted done and not what that person wanted done. The President agreed.

The President asked about McNaughton and Mr. Mann said he was an awfully bright boy. That was all he knew about him.

[Omitted here is discussion of Chile and the Dominican Republic.]

Washington, December 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. Personal and Confidential.

On Sunday you asked me for a memorandum on members of my professional staff, and here it is.

My principal deputy is Robert Komer (age 43), who has been here for nearly five years. Before that he worked in the Central Intelligence Agency in intelligence evaluation. He is a graduate of Harvard College and the Harvard Business School, and served in the Army in World War II. You know Komer well enough to make your own judgment, I am sure. To me he has been an invaluable colleague. He is able, energetic, quick and highly knowledgeable. While he presses his point of view with energy, he is disciplined in the execution of decisions, whether or not they accord with his recommendations. I believe him to be, in many ways, the most suitable candidate to succeed me here, and I think that if he were the principal officer, he would accept the need for insuring fair and complete presentation of other points of view than his own. It is indeed precisely because of his alertness and reliability in moments of tension and uncertainty that I initially recommended him to the President for appointment as my Deputy. He is a man upon whom we can rely in times when I am out of town or otherwise unavailable.

Francis Bator (age 40) is my deputy for economics. He came here in early 1964, after a year as consultant to David Bell in AID. Before that, he was an associate professor of Economics at MIT, where he did his graduate work after taking his Bachelor's degree at Harvard. I think him to be the most gifted analytical student of international economics now working effectively in the bureaucracy. He has played a quite critical role in all of our balance of payments work. In addition, since the departure of David Klein, he has been the principal staff officer here for European problems, and has established close relations with John Leddy and John McNaughton. I think you will find that George Ball knows him well, and thinks highly of him. Bator does not have the experience or the breadth of political knowledge to take over the top job here, and in some ways he might be still more valuable to the government in a sub-Cabinet post in the Treasury. As a practical matter, he does extremely good work where he is, and the President has found him quick and helpful in a number of important matters.

The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, as you know, is Bromley Smith (age 54), and I think he would like to leave his present job, in good time. The NSC as a formal council has had even less to do under President Johnson than it did under President Kennedy. But Smith is not sure just where he would want to go if he does leave. I was wrong in telling you the other day that he would be ready now for a chance at an Embassy. As you suspected, his wife's architectural undertakings make such a move impractical in the near future. Bromley Smith is one of the most experienced and loyal of professional bureaucrats. He has chosen not to develop a taste for active participation in the making of policy, but he runs a clean, thorough, and highly knowledgeable shop.

Two other staff members have great seniority on the National Security Council staff--(1) Charles Johnson, age 53, who is the liaison officer for space and telecommunications, and some parts of atomic energy; and (2) Russell Ash (age 51), who spends most of his time supporting Patrick Coyne in the staff work for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but also has responsibility for our internal security. These two men have long-standing civil service status within the NSC. They are both loyal public servants of real ability. Neither of them is likely to move to substantially higher responsibilities, as far as I can tell.

The next senior member of my staff is Chester Cooper (age 48), who works on Far Eastern affairs. He came to us in 1964 from CIA, where he ranked just after Ray Cline on the "open" side of the house. He has done extraordinarily devoted and useful work here, but both he and I agree that, for reasons which are hard to explain, his service has not been quite up to either his hopes or mine. I believe he intends presently to seek an academic leave of absence from the Central Intelligence Agency, and I believe that this arrangement would be very much in his interest and also in ours. I think the timing of this move can be adjusted so that my successor would have the opportunity which he deserves to pick his own principal Far Eastern staff officer. My instinct would be to concert a choice with my brother Bill.

Under Cooper, in Far Eastern affairs, there are three more junior staff officers:

(1) Mr. James Thomson (age 34), FSR-3, came to us from the Far Eastern bureau two years ago. He was brought into the Department by Chester Bowles, and is a gifted young man, but not perfectly suited to the bureaucracy. My hunch is that in due course he should go back to academic life (he has received regular feelers from Yale, where he did his graduate work in Chinese).

(2) Don W. Ropa (age 38), GS-14, came to us from CIA only last July when the expanding struggle in Vietnam placed heavier requirements of coordination upon Cooper's office. Ropa has shown great energy and determination, and I think my successor would probably wish to keep him here, with a more senior officer, after Cooper's departure. If not, I am equally confident that the CIA would be glad to get him back.

(3) Miss Ruth Nicalo is a veteran of the National Security Council staff, and I am ashamed to have to say that I do not know much about her work, although I know she has been very helpful to a number of my colleagues in the Executive Office Building.

Under Komer in Middle Eastern and African affairs are two able young men:

(1) One is Hal H. Saunders (age 35), a GS-13, who came to us three years ago from CIA. He is unusually thoughtful and hard-working, and I think he has the confidence and trust of the working levels in all departments. Where Komer goes Saunders is likely to go, and he is an admirable staff assistant to his able boss.

(2) Ulric Haynes (age 34), FSR-4, handles African affairs. He is the ablest young Negro I have met in ten years of fairly constant looking. He has both judgment and energy. He is also unusually clear-headed about African affairs. He came to the Department from the Ford Foundation, and an intelligent Foundation executive might well try to get him back.

Under Francis Bator in economic and European affairs is Edward K. Hamilton (age 26), GS-13. Hamilton came to us from the Budget Bureau, where he established an extraordinary reputation as the most effective young man to join that bureau in recent years. He has done outstanding work here, and while his life has been clouded in recent months by family troubles, I feel confident that he will go on to make a record as one of the best public servants of his generation. If for any reason he should decide to leave the government, I am equally confident that he would succeed in private life.

Our Latin American affairs are handled by William Bowdler (age 41), an FSO 2. Bowdler was picked out by Jack Vaughn, and has done genuinely outstanding work over here. He handles the entire Latin American account, and he does it in the closest cooperation with ARA. I see no reason why he should not continue sympathetically and effectively in the same work in the future.

I get great support here from the half-time service of Spurgeon Keeny, who divides his time between Don Hornig's office and mine. Keeny is a really extraordinary public servant, and almost nothing happens in this complex field that he does not hear about from his wide circle of trusted colleagues in every department. He tends to know about sensitive new developments in weaponry before Cy Vance and Bob McNamara, and he knows about tricky issues in technical intelligence before Helms and Raborn. But he is much more than a source of information-he also has good judgment and broad experience in his subject. If he did not look like an undergraduate, I think he would already be emerging into the level of Presidential appointments.

8. Finally, I should mention two special liaison officers:

(1) Mr. Peter Jessup (age 45), who handles the staff work for our supervision of covert intelligence. He came from the CIA and he, or an officer like him, should be here as long as the 303 Committee continues. Jessup does this work with great skill and sense.

(2) Colonel Richard Bowman (age 39) is our liaison officer with the JCS. He is an able and hard-working officer, even if he sometimes has trouble in separating his Air Force allegiance from his staff obligations here.

9. And last of all, I should mention my personal assistant, Gordon Chase (age 33), GS-15, although he is leaving any day now to accept a double promotion in AID. Chase came to us from the Foreign Service and has proved himself to be fully first-rate as a staff assistant. He now wants a chance to spread his wings in a job with more direct responsibility, and he has fully earned it.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, December 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
Letter of resignation

/3/"I have asked the Trustees of the Ford Foundation if I may accept their invitation on the understanding that I shall always be free to accept any special assignments from you, and they have generously agreed to this condition."

2. If you think well of it, you might wish to add the fact that we asked for this condition and that the Ford Foundation granted it, to any background account which Bill Moyers might give of our discussions. The month in which we have worked on the matter might then look something like this:

November 7--McCloy offered Bundy the job.

November 8--Bundy reported the offer to the President.

November 11--At the Ranch the President told Bundy he would talk with him the following week in Washington.

November 19--The President and Bundy had a thorough talk in Washington. The President told Bundy he was free to make his own decision in the light of his judgment of what he could most usefully do, and Bundy told the President that he would like to accept the Ford offer if the Ford Trustees would allow time for an orderly transfer of his duties at the White House. The President authorized Bundy to report this decision to Mr. John McCloy personally, and asked him to work out a time schedule for the transfer in terms of the national interest alone--and then to see if that schedule was acceptable to Mr. McCloy.

Between November 20 and 28, Bundy studied this problem and consulted about it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. He reached the conclusion that he ought to stay on his present job through February, 1966. The President has agreed with this judgment, and Mr. McCloy, for the Ford Foundation, accepted the delay it involves on November 29.

On December 2, the President and Bundy discussed the matter further and began the consideration of a successor. The President asked Bundy to obtain assurance from the Ford Foundation that he would be available to undertake special assignments, and on December 3 Bundy obtained such assurance from the Ford Foundation.

McG. B.

Washington, December 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Organization of the Bundy shop

1. Alternative plotting. The key, essential responsibility of your foreign affairs group in the White House ought to be cataloguing, illuminating, bringing forth alternative courses of action to every recommendation from State and Defense.

Every recommendation from State and Defense ought to be put under a coldly appraising eye: What else can we do--what other paths can we take--what are the alternative costs in money, treasure, prestige results?

2. Planning. There ought to be a small cadre in your Bundy shop who do nothing but try to figure out how to solve a particular problem. For example, there ought to be a small group thinking, all day and all night, on how we can break the Viet Nam logjam.

3. Briefing and digesting. This is an obvious task, briefing down cables, digesting reports--in other words making available to the President a full flow of information.

No matter how much the President relies on his Secretaries, he ought to have, indeed must have, a checking mechanism, a competitive force that gives him flexibility. (State and Defense will perform with more agility and imagination if they know they are being counter-checked by someone else. This is the reason many business firms have two or more advertising agencies--it keeps each agency working harder to outdo the competitor--no one grows lax or lazy.)

The large majority of people now in the Bundy shop are technicians, custodians who deal with cables, the Situation Room and all its paraphernalia. There are less than two dozen professionals and their assistants. This is a small price to pay for an indispensable Presidential asset.

No doubt the hangers-on could be eliminated. But the hard-core thinkers and planners ought to be kept or even added to, if after a thorough search it was found to be useful.

The decisive point: Anything or anybody that helps the President come to sound foreign policy decisions is worth the price, whatever it is.

Washington, February 27, 1966, 9:10 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape 66.09, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Prior to and following the exchanges below, the President and McNamara discussed the appointment of Robert Kintner to a position in the White House.]

President: We have this Bundy thing we're going to have to face up to. I like Rostow, but I don't want to get started off here and get everybody to thinking we're going back to war and a hard-liner.

McNamara: I still like Moyers for that, Mr. President.

President: Well, that's like liking Cy Vance to be General Counsel. [McNamara laughs.] You'd like to have him General Counsel of the Army, wouldn't you?

McNamara: Yeah, yeah. But I need him more where he is, and I would say you need Moyers more in the Bundy job now that you've got the other one bucked up a little bit.

President: Do you think so? I don't know. My number one problem--I think you can do the Bundy job. You'd just raise hell and do the Bundy job yourself, if you have to, with Komer and the groups you got around there, just processing the papers. I doubt that these wolves, although there a hundred of them every day--I just think about how much time you'd take on correcting some mistake in the press. Doesn't about half your time go to trying to clean up stuff that somebody--

McNamara: That's right, and I don't have a Moyers and hence I don't get it done the way you do. So I realize the function's important. It's essential to you and I know it's being done beautifully. I would think Moyers could spend a little time--25 or 30 percent of his time--on the press and the other 60 to 70 percent on the other, and have maybe Komer work for him or something like that.

McGeorge Bundy's resignation as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was effective on February 28, 1966. At 7:20 p.m. that evening he telephoned Secretary of State Rusk. According to a February 28 memorandum of the conversation, prepared by Rusk's secretary, Carolyn Page, "B wanted to be sure Sec knew Pres planned to keep freedom of choice with regard to what he does with B's job and has asked Komer to hold the staffing together as of now; B asked Sec's help in keeping things in line; B had lectured Komer on procedure. Sec said ok." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) In a February 19 memorandum to the President, Bundy had stated that if there was to be an "interregnum" before a permanent successor was named, his inclination was "to deal with this problem by saying unless and until you make another appointment, Bob Komer should act in my place and have the same authority over members of the NSC staff that I have had." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20) Komer acted in Bundy's place until the appointment of Walt W. Rostow on April 1. On March 28 Komer himself was named President's Special Assistant in charge of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction in Vietnam.

Washington, March 1, 1966, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking.

Mr. President:

Here are some thoughts and suggestions that you may want to consider in regard to the Bundy operation.

I. I suggest that you install Bob Komer as Acting Special Assistant in Charge of National Security.

I think it important that the job not go vacant for more than several days else we will incite stories about unfilled positions in the White House--such as Congressional relations and National Security.

I have been probing throughout the basement staff over the last several days and I think the Komer appointment would meet with approval of all the people now in the group.

There is no doubt that Komer has the ability to do the job. The principal drawback that I have found is he might feel some concern about not being able to talk at the level of Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk.

Also, there is a petulance about him that causes some concern with his co-workers. Moreover, there is the feeling that Komer lives close to the surface of these problems and sometimes becomes emotional about them.

But in general, my probings have brought forth the information that Komer is tough and able--and with the assurance that the President has confidence in him he would be able, I am persuaded, to disavow all these liabilities and do the kind of job that you would want to have done.

Once Komer was established in his own mind as your man, in whom you repose confidence and trust, he would be able to function with efficiency and dispatch.

II. Bright young men in the basement.

a. Ed Hamilton. He is 27 years old-a graduate of the University of Minnesota--did his Doctoral work at Harvard. He is a Political Scientist by trade and right now engages in European and Economic Affairs in the Bundy shop. For a time he was assistant to Kermit Gordon at the Bureau of the Budget. He is an excellent writer, whose mind is quick and daring--the kind of young man that I think could serve you well.

I have talked to him at great length and I think that he would be loyal as well as energetic.

b. Jim Thomson. He is 34, with a PhD from Harvard in Chinese history. In 1959 he was an assistant to Chester Bowles when Bowles was in Congress and moved with Bowles to the State Department. After that he worked for Roger Hilsman and Bill Bundy and then came to the Mac Bundy Operation. Thomson is by all odds the most imaginative and brainiest of the group downstairs. He and Hamilton would rank as No. one and two. Harvard has been trying to get him to come back to teach there. But I think that he would stay and do the kind of work that you need done if there was some indication that he was needed.

c. Rick Haynes. A young Negro and Yale lawyer who has been working on African affairs. From every source that I have investigated, Haynes comes out as being one of the smartest men in the shop. He has done an exceptionally good job working under Komer's tutelage for a year. He is an excellent man and his credentials seem to be valid. He is the kind of man that you would certainly want to keep in the operation.

d. Francis Bator. Bator, of course, is a deputy along with Komer. He gets very high marks from his associates as an extraordinarily competent man in the economic field. There is little doubt what he ought to be kept on for his loss would produce a real void in the operation. He has your best interests at heart and from all I can gather has been totally loyal in every respect.

There are other bright young men in and around the government that we might want to consider bringing into the Bundy operation, such as:

Nick Farr, who is now on the Near East and Southeast Asia desk at AID is one such man. He is 40 years old and extremely competent.

Al Puhan--on the German desk at the State Department is another young man who seems to fit the bill as bright and able and imaginative.

Allen Whiting, who is the Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of Intelligence. He works for Tom Hughes at the State Department and is considered to be one of the foremost scholars on China.

Tom Hughes, who is 40 years old--in charge of the Intelligence operation at the State Department. He comes up with high marks from everyone I talk to. He seems to be one of the ablest men at the State Department and someone that you may want to consider bringing over here.

David Klein used to work for Bundy in the European Affairs. Klein was with me at the Harvard Business School and is a very bright and able man.

Spurgeon Keeny, who is the Science and Technical representative on the Bundy staff has been favorably talked about by nearly everyone with whom I had conversation. Bundy depended upon him greatly in matters of Science and Technology.

III. The next stop: What I would choose to suggest is that the next week or so you might gather all these bright young men together in your office or in the Situation Room and chat with them about their views on Vietnam and the world in general. I think it might prove very beneficial to let these young daring minds explore with you some of the problems that are troubling you. Sometimes it's very good to have access to new thinking, particularly from young people who aren't constricted by tradition or bound by circumscribed limits.

The point is that a really formidable team can be enlisted to carry on in the wake of the Bundy departure. The more imaginative and able people that you can gather in your national security shop in the basement, the more options are open to you.

IV. I would suggest you might want to consider naming Walt Rostow as the equivalent of Ambassador Porter in the State Department. Rostow had great ideas about the viability of the Vietnamese political system and how to move from a position of war into peace with the least possible discomfort. From what I have been able to gather, if Rostow is given a specific job like this, he would do a very competent job. Moreover, by putting him in charge of the peace operation it would cover up the so-called "hard line" that he is expected to take in matters of military policy.

V. In my probings I have found that the idea of a military adviser to the President meets with very good favor. It is good for the President to have not only diplomatic options, but he ought to have military options also. Bringing General Goodpaster over in the Bundy operation as military adviser to the President would be a good move and would allow you to have someone to digest and brief down all the military recommendations. In this way you again widen your options and alternatives.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

164. Editorial Note

On the morning of March 31, 1966, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Francis Bator drafted a memorandum to Bill Moyers, the President's Press Secretary, in which he outlined the points Moyers might want to make at a National Security Council staff meeting scheduled for noon that day, including the fact that "as long as [there was] no final appointment of new Special Assistant for National Security, Moyers will act in that capacity." (Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Chron File) The meeting, however, was not held.

At a news conference that began at 12:30 p.m. March 31, the President announced that he was naming Walt W. Rostow, who had served since late 1961 as Counselor for the Department of State and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council, as Special Assistant to the President. The appointment became effective the next day. The President indicated that Rostow would "come to the White House to work principally, but not necessarily exclusively, in the field of foreign policy. I will especially look to him for the development of long-range plans in that field, as well as special coordination of Latin American development." When asked by a reporter whether it could be said that Rostow would "take over all or many of the duties and assignments handled by McGeorge Bundy," the President responded: "it could be, but that would be inaccurate. It would not be true. Most of the men play any position here. We hope--I hope Mr. Rostow can. Part of the work Mr. Bundy did we will say will now be done by Mr. Komer. Some of the work Mr. Bundy did is now being done by Jack Valenti and Bill Moyers." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pages 384-392. Within 4 days of appointing Rostow, the President designated both him and Moyers as Bundy's replacement on the National Security Council's 303 Committee, which reviewed and approved covert actions (see Document 249 and footnote 4 thereto). However, Moyers attended only one 303 Committee meeting as a regular member, while Rostow attended regularly. (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes)

In reporting Rostow's appointment in its April 1 issue, The New York Times stated that the President seemed "reluctant to put in the hands of one man the kind of power within Government that Mr. Bundy had. In effect, Mr. Bundy created within the White House a little State Department that rode herd on many aspects of foreign policy. The President apparently intends to shift many of the policy-making aspects of the post back to the State Department, using a number of men inside the White House as personal advisers to him on foreign affairs."

Washington, March 31, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron. No classification marking. Smith sent a less detailed memorandum to Bundy on October 6, 1965, outlining national security information sent to the President each day. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Intelligence and Information on National Security Problems

1. Classified information and intelligence is now being sent to you in the following forms:

a. Morning Report from the Situation Room is delivered to the Usher in the House at 7:00 A.M. every day.

It is a one-page summary of military developments in Vietnam during our nighttime based on MACV reports from Saigon relayed by the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon.

If there has been a major civil or military development in any foreign area it is summarized in an additional paragraph.

b. Important cables from Heads of State, Prime Minister, U.S. Ambassadors or U.S. Commanders in the field which we think would be of interest to you.

These include special field reports written for you and substantive messages addressed to you personally.

They are typed here and sent to your office with explanatory notes.

/2/See Document 214.

It is a 3 to 7-page highly classified capsule report based on intelligence from all sources and written especially for you. It includes maps and photographs when appropriate.

Editorial guidance is given here to ensure that it focuses on your interests.

/3/See Document 1.

It is a 2-page report from Secretary Rusk summarizing Department actions and policy information received during the day.

e. National Security information on major problems consisting of selected cables, intelligence documents and reports.

These are sent to your office throughout each day as they are received here by courier, classified teletype or classified facsimile transmission.

Special reports on critical situations are prepared here during the day on the basis of information from State, Defense, CIA, NASA, etc.

After office hours there is on duty in the White House Situation Room a Watch Officer always on call. He has available to him information and intelligence reports forwarded by teletype and courier from the State Department, the Pentagon, and CIA.

2. For some time we have not checked with you to find out whether the information and intelligence we send up is meeting your need. Any suggestions or guidance would be very helpful. For example:

Cables--We are sending

too many

/4/The President checked this option.

about right

Summaries--We are sending

too long

too brief

/4/The President checked this option.

Foreign Situations-We are reporting on

too many

/4/The President checked this option.

about right

Intelligence Estimates--

/4/The President checked this option.

I prefer short summaries of them

The Vietnam War--

Continue to report entirely in writing

/4/The President checked this option.

Evening Reading--

/4/The President checked this option.

Less for evening reading

Continue as now

Bromley Smith

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966--. No classification marking. The document was presumably written soon after April 1, 1966, when Rostow succeeded Bundy. Rostow wrote numerous fragmentary notes on the memorandum, presumably reflecting his thoughts and reactions while reading it. Some have been noted below. At the top of page one of the memorandum Rostow wrote "Talk to Brom" (Bromley Smith).

WWR

SUBJECT
Internal Communications

I promised you a memo on this, because--for an operation which lives on speed and wits--it is obviously important that there be minimum slippage in communications. Physical separation makes the problem more important. (If we were all sitting in the basement, the chance of not getting hold of relevant papers would be much reduced. Although I enjoy the exercise, foraging expeditions across West Executive Avenue are only a partial substitute.)

In any case, I would suggest the following--most but not all of it already SOP:

1. Outgoing Cables for Clearing: We will have to work out what cables State does and does not send over for clearance as we go along. This is obviously a delicate question. As regards the European and non-regional economic cables which do come over, I suggest that they be routed automatically to me. I will clear, haggle, check with you, check with the President (routing through you), as appropriate. But primary responsibility for the cable-clearing business on Europe and non-regional economics should, I think, be here.

/2/Rostow wrote "if possible--we'll try real hard" above the line at this point.

/3/Rostow wrote "I know" in the margin next to this sentence.

/4/In the margin next to this sentence Rostow wrote "in general yes-but can't guarantee 100%. I will decide."

/5/Rostow wrote "Decision made here" in the margin next to this sentence.

/6/Rostow wrote "me" after "Treasury."

/7/Rostow wrote above the line at this point "no--all."

6. Your European and Economic Memoranda to the President: It would be helpful, and avoid crossed wires, if you could let me see copies of your memoranda to the President on Europe or non-regional economic matters.

7. Exdis Daily Summaries, State Evening Report, President's Schedule: Because the inflow of relevant cables is enormous, the Exdis Summaries are useful in giving a quick lead to what is hot. As regards the Secretary's Daily Report, it is important and useful to know what information the President is getting. I am aware that these are delicate documents, but rather less delicate than a lot of the standard business for which I have responsibility. (If these were held for me in the Situation Room on a routine basis, I would be prepared to read them over there. This is a nuisance, but less of a nuisance than foraging, which is what I do now.)

/9/Rostow circled "for execution" and wrote in the margin "reserve--check with me."

10. Weekends: Ed Hamilton, who is really a gem--as discreet and sensible as he is able--will continue to be my stand-in and communication center on weekends. For some months he has been privy to everything going on in my office and, whenever I am not available, should have full access to all the above. He will be in close touch with me on the telephone.

I put all this on paper because it is critical to our providing the President with efficient and effective service. Every one of us is operating on very, very thin margins on speed, wits and 12-plus hours worth of energy per day. If our own internal information system bogs down the job becomes entirely unmanageable.

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, April 8, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. No classification marking. At the top of page 1 is a handwritten note from Rostow to Bromley Smith stating "good memo."

WWR:

/2/The composition of the NSC staff as of March 31, including individual responsibilities and types of appointments, is described in an attachment to a memorandum from Bator to Moyers, March 31. Also attached is a second memorandum from Bator to Moyers, March 31, that describes the NSC staff as of August 1965 and notes that, since that date, the staff had lost Bundy, Komer, Klein, Cooper, and Chase, none of whom had been replaced. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Chron File)

As I see it, this staff has three very clear but often distinct functions:

1. To frame decisions and other actions for the President in the broadest possible perspective. Actions range from big--how to move next in India-Pakistan--to small--simple letters and minor loan decisions. No one but a small staff close to the President sees things from his point of view. A paper cleared through the bureaucracy rarely tells the President what the real choices are or all the reasons pro and con. Those papers usually recommend. Only staff that has participated in the debate on an issue from beginning to end can take the President behind those recommendations to see what his real choices and their consequences are. It can also protect him from oversight. In all humility, I doubt the President himself realizes the extent to which the Departments don't do that for him.

2. To put the President's stamp on policy by injecting his viewpoint into deliberations early. As Schlesinger says, this government is a "sprawling" affair "filled with strong men eager to go into business on their own." This staff can be a major tool in bringing the town into line with the President's thinking. It can be a device for strengthening his grip. Using the staff this way also makes government more efficient by putting its vast resources to work on the problems the President wants solved in ways he wants them solved without a lot of waste motion.

3. To generate new initiatives and concepts. Line officers don't readily swallow planners' ideas. The best are good at plotting a course of action, but even they fear rocking the boat with innovation. A small staff close to the President can get new ideas into the mainstream and force their consideration where intra-departmental planners may have trouble. Moreover, only this level can see where opportunities are falling between the stools. But no small staff at this level can come up with all the new ideas there are on all the problems we face. So the staff's job is partly to spark the imagination of experts everywhere and to focus their thinking on the President's problems.

The main problem in combining these functions is that, here at the top, planner and operator must become one. At one extreme, it's possible to get so immersed in tactics, cables and operational problems that there's no time to think. At the other, a really good think-project can cost you the advantage of staying ahead of events. (This suggests that one advantage in having two people work on an area is the flexibility to divide the labor ad hoc and give each a crack at both phases of the job without sacrificing either. )

To function effectively, staff members need three things:

1. They must know the President's thinking. The only reason the rest of the town listens is because it thinks it may be hearing the President. This doesn't mean that every staff member has to talk to the President. It does mean that every staff member must talk to his chief who does. (When two people work on an area, both must have this access.)

2. They must take part in the town's debate. The moment they lose touch, their thinking loses its sharp edge. Instead of leading debate to the next step, they run behind, trying to catch up. (In practical terms, this means that when two people work on an area, some way must be found to keep both in the mainstream.)

3. They should be in touch with the frontiers of thinking outside government as well as in. We have done least of this in the past.

1. Stay operational. In my view, it would be a mistake to make it purely a long-range thinking outfit. It must stay in the middle of the dialogue between the President and the town. Its job--if it serves the President well--is not just to come up with ideas. Its job is to put ideas to work. So it must stay with the stream of daily business to have any effect. This may seem overly tactical, but an administration imparts a particular flavor to its policy as much through a persistent posture in tactical matters as through dramatic decisions. Also policy most easily runs off the rails on tactical questions.

If this staff has failed in any way, it has been not "overly operational" but "not think-oriented enough." For instance, we (at least on Near East matters) have had very little contact outside the executive branch. So one area for new activity would be more active and broader outside contacts (conferences, touch with interest groups, etc.)

2. Staff members must play more than a staff role in its purest sense and become advocates. This would be a slight shift in character. The staff has always tried to force consideration of new ideas, but it has sometimes been wary of peddling them too hard. There is danger in this because the President's men must be able to give him a balanced view of his choices without grinding their own axes. But new ideas die quickly unless pushed hard.

3. The staff must be willing to wrestle certain decisions into the White House. It may be putting things backwards, but the staff's influence depends almost exclusively on the President's desire to hold tight the decision-making reins. I assume he intends to because that's the way he works, but the moment he stops, the staff loses its wedge into the policy-formulating councils. Maybe one reason the Eisenhower NSC staff gained a reputation as a paper mill was that many of the real decisions weren't made in the White House. This may all seem self-evident; but it's a fact that a staff like this not willing to engage will soon be cut out and just become a paper-handling outfit.

What's this have to do with me? Let's be blunt. Where two people work on an area, both need contact with you and jobs of their own to do. This means a vertical division of labor with each man running his own projects with you and with the town. If the division is exclusively horizontal, the junior member ends up getting only the crumbs that fall from the senior's table. That just kills the victim's usefulness to the staff. I realize this is a two-way proposition--that each member must justify having an independent voice via his contribution. But the setup also has to encourage it.

Hal

Washington, April 29, 1966, 4:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11-5. Confidential. Copies were sent to Moyers and Kintner.

/2/Not further identified.

/3/An NSC meeting on Vietnam, in which Lodge participated, was held on May 10. Lodge returned to Washington for consultations in early May and departed May 17.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, May 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill D. Moyers, BDM Memos. No classification marking. The memorandum is an unsigned copy.

/2/Not found.

Work, furthermore, flows not from one layer to another, but directly from the President's needs. There is no pattern to it that can be fitted to a chart.

Harry McPherson, for example, is Chief Counsel, handling legal matters, speeches, and programs of civil rights and natural beauty; but he does a hundred of special assignments each week which go beyond those general descriptions, which transcend other people's responsibilities, and which can't be fitted into a box. So does everyone else on the staff.

In his own mind the President knows what each man does; he doesn't need an organization chart to show him. In our minds, we know what the President expects of us; a chart is irrelevant.

Every time a new man has come to the White House, the President has asked him to prepare a chart: Moyers, Watson, Valenti, and Califano have all tried. It is an irrelevant operation which never produces anything useful.

Nonetheless, since the President has asked you to prepare something, you should proceed to carry out his instructions. I do not believe it would be wise to have Milt Semer talk to the White House staff about what they do, since Joe Califano did this only a few months ago. If anyone talks to them, you should, because you are clearly the senior man in experience. But I believe it would be misuse of your time. I recommend you get the chart Joe Califano prepared following his exercise, revise it somewhat if necessary, and submit it to the President.

Alternately, you could prepare a chart as I suggested the other day, showing the radial nature of the staff.

Next point: Thanks for the point about Mike Foster. I'll look into him. If the President asks you about briefers, simply tell him we're scouting for men, but it is hard to find someone who can come in cold and do better than Fleming.

Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. A copy was sent to Jim Jones of the White House staff.

I am informed that you wish to schedule regular NSC meetings at two-week intervals.

/2/Rostow's May 24 telephone conversation with Ball regarding NSC meetings, during which he discussed McNamara's proposals, is summarized in a memorandum of conversation, May 24. (Ibid., Ball Papers, India)

We believe you will still wish to use formal NSC meetings from time to time as you have in the past; i.e., for the presentation of recommendations on major problems like Viet Nam and NATO.

But the following appear the conditions for making a regular NSC series a success.

--We must not pretend the NSC meetings are the occasion when you will actually be making your major foreign policy decisions.

--On the other hand, we must avoid creating a paper mill that would produce unimportant or uninteresting briefings for you.

There are two areas for successful regular NSC meetings, within these limits:

1. Well staffed presentation of issues which will, in the fairly near future, be coming to you for decision and on which your principal advisers should exchange views in a preliminary, informal way, against the background of a paper defining carefully and precisely the elements in the problem.

2. Intelligence briefings based on information not to be found in either the New York Times or in the normal flow of intelligence (this might include briefings on new technical developments of far-reaching implication).

With respect to the first type of subject, a good example is the Indian nuclear question. I would like to suggest this as the subject for a meeting of the NSC late next week (or the following, if you do not wish both a Cabinet and NSC session in the next week).

The problem is complex. It has been well staffed out at the planning level. There is no agreed view in the town as to whether we can do anything--or what it is we can and should do.

The subject is hot because the third Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has increased the pressure in India to go for a nuclear device. Chet Bowles has sent us a cable outlining the alternatives.

/3/An NSC meeting on Indian nuclear weapons was held on June 9. At the beginning of the meeting the President "indicated that this was the first of a series of NSC meetings to be devoted to the discussion of complex problems requiring careful exploration before they were to come to him for decision." (Summary notes of the 558th NSC meeting; ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings File)

Another subject might be the Israel de-salting project.

I also propose that we go to work immediately to produce for you a list of other such important, foreseeable problems, plus possible intelligence problems; submit that list to you; and, on the basis of your reaction, set in motion systematic staff work in the town on the basis of a schedule looking, say, four or five sessions ahead.

Only on the basis of such a reliable schedule can we assure that the staff work will be serious and worthy of your attention at an NSC meeting.

One implication is that, within the limits of your schedule, we must try very hard to be regular about these meetings. This is desirable because Council members can plan their advance schedules so as to avoid conflicts or absences from Washington on the regular Council meeting day.

Walt

BKS

the week after

/4/The President checked this option.

/5/The President crossed out "better" and wrote "good also."

See me

/6/The President checked this option.

See me

/7/The President checked both dates.

See me

From 12:02 to 12:45 p.m. on May 27, 1966, the President and Vice President met in the Cabinet Room with Special Assistant Walt Rostow and 16 members of the National Security Council Staff. The President outlined major themes of his administration, and various NSC staff members presented subjects on which they were working. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A memorandum for the record summarizing the meeting, prepared by NSC staff member Harold Saunders on June 13 and printed in volume X of Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Document 129, indicates that "the President said he was very happy with the memos, analyses, and recommendations coming from the staff. What he would like to see more of now is 'ten new ideas' in his reading folder every night. He said these were beginning to flow but he wanted more and more of them."

In a memorandum for the record prepared January 24, 1992, and based on notes taken during the meeting, Rostow stated that he requested that the President meet with the NSC staff because "they wrote a flow of memoranda which he read and on which he depended, but they rarely saw him." According to Rostow's memorandum, the President's remarks included the following comments about the staff's work: 1) "I expect of you three things: information, analyses, and recommendations. But I expect you to bring to your technical work a sense of concern, responsibility, and obligation"; 2) "In developing proposals for me I want you to unlock your brains; let your proposals reflect new ideas and your visions. I don't need a staff to maintain the status quo"; and 3) "As for your jobs on the NSC staff, each of you has the most challenging assignment a man can have. Your President wants ten ideas a week from each of you. Cut it to nine, but one will give me satisfaction. Dream your dreams and let me have them." (Johnson Library, Reference File, Walt Rostow)

Washington, May 30, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, Notebook on NSC Meetings, 1966. Confidential. Lot 72 D 318 contains three notebooks with State Department briefings and other backup material for NSC meetings from June 9, 1966 through November 25, 1968.

SUBJECT
Regular NSC Meetings; Request for Suggested Agenda Items

The President has instructed the White House staff to schedule NSC meetings every other Thursday, starting Thursday, June 9 at 1:00 p.m. The meetings are scheduled to last 45 minutes, and every effort will be made to hold them on a regular schedule.

According to the White House staff the NSC meetings will be as they have been in the past, for "the presentation of recommendations on major problems like Vietnam and NATO", but they will not be the occasions when the President will be asked to make major foreign policy decisions. Emphasis will be placed on the presentation of and exchange of views on issues which may shortly thereafter be coming to the President for decision. The NSC members will be expected to exchange views against the background of papers defining the elements of the problem and discussing available options for the USG and their implications. It is envisaged that the end product of most of these meetings, aside from a common look of the problem, would be Presidential instructions as to the next steps in policy formulation, rather than "final decisions".

Meetings will also be used for briefings on important intelligence matters not adequately covered in the normal flow of current information, such as "significant, new technical developments."

In order to make the NSC meetings useful to the President and to the participants, the White House will need the papers to be considered 4 or 5 days in advance of the meeting whenever possible, but never less than 48 hours ahead of time, so that the President and the Council members will have an opportunity to study the submissions in advance.

The White House has requested the Department (and each NSC member) to submit a list of appropriate subjects for early NSC consideration. If there are any such issues in your area please let me have your suggestions by c.o.b. Wednesday, June 1, for review by the Acting Secretary and forwarding to the White House.

BHR

Washington, August 12, 1966, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol.

11. No classification marking.

Mr. President:

I take two weeks leave starting tomorrow. I do so with some trepidation, although:

--leave is necessary for year-round efficiency;

--It is always good for a bureaucrat to be reminded that the U.S. Government can operate very well without him;

--I am confident that your National Security Staff is geared to serve you for this time without me.

Brom Smith will be the central point of communication, as well as for intelligence, AEC, military and related matters. He will also fill in on Latin America for that part of the two weeks when Bill Bowdler will be away, and coordinate with Bob Kintner on speech raw materials our staff will be generating.

On other substantive matters, you have a sturdy senior team:

--Francis Bator, of course, on Europe and foreign economic policy;

--William Jorden, Viet Nam and the Far East;

--Howard Wriggins, India-Pakistan and the Middle East;

--Bill Bowdler, Latin America;

--Ed Hamilton, Africa.

As you know, I run the staff without a single deputy; but they all know their business now; work well together; and are looking forward to serving you in any way you may direct. We've gone over together carefully how they will operate without me.

I've also spoken to Bill Moyers, who is ready to lend a hand if needed.

I figure I'm a pretty poor administrator if I can't organize the shop to operate in my absence.

On the other hand, I would be greatly distressed if you didn't feel wholly free to telephone me or whistle me back. (Everyone has my Martha's Vineyard telephone number.) This is a pretty lively time in foreign affairs; and, to my great pleasure, right now I'm your boy.

I shall complete my three drafting assignments for Bob Kintner before the day is out.

Looking ahead, we have three major foreign policy issues for which we should prepare our minds:

--the German-UK-US offsets-troop issue on which Francis filed a good memorandum last night;

--the arms limitation-spare parts problem with India and Pakistan;

--a review at one time of all the various possible arms control measures, including where we go with non-proliferation.

On all I advise against haste. The staff work on the third needs most attention; but I've left instructions to get this in shape in my absence.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, April 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC Personnel. Personal and Confidential.

SUBJECT
Ideas on Staffing

/2/Howard Wriggins, an NSC staff member whose areas of responsibility were South Asia and the Middle East; Wriggins left the NSC staff in July.

1. Should this person be from inside or outside the government? Are we seeking someone of independent stature or someone from within the ranks who knows both the NEA area and the bureaucracy? My own feeling is that, although it may limit our scope, it's extremely important to have someone who knows his way around the bureaucracy. Right or wrong, much of our role is knowing how to get the best possible job done for the President rather than staking out the far-reaching guideposts of strategy. We try to inject as much of the latter as possible, but I believe we lead chiefly by our ability to influence week-to-week proposals as they're formulated for the President.

2. If we pick somebody within the Government, what background? There's a good argument for staying away from Foreign Service officers because they may be reluctant unless unusually well connected at State to push the Department very hard. People like Bill Bowdler manage this pretty well because of their personal relationships. However, an honest skepticism of the Department's approach to things does no harm in this job. I think the problem would be less so getting someone from Defense or AID, although they're specialized agencies and it would take a pretty broad-gauged person to meet our needs. The one other possibility is CIA. My mind naturally runs in that direction since I know people there and came from there myself. Obviously a good man can overcome minor handicaps, but I'd like to know whether you have strong feelings.

3. What level officer do you have in mind? The choice, as I see it, is between a junior assistant (such as I was when I came to work for Komer in 1961) and an alter ego. In practical terms this choice is between (a) a fellow 28-33 with 7-10 years of experience (maybe GS 11-13, O-4-6) and one with ten plus years of experience (around GS-14 or O-3-4).

Obviously we want the strongest person possible. On the other hand, experience in this job shows that one person must clearly be in charge of the whole show and that it's impossible to divide up the area in any way except by dividing the daily work load. This suggests a clearly senior-junior relationship. Although the supervisory relationship is largely a matter of personalities, it's important to me not to have any question about who is in charge simply to avoid friction.

Once we've had a chat on these questions, I'll run up a list of candidates for you, and we can be more precise.

[Omitted here is discussion of a minor administrative matter.]

Hal

On April 15, 1967, Francis Bator, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, testified before the President's Task Force on Government Organization. During a presentation that focused on the larger issue of managing interdepartmental foreign policy-making, Bator also commented on the specific foreign policy role of the White House staff. For text of his notes on that part of his presentation, see Document 118, Part III, Role of the White House Staff.

Washington, May 3, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Hamilton Memos. Eyes Only.

WWR:

/2/Bator's resignation was announced on July 20 and became effective September 1.

/3/April 28.

I think it makes sense for me to continue handling sub-Saharan Africa. I have invested a fair amount of effort in learning the Continent and the segment of the foreign affairs establishment assigned to it. It would take time for another man to duplicate my relations with Joe Palmer & Company; this cost should only be incurred if there is some offsetting benefit.

However, except for crisis periods, visits, etc., the Black Africa account is not a full-time job. It can be made into one, but I don't think that the dividends to the President justify expenditure of a full-time slot for Africa alone. Moreover, if I am to continue and expand my activities in the area of AID policy and programs, the African account alone is not a very good base. It is small and clearly at the bottom of Bill Gaud's totem pole. My relations with Gaud are excellent, but it would be much easier to swing weight on major issues if I had strong direct responsibility in one of the areas where AID's heart is.

This, together with other factors, leads me to a preference for South Asia. My responsibilities in the Budget Bureau, before my tenure as Assistant to Kermit Gordon, included economic programs in Near East/South Asia. I have spent some time in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; I have been somehow involved in most of the major policy questions in those areas in the past five years. It seems to me that this would be the optimal base from which I could operate with AID, and with Agriculture and other Departments on food aid and related programs.

Let me repeat that if you have decided on, or are considering, assignment of Hal Saunders to cover South Asia as well as the Near East, I do not want to stand in the way. Hal is first-rate and very experienced in this area. He has my strong support for whatever responsibility you want to give him. I raise the above possibility only because you suggested you may be thinking of splitting the account.

It could be argued that splitting off South Asia will present a bureaucratic problem with State/AID in that two people would be dealing with Luke Battle and Maury Williams. I doubt that this would be a serious problem. With Hal handling the Mahgreb, we now have two people dealing with Joe Palmer without difficulty. The Near East/South Asia has always been a shotgun marriage; the Near East--including North Africa--is a reasonably coherent region, but South Asia is an entirely different problem. Moreover, I have spent enough time on South Asia to have a fair working knowledge of the NEA/NESA personnel, and would expect to begin with something of a running start.

In summary, assuming you have decided to split the NESA account, I would propose that I use the time I have previously devoted to Europe (at least half-time, on the average) to South Asia, while continuing to handle Black Africa.

I would group our economic business under four heads: trade, aid, international money and balance of payments. If Ed Fried were to come over, I would think he would be a natural for trade, that it makes sense for me to continue with aid, and that we might split the other two problems, perhaps allocating money to him and the balance of payments to me. (This assumes Ed would also be carrying a regional account. If he isn't, he should have both money and balance of payments.) It may be useful for me to take each of these categories in turn and comment on the special problems involved in each:

1. Aid: It is very difficult to have a strong and continuing impact on aid matters unless one has a regional base which involves him in a healthy portion of the specific issues which occupy the Administrator. There are a few general problems each year--the Message, the Bill, etc.--but most AID policy gets made in regional contexts, usually in South Asia or Latin America. Thus, it makes sense to marry the general AID mandate with one of those regional charters. I might add that the aid franchise inevitably, and rightly, also includes most of the work pertaining to the regional development banks and the World Bank/IDA, as well as food aid. In these cases as well, a strong regional base is an invaluable asset.

2. Trade: This account presents a spectrum running from customs conventions and air agreements to the general problem of post-Kennedy Round trade policy. It is already clear that the latter will involve a public committee which will require a fair amount of staff work, much of it done here. Ed Fried will bring much more knowledge and experience to these problems than I, and should certainly have the primary responsibility in this area.

3. International Money: Depending on when Francis leaves, we may be just approaching the hump or be just over it when Fried arrives. This is probably the most difficult economic account to pick up quickly. Again, I would recommend that Ed have the lead, but it may make sense for us to work together until he is comfortable with continuing alone.

4. Balance of Payments: It could be argued that the responsibility for this can of worms should go along either with money or with aid. My own feeling is that, unfortunately, it more often involves aid than money. Thus, I am perfectly willing to take it on--but also perfectly willing to give it to Ed if he has strong feelings on the subject.

Again, there would be more togetherness than separation in any division. We would have to live a good deal with each other. I, for one, would look forward to it.

As I have said to you, and implied above, I do not think that I should be assigned to handle Europe. This is not so much a professional judgment as a bureaucratic one. With all his assets--ranging from his immense ability to the leverage provided by his Presidential appointment--Francis has had to overcome enormous resistance in order to play the effective and independent White House hand on Europe which I think is necessary. I think it would be a disservice to the President to gamble that someone of my age and relative juniority could pick up where he left off. At best, it would be a long shot and it would take time. When one adds in the fact that my primary interests are the problems of the less-developed world, it becomes a bad idea all around.

I certainly agree with you that there is a powerful case that the trade and money accounts go with the man responsible for Europe. Most issues in these fields are closely interlocked with European politics and are handled by the same people in State and Treasury. Thus, the optimal solution is certainly a man who can handle both. Ed Fried may well be that man. He probably stands well enough in the Department to gain quick admission to the right clubs, and he is eminently qualified to hold up his end in the policy debate. Thus, if he will take the job, he has my strong support; I would be happy to help him in any way possible.

However, there are very few Ed Frieds. If he decides against coming over, you may want to consider splitting off Europe. In that event, I think Mort Halperin (Special Assistant to John McNaughton) is the best candidate I know for the European account. He is very bright, well balanced and would, I think, keep firmly in mind who is President. I would strongly recommend him if the Fried thing falls through.

Whoever takes the European account will need help. Specifically, he will need a middle-level Foreign Service officer who knows the European Bureau. Larry Eagleburger has been of invaluable assistance to Francis; if he did not exist, it would surely be necessary to invent him. Thus, I would suggest you think of the replacement problem as a two-man parlay.

I have that Polonius-like feeling of peddling bromides. My apologies for the lecture.

EH

Washington, May 11, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No

Mr. President:

I made this point quite vividly by getting out the file of Tuesday lunch meetings and, without giving anything away, indicated the extraordinary range of issues that are dealt with at lunch.

/2/Chalmers Roberts, Carroll Kilpatrick, and Murray Marder. Presumably they interviewed Rostow in connection with the preparation of the article, "At Tuesday Lunch, Decisions Are on the Menu," that appeared in The Washington Post on May 21.

I also gave them some sense of how the meeting is organized and how it proceeds.

Beyond that, I made these fundamental points:

--The whole national security machinery is, must be, and always will be organized to serve the particular needs of a particular President. There is no single, correct formula; but only what helps a President do his job the way he wants it done.

--In the case of President Johnson, a great deal of business is done through orderly paper work flowing to him for decision. In fact, 90% of the job of our staff is to make sure that we are an effective and reliable means of communication two ways: to the President and from the President.

--Beyond that, the President relies on a number of different types of meetings with the senior advisors to assess problems and to make decisions: the Tuesday lunch; special ad hoc meetings on particular subjects (tripartite negotiations, Punta del Este, India food, balance of payments, etc.); and NSC meetings of the anticipatory type we are now regularly mounting.

--I then described the particularly close relation between the President and his two senior advisors--Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara. I noted that we had only rarely in our experience--if ever--so close and confident relations among the three men at the apex of national security affairs.

--In response to their questions, I explained at some length the job we do here and drew a sharp distinction between the task of a Cabinet officer who has to run one of the great departments and deal with the Congress, present himself before the country and the world, and a White House aide.

--In response to specific questions, I said there was no sharp split in the government on Viet Nam policy or bombing: we all looked at the facts together; listened to each other's arguments, and then carried out as a team the President's decision.

--When further questioned about my own views, I said that I had no very special views to press, contrary to those of my senior colleagues; but that if anyone tried to use the post I now hold for lobbying, he would soon be out of his job--and properly so.

--I took some pains to emphasize by concrete example what you have been able to accomplish in foreign affairs in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, and East-West affairs, despite the heavy burdens of Viet Nam.

Walt

On June 7, 1967, President Johnson established a Special Committee of the National Security Council to coordinate United States policy in the Middle East in the wake of the Six-Day War, which began on June 5. The President named McGeorge Bundy, who took a leave of absence from the Ford Foundation, to be the committee's Executive Secretary. The committee ended its formal work in mid-August. In a memorandum to the President, August 24, 1967, McGeorge Bundy recommended arrangements for continuing the work of the committee through the normal machinery of government. The files of the Special Committee are in the National Security File at the Johnson Library. Selected notes of committee meetings and memoranda of its decisions are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

Washington, September 25, 1967, 9 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 43. No classification marking.

Mr. President:

Our National Security Staff is now reorganized in the wake of the departure of Howard Wriggins and Francis Bator.

The attached sheet shows the assignments of responsibility.

Rather than having a single deputy, I regard the senior men as my deputies, each in his own field. Filing their materials through Brom Smith, they have proved they can operate smoothly when we are travelling or I am otherwise absent.

In a number of cases they have junior officers working with them, as indicated.

I think we are now set up to cope with the tasks ahead. Specifically:

--Dick Moose is not only serving to help link George Christian's shop to State and Defense press operations, but also keeping an eye on quick responses to Congress by State and Defense.

--Kaplan's shop, under Bill Jorden, is beginning to function on Viet Nam public relations issues.

--We should be capable of quick responses, speech drafting, and other foreign affairs backstop work in the course of the campaign; although that we shall have to prove.

I would greatly welcome any thoughts you have at this stage about improving the work of the shop.

/2/No record of such a meeting has been found. A meeting was scheduled for September 28 but not held. Rostow's briefing memorandum for the meeting is at the Johnson Library. (Bromley Smith Papers, Memos Written by Mr. Smith, Signed by Others)

/3/See Document 171.

Walt

/4/None of the options is checked.

No

See me

National Security Council Staff

Bromley Smith

Edward Fried

Richard Ullman

Nathaniel Davis

Edward Hamilton

Roger Morris

William Bowdler

Harold Saunders

(an assistant being recruited)

William Jorden

Alfred Jenkins: Communist China

Harold Kaplan: Public affairs re Viet Nam

Marshall Wright

Spurgeon Keeny

Charles Johnson

Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh

Peter Jessup

Richard Moose

Communications and Operational Intelligence

Arthur McCafferty

Washington, March 15, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA.

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

[Omitted here are an introductory discussion and a discussion comparing Eisenhower's "institutional system" for organizing national security with a Kennedy system, the key to which "was a few important people and the groups and committees they set up."]

III. It's obvious from what I've already said that President Kennedy chose the less institutional approach. But what about President Johnson and the system as it operates today.

A. The simple answer is that President Johnson is between the two extremes I've described but much closer to Kennedy than to Eisenhower. There is, of course, the obvious historical fact the President Johnson developed his system from what he inherited from President Kennedy. But there is the far more important fact that President Johnson, like President Kennedy in this way, determined to keep his own hand on the foreign policy helm.

B. President Johnson's system didn't really emerge until spring 1966. Two concurrent events precipitated it--McGB's departure and Maxwell Taylor's return from Vietnam and review for the President of our organization to backstop overseas operations.

C. President Johnson has acted on two principles:

1. He personally wants to make a large number of decisions.

a. For example, aid and PL 480 approvals. These are good examples of the President's problems of coordination--aid, diplomacy, domestic economics and politics.

2. However, short of his own decision-making, he wants the State Department--not an especially large staff in the Executive Office--to coordinate our foreign policy and programs.

a. Set up the SIG and IRGs as the mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination.

b. Interesting to look back at some of the press comment when these groups were formed. The main comment then was that Bundy would not be replaced and that the President was strengthening the real State Department and killing the "little State Department" in the White House. But the idea was rather to strengthen State's mandate and machinery for coordinating the activities of the other foreign affairs agencies. State could have done this before but it didn't, so this gave it the formal mandate. Meanwhile, the small White House staff remains strong because the President keeps his own firm hand on the wheel.

D. What machinery does this leave the President to help him?

1. The Rostow staff--that "small personal staff" the Jackson Committee spoke of to provide "help and protection." Through this group of about a dozen principal officers flow the great majority of decisions the President must make. From here, too, flow the themes that set the tone for national policy. (For instance, Rostow regionalism, State of the Union--the Great Transition.) This staff also presides over a continuing dialogue between the President and the professionals.

2. Where discussion between the President and his cabinet officers is required, two institutions:

a. Tuesday lunch.

b. NSC in present format.

3. To deal with emergencies, the Special Committee of the NSC on the Middle East. Why it was needed and what it accomplished.

IV. So where do we find policy in a system like this? You find it principally in the views and wishes of the President and those who effectively implement or block them.

1. Real lifeblood of this "system" is the deep personal involvement of President in details of major policy decisions and often implementation. Behind this is a complex of "interlocking directorates." A small number of key men--under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and key staff members backstopped the President. To this nucleus is added a further group of key people responsible for specific areas and problems. If anything can accurately be described as "the invisible government" it is not the insidious CIA but this small group of key policy-makers.

2. Still find written guidance in NSAMs, State Policy Guidelines, and new series of national policy papers. The collection of papers is not so neat as the old book of NSC papers, and the bureaucracy--especially in the Pentagon--often complains. The new NPP's are designed to fill this gap (responsible officer idea).

3. However, equally important concept is that you don't find policy on paper. It's a "mix of people and ideas." From the President's point of view, this requires continual prodding and needling from the White House. The problem recognized in 1947 is still with us--someone must wrap up the many loose ends in the complex foreign policy field. Some people feel SecState should do this, but it doesn't always work out that way. I'm sure you see my peculiar approach in this statement. I'm deeply conscious that the President is a man elected to take the country along a certain course. When he takes office, the bureaucracy may not always agree with him. His job is to move it, or at least to apply enough pressure so that a good balance between new directions and old realities evolves. The organization for national security is no less than the machinery each president modifies or builds to help him do his job. So you really find policy in the views and wishes of the President and those who effectively implement or block them.

V. Where does CIA fit into this structure?

A. Set up by the National Security Act to provide intelligence basis for realistic policy--both collection and analysis. What does this mean?

1. There must be a place in government where the policy-maker's tough questions can be answered. So the intelligence community's job is to collect the data on which answers can be based and then to apply those data to those questions. Much of the intelligence function is simply to report what is going on, and that's important. But the real job is to add enough analysis to the reporting to make it relevant. (I may be talking out of school to say this, but some of the community's product is irrelevant today.)

a. In this connection, it can provide a detached source of information--a sort of touchstone against which to measure policy. All other sources of info--foreign service, attach?s--also have policy axes to grind. CIA--at least the intelligence-producing side of it as contrasted to the spook side--the ivory tower of government.

2. There must also be an organ of government that can compete with our adversaries on their own ground. The Communists have a unique instrument in the Communist parties. Our intelligence operations provide our only organizational counter.

B. What is the Agency's chief product?

1. It has its formal channels of communication--regular publications (some especially for WH), briefings, etc.

2. I think its more important product is the people it sends into policy-making councils. In a sense, the Agency's chief product is its director or whoever represents the intelligence viewpoint in meetings where policy consensus emerges.

Washington, July 24, 1968, 6:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA.

Mr. President:

While I am away on leave, Brom Smith will manage the office, the flow of intelligence, the Tuesday lunch agenda, etc.

As you know, he is knowledgeable, wise, wholly discreet, and reliable. He works well directly with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, Dick Helms, etc.

The substantive issues are distributed as follows in the senior staff which is now experienced and used to team-work.

Ed Fried: Western Europe; NATO; money; trade, including East-West trade.

Nat Davis: Russia; Eastern Europe (including Czech crisis); UN.

Bill Bowdler: Latin America.

Hal Saunders: Middle East plus North Africa.

Spurg Keeny: Arms control; scientific aspects of weapons. (Works with Bob Ginsburgh on preparations for Soviet missile talks.)

Bob Ginsburgh: Military and negotiating aspects of Vietnam. Military aspects of NATO and Czech crisis.

Marshall Wright: Far East in general, plus political-economic aspects of Vietnam.

Ed Hamilton: Africa; India-Pakistan; aid problems in general.

They will file, via Brom, their memoranda directly to you.

Walt

Washington, December 5, 1968, 10:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No classification marking.

Mr. President:

/2/The President met with Kissinger and Rostow from 12:40 to 1:51 p.m. on December 5. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

1. There are only a few points of advice that one Administration can give another with respect to organizing the business of government; but there are a few based on hard-won experience which relate to the task which Henry is about to undertake.

2. First--and above all--the organization should meet the working style and convenience of the President. No two Presidents are the same. The only right way to organize is to serve the President's needs.

3. Before making changes in the national security field, study carefully how things are done. The system that exists in 1968 is the result of the accumulative lessons of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years; that is, the period when this nation has become a world power.

4. For example, the Tuesday lunch is, in effect, a regular NSC meeting with carefully prepared staff work, plus the advantage of bringing together in a human setting the President and his chief national security advisers: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, JCS; Director of CIA; Special Assistant for National Security; plus others-- including the Vice President--when the President decides that they can contribute. Nothing is more important than that this group be close; feel free to debate openly with each other in the presence of the President; be loyal to each other as well as to the President. We have seen in this town times of great difficulty in this respect; for example, between Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson. There were serious problems when Mr. Wilson was Secretary of Defense. The President's National Security Assistant can play one of his most important roles in keeping this decisively important group close to each other and to the President.

5. Rostow will explain to you how we now use formal NSC meetings and the other instruments of coordinating our policy. Each has a history. It is what it is as a result of hard-won lessons. That does not mean that things should not be changed. It only means they should be studied carefully and their history understood before they are changed.

6. The President's National Security Adviser should be prepared to put aside all personal feelings and ambitions and to ignore criticism in the press. Because he is close to the President, the press--and others in Washington--will inevitably be getting at him from time to time. He must be a spokesman with the press for the President's views; but he must never become concerned about his own status with the press.

7. The task of Special Assistant for National Security can be one of the most rewarding in government, because, in serving the President he is also serving the great departments of government in their relations to the White House. It is possible in this job for the man who holds it to be regarded not merely as the President's agent but also the friend and channel of communication to the President with respect to State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc. It is a challenging but rewarding job.

Walt