U.S. Department of State

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was established by Executive Order 10938 of May 4, 1961, to "advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security." (26 Federal Register 3951) According to Clark Clifford, Chairman of PFIAB from April 1963 until the beginning of 1968, President Johnson met with the Board less frequently than President Kennedy had, but relied on individual members to fulfill special missions in various parts of the world. (Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York, Random House, 1991), pages 350 ff.) For information on the activities of PFIAB during the Kennedy administration, including the full text of Executive Order 10938, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXV, Document 87.

On December 27, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, "at breakfast the President immediately brought up his desire 'to change the image of the DCI from a cloak and dagger role' to the role of an adviser to the President on world situations derived from intelligence sources which were of importance to the President in reaching policy decisions. For this reason he intended to call upon me for a great many activities which would be different from those of the past." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with President Johnson)

McCone himself made a similar point in a memorandum for the file, January 13, 1964: "I have felt, and expressed myself to the late President Kennedy, to President Johnson, and to Secretary Rusk and others, that the DCI and CIA image must be changed. Its basic and primary responsibilities by law are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate, estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit of policy makers. This function has been submerged and CIA has been consistently referred to as a 'cloak and dagger' outfit whose activities involve (almost exclusively) operations designed to overthrow governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none of these activities are either controlled or coordinated with the White House or the State Department. This is entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity and the coordination and control, and I wish to attempt to change this image." (Ibid., DCI McCone Memo for the Record)

In a meeting with McCone on February 20 President Johnson reiterated his position, saying that "he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick." The President, according to McCone's memorandum for the record, "was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time." (Ibid., DCI Meetings with the President)

Washington, January 13, 1964, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCl McCone Telephone Calls. Eyes Only. Transcribed in McCone's office from a tape. Parentheses apparently indicate words about which the transcriber was uncertain.

DCI?: Ros?

G: Good morning, John.

/2/Gilpatric left office on January 20 and was replaced on January 28 by Cyrus Vance.

G: Last week.

DCI: I'll write you a letter and tell you how sorry I am. Because I really am. Really very regretful you are going, but understanding. It will be a great loss to the Govt., to the Dept. of Defense and a great loss to me personally.

G: Well, that part of it is one of the hardest parts. I started in working with you when I came into this Dept. and I don't like to--of course you preceded me out the last time--I know personally we will continue to?

DCI: Oh sure.

G: Before I do go a week from today are there any things, in your judgment, that I could address myself to together with you before then.

DCI: I would like to see if you could work out so that the continuity of the responsibility in our interdepartmental affairs would continue in your office rather than either being--rather than going to the Secretary's office which in effect would mean that they would be in Fubini's hands. Now Gene is--leans over backwards to do what he can but there are two things about him. One is he is volatile and in matters of management not always the--thoroughly sound and secondly, there seems to be some considerable question as to whether he has the type of authority which you need in a (pinch) to handle others who might have a statutory and presidential appointment confirmed by the Senate and all that.

G: From that point, he doesn't have enough authority over the Air Force.

DCI: I would hope that Vance could continue on.

G: And as soon as Cy gets back from Panama, probably tomorrow, I would like for the three of us sit down--I would like to have him here and you and I discuss the things that we see that he might address himself to. It is absolutely essential that he step in and we continue to have these two offices the poles of the axis because Bob is being increasingly asked to do more things, both within and without the Dept. Well it would just work better if Cy does what I have been trying to do and there is no reason why he can't. He'll have to learn more about it that's all, but we all do that. He alone, other than Bob, has the broader view. Gene Fubini obviously isn't in on the policy aspects.

DCI: That's right.

G: So as soon as Cy gets back one of the first orders of business I have before I leave is to--I have already gone over this with him. Bob agrees. He agrees. It is just a matter, I think, of it would be helpful if first session, the three of us meet together and we could do that this week.

/3/Neither the letter nor the paper is further identified.

/4/McCone made the proposal to remove the intelligence chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in a letter to the President, December 21, 1963. The change, he explained, was "warranted in the interest of better management and more effective administration" since the military services were now represented by the Director of DIA, whose agency had been "created in 1961 to coordinate and supervise all intelligence functions in the Department of Defense" (except for those under NSA). For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 114.

G: Well, Max told us, John, that--and I think the paper makes it plain, they are not fighting this. They don't like it but they are not fighting it as long as these two conditions which you have always intended, as I understand it, are observed. One is that (dissenting) positions will be noted. There will still be footnotes, still be brackets if two or more of the Chiefs Services differ on a particular estimate which consequence you now reflect in an NIE or SNIE and secondly that on some particular issue that if they want to have a Service J-2 present when it is discussed--not as a voting member but just to be sure all issues are laid before the Board--you are willing to do that.

DCI: Of course we made that arrangement when they reorganized the NSC and removed the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs. The first guy that came in was a unilateral protest as--Symington with his first few days he was over running the Export-Import Bank. I think there is something a little illusory about this.

G: Well, I don't know. You have?

DCI: But I really feel this. That this is going to cause a stir up on the Hill. No question about it. I am perfectly willing to carry my end of any stir. On the other hand, this was in--this is more of an internal Defense decision than it is mine.

/5/Reference is to the report of the Joint Study Group on the "Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government," chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick of CIA. It was prepared during 1960 and presented to President Eisenhower on December 15. A copy is at the Eisenhower Library, Records of the White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, Intelligence Activities in Government, Study of. At a meeting on January 18, 1961, the National Security Council approved most of the report's recommendations. For more information, including a discussion of reorganizing the USIB, see Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 216-232.

/6/Presumably a reference to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-62, "Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces," December 5, 1962. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-62, USSR) For text of the summary and conclusions, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 117.

G: Well, whatever contributions they can make, you will get through DIA and through individual J-2 who might be heard at a particular time. All I can say is that after 3 years I feel just the way I did when Jim Douglas and Tom Gates strongly urged Bob and me three years ago to go through with this particular recommendation. They urged it very strongly and they felt it would be--as soon as we had a DIA going and as soon as DIA could handle it which we think it can. We can't make you do it, obviously, John, if you don't want to do it, but we think it is a good thing. Apparently Eisenhower did, Kennedy did. It hasn't come up to Johnson, but--and we are perfectly willing--Bob is perfectly willing, I won't be here--flak that comes from it and Max Taylor has told us that other than going on record that they don't like it. Obviously they don't like it. They go on record with us all the time about things they don't like. If we are going to do things they like only we would never get anywhere.

DCI: Well, I know that.

G: And this paper is so worded. They are not saying they demand to be heard by the President, the NSC, they simply say (a) we don't like it, (b) if it goes into effect, we think [it] ought to contain these two face jobs, provisos and (c) we are going to look at it come April. They can look at it all they want and the provisos are perfectly satisfactory at least from McNamara's and our standpoint.

DCI: Well, don't you think then you should say that since this is an internal matter of the Defense Dept. primarily that you should recommend it to me?

G: If you want to get some kind of a paper record here, John, but God you had this Kirkpatrick report which you voted for, you told me when you were a member of the NSC.

DCI: Yes, as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission I voted for it.

G: Well, your name was still John A. McCone and?

DCI: I don't know whether it is anymore or not.

G: I mean--I think if you don't agree with it now, in your present position, you ought to say so, but I understood you were in favor of it and you were holding it up until we thought it came at a time we could live with. We can live with it now and we haven't got so many other issues cooking that we can't take this from Congress.

/7/Regarding the reorganization of the USIB, see Document 196.

Washington, January 13, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961-30 March 1965, Box 8. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Typed notations at the end of the memorandum indicate that Assistant Secretary of Defense Fubini dictated this memorandum in McCone's presence and that the original was handcarried to Fubini.

/2/For a brief history of the NRO, see Gerald K. Haines, NRO: The National Reconnaissance Office, Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years (Washington: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997).

/3/The Drell Committee was a committee of experts in optics established in October 1963 to provide a technical evaluation of the prospects for improving satellite photography.

I further suggested that as a part of this agreement the same rule be applied to the Corona program that I was proposing for this follow-on broad coverage system; by this it is intended that the "keep well" steps necessary to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the Corona program be made unmistakably part of the Air Force's responsibilities. To the extent however that additional research, development and engineering work appears necessary in the existing payloads to eliminate defects or make substantial improvements, that the capabilities of the CIA must be employed. Thus, the principle would be established that, despite the fact that transition to the Air Force of a project has taken place, still the development team maintains both an interest and a responsibility toward major improvements (as contrasted with routine, "keep well" engineering operations).

The above plan is designed to utilize to the maximum extent (as provided in the NRO Agreement) the unique capability of CIA which has been demonstrated in the past in various advanced developments as well as the strength, organization and capability of the Air Force which is uniquely equipped to carry on operations which have reached a character of routine.

As part of this over-all reassignment of responsibilities in the NRO management, I stated that it would be expected that the Air Force would apply itself to the research, development, engineering and early test flights of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with exactly the same procedure toward the NRO that the CIA has in the broad coverage program.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

In early January 1964 General C.V. Clifton, the President's Military Aide, expressed concern at the meager volume of intelligence reaching the President. According to a memorandum for the record prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on January 9, Clifton "again" reported that "while the President does get up on situations demanding an immediate solution, he is not getting a steady feed of intelligence on world situations. He reads the papers and occasionally asks questions. He gets what Clifton and Bundy can tell him orally when they see him, which, Clifton says, isn't much." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Records, Job 80-R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964) Clifton did report, however, that following the departure of President Erhard of Germany on December 29, he had managed to get the daily President's Intelligence Checklist to Johnson "with some regularity." (Memorandum for the Record, January 6; ibid.)

Under cover of a January 9 memorandum to President's Special Assistant Walter Jenkins, Clifton forwarded for Johnson a new effort by CIA "to bring the President up to date on intelligence with a minimum effort on his part," the President's Intelligence Review. The President approved Clifton's proposal to produce it twice a week. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings) On January 21 Clifton reported to CIA that the President was such "a painfully slow reader" that "he just cannot afford the time to digest a daily book. A bi-weekly, kept short, blunt and easily read will do 'just fine.'" (Memorandum for the Record, January 21; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Records, Job 80-R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964) A week later, however, Clifton reported that he had given up on hopes to dispense with the daily Checklist, even though the President found the bi-weekly report "very valuable" and wanted it "kept up without change." Clifton felt that Johnson expected Bundy, Smith, and him to read the Checklist each day and, in any case, "the first day you stop, the President will ask for the Checklist or query us about something, and we will not have the answer." (Memorandum for the Record, January 28; ibid.) The CIA continued to provide the Checklist through November. On December 1 it was replaced by the President's Daily Brief (see Document 214). Production of the bi-weekly Intelligence Review also ceased in November. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings)

For additional information on CIA briefing material provided to President Johnson, see John L. Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992 (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), pages 69-77.

Washington, January 29, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, February 11, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan-5 Apr 1964, Box 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. A 53-page verbatim transcript of this meeting, which took place in the East Building of CIA Headquarters from 10:35 a.m. to 12:25 p.m., is ibid., Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64-15 Apr 64, Box 7.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Dr. McMillan on 11 February 1964

/2/Not found.

Without attempting to discuss the chart in detail, it is apparent that the Thor booster (Douglas), the standard Agena D (Lockheed), modifications of Agena D (Lockheed 162) and the launching services and operations (6595 ATW Vandenburg) and the on-orbit control and recovery (6954 ATW Sunnyvale) are under the control of General Greer.

The camera (ITEK), reentry vehicle (General Electric), the payload superstructure and its integration with the camera and reentry vehicle (Lockheed, Sunnyvale SK) are contracts under the control of CIA.

A technical Committee coordinates the work of these various contractors but is limited because of provisions calling for unanimous consent.

Note: I stated that no Committee should have such authority. The final judgment of what should be done, when and how, should be made by an individual after receiving advice of committees, specialists, etc.

McMillan then turned to a new plan of organization, the effect of which was to center all of the above functions under General Greer who has collateral responsibility for the Thor and Agena. General Greer would have an operating director in the procurement division. The procurement division would assume responsibility for all contracts for Corona M & J projects.

/3/Attached but not printed.

1. It seemed logical that there should be a fully integrated organization under competent management to provide all necessary management functions including procurement, supervision of contractors, scheduling and operations of a proven article. Corona was a proven article (although the J was still somewhat doubtful), and I would like to see such an organization established forthwith.

Note: With respect to procurement, I thought it might be well for the project to have CIA procurement officers, administrators and security personnel who would issue CIA contracts because secrecy was respected under these circumstances and not with Air Force contracts. This however did not change the authority of the project manager.

2. In addition to all else the management organization had to be equipped with a technical division which could make improvements to the proven article which would increase its utility and most particularly its dependability. These I envisaged would be routine types of engineering improvements which would evolve from the system engineering components and the purpose of which would be to provide a more dependable Corona system producing more useful results.

Note: The management of the Corona project envisaged in 1. and 2. above would schedule operations to meet the needs of USIB and its COMOR Subcommittee. USIB would have the final say on requirements.

I said that these changes should not be injected into the operations of the "proven devices" because they would involve such extensive changes that the system would revert to the R&D phase, therefore when we were ready to go with these innovations, we could consider how to introduce them into the system without jeopardizing schedules considered essential from an intelligence requirements point of view.

4. Developing a new system designed to give better resolution than can possibly be obtained from the Corona system.

Note: I said that it appeared to me that 3. and 4. should be assigned by D/NRO to CIA who should use all of its resources to accomplish these two objectives as promptly as possible and with as little interference to the operation of the proven system as possible.

5. A Board of technical advisers should be established by the D/NRO composed of men engaged in 2. above and those engaged in 3. and 4. above and they should be charged with the responsibility of seeing that there are no overlaps or gaps, and with advising the D/NRO on steps which should be taken. This Board should meet as frequently as necessary and should consider the broad spectrum of problems which arise in implementing the above.

Dr. McMillan did not object to the above. He feels there is a good deal of sophistication in the Air Force as evidenced by the successful [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He also indicated the difficulty of differentiating between 2. and 3. above.

I stated if the above procedure were adopted and adhered to, then I thought that the resources in both CIA and Air Force could contribute to the success of our reconnaissance program. Any plan which did not utilize the resources of both organizations would not be agreeable to me. I took the occasion to tell Dr. McMillan I remained convinced that he, as Under Secretary, is making a mistake to attempt to run a line organization because of his varied statutory responsibilities from which he could not escape and for that reason I urged he consider some different "in-house" arrangement for directing the NRO.

Washington, February 13, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Telephone Calls-E.O., 04 March-19 May 1964, Box 10. No classification marking; Eyes Only.

DCI: What is the problem of Wheelon going out?

F: The problem is the fact, in my judgment, this is an internal affair of the person who is running that particular program?

(tape picks up)

?to eliminate that one is one of the reasons for that agreement.

/2/According to the transcript of this February 11 meeting (see footnote 1, Document 189), McCone wanted McMillan to draft a memorandum in the next day or two that McMillan, Fubini, McCone, Carter, and Wheelon could approve, but McMillan remarked: "I'm at this point not too sanguine about completing it in two or three days. I haven't changed my views?since the end of October when I first made my views known." McCone replied, "Well, my views haven't been changed either."

F: Mr. McCone, may I interrupt.

DCI: Yes you can interrupt.

F: Let's separate the Philippine episode, which I think I would prefer not to talk, it's pretty bad. It has nothing to do with McMillan. McMillan didn't even know it was going on and I will plead guilty anytime you want. I think you are right. I don't want to debate it. The fundamental point here is I am trying to establish a position whereby Wheelon, McMillan, McCone and Fubini get along and work together.

DCI: Well, my patience is gone!

F: Well, Mr. McCone, I would like for you to give me a little bit more of your patience, because, frankly, I have as you know gone a long way toward reaching something of an agreement and it is a matter of a very few days before we accomplish that agreement which will help eliminate this friction.

DCI: Well, I think the thing I should do is call up the President and tell him to get a new Director of Central Intelligence, that the bureaucrats in the Pentagon are trying to screw things so that nobody can run the intelligence business. I won't have any more responsibility for it. That's what I'm going to do. I'm not going to monkey around with this anymore, Gene. I appreciate your help; I appreciate your friendship-but that one upstairs I'm not going to monkey around with for 5 minutes. Tell the Secretary to get a new man in charge of NRO and I want to be the Executive Agent?

F: Can't you forget that I have even mentioned this problem?

DCI: What ?

F: Can you not forget that I even mentioned this problem. Do you have to make a big todo about this one? Can't we just forget about the whole thing?

DCI: Sure. I'm going down to Cat Cay for a few days and I'll be back.

F: Mr. Mc Cone, let's forget about this whole episode, please.

DCI: All right. O.K. fine, Gene, anything you want.

Washington, February 13, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Security Action Memos (NSAM). Secret.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT
U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Training Policy and Objectives

/2/Entitled, respectively, "Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency," March 13, 1962 (ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 131); and "Training Objectives for Counterinsurgency," June 14, 1962 (ibid., NSAM No. 163).

The President has noted with approval the considerable progress made in the Government's internal defense/counterinsurgency training effort and would like to be assured that this effort is sustained in the future. He desires that personnel of each of the addressees with or to be assigned foreign affairs responsibilities (hereinafter foreign affairs officers) continue to receive comprehensive instruction on U.S. policy and strategies, and on the resources and techniques available to the United States in assisting underdeveloped countries cope with the problems of development and internal defense.

The President has directed that all career-development training programs offered by each agency with major foreign affairs interests include study of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy. This instruction will be tailored in accordance with the specific overseas internal defense role and mission of the particular agency as well as to the career level of the officers receiving training.

In addition to this broad training for all foreign affairs officers, the President has approved specific training objectives for those officer-grade personnel indicated below who are scheduled for relevant assignment to the underdeveloped world or to headquarters or instructor positions related thereto.

1. For officers of the ranks GS-9 through 13 (FSO-8 through 4, 2 Lt (Ensign) through Lt. Colonel, Commander USN):

(a) Background

A comprehensive understanding of the history of insurgency movements, especially those in which the U.S. interest was involved. This will include instruction on the background and environmental factors--political, economic, social and psychological--of subversive insurgency, the means utilized to prevent, deter or defeat such movements, and the related problems of economic development.

(b) The Threat

A basic knowledge of communist ideology, organization, goals, and the strategy and techniques employed by communists in the underdeveloped world, including the doctrinal approaches of the Soviets and Red Chinese to political power. Particular emphasis will be placed on the various problems of development and communist methods of exploiting these problems.

(c) U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Programs

A basic knowledge of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, its strategy of employment, U.S. internal defense (civilian and military) resources and programs, and the techniques and methods through which these programs are implemented.

(d) Departmental Tactics and Techniques

A thorough understanding of the tactics and techniques of the parent department, agency or military branch which have an application in detecting, combatting and defeating insurgency.

2. Officers of the ranks GS-14 (FSO-3, Colonel, Captain USN) and above will receive training in addition to instruction required by paragraphs A and B above, to prepare them for departmental, command, and staff responsibilities. At this level, special attention will be given to the unique resources and capabilities of all U.S. Government departments and agencies and of the need to combine these assets into effective programs.

(a) Situation Assessment and Evaluation

Develop an ability to identify the critical factors in internal security analyses of underdeveloped areas; how to recognize manifestations of dissidence and subversion.

(b) Program Planning

Detailed knowledge of the resources and capabilities of the parent department/agency or military branch which contribute to the overall USOID effort; the methodology of program development and internal defense planning to include inter-agency coordination of planning at the national level and abroad.

(c) Program Implementation

A thorough knowledge of the methods and techniques of implementing and executing programs of the parent department and related agencies; techniques of cooperation with the host government and third countries.

C. Officers Assigned "Key Positions"

All officers assigned to "key positions" (as determined by the Special Group (CI)) in the underdeveloped world or in headquarters positions related thereto, will receive special instruction at the National Interdepartmental Seminar. This training will be considered as a prerequisite for assignment to designated "key positions" although it will be available to other selected personnel on a case by case basis. Exception to this training as a prerequisite to such assignment may be made only by the head of the department or agency concerned.

While this training will include coverage of those items outlined in paragraph B above, emphasis will be given to the problems faced by the U.S. in assisting in the development and internal defense of the underdeveloped countries. Additional coverage will include:

1. The growing interdepartmental nature of U.S. foreign policy problems and programs.

2. The development and coordination of policy and program implementation.

3. The concept and operation of the Country Team.

4. The Washington organization for overseas internal defense.

It is in the interest of the U.S. to provide training corresponding to the above to selected officials, both civilian and military of foreign governments. While emphasis should be placed on training officials from those countries actively threatened by an active subversive threat, our efforts should be aimed at influencing and gaining the support of USOID policies and programs from as many official personnel as possible throughout the underdeveloped world. To the extent practicable, this training should be given in the following places:

1. In facilities operated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency which are available to foreign nationals.

2. In special facilities operated by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and other available U.S. Government training centers operated for the benefit of foreign nationals.

3. U.S. MAAGs/Missions and USOMs in underdeveloped areas.

4. At private U.S. institutions, where feasible.

The Department of State will be responsible for developing and conducting such courses as may be necessary for officials of State, AID, and USIA and when appropriate for other civilian agencies with limited foreign operations. Each of the other addressee agencies will be responsible for the organization of appropriate training programs for its own officers. Each of the responsible departments and agencies will seek to coordinate its training programs and to the extent practicable and necessary, make available spaces for the cross-training of personnel from other U.S. agencies with development and internal defense responsibilities. While the Foreign Service Institute will be responsible for the administration and presentation of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, each of the addressee agencies will provide financial, faculty and student support to it.

The National Interdepartmental Seminar will be the inter-agency training center for those officers assigned to "key positions". In performing this function, the Seminar will undertake research, develop case studies, and offer instruction on the manifold problems of development and internal defense and improve the U.S. capability to assist underdeveloped countries overcome these problems. In addition, the Seminar will serve as the focal point of the U.S. overseas internal defense training effort. Accordingly, it will undertake to assist other more specialized U.S. Government institutions engaged in related training activities by developing instructional materials on the non-technical aspects of internal defense and counterinsurgency.

It shall be the responsibility of the Special Group (CI) to oversee and support this entire training effort, and to report to the President periodically upon the degree to which the training objectives outlined above are being achieved. The inter-agency Subcommittee on Training, established by the Special Group (CI), will assist the latter in overseeing and supporting this training effort.

Further, it is desired that the Special Group (CI) determine the adequacy of the effort we are making to train selected foreign official civilian and military personnel in the problems of development, internal defense and counterinsurgency and seek to insure the effective coordination of these programs. Where deficiencies are determined to exist, the Special Group (CI) will direct appropriate corrective action.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Chronological File. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Its filing location suggests it was prepared between February 21 and 24.

/2/Under cover of a February 21 memorandum to Bundy, Cline forwarded a new distribution list that included the President and 12 other U.S. Government officials. (Ibid., National Security File, Clifton Files, CIA)

One of the most important functions of the Checklist is the open invitation for the Director of Central Intelligence and his boys to comment on everything in the Government they want to talk about. Furthermore, it gives them an avenue of written approach to the President and to you, and to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, where they can put in highly sensitive material which they could be sure no one else would see and yet wouldn't have to brief individually men who are hard to catch.

A third and most important factor is that a small group of people can prepare this, it can be prepared rapidly without any detailed coordination in the Government, and if there is a mistake in it, or if there is something in it which the President might see and not want to have disseminated, it is very easy for us to go back to the originators of the material and turn off the water before it gets spread over town.

Last but not least, if there is to be criticism of the CIA on things which are put out from the Director's office, this certainly would enlarge the number of people who can shoot at the CIA and its material.

As far as I can see, this just makes it another intelligence paper which has lost most of its value to the President. If they are going to enlarge it to this extent, I would suggest that we drop our subscription and settle for the Central Intelligence Bulletin, and then have only individual reports, summaries and analyses from the Director to the President as we see a need for them.

Perhaps you will recall some of our problems with a simple Eyes Only message and how we try to keep the distribution down. With this many people fumbling with the Checklist, disseminating it, [1 line of source text not declassified] we might just as well print it in The New York Times. I think we will reach more people faster, but not much.

Washington, March 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads "DCI has noted."

1. There are several basic factors to consider:

a. The NRO has developed into an essentially Air Force owned and operated component, one of whose aims is to get the CIA out of the reconnaissance business, both satellite and aircraft.

b. The Air Force, the D/NRO, and the staff of the NRO have never been oriented to the intelligence collection responsibility for which NRO was set up.

c. The bulk of those things that have been undertaken by the Air Force component of NRO have been sloppily done.

d. Large numbers of actions taken by the NRO are not coordinated with appropriate elements of the Agency and in many cases are done without the knowledge of Mr. [name not declassified].

2. We could list a large number of gripes by item to prove the foregoing. What is needed, however, is a solution to the problem rather than more discussion of the shortcomings.

3. I am personally convinced that as long as the Director, NRO, is the Under Secretary of the Air Force or has any allegiance to anyone other than the DCI and SecDef jointly, these jurisdictional matters will continue.

4. The Air Force and the CIA and any other Governmental agencies having a capability for NRO must be considered as operational assets in their entirety and must not be broken down into small components as part of a line organization under D/NRO.

5. We must have a D/NRO whose principal orientation is toward intelligence collection and who can utilize through a small staff on a managerial basis only, the assets of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole.

MSC

Washington, March 4, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64-15 Apr 64, Box 7. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the paper is a March 12 covering note from Henry Knoche, the DDCI's Executive Assistant, to Walt Elder, the DCI's Executive Assistant, indicating that this summary of McCone's views on the NRO was derived from a transcript of a conversation between McCone and Baker and that General Carter made use of this summary during his recent appearance before the Baker Panel. Knoche was referring to Dr. William O. Baker, vice president in charge of research with Bell Laboratories and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Baker Panel was a special PFIAB committee charged with reviewing the National Reconnaissance Program.

DCI VIEWS ON NRO MATTERS

I. If US Government department heads not capable of organizing national reconnaissance operation, they are not competent to do their job.

II. Problem is deep bureaucratic row--

A. CIA has done its part of job with flair, imagination and surprising secrecy.

B. AF has made great contribution also. But, at working level, AF has maneuvered to eliminate CIA from the reconnaissance effort.

C. Within USAF there is unhappiness that D/NRO is running a line operation which is outside exclusive AF plans and the AF Systems Command.

D. AF spokesmen have told contractors not to talk to CIA. This worries the contractors.

III. CIA also holds views on these bureaucratic aspects. DCI, however, looks at problem as DCI, not as head of CIA.

A. As DCI, with his responsibility as intelligence advisor to President, DCI must be satisfied that reconnaissance facilities are operating for maximum intelligence benefits.

1. Of extreme importance to DCI is developing systems improvements for future.

B. Collection and analysis of intelligence is a full-time DCI concern--his primary mission. This is not true of SecDef or Chairman, JCS. This primary DCI responsibility cannot be diluted.

1. History of progress in reconnaissance fields shows that the gathering of intelligence has not always been a primary objective of SecDef.

2. Same history shows need for secrecy. CIA shines at this. It is extremely difficult for DOD. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were quite conscious of this.

3. CIA compartmentation and flair have built an atmosphere which seems to bring out the best in contractors. This is not always true in DOD projects.

4. CIA has demonstrated flexibility in procurement procedures as contrasted with rigidity in DOD. SecDef has pointed to successful Oxcart development at lower costs than unsuccessful, costlier programs such as the B-70.

IV. The history of the U-2 demonstrates CIA flair and imagination.

A. CIA adopted the J-75 engine for better altitude. USAF did not. CIA had to give two J-75-equipped U-2's to SAC for Cuban reconnaissance.

B. CIA equipped its U-2's for aerial refueling. USAF did not do so until quite recently and only three have been so modified.

C. CIA put improved ECM equipment aboard U-2's for use when overflying near SAM's. USAF has not.

D. CIA has made successful tests for flying from carriers. USAF, for obvious reasons, has not.

V. Main point is, modifications such as these are undertaken to protect and improve intelligence sources and methods. To the USAF, budg-et considerations give intelligence aspects a back seat to operational considerations.

VI. Much can be said for using USAF planes, even sanitized, in reconnaissance operations, but there is a certain sophistication that CIA has acquired in this regard.

A. CIA gets approvals, within US, and from high authority abroad.

B. USAF could probably develop this sophistication, but the recent sudden deployment of a SAC U-2 detachment to the Philippines without approvals very nearly caused a major international incident.

VII. DCI foresees problem with Oxcart, which can be detected by the Soviets.

A. This fact changes the Oxcart role from a regular collector to that of a standby vehicle for emergency collection.

B. Maybe this means the Oxcart should be a part of the USAF inventory.

C. DCI has not yet personally resolved this in his mind.

VIII. This, then, takes one to the matter of improving satellites for reconnaissance purposes.

A. History shows that the Samos failure would have left the US bereft of a satellite capability.

B. The CIA decision to go black and procure a re-entry vehicle, camera systems, film, etc., has led from a useful capability by stages to improved resolution and a highly trustworthy system.

IX. In future, we must have an ever-improving search system that cuts a wide swath with maximum resolution:

A. We will want to use the search system to pick targets for coverage with a special system of narrow scope and high resolution.

B. It is in matters like this that bureaucratic maneuvering is most intense.

X. DCI is not prepared to relinquish operation of principal assets for intelligence collection to an agency outside his control. Neither is he prepared to remove CIA's "cutting edge" in reconnaissance.

A. Arguments on this score broke Scoville's back and present Wheelon with his headaches.

B. Maybe there shouldn't be an NRO. Possibly these tasks could be worked out between various agencies on a case-by-case basis.

1. Another way to tackle the thing is to establish an NRO that has fullest input from both CIA and DOD, while remaining responsive to the DCI's statutory responsibility.

2. In this respect there was a good deal of soul searching in Washington as to whether there was adequate photography of Cuba in the months leading up to the missile crisis, but nobody in Washington other than the DCI went up on the Hill day after day to explain the situation. If there were to be a sudden surprise development in the USSR, it wouldn't be the D/NRO, the SecDef or the SecState who was responsible for the surprise. It would be the DCI.

C. Perhaps we can allocate these tasks, while they are in the development stage, with the appropriate agency fully and unilaterally responsible for the development. Then when systems become operational, an operating organization could take it over and run it in response to the requirements of the Chairman of USIB.

1. In this manner we might provide an official like General Greer with a purchasing organization to keep procurement contracts covert after the system has become operational. The agency responsible for the development phase could be made responsible for future improvements and follow-on systems.

D. Whatever is done must provide for the depth of experience and manpower that exists in the military and for the flexibility and initiative of CIA. This couldn't be done below the level of SecDef and DCI. Below this level, departmental warfare is deep and determined.

XI. DCI never conceived of NRO becoming a line organization. In his view it should be a management organization which would call on the resources of the Air Force, the CIA and maybe NASA and others. It would consist of a small group of people to parcel out assignments, see that the assignments were carried out, and operate under the direction of SecDef and DCI. It hasn't turned out that way.

A. It is a line organization. This is entirely wrong. It should not be administered by an Under Secretary of the Air Force operating within Air Force channels.

B. The problems that beset NRO now are dangerous because they are affecting a national intelligence resource of the greatest importance--so much so that it should be beyond any parochial approaches.

Washington, March 10, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume I [1 of 2], Box 5. For Official Use Only.

SUBJECT
Measures for Strengthening the Counterintelligence Posture of the United States

/2/Not found.

We have adopted recommendation number 1--"That the National Security Agency be given the complete personnel security responsibility for all personnel employed by and assigned to it."

/3/None of the tabs is printed. The directive is dated August 25, 1959.

/4/By voice vote on March 19 the House agreed to the Senate amendment, which limited the delegation of the powers of the Secretary of Defense summarily to dismiss employees from the National Security Agency. H.R. 950, which specified requirements for both the employment and dismissal of National Security Agency employees, was signed into law on March 26. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XX (1964), p. 468)

/5/88th Congress, Second Session.

Recommendation number 5--Deals with concentrating our investigative effort of questionable security cases, proceeding with "across the board reinvestigation of all personnel as resources then permit." This recommendation has been fully implemented by the National Security Agency and action has been taken to institute this policy throughout the Department of Defense.

We are in complete accord with the objectives of recommendation number 3. The Secretary of the Army has instituted a series of actions including necessary studies to reach the objectives of this recommendation. As soon as these actions and studies are completed a further report on this recommendation will be submitted to you.

Cyrus Vance

USIB-D-1.1/1

Washington, March 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. Secret.

SUBJECT
Reorganization of USIB

/2/Not found.

1. As announced and explained by the Chairman of the USIB in the referenced minutes, the President has directed that the composition of the USIB will be as follows:

Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission
A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

2. In accordance with the President's directive, the above reorganization was put into effect at the close of the USIB meeting on 4 March 1964.

/3/A copy of NSCID No. 1 as revised January 18, 1961, and March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA.

4. In consultation with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the following arrangements and actions in order to accomplish the efficient implementation of this reorganization:

a. The Director, DIA, will represent on the USIB all elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the exception of the National Security Agency (NSA). However, the Military Departmental Intelligence Chiefs are invited and encouraged to attend as observers all USIB meetings which are of interest to them collectively or individually.

b. The intelligence chiefs of the military departments retain the right to express divergent or alternative views which they deem significant and to have such views footnoted in appropriate USIB documents such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Watch Committee reports. They are also encouraged to make such views known to the Board of National Estimates during the coordination of draft NIEs and SNIEs. To this end, the service intelligence chiefs will have access to the drafts of NIEs and similar USIB documents and their representatives may continue as active participants at the usual interagency sessions at the working level.

c. No immediate changes will be made in respect to DOD representation on USIB committees. The Director, DIA, intends to make recommendations to the DCI concerning DOD representation following discussions with the military departments on a committee-by-committee basis. Upon receipt of the DIA proposals the Chairman will then ask each of the committee chairmen for his suggestions. Meanwhile the USIB committees and working groups should retain their present membership.

/4/Not found.

e. It is not proposed to make any changes at this time in the distribution of USIB documents in connection with this reorganization. The Chairman, however, believes that it would be useful to have each member re-examine the distribution of USIB documents within his department or agency and he has directed the Executive Secretary to request such a review. This will be done in a separate memorandum.

5. The above information on the subject is circulated herewith for information and guidance of all concerned.

James S. Lay, Jr.

/1/Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104-01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret.

No. 5105.23

Washington, March 27, 1964.

SUBJECT
(S) National Reconnaissance Office

REFERENCE
(a): DoD Directive TS 5105.23, subject as above, dated June 14, 1962 (hereby

cancelled)

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a (S) National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operating agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction of and supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

The (S) National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defense under a (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, [1 line of source text not declassified] into a single program, defined as the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense.

A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall:

1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of projects of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program.

2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.

3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the (S) National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defense as full time members of the (S) National Reconnaissance Office.

B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. Streamlined management procedures will be utilized whereby individual project directors will report directly to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests, and these proj-ects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense staff review.

A. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the (S) National Reconnaissance Office and the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

1. Organize, staff, and supervise the (S) National Reconnaissance Office.

2. Establish, manage and conduct the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program.

3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, [1 line of source text not declassified] photographic and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both within and outside the Department of Defense.

4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items falling within the definition of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects.

B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this directive.

All projects falling within the definition of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive.

A. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, including suitable unclassified names and functions to protect all elements of the (S) National Reconnaissance Office.

B. All communications pertaining to matters under the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by either (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense.

C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to in B. above: (TS) National Reconnaissance Program; (S) National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."

This Directive is effective upon publication.

Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Washington, April 6, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 277. Secret.

SUBJECT
The Anticipation of Foreign Crises

/2/Document 5.

1. The anticipation of foreign crises is a fundamental problem, running across the whole range of political, economic, sociological and even military intelligence. It is also an exceptionally intractable one. Furthermore, unlike the specialized problem of providing warning of impending military action, it cannot usefully be attacked by the methodology of "indications intelligence". A nation preparing to go to war normally must do certain things; a pattern of these things may sometimes be detectable. Political crisis, however, arises from the complex interaction of all-too-human beings and political and social dynamics which they do not necessarily understand or control. This is not to say that detection of impending military action is any less difficult, but only that it is different. Examination of the most recent crises with which the US Government has had to deal--Vietnam, Cyprus, Panama, East Africa, Malaysia--shows few patterns or similarities. Specifically, Communist policy cannot be singled out as a unifying element; only in Vietnam is the crisis primarily a result of deliberate Communist action.

2. CIA believes that the anticipation of crises depends less on simplistic mechanical approaches, "quick fixes", or organizational questions than on the general quality of intelligence produced, and essentially on the caliber of intelligence personnel. Within this framework, and recognizing that no system can guarantee the US Government that it will not occasionally be surprised by foreign developments, there are elements in the present system which can and should be strengthened.

a. Collection: An effective country team, with reporting responsibilities clearly determined and vigorously pursued, is essential if political warning is to be provided.

b. Analysis: In general, present procedures seem adequate. The difficulty is to get and keep the best possible people. Warning is as likely to come from a trained analyst's visceral reaction to a seemingly innocuous bit of information as from a circumstantial field report of high evaluation.

c. Reporting: The most important problem, and one that has never been adequately solved, is that of communications between the intelligence producer and the national policymaker, notwithstanding the number of intelligence publications devoted to this purpose. I am giving this subject fuller treatment in the following paragraphs.

3. Both producer and policymaker are at fault. The intelligence officer may take out cheap insurance by publishing extensive "laundry lists" of potential crises in which genuine warnings are buried, or may coordinate his product until warning is effectively camouflaged by qualifiers and over-formal language, or may lose focus on his audience by treating the dramatic and immediate in one publication and the dull and gradual in another. The senior policymaker may be too reluctant to accept warnings that go counter to his own policies, or too dulled by cumulative exposure to read his intelligence perceptively, or too preoccupied with the immediate to respond to the longer-range. More often than not, an extraordinary number of administering, reviewing, coordinating, editing, and sometimes operating echelons insulate him from the intelligence desk officer.

4. To the extent that there is an answer to these difficulties, it lies not in creating additional publications or repeating warnings by rote in existing ones, but in sharpening intelligence warning and aiming it more directly at responsible officials. For instance, consideration might be given to holding regular National Security Council meetings limited to examination of crises which can be expected in the months ahead. Such a meeting would give the intelligence community the opportunity to ensure that the highest levels of the government have been warned, in specific and direct terms, of problems which it foresees.

5. Our widening of the distribution of the President's Intelligence Checklist is one effort to tighten the crucial relationship between policymaker and intelligence analyst. Another, perhaps less direct, is the increased attention we are giving in National Intelligence Estimates to warning of developments which are realistic possibilities, even if less probable than others. We continue to highlight the main lines of probability, but attempt to convey greater awareness of variations and contingencies.

6. Beyond these measures, I would propose within CIA to:

a. Conduct more systematic periodic reviews of the raw intelligence received on each target country to make sure we know what is going on there.

b. Conduct similar reviews of our finished reporting on quiescent but inflammable situations with a view to providing more sharply focussed warning to responsible senior officials, perhaps by personal memorandum.

c. Circulate with occasional issues of the Central Intelligence Bulletin selected longer-range articles from the Current Intelligence Weekly Review which deal with potentially dangerous situations not susceptible to normal daily reporting.

John

Following a breakfast meeting with the President on April 22, 1964, Director of Central Intelligence McCone told McGeorge Bundy, according to McCone's memorandum for the record, that "I was highly dissatisfied over the fact that President Johnson did not get direct intelligence briefings from me as was the custom with President Kennedy and had been the Eisenhower custom in the prior administration. Bundy recognized this and thought that I should discuss it directly with the President." (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, April 27; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)

McCone met with the President on April 29 and told him "that I was concerned that the President was not getting sufficient and adequate intelligence briefings; that I was not seeing very much of him, and this disturbed me. He said he was available any time that I wanted to see him. All I had to do was call up. I said this had not been the case on several 'attempts.' He mentioned that he had been very busy the last two weeks but he did not think this would be a recurring situation, therefore he invited me to bring to his attention any matters of special and particular interest; however he did not wish to be briefed just for the purpose of being briefed. He said that the Checklist summary was perfectly adequate, that he went over it carefully, and that it gave him a satisfactory feeling of the world situation." (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, April 30; Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President)

In a May 1 memorandum to the President, Bundy remarked that he and Clark Clifford "had agreed on the ideal method of keeping John McCone really happy about the level of his contact with you: Golf. McCone is an energetic and agreeable golfer." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4) Three weeks later, on May 24, Johnson played eight holes with McCone at Burning Tree Club, but they did not play again prior to McCone's resignation on April 28, 1965. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

While meeting with the President on July 24, McCone asked him "if he was receiving satisfactory intelligence reports and he said, yes he was very satisfied. I said I would like the opportunity to sit down with him occasionally to exchange views on matters of importance to him, that he had in the CIA the most competent group of intelligence experts and analysts that existed anywhere in the world and that he was not getting the full benefit of their views and judgments through the written word. I said that any time that his calendar would permit and he was so disposed, I would like to discuss personally with him any problems of interest to him which were within our competence." (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, July 24; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President)

Washington, April 24, 1964

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1. Top Secret. The memorandum was forwarded via Patrick Coyne.

/2/A reference to a draft of PFIAB's report on NRO; the final version is Document 201.

I think it is quite important not to appear to close off the traditional responsibilities of the CIA in the broad area of research on intelligence methods, responsibilities which I believe have statutory support under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended. I share the report's view that large-scale operations and probably large-scale development enterprises can usually be done best somewhere else, but I would be sorry to see the research role of the Agency limited to the photographic field, since it is possible to imagine many other aspects of information gathering in which imaginative research might be productive, and which might not be surely covered in the alternative assignments of your draft report.

To put it another way, I believe in competitive spirit at the fringes of thinking on these subjects, and I do not believe that we should neglect the fact that the Agency has been in the past, and may be in the future, a very fertile center of such work.

My other general point is that the report might usefully put more emphasis upon the second hat of the Director of Central Intelligence in all these matters. As the President's senior intelligence officer, with certain community-wide responsibilities, the Director can and should have a very large role in setting priorities and in reviewing progress, and it should not be beyond the wit of man that in the field of intelligence there should be developed the kind of relationship between him and the Secretary of Defense which has been developed in recent years between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in political matters. There will always be slips and rough spots in both these relationships, but that is not an excuse for neglecting the effort. I think there would be both tactical and strategic value in emphasizing this point in this important report.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, May 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Talent; [codeword not declassified]; Keyhole; [codeword not declassified].

SUBJECT
National Reconnaissance Program

The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of photographic and signals intelligence through aircraft and satellite overflights is of vital importance to the national security and is likely to become increasingly so. The Program has produced most of our Government's information on Soviet deployment of land-based nuclear missiles and a great deal of highly valuable intelligence on other subjects.

Beginning with a small, closely-knit organization and operation concerned with relatively infrequent overflights by a few aircraft, the Program now encompasses the following: (1) a billion-dollar-a-year activity involving hundreds of Government and contractor personnel; (2) the development and production of aircraft and their operation on reconnaissance missions on a scale far in excess of that which marked early stages of the Program; (3) the procurement of boosters, orbital vehicles and camera payloads, and their integration for launching; (4) the launching of complex satellite mechanisms and the air-catch recovery by Air Force teams of payloads upon re-entry into the atmosphere; and (5) the technical processing, interpretation and analysis of the quantities of intelligence information obtained.

A special Panel of the Board, with the Board's Executive Secretary, has made an intensive examination of the organization, management and operation of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Board and its Panel have had consultations with officials of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency--the two Government agencies primarily engaged in the Program. Representatives of the Board have conducted on-the-scene examinations of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance installations and activities on the West Coast and elsewhere. Conferences have been held with key officers of private companies holding Government contracts for the development and production of elements of the reconnaissance systems employed--including boosters, orbital engines, aircraft and camera payloads. We have been thoroughly briefed on all significant aspects of the Program.

As a result of its studies the Board has found that the National Reconnaissance Program, despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential. Basically, the problem is one of inadequacies in the present organizational structure and support of the national reconnaissance effort. Also, the Program is complicated by the absence of a clear, authoritative delineation and understanding of pertinent roles and missions of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and of the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as principal intelligence officer and coordinator of the total U.S. intelligence effort. In our opinion, action must be directed from the Presidential level in order to correct these difficulties, and to assure that this vital national asset is preserved and strengthened.

Based on our review, the Board submits the following conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions:

1. The National Reconnaissance Program must be conducted as a national effort geared to meet as effectively as possible over-riding national intelligence needs in support of the President, members of the National Security Council, and other officials concerned with matters of national security significance. The national character of this vitally-important intelligence enterprise must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Intelligence Board-with a clearly-established delineation of the roles and responsibilities which each is to perform in support of the Program. It is essential that there be an effective mechanism to accomplish close and continuing collaboration between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and to assure recognition of the intelligence needs and capabilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Unified and Specified Commands.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence (as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board responsible for providing coordination and guidance to the United States intelligence effort) has a large and important role in the establishment of intelligence collection requirements and priorities to be met through the National Reconnaissance Program, and in ensuring effective exploitation of the intelligence product. Under his leadership the United States Intelligence Board must provide the necessary base for the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions over areas which are virtually inaccessible to us through other forms of intelligence coverage. Of equal importance is the function of ensuring that the intelligence "take" from the National Reconnaissance Program is effectively processed, analyzed and fed into the estimating process--in order that timely consideration may be given to the product at highest Government levels. (We note an analogy in the National Signals Intelligence Program where that complex collection activity is conducted by elements of the Department of Defense, with guidance as to intelligence requirements and exploitation provided by the United States Intelligence Board under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence.)

3. Historically, both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have made important contributions toward the achievement of an effective, national reconnaissance capability.

The Central Intelligence Agency in the aircraft reconnaissance field has contributed imaginative planning, technical competence, security guidance, and flexibility in the negotiation of "black" contracts for the production of systems components in instances where secrecy is required in the contracting process. The value of the Central Intelligence Agency's contributions of personnel, skills and other resources in this effort is demonstrated by previous successes in the development and operation of the U-2 Program, and more recently in the Oxcart Program which is presently in the flight-test stage. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency has contributed importantly to the development and production of some of the camera payloads used in the satellite reconnaissance program.

The Department of Defense has demonstrated competence and effectiveness in the management and utilization of the vast military resources which are involved in the development, procurement and operation of both satellite reconnaissance systems and aircraft reconnaissance programs, including extensive support of programs in the latter category which have been managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (We are informed that the Air Force provides over 90% of the personnel and resources involved in the satellite reconnaissance program, and that it provides over 50% of the manpower and 90% of the other resources utilized in support of the aircraft reconnaissance program.) Notable examples of achievements by the Department of Defense are the recent photographic intelligence successes in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] satellite project, and the successful emulation by the Air Force of the Central Intelligence Agency's capability for secure handling of "black" covert contracting procedures. In our judgment both of these successes are directly attributable to the centralized management and control practices which are being applied by the Department of Defense under the National Reconnaissance Office structure.

4. It is essential that the National Reconnaissance Program include the fullest use of science and technology in the conduct of long-range, forward-thinking research and development leading to the advancement of our reconnaissance intelligence collection techniques, and to more efficient means for processing and analyzing the intelligence obtained.

The multi-dimensional growth of the National Reconnaissance Program has been accompanied by increasing intelligence demands upon the collection systems involved. Under conditions of heightened emergency these demands would be intensified. Furthermore, should present systems become unavailable to us as the result of the defensive capabilities of governments whose territory we are now overflying, or as the result of restrictions imposed by national policy considerations, the need for advanced reconnaissance capabilities must have been anticipated and provided for within the National Reconnaissance Program.

5. We believe that fuller use should be made of the potential of the Central Intelligence Agency in meeting the vital need for advance planning and research which must be maintained on a high priority basis if our Government is to continue to benefit from uniquely valuable intelligence returns available from overhead reconnaissance operations.

The Central Intelligence Agency, in keeping with its traditional responsibilities in the broad area of research on intelligence methods, should continue to serve as a fertile center of imaginative scientific exploration looking to increased capabilities for information-gathering and intelligence exploitation.

In the reconnaissance intelligence field the Central Intelligence Agency has already acquired invaluable experience, and has assembled a nucleus of scientific and technological talent, all of which can be brought to bear in introducing into the National Reconnaissance Program more effective means for the collection and processing of intelligence data.

New methodologies for using and interpreting film, and for analyzing the total intelligence meaning of it, must be acquired. This latter need, including the application of modern information theoretic, exploitation of photographic images, and even of new information

processing of the intelligence derived from this product, lies in the special domain of the Central Intelligence Agency. This subject, unlike the large operational projects cited above, fits the extensive skills and special interests of the intelligence expert. We believe that a brilliant new capability for the handling of huge volumes of photographed knowledge could be stimulated by a major effort of the Central Intelligence Agency. Also evident are obviously wide opportunities for research and development regarding the photographic process itself, and the science and technology associated with it are now timely since there has never really been a planned assault on deep understanding of photography on this scale.

6. Effective development and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program require that it be a streamlined operation under strong, centralized management and control within the Department of Defense, with ready access to personnel and resources of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency. The cost, complexity and size of the Program, particularly the large scale of satellite operations, and even of experiments such as the forthcoming [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] make earlier management schemes archaic.

7. We consider that, with modifications which we will propose, a sound organizational concept for the National Reconnaisance Program is set forth in certain parts of the March 13, 1963 Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence which (although sometimes honored more in the breach than in its execution) contains these basic provisions:

a. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the development, management, and conduct of the entire National Reconnaissance Program.

b. Authorization to the Secretary of Defense to establish within the Defense Department a National Reconnaissance Office directed by a Defense Department official responsible to the Secretary for carrying out the Program.

c. Authorization to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to utilize the personnel and other resources of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency as required for the conduct of the Program.

d. Provision by the Central Intelligence Agency of security guidance for procedures required for protection of sensitive National Reconnaissance Program activities.

e. Assignment to the National Reconnaissance Office of responsibility for complying with the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board.

f. Planning and conduct of research and development of future national reconnaissance projects, utilizing appropriate resources and capabilities of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and private contractors.

8. Departures from the basic concepts enumerated above, and differing interpretations of the responsibilities involved, are illustrated in part by the following:

a. The opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence that "The problem is to eliminate the conflicts, misunderstandings, personality differences, and organizational ambiguities which continue to plague the program and threaten its future. These result largely from poorly defined interagency responsibilities."

b. The Board's study reveals that the use of monitors by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program has interfered with the direct chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and from the National Reconnaissance Office Director to the Central Intelligence Agency elements engaged in the Program.

c. The authority and responsibility of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office are further diluted by the operation of an inter-agency committee which provides technical direction to some aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program on the basis of decisions which must be unanimous and which are unduly time-consuming.

d. There is a lack of firm, unified direction of the entire National Reconnaissance Program with the result that:

(1) centralized systems engineering and technical direction are lacking in the satellite reconnaissance program,

(2) one contractor stated that decisions which once took minutes now require months,

(3) contracting authority is diffused between officers of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency,

(4) the operations of the National Reconnaisance Program are badly fragmented and confused,

(5) progress in the research and development of advanced reconnaissance intelligence systems is not sufficiently pursued, and

(6) the economy of the Program is not the subject of coherent cost reduction or production gain efforts.

We recommend the issuance of a Presidential directive which will provide guidelines for the centralized direction, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, and clarification of the departmental and agency responsibilities involved as follows:

1. Definition of the National Reconnaissance Program as a single program, national in character, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long-range, for the collection of intelligence, mapping and geodetic information through overflights (excluding normal peripheral reconnaissance operations).

2. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program, having primary responsibility and authority for (a) the management and conduct of reconnaissance activities involved in the Program and (b) the tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as required to carry out that responsibility.

/2/Pending the outcome of studies now under way in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Board reserves judgment on the advisability of (a) designating the Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center as Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in order that the reconnaissance resources of the military commands may be made readily available to the National Reconnaissance Program, and (b) designating the Commander, Air Force Systems Command, as a Special Assistant in the National Reconnaisance Office to provide immediate coupling of the National Reconnaissance Program with the full resources of the Air Force Systems Command. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. Assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, of the function of sharpening and expediting the efforts of the United States Intelligence Board with respect to: (a) the establishment of realistic intelligence collection requirements to guide the national reconnaissance effort in the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions; (b) ensuring prompt processing, analysis and reporting to appropriate users of the photographic and signals intelligence obtained from the national reconnaissance effort; and (c) the fullest utilization of such intelligence in the preparation of national intelligence estimates.

5. Direction that there be a coordinated, comprehensive budget for all elements of the National Reconnaissance Program, and that there be established fiscal control and accounting procedures to assure appropriate utilization of funds by the agencies concerned in support of the Program. (We suggest that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Budget jointly review this matter with a view to achieving the best formula for the accomplishment of these objectives.)

6. Direction to the heads of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies concerned that full utilization be made of the resources of each of those agencies as required for the conduct of research projects looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photographic and other sensors, and advanced methods for improved processing and exploitation of the intelligence obtained therefrom.

7. Assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the responsibility for providing the Executive Agent with security policy guidance required for the maintenance of a uniform system of security procedures for the National Reconnaissance Program.

8. In lieu of the monitor and review functions provided for in the present National Reconnaissance Program Agreement, periodic reporting by the Executive Agent for the Program to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, concerning all aspects of the Program, including organization, management, funding, programming, security, advance planning, research and development, production, and operations.

9. Authorization to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to establish a Scientific Advisory Board, to include experts in the fields of science and technology from outside the Government, to provide the Director with technical advice and guidance relating to the achievement of national reconnaissance objectives.

We recommend further that if the President approves a directive along the lines proposed above, its implementation within the framework of the National Reconnaissance Office include the following actions (along with such others as the Secretary of Defense may authorize as Executive Agent for the Program):

1. Close and continuing collaboration on the part of the Secretary of Defense (as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program) and the Director of Central Intelligence (in his capacity as principal intelligence officer and coordinator of the over-all U.S. intelligence effort) with a view to ensuring (a) the most productive possible utilization of national resources and skills in meeting the critical intelligence objectives involved; (b) opportunities for the Director of Central Intelligence to survey periodically progress made under the Program; and (c) evaluation of the need for proposed reconnaissance systems prior to the undertaking of development and testing.

2. Continued designation of the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

3. Contributions by elements of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency of personnel required to provide staff support to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in the performance of the mission, functions and operations of the National Reconnaissance Program--such personnel to serve solely under the direction and supervision of the Director while so assigned.

4. Delegation by the Secretary of Defense (as Executive Agent of the National Reconnaissance Program) to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, of the authority for the issuance of directives to elements of the Department of Defense, and for the levying of requests upon the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies involved, as required for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

5. Assignment to the Department of Defense (Air Force) of responsibility for the management, over-all systems engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems.

6. Elimination of the interagency Configuration Control Board as a decision-making entity within the satellite reconnaissance program.

7. Continued assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the Oxcart Program. With respect to manned intelligence-collection aircraft of an advanced character, we recommend as general principle that, following the development stage, the responsibility for their operational use be determined by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group.

8. Continue for the time being present management arrangements with respect to the A-11, the R-12 and the Tagboard Projects. (We note in this regard that the recent surfacing of the A-11 and the initial deliveries of the R-12's starting in August 1964 will undoubtedly require review and possible adjustment in their management structure.)

Respectfully,

For the Board

Clark M. Clifford

On May 4, 1964, the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms met at the Department of State with Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, to discuss National Policy Papers and their implications for CIA. Agreement was reached on several issues, including Rostow's proposal that completion of a National Policy Paper involve a review of CIA operations in the area. For a memorandum for the record summarizing the discussion, see Document 11.

Washington, May 19, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting, February 21, 1964. Secret.

SUBJECT
Proposed Name Change for Special Group (5412)

/2/Special Group 5412 was the name given to the group assigned responsibility for the planning and conduct of covert operations, as set forth in NSC 5412, "National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations," March 15, 1954. See footnote 5, Document 263.

/3/Reference is to David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964).

Since the Group does make highly classified decisions, its working methods and the people who compose it should be protected. If it is surfaced as an elite policy command, its members will be more vulnerable to speculative publicity, i.e., "The second most powerful man in Washington, Alexis Johnson", "Bundy's Secret Task Force", "McCone's Three Musketeers", "The hand inside McNamara's glove, Cy Vance", "The Four Horseman", etc. etc.

Therefore, the mildest, most easily forgotten or confused description would be best. Anything clever, startling, or attractive should be avoided. No SMERSH men, we. The words "Special" and "Group" and any number should be dropped.

The following banalities come to mind:

Positive Actions Board (PAB)
Periodic Decisions Unit (PDU)
Executive Review Committee (ERC)
Security Review Staff (SRS)
Joint Committee on National Security (JCNS)
Subcommittee on National Security (SNS)
Plans Review Board (PRB)
The Invisible Group (IG)
International Affairs Problem Unit (IAPU)
Periodic Review Directorate (PRD)
International Affairs Council (IAC)
Interim Decisions Council (IDC)
Interdepartmental Decisions Unit (IDU)
National Policy Decisions Forum (NPDF)
Executive Action Adjustment Unit (EAAU)

/4/A handwritten notation, probably by Bundy, in the left margin just below this sentence reads: "McC[one] v. any change." Nevertheless, at a meeting of the Special Group on May 21, the members agreed after a brief discussion to issue an NSAM redesignating the Group "as a committee with the number which will be assigned to the NSAM." (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting, May 21, 1964) For text of this NSAM, see Document 204.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 2, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, General. Top Secret.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Change in Name of Special Group 5412

/2/An undated list identifies the members of the 303 Committee as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance. (Ibid.)

/3/See footnote 2, Document 257.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, June 2, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Copies were sent to Clark M. Clifford, McCone, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

SUBJECT
Memorandum for the President, by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, re National Reconnaissance Program

/2/Document 201.

Cyrus Vance

Washington, June 11, 1964.

1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2 [4 of 4], Box 6. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

SUBJECT
National Reconnaissance Program

/2/Document 201.

2. In many respects I have found the conclusions of this report constructive and helpful. However, the proposed Presidential Directive contains certain organizational proposals which do not seem to me calculated to provide the most productive possible utilization of national resources for the reconnaissance effort of the government. If these proposals are adopted, I do not believe that it will be possible to discharge the responsibilities which the report itself envisages for the Director of Central Intelligence or that the Central Intelligence Agency can perform the mission which the report apparently contemplates for the Agency.

3. I believe that certain basic principles must be established and recognized if, as the conclusions of the report state, the reconnaissance program is to "be conducted as a national effort geared to meet as effectively as possible overriding national intelligence needs." The conclusions of the report correctly characterize the National Reconnaissance Program as a "vitally important enterprise" which must be conducted as a "national effort," the national character of which "must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Intelligence Board." The problem is to delineate clearly the roles and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department in support of a national program while maintaining its character as a "joint endeavor."

4. Some of the principles which I have in mind find support in some of the language of the report but appear to be obscured and contradicted elsewhere in the report, particularly by the implications of provisions in the proposed Presidential Directive. I consider it important to identify these principles as clearly as possible as I am convinced that their adoption is an essential prerequisite to a reconnaissance effort conducted for national intelligence purposes on a collaborative basis which makes maximum use of all resources available to the government.

5. These basic principles involve (a) clear recognition of the Director of Central Intelligence's joint responsibility with the Secretary of Defense for the development of the reconnaissance program and (b) assurance that the capabilities of CIA, in both the operational and the research and development fields are fully utilized. I believe that the President's Board agrees with these objectives. In order to make sure that there is full understanding of these principles, however, they are defined and discussed in the following paragraphs.

A. The Director of Central Intelligence should participate fully in the formulation of the plan for the National Reconnaissance Program and in decisions relating to the assignment and implementation of responsibilities and the allocation of resources under the program.

The effectiveness of our reconnaissance program depends upon an intimate interrelationship between intelligence requirements and priorities, and the development and utilization of the effort and resources necessary to satisfy these requirements. Essential ingredients of the program are (in addition to the identification of targets, the establishment of collection schedules and processing of the take): (a) assignment of responsibility for research and development to produce new and improved collection systems, (b) allocation of responsibility for specific operational activity, (c) budgeting and programming to finance individual activities, and (d) review and correction of operational or technical deficiencies in the implementation of program responsibilities.

Decisions in all of these areas contribute to a vital intelligence effort and require the participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. It is essential that these decisions should not be influenced by other considerations than the need for maximum effectiveness and efficiency in the reconnaissance program, and that this program should not suffer for lack of informed support from the official of the government primarily charged with responsibility for intelligence activities. The ultimate responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for identifying and evaluating Soviet weapons technology, strategic military deployment and other threats of critical significance to national security, makes it essential that he should have an adequate voice in basic decisions relating to the reconnaissance program which is the basic source of intelligence on these matters.

The conclusions of the Board's report are generally consistent with these views and certain paragraphs are in full consonance with them. For example the report enjoins (page 9) "close and continuing collaboration between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence with a view to ensuring" (a) the most productive possible utilization of national resources; (b) opportunities for the Director of Central Intelligence to survey progress under the program; and (c) evaluation of the need for new reconnaissance systems.

The responsibilities and prerogatives implied by this language, however, are not sustained by other provisions of the report which have contradictory implications and are not adequately reflected in the proposed Presidential Directive. For one thing, the program is defined as "a single program?for the development, management, control and operation of all projects" (Recommendation 1, page 7) and primary responsibility and authority for "the management and conduct of reconnaissance activities" and "the tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies" is vested in the Secretary of Defense (Recommendation 2, page 7). Recommendation 3 (page 8) provides for the delegation of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities to "a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense."

The reconnaissance program will be a successful intelligence effort which produces the hard information essential for the intelligence estimates on which strategic judgments are based only if there is full participation by the Director of Central Intelligence in the development and direction of the program. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence must include an adequate voice in decisions which affect the utilization of resources, the allocation of responsibilities and funds, and the scheduling and direction of missions. The agreement governing activity under the program should include an unequivocal affirmation of this principle.

In this connection Recommendation 8 (page 9) of the Board's report refers to the provision of the present NRO agreement relating to monitors. To the extent that this recommendation can be understood as proposing to eliminate the staff required by the Director of Central Intelligence for normal support and advice it is clearly incompatible with the exercise of his responsibilities. To ensure effective participation in the development and direction of the program, the Director of Central Intelligence (and presumably also the Secretary of Defense) must be free to utilize deputies, assistants and staff to any extent necessary.

B. Provision must be made to ensure that research and development potentialities of CIA are fully utilized.

The Board's report recognizes the importance of full utilization of the facilities developed by CIA for the invention and development of new systems. It speaks of the "invaluable experience" of the Central Intelligence Agency which "has assembled a nucleus of scientific and technological talent, all of which can be brought to bear in introducing into the National Reconnaissance Program more effective means for the collection and processing of intelligence data." (Conclusion 5, page 5.) The report further recommends appropriate action to ensure "that full utilization be made of the resources of" the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Department of Defense "for the conduct of research proj-ects looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photograhic and other sensors," etc. (Recommendation 6, page 9.)

An important responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense (as I have pointed out above) is to see that assignments for research and development are allocated with a view to making the best use of the talents and capabilities of individual agencies. One of the reasons for making his right to participate in decisions of this nature explicit is to ensure that assignments of research responsibility will be made to the Central Intelligence Agency when appropriate.

A point which I would particularly like to urge is my belief that the "cutting edge" of advance thinking cannot be preserved within the Central Intelligence Agency if its role is confined to research and if the "responsibility for the management, over-all systems engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems" be assigned to the Air Force as proposed (Recommendation 5, page 10) in the Board's report. If this procedure is followed, we should recognize that we have decided as a matter of policy to place responsibility for future reconnaissance operations and improvements on a "single instrument basis" in the hands of the Air Force.

The Central Intelligence Agency should be charged not only with advance planning and research in specified areas of overhead reconnaissance, both satellite and aircraft, but should maintain a continuing responsibility for the development and production of the new systems developed. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Under such an arrangement continued growth and improvement in the systems can be expected, comparable to the process we have witnessed in the U-2 and Corona programs. In both these systems very significant growth has taken place as they have developed and matured. The U-2's operating characteristics were improved with new engines as they were developed, equipment for electronic countermeasures was provided as equipment became available and the planes were modified to operate from aircraft carriers (with recent impressive results) as it became apparent that foreign bases would be denied us. Cameras and films likewise have been improved. The Oxcart vehicle is of course a follow-on to provide the replacement for the U-2.

Similar progress has been made in the Corona program which has been radically altered and improved since its initial introduction.

If responsibility for production of the system is removed from those responsible for its initial invention and turned over to others, motivation for continuing improvement will be seriously impaired. I am not impressed with the arguments of those who maintain that the organization responsible for actual operations must have control of production of the "payload." Many years of practical experience in business and government have convinced me that operations can be successfully conducted using components (in this case the "payload") which are furnished to the operating entity by some other organization.

In the context of a discussion of the continued contribution to be expected from the Central Intelligence Agency, it seems to me important to make clear that program responsibility and operational assignments should be levied upon the Central Intelligence Agency through normal command channels.

Recommendation 2 (page 7) confers upon the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the program, authority for "tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of? the Central Intelligence Agency." Any ambiguity occasioned by this recommendation should be clarified and the principle established that instructions relating to tasks or assignments should be transmitted to the Central Intelligence Agency through normal command channels although informal working relationships should of course be encouraged.

6. I believe that establishment of the principles which I have described above is an essential prerequisite to an effective national reconnaissance program. I therefore recommend that these principles be accepted for incorporation in a revised agreement governing the national reconnaissance effort and that instructions be issued accordingly.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 23, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. Top Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]