U.S. Department of State

Washington, July 9, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961-30 March 1965, Box 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 12.

SUBJECT
Discussion on NRO matters on Thursday, July 9, 1964, between McGeorge Bundy, Secretary Vance and McCone

/2/See Document 201.

1. Secretary Vance stated that he and McNamara had read the President's Board report and had concurred in it as they thought it was representative of what the President wanted to do and they had no alternative except to go along. Furthermore he said he thought that the procedure outlined in the Board's report was thoroughly practical and would resolve the problems in the NRO.

Bundy stated he could not go along with this. That he thought the Board's recommendations would seriously reduce the role of CIA and he questioned whether this was in the national interest. He furthermore corrected Vance with respect to the authoritativeness of the report stating the President had not accepted it and that he, Bundy, was not inclined to ask him to "sign off" on it because he felt there was considerable validity in the views I had expressed.

/3/Presumably reference is to McCone's letters to Bundy of June 11 (Document 206) and June 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI McCone-Department of Defense)

/4/Presumably reference is to McCone's June 19 letter to McNamara. (Ibid.)

Vance said that my proposed changes would create some serious "managerial problems" within NRO and the Department of Defense and therefore they were unsatisfactory to McNamara and himself. He did not go into detail.

2. The following matters arose.

a. In discussing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Vance made the point they were duplicative and that we therefore were working on "two tracks to accomplish the same end". I expressed surprise, quoting Dr. McMillan's statement to Dr. Land that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] system was in no way duplicative of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] anything else that NRO contemplated and that Land had exacted this kind of a statement from McMillan prior to examining [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Vance said that very possibly the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] project had been expanded in its scope after the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefing. I countered by saying that this was a very good reason why we should keep at least two organizations in this very important business.

b. I reviewed a few of my personal complaints against McMillan's operations, details of which are well-known and are recorded in other memoranda, but involved failure to inform me of developments, failure to work cooperatively with COMOR, failure to present budget figures for review and study, failure to brief on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] other programs, continual changes of schedules and postponement of events without consent of USIB, etc., etc. Vance said all of these were inexcusable and they would see that McMillan sent budget papers and other information over to me forthwith.

Bundy then said that he felt that probably the seat of the problem was the parochial ambitions of the Air Force and perhaps the whole situation would be ironed out if the NRO was located in the SecDef's office and not in the Air Force. Vance concurred with this view, stating that this was a matter which he and McNamara had under serious consideration but they did not wish to move on it until after the election because there would be some consequences, a possible flare-up by Zuckert and Gen. LeMay which would be somewhat embarrassing, and furthermore McMillan would quit. Bundy recognized that all of these things should be avoided but repeated his feeling that he preferred the SecDef arrangement. Vance left me with the impression that such a change is definitely in the Defense Department program but will not take place immediately.

/5/The text of the March (not April) 13, 1963, CIA-DOD agreement on the management of NRO is ibid., NRO File, 06 Sept 1961-30 March 1965, Box 8.

It was left that the subject would be placed high on the agenda after Vance returns from his leave on July 17th. The first order of business would be the review of the budget and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefing scheduled for that afternoon.

After the meeting Bundy and I had a brief talk alone. He said he thought we had made some progress in "moving the Defense Department over a little and getting them to take a more reasonable viewpoint". He seemed personally committed to keeping both organizations in the business and finding a solution to the existing problems, deliberately and carefully, and to avoid at all costs emotionalism and personalities.

3. During the discussion with Bundy and Vance and also in a later discussion with Bundy, the question of the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the Corona project was briefly commented upon. I stated that it seemed to me this was a very questionable move because the project had been going along for several years under Lockheed management and the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who, while competent, were unfamiliar with the project, its background, problems, etc., would probably involve more confusion than help and might be counter productive. I pointed out that the SAMOS project had suffered from just this kind of an arrangement and that the idea of a direct relationship between Lockheed (the producer) and the responsible authorities (CIA for the payload and Air Force for the boosters) was developed in order to avoid the managerial problems that developed in the SAMOS project. There was no final conclusion.

I would like verification of these facts.

/6/Clarence L. Johnson, vice president of advanced development projects, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Washington, July 14, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Mr. Clark Clifford at luncheon--14 July 1964

/2/Presumably a reference to the Republican National Convention, held in San Francisco in July.

/3/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 208.

/4/Not found.

/5/Not further identified.

There followed a long discussion of the organization of the Office of Director of Central Intelligence. Clifford said that he had proposed in 1961 that the DCI, as principal intelligence officer to the President, be separated from his intimate relationship with CIA and thus he could render more effective assistance to the President and also could more effectively give guidance to the community as a whole. He said that at one point at a special Board meeting, he had made such a proposal to Allen Dulles, then DCI, but Dulles absolutely refused to consider any such plan. I said there might be considerable merit in such a plan but it presented a difficulty because the DCI was so heavily dependent upon CIA for staff support. In effect, CIA was the DCI's only staff and organization and I pointed out that the original legislation provided that CIA be the coordinating agency within the intelligence community and that this role had been transferred to DCI with the passage of time.

I then made the point that perhaps the DCI should be the executive agent of all national intelligence resources, i.e. NSA, NPIC, NRO and AFTAC with an organizational arrangement that operational management of these agencies would rest with CIA and Defense. Furthermore I pointed out that CIA was the only unit which could be considered as completely objective with no "axe to grind" or no parochial interests outside of intelligence. I said this was particularly true of the DDI side of the house and it might be that parochialism might, in time, enter into the thinking of DD/S&T and DD/P.

Clifford asked if I would give some thought to a practical operational plan along the above lines as he felt the existing arrangement was not a good one and did not represent a precise and therefore satisfactory plan of organization.

Washington, July 15, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Office of General Counsel, 1964-65. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Position of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Executive Branch

1. This memorandum is for information.

/2/See Document 209.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 221, and footnote 4, Document 271.

4. The Agency in 1947 started with the concept that it had the sole responsibility for the production of National Estimates. Thus, the old Office of Reports and Evaluations proceeded with the theory that it should have the competence to take the raw intelligence, and intelligence data in all fields of interest, analyze it, correlate it, and evaluate it for the production of National Estimates. This was bitterly opposed, particularly by the military intelligence services. As an example, they asserted that the Agency had neither the competence nor the responsibility to produce finished intelligence relating to weapons. Towards the end of Admiral Hillenkoetter's regime the dispute broke down the estimative process to where literally a National Estimate could not be produced. I participated in the negotiations between Admiral Hillenkoetter and General John McGruder, trying to resolve this impasse, but no solution was in sight. Before General Smith arrived he asked me what I saw as the primary problems with which he would be faced, and I told him I thought this was No. 1. He assigned this problem to his first Deputy, William H. Jackson, who proposed a concept that the National Estimates were the common responsibility of all the intelligence community. I objected strongly, and General Smith modified this to say, in effect, that the responsibility was in the Agency under the DCI and required the combined effort of the intelligence community. This led to the establishment of the present system of contributions by other intelligence components in their assigned fields with the correlation and evaluation done through ONE and USIB structure.

/4/For text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 131-135.

6. The present concept tends to downgrade the intelligence function of the Agency to the position of one among equals and to widen the split between the Agency's intelligence functions and the DCI, which cannot, of course, be completely separated. Present organization with the Office of National Estimates in rather an anomalous position under the DD/I but processing its material through USIB, contributes to the problem, and the emergence of DIA tends to underline the situation. Some move to upgrade ONE and tie it in more closely organizationally with the Director might be one move that could be considered in the near future.

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Houston signed the original.

Washington, July 31, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum indicates that McCone noted it.

1. The DCI gave me the following policy position for NRO and reconnaissance programs as of this date:

a. It is his fixed and unalterable position that the national interest demands the continuation of two organizations in instigating reconnaissance capabilities thinking independently but eventually working together at the management level when hardware is imminent;

b. There is no question in his mind but what the contribution of CIA in the past and its current assemblage of talent with great enthusiasm and high competence bears this out, particularly in the light of the stagnation in this field elsewhere.

2. He says that if the straightening out of this matter requires a Presidential decision, he insists upon it and he insists upon it now. He is not going to see the CIA capability frittered away by fiat or by decisions at a lower level.

3. If the President is not prepared to make this decision now or if the nittering and frittering away continues, it would be his position that the whole reconnaissance operation be turned over to the Department of Defense along with all the responsibilities and the dangers of such a decision. I got the distinct impression this would also include the Director's suit if such action were taken.

4. As to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the DCI wishes us to develop plans for the construction, assembly, testing, and contracting of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reconnaissance space craft which would then be delivered as a piece of Government-furnished equipment to whatever operations people are designated to launch and recover the payload. This would include whatever intelligence community inputs are required to schedule and approve launchings and nominal orbits as well as targeting.

5. What he has in mind is CIA as a Government agency delivering a totally completed and checked out space craft to either NASA or the Air Forces for launching by them by an appropriate booster system. Recovery would likewise be done by the launching agency and the payload would then be returned to CIA and the intelligence community for further action.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 9, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT
Luncheon Meeting Attended by: Messrs. McCone, Carter, and Bross for CIA. Messrs. Kermit Gordon, Elmer Staats, Bob Amory and Bill Thomas for BOB--9 October 1964

This memorandum does not attempt to review intimate details of the rather extended discussion of this meeting, it merely treats the highlights.

1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Gordon asked McCone's views on such an appointment. McCone responded that he had recommended this to the SecDef eighteen months or two years ago and suggested that a man holding such a position should be a regular member of USIB. McCone had suggested that an Assistant SecDef/Intell could represent the Secretary's views at USIB, could serve as the link between SecDef and DIA, could administer the NRO, execute SecDef's responsibilities as Executive Agent for NSA and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and also would be a focal point between DCI and DoD on all intelligence matters. McCone said the idea was turned down by McNamara for unexplained reasons; however, McCone assumed that such an arrangement would create problems on the interrelation of SecDef and DIA, would remove NRO and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from the Air Force, and would exacerbate existing serious problems with the Air Force. McCone concluded that from the standpoint of administering intelligence and considering the enormous intelligence assets under the authority of SecDef, this arrangement would be highly desirable and urged a reconsideration of the proposal.

/2/Attached but not printed.

3. This led to a discussion of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] McCone said that for a year and one-half he had been pressing the D/NRO to develop an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Nothing was done and no recognition was made of the DCI's request. In March, D/NRO was asked to brief USIB on his plans for an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The briefing was perfunctory. The briefing boards were hurriedly put together the night before the briefing and the briefing evidenced that no research contracts had been considered, authorized or awarded to meet this objective. McCone stated that the reason for this was that the NRO organization was oriented exclusively towards the spot system which it had developed and it appeared to be its primary and only interest. Hence, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] most important to the intelligence needs, was a stepchild.

McCone said he then asked the DD/S&T to explore the field. After several months, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and a considerable amount of in-house work, the very ingenious system was presented which offered [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with Corona KH-4 area coverage. A panel chaired by Dr. Land reviewed the program and reported it as entirely feasible and within the state of art and recommended approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for research and development along four specified lines. The D/NRO has obviously made every attempt to frustrate this development and to block it, and this is still going on. Unfortunately Secretary Vance has been taken in by McMillan and Fubini and has joined in the attempt to hold up [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. McCone said despite all of these frustrations and bickering, which appear to him to be bureaucratic and absolute nonsense, he had authorized the work to go forward and demanded that it be financed out of the NRO budget.

Gordon questioned DCI as to availability of funds. McCone said an excess of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was appropriated in 1965 for research and development by CIA and that he didn't think that SecDef or anyone else had the authority to exercise a veto on the expenditure of this fund, and he had no intentions of stopping. McCone then engaged in a discussion of the equivocation of the term "technical direction," stating that he would not, under any circumstances, turn over final decision on a project of this type to a contractor but would employ system engineer contractors to the maximum extent for the supervision of the work, thus minimizing the requirements for in-house staff. Gordon stated that a number of Defense missile projects had delegated complete technical direction to contractors. McCone replied that that probably accounted for repeated failures and the fact that the New York Times in a blistering editorial on October 5th criticized the Defense Department for its failure to produce anything new in the past four years. In fact the editorial stated that the whole Defense structure was based on invention and development originated and advanced, much of it to an operational status, by the Eisenhower Administration. McCone said that in AEC he had insisted that the Director of Military Application and his staff assume final responsibility for technical direction, with the laboratories doing all the work. This, he said, was the proper way to run a government operation and the responsibility for final decision should not be delegated to others.

During the conversation the question arose about launchers and boosters. McCone said this was not the issue, as there was no intention in his mind or anyone in CIA to become involved in the development or operation of launchers and boosters since this could be adequately done by the Air Force. What he was talking about was development and production of an improved payload which involved a space craft, a camera and recovery vehicle, all of which could be delivered to the organization responsible for the launch and proper exchange of technical and scientific information could readily be accomplished.

No attempt was made to gain BoB's support in this argument, however, McCone made it abundantly clear we were proceeding and we intended to use NRO research and development funds and he did not respect the veto rights or privileges of SecDef.

3. Mr. Gordon raised the question of separating DCI from CIA, placing him in position as principal intelligence officer for the government, to be free of parochial views of CIA. McCone said he had given a great deal of thought to this arrangement which had been frequently suggested by Mr. Clark Clifford. Indeed he had recently studied the British setup under which the Chairman of the JIC was removed from operations and had concluded that the Chairman, because of his remote position, was of little value to the Prime Minister as his J-2. McCone said the same is true in France. However, in Germany General Gehlen, J-2 for the Prime Minister, was of real value because he directly controlled the analytical and estimating process and coordinated the intelligence in the Military, Foreign Office and elsewhere. McCone said he felt the law as written was pretty good and that he could not function as DCI if he were cut off from access to several hundred specialists in CIA whom he conferred with on problems as they arose.

Gordon then said perhaps a change as important as this could only be made by people who are not captured by parochial views and McCone responded that of course any government structure could be changed. Unification could be abolished and the three services could exist independent of one another. The Air Force could be merged back with the Army, etc.; however, it was his judgment and his views not to attempt such a change until and unless a better plan which did insure better functioning of the community was produced.

Gordon then said that he felt an independent DCI, functioning as McGeorge Bundy, was feasible. McCone replied that Bundy's success was due to his unusual ability and that no other man in Bundy's position had been able to do what Bundy had done. In other words, the current situation was due to Bundy's being an extraordinary fellow and maintaining a close liaison with Secretaries of State and Defense which gives him access to the resources of both Departments. McCone noted there was a day when this was different. For instance, at one time the only contact between State and Defense was from the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Secretary of State, and no other people in either organization were permitted to discuss their respective affairs with one another.

4. Throughout the luncheon there was considerable discussion of the functioning of USIB. McCone contended it was working well and that his dual role did not foreclose open discussion and unprejudiced rulings by him. In fact, he said, he had ruled against CIA more often than in favor of it. He commented on the managerial problems which USIB is now dealing with in addition to estimates and reports and viewed in some detail the manner in which ELINT and NRO operations are controlled.

5. The meeting concluded at 2:30 p.m., permitting the attendance of a USIB meeting.

Washington, October 22, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office on October 24.

SUBJECT
Discussion with The President--22 October 1964

On 22 October I prepared to depart with Mrs. McCone to attend the funeral of Herbert Hoover, Sr. I was called by the White House and advised that the President requested specifically that we accompany him. I drove to Andrews Air Force Base and proceeded in the Presidential party to New York, to the services, and to the Presidential suite, 35A in the Waldorf, remaining there two hours, and returned with the Presidential party.

While traveling with the President I was able to discuss a number of matters with him. The principal items were:

1. The President stated that he did not know too much about CIA's organization but he had heard from many sources that we had a great many unusually competent people in the Agency. I responded by giving him briefly my appraisal of the quality of the personnel in the Agency from the standpoint of education, intellectual qualities and continuity of service. I emphasized the objectivity of the organization, the fact it had no parochial "axe to grind" in any field most particularly those relating to foreign policy and defense policy. The Agency looked upon its responsibility as that of collecting intelligence by every possible means and evaluating our own intelligence and that gathered by all other Community members carefully and objectively. The President asked the size of the organization. I told him our budget was about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and said we had about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] employees. He asked about the future outlook. I said that I thought the organization was pretty well shaking down, the five-year forecast indicated no increases in personnel and the increases in the budget were minimal and attributable largely to the wage and salary increases and other escalations. I said this resulted from very careful management and that we hope to "hold the line" unless new tasks were assigned to the Agency. This would necessitate additional people and money. The President asked what part of our budget went for operational activities such as political action, paramilitary, etc., and I said about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] out of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This was the first opportunity I have had to discuss the Agency with the President. I thought he was interested and impressed.

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

During November 1964 the Central Intelligence Agency again addressed the issue of the best way to provide the President with daily intelligence information. At a meeting with Director of Central Intelligence McCone on October 30, Secretary of State Rusk raised concerns about the security of the President's Intelligence Checklist given its distribution (see footnote 2, Document 192). In a November 3 memorandum, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter asked Ray Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, to follow up on the matter, keeping in mind McCone's points of view: "The Checklist is and must continue to be comprehensive and capable of containing the most sensitive intelligence in a condensed form"; and "the President should read it or have it read to him daily and should not depend on the bi-weekly summaries [the President's Intelligence Review]." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, DCI "Eyes Only" File, 01 July-31 Dec 1964)

Cline conferred with McGeorge Bundy, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Bundy informed the President in a December 1 memorandum that he and Cline had worked out a "new form of daily intelligence briefing on the premise that it is more useful to you if it comes in your evening reading. Our thought is that this may run parallel to Dean Rusk's daily report (see Document 1) and be more nearly responsive to your own interests than the papers we have been sending heretofore." Bundy attached a copy of the new summary, the President's Daily Brief. President's Special Assistant Valenti later noted on Bundy's memorandum: "Mac, The President likes this very much." The President's Daily Brief replaced the President's Intelligence Checklist as of December 1 and was provided to President Johnson daily (6 days a week prior to 1966 and 7 days a week thereafter) for the rest of his administration. While both the Checklist and the Daily Brief provided brief intelligence notes organized by country, the Daily Brief was initially much shorter. Whereas the Checklist was usually about 6 to 8 pages (on 8 x 8 inch paper), the Daily Brief started out with one 8 x 13 inch page. From late 1965 on, however, it was typically 2 to 4 standard-sized pages plus maps and occasional photographs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings) At the request of the White House, in 1967 CIA shifted from providing it late in the day for Johnson's Evening Reading to making it "available to the President wherever he may be at the start of each day before he reads his morning newspapers." (Annual Report to PFIAB, 1966; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80-B01447R, DDI Annual Report to PFIAB, 1966, 1967)

President Johnson saw both the Intelligence Checklist and the Daily Brief regularly, according to a spot check of the President's file of Intelligence Checklists and Daily Briefs at the Johnson Library. Almost all copies examined are marked with an "L" or a "ps," indicating that Johnson saw them. President's Special Assistant Bill Moyers reported in May 1965 that the President read the Daily Brief "avidly." (Richard Lehman, Memorandum for the record, May 25, 1965; ibid., White House and Executive Offices, 1966) The shift to the Daily Brief did not, however, dispose of more general concerns about getting intelligence reports into the hands of the President. In a memorandum for Cline, May 19, 1965, Helms stated: "We still have quite a problem at the White House getting material to the President. Mr. Bromley Smith spoke to me about it again today. Upon Mr. Bundy's return, we have all got to get together and see if we can solve this crucial problem." (Ibid., DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Helms Chrono as DDP and DDCI)

Washington, November 17, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11-2. Confidential.

/2/The President met with McCone on November 17 from 2:30 to 2:44 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

Mr. Bundy asked that the following information be brought to your attention prior to your meeting with CIA Director McCone this afternoon:

1. Mr. McCone has repeated to Mr. Bundy his desire to be relieved as Director of CIA in due course. His reasons include the necessity of attending to family business, as well as his and his wife's West Coast responsibilities.

2. Mr. McCone has given no clear indication as to the time of his leaving his post, and a question as to his intentions would be appropriate.

3. Mr. McCone has said it would be highly useful if his successor were named far enough in advance so that McCone could introduce his successor to his intelligence colleagues during the course of a familiarization trip of some two months to the Far East and Europe.

/3/Rusk's intimation during a discussion with McCone on March 18, 1965, that Maxwell Taylor was under consideration elicited a comment by McCone that Taylor "would be very bad indeed." For text of McCone's memorandum for the record, see Document 30.

5. Mr. Bundy recalls the special knowledge which Clark Clifford has in this area, and suggests you may wish to telephone him prior to your discussion with Mr. McCone.

Bromley Smith

Washington, December 3, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, White House, July-Dec 1964. Secret. Drafted by Bross on December 2.

Dear Mr. President:

/2/Text of the President's statement is in the Johnson Library, Statements File, 11/19/64, Statement of the President at a Cabinet Meeting: The Great Society.

At my direction the Central Intelligence Agency has intensified its program of management control designed continually to improve efficiency within the Agency, to eliminate marginal or outmoded activities and to stabilize, and if possible reduce, the Agency's budget as well as its manpower.

I believe that this program has been successful. The five-year forecast for the Agency's budget contains only very moderate increases which reflect the costs of conducting operations in foreign countries where rising price levels prevail; and the cost of pay raises already granted. These increases will be offset to some extent by actual reductions in the Agency's manpower. We are actually budgeting in 1966 for 558 fewer permanent positions than we had included in our 1964 budget. Many new and costly programs calling for additional funds and manpower have been successfully absorbed within established ceilings. Programs considered redundant or of lesser priority have been screened out to make this possible. I see no reason why the five-year forecast should not prove to be accurate unless unanticipated tasks are assigned to the Agency.

Two points of importance, however, should be noted. One is that CIA must be prepared to take action required by policy makers on short notice to meet new political crises which are essentially unpredictable. A second point is the fact that CIA performs certain services which call for both manpower and appropriations over which it does not have exclusive control and which may involve increases over estimates projected in the five-year forecast. I have in mind certain communications responsibilities for the Department of State.

Turning to the question of the Intelligence Community as a whole in which I, as Director of Central Intelligence, by Presidential Directive have responsibility for coordination and guidance, I feel a continuing effort is indicated. The recognized budget for all intelligence activities is about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. CIA costs account for roughly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The Defense Intelligence Agency, including intelligence components of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, accounts for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; the National Security Agency, including the collection activities of the Services, for approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; and the National Reconnaissance Organization for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. A small amount is attributable to the Department of State.

I have created a small but highly qualified staff to assist me in my coordinating capacity, which has undertaken a series of studies and evaluations of programs conducted by the Intelligence Community. With this assistance, I have made and will continue to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, who is the Executive Agent for the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Organization, concerning the extent to which economies might be effected without impairing the collection, analysis and dissemination of essential intelligence. My concern has been to identify the priority objectives of the United States intelligence effort and to make sure that intelligence programs are as responsive as possible to these objectives. Over the past two years the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has increasingly been providing guidance and managerial direction to the Community through the refinement of intelligence requirements and by careful scheduling of overhead reconnaissance activities, the allocation of ELINT and COMINT responsibilities, and review of the needs of the Community for research and development of new collection systems and sensors.

The cost of the U.S. intelligence effort, as I have said, runs about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and employs about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] men. This effort will continue to be substantial and is obviously essential for the national security. It is also a necessary factor in containing the military budget within realistic limits. In the absence of an intelligence system capable of identifying probable military and political developments, the cost of the forces required to meet all possible contingencies would clearly be prohibitive. Accurate information about enemy strengths and dispositions enables us to avoid excessive, as well as inadequate, expenditures for forces and armaments.

/3/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 99.

/4/For text of the National Security Act of 1947, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 131-135.

I consider the relations of the Central Intelligence Agency with the Congress as reasonably satisfactory. During the three years of my tenure of office, I have met approximately once a month with a subcommittee of the House Armed Forces Committee chaired by Chairman Vinson and reviewed in depth our estimates of the world situation and details of the Agency's operations. Similar meetings have been held with a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee chaired by Chairman Russell, although because of the demand on the time of the members of the Committee, these meetings have been less frequent. Also, it is our practice to meet periodically with subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for the purpose of reviewing our budget which involves discussion of our activities and, in addition, to present a substantive briefing. I have recommended to both Senator Russell and Chairman Vinson that these Committees be expanded to include the senior Majority and Minority members of the Foreign Relations Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee and it is my hope that early action will be taken on this subject. Frequently members of the Senate or the House visit the Agency headquarters at Langley and thus are acquainted with the organization and activities of CIA.

Respectfully yours,

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original.

Washington, December 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone on December 17. A copy was sent to Wheelon. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by Carter.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Mr. Vance, 16 December 1964

/2/Not further identified.

With respect to NRO, I made the following points:

1. DCI must have a continuing and positive voice in all of the reconnaissance operation, including research and development directed towards new systems, as well as operational details, schedules, targeting, etc. I said that aerial photography represented such an important input to the intelligence inventory that the DCI could not function responsibly without a strong voice in these activities.

2. I agreed there must be an NRO and a D/NRO as reconnaissance was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a year operation and could not be managed by a committee or a group. However, some changes had to be made.

a. I questioned whether the D/NRO should be the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

b. The D/NRO should utilize to the fullest extent available scientific, technical and operational resources of the entire Air Force (not just a very narrow compartmented section of the Air Force) and CIA. In this regard I said that General Schriever, of whom Vance spoke most highly, appeared very dissatisfied with the present NRO setup.

c. That if D/NRO was to operate a "line operation", the line operating responsibilities should be limited to the Pentagon and the field and that he should task CIA to perform assigned responsibilities in research, development, procurement, etc., should set up a procedure for reporting on the performance of the assigned tasks and should hold the CIA responsible for its performance. The D/NRO should not go "through the side of the building", direct personnel within CIA, attempt to control contracting and fiscal procedures in CIA, attempt to remove and reassign men within the CIA organization, as all of these actions were highly disturbing and unnecessary.

d. I did not feel it necessary to duplicate the Air Force's booster program or its management of it. I envisaged a plan under which CIA would deliver to the Air Force operating unit a payload properly checked out and enough technical assistance to insure the interface between the payload and the booster, and the Air Force could do the job from there.

e. I did not feel it possible to maintain a competent organization which could do the imaginative things, such as the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the U-2 operating from a carrier, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] camera (which I briefly discussed with Vance) and dozens of others which require a highly competent technical organization, oriented towards the intelligence mission, unless they are authorized to carry through on the development, thus encouraging close liaison arrangements with the contractors, scientific groups, etc.

f. All camera systems are subject to evolutionary improvements. No one payload exactly duplicates another. History of the continual improvements of the U-2 camera, Corona camera, etc., have proven to me that evolutionary improvements are made by the organization responsible for the development. Thus, I think a plan under which the R&D developing agent, i.e. Air Force or CIA was responsible for supplying to the Air Force operating unit the payload as suggested, would insure the maximum evolutionary development.

/3/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 208.

Finally, in discussing the single instrument, I pointed out that the military have a mission which requires "instantaneous readout." CIA has a mission of acquiring "maximum input into the intelligence inventory for estimative and analytical purposes." Therefore I reasoned that if the Air Force became the single instrument of reconnaissance, we would revert to a condition where all R&D and development programs would be oriented to meet the requirements of the military mission. This could not be changed as it was traditional and correct that the military should so plan. There would evolve, therefore, a situation in which essential intelligence would be lost. I pointed out this was the history of the SAMOS development in which the Air Force insisted on a "readout system" against the advice of almost everyone because the military mission demanded instantaneous readout. The NSC (and I was sitting on it) finally had to insist on a new approach, the military fought it, and finally CIA picked up the Corona and made a great success of it.

It is against this background that I feel the program proposed in my letters is logical, in the national interest, will probably save money, and will satisfy both the needs of the SecDef and the DCI.

One essential ingredient of a successful NRO would be the maintenance of the NRO Executive Committee although I would not feel it required weekly meetings if a properly oriented D/NRO was running the show.

Washington, December 21, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Evaluation of DIA 1964. Secret. A copy was sent to the DDCI. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by McCone and Walt Elder.

SUBJECT
CIA/DIA Relations

/2/McCone requested the information for a meeting on December 22 with Admiral Wellborn. Following a discussion with McCone about the upcoming meeting, John Bross of CIA wrote Kirkpatrick a memorandum on December 15, in which he stated that "the DCI supports the concept of DIA and feels that it ought to be strengthened" but "will take the position that DIA should concentrate on essentially military intelligence activities and should leave to CIA the responsibility for activities which extend beyond strictly military implications." (Ibid.)

DIA has helped the Clandestine Services in its relation to the military services and their participation and support of clandestine operations. DIA has provided a unified channel for intelligence requirements to all DOD components which has helped to eliminate duplication. DIA evaluations and assessments have assisted clandestine operations. There has been some delay in Clandestine Service reports reaching DOD elements, but DIA is working on this. DIA has assisted in considerable improvement in the coordination of clandestine operations between the services and CIA, but there has not been similar improvement in the counterintelligence areas.

/3/In a December 4 memorandum to Kirkpatrick, on which this section is based, Paul Borel, Assistant Deputy Director, Intelligence/Management, also stated that "the establishment of DIA has provided CIA with one focal point to which to turn on matters requiring collection by Department of Defense resources. In this regard, DIA has effected noteworthy improvements in responsiveness and effectiveness, which have resulted in more timely and valuable DOD reporting on significant intelligence problems." Borel noted, however, that "it is our impression that DIA has not yet developed an effective methodology for integrating the views of the various elements of DOD on intelligence matters. On occasion, DIA seems to have sought a surface unity among the military by incorporating, as its own, views which otherwise would have emerged as individual service dissents; on other occasions, the result has been a suppression of differences which, if submitted as individual service views, would have been more fully explored on a community-wide basis." (Ibid.)

In the research and development areas DIA has proved an effective focal point for coordination of R&D in intelligence areas between CIA and Defense Intelligence components. The information exchange is today effective and meaningful. In the collection and analysis areas, DIA is responsive and effective in the ELINT advisory group and the SIGINT evaluation subcommittee. It could be better coordinated with CIA on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ELINT operations. The creation of the Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center at Ft. Meade under the joint direction of DIA/NSA has greatly improved the task of DOD collection assets. In the production and estimating areas the Directorate of Science and Technology in DIA, in our opinion, needs more in-house intelligence production and estimative capability and less dependence on such units as the Foreign Technological Division of the Air Force Systems Command, the Foreign Scientific and Technological Center of the Army Materiel Command and the Scientific and Technological Intelligence Center of ONI.

The primary areas of relations between our support directorate and DIA are in the security and training fields. There is close coordination and exchange between our Office of Training and the DIA training effort including a full-time CIA officer at the Defense Intelligence School. DIA has been most cooperative and effective in the security field in such matters as special security control systems, surveys, etc.

DIA's work in the estimative field has been responsive, cordial and cooperative but reflects a need for experienced officers in the estimative fields with depth and continuity in substantive intelligence. (It is recognized that this is hard to achieve in a relatively new organization

dependent on the services for its personnel and we are well aware of General Carroll's intensive efforts in this field.) DIA is responsive to spot requests for specific information and briefings in the production of estimates. Good lines of communication have been established and the CIA/DIA working group has been a good device. However, contributions to military estimates are uneven in quality and we are consequently shaky on a myriad of military questions in the Far East, with considerable uncertainties on the reliability of our Order of Battle on Communist China. Finally, more and more dependence is being placed on CIA's Office of Research and Reports for estimates of production of military equipment, which perhaps they are best qualified for, in relation to DIA, because of their depth in the economic area.

DIA's widespread Indications organization provides rapid and effective screening of indicators and assists the overall effort. The DIA 24-hour watch is energetic, consistent, and operates on the highest priority basis. We would urge closer coordination between the DIA representatives on the Watch Committee and the producers of the Defense Intelligence Summary for the purpose of reaching unified analytical judgments.

DIA has facilitated COMOR action by serving as a focal point for DOD in all collection matters and the DIA representatives have been cooperative in the coordination effort.

DIA has been rebuilding the competence in the nuclear energy intelligence effort and has hired some good civilians and hopefully is getting some good military personnel. There is a need for depth and analysis and for closer coordination between the production center and the Directorate for Science and Technology. CIA has helped train DIA analysts and we will continue to give all the assistance we can.

/4/NIE 11-8-64, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," October 8, 1964. For text of the summary and conclusions, see Donald Steury, ed., Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 /pp. 191-198.

The basic Missile and Space Analysis capability still resides in the departments, which are cooperative in providing special studies, and CIA is appreciative that the channels are kept open for this purpose. As mentioned above, there is a need for greater in-house capabilities in DIA in the missile and space field.

CODIB--Committee on Documentation and Information (Borel)

DIA is responsive and active in this field and we noted above the requirement for retrieval capability.

DIA has provided a dynamic and constructive approach to the efforts of the Critical Collection Problems Committee.

[1 heading and 3 lines of source text not declassified]

DIA has provided an excellent job at the EIC level and promptly assists in providing members to the subcommittees.

DIA has provided a central point for cooperation and has developed considerable expertise in this field.

DIA has absorbed the responsibilities for all service inputs to the National Intelligence Surveys and is meeting its deadlines in a satisfactory manner as to time and quality.

Lyman Kirkpatrick

Washington, January 22, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11-1. Secret. Drafted by Johnson, Clifford, and Moyers.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

/2/Attached is Humphrey's undated memorandum to Johnson. Also attached is Clifford's January 18 memorandum evaluating Humphrey's memorandum together with a draft reply.

First, let me say that I am in general accord with your constructive suggestions, and that I appreciate very much the genuine interest which prompted you to write to me.

/3/Dated May 4, 1961. (26 Federal Register 3951) A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2.

/4/Not attached, but see footnote 3 above.

The Board's review functions include not only the organization, management and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency but also the review of all the intelligence activities of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Unified, Specified and Component Commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. It seems to me that this broad assignment is preferable to an approach which would confine review functions to the Central Intelligence Agency alone, particularly since the CIA is but one segment of our foreign intelligence structure and its current budget is only about one-seventh of the total foreign intelligence budget.

In my judgment, because of their size, cost, complexity and crucial importance, the various foreign intelligence agencies should be the subject of intensive and continuing review within the Executive Branch, rather than the object of examination by an ad hoc task force having no responsibility for following up the recommendations which such a task force might submit. (The ad hoc study group approach was tried and found wanting by earlier administrations with the result that a continuing review body was first established for this purpose by President Eisenhower in 1956.) Further, it is my belief that the reviewing board should be composed of experts whose specialized backgrounds and experience can, on a continuing basis, be brought to bear on the consideration of significant foreign intelligence problems. An added requirement is that the review groups should perform its sensitive responsibilities objectively and impartially, with a minimum of public fanfare and with no organizational ties to any of the intelligence agencies.

/5/Not found.

Since its establishment in 1961 the Board has held 30 separate meetings covering a period of 47 working days. In between its regular meetings it has carried out its review and assessment functions through: (1) special panels, composed of two-to-three Board members who undertake responsibilities on behalf of the full Board to keep abreast of specialized segments of the over-all intelligence effort; and (2) the Board's Executive Secretary who devotes full time to review of the foreign intelligence effort both in the United States and throughout the various countries where our intelligence operations are conducted.

When I first met with the Board in January 1964, I was briefed on the highlights of a series of reports, including some 170 recommendations, which the Board had made to President Kennedy during the preceding three-year period. Many of its recommendations had been fully implemented, while others were in the process of being carried into effect by the agencies concerned. Reports which I have received from the Board subsequent to my initial meeting in January 1964 have singled out for continued, specialized attention a variety of problems including a number of subjects set forth in your memorandum. Within the next two weeks I expect to meet again with the Board to receive further reports and recommendations involving existing problem areas within the intelligence community.

With respect to other comments in your memorandum, I concur in your view that the CIA has made some progress in cutting down on superfluous employees, in bringing in talented specialists, in working more closely with the Department of State and its Ambassadors, in bringing in more modern scientific equipment and in accumulating an impressive library of useful data. I also subscribe to your view that the examples of Vietnam, the Congo and Cuba underline the need for developing much-improved indigenous, clandestine agent assets to augment the highly valuable intelligence which is now acquired through advanced scientific and technological means. The problem of developing such improved clandestine agent assets has been a matter of deep concern to the Board since its creation; indeed, the Board has repeatedly reviewed this problem with CIA and the military intelligence services in an effort to devise new means to meet this age-old and increasingly difficult situation.

With respect to the need for some basic institutional reform in the CIA, I can report that a number of worthwhile modifications have been made in the internal organizational structure of the Agency over the past four years. Other changes are under intensive review, including the very difficult problem of reaching a suitable solution to the "overt-versus-covert" questions to which you refer.

I believe that over the past four years, as a result of the combined efforts of the Administration, the Board and the heads of the several agencies concerned, considerable progress has been made in our total foreign intelligence effort. However, the situation today is not by any means perfect. With the aid of constructive suggestions such as yours, and with the assistance of the Board, I will continue to seek ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of all our intelligence agencies.

I thank you sincerely for your very useful and highly valued comments.

Sincerely,

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original.

In a March 5, 1965, letter to Ambassador to Germany McGhee, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett responded to several questions McGhee had raised concerning the role of ambassadors in the planning and direction of Central Intelligence Agency activities (Document 28). McGhee raised the questions in connection with implementing the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System. Crockett sent a copy of the letter to Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency, which Helms acknowledged in an April 6 letter to Crockett. Helms noted that he "was about to dispatch my detailed reply when our meeting of 1 April took place." No record of that meeting has been found, but Helms commented that it "tended to bring us closer together on how to handle the problems presented by the CCPS." Helms noted further that he would send a representative to meet with Richard Barrett, Director of the Department of State's Office of Management Planning. In that meeting on April 16, and at a second meeting with Robert Cox of Barrett's office on July 6, CIA representatives pointed out (according to an October 5 draft letter from Helms to Crockett) that portions of Crockett's letter were "in conflict with standing agreements and suggested that there be no further distribution of the former." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-3805, US Gov't-Dept of State) For information on the standing agreements, see Document 243 and footnote 3 thereto. In a March 27 memorandum to all Chiefs of Station, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter reviewed the coordination of clandestine intelligence activities abroad (Document 221). CIA concerns over Crockett's letter were raised anew by a CIA representative at a meeting on October 8 with Koren, Deputy Director for Coordination of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (see Document 238).

For the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's view of the role of ambassadors in CIA activities, see Document 248. For additional discussion of the issue, see Documents 234, 237, 243, 257, 261, 263, and 267.

Washington, March 27, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, DIA 1965. Secret. The top of page 1 of the memorandum is stamped "Book Dispatch."

SUBJECT
Coordination of Clandestine Intelligence Activities Abroad

/2/A copy of NSCID No. 1 as revised January 18, 1961, and March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA.

/3/Dated December 12, 1947, and revised August 28, 1951. The earlier version is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423. The revised directive is scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1950-1955.

/4/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 99.

/5/Not found.

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to give station chiefs current guidance concerning the implementation by them of the responsibilities which they carry on behalf of the Director for coordination of clandestine intelligence activities.

/6/Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/1, December 8, 1959, is scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1956-1960.

3. During the three years since Reference D was issued, a large volume of experience has accumulated concerning the appropriate methods for effecting the Director's responsibility to coordinate all clandestine collection intelligence activities abroad. Considerable experience has also accumulated concerning the problems that exist in implementing this responsibility.

/7/Not found.

5. I have carefully reviewed the guidance in Reference D, and I hereby reaffirm what is said therein, with the following comments:

a. Chiefs of Station are the DCI's representatives abroad for carrying out the DCI's responsibilities for coordination and approval of all U.S. clandestine intelligence activities. [2 lines of source text not declassified] These activities include espionage and counterintelligence (including double agent operations), and also U.S. liaison with foreign clandestine services and with foreign intelligence and security services concerning clandestine activities.

b. There is still too great a variation in the degree of effectiveness with which the station chiefs have carried out this responsibility. The responsibility in this field is a most serious one and the highest level of the Government expects it to be carried out effectively.

c. To avoid any misunderstanding concerning the nature of the coordination role which the station chief exercises, I want to make it clear that he should apply generally the same judgment concerning the operational features of the proposals of the military services as he applies to his own, and that it is his responsibility either to approve or disapprove of each proposed activity according to his view as to its operational soundness. His decisions are, of course, subject to appeal to the Director of Central Intelligence by the military services through the established channels.

d. In exercising a judgment leading to an approval or a disapproval of a proposed activity, not only is the station chief to consider the harm to the U.S. clandestine intelligence effort if the activity should be comprised, but also he is to consider the harm to the U.S. national interest in the broadest sense. In any instance where there is inherent in a proposed operation a risk of compromise, yet where the objective in the judgment of the station chief appears to warrant such a risk, he should make every effort to insure that the degree of risk is kept to a minimum through sound planning.

e. It is the responsibility of the station chief to decide how much detailed operational information he needs on each proposed activity to make a judgment as to whether to approve or disapprove the proposed activity. If the details provided are not sufficient, the station chief should refuse to approve the proposed activity.

f. The examples of harmful or duplicative activity which are mentioned in paragraph 8 of Reference D are hereby re-emphasized.

g. When the station chief withholds approval of a proposal, he must inform the service representatives of the reasons for this decision, and point out to them that they may refer the case through military channels to Headquarters for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence.

/8/Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1345-1347.

7. The military clandestine collection activities are concentrated largely in a few areas, such as Western Europe, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and specific areas of the Far East, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. However, the services do have activities in certain countries of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Because of this pattern of concentration of effort, some station chiefs have found it necessary to devote a great deal of the time and manpower of their stations to carrying out these responsibilities on my behalf. On the other hand, for a large number of stations, there has been no occasion for the station chiefs to exercise this responsibility because the services have not programmed clandestine collection activities in their countries. In any event, the station chiefs must devote whatever amount of time and manpower is required to carry out these responsibilities.

8. It is my desire that Headquarters be kept regularly informed in regard to the coordination activities of our station chiefs. In the past, we have required quarterly reports, but I find that this requirement is somewhat unrealistic, in that for those stations which have no coordination work to perform from one year to the next it is an unnecessary burden to send in negative reports every three months. On the other hand, experience has shown that for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] regular monthly reporting is more desirable than quarterly reporting and this practice has been found very useful. Consequently, I have the following guidelines for the reporting of coordination activities to Headquarters:

a. Those stations which have a regular volume of business should report a summary of the routine cases on a monthly basis. [1 line of source text not declassified] In addition, all cases of outstanding significance or which involve unusual problems or difficulties should be reported promptly to Headquarters.

b. Those stations which do not have a regular volume of business and only an occasional activity to coordinate should report promptly to Headquarters as each coordination takes place.

9. I also wish to remind you of the principles and procedures of DCID 5/2 and DCID 5/4 concerning the coordination of liaison and cover, respectively. We have asked the stations to obtain reports from the local U.S. units having local liaison as to their current liaison arrangements. I understand that some station chiefs have not complied with this request, and I wish them to do so at once and to forward these reports to Headquarters. In addition, I request that those stations which have previously obtained such reports have them brought up to date and forward them to Headquarters.

10. The military services are under an obligation to cooperate with the Director and our station chiefs in our efforts to carry out this coordination responsibility. I am confident that the services intend to do so. The efforts of all of us will be made easier and more effective if we all understand and appreciate the principles and the procedures which have been established to accomplish this end. I urge that you take all reasonable measures to insure that the military components which are charged with responsibilities for conducting clandestine activities in your areas understand the principals and procedures for coordination as set forth in the directives to you, and that they also understand that the purpose behind this coordination effort is to insure a better and more effective U.S. clandestine intelligence effort. In the event that, after reasonable efforts on your part to obtain full cooperation, an element or elements do not cooperate you should make it clear to them that their activities will be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence for his further action at the command level in Washington. I wish to be personally informed of such situations if any should arise.

/9/Attached but not printed.

/10/Printed from a copy that indicates Carter signed the original.

Washington, April 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Memoranda Prepared in O/DCCI for MSC Signature. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Carter on April 5.

/2/In a separate memorandum for the record regarding the same meeting, Carter noted that Murphy indicated that "he was greatly dissatisfied with the operations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He felt that the agendas prepared for these meetings were sterile, reviewed over and over again the same bureaucratic jungle of NRO and the highly technical aspects of NSA, and inadequately covered the problems or classical intelligence collection and classical intelligence analysis. He felt that everybody was carried away with exotic collection and analysis means and was losing sight of the tried and true systems that had been so successful for so long." (Ibid.)

2. Mr. Murphy, commented that Mr. Kirkpatrick had probably been around the world more times as Inspector General of the Agency for eight years than any other officer in the Agency, and had probably visited more Stations and Bases on these trips than anyone in the entire history of the Agency.

3. There was no substantive discussion of qualifications of any of the officers mentioned, nor did Mr. Murphy express any views other than as indicated. He did, however, seem to be sympathetic to the proposition that the selection criteria enumerated above were the best in the long run for the Agency and the national interest.

MSC
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Washington, April 6, 1965, 4:26 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn, Tape FMISC.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Omitted here are opening remarks.]

President: I want to talk to you confidentially about a matter, and I don't want anybody to know it but you and me. I know your health problem and I know your financial problem and all those things, but we're getting in a pretty serious business up here now, and I've been giving very earnest consideration to asking you if you couldn't come back and help us a little while.

Raborn: Yes sir. Well, I'm terribly honored to have you think of me. You know of my strong affection for you sir, and strong support any way I could, but I do have a continuing health problem.

President: I thought I might take a young man over here and make him your deputy, and you kinda handle it. I don't think you got much more health problem than I have, and ah--

Raborn: That's a little different.

President: Well, my blood pressure went to zero--can't go any lower--when I had my heart attack.

Raborn: That's cause you would land on the other side. Yeah, I agree with you there.

President: I don't want you to just, ah--. John McCone's out there now, and he's spends some time away, and he's--. We can't have but one military man, or one man with military background, but I want somebody that McNamara has great respect for, and he does for you, and somebody that I can-whose judgment, J-U-D-G-M-E-N-T, you can trust. Mr. Rayburn used to say, "I don't give a damn how smart a man is if he hasn't got judgment." And I think we got a fella that in a year or two would be real good to succeed McCone. He's in charge of Plans out there now. He's a career man. His name is Helms. Do you know him?

Raborn: Helms?

President: Yeah, CIA. He's a young, attractive fella, but I would like to give thought to moving him into the deputy's spot, and giving him some training and some seasoning there, but doing it for a period until we thought he was ready, under, rather, a man with seasoned judgment and somebody that could deal pretty well with Russell and the House committee and Mahon, appropriations people, and let them feel during this critical period that we had somebody that was an old war horse and knew what he was doing and just wasn't a civilian out of the service.

Raborn: Yes.

President: Now I need you and need you awful bad awful quick. I've thought of that, and I don't think it's something that you've got to go to war about or around the clock. I think you can just take about it as easy as you want to, as long as you're satisfied that things are going. I think it's in pretty good shape. I think it, ah--you might want to take a little trip once in a while, but I believe he'd be a very good deputy, and I would almost make him the director, but I'm not quite that close to it at this moment.

Raborn: This is your suggestion--that I would relieve Mr. McCone?

President: Yeah. I'd want you--what we'd do is that's a pretty closed corporation.

Raborn: I understand sir.

President: And when you--it's pretty worldwide, and it's pretty heavy in its appropriations, as you know, many hundreds of millions. But they've got a good organization. They've got good men. They need a top man that can keep the Congress pretty well informed without [unintelligible] in the newspapers, and they go up and see Russell once a month, spend an hour with him, and kinda of tell him what's going on, and Harry Byrd, and the same thing with Mahon. But every Tuesday his principal job is bringing in his little briefing for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the President. We have lunch, the four of us, every Tuesday, at my dining room at the White House. He's responsible for the show, but McCone the last few months has been away quite a bit. His wife's had some trouble. He's out there now. He's got some folks sick, and he's been at it 4 or 5 years, and he will be available to us anytime we want him to use for anything. The main thing for me to do is try to get a man in the spot that I have confidence in when he comes in and says, "Now here's what we see coming down the trail here. Here's what our judgment is. I want you to bear in mind that this could happen and this could happen, but our best information this morning so and so." Because my judgment's no better than the information it's based on. And I need someone that I can have respect for and that I've watched through the years, and it's a very critical period right now. I hate to ask you to do this, but I just don't know of anybody that I think is better equipped or better able to do it. I've looked over all what the doctor said about you and over your whole record, and they just don't want you playing twenty-eight holes of golf.

Raborn: I think with that job you wouldn't.

President: No! You could take you a nap every day after lunch, and you could have you a good deputy, and you've got a good bunch of people running it. John doesn't take it too hard. He's gone out and got married, and traveled all around the world, and he's had a pretty good thing, and I would like to have General Carter, who's there now, go back to the Defense Department with a good assignment. I would like for you to take over and be the boss and I'd like for Helms to be your deputy and you train him to when you can turn him loose. And I think there's a good many of them want him now. Good many of them think he'd be all right--some of the boys in my own shop. I'm not quite ready for that, and this is a pretty touchy period, and even if they go wrong, I want to have somebody of my own complexion and my own knowledge.

Raborn: How long can I have to make up my mind? [unintelligible] consider this?

President: Just as long as you want to. I need to know. The quicker the better, and he wants to leave this month. And he's gonna leave. And I don't want an acting there. But, you just take whatever time you think about it. Course, if you're going to come the first of the month, I won't have any problem. If you don't, I'll be in a hell of a shape. And I've looked the whole country over. I've looked at the jackets, and I've talked to the people that I've considered. I've talked about promoting folks from within and without, and I think you just have to tell your company that you have to come up here--I wouldn't want it in the paper--on this basis. But I think you have to tell your company that you just got to come here and stay a few months, and they've got to make a little sacrifice too and give you leave. We won't overwork you and we won't overdo it, and I think you'll enjoy it and I think it'll be a great experience for you, and I think you'll be worth a hell of a lot more to anybody after you leave, including yourself, than you are now, and you just got a wonderful record. I'd just like for you to sit across from Bob McNamara and give him your views and hear mine and listen to Rusk's and then all of us try to make a judgment, because, ah--. You can't stay out there when you hear that fire bell anyway if these damn red Chinese--about 35 divisions of 'em start coming down there. I know what the old war horse does when he hear the bell ring.

Raborn: Well you certainly do me high honor, Mr. President. About how long do you think this would be?

President: I think it would be up to you. I would come without anybody ever knowing it might not be the rest of your life. But I would take Helms in there, and I have a couple--. McNamara thinks Helms is about ready to do it now. Rusk is ready for Helms now. Mac Bundy thinks that Helms ought to go in now. I don't feel quite that sure, although he's been with the Agency a good many years. I just want to have somebody--he's a Brooks Brothers looking fella. He's a real attractive fella, black hair and olive skin and wears a little pin in his collar, and stuff like that. But I think that in our meetings here, you can bring him with you anytime that you want him or need him and have him around. McCone [unintelligible]. I think in our meetings and with the things as they are now and with Russell sick and with [unintelligible] and Vincent gone over to the House and with Byrd, I just rather think I'd rather have you for a few months and see how we come out on this Vietnam thing and see what your evaluation of him is, and then, and I think, anytime you felt like if you wanted to go back, first of the year, October, September, anytime you thought, well, this is going all right now, or if it's working too much on you--and I wouldn't expect you to spend your nights and your Saturdays and things like that. I think the show runs itself pretty well if it's got a man that everybody respects and thinks is impartial and that there's nobody [unintelligible], and they wouldn't be that way about you. I had lunch--I haven't talked to anybody about it but McNamara and John Macy, and John Macy thinks that your background, your acceptance, your respect would just be the best we can get, and McNamara went and got your jacket and went over it all, and I did ask John Connally and Fred Korth what they thought of you. I didn't mention CIA at all because I don't want it to get in the paper, and John said if he's worth a billion dollars he'd put you in charge of all of it. He thought you were the most competent fellow that he'd ever run into, and that you had the best management job he'd ever seen, and it was the best managed project he'd ever seen, and you were on top of it every minute, and Fred said substantially the same thing. So nearly everybody that's worked with you feels that your name is what I know it to be and what I believe, but I'm not getting into these things lightly.

Raborn: [unintelligible] Well, sir, I take it then it will be something 6 months to a year.

President: Well, it will be as long as you want it and as soon as you can get out of it if you think it's all right. I don't want you to leave unless you think this fella's all right. If you get in there and stay awhile, you can stay here as long as I'm President or go leave as soon as you think it will run itself.

Raborn: Mr. President, I couldn't ask for a better deal, and I certainly thank you for your confidence, and I will be in touch with you right quick.

President: Thank you, Admiral

Raborn: Thank you.

/2/At 10:07 a.m. on April 8, Raborn telephoned the President and accepted the job. A recording of the conversation is ibid. Raborn served as DCI from April 28, 1965 to June 30, 1966. Helms served as his deputy and succeeded him. For Helms' recollections of what he was told by Johnson about the decision to appoint Raborn, see John Ranelegh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. Revised edition. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 448. "The Raborn Interlude" is discussed by DDI Ray Cline in his memoir, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976), pp. 210-215, and "The Raborn Episode" is discussed by Cline's successor as DDI, R. Jack Smith, in his memoir, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), pp. 165-177.

Washington, April 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

/2/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 99. In January 1964 McCone sought to get President Johnson to reconfirm the Kennedy letter. According to a set of "Notes for the DDCI," January 14, 1964, drafted by H. Knoche, the "DCI decided on his own he would seek such a confirmation and left with the President one day last week a copy of the Kennedy letter. The President told DCI he would go to work on this." However, there is no indication the President officially reconfirmed the letter. (Ibid., Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676, Daily Notes for DCI)/

He wished me to concern myself with the entire Intelligence Community by coordinating and providing effective guidance to the community as a whole. To do this, he suggested that the Deputy Director serve more or less as a general manger of CIA, thus relieving me of the burden of responsibilities within the Agency. I believe President Kennedy's views as expressed in the letter developed from the advice given to him by individuals or committees who investigated Intelligence Community activities during the first year of his Administration.

I have followed the instructions in this letter. General Carter has represented CIA on the United States Intelligence Board and thus I, as Chairman, could serve the broad interests of the Intelligence Community. Also, General Carter has carried much of the detailed operation of CIA.

This has worked very well. I believe that the Community has benefited from the results of coordination and certainly the Intelligence Board has been both more active and more effective because of these arrangements.

/3/Not attached.

Respectfully yours,

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, April 28, 1965, noon.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT
Discussion with the President alone on 28 April 1965--12:00 Noon

1. I told the President that time had not permitted me to take Admiral Raborn abroad to introduce him to our counterparts with whom we work very closely in a number of European and Asian countries. I explained to the President that in discussing this subject with Secretary Rusk, he had felt that the trip might well be postponed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the need for Admiral Raborn to be close by during the next few weeks. We therefore plan to make the trip about the middle of June, assuming that indications at that time are such that a trip of this nature would be useful from the standpoint of the Government and the Agency, and desired by Admiral Raborn. It was agreed this was probably a good idea; final decision was left to a later date.

/2/Raborn attended five Tuesday luncheons during 1965 and one during 1966 prior to leaving office on June 30. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

/3/Document 224.

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

Washington, May 21, 1965, 2:30 p.m.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB Committee, 1965. Secret. 9 pages of source text not declassified.]

[text not declassified]

Washington, June 29, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-3805, US Govt-Dept. of Defense. Secret.

/2/A member of CIA's Departmental Coordination Group advised the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans in a May 11 memorandum that the new Defense Attach? System (DAS) plan, phased to be completely effective by June 30, "calls for a single integrated attach? system to handle intelligence requirements and relationships with foreign defense establishments, directly responsive to the needs of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." At each post "service attach?s will be under the direction and control of the Defense Attach?," who "will be the military advisor to the Ambassador on intelligence and coordinate all DAS intelligence activities with other U.S. governmental agencies." (Ibid.)

2. After some of his current planning has ripened, General Carroll hopes to get together with us to see what might be done to make attach?s and CIA collection plans more "compatible and mutually supporting."

3. General Carroll said he hopes in time that a closer relationship can be promoted and developed between the Defense Attach? and the CIA Station Chief in missions abroad. He said he thought that the CIA Station Chiefs will find a new system more simplified in that the Station Chief will have to deal primarily with one rather than three separate individuals.

[Omitted here is a discussion of other intelligence issues.]

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

Washington, August 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Helms Chron as DDP and DDCI. Secret. A note on the memorandum reads: "On 6 Aug Mr. Helms showed this memo to the Director." Helms sent Kent another copy of his August 5 memorandum under cover of a December 10 memorandum in which Helms wrote, referring to the August 5 memorandum: "I know you will agree with me that the importance of this subject has not diminished, and I do not mean to suggest for a moment that you have not given it thought. I simply wish to underline that we must not lose sight of this objective at a time when the request for meaningful answers to serious problems are coming thicker and faster than ever before. I continue to be concerned that an estimate which is discursive and interlarded with 'uncrisp' footnotes will not receive the attention it deserves." A handwritten note on the original of the December 10 memorandum, in Kent's files, reads: "Dick has not forgotten." (Ibid., D/ONE Files, Job 80-R01621R, Box 1, Folder 15)

SUBJECT
National Intelligence Estimates

1. As you take off on holiday, I want to leave with you some thoughts which we can discuss on your return. This is nothing more sinister than my initial reactions after three months in this new job.

2. National Intelligence Estimates have long been, and correctly, regarded as that single intelligence document which best summarizes the trends of a given situation so that the user can foresee the most likely course of future events. The Director and I are the penultimate users of all our intelligence publications, of which the most important are the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates. The ultimate user must be the President and his small circle of advisors--including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

3. My purpose in writing this note is to raise, frankly, the question of whether the estimates are so written as to serve the ultimate user best.

4. Estimates include a great deal of basic information and argumentation which are needed by staff people to shore-up the conclusions and judgments which are then highlighted in the summaries of the estimates. Estimates are carefully coordinated; the main instrument of coordination seems to be agreement on shadings of verbal meanings. Estimates are on special occasions directly responsive to specific requests, such as the recent series of projected United States courses of action in connection with Vietnam.

5. Granting all the above, I should like to offer up ways in which we can make the estimates more useful. How about the following:

a. Estimates do not lend themselves to oral presentation. Often a briefing is the first and only chance that the Director and I have to make the main estimate point to the President and his advisors.

b. Estimates are seldom, if ever, responsive in advance. There does not seem to be an organized effort to identify in advance those courses of action open to the United States which will provide reactions by the Communists. For example, in the Director's instructions to Peer de Silva in establishing the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, the Director asked specifically that Peer try to keep "at least one step ahead" where United States actions were contemplated or planned.

(I believe the Director's purpose in defining a range of options open to the United States in connection with Vietnam was a good first attempt to try to define in advance those actions or lack of actions by the United States which we needed to consider to the exclusion of certain others.)

c. I recognize that the oral presentation which I have mentioned above must be supported by written argument. I suggest that an "executive summary", if it may be so termed, be prepared. This would state very briefly the exact nature of the problem and single out the most likely judgment which the estimate is advancing.

d. There must always be a complete separation of policy and intelligence. I believe it is this thesis which underlays Abbot Smith's statement that no NIE has or will say that the Communists are winning in Vietnam. On the other hand, there has always been and should be the closest possible contact between policy and intelligence, and it is one of the heaviest responsibilities of the Director to make an intelligence presentation closely responsive to United States policy and considerations. Therefore, I believe that an intimate knowledge of United States policy can only improve the quality of the estimate. Such knowledge would also permit the estimators to keep "one step ahead".

e. In connection with the above, I believe that the senior members of the Board of National Estimates can be most useful in their conversations with senior Government officials by identifying those problem areas where a course of United States action seems likely and needs to be estimated.

6. As you can see, although I have long regarded the estimates as a bulwark of our knowledge of forthcoming situations, I am now concerned about presenting this product to the President and his advisors who need short, sharp answers. I know that the estimates are often answers to long and fuzzy questions. I do believe, however, we can do much more to refine the questions and thus refine the nature of our answers.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, August 11, 1965.

/1/Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104-01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U.S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP;

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;

3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

/2/In an October 1 memorandum, following up the new NRO agreement, Helms informed NRO Director Alexander Flax that CIA's National Reconnaissance Program activity would now "come to a management focus in the person of a Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs," who would report to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology. "This will provide you with a single authoritative point of contact within the CIA for all our programs." (Ibid., P & A, PA Library, 105-0, Flax (DNRO) Chron File, Miscellaneous)

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;

3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;

4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;

5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

/3/Due to the deterioration in relations between CIA and Air Force representatives to the NRO during 1964, resulting in an impasse in decisionmaking, an Executive Committee was formed during the latter half of 1964. McCone and Vance met in Executive Committee sessions with the CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, the Air Force Under Secretary/DNRO, and the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering. (Donald Welzenbach, CIA and the National Reconnaissance Office, working paper, 3/18/87 draft, chapter VII, pp. 45-46; National Reconnaissance Office)

a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or the DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to the CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.

f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director the Central Intelligence consider desirable.

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director of NRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in the line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

/4/Attached but not printed.

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Vance and Raborn signed the original.

W. F. Raborn
Director of Central Intelligence