Washington, September 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Confidential.

/2/Attached but not printed. In an August 12 memorandum to Clifford forwarding Clifford's latest draft with suggested amendments by Eugene Fubini of DOD, Bundy stated: "My own reservation about the somewhat more sweeping language of your current draft relates to the question of whether we want to affirm this mandate at this time with this particular DCI. I think there may be a case for a simple reaffirmation of the document of 1962 in a time when there are some of the uncertainties that you and I discussed at lunch last month." Bundy wrote in hand on his copy of the memorandum, presumably reflecting Clifford's response to it, "Yes a letter. Likes his letter better than '62 letter." (Ibid.) For text of Kennedy's letter, January 16, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 99.

/3/The third paragraph in the attached draft is identical to the third paragraph in the final version (Document 233).

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Secretary of State has final responsibility for advice to the President on matters affecting the conduct of our foreign relations, and I don't think the President would wish to do anything that would undercut this basic responsibility of yours. My question, then, is whether there is language that would protect Dean Rusk without giving INR a bureaucratic veto on all efforts on intelligence coordination.

I would be grateful for your comments.

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that began at 8 p.m. on September 14, 1965, the following exchange took place. Material just preceding the exchange, presumably dealing with Director of Central Intelligence Raborn, was excised by the Johnson Library under donor's deed of gift.

Russell: "Let me tell you, if you ever decide to get rid of him, you just put that fellow Helms in there. He got more sense than any of them."

President: "Well, I've got Helms. I'm trying to build Helms where he--"

Russell: "He's been there since that thing was organized, and he's familiar with all those operations, and he can explain them more clearly. I had a hearing here this morning, for an hour and a half before our own subcommittee, Stennis and Saltonstall and old man Hayden, Young, and I guess it wasn't [inaudible] Democrats because they were all there, and Helms had a better understanding of all the operations in the CIA everywhere than even old man Allen Dulles had and he helped set it up. Raborn is a good man. Raborn has got one failing that's going to get him in trouble. He won't ever admit he don't know. He assumes sometimes. You ask him a question a man don't know in his position, you ought to say, Senator I don't know exactly the details on that. I'll have to get up a memo on that and let you have it. He's knows it all, and that may get him in trouble one of these days. But he's a damn good man. And I think's doing a good job. Of course he's got an impossible job. That crowd can't hit back. You can just slaughter them at will and there's no way they can possibly hit back."

President: "You reckon I ought to ask Raborn to leave?"

Russell: "No!"

President: "He didn't want to come in, but they're all taking after him now."

Russell: "What's the basis of their attack?"

President: "No basis." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Russell, Tape 65.03, Side A, PNO) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Washington, September 24, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry; Job 80-B01580R, DCI/Admiral Raborn. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, and Clifford. In a memorandum to the President forwarding this memorandum to the President for his signature, Bundy recommended that the President sign it and send it to Raborn "as a reflection of your personal interest in his efforts to improve the organization, management and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system." (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron)

SUBJECT
Coordination of the United States Foreign Intelligence Effort

Our Government is making a substantial effort and is expending large sums of money to obtain timely intelligence vital to our national defense and security. This effort requires the most efficient possible organization of the activities of the various departments and agencies concerned. It is essential that these activities be conducted as an integrated endeavor best suited to meet both current and longer-term national intelligence needs. One of the essential objectives of this integrated effort is to give timely notice to me and to other officials of critical developments which have an important bearing on our national security.

/2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA)

In the performance of your responsibility I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of U.S. Government departments and agencies having foreign intelligence responsibilities, with a view to assuring the proper coordination, correlation, evaluation and prompt dissemination of intelligence obtained from all sources. You are authorized and directed to establish, in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community, such arrangements and guide lines as are necessary for this purpose. It is my wish that you receive from the departments and agencies concerned the full cooperation and assistance which are essential to the success of your coordinating responsibility.

I will continue to look to your efforts as a means of achieving significant improvements in the organization, management, and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-3805, US Govt-Interagency Correspondence. Secret. The report was forwarded to Richard Barrett of the Department of State by Desmond FitzGerald under cover of a September 29 memorandum.

GENERAL ISSUES RAISED IN EROP REVIEW OF CIA PROGRAMS

CIA Comments

/2/For the establishment of EROP, see Document 33.

a. It is evident, from the tenor of their reports, that in most instances the recent EROP review of CIA programs has been of some benefit to the U.S. chiefs of missions concerned. It has, to varying degrees, provided new insights into the rationale of covert action and especially of clandestine intelligence collection. It has prompted examination and confirmation of the function and value of covert political action, and has indicated at least two broad areas in which interagency communications and activities of mutual concern can be improved. Similarly, EROP has occasioned useful discussion of these subjects at the Washington level.

/3/Not found.

c. For internal CIA purposes, the EROP-type annual review has not proved to be a useful addition or modification to the present, more comprehensive and detailed annual internal review of programs conducted by the Agency. CIA programs are also subjected to exhaustive review by the Bureau of the Budget, in terms of allocation of resources. It should be noted, too, that the 303 Committee and Special Group (CI) provide for review of covert programs, whenever appropriate. Means exist also for current assessments of clandestine intelligence reporting (please see also paragraph 7, below, in this regard).

d. In sum, CIA recognizes a duty to keep U.S. chiefs of mission and the most senior officers in the Regional Bureaus aware, in considerable detail, of clandestine activities particularly in the political action and related fields, and by no means ignoring the policy implications of certain intelligence collection operations. To this end, periodic oral briefings and frequent discussions, including an annual summary briefing if appropriate, are preferred over an annual EROP-type review. They should provide ample opportunity to relate CIA activities to overt mission programs, and to secure the views of ambassadors and Regional Bureaus concerning CIA programs and reporting in their respective areas. These views are welcomed and given full consideration.

[Omitted here are sections 2 and 3 of the report.]

a. A CIA briefing in Washington on the general nature of the Agency's operations in the country of assignment should generally be confined to the Ambassador and DCM. Any further briefing of Political Officers should be conducted in the field at the discretion of the Chief of Station, often after consultation with the Chief of Mission or Principal Officer. These additional field briefings will vary as to their nature and depth, and as to the need-to-know of the officers concerned.

b. A more generalized briefing, perhaps in the appropriate FSI course, may be feasible. If so, it might cover such points as the relationship of the station to Mission, its basic missions and rationale of operational methods, the wide variety of station responsibilities, problems of cover and security, and the apparent conflicts and contradictions with other, short-range U.S. Government programs.

a. The problem here is the conflict between locally and nationally established tasks and priorities. The Ambassador has at all times access to the station chief to discuss these matters, and the latter will keep his headquarters informed of the Ambassador's wishes. After this, decisions must be reached as a result of examination of the problem in terms of conflicting priorities and available manpower. CIA will always see to it that an ambassador's wishes are given full weight and consideration.

b. The Ambassador can also, of course, present his views and requirements to the Regional Bureau or INR for their action through Washington liaison and intelligence requirements channels.

An ambassador will always be advised in advance of covert action operations unless otherwise stipulated by the White House or Secretary of State and normally these operations would not be submitted for approval without prior joint discussion in the field. The Ambassador will be advised in general terms or in detail, depending on his individual interest in the program. In most cases, ambassadors would also be advised of CIA intelligence targets or objectives, although usually without the operational detail which would identify sources or potential sources. Ambassadors are provided the information product, of all operations which affect their missions. The station chief must exercise his good sense and discretion in apprising his ambassador of those intelligence operations or proposed initiatives which are politically sensitive and could adversely affect the Mission.

[Omitted here are sections 7-9 of the report.]

Washington, September 30, 1965.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB Committee, 1965. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, October 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry: Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and White.

SUBJECT
Proposed Issuance of New Terms of Reference for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)

/2/Not further identified.

/3/See Document 183.

/4/See Document 239.

3. Specifically, I would recommend that the DCI indicate his concurrence in the issuance of a new letter of authority provided there be agreement that:

/5/Thomas Parrott of CIA raised this issue with General Taylor, noting that he understood Raborn had suggested it to Clifford. Parrott summarized the ensuing discussion in a memorandum for the record, October 7: "General Taylor demurred, saying that there could well be cases where the Board would want to have frank, 'internal discussions' and that the presence of 'an outsider' might inhibit them. I replied that sessions of that kind would of course be privileged to the Board, but that the idea would be that the DCI would be present when other major components of the intelligence community are making presentations, in order to help him in carrying out his coordinating responsibilities and perhaps avoid having some of them pass by default to the Board." After further discussion, Taylor said he would think about it and perhaps discuss it with Clifford. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1965)

b. All reports from individual components of the community be submitted to the Board through the DCI with the understanding that they will be forwarded as initially submitted but that the DCI reserves the right to comment.

c. A record of all hearings before the Board be kept by the Executive Secretary of the Board and that a copy of these minutes be provided the DCI for his retention.

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01284A, DCI Speeches 1965-1967. Top Secret. The presentation was made in the CIA Auditorium to students of the National War College. Helms forwarded the transcript of his remarks to Enright on November 11, asking him to "please read my poor prose and decide whether it is worth cleaning up for use as basic doctrine for other speakers on other occasions." (Ibid.)

[Omitted here are Helms' opening remarks.]

One of the principal charges made of the Central Intelligence Agency is that it tends to make policy, on the one side, and tends to freewheel in carrying out some of its operations, on the other. We do not make policy, and we do not freewheel. Those are two rather flat statements, but they are also truthful statements. Foreign policy is made by the State Department, defense policy is made in the Defense Department, and other policies are made elsewhere, but they aren't made in this Agency.

When we are carrying out an operation overseas we carry it out with the full authority of the United States Government or we don't carry it out at all. The Director reports to the National Security Council, which in effect means that he reports to the President. By law he's not beholden to any other department of Government, and in the minds of the Congress this was the only sensible way to establish this Agency so that it was not obliged at any time or at any place to do anything which was other than either objective or at least the way it saw conditions in various parts of the world. In other words, departmental intelligence is not part of our job, nor are we interested in being influenced by the various competing demands for money or manpower that various departments have up with the Congress from time to time. But this also has to do with the policy making aspects of life, because the President, sitting as he does in our form of government and under our Constitution, has a variety of responsibilities, and these responsibilities in turn have nothing to do with individual departments, or at least the parochialism of individual departments and agencies.

Now as far as our overseas operations are concerned, there is a mechanism which has been devised, and has been in existence for some time, which is designed to provide the approval or the clearance or the authority-whatever word you choose to use-for each and every one of these operations. This little group that does this has been variously known as the Special Group, the 303 Committee-it has had various names and various incarnations, but through the months and years has sat essentially as it sits today. It is composed of McGeorge Bundy as the Chairman, who represents the President. Sitting for the State Department these days is Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who represents the Secretary of State. Deputy Secretary Vance sits for the Defense Department and represents the Secretary of Defense. And Admiral Raborn sits representing the Agency. These four gentlemen meet approximately once a week with an Executive Secretary who keeps the minutes, and they are agreed minutes, and each and every operation which the Agency is going to conduct overseas in the political field, paramilitary field, economic warfare, any of a whole host of things, is presented to this group and secures the group's approval, otherwise it does not go forward.

There are times when there are disagreements in the group, or there are varying points of view, and, depending on the circumstances, the decision may in the end be made by the President himself. But since in our form of government this type of thing should not be put on the President's platter, the 303 Committee is there not only as a group to sit in judgment on the validity and wisdom of these projects but even, and equally important, to protect the President from criticism for something that goes wrong, even though he may have been privy to the fact that it was going on all the time-and he is normally kept very well informed on these matters.

In addition to this group, we appear before the standard number of Congressional committees-we appear before the same number of Congressional committees that everybody else in Washington appears before, and that's four-two in the House and two in the Senate. We appear either every week or every couple of weeks before our principal subcommittees-and of course less frequently before the Appropriations Committees-but nevertheless, they are kept currently informed not only as to the state of the world as seen through the Director's eyes but also as to the various operations and types and kinds of things we are doing around the world.

Lastly, there is an organization known as the President' s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford and has a distinguished group of public citizens sitting on it-such individuals as General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral (Sides), Gordon Gray, Frank Pace, William Baker of Bell Labs, Edwin Land from Polaroid Camera Company, Robert Murphy of ambassadorial fame, William Langer, Professor of History at Harvard, and so on. And this group meets periodically with various members of the Agency, usually for two or three days at a time, goes over the various programs, organizational matters, operations, things that have gone right and things that have gone wrong, and on behalf of the President conducts a type of watchdog function, if you like, in addition to all the other watchdog functions which are performed. So when you take these three elements-or if you include the National Security Council, four elements-the Central Intelligence Agency and its work is really well supervised, and supervised to a degree that apparently has not conveyed itself to many people in the American public at large.

Tied into this, of course, is the role of the Ambassador overseas, who, as the principal representative of the President and the Chairman of the country team indeed has a good deal to do with operations that are being carried out in his area. The normal way to get an operation started is to have it recommended by our field station, concurred and approved-or recommended for approval by the Ambassador, brought back to the State Department where it is examined by the proper Bureau-if it has a military aspect or any other kind of an aspect it's referred to the proper department or agency-and finally ends up, as I said a moment ago, in the 303 Committee. So that in effect an Ambassador has a veto over any of these things in his area which he thinks would be counter to the U.S. interest or which for any reason he feels should not go forward.

It is obvious, I think, to anyone that if an Ambassador is against something in his area it would be pretty hard to get it through. I know of only one instance in my years around here where there was a difference of opinion between the Ambassador and the Administration in Washington, so the matter was referred to the President, who decided what the final position should be. But as you can imagine, under those circumstances only the President can decide.

Thus, briefly, I have tried to outline the approval authority and the supervision under which we operate. I could go on at much greater length, of course, and in much greater detail, but I think that this should suffice to convey to you what I said at the outset-that we do not go off on our own, that we do not freewheel, and that we are well and carefully supervised.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Helms' presentation.]

On October 8, 1965, Henry Koren, the newly appointed Deputy Director for Coordination (DDC) of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, held his first staff meeting. In a memorandum for the record prepared on October 11, [text not declassified] of the Covert Action Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency reported that Koren said "he felt there could be no exception to the complete knowledge of an Ambassador in the field concerning any CIA activity being run in or into his country. If DDC is aware of such an activity of which the Ambassador is unaware, it is DDC's responsibility to see to it that he is made witting; Koren indicated that he would depend upon us and specifically on the undersigned to assure that DDC was not itself uninformed." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-3805, US Govt-Dept of State)

At a meeting with Koren on October 15, CIA's Acting Deputy Director for Plans Karamessines raised the issue of the Crockett-

McGhee letter (Document 28). "I mentioned the misunderstandings it was causing at various places overseas. I told him of our having raised the matter with Mr. Barrett and later with Mr. Cox earlier this year. I explained how Mr. Crockett's letter was inconsistent with our written and oral agreements with the department. I then solicited Ambassador Koren's assistance in taking whatever action would be appropriate to eliminate these misunderstandings and the problems they are causing." Koren promised to review the issue, continued Karamessines. "He feels strongly about the full authority of an ambassador overseas, but he also volunteered that he did not think that this necessarily meant that an ambassador would want or need to know the names of sensitive agents and sources." (Memorandum for the Record, October 15; ibid.)

Washington, October 19, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Intelligence and Handling Disclosure. No classification marking. Coyne forwarded this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy for the President's signature under cover of a September 29 memorandum in which he stated that, unlike the President's September 24 memorandum (Document 233), this one was "not controversial. It causes no new problems for State, Defense, CIA and the rest of the intelligence community. It merely reiterates the substance of President Kennedy's older Executive Order." Such a "restatement of the Board's mission in this way and at this time will better enable the Board to do its job for the President." (Ibid.)

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SUBJECT
Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States

The interests of national defense and security require sustained effort on the part of the intelligence community to support me and other officials having policy and command responsibilities. It is therefore my desire that priority attention be given to ways and means of strengthening the Government's capabilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields through concerted action to improve the organization, conduct and effectiveness of the major intelligence-related programs in which U.S. departments and agencies are engaged. Efficient management and direction of the complex activities which make up the total foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet day-to-day national intelligence requirements, and to ensure the development and application of advanced means for the collection, processing, analysis, estimating and reporting of intelligence information. In this connection, you have already seen my letter of instruction to the Director of Central Intelligence dated September 24, 1965.

In keeping with Executive Order No. 10938, I will continue to look to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for advice and recommendations concerning the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States. I shall expect represent-atives of the Board to continue the practice of making on-the-scene reviews of significant intelligence activities carried out in the United States and at appropriate locations abroad.

To facilitate the work of the Board I shall expect the heads of all departments and agencies concerned to make available to the Board any information which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to me.

Lyndon B. Johnson

In January 1966 Ray Cline stepped down as Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, a position he had held since April 1962. R. Jack Smith succeeded him. Published memoirs by top CIA officials during the Johnson administration are rare, but the DDI is an exception. Cline discusses his experiences as DDI during the Johnson administration in Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA, pages 199-214. Jack Smith describes his tenure as DDI under Johnson in The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency, pages 170-199.

Washington, January 17, 1966, 8:08 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INT 6. Top Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by William McAfee (INR/DDC), cleared by Ambassador Johnson (G) and John P. Walsh (S/S), and approved by Henry L.T. Koren (INR/DDC). Also sent to Hong Kong and Singapore.

/2/The full report has not been found.

Pertinent to all Foreign Service Posts in final recommendation as follows:

"That the Secretary of State emphasize to each US Chief of Mission overseas that, in supervising and coordinating all activities of the US Government in his country of assignment, he ensure as a primary responsibility of his office that: (a) a consistently high level of effort is maintained by Foreign Service Officers in the overt collection of intelligence information of significance and value to the President and other officials having policy and command responsibilities; and (b) the personnel and other resources within his cognizance are allocated and utilized as appropriate for the furtherance of US foreign intelligence objectives."

In connection with this recommendation report further notes:

/3/See footnote 8, Document 221.

The Secretary desires that you give your personal attention to implementing the Board's recommendation and take whatever measures you deem appropriate within your mission and subordinate posts to achieve the goals listed in sub-paras a and b.

In order that the Secretary may make an interim report on implementation request by February 7 brief summary of actions taken by you in compliance this message.

Ball

Washington, January 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1966. Secret.

SUBJECT
DCI Appearance Before the PFIAB, 25 January

1. Proposed as item 1. for discussion with the PFIAB at their 25 January meeting:

Major problems affecting over-all coordination of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort, and prospects for their timely resolution.

2. Some of the more important problems of immediate interest are:

Probably the DCI's most important responsibility in the coordinating field is to ensure a concerted intelligence effort, involving all existing or potential resources of the community, against priority targets. This problem has two elements:

(1) The first element of the problem is to determine what the priority objectives of intelligence ought to be. The procedures and competence of the community to accomplish this purpose have greatly improved in the course of the past few years and function smoothly. For example:

(a) USIB continues to review the list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs) every three months for the purpose of ascertaining the most important geographic areas of current intelligence interest.

(b) The Board of National Estimates reviews National Intelligence Estimates from time to time to ascertain retrospectively the validity of these estimates. These "Post Mortems" identify gaps which appear to have existed in the information available during the formulation of particular estimates.

(c) The attention of the community is directed to specific problems by senior officials of the Government concerned with the formulation of national policy. We are responding to an increasing number of requests from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and others for coordinated studies, many of which involve concerted effort by the community. The most recent example of such a request, which involves an evaluation of our collective capabilities for intelligence coverage, is a request, addressed to me personally by the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Secretary of State, which calls for an expansion and intensification of intelligence programs aimed against Cambodia.

(d) In this general connection I have recently initiated a searching review of the process by which requirements are identified and formulated in the Central Intelligence Agency and will extend this study to include a review of the adequacy of community procedures in this field.

(2) The second element of the problem of achieving a concerted effort against an important target is the adequacy of the arrangements for reviewing and evaluating existing programs and activities of all components of the community; ensuring their appropriate interrelationship and stimulating additional activity, including the redeployment of existing resources and, where appropriate, the development of new resources. We have assigned this responsibility to the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of USIB which functions as a senior committee under the Chairmanship of a senior and experienced staff officer, Major General John M. Reynolds. It was to this committee, for example, that the problem of evaluating and improving our intelligence effort against Cambodia, referred to above, was referred. Another area with which the CCPC has been particularly concerned recently is China. As part of its charter responsibilities, it has developed and maintains a complete inventory of all U.S. foreign intelligence installations and activities.

(3) The CCPC is not the total answer to the organization required to ensure appropriate focus and total coordination of the intelligence effort against a given target. This is partially because the CCPC is concerned exclusively with collection and is therefore not competent to deal with the analytical or production aspects of intelligence problems. Secondly, although functioning with increasing effectiveness, it is inevitably subject to some of the weaknesses of committee action. In important areas, therefore, requiring staff action to review all aspects of the intelligence effort in a given area, I have adopted the device of designating a senior officer to act as my personal representative. For example, I have designated General Reynolds to be responsible for a continuing review and evaluation of the intelligence effort focused on China. As required, I can appoint other members of my personal staff to act in this capacity or, if desirable, can assign qualified and senior officers of the community to this staff to serve as long as may be required.

/2/For documentation on the issue of audio surveillance, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X.

The new committee which has been constituted to improve the community effort and resources required to counter hostile technical surveillance activities against American installations is functioning smoothly and effectively under the Chairmanship of Mr. Cornelius Roosevelt.

For a number of reasons, it does not appear desirable or practical to try to combine the budgets and programs of the Central Intelligence Agency with the intelligence budgets and programs of the Defense Department into a single consolidated intelligence program or budget presentation. On the other hand, the DCI has participated with increasing effectiveness in the formulation of the two large Defense Department intelligence programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP). As a result of this participation, the DCI is now able to afford rather specific and effective guidance to the Defense Department concerning the level of effort required to meet important intelligence objectives. A very thorough review of requirements for COMINT has recently been completed and recommendations are now pending before USIB which, if adopted, will establish USIB as the sole source of intelligence guidance for COMINT programming. The DCI of course participates through the Executive Committee of the NRO in the development of the NRP.

In addition to participation in the formulation of the large individual intelligence programs of the Government, the DCI has, on an informal basis, proceeded with the centralized collection and collation of data concerning the size, deployment and objectives of all the national intelligence programs of the Government.

/3/The Office of the Director issued a notice on January 20 stating that, "effective immediately, the Board and Office of National Estimates are established as a component reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence" and thus no longer through the DDI. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files: Job 80-B01439R, Organization-DDI-1966-67) The change followed by just a few days R. Jack Smith's accession to the position of DDI, replacing Ray Cline. Smith discusses the change in The Unknown CIA, p. 171.

/4/A handwritten note underneath the last line reads: "DDI & OCI Op's Center."

John A. Bross

Washington, January 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78-5505, US Govt-State. Secret.

SUBJECT
Operating Relationships with Ambassadors

1. This is in response to your request, passed on to me by Mr. Warner, for a statement of our operating relationships with Ambassadors.

/2/Scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1956-1960. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/MS Files: Lot 60 D 220, 1957/61, Inter-Agency, CIA.

/3/The instructions specified that the Ambassador "be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved." The instructions stated further that "in many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these, and in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington." Also, "there will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels." (Attachment to draft memorandum from Helms to Crockett, October 5, 1965; ibid., Job 78-3805, US Gov't-Dept of State)

/4/Not found attached.

4. Such misunderstandings as do infrequently arise between a Station Chief and an Ambassador these days will usually be found in the area of clandestine collection as opposed to covert actions. In this area, we have occasional difficulty along one or more of the following lines:

a. An Ambassador may feel that our reporting on the internal political situation is unnecessary or troublesome. In such cases, we point out that the Ambassador, who invariably receives an immediate copy of all such reports, has the right to file a "dissenting opinion" if he does not agree with the report or with the field's comments on the report.

b. An Ambassador may demand to know the identity of the source of our information. Although this does not happen often, we have had one or two instances of it within the past few months. In such cases, we cite the responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of sources and methods and, if he presses the matter, it is referred to Headquarters for resolution. We take the position that only the DCI can empower our field representatives to reveal the identity of a source.

c. An Ambassador may feel that we are employing an agent or clandestine source who is so highly placed in the local government that compromise of the operation could well result in a major diplomatic incident affecting not only the Ambassador but the existence of the Embassy itself. We recognize the extreme sensitivity of such exceptional cases and where these occur the Ambassador is made aware of the identity of the source.

/5/Not further identified.

6. Recent initiatives, ostensibly stemming from budgetary and managerial considerations, have been made to codify and systematize the budgetary and manpower aspects of all our civilian overseas activities taking place within the cognizance of an Ambassador. Our participation in these efforts has been granted special protection in the form of separate highly classified annexes to the main studies and plans. Nevertheless, it will continue to require diligence if we are not to be caught up in such exercises in a way which would make it virtually impossible to keep our budgetary and manpower figures as well as our operations from being compromised.

Thomas H. Karamessines

Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11-2. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
The CIA

I had a farewell meeting yesterday with the members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and this morning Clark Clifford called me simply to thank me and to bring me up to date on the proceedings of the Board. In the course of the conversation, it became very clear that the Board is genuinely and deeply troubled about the leadership problem in CIA. These are men who have learned over the years how to keep their mouths damn well shut--people like Bob Murphy and Bill Langer and Gordon Gray, and Clifford himself. So they are not the source of the gossip. But they see the same things in the Agency that some of the gossips hear about, and they are troubled about their obligation as your advisers.

In this situation, I think it might be wise if you were to get hold of Clark on your own terms and in your own good time, and talk with him about it. He has a good, clear sense of the shape of the problem and the degree of the urgency. (I myself do not think that any catastrophe is imminent, although I do think the situation is serious.) I also believe that if you should wish to execute a change skillfully and silently at any time, Clark is the man who can help most to get it done right. He has been extremely careful to maintain good human relations with all concerned.

McG. B.

Washington, February 14, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11-2. Secret. The letter indicates the President saw it. Moyers forwarded it to the President under cover of a February 14 memorandum in which he stated: "Admiral Raborn wanted you to see this. He was concerned, obviously, about the Washington Star story." On February 13 the Star reported that, according to "informed circles," Johnson intended to appoint General Maxwell Taylor to be DCI. "There reportedly has been some dissatisfaction with the operations of the present director," continued the Star. "Johnson apparently feels he needs a prestige man in the CIA job now, and Taylor fits the bill."

Dear Bill:

In response to your invitation to come over and talk things over some time, I am taking the liberty of putting some ideas down on paper regarding the Agency which you may find interesting and possibly so will the President.

In reviewing the stewardship and administration of Dick Helms and myself the past 10 months, it is quite clear that some very considerable progress and improvements have been made in the Agency as a whole.

I should like to list them for you because they are constructive and are entirely in line with the President's wishes that we "spare no effort to make this the best intelligence agency in the world."

/2/Presumably a reference to the Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency, prepared by representatives of CIA's four directorates and the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower, under the direction of CIA Executive Director Kirkpatrick. Kirkpatrick presented the Long Range Plan to Raborn under cover of a memorandum dated August 31, 1965. (Central lntelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 1965)

b. We have installed a modern management system which has built on the successful management principles used in the Polaris program. This has done much to identify and weed out obsolescent and less effective programs and permits us to emphasize the higher priority ones and be responsive to the intelligence objectives which we had previously brought into focus. Permanent planning and evaluation groups were established in each of the Directorates of the Agency. These follow the progress of the work during the year and compare the progress of the Directorates with the previously announced fiscal year goals and thereby provide day-by-day good management and planning for the next year's budget. This has been enthusiastically accepted and endorsed, as well as utilized by the entire Agency. The Bureau of the Budget has complimented us on our management system because it permits us clearly to justify by-line items in our requirements and enables the Bureau to obtain a better conception of the validity of our needs. This is drawn together in a modern management center located in the Headquarters Building of the Agency.

c. We have installed a 24 hour Operations Center manned with seasoned intelligence officers who receive intelligence inputs around-the-clock from all parts of the world and Agency. They evaluate the news and give prompt service to the White House, Defense Department, State Department, etc., as well as to the DCI. This, too, has been enthusiastically endorsed within the Agency and our people are quite proud of it.

d. We have settled the "NRO problem." As you may recall, one of the most distressing and difficult problems was the difficulty in reconciling the respective differences of the DoD and the CIA in the management of the overhead reconnaissance programs. Working with Mr. Cyrus Vance, it was my pleasure to draw up an organization and modus operandi which he gladly endorsed. Today, both the Agency and the Defense Department are working harmoniously together for the best interest of Uncle Sam and have reduced the previous differences and frictions to miniscule size. Mr. Vance and I form an Executive Committee to over-see this most important part of our intelligence program and we resolve all questions on the basis of "what is the best way to do it and what is best for our country!"

e. We have initiated some striking new innovations in intelligence production. We have "systemized" the approach to determining the existence, or the incipient existence, of new important developmental programs by foreign countries. Basically this takes the various elements, say of a weapons system or nuclear rocket engine development, and breaks them down into component parts. We make models of what the various major components of the system component or production facilities would look like. We take pictures of these as they would appear from overhead satellites or reconnaissance aircraft and, utilizing the skills of the most competent photo-interpreters, collate these elements so that we high-light the missing pieces that we are looking for to "fit into the jigsaw puzzle" and thus give organized guidance for the technical collection of intelligence.

f. We have formed a Vietnam Task Force within the Agency with associate members from the various other members of the intelligence community. This Task Force is headed up by our former Chief of Station at Saigon and its members are from every part of CIA plus other elements of the community. The announced mission and purpose of this Task Force is to insure top coordination of all of our efforts and to high-light areas in which we should perhaps increase our efforts and in the main to be responsive to the stepped-up American efforts in Southeast Asia.

g. We have established China, within the intelligence community, United States Intelligence Board, as a co-equal highest priority intelligence target, equal to Soviet Russia. Similarly we have established a China Intelligence Task Group under one of CIA's top intelligence officers and staffed it with representatives from all elements of the intelligence community within Washington. This China Task Force is working full time to give coordinated direction to the intelligence efforts against China to ensure that we are optimizing our efforts relative to this long-time and very dangerous threat. It is working very well indeed and we are already seeing good results from their efforts.

h. We have re-emphasized and rededicated the mission of CIA to its principal mission, which is to collect, digest, interpret and disseminate intelligence. The lure of paramilitary efforts and similarly exciting facets of our over-all responsibilities have been appropriately subordinated and more emphasis has been given to the primary job of obtaining by every means intelligence on the activities within foreign countries, which we consider our primary mission.

i. We have more than doubled the political action team effort in South Vietnam. As you will recall, this pacification effort, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], has received the unqualified and enthusiastic endorsement of Ambassador Lodge, General Westmoreland, the Defense and State Departments. They have gone so far as to say this is equally as essential as the military effort there. As you know, the training school at Vung Tau is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]- operated through native instructors [1 line of source text not declassified].

j. We have more than tripled our intelligence efforts in South Vietnam. This includes counterintelligence efforts under deep cover. The latter has been successful in ferreting out VC spies, one of whom was a regular South Vietnam Army officer in the South Vietnamese J-2 Section of the General Staff! This effort is continuing and we will beef up the straight intelligence efforts in South Vietnam as the situation indicates and as we can prepare the manpower.

k. We have recently established Dr. R. Jack Smith, vice Dr. Ray Cline, as Director of Intelligence. This is our most senior intelligence job within the Agency and the resultant team is working most harmoniously together.

l. And finally, we have established most friendly and constructive relations with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We appreciate the fine guidance and assistance of the Clifford Board very much indeed, and are responsive to it.

I am told by many people who volunteer the information that the morale of the Agency has never been higher and there seems to be a new sense of purpose as well as dedication on the part of our wonderful people here. Mr. John McCone visited me about two weeks ago and reported that his several days' visit to Washington clearly indicated to him that the regard for the Agency's performance had never been higher. While this was most welcome news, we are not resting on our laurels because the intelligence business is a dynamic one and we can never become smug or complacent.

I shall be very pleased to discuss with you any of the above or other topics at your pleasure.

I am proud to serve the President and will continue to dedicate my management efforts to insure optimum performance of the CIA and its outstandingly competent personnel.

Respectfully,

Red

The following exchange took place during a telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, that began at 9:04 a.m. on February 22, 1966:

President: "Raborn's recommendations and judgments to me--and I have seen a good deal of Raborn, alone, just sit and talk to him--and if anything he has too much confidence in his people, and he's too complimentary of 'em, and he feels that they're doing too well, and he is totally oblivious to the fact that he is not highly regarded and he is not doing a good job. He thinks that he's made a great improvement and he's a great success. And I'm afraid Helms lets him think that and I'm afraid that others tell him that, and I think that--"

Bundy: "That's a better way for it to be though. It makes it easier to deal with when and if you get ready to. Clark [Clifford] is your best counselor on that. He's very thoughtful about it, very watchful." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Bundy, Tape F66.08, Side A, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

On March 2, 1966, President Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 341 (Document 56), which "assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." On March 8 the Central Intelligence Agency advised its field stations that the statutory responsibility of the Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence were not affected by NSAM 341 and that relationships with Ambassadors and other U.S. Mission components were unchanged (see Document 67). On September 30 CIA notified Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett that it saw no useful purpose "at this time" in identifying which of its activities were interdepartmental within the context of NSAM 341 and that CIA was not prepared to participate in the Foreign Affairs Programming System (see Documents 95 and 97).

For a briefing memorandum prepared by CIA in September 1966 that outlined the agency's relationships to the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Groups under NSAM 341, see Document 254. For CIA views on how cooperation worked, see Document 263.

Washington, March 22, 1966.

[Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder E, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66. Confidential. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

Washington, March 24, 1966, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
Need for White House Representation on 303 Committee

The 303 Committee, the small four-man group consisting of Cyrus Vance, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Raborn, and formerly McGeorge Bundy which has been meeting weekly since 1963, is in need of a White House representative to continue its vital work.

/2/See Document 263 and footnote 5 thereto.

/3/On March 28 Komer was named Special Assistant to the President in charge of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction in Vietnam.

According to the Executive Secretary, Peter Jessup, a number of important and sensitive matters awaiting decision have backed up and need attention. These include deployment and possible use of the A-12 aircraft, support to the Congo, Dominican Republic election, etc. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, in its first meeting, agreed that it would not deal with the most highly classified matters presently under 303 cognizance.

/4/Helms informed Raborn in an April 4 memorandum that he been told by Moyers that the President had decided to have both Moyers and Rostow sit on the 303 Committee. Rostow would be chairman, since "Moyers feels that he should not be locked into this position in view of his other duties and responsibilities." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01580R, DDCI) However, Moyers attended only one 303 Committee meeting as a regular member, on May 5. (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes)

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

Washington, June 1, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. II. Secret.

SUBJECT
Admiral Raborn's View of Compromise on CIA Watchdog Committee

/2/Senator Fulbright raised the issue directly with Raborn in a June 13 letter: "What I wish to know is whether a Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, created for the purpose of keeping itself informed of the activities of the CIA in fields related to the foreign policy of the United States, would be able to receive without restriction information on the same basis as that now supplied to the Subcommittees" of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80-B01439R, Congressional Relations, 1966-1968)

/3/See Document 251.

Admiral Raborn has heard that Senator Mansfield wants to avoid a floor fight on the CIA "watchdog" issue and, therefore, is ready to recommend to you acceptance of the compromise.

Senator Russell opposes the new suggestion because he shares Admiral Raborn's view that Fulbright's group wants not only information, but also knowledge of sources and methods used by CIA.

Admiral Raborn said that recently he agreed to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in 44 countries. However, Senator Fulbright was uninterested and insisted on being told the source of information and the methods used by CIA. When Admiral Raborn said that he was unable to make such information available, Senator Fulbright said, in effect, the Director was refusing to testify before his Committee.

/4/The President wrote by hand: "Because they leak! See Dominican Rep. testimony."

Walt

Washington, June 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 11-2. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
C.I.A. and the Senate

/2/No substantive record of the meeting, which lasted from 5:01 to 6 p.m. was found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

(1) Enlarging either the Appropriations or the Armed Services Subcommittee on the C.I.A. by including at least two members of the Foreign Relations Committee in one or the other. This is not going to work as a solution at the present time because of the determined opposition to enlargement of these subcommittees by the Members comprising them;

(2) Calling up for floor consideration the resolution which has been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 14-5. If this is done, there will be considerable debate on the Floor with the result that the C.I.A. will suffer, the Senate as an institution will suffer. No party to this dispute will, in any way, shape or form, derive any benefit from this debate except the newspapers and they will, of course, naturally give it the headline-treatment.

This will furnish, in turn, further grist for the mill insofar as the C.I.A. is concerned. It will create greater suspicions about it both at home and abroad. The issue is not likely to die even after a debate or vote on the floor. The matter, in my opinion, will continue to simmer, creating more and more suspicion and the position of the agency is likely to become much more difficult in the months and years ahead.

(3) Creating a special C.I.A. subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee to be composed of not less than two nor more than four members. Those members would be chosen on the basis of seniority. Creation of such a subcommittee is within the authority of the Foreign Relations Committee. If it is not treated by the Director of the C.I.A. on the same basis as the other two special subcommittees, however, it would only be a C.I.A. subcommittee in name; it would not be one in fact or knowledge and the impasse would remain.

To overcome this factor, I met with the members of the other two subcommittees and asked for their reaction to a suggestion that the President consider the possibility of directing the head of the C.I.A. to give to a proposed special subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee the same type of information he gives the other two subcommittees. The Democratic members of these two subcommittees took the suggestion with open mind, realizing that the responsibility was yours. Some of the Republican members, however, expressed opposition to having the C.I.A. responsibilities in the Senate spread in this manner although all of them, I am sure, realize that it would be a question for you to decide on the basis of the law setting up the C.I.A.

I realize, as I stated to you, that this possibility involves passing the buck but it was the only way I could think of at the time to achieve a compromise which would avoid a bitter Floor fight on the resolution which has been agreed to by the Foreign Relations Committee.

(4) In view of the difficulty which faces you with the above suggestion, it would be my present feeling that a two-man subcommittee should be created in the Foreign Relations Committee to be composed of the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member. As I have stated previously, it is within the authority of the Foreign Relations Committee to set up a Subcommittee on the C.I.A.

It would be my further suggestion that the Director of the C.I.A. should be requested by the Chairman to furnish to the Foreign Relations Subcommittee the same information he furnishes to the other two subcommittees. If this was agreed to by the Director of the C.I.A. and if, during the course of meetings held between this subcommittee and the Director of the C.I.A., questions arose which he felt he could not and should not answer because of the security involved, he should make that plain to the committee. If the committee was insistent, then and only then ought he to clear the matter with you.

If this suggestion meets with your approval, it would obviate your becoming directly involved as the original suggestion would not. It would allow some flexibility and it might break this impasse in a way which will be better for all concerned.

I have not discussed this suggestion with anyone but you.

In a letter to the President, June 8, 1966, Director of Central Intelligence Raborn indicated that he "would like to leave government service at your earliest convenience." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX FG 11-2) The President discussed the issue briefly with Senator Mansfield during a telephone conversation that began at 8:45 a.m. on June 10:

President: "Just between us, Mike, our friend Raborn is leaving us. He's kinda like Mann and he's quitting, and so I rather think I might put in Helms. Do you have any reaction?"

Mansfield: "Oh I don't even know the fellow. I have no reaction to him. He's the one you said that's the old pro down there?"

President: "Yup. I don't know how he'd get along with the Hill. He doesn't know a thing in the world about politics. Never got elected."

Mansfield: "Well that's an important factor you have to consider."

President: "Yes it is. Yes it is. He's a newspaper man, and he gets along with all the press, and they all like him, and all the folks like him and seem to trust him more than they do a fellow with a military background. They didn't like McCone much."

Mansfield: "Yes, they liked McCone. He was pretty good." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Mansfield, Tape 66.16, Side B, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Raborn's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence ended on June 30, 1966. He was succeeded the same day by Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Washington, September 20, 1966.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. Drafted by Bross.

Dear Clark:

[3 paragraphs (23 lines of source text) not declassified]

/2/Dated January 16, 1962; printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXV, Document 99.

/3/Document 233.

/4/[text not declassified]

The most important question to decide is the extent and limitations of the responsibilities of the DCI, particularly insofar as they have managerial implications for programs functioning under agencies of the Government other than CIA, particularly under the Department of Defense. Specifically the questions are to what extent the DCI should be held responsible and accountable and given authority:

a. To determine the needs of the Government for information derived from intelligence channels;

b. To determine the scope, character and level of collection and analytical programs and facilities required to meet those needs; and

c. For the efficiency and economy of these programs (now costing in excess of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a year).

Under existing arrangements the DCI, supported and advised by USIB, tends to be regarded as primarily responsible for validating and determining the needs of the Government for intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the control and management of a very large preponderance of programs and facilities calculated to meet these needs. The precise delimitations of authority and responsibility as between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI remain vague and ill-defined although practical working relationships are satisfactory. It may very well be that there is no practical alternative to the present dichotomy and that we should continue to work under current authority, recognizing the somewhat nebulous nature of the DCI's commitment "to provide effective guidance and coordination," but recognizing also that there has been very considerable improvement in the coordination of the national intelligence effort and that further progress under something comparable to the existing authority can be reasonably anticipated.

Before expressing my final views on this subject, however, I should appreciate further time for reflection and suggest that this matter be scheduled for further discussion some time towards the end of this year. I am attaching a memorandum on the subject which may help further to clarify the issue.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated items.]

Sincerely,

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

Washington, undated.

DISCUSSION OF ADEQUACY OF DCI AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE THE
U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

As a minimum, the DCI must have the authority to find out anything he wants to know about all activities which contribute to national intelligence. He must have the ability to form an independent judgment as to whether intelligence programs are generally responsive to national needs. Institutional arrangements must exist which ensure that he can communicate an authoritative view, if necessary to the President and the President's immediate advisers, as to which programs of the Government are redundant or marginal and what should be done to fill intelligence gaps.

/6/A copy of NSCID No. 1, January 18, 1961, indicating the revisions incorporated in the revised NSCID No. 1 issued March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA.

The two Presidential letters, respectively to Mr. McCone and Admiral Raborn, constitute at least a clarification and probably an extension of the DCI's authority. Certainly the Kennedy letter constitutes a mandate to the DCI, acting jointly with the heads of departments, to review the activities of all U.S. agencies "with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness. . ." It has been argued that the Johnson letter is weaker because it directs the DCI to coordinate and guide the total United States intelligence effort "in accordance with NSCID No. 1." Certain of the provisions of NSCID No. 1 imply a certain obligation on the part of the DCI to act, in some respects at least, with the advice and consent of USIB and to deal with heads of agencies and departments through their intelligence representatives. The Johnson letter also uses language which appears to emphasize the DCI's responsibility for coordinating intelligence output, rather than intelligence programs and activities.

In view of the practice that has developed of giving the DCI a personal mandate from the President, a new letter of authority, emphasizing the President's concern with the need for effective guidance to the over-all intelligence effort and directing the new DCI to ensure the provision for this guidance, may be desirable.

It remains to be asked whether the Board expects the DCI to be responsible for more than general guidance and coordination for intelligence activities. Do they expect to hold him accountable for the efficiency of all intelligence activities. Do they expect him to be responsible for the elimination of all waste and extravagance in any intelligence program run by the Government.

As of today, there is no central mechanism in the Government for an over-all budgetary or program review of all intelligence activities as a whole. The four basic programs: CIA, and CCP (SIGINT), the CIP (DIA and the Service intelligence programs), and the National Reconnaissance Program are all reviewed separately with somewhat different representation through somewhat different channels. It should be recognized, however, that the DCI's right to participate in the review and have a say in the formulation of all three DoD programs is now firmly established.

Consideration has been given in the past to the desirability of establishing a National Intelligence Resources Board, to be chaired by the DCI or jointly by him and the Secretary of Defense which would be responsible for the consolidated review and approval of all intelligence programs. There are many practical considerations, however, which suggest that such an arrangement may be unwise or, in any event, premature.

A basic factor affecting the coordination of intelligence activities is the necessary division of authority amongst individual departments and agencies of the Government. It is inevitable and appropriate that heads of departments having responsibilities in the foreign policy fields and commanders of major military commands should have the personnel and facilities required to assemble and analyze the information needed for their parochial and departmental purposes. Information which they legitimately require is also, in most cases, relevant to national decisions which affect "national security." Moreover, intelligence data of national significance is collected by individuals, diplomats for example, as part of their official responsibility for carrying out normal departmental activities. Intelligence, whether national or departmental, is very often a by-product of some essentially non-intelligence activity controlled and conducted by non-intelligence components of the Government.

/7/Brownell report on communications intelligence, June 13, 1952. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B00269R, Box 10, Folder 62, and Box 14, Folder 130)

The net result of all this suggests that we are stuck with the present concept under which the DCI "guides and coordinates" the community but does not manage or command it. If so, the various institutional arrangements through which the DCI provides guidance and coordination (USIB, intelligence agency program and budget reviews, the NRO, etc.) should be examined to ensure that they provide an adequate basis for the assertion of his influence but do no imply responsibilities which extend beyond the limitations on his authority.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79-01201A, SIG Procedures and Support. Secret; Eyes Only. A log in the folder in which the memorandum is filed dates it September 1966. The recipient of the memorandum, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, was appointed DDCI by the President on September 20, confirmed by the Senate on October 7, and sworn in on October 13. The memorandum was sent to Taylor via the Deputy Director for Plans, but it contains no drafting information.

SUBJECT
The 303 Committee, Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups

/2/None of the attachments is printed.

The National Security Council has placed the responsibility for covert actions on CIA and has required that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and correlated with espionage and counterespionage operations. Further, the NSC has stipulated that, except as the President otherwise directs, designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, and a representative of the President designated for this purpose are to be advised in advance for policy approval of major covert programs initiated by CIA or otherwise directed. This directive is NSC 5412/2 (Attachment A). These designated representatives, together with the DCI are known as the 303 Committee, after NSAM 303 (Attachment B). Formerly they were referred to as the Special Group 5412. Proposed paramilitary operations, either overt or covert, are also approved by the 303 Committee (NSAM 57, Attachment C).

The present membership is:

Mr. Walt Rostow, Chairman and the President's Representative
Mr. Foy Kohler, State
Mr. Cyrus Vance, Department of Defense
Mr. Richard Helms, DCI

The Chairman briefs the President on the Committee's decisions.

The decision to submit an operational program or activity to the 303 Committee is made by the Director. However, guidelines have been established which, along with internal procedures, are reviewed in Clandestine Services Instruction 50-20 (Attachment D). Coordination within CIA of the proposals includes review and approval by the DDP, the Executive Director-Comptroller (for fiscal authorities) and the DCI before being presented to the representatives of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The DDI also reviews the proposal for the validity of the intelligence base underlying it and may comment directly to the DCI. This internal coordination is managed by the Special Group Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], a member of the Staff of the DDP.

Coordination, external to CIA, of the proposals for covert operations is accomplished in two steps. First, the Chief of the Clandestine Services Area Division advancing the proposal secures the approval of the regional Assistant Secretary of State concerned with the proposal. Ordinarily, this has been preceded by the approval of the Ambassador to the country concerned with relevant communications between the Ambassador and State Department and the CIA Station Chief and CIA Headquarters. In some instances, the proposed covert action has been suggested by the Ambassador or the Country Team.

Second, with approval of the proposal by the DCI, the proposal in the form of a "303 Committee Memorandum" is referred to the other Committee principals. The DCI's representative at the Executive Office Building (Mr. Peter Jessup), who is also the Secretary of the Committee, transmits the proposals to and briefs the representatives of the President and is in liaison with the representative of the Secretary of State. The DCI's representative in DOD [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefs the representative of the Secretary of Defense. Normally, the proposals are "staffed" by Defense and State on a high executive level.

The 303 Committee ordinarily meets weekly on late Thursday afternoons in the White House Situation Room to consider proposals released by the DCI and circulated in the previous week.

The President has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. The Secretary of State is empowered to discharge these authorities through the Under Secretary of State and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State.

The enabling Presidential directive, NSAM #341 (Attachment E) established a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) to assist the Secretary of State and regional interdepartmental groups (IRG's) to assist the regional Secretaries. The SIG also was assigned the responsibilities of the Special Group (CI). The Under Secretary of State is the Executive Chairman of the SIG and the regional Secretaries are Executive Chairmen of their interdepartmental groups. The Executive Chairmen have full powers of decision on all matters within their purview. Individual members of the SIG and the IRG's, however, who do not concur may request referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority. The regional Assistant Secretaries, as Executive Chairmen, have the responsibility for assuring the adequacy of U.S. policy and programs for the countries in their regions.

The DCI is a member of the SIG and has designated the Chiefs of the CS Area Divisions as the CIA members of the five Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's) whose jurisdictions correspond to those of the geographic bureaus of the Department of State. Attachment F lists the members of the SIG and the State and CIA representatives on the IRG's.

The authorities assigned in NSAM #341, related as they are to interdepartmental activities overseas, do not affect the DCI's authorities and responsibilities arising from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended or invalidate other executive directives, i.e., the NSCID's and NSC Directive 5412/2. Consequently, the participation of the CS Division Chiefs on the IRG's is separate from their liaison and coordination with the regional Assistant Secretaries of State on covert action and related intelligence matters. Further, covert action matters which fall within the purview of the 303 Committee are not considered in the SIG, the IRG's and their subcommittees.

Normally, the Staff Director, SIG prepares and circulates the agenda and related papers to the members in the week preceding the SIG meeting which is scheduled routinely on Tuesday afternoons in the Under Secretary's Conference Room. Agenda items are recommended to the Executive Chairman by the SIG members and the Executive Chairmen of the IRG's. Those from the latter are frequently in response to earlier directives from the SIG.

The Special Group Officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is the point of contact in CIA for SIG matters for other member agencies and, in CIA, provides staff support to the DCI to accomplish internal coordination on SIG papers. Normally, this means analysis of the SIG paper by appropriate elements of the DDP and DDI and the preparation by the Special Group Officer of an "Agency position" on the matter which is presented to the DCI in a briefing book.

On Monday of each week, the DDI prepares an Intelligence Report exclusively for the SIG. The substance of the Report is not necessarily related to the agenda of the SIG meeting for the following day. Rather, on a world-wide scale, the Report attempts to forewarn the SIG of developing situations in countries or areas where there are signs of potential crisis or subversive aggression. Attachment G is a recent Report.

The Chiefs of the CS Area Divisions, as CIA representatives on the IRG's, coordinate IRG matters with other CIA components and keep the DDP and the DCI advised of IRG matters and decisions made by the IRG's. The DDI has designated Regional Contact officers to provide intelligence support to these CIA representatives.

Pertinent internal CIA directives relative to these procedures are Attachment H (HR 50-9) and I (CSI 50-25).

Washington, September 29, 1966.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. Extract-4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, October 10, 1966.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, October 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, NSC 5412, 1957-, Basic Document. Top Secret. Both Macdonald and McAfee worked in the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination.

SUBJECT
Department of State Responsibility and Organization in the Covert Action Field

/2/See footnote 5, Document 263.

It is assumed that the necessity for appropriate covert action is accepted and requires no further argumentation; and that State Department concerns focus upon appropriateness.

NSC 5412 (Top Secret) establishes six objectives of covert action (which it terms "covert operations"). All but one of them are directly aimed at "International Communism," the covert activities of which, according to the directive, make necessary the undertaking of such activities by the U.S. The remaining objective is concerned with promoting Free World support for the U.S. as well as strengthening Free World resistance to International Communism.

Covert operations are defined in NSC 5412 as those for which U.S. Government responsibility is not evident, or can be plausibly disclaimed if they are uncovered. They include propaganda, political action; economic warfare; preventive direct action including sabotage, etc.; escape, evasion, evacuation; subversion and assistance to resistance groups; support for indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened Free World countries; and activities to accomplish these categories. Responsibility for all these actions is given to CIA by NSC 5412, in preference to the creation of a separate agency for the purpose. Excluded are armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.

The State Department's concern for covert action might be listed under the following headings, listed in a rough priority order:

a. Short-term risks. Covert action, however necessary and promising of success, risks jeopardy of U.S. foreign relations and frustration of U.S. foreign policy objectives if it is exposed.

b. Consequences. Since the risks of covert action multiply, with scope and time, it follows that each such action if successful must have a phase-out point at which overt methods and social forces are depended upon to carry the objective forward. If these methods and forces are inadequate when the phase-out point is reached, the success of the covert action will be jeopardized or nullified.

c. Long-term risks. One of the basic long-run objectives of U.S. foreign policy, frequently reiterated, is to achieve the rule of law in international as well as domestic affairs. It is difficult to conceive of covert action, however necessary and justifiable, which is not in some measure antithetical to the rule of law (although the antithesis is less to the extent that the source of law in the target area is weak in popular support).

d. Action v. intelligence. The line between action and intelligence, although drawn by the National Security Act, the exclusions of NSC 5412, and other directives, is sometimes difficult to maintain in practice. There is a consequent concern that intelligence may be biased by the action to which it is related, and that policy will show a resultant bias.

e. Institutional bias. A large and highly qualified organization naturally has professional enthusiasm for projects in its competence. Covert action often promises (and can achieve) quick results. But objective scrutiny may indicate that such projects are not as necessary or desirable as their proponents believe when weighed against the costs and risks.

f. Civic concerns. Covert action is obviously not subject to the usual checks and balances of a free society. Witting officials concerned with covert action should therefore endeavor through their own judgments to represent the legitimate civic consciousness of the community.

The National Security Act empowers the National Security Council to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security . . . ." and makes the Secretary of State a member of NSC. It makes CIA subject to NSC in the intelligence coordination field. NSC 5412, in giving CIA its covert action responsibilities, says that CIA is "subject to directives from the NSC." The Secretary of State shares this NSC responsibility as a statutory member of it. In respect to covert action, NSC 5412 provides that designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the President shall be advised in advance of major covert programs and shall be the normal channel for approval and coordination.

/3/Document 56.