Washington, January 23, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, China Representation. Secret. The memorandum is marked "Hold for Bundy."

Mac--

/2/France announced its recognition of the People's Republic on January 27. Documentation relating to the U.S. position on Chinese participation in the United Nations is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXX.

Desirability of postponing Arab-Israeli hassle in UN is an additional good reason. I've pushed Sisco on this (Cleveland is in Europe) and was told they fully agreed. Rusk had already made decision to seek GA delay before French problem hotted up. SYG seems sympathetic; he and our own people are making soundings with an eye to a decision in June.

/3/In a January 31 memorandum to Bundy, Samuel Belk of the NSC Staff reported that "We will have no difficulty in getting a postponement until around November 14." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations Miscellaneous)

RWK

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by Nathan Pelcovits and Elmore Jackson (IO) on January 31 and cleared by Tyler and Meeker (L).

SUBJECT
Ambassador Stevenson's Talks with Soviets on Future of United Nations Peacekeeping

/2/A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, USSR-Khrushchev. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I, pp. 153-155.

Ambassador Stevenson would make it clear that any future arrangements on peacekeeping, such as those foreshadowed in your letter, must presuppose settlement of Soviet arrears. Unless they settle they face a showdown. The Soviets are subject to loss of their General Assembly vote under Article 19 of the Charter at the first meeting of the Assembly in 1964.

Our strategy and discussions would proceed on two parallel lines:

/3/Article 19 of the UN Charter states: "A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of the arrear equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member." For text of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see 59 Stat. 103.

On arrangements for future costly UN peacekeeping operations, we would initially explore Soviet reaction to the two features mentioned in your letter:

--to strengthen the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping. We might suggest that all major peacekeeping operations be considered first by the Security Council. The General Assembly would undertake them only if the Security Council had been unable to take action;

--to take account of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries (particularly the Permanent Members of the Security Council) in meeting the United Nations' financial problems. This might be done by establishing a new peacekeeping financing committee of the General Assembly, weighted in favor of the larger contributors, to determine the most suitable financing plan in each situation and to apportion expenses.

Under such an arrangement, the General Assembly would need to adopt a rule of procedure that it would pass no financing plan for the more costly peacekeeping operations without the prior approval of two-thirds of this committee.

There are two other interrelated elements of importance.

A UN Working Group of 21 members is scheduled to meet this spring and will almost certainly recommend a special scale of assessment under which big contributors would pay more than the regular scale for expensive peacekeeping operations. The "special scale" would be available to the peacekeeping finance committee as one of the alternative financing plans. The preferred formula from our viewpoint would be that the special scale apply only after the first $5 to $10 million needed for peacekeeping operations in any given year had been assessed at the regular scale. We would seek to hold our share on the special scale to less than 40%. A change by Congress in the present legislative ceiling of 33-1/3% for our assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping would be required before we could accept a General Assembly resolution applying the special scale to a particular operation.

We plan also to discuss with the Soviets a formula permitting selective assessment. Under the arrangement we have in mind, the General Assembly (or the peacekeeping finance committee) could decide to apportion expenses among members in such a way as to exclude from assessment under the special scale a permanent member that has fundamental political objections to a UN peacekeeping operation. The Soviets may insist on a formula which would, in effect, give the permanent members a right to "opt out" rather than to leave this decision to a two-thirds majority of the peacekeeping finance committee or the General Assembly.

/4/All brackets in the source text.

[Alternative II. I recommend that Governor Stevenson be authorized to discuss such a procedure with the Soviets if in his judgment it is a necessary part of reaching an agreement with the Soviets on a package that includes paying up its arrears.]

If you approve of our exploring the above approach with the Soviets, we would plan to consult with appropriate Congressional committees to outline our proposals and to explain why we believe they are in our national interest.

If the Soviets do not settle their arrears before the next General Assembly session (we might be faced with a special session at any time) we would press for a ruling on suspension of the Soviet vote if we are confident of the votes to support a favorable ruling. If not, as a means of building greater support, we would consider having the General Assembly refer to the International Court of Justice the question of whether suspension of vote under Article 19 is automatic and mandatory.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, February 7, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential.

/2/Document 287.

The Secretary's memorandum begins as though the Department's proposals on the problem are solely to carry forward the momentum of the President's January 18 letter to Khrushchev. The truth of the matter is, of course, that the situation we now face would have been the same even if the President had not written the letter.

As for strengthening of the Role of the Security Council, it is in the long-range interest of this country, as well as the USSR, that important matters such as peacekeeping go through the Security Council channel due to the present nature and composition of the General Assembly. In this, the US and USSR have a common interest. We will not, of course, mention this in our negotiations with the Russians, but it will be a consideration both sides will be taking into account most seriously. As for the attitude of the less-developed countries, there will be no objection because they ultimately will be represented on an enlarged (15) Security Council.

Also, in order that greater account can be taken of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, we would support the creation of a new Peacekeeping Finance Committee of the General Assembly, weighted in favor of the larger and middle countries, which would, determine how a particular peacekeeping operation would be financed. In this way, those countries who pay the larger amounts would also have a larger voice in how it was spent.

We also would be willing to accept a special scale of assessment under which large contributors would pay proportionately more than the regular scale for an expensive peacekeeping operation (i.e., in excess of $5-10 million). This would be advantageous because those who have the greatest responsibility and concern for peacekeeping would have greater control through the membership of the new finance committee, heavily weighted in their favor. The less-developed countries would approve of this because they would pay less than they now do.

On the matter of selective assessment (allowing a permanent member of the Security Council to opt out of a particular peacekeeping operation of which it does not approve), it might be that our accession to such an arrangement could be traded for payment by the USSR of its arrears. If this works, the less-developed countries, who shudder at the prospect of a confrontation with the USSR on Article 19, would be greatly relieved. Such a provision might, at some time in the future, be desirable for this country, let us say, if the wrong kind of government came to power in Puerto Rico accompanied by internal strife.

/3/Reference is to the United Nations Emergency Fund (UNEF), created to support emergency peacekeeping operations, and the special allotment established in 1961 to support peacekeeping operations in the former Belgian Congo.

The Department believes that if it takes the "reasonable" approach outlined in the Secretary's memorandum, rather than a "Cold War" one, there is a good chance to make progress. It is also believed that such an approach will line up more votes in favor of our interpretation of Article 19. This, only time will tell. The Russians have indicated to us that they are concerned about the problem and have indicated to the SYG that they expect bilateral negotiations with the US to begin soon.

/4/The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice issued July 20, 1962. For text, see ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151-308.

/5/In a February 13 memorandum to Bundy, Belk reported that having failed to find support for his approach Stevenson had accepted the approach recommended by Rusk and that negotiations with the Russians would probably begin the following week at the United Nations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1)

/6/Neither found.

SEB

Washington, March 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on UN Problems

/2/Authorization was transmitted in telegram 2207 to New York, February 14. (Ibid.)

1. Strengthening the Security Council so that peacekeeping operations first come to the Council, and go to the General Assembly only if the Council cannot act because of a vote. Also, Stevenson will propose the creation of a new finance committee, heavily weighted in favor of permanent Council members and large contributors, so that financial arrangements for peacekeeping will be controlled by those who pay the most.

2. Stevenson will propose a new scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations by which large contributors would pay a larger percentage than for the regular budget. We believe we could keep our share to less than 40%, which would represent a saving over the approximately 46% we have paid for the Congo and the Middle East operations.

3. Another financial arrangement we would be willing to consider would allow a permanent member of the Council to be excluded from any assessment for a peacekeeping operation of which it did not approve.

4. We plan to stick to our policy of insisting that the Soviet Union lose its vote in the General Assembly if it is still two years financially in arrears when the next General Assembly convenes.

The Secretary and Ambassador Stevenson believe that if we take this reasonable approach rather than a "Cold War" one, there is hope for resolving some parts on these problems.

The Congress is being kept fully informed. Assistant Secretary Cleveland has individually briefed Senators Aiken, Church, Hickenlooper, Sparkman and Fulbright. Ambassador Stevenson, accompanied by Cleveland and Chayes of the Department, met with the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 26. The meeting went satisfactorily, and the Department plans to keep the Senators informed as the negotiations progress.

On the House side, Cleveland already has briefed Representative Fascell (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Organizations), who thought it would be helpful if Cleveland briefed the full House Foreign Affairs Committee next week. Cleveland plans to do so.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, March 3, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Limited Official Use.

SUBJECT
UNCTAD

/2/A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Ball Papers, UN.

/3/Not attached and not found.

The problems posed by this conference result from the lamentable fact that the less-developed countries have been the victims of a high-class confidence game conducted in elegant economic jargon. When they finally open the package and find it contains old newspapers they will be mightily upset.

Almost alone among the economically competent countries, we have tried to be realistic and honest. We have not been rewarded with smiles of gratitude but we have kept expectations from soaring too far into the stratosphere. Moreover--as was shown at the last OECD Trade Committee meeting--we have brought several of our European allies toward sobriety and responsibility.

The tactical problems at the conference will be:

1. How to continue to play a responsible role without appearing overly negative;

2. How to avoid the appearance of sympathy with commercial policies that could give comfort to the enemy in the forthcoming political campaign; and

3. How to steer the conference in a manner that will be instructive to the participants, yet permit the conference to end with a whimper and not a bang.

This will not be easy.

The best tactic, I think, is for us to play a relaxed role during the early weeks of the conference while it generates its own confusions. There will be well over 100 countries represented from both sides of the Iron Curtain and the speech-making will be interminable.

/4/Ball visited Geneva for the opening of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, March 23-June 15.

/5/Reference is to a paper submitted by Dr. Prebisch, Conference Secretary General. It was summarized in an attached but not printed February 24 strategy paper.

In the meetings of the Gargantuan working committees--each of which will contain representatives of every member country--I think we should, during the early phase, pursue the Socratic method--attempting to draw the other countries out so far as possible. We can be reasonably confident that chaos will result since the interests and views represented will be many and diverse.

At the end we should try to pick up the shards and put together all that is good and salvageable. We have some sane and positive ideas and in the end they should prevail.

George W. Ball

Washington, March 6, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow.

3303. Article 19 and Future of U.N. Financing.

1. Stevenson and Plimpton, together with Dean (U.K.), met with Fedorenko and Morozov (USSR) this morning to make our presentation on Article 19 and financing.

/2/Not found.

4. Fedorenko said present financial situation not created by USSR. Financing of peace-keeping belonged to competence of Security Council. This was avoided not by USSR but by western powers. Full responsibility for present situation therefore rested with western powers. Said principal position of USSR "had not been changed" and "we do not see any reason to change".

5. Re application of Article 19, stated USSR knew procedure and order of its implementation, including competence of General Assembly. Stated USSR considered it was right and had acted in accordance with Charter. Western approach to financing had not been reasonable nor lawful. USSR could not accept it and was not afraid of any meeting, including General Assembly.

6. Fedorenko stated this was the past. As to future, it was difficult to consider proposals just after hearing them and proper consideration was necessary. One matter was clear. Every step had to be taken in accordance with Charter. Security Council had privilege and right to decide problem of financing. USSR would bear in mind this simple procedure, that everything done must be in full accord with Charter. If you say you are interested in strengthening Security Council we would understand this to be in accordance with Charter. Said some elements of our proposal were not clear. Understood from what Stevenson said we had further elaboration in mind. Needed time to report to Moscow and receive their views and wondered if we had something in writing to give him. Stevenson and Dean said presentation had intended be oral. In response Fedorenko's elaboration Stevenson recapitulated position as follows:

We wish keep U.N. peace-keeping operations going. We were prepared to consider new arrangements for future under which major peace-keeping operations would be authorized by Security Council only in first instance and would go to General Assembly only when Security Council could not act; there would be weighted peace-keeping committee to consider and make recommendations to General Assembly re financing; if other aspects agreeable we were prepared to consider means to take into account special position of permanent members, possibly to exempt from assessment, by recommendation of committee or some other device, permanent members who fundamentally politically opposed to operation. Stevenson said all this was premised on clearing up past, including arrears. Noted Fedorenko had said USSR would not change position on past, therefore we must be confronted by Article 19. Regretted to hear this reply before he had given careful consideration to our proposals. Whether it would be useful to consider future before there was reconsideration of past he did not know, but he hoped USSR would consider our whole proposal. He should understand that U.S. was clear on relationship of proposals to past.

7. Fedorenko said he had expressed Soviet position just to avoid illusions. We must be realistic and we must be precise. Again expressed preference for piece of paper, with understanding it would be entirely informal. Stevenson and Dean said we would prepare one of these lines which would constitute "series of headings".

Dean then stated he wished to associate U.K. with Stevenson's position about importance past problem as well. Proposals must be considered as whole.

8. Fedorenko then asked whether we had talked to French. Plimpton said we had given French general outline of views but had received no answer. Said we noted certain similarity of French and Soviet views but hoped they would both come around. Said we had also given general statement of our views and intention to talk to USSR to western group and LDCs in group of 21. Had asked them to keep it confidential. Stevenson added it was just as well not to have public discussion now. If our ideas offered possibility for solution we felt they should be pursued first among three delegations present. Fedorenko strongly endorsed importance conversations being kept confidential.

9. At end of meeting it was agreed that if press found out about meeting we would all three say it was discussion of general U.N. issues without elaborating on any of the details. Also understood U.S. and U.K. agreed would give French paper similar to that we would give USSR but would not do so with anyone else.

Stevenson

Washington, March 30, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Confidential.

SUBJECT
United Nations Trade and Development Conference

I returned last night after attending the first week of the United Nations Trade and Development Conference (UNCTAD) in Geneva. These are my impressions:

1. This Conference was originally inspired by the Communist Bloc as a device to demoralize trading relations among the industrialized Western countries and gain a propaganda advantage with the less-developed countries. The leadership was subsequently taken over by a small group of intellectuals from the less-developed countries headed by Dr. Raul Prebisch of Argentina.

2. As it has developed, the Conference has become an organized pressure campaign designed to force a massive transfer of resources from the industrialized countries to the less-developed countries by pegging prices and manipulating world trading patterns.

3. Dr. Prebisch, who has been working on this Conference for over a year, has managed to whip up a high degree of enthusiasm among his clients. The less sophisticated of the less-developed countries have been led to regard the Conference as the dawn of a golden age. These expectations have been encouraged by the fact that some of the Western industrialized countries--particularly France--have given the appearance of sympathy to Dr. Prebisch's ideas-although with no intention of adopting them.

4. We have pursued the opposite tactic. We have tried to bring about the deflation of expectations by directing the attention of the Conference at the hard facts of the development problem and the need to be quite clear as to what each country is talking about.

/2/Ball's March 25 speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1964, pp. 634-640; excerpts are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 141-149.

/3/"Dutch Uncle at the UNCTAD," March 28, 1964.

7. In the next few weeks the deceptively solid position of the less-developed countries will crumble as they begin to realize that their individual interests widely differ. As the chief Indian representative has already told me, we can also expect a spreading recognition that the Prebisch gimmickry is not the answer to their problems.

8. At that point, the United States can and should step in to pick up the pieces and put together a constructive set of proposals that will be both economically sensible and politically feasible. We should be in good position then to take the leadership since the less-developed countries will know that we have held out no false hopes and that, from the beginning, we have told them the truth.

9. One interesting point was the behavior of the Soviet Delegation. I sent word to the Soviet Minister through the Yugoslavs that we were not going to take the lead in turning the Conference into an East-West confrontation. I said I hoped that the Soviets would follow this same course, but that, if they didn't, we were loaded for bear and they would wish they had never come.

10. The next day the Soviet Minister assured me that they would not attack the United States and, in fact, his speech was the mildest Soviet statement I have seen in years. Quite clearly they recognized that, in this particular Conference, their interests were on the side of the industrialized countries.

11. Che Guevara, on the other hand, delivered a 1-1/2 hour tirade. His speech might have been effective had it been short, but, in the end, it bored the delegates and a number expressed their gratitude to us for not taking Guevara on and making the Conference an East-West donnybrook.

George W. Ball

Washington, April 11, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Committee of 24 Consideration of United States Territories

/2/Not attached to the source text; for text, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 438.

The Committee of 24 will probably undertake its initial consideration of United States non-self-governing territories within the next few weeks.

By Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, the United States agreed to transmit information to the United Nations on our non-self-governing territories. Since the beginning of the United Nations the United States has transmitted such information to the Secretary-General and cooperated throughout its existence with the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which was established by the General Assembly to review these data.

The Committee of 24 is much different in composition and emphasis from the Committee on Information. Its membership is weighted heavily in favor of the Afro-Asians, and Soviet Bloc, in contrast to the balanced composition of the Committee on Information, and its basic thrust thus far has been rapid independence for dependent areas. While the Committee of 24 has on a number of occasions taken unrealistic and unwise actions, it should be noted that the issues involved (e.g., Portuguese Territories, South West Africa, Aden) have been mainly those having high emotional and political content for the Afro-Asians and involving disputes between the metropoles and important elements of the indigenous peoples in the territory. We, of course, have no such problem in the United States territories, and the Committee's approach to our territories may pose no difficulties for us. However, we do not know yet how the Committee will approach the subject of our territories and believe it desirable to inform you of the Committee's upcoming discussions in case problems arise.

The United States objective regarding our territories in the Committee is to prevent or minimize any harmful or embarrassing Committee action (e.g., call for Committee Visiting Mission to U.S. territories, criticism of fact U.S. territorial governors are not elected). We believe the best way to achieve our objective is by making an effective presentation of the United States accomplishments of territorial administration as we successfully did in the more favorably composed Committee on Information. The Departments of State and the Interior are now preparing these presentations and undertaking appropriate Congressional consultations.

/3/J.W. Davis signed for Reed.

New York, April 21, 1964, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and London.

3826. Discussions with Soviets re payment of arrears and new peacekeeping financing arrangements.

Fedorenko (USSR) and members his staff met with Stevenson, Dean (UK), and staff members at USUN today on request Fedorenko.

/2/See Document 291.

Fedorenko said Soviet Government had given consideration to suggestions made by Stevenson March 6. They had paid particular attention to statement President Johnson desired avoid hampering relations between US and USSR on UN financial issue. Similarly, USSR Government had no intention strain relations between two countries and there no basis such strain if both parties proceeded in spirit of mutual cooperation and in conformity with Charter.

Charter laid down procedure for UN action for maintenance peace and security, including financing of UN operations, those of Middle East and Congo in this case. Unfortunately, Fedorenko said US had taken steps which could not be qualified but as complicating situation and aimed at deterioration in relations between US and USSR. Responsible representatives of USG, while giving arbitrary and biased interpretation to Charter provisions, came out with threats to USSR and statement intent to win application Article 19. This action has given impression that US determined facilitate situation which will undermine UN as instrument for safeguarding peace and for creation of peaceful cooperation and compel USSR re-examine attitude re UN activities.

/3/For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 26 (April 15, 1964), p. 18.

/4/UN doc. A/5431.

Fedorenko then quoted from March 21 statement that USSR shall consider any actions aimed at exploiting UN machinery including application provisions of Article 19 of Charter for ends alien to Charter as actions of those who do not care for UN and who do not take into account prospectives of its break-up of UN as result such actions. If anyone has illusions USSR may reconsider refusal pay expenditures for UN operations in Middle East and Congo and can be forced do so by pressure, USSR can only warn these speculations not only groundless but that, if there any attempt act along these lines, USSR may be obliged reconsider attitude towards UN activities. USSR stresses that attempt make groundless charges against it in connection with its position of principle will be considered as unfriendly act towards USSR.

Fedorenko went on say, if Article 19 on legitimate grounds is to be spoken of at all, this must be done in strict conformity with Charter in conformity with provisions re suspension rights of members. This means application is not automatic but requires two-thirds vote under Article 18(2) as indicated in Soviet statement of June 11, 1963. (Then quoted 18(2).)

/5/Summarized in U.S. Participation in the UN, 1964, p. 2.

Dean stated briefly that USSR in error if it believed any threat to it had been intended by US and UK. Said fact that UK stands on its position re applicability of Article 19 should not be considered such threat. Added that no progress in talks possible if there are threats on either side. Believed our view of principle right but this not question of threat at all.

Fedorenko responded by saying impression had been created and that we should know it was fact Moscow had such impression.

Stevenson said it appeared to him we had arrived at serious and important crisis in life of UN. He regretted Soviet statement not because it was statement of old positions but because it implied that US and UK had consciously created situation threatening undermine possibilities of international cooperation and threatening break up UN. No one else believed this was true and he was concerned that Soviets appeared believe it. US record in support UN did not justify such belief and he wished make it clear he completely resented implications of Soviet statement. Stevenson went on say our approach in March was attempt find solution through consultation to problems posed by different positions of great powers and was attempt see what could reasonably be done to meet Soviet positions. He noted text our memo of March 6 was being restudied but believed that further talks would not be useful if USSR proceeded from assumption we trying destroy UN or threaten USSR. We trying to make UN effective and circumvent conflict on Article 19. He hoped we could proceed on assumption that both sides trying preserve UN and he hoped Soviets would either react to our proposals or put forward any others they had in mind.

Stevenson said Soviet Union knew our position which we consider based soundly on Charter. Since there seemed no point in repeating debates on past positions, he suggested we discuss future arrangements, recognizing that, in our view, it was essential that Soviet indebtedness to UN must be liquidated.

Finally Stevenson said, if Soviets had no new proposals put forward, we were apparently at point where we could only wait for Soviet study and reactions to our memo of March 6.

Fedorenko suggested that perhaps Stevenson had not taken fully into account evaluation in his statement of Stevenson's suggestion of March 6 on Article 19 that attempt be made find solution to UN financial problem which was not detrimental to positions of principle of both sides. Said USSR had noticed this and taken into consideration his explanation. Then requested three key sentences of statement on "positions of principle", "concrete proposals", and Soviet-Government willingness to consider such proposals (above).

Stevenson and Dean responded by saying that U.S. and U.K. had already made proposals and could not understand why any of them had been considered contrary to Charter. Said we had no new proposals now.

Fedorenko simply reread sentence re Soviet position on proposals contrary to Charter. Then said that, if we considered proposals of March 6 serious and constructive, then adequate time must be given USSR for study.

Stevenson then pointed out that six weeks had passed since our approach March 6 and that other members of working group were formulating proposals re peacekeeping financing and that question arose how long could they be excluded from talks re these matters. We had thought desirable see how far U.S. and U.K. could progress with USSR towards some agreement before inviting others participate in talks but delay now made situation difficult. Plimpton emphasized fact that was important for Moscow react to memo of March 6 in reasonably short time because other working group members becoming restive.

Fedorenko said he would report U.S.-U.K. reaction his government immediately. He added, however, that U.S. and U.K. had obligation study and present specific constructive proposals to USSR. When reply was given that proposals had been presented,

Fedorenko asked whether we had any new suggestions. Stevenson and Dean replied in negative. Stevenson pointed out to Fedorenko that we were reasonably satisfied with existing UN procedures and that we had been trying meet some Soviet objections to these. We were prepared give further consideration if Soviets had any suggestions to make. Our proposals had not been worked out in detail and were not final. Soviets should also be aware that our proposals required only changes in rules of procedure and not Charter amendments.

Fedorenko then raised question as to what to say to press about today's meeting. He said that, of course, he expected we and U.K. would immediately give full account to New York Times and Tribune and question really was what he would say. Stevenson and Dean pointed out that we had informed no one else of today's meeting and did not intend give any publicity to discussions which had taken place. Fedorenko indicated skepticism.

As Fedorenko left, Stevenson repeated request he had also made earlier request for copy of text of Fedorenko's statement, and latter said he would consider request.

In subsequent discussion U.S. and U.K. delegations agreed Soviet reply softer than we had expected and that Soviets were asking for our proposals on arrears problem as well as on those for future. If Fedorenko gives us written text his statement, we can examine it closely with this in mind. However, Fedorenko statement as given above virtually verbatim, especially this aspect.

/6/In telegram 3257 from Moscow, April 24, the Embassy in the Soviet Union commented that "Stripped of its rhetoric and imputation of motives to the US, we believe Fedorenko statement designed to say that: (1) Sovs absolutely inflexible in refusal to pay Congo and ME arrearages and (2) within that limitation, Sovs anxious find accommodation on Art 19 issue and future peacekeeping operations." (Department of State, S/S-S Exdis/Limdis Telegrams, Reel 40)

Stevenson

Washington, April 22, 1964.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75-45, WJC Book, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. No classification marking. Drafted by Richard Fox (O).

You will recall that I have mentioned to you my concern about the staffing at USUN with particular reference to the utilization of Negroes. At the present time there are only two Negroes in professional jobs--Carmel Marr and Frank Montero, both at the ES 14 level; moreover, Mr. Montero may be leaving shortly. There may be one or two other Negroes serving in clerical or semi-professional positions, but, by and large, the prevailing pattern of employment at the Mission has been a failure to utilize minorities in the higher level professional positions.

Over the past several years Ambassadors Mercer Cook, Carl Rowan and others professionally employed in the foreign affairs field have been appointed as alternate delegates to the General Assembly. Not since the Eisenhower Administration has there been a Negro serving as a full Delegate.

The continuing absence of Negroes in senior level positions and on the Delegation at USUN has drawn mounting criticism from the Negro community and particularly from the politically sensitive minority organizations in New York City. If unchanged this will culminate in strong criticism of the Department and the Administration. The immediate appointment of a Negro as a full Delegate probably would not stop it, but would certainly soften the effect.

I understand that the President is considering having Sidney Yates fill Jack Bingham's former position at USUN. We think we can offer a qualified Negro candidate for this job. However, if the President believes it important that Yates get the position, perhaps we can have a Negro take Yates' present job. I would appreciate your raising this possibility with the President.

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Crockett signed the original.

Washington, May 7, 1964, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol 1. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Pelcovits and Jackson on May 6; cleared in CIA, L, EUR, SOV, UNP, and IO; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Geneva for Gardner.

/2/Dated May 1; it set out proposals for future discussions with the Soviets on Article 19 issues. (Ibid.)

Re methods for handling arrears problem following is for your guidance in talks with Sovs and Secretariat.

Dept concurs in general with line you propose take on arrears problem in event Fedorenko makes another approach. Our understanding is that you do not propose to take initiative for any meeting on this subject but are preparing contingency position. In next talk, if Sovs renew request for proposals on settling arrears you would adopt position described this telegram. Also, our understanding that in any discussions with Sovs (or informal exchanges with Working Group) on financing arrangements, you would adhere to line in comment B of reftel and guard against any weakening of essential and inherent link between problem of future and satisfactory settlement of arrears.

Following are points we suggest you emphasize in event next discussion with Sovs turns to arrears problem:

1. We are flexible on accounting devices for settling arrears, and will not make issue of modalities. We believe several possibilities can be designed which would allow Sovs to settle their debts without appearing to abandon their position. (FYI. We suggest that you do not get into question of how particular solution relates to Sov "principles". We will try to be accommodating but feel that question of whether settlement is detrimental to their principles is matter basically for them and not for us. End FYI.)

2. Particular devices are matter Sovs will want to work out with Secretariat. We are willing to go along with any reasonable scheme that does not violate Financial Regulations and is consistent with Charter. We would not want to leave impression (para 3 of reftel) that we would be satisfied with minimal payment just to avoid Article 19 hassle at this time. This may well be outcome but we are concerned with satisfactory settlement arrears and not simply resolution Article 19 issue. We recognize that Sovs may be concerned about possibility that after they have worked out apparently viable scheme with Secretariat we might pull out rug from under them by rejecting it as unsatisfactory. If this becomes apparent in conversations with Fedorenko you are authorized to outline in very general terms methods we might regard as satisfying requirements, using as illustrations the consolidated account and ex gratia devices described below. You should avoid, of course, being drawn into any negotiations with Soviets on modalities to pay off arrearages. We would like this aspect kept between USSR and UN. End FYI.

3. FYI. We want to avoid any suggestion of US-USSR deal in which we appear to abandon principle of financial integrity UN and wink at violation of financial rules to avoid showdown. For this reason Dept believes you should not at this time seek informal exchanges with Sovs, even at working level, on methods of arrears payment. End FYI.

4. Sovs may be concerned by prospect that after they pay they will suffer prestige loss and that US public and press will picture result as backdown from showdown. We cannot of course control what others and press will say but believe that world will applaud satisfactory outcome and that Sovs will not suffer from policy of support for UN. If satisfactory arrangement can be worked out we would in public statements indicate our gratification at settlement and would not seek to exploit it to their detriment.

/3/Dated April 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4)

/4/Bruce R. Turner, Under Secretary, Office of the Controller, UN Secretariat.

/5/For text, see United Nations Yearbook, 1963, pp. 575-576.

Following are three illustrative devices that have been suggested and that might meet problem. You can tell Secretariat we believe any of these offer possibilities satisfactory financial settlement and might be politically acceptable. All of them assume that Sovs pay Working Capital Fund assessments and will not object to UN crediting their regular budget payments to cover arrears for items for which payment withheld in 1963.

/6/Not found.

/7/Printed in Izvestia July 18, 1963.

2. Ex gratia payment, covering total arrears, in single contribution or in installments. Sovs would not pay on peacekeeping accounts but make ex gratia contribution to UN to mitigate UN's financial crisis and avoid situation which could prejudice prospects for international understanding. Sovs might couple this payment with reservation of their legal position. Sovs would not attach such conditions to ex gratia contribution that comptroller unable credit contributions to peacekeeping arrears. In subsequent years Sovs would make further voluntary contributions in requisite sums and with similar reservations.

3. Voluntary Payments for Peacekeeping (UNOC & UNEF) Arrears. Sovs would make "voluntary" payment to settle all or part of their peacekeeping arrears, probably after UNOC withdraws, at the same time reserving their legal position. Soviets might arrange pay in installments if they wish.

Apart from tie to International Cooperation Year, Dept does not believe that, at this stage of discussion with Sovs, linkage of arrears problem with other issues, either in UN context or outside, is likely be fruitful approach. We have already made logical tie with future of peacekeeping and in that connection emphasized our common interest in strengthening UN peacekeeping capacity.

Department aware that in broader context in which this was in President's January 8 reply to Khrushchev, strengthening of peacekeeping encompasses wide range of common objectives in putting limitations on nuclear weapons, reducing risks of war, and moving toward effective disarmament. We will continue to study possibilities of linkage to some of these broader questions but believe that to bring any of them in now would be premature.

Rusk

Washington, July 7, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. No classification marking.

/2/Summarized in an attached but not printed July 10 memorandum from Read to Bundy. The translation was not found.

We have now received an unofficial translation of the Soviet note from the Japanese news media and, according to press reports, all other UN members will receive the same note. Governor Stevenson, who has returned early from Illinois, is scheduled to see Ambassador Fedorenko late this afternoon, when it is assumed the note will be delivered.

If the Japanese translation can be depended on--and I think it can--the Russians have made still another strong pitch for strengthening the Security Council. We, of course, want to do the same thing, but in a different way.

The Russian approach would take away the prerogative which the General Assembly gave itself in 1950 when faced with a Security Council deadlock on the matter of going into Korea. (At that time, the GA, under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution", decided that there were two ways to by-pass the Council when faced with a deadlock because of the veto: 1. any problem could be sent to the Assembly by an affirmative vote of any seven members of the Security Council, and 2. the GA could, by a simple majority vote, decide to take up an issue at a special emergency session.) There is a strong argument that the Resolution violates Chapter VII of the Charter, which relegates peacekeeping to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly. The US, however, is in favor of retaining the Resolution because it provides the only escape hatch from a deadlocked Council. Our hope for strengthening the Council would come through our proposals for controlling financing through the Council (a weighted Finance Committee of Council members) and increased Soviet cooperation in the Council because of the make-up of the GA.

On the problem of financing, the note alludes only to the future, but at least the way is cleared for further discussions. Stevenson is going to probe Fedorenko on the matter of past financing when he sees him today.

The Peacekeeping Force proposed by the Russians would be under Security Council jurisdiction and, therefore, the use of such a force would be subject to the veto. This shouldn't worry us very much. If we and our allies decide to put a peacekeeping force into a country we can do it just as we did in Lebanon and inform the Security Council that we have done it or that we are going to do it.

The tone of the note is reasonable and holds promise at least for extensive negotiations on matters that need much to be negotiated. There certainly will be more to be said when we get the official text with whatever remarks Fedorenko makes to Stevenson.

Sam Belk

New York, July 10, 1964, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Part 5. Confidential. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-4 UN.

/2/For text, see UN doc. A/5721.

Twenty members Western Group met today to discuss USSR memo on UN peacekeeping. About half of members had copies (we confidentially made copies available to others), but only Japan and Sweden indicated their govts had received copies directly from USSR.

Stevenson stated USSR memo, while apparently in response US-UK initiative, reflected USSR's own proposals and did not comment on suggestions made by US and UK on Mar 6. He said US is attempting discover whether USSR desire hold fruitful negotiations, but memo appears be only reiteration standard Sov position on exclusive rights SC to establish and finance all peacekeeping operations. USSR want make every phase of operations subject to veto which appears contrary to membership desire retain reserve powers GA. USSR proposal would also inhibit SYG executive role and did not mention resolving of arrears situation.

Amb Dean (UK) said UK giving memo careful study, but "troika" implications clear in suggestion that "socialist" countries supply troops and participate in command of operations. He saw memo as careful restatement USSR views on Chap 7 plus introduction further restriction that SC Perm Reps should not participate in operations.

/3/The article that specified that members undertake to provide armed forces, assistance, and facilities to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Reps attending indicated they had no instructions, but in general found little in USSR note on plus side; raised numerous questions about what USSR really means in substance--especially on what operations USSR considers could be carried out under Chap 7 and Art 43 concept; expressed considerable skepticism about motivation of USSR on timing of making note widely available; and considered in some detail best ways of countering USSR offensive by educating UN membership quickly so appropriate action by OAU and during SYG trip to Moscow not be aborted. Another Western Group mtg scheduled for Wed, July 15.

Amb Loridan (Belgium) believed USSR memo talking only of Chap 7 operation and would exclude such operations as Congo, Cyprus, and UNEF. He questioned whether Congo is an operation of aggressor under Chap 7 in USSR view.

Plimpton supplied that, when US had queried Fedorenko about Kashmir-type operations, reply had been SC had exclusive jurisdiction in such cases. Loridan said memo led him to conclusion it addressed only to Chap 7 situation, especially aggression, and that this might exclude action by SC under Chap 6. Stevenson agreed matter should be further explored with USSR.

Amb Cremin (Ireland) saw gap in memo between peacekeeping operations like Cyprus which Sovs had not opposed and peace "enforcing" operations under Chap 7. Dean said Sovs see Cyprus as past operation and memo addresses itself to future. Barton (Canada) averred USSR position was Cyprus should be left to Cypriots and UN should not take role unless Turks invade. If Turks invaded, Cyprus then it becomes Chap 7 operation.

Stevenson at this point expressed personal concern how SC could draft and deal with res as complicated as USSR prescriptions at bottom page 3 of note.

/4/Apparently the June 7 article in Izvestia "Concerning a Vicious Undertaking," translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 1, 1964, p. 15.

Stevenson interjected additional negatives: USSR planning to substitute permanent UN force for earmarking of national units and difficulty of negotiating treaties with individual members. Pointed out that flexible call-up more fruitful approach to problem.

Matsui (Japan) said he knew of no particular reason Tokyo selected for first Sov presentation. When Sov Chargé delivered memo on Jul 6 he gave only short explanation and indicated all members would receive it. Japan since learned memo given Laos and Sweden same day. Matsui said GOJ had received text in Japanese, which probably reason for slight difference between press report and document received by US and UK. Japan was studying memo and had reached no conclusion on its value.

Amb Vinci (Italy) expressed personal view that all chances of negotiation should be explored. Saw timing of memo presentation as attempt influence Africans before Cairo mtg and indicate Sov position before SYG visit Moscow. Vinci felt US and UK should continue explorations with Sovs, present opinions to SYG before he leaves, and utilize Working Group 21 as means of expressing Western views and drawing more backing for our position.

Stevenson said we hope see SYG before he leaves and summarize for him preliminary views Western Group indicating that dels presently without instructions. Principal danger is that Sov memo calculated stimulate long discussions and divert attention from more realistic proposals and obscure Art 19 before Nov 10. Stevenson agreed Vinci analysis Sov tactic re timing and reflected personal opinion that memo was obviously in part for propaganda purposes.

Amb Tabor (Denmark) saw little progress on face of memo, but felt it best not be too negative since we all want arrive at some plan for future. To counter Sov propaganda, US might consider making public statement before Cairo mtg (which should not concentrate on Art 19) but point out Sov proposal would take away GA powers. Tabor inquired whether SC Perm Reps exclusion included logistic support for operations. Stevenson thought it applied only to troops.

Amb Corner (New Zealand) saw memo as another attempt of Sovs to plug up leak in what they had thought was water-tight control over activities of organizations as established in 1945. ASAF's with whom he had spoken (mentioned UAR, India, Nigeria) had been able see through memo, and West need not react too negatively in public.

Patricio (Portugal) said he had not received text, but would pass it on to his govt. His first reaction was that it was composed of generalities to attract "certain majorities."

Stevenson expressed agreement with Tabor suggestion that public statement might be desirable, but questioned advisability of it coming from US and UK. Facts of situation were that it problem of entire membership and we don't want situation appear as bilateral confrontation or extension of cold war. Tabor agreed, but saw timing problem in reaching Western consensus and having it cleared with govts for prompt issuance. Vinci suggested that each member make statement to own press.

Dean pointed out US-UK must have mtg with USSR first. Stevenson suggested it important get around corridors and make views clear to USSR. Important Western Group members make comments to LDC's. Corner read excellent statement made in New Zealand parliament. (Copies pouched Jackson/IO.)

Amb Hay (Australia) concerned if all Westerns publicly comment, this likely enhance importance of memo and upgrade it to status of document on which to base negotiations. Hay inquired of Chief Adebo's reactions to memo. Plimpton reviewed appropriate info contained USUN 87.

Amb Waldheim (Austria) suggested that another mtg be held next week after guidance received from Western govts. Mtg tentatively scheduled Jul 15, 10:30 a.m., US Mission.

Tine (France) urged (and all concurred) advisable not mention these mtgs to press.

Stevenson stressed there much missionary work be done with other dels, and asked that Western Group urge countries make views known to Sovs.

Comment: Corner comment at end mtg quite accurately characterized Western reaction: He stated seeking positive aspects USSR proposal like looking for needle in haystack.

Stevenson

Washington, July 11, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. A note on the memorandum reads: "For Information Only."

SUBJECT
Soviet Memorandum on UN Peacekeeping

/2/See footnote 2, Document 298.

/3/See Document 291.

However, in proposing these new approaches to the Russians we made it clear that our agreement to any new arrangements for the future would depend upon the payment of Soviet financial arrearages. We have told the Russians and other UN members that unless arrearages are paid, the Soviet Union--or any other member in the same situation--must lose its vote in the General Assembly when it convenes next November.

The Soviet memorandum just received--which is very reasonable in tone--is by no means a full response to our March proposals. It especially makes the following points:

(a) It mentions future financing, but Ambassador Fedorenko told Governor Stevenson that the USSR had not altered its position of refusal to pay its past debts.

(b) It reiterates Moscow's long-standing view that the Security Council has exclusive jurisdiction over UN peacekeeping, including financing, thus precluding any recourse to the General Assembly. (There is not the slightest chance that the UN membership will buy such a proposal.)

(c) It implies that the Russians are more willing to accept some sort of peacekeeping role for the UN than they have been in the past.

The major significance of the memorandum is that it opens the door just far enough to make possible a further exchange of views on these long-standing problems. The next step is to find out exactly what the language of the memorandum means and, if it means what it seems to mean, then to see how far the Russians are willing to fall back--if at all--from their stated position. Peacekeeping, financing and Article 19 all are hard problems and they are interconnected in such a way that if you negotiate on one, you have to negotiate on all three.

On the assumption that talks with the Russians will begin soon, Governor Stevenson may have some hard probing--and perhaps negotiating--to do in the coming weeks. We are fortunate in having the UK solidly with us on these issues. The first reaction to the Soviet memorandum from other non-bloc UN members has been very near our own, although it is still too early to get a dependable reading.

You will be seeing U Thant on August 6 when he will report to you the results of his trip (London, Moscow, Paris, Geneva and Cairo) and these are some of the problems you may wish to discuss with him at that time.

McG B.

SEB

Washington, July 13, 1964, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Confidential. Drafted by Polansky and approved in M on August 31. The meeting took place in Harriman's office.

SUBJECT
Soviet Aide-Mémoire on Election of President of General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Chargé d'Affaires, Soviet Embassy
Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary--EUR
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary--IO
Mr. Sol Polansky--EUR/SOV

/2/Not found.

/3/For text, see GA 1990 (XVII), December 17, 1963.

Governor Harriman asked whom the Soviet Union was nominating. Mr. Kornienko replied that the Soviet Government had no one in particular in mind, but added that the Soviet Union was willing to support an African candidate for the coming 19th GA session since African countries had already proposed candidates before Resolution No. 1990 had been adopted. In turn, the Soviet Union would expect that an Eastern European representative will be supported for the GA Presidency at the 20th session in 1965.

Mr. Kornienko replied that the Soviet Union had observed that the French and the United Kingdom were circulating a memorandum to the effect that the GA Presidency at the 20th session should be held by a Western European. He then reviewed the geographic distribution of past GA Presidents: 6 from Western Europe, 5 from Latin America, 1 from Africa, and 6 from Asia. Mr. Kornienko concluded by pointing out that the Soviet Government believed that the U.S. Government, in accordance with Resolution No. 1990 and in the spirit of improving relations and mutual understanding among countries, would support the candidacy of a representative from an Eastern European socialist country at the 20th session of the General Assembly.

Governor Harriman replied that the U.S. Government would give the Soviet proposal "weighty thought and consideration."

Mr. Sisco pointed out that more and more countries are throwing their hats into the ring earlier for chairmanships of UN committees and other elected offices.

Mr. Kornienko asked "informally" if the Soviet Union could count on U.S. support. Governor Harriman replied that we would give it consideration.

Washington, August 4, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, U Thant Visit. Confidential. A memorandum of the President's conversation with U Thant on Southeast Asia is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 298.

SUBJECT
Your Working Meeting with U Thant, August 6, at 11:30 A.M.

U Thant will arrive in Washington immediately following visits to London, Cairo, Paris, Geneva, Rangoon and Moscow. U Thant will be eager to review his recent trip with you--especially his meetings with de Gaulle and Khrushchev. Foremost in his mind will be (1) the three-fold problem of financing; peacekeeping; and the application of Article 19 of the Charter (under which a member loses its vote in the General Assembly if it is more than two years behind in its dues); (2) Southeast Asia; (3) Cyprus, and (4) Cuba.

Background: De Gaulle received U Thant warmly but offered no hope that the French intend to pay the approximately $15 million they owe the UN. Under Article 19 the French would lose their vote in the General Assembly after January 1, 1965 if no alternative--such as a "voluntary contribution"--has been found.

Contrasted with de Gaulle's noncommittal attitude toward financing, Khrushchev was adamant against paying the $55 million of Soviet arrearages. Khrushchev told U Thant that if the USSR were deprived of its vote, it would leave the UN. This may be merely a bluff, but it probably has made U Thant more eager than ever to find a compromise and avoid an Article 19 showdown. There will be further exploratory exchanges of views between the U.S. and the Soviet missions in New York before the General Assembly opens on November 10.

Response: It would be helpful if you would emphasize to U Thant that we are firmly committed to the application of Article 19 under which the Soviet Union and other countries will lose their votes when the next General Assembly opens. U Thant should be left with no doubt that future support of the UN by the U.S. and other free world democracies--which supply 3/4 of the UN budget--will be seriously impaired if the law of the Charter is not upheld. U Thant should understand that it is not our objective to deny the Soviet Union its vote but rather to find, with them, a workable formula for past and future financing.

Background: U Thant has tended in the past to speak as a Burmese, rather than a UN official, and has been critical of our present military effort in this area, expressing strong views in favor of an early Geneva conference. He also has been doubtful of the value of UN observers on the Cambodian-Viet-Nam frontier. He thinks much like de Gaulle on this.

Response: U Thant should be reminded that the U.S. has taken the lead in seeking the establishment of a UN Commission to deal effectively with the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border difficulties. We continue to favor this approach provided it can have sufficient mobility, freedom of movement and means of communications to operate effectively. However, there seems little hope that Sihanouk will accept a UN border group of any kind.

On the broader question of Southeast Asia, emphasize to U Thant our continued willingness to participate in a Geneva conference on Laos if Souvanna Phouma's conditions can be met (primarily the withdrawal from the Plain of Jarres).

Background: U Thant is deeply concerned about the overall Cyprus problem, and specifically about the recent arms and personnel buildup in Cyprus and Cypriot interference with the UN forces freedom of movement which has inhibited the UN from detecting the buildup more accurately. Makarios has shown contempt for the UN. While using it as a shield against Turk action, he flouts its efforts to control the Greek military buildup and harasses the peacekeeping force. U Thant may submit a report to the Security Council expressing his concern over these developments. U Thant has been kept informed by Dean Acheson and the UN Mediator on the status of the talks in Geneva.

Response: We have to convince U Thant not only that we continue to support the UN effort but that he should be as worried as we are about Makarios. We want to convince him that he must be tough with Makarios, because it will help us box him in--the best argument (to avoid suspicion that we are pro-Turk) is that we think UN prestige suffers and a bad precedent is set when the UN is "used" in this fashion.

We continue to believe that a Security Council meeting would not be helpful at this time because of the adverse effect it might have on the Geneva talks.

Background: U Thant probably will tell you Khrushchev told him that continued U-2 flights over Cuba were unacceptable and that if one were brought down, and there were difficulty, the USSR would then come to the aid of Cuba. Khrushchev said he could wait until after the elections in the hope that a better attitude would prevail. Khrushchev confided to U Thant that he might visit Cuba in December or January if the atmosphere had improved following the elections.

The Cubans have asked U Thant to take some action (unspecified) with regard to the overflights.

Response: As Governor Stevenson already has informed U Thant, the Cuban failure to permit safeguards against the re-entry of offensive weapons required the U.S. and OAS members to develop other means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The U-2 flights over Cuba are necessary. They will continue until other effective means are found. We are ever ready to explore this problem.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, August 25, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Problems that May Arise in the UN before November 3

The worst thing that could happen would be an Emergency Special Session of the GA.

/2/A copy is ibid.

The regular session of the UN General Assembly will start November 10th. So far this year, no situation has arisen that brought us close to having an out-of-season General Assembly. Most of the UN's members, and especially the US, would prefer to avoid an out-of-season Assembly, because it would touch off major difficulties over the Article 19 issue, and there might be difficulties over Chinese representation.

If a sudden emergency should develop requiring UN consideration, the US would try to get it brought first into the Security Council. If a UN peacekeeping operation should be required, our first approach would be to have it authorized by the Security Council and financed by voluntary contributions--in the manner of the Cyprus operation. Only if the Security Council could not deal with the matter--presumably because of an impending or actual great power veto-would there be general support for an Emergency Special Session.

At an Emergency Special Session, the best guess is that the Chinese representation question would be disposed of in the traditional way--that is, by turning down Communist proposals to substitute Peking for Taipei in the China seat.

As for the Article 19 issue, we would hope to have marshalled, previous to any such session, at least a simple majority of the votes to apply Article 19 to any member two years in arrears. If the Soviets are convinced that they would lose on this issue, the US believes they will find some way to pay up. If, on the other hand, it appears that we do not have the votes on Article 19--perhaps because some Members would want to set aside this issue in view of the crisis for which the Emergency Session was called--there are two escape hatches:

1. We could work for a deferment of the application of Article 19 so that the Emergency Session could deal with the urgent business before it. This would put the loss-of-vote issue over to the regular session of the Assembly in November, without prejudice to the merits of the question.

2. The General Assembly could submit to the ICJ one or more questions on the application of Article 19. (The previous Court decision covered the binding character of the Congo and Middle East peacekeeping assessments, but did not rule on the procedures for applying Article 19.)

Which of these escape routes would do the least damage to our position on the merits of the issue could be better judged when we are nearer to the need for an Emergency General Assembly.

If there developed a serious possibility of an Emergency Session of the General Assembly, the Department would immediately consult with Congressional leaders, particularly on the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.

In consultations on UN questions in Washington at the end of May we discussed with the British our general approach to an Emergency Session of the Assembly. There is some doubt of the value or wisdom of wider consultations on this contingency in the absence of an emergency that might require a quick meeting of the General Assembly.

In addition to the foregoing, there is a possibility of Security Council meetings on one or several outstanding problems--the Congo, Cyprus, SEA, Cuba, etc. All of these will have to be played by ear in the light of the situation prevailing at the time. But, at this writing, none of these seem probable with the exception of a Council meeting already scheduled for mid-September to handle the problem of financing the Cyprus operation.

In the absence of a serious crisis, the mood of UN Delegations will not be one of favoring an Emergency Session. Many of the delegates already have left New York for the summer holiday. Some of them plan to attend the Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo during the first week in October, which they regard as important as the UN, and they would be most reluctant to come back to New York before it ended.

As of now, the prospects are good for a relatively quiet period in New York, but we should not and we do not count on it.

Sam

Washington, September 18, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Limited Official Use.

SUBJECT
The Soviet Letter of September 11, 1964 on UN Financing

/2/UN doc. A/5729.

/3/UN doc. A/5721; see Documents 297 and 298.

Preparing for a Collision. The two Soviet documents and Moscow's adamant defense of its position in propaganda and private conversations all indicate that the Soviets are preparing for a head-on confrontation on the financing issue at the coming General Assembly. They evidently calculate that a combination of sober legal arguments, expressions of interest in peacekeeping operations under the Security Council, and threats of dire consequences if Article 19 is applied will work to dissuade a substantial number of UN members from acting against the USSR.

Moscow may hope that by increasingly making the Article 19 issue a US-Soviet confrontation (the letter stresses the responsibility of the Western powers, "and especially the United States," for alleged Charter violations), non-aligned states will wish to contract out of the dispute or seek compromises which accommodate Soviet views. Moscow might conceivably calculate that its legal argumentation will generate pressures in the UN to delay action under Article 19 pending renewed recourse to the International Court. It should be noted, however, that the question of whether Article 19 can be applied automatically or requires a two-thirds vote--an issue some countries might seek to refer to the Court--is not addressed at all in the Soviet letter.

Longer-Range Soviet Intentions. Since the entire Soviet position seems currently geared to a confrontation in November, little or nothing can be gleaned from Moscow's latest statement regarding its ultimate intentions should its present tactics prove unsuccessful. Whether at that point Moscow would seek a face-saving way out or let Article 19 action take its course and leave at least the Assembly will depend significantly on the general international climate then prevailing, and we doubt whether the Soviets have reached a fixed decision. We continue to believe that the chances of getting the Soviets to relent are probably improved to the extent that the Soviets are convinced that their failure to relent will have results damaging to their interests.

Washington, October 9, 1964, 8:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Cleveland; cleared in G, L, EUR, and IO; and approved by Rusk. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4.

/2/Telegram 1034 from New York, October 8, is ibid., UN 3 GA. Telegrams 1041, 1044, 1046, 1048, and 1049 from New York, October 8, are ibid., UN 10-4. These telegrams discussed the Article 19 controversy and possible postponement of the 19th General Assembly.

I am greatly concerned at the extent to which view apparently prevails in UN circles that US position on Article 19 will change after our elections and that a postponement of GA until next year would be desirable to permit further efforts at compromise. Judging by all available evidence, and despite Narasimhan's protestations that Secretariat is neutral on question of postponement, I assume SYG is encouraging postponement apparently in expectation that a meeting between President and Khrushchev could solve this issue.

You should make it plain that application of Article 19 has nothing whatsoever to do with US elections, nor is it bilateral US-USSR problem suitable for disposition at summit. US policy will remain firm on issue after elections as it is now.

Moreover, from technical point of view, review of postponement shows such course not technically feasible. Article 20 aside, there are two important items of business which require voting during calendar year 1964: 1) either a budget must be adopted for 1965 or some form of authorization enabling the Organization to continue to incur expenses would have to be passed; and 2) elections must be held for the Security Council seat of Members whose terms expire or there would be serious question as to Council's legal competence to function in 1965.

An additional and strong consideration of a political character militating against postponement of the issue until 1965 is that in January the ranks of delinquents will swell, to include so important a Member as France; this would probably further erode our voting support. The GA must meet in 1964 and the Article 19 problem must be faced this year.

I am glad to see that you took a strong line with the Western Ambassadors yesterday on the need for firmness and confidence in opposing postponement and that most of this group agreed the issue must be faced this year.

In reviewing the entire problem, I conclude there are five major fallacies which need to be exploded:

1) That the US position will suddenly soften after our election, leading to some compromise in which the Soviets do not pay and do vote. I agree with your recommendation that you make publicly clear that the US position has nothing to do with election politics and will be the same a month after the election as it is a month before the election. As occasion offers, I will take the same line publicly here.

2) That the issue itself can be postponed in the coming GA. It cannot be postponed in the sense that if the Assembly convenes and conducts normal business pending study of the question or during referral to ICJ, the battle will have been lost by simple failure to apply Article 19.

3) That the session can be postponed until 1965. The comments above deal with this.

4) That more time is needed to work out an accommodation with the USSR. We have been trying since last March to do just this, and the Soviets have not budged. That is not to say that we should not make one last major effort with the USSR in the very near future which will give them an opportunity to accommodate themselves if they wish, or at a minimum demonstrate to the rest of the Members that we have gone the last mile. I would appreciate your view on this.

5) That a Johnson-Khrushchev meeting would resolve the Article 19 issue if it is delayed pending a summit. This is not a US-USSR problem; it is, rather, a problem between the UN membership as a whole and that handful of States which refuses to abide by the clear terms of the Charter and the clear opinions of the ICJ. It is a test of will between those who advocate a dynamic, operational UN and those who shrink from support of international peacekeeping forces. It is not the type of issue which is appropriate for a summit exchange between the US and the USSR.

As a next step, I think you should talk to U Thant personally. Bunche must obviously have been acting under U Thant's instruction in suggesting GA postponement until 1965, and they should both know our appraisal of situation, including consideration that such activity impairs the prospects of getting the Assembly membership to uphold the Charter when GA convenes. In particular, I think that they are doing no one a service if they are suggesting that a resolution of this issue should await a Johnson-Khrushchev meeting.

Moreover, the SYG more than any other individual should appreciate fully the need to protect the integrity of the ICJ which has expressed itself clearly on this issue.

Finally, the SYG and others should understand that I see no prospect that the Executive Branch would propose or the American people support appropriations for the UN as in the past if financial issue not resolved satisfactorily.

Rusk

Washington, October 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential.

SUBJECT
UN Matters

/2/This meeting was reported in telegram 1171 from New York, October 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4)

/3/Reference is to the removal of Nikita Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 16.

/4/On October 16 the Labour Party won a majority in parliament.

/5/It was transmitted in circular telegram 935, November 16. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Department of State Administrative History, Vol. 2, part 5)

/6/On October 16; for text of President Johnson's statement on the detonation, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1357-1358.

Sam

Washington, October 20, 1964, 6:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Secret. Drafted by Polansky. A note on the memorandum reads: "uncleared. never distributed." The memorandum is "Part 2 of 4." The meeting took place in Rusk's office.

SUBJECT
Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin--USSR

The Secretary
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, USUN

The Secretary stated that the United States was intrigued by comments coming from the new leadership in Moscow calling for an improvement of relations. He felt that we should explore all avenues toward this end. In this connection, the Secretary stated that it was important that Moscow should understand fully our concern over the Article 19 issue and the matter of payment of arrearages.

One aspect of the matter was payment for the Congo operation. The Secretary noted that the USSR had, in the Security Council, voted for four of the five resolutions authorizing the Congo operation. Therefore, we felt the USSR had committed itself to pay for this operation. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that the USSR had never intended to pay for UNOC, and could not understand why the U.S. was under a different impression. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that this was definitely not our understanding of the Soviet action in voting for the Congo resolutions.

Little mention was made of UNEF.

The Secretary stressed that the principle of Article 19 and collective financial responsibility were of the gravest concern to the U.S. Government, both from the standpoint of the development of the United Nations as an effective international institution and also with respect to U.S. public opinion. He added that the USSR could not hope to win on this issue, and suggested that it might make a voluntary payment in some form as a way of avoiding a confrontation The Secretary pointed out that the United States does not look on this as a cold war issue, and added that there were so many important issues between us that we should not let this one interfere with or cloud them.

Ambassador Dobrynin was generally non-committal and indicated no change in the Soviet position on Article 19. He stated that he was certain Moscow fully understood our position on this matter, and would report back fully to his Government the substance of the discussion.

Washington,