U.S. Department of State

Washington, December 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
The 19th General Assembly Opens

The SYG's language as he opened the GA is interesting:

/2/Brackets in the source text.

1) Appointment of the Credentials Committee.

2) Election of the President.

3) Admission of new members.

I would recommend that the Assembly may proceed accordingly."

Following this, a highly nervous Sosa Rodriques managed to get the Credentials Committee appointed by the Assembly "without objection" (interpretation: "I don't care"). Next, Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana became President of the 19th GA "without objection" because (1) the other two candidates withdrew and left him as the only candidate, and (2) Quaison-Sackey reportedly had $150,000.00 to spend on behalf of his candidacy from the coffers of Accra. This is not a happy choice for us, but what can you do when it was already agreed that an African would be the GA President for this session, and the other two African candidates withdrew.

Quaison-Sackey, as a first order of business made a sharp, anti-colonial speech that might have been drafted by Nkrumah himself.

He then proceeded to get three new members admitted (Zambia, Malawi and Malta) "without objection". Quaison-Sackey then adjourned the Assembly until 10:30 tomorrow. At that time representatives of the new member states will speak and most likely a number of other welcoming speeches will follow. That should occupy the day.

Next, the Assembly will go into the general debate which could easily occupy the time between now and Christmas recess. So much for the non-voting General Assembly for the time being.

The important work now at hand is what the Secretary can accomplish with the Russians beginning with another lunch with Gromyko tomorrow. There are four items--requiring no vote--on which there could be forward movement and, as of now, it is the Secretary's plan to propose them to Gromyko:

1) The establishment of a voluntary fund into which the Russians can make a contribution and take care of their debt to the Organization. The Russians have agreed to this in principle, but the terms of reference have not yet been worked out.

2) The creation of a Committee to take a new look at long-range-financing or, alternatively, refer the matter to the already existing Committee of 21 (Finances).

3) An agreement with regard to the membership of councils--the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC will change at the end of the year and this should not be delayed.

4) A means whereby the SYG can continue to expend funds at the current rate until a new budget can be agreed upon.

This is where we now stand. The key to where we emerge is in the Secretary's pocket.

A mildly humorous sidelight on the afternoon's procedures was the dropping of the language "by acclamation" for "without objection" because it was argued that the former could be interpreted as a unanimous affirmative vote. Therefore, the business accomplished was "without objection", but with applause. One purist in Harlan's office yelled: "Oh no! They can't applaud! They're voting!" End of report.

SEB

New York, December 1, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4. Confidential. Drafted by Richard Pedersen on December 1.

1937. Re: Article 19.

1. Early this morning Stevenson called SYG to suggest that SYG have meeting today in his office including US, USSR, UK, France, Sosa (Venezuela) and Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) to try to reach final agreement before GA opened. SYG agreed and called meeting at noon, SYG adding chairmen LA and Afro-Asian Groups.

2. Prior to meeting we drafted statements for possible use by SYG and Pres in which SYG would refer to consultations he had undertaken on crisis and their continuation and Sosa would then suggest GA start its work "on such basis that no voting would be involved."

3. When meeting convened SYG noted he had been consulting members with "sole motive" of avoiding confrontation and asked for this meeting to discuss conduct of opening session. Stated that USSR yesterday had proposed fol procedures to avoid confrontation and facilitate negots outside chamber: GA would meet as scheduled, Pres would be elected and new members admitted by acclamation or without opposition; General Debate would subsequently proceed as scheduled; USSR would then discuss future business with colleagues, including Vice-Preses, chairmen of Comites, elections to Councils, and budget.

4. Stevenson then said that as presented by SYG Sov position was not satisfactory. There must be no voting until such time as agreement was worked out. Otherwise Art 19 could arise at any minute. If there were agreement on no voting and SYG said so something along suggested lines might be all right. But it would have to be explicitly clear there would be no other business and no votes taken.

5. Caradon (UK) said purpose of meeting was to avoid confrontation and we must not fail. As he understood position shared objective of those in room was that we go through period of no vote so we could find solution. Issue was how this was to be stated. Public impression was very important and we must act openly and not risk dangers of misunderstanding.

6. SYG then said he thought positions were very close. It was now question of formulations and procedures. With spirit of give and take he thought we could reach agreement.

7. Stevenson then read draft statements he thought SYG and Pres might make, which would refer to continuation of consultations and to GA proceeding on such basis that no voting would be involved.

8. SYG said that in principle he was prepared to make such statement if it acceptable to all. He had had impression Gromyko would prefer that Pres make any statement.

9. Sosa noted proposal on no voting meant waiving of rules. Believed this should be raised by SYG, not by outgoing Pres. He would then put issue to Assembly to obtain Assembly's concurrence.

10. Fedorenko (USSR) said SYG had expressed main Sov points in clear terms. He wished to stress that USSR's only idea was and is to have clear understanding among ourselves. It would then be satisfactory to open session as described by SYG and elect Pres by acclamation; then to admit new members in same way. If some states wished to make statements there would be no objection but there would be no controversial aspects for today's work of GA. GA would then proceed with General Debate. No other steps would be taken until consultations were completed. He noted Gromyko and Rusk intended to have further talks. Beyond this there was no necessity to take up other aspects now, especially those of interest to one side. When meeting was ended we should tell other members of GA what we have agreed. No special statement by SYG was needed. This would be one-sided. We should simply go ahead with this understanding as there was no real problem now involved. Statement would be a "precondition" to further work of session, and this would not be right.

11. Seydoux (France) said it would be difficult to postpone opening of GA further. GA would lose prestige and it would be shock to public opinion. He thought confrontation should be avoided. But election of new Pres and admission of new members could be accomplished today. Position of future would be reserved. Perhaps a suspension of GA should follow this afternoon's session for several days during which consultations would continue.

12. Sosa said if no agreement reached on procedure it might be wise to adjourn as Seydoux had suggested. GA could be adjourned either after election of Pres and admission new members or before these two items.

14. Stevenson said he understood Fedorenko as suggesting we go ahead with General Debate, while Seydoux suggested recess. Noted GA rules required election of new Pres to be without nomination and by secret ballot. Election without objection would therefore require waiving of rules. If there was agreement we could proceed on all these items without voting we could agree, but there needed to be explicit understanding on basis of which we could proceed. He failed to understand Fedorenko's view that statement on non-voting would complicate matters. We needed to have precise understanding on procedure under which controversial business would be avoided and we would proceed without objection. On Seydoux's suggestion of recess US had no firm views.

15. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) said he wished make appeal. There was nothing fundamentally different between views of US and USSR. One wanted statement; one did not. He stated everyone knew about discussions which had taken place and about today's meeting. He therefore thought some kind of statement was called for so that GA would know we were not following normal procedure. Statement of SYG might avoid word voting but get same meaning with other suitable language. He did not favor further suspension of GA procedures.

16. Vidaurre (Dominican Republic) stated LA group would have no objection to SYG's proposal and appealed to all to agree to it.

17. Bouattoura (Algeria) agreed with Quaison-Sackey that we were close to agreement. Question was how to express this to membership. Quaison-Sackey's proposal was a good way and he was sure SYG could do this. Problem was how to proceed with GA work without disturbing consultations going on outside. We should go ahead into General Debate with understanding no voting should take place. Consultations would continue with parties concerned, following which GA could follow its normal procedure. But GA should be convened. Two postponements had already been a blow and further postponement would be another.

18. Fedorenko then asked questions about Credentials Comite, to which we had referred in our statement. Stated he understood this was appointed by Pres. Sosa said Credentials Comite in fact had to be confirmed by GA but that there had never been vote on confirmation.

19. SYG said that it might be useful for him to make short statement as suggested by Quaison-Sackey, avoiding contentious phraseology, to explain why new procedure adopted.

20. Fedorenko stated he wished members to understand that anything beyond what SYG had suggested at start of meeting must be studied by his Del. He must see text of any statement that SYG would make and decision on it would be "in competence of Chief of our Del."

21. SYG then produced one-sentence statement to effect that there was "an understanding" that controversial issues would be avoided while consultations were taking place. Plimpton suggested this might be modified to add something like "issues other than those which can be unanimously agreed upon."

22. Fedorenko stressed again that USSR had to study anything new. SYG said he could have draft available by 2:30 PM. Fedorenko said the sooner the better. SYG then said he would have revised sentence available in five minutes. Short discussion on scenario of opening moments of GA followed, after which Narasimhan (UN) distributed revised text as fols: "There is an understanding to the effect that issues other than those that can be disposed of without objection will not be raised while the General Debate proceeds." SYG suggested meeting reconvene at 2:45 for 15 minutes. In meantime he would draft rest of statement.

23. Stevenson asked whether SYG's sentence was intended to be applied to procedural questions as well as to substantive items on agenda. Noted procedural question might arise at any time without notice and precipitate issue in spite of intention of agreement. He assumed Chair could handle such issues without vote. SYG said his statement was definitely applicable to procedural problems as well and Quaison-Sackey indicated he would handle them in accordance with the statement. Fedorenko added that if anyone who did not understand situation should try to raise such problem he was sure Chair could handle it.

/2/Not printed. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 142, Frame 9)

25. In response SYG's request for views Fedorenko promptly said Sov position was that it would be best if there were no statement. If there had to be one USSR had "no objection to this text."

26. Stevenson said he understood opening day procedure under statement would be on these lines: After SYG's statement Sosa would say, "I assume there is no objection and we can proceed on these lines; there being no objection it is so decided." Appointment Credentials Comite, election of Pres, and admission of new members would then be accomplished on no objection basis. On this understanding he agreed to draft statement. SYG and Sosa both said this was correct understanding of procedure. SYG then distributed short statement for Sosa under which he would say if there were no objections it was so decided. Fedorenko said that if others agreed to this statement USSR had no objections.

27. Seydoux said that if understanding involved budget and elections to Councils he would have reservations, but if statement was agreed around table he would be reluctant to oppose it for today's procedures. SYG said he took it from Seydoux's comments that he had reservations but was not objecting. Meeting then adjourned.

28. US participants in meetings were Stevenson, Plimpton, Yost and Pedersen.

Stevenson

SecDel/MC/7

New York, December 2, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 7. The memorandum is Part V of V. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, December 1964

SUBJECT

Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Mr. Cleveland
Ambassador Yost
Ambassador Kohler
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Akalovsky

U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Fedorenko
Mr. Smirnovskiy
Mr. Sukhodrev

The Secretary wondered whether Mr. Gromyko had any views on how we should proceed with respect to the UN problem. He believed, and he thought Mr. Gromyko was of a similar opinion, that the Secretary should take considerable part in discussions of problems related to peacekeeping operations, both past and future. We were interested in both those aspects and we would like to know what Mr. Gromyko's views were on them.

Mr. Gromyko thought that there was agreement to continue consultations and inquired whether Ambassador Stevenson had any comments to make.

The Secretary commented that, as a general observation, he believed we would need quite detailed consultations in New York and that the Secretary General should be involved in them. As to the aspects of the problem relating to the future, we were interested in the Charter's provision for "primary responsibility" of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and international security. However, the Charter did not state that the Security Council had exclusive responsibility and we believed that the General Assembly had important powers in this respect. Those powers were perhaps residual inasmuch as they resulted from a situation where the Security Council may be unable to act. In any event, we believed that the Security Council was important and the United States and the Soviet Union, as members of the Security Council, were interested in its having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security.

The Secretary then noted that the membership of the United Nations had considerably changed over the past years. For example, there were some members today who contributed as little as .04% of the total UN budget. Indeed, one could construct a hypothetical two-thirds majority in the General Assembly whose total contribution to the UN budget would amount to something like 5%. For these reasons, we believed that those who carried a larger financial burden should have a greater voice in financial decisions. Thus there were two points of interest to us: (a) the Security Council's primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security, and (b) that those who carry a heavier financial burden should have a greater voice in financial decisions.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the question was not as the Secretary had formulated it. The question was not of the Security Council's having primary and the General Assembly a non-primary responsibility. This was a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach, i.e. it was placing the question on the basis of the degree of responsibility. In fact, the point was that under the Charter the Security Council had authority to pass binding decisions whereas the General Assembly had no such authority. The General Assembly could take only consultative decisions, in other words, make recommendations. Thus the question should not be turned upside down. There was no point in breaking into an open door. The Soviet Union knew, and had so stated, that the General Assembly could discuss matters relating to the maintenance of peace and international security. No one had any objection to that. But the General Assembly could not take binding decisions whereas the Security Council could both discuss problems relating to the maintenance of peace and international security and take binding decisions on them. The Soviet Union had itself participated in the drafting of the relevant provisions of the Charter. Mr. Gromyko suggested that actions and decisions be based on the Charter and that everything be kept in perspective in the process of analyzing the situation.

Ambassador Stevenson recalled that, as Ambassador Fedorenko would probably remember, way back in March it had been agreed to discuss all questions arising from the past and also those related to new arrangements for the future. The question now was how, where, and with whom we should discuss peace-keeping operations and finances. As far as we were concerned, we were prepared to start from either end, from the past or from the future. As to the past, he understood that the Soviet Union was willing to make a voluntary contribution to some rescue fund. He wondered whether we should discuss that first or whether future arrangements should be taken up as a first order of business. He reiterated that the U.S. was willing to proceed either way. He noted that the duration of Mr. Gromyko's stay in New York might be a factor in this respect. Regarding substance, Ambassador Stevenson said it was hard for him to say anything now and he thought that perhaps it would be better to settle procedure first.

Mr. Gromyko said there were two ways of proceeding: a) to discuss the past, which would be simpler, or b) to discuss the past, the present, and the future, i.e., all questions relating to peace-keeping, including finances. Obviously, the latter was a much more complex problem and apparently the range of differences in the positions on it was much greater. The Soviet Union was prepared to proceed either way, but the two of us and others as well should keep in mind that one method is simpler and the other more complex.

Regarding the question of contribution, the U.S. side had already been informed that the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss this matter either in a committee set up for the purpose of discussing all questions relating to peace-keeping, or on the basis of the Afghan proposal. The latter covered only the past and consequently it involved a narrower range of problems. The Soviet Union accepted the language of the Afghan proposal as a whole. That proposal stated that all UN members would voluntarily contribute to a fund, and obviously the Soviet Union was not excluded. As to the amount, the Soviet Union understood the term "voluntary contribution" to mean only one thing, namely, that the Soviet Union itself would determine the amount of its contribution, without anybody else's diktat or even advice, to which the Soviet Union would never agree. If the Afghan proposal was accepted by common agreement, the Soviet Union would take part in such an arrangement. However, in such an event, it would be the Soviet Union's understanding that the entire question of the Soviet contribution would be disposed of and no one would have any more claims in the future. He also noted that the question of the form of a contribution would have to be settled.

Governor Stevenson wondered whether we should discuss bilaterally the question of a voluntary contribution or the broader complex of questions, or whether those questions should be taken up with the Secretary General and other powers. In addition, of course, there was the Committee of 21 where these matters could be discussed. This was a procedural question, but he thought its solution would accelerate our work.

Mr. Gromyko said he did not exclude bilateral discussions like the current one. Neither did he exclude discussions with the Secretary General; indeed, such discussions were desirable. Discussions could also be held in the various groups which had been formed recently, and all these discussions could proceed in parallel. Perhaps some special committee could be formed. Thus there was a whole series of fora, but he wished to point out that in those groups already in existence no socialist states were represented. Those groups included mostly representatives of the various blocs. Therefore, perhaps it would be better if a special, more representative committee were created. However, the Secretary General would be consulted in any event, and of course nothing ruled out U.S.-Soviet bilateral consultations. It went without saying that, whatever the forum, decisions would not be taken by a vote, but only on the basis of agreement.

The Secretary commented that the question of a fund was not a very suitable subject for bilateral discussions. The Soviet Union had never asked the U.S. for money, and the U.S. had never asked for money from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Secretary General asked both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for money. Therefore, perhaps the Secretary General should take a more active role in this matter. He would surely want to consult the major powers--the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and France--both as regards the fund and the problems of the future as related to the Charter. The Secretary said he wished to point out that the reason he had not mentioned China in this connection should in no way be interpreted as an indication of a change in the U.S. position.

Governor Stevenson also said the Secretary General should be in charge of the rescue operation. However, he believed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should inform the SYG of their bilateral discussions and of their intention to discuss the problems relating to the future.

Mr. Gromyko then raised the General Assembly's order of business. He said the Soviet Union was firmly opposed to any indefinite postponement of the major political issues before the Assembly. He wanted to make clear that consultations should move promptly. Perhaps it would be simpler to take up the past first, because discussion of the broader range of questions might take more time and might go even into the next GA. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it hoped this would not be the case, and it wished agreement on all these questions as soon as possible. In any event, the broader complex of problems could be discussed in parallel with the discussion of the past.

/2/A non-aligned nations draft proposal being circulated by the representative from Afghanistan.

Mr. Gromyko said we should not impede the work of the non-aligned delegations, because they wanted to help. Therefore, we should ask the Secretary General to consult with any delegations he wanted to invite, and he probably would not exclude the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Then, in a couple of days, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could meet to review the situation.

Ambassador Fedorenko wondered whether there was any point in going far into the history of the various proposals. He thought it more useful to concentrate on what was before us today: (a) the Soviet suggestion for a committee to discuss all peace-keeping questions, and (b) the Pazhwak proposal. He said the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Pazhwak proposal. It has been developed by twelve Afro-Asian delegations and advanced by Ambassador Pazhwak. The Soviet Union accepted the proposal in an effort to meet the U.S. halfway. It regarded the proposal as a mutually acceptable compromise solution of the UN's financial difficulties. The proposal certainly did not reflect the Soviet position as it had been stated both in New York and Washington. Ambassador Fedorenko did not see any point in taking up those proposals which were already dead and which had never deserved serious consideration, let alone implementation. He would, therefore, wish to see the U.S. concentrate on the Pazhwak proposal, which he believed was feasible and which had been made in an effort to help out of the situation. He thought the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should be able to get together on its basis.

Ambassador Stevenson thought it was now agreed that the Secretary General should be informed that the two sides had had bilateral discussions and that they believed, subject to his approval, that he should take up with whoever he wanted the question of a fund.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that the two sides review the situation in a couple of days. Meanwhile, the Secretary General would consult with the various delegations, but not necessarily with all of them at the same time. We should not prescribe any procedure for the Secretary General.

Ambassador Stevenson agreed and then asked whether Mr. Gromyko could help him understand the proposal which the Soviet Union said it was willing to accept. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to the creation of a fund. It would be very helpful if he could describe his conception of such a fund, the form of the contribution, and the purpose for which the money would be used.

Mr. Gromyko said the UN would be saved by contributions from all, not just the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would not contribute for the operations in the Congo or in the Middle East, but rather to the UN as a whole. As to the size of the contribution, he reiterated that it would be strictly up to the Soviet Union to determine. The Soviet Union would contribute as much as it believed to be necessary. This was a matter of policy rather than money.

Ambassador Stevenson commented that since the contributions would be voluntary, somebody might not wish to contribute.

Ambassador Fedorenko quoted from the text of the Pazhwak proposal that contributions would be made by the entire UN membership. Ambassador Stevenson remarked that the more members contributed, the better.

The conversation ended at about 4:30 p.m.

Washington, December 17, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley (IO/UNP).

SUBJECT
Charter Amendment

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. John K.E. Broadley, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mrs. V.F. Hartley

The Minister called at his request to discuss ratification of the pending Charter amendments. He referred to an earlier conversation last May when we had indicated that we had no intention of proceeding with ratification at this time since this was likely to trigger an across-the-board review of the UN and all its works. The UK had accepted this position. However, the UK now saw no advantage in further delay and its UN delegation saw certain positive advantages in an early announcement of the UK's intention to ratify, particularly before the USSR had acted. The inclusion of such an announcement in the British general debate speech at the General Assembly was therefore being considered. However, the British wished to know the US view before making a final decision. The Minister noted that if the general debate speech is in January, it will probably be made by the Prime Minister and will be a major foreign policy statement. He also recalled that the new Government has repeatedly indicated that it considers the UN of primary importance.

Mr. Sisco pointed out that the situation is still unclear with respect to the Article 19 problem and that while the Rescue Fund idea would probably be pushed ahead, details with respect to it were likely to remain unclear for some time. If the Article 19 problem has been resolved when the British make their general debate speech, then an announcement of their intention to ratify would create no problems. If the situation is still uncertain, however, such an announcement would create certain difficulties for us. We simply cannot proceed toward ratification so long as the Article 19 problem is with us and British ratification is almost certain to increase pressure on us to act. Moreover, it is likely to create the impression that there is a split between the US and the UK over Article 19.

SecDel/MC/45

New York, December 19, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, CF 2449. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 21 and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum is Part V of VI. The meeting was held at a luncheon in the Secretary's Suite at the Waldorf Towers.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, December 1964

SUBJECT
Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Stevenson
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Gromyko wondered how long the GA recess for the holidays should be. He asked whether it should be three or four days.

Governor Stevenson commented that if the financial situation were resolved, it had been suggested that the recess be from December 23 to January 11. As far as we were concerned, we had no particular views on this point.

Mr. Gromyko wondered why the recess could not end earlier.

Governor Stevenson said there was no particular reason except that a longer recess would give more time to the Secretary General to do his work. There would be no difficulty from us on the recess if the financial problem were resolved. However, it would be quite difficult to resume before January.

/2/The General Assembly president had been circulating various informal proposals for settlement of the Article 19 controversy.

The Secretary observed that the Soviet Union had suggested certain amendments to that resolution, some of which we accepted.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that no formal amendments but rather only a few suggestions had been put forward by the Soviet Delegation.

Governor Stevenson said we had told Quaison-Sackey that some of the Soviet suggestions were acceptable; for our part, we had also given him some suggestions. Thus Quaison-Sackey now had both Soviet and U.S. views. He wondered whether the Soviet Delegation had been in touch with Quaison-Sackey today.

Mr. Gromyko replied in the negative. He said that in any event the Soviet Delegation did not like Quaison-Sackey's draft and was not optimistic about it.

Governor Stevenson inquired what the problem was.

/3/Reference is to one of a series of drafts being circulated by a group of states led by Afghanistan. The Mission to the United Nations had forwarded the latest version in telegram 1722 from New York, November 18. (Department of State, Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 141, Frames 161-163)

Governor Stevenson commented the Soviet Union apparently did not like the idea of a fund. We did not particularly care about this point; nor did we care about the provision regarding the future. The main point now was to avoid a confrontation.

Mr. Gromyko stated the easiest way to proceed was to accept the Pazhwak draft.

Governor Stevenson said the Pazhwak draft would make us buy a pig in a poke. He wondered whether Mr. Gromyko could explain his understanding of it.

Mr. Gromyko said that when the General Assembly started working normally, all parties would make their contributions. However, the Soviet Union could not make any commitment because this would be contrary to the concept of voluntary contributions. The Soviet Union believed it had made a step of good will by accepting the idea of voluntary contributions, and he hoped that step would be appreciated. He reiterated that Quaison-Sackey's draft was not acceptable, even though some of its provisions seemed to be all right. For example, the Soviet Union would not object to having a report by the Secretary General, even though it was not quite clear why such a provision was necessary since the Secretary General was free to report at any time.

The Secretary suggested that the Soviet Delegation discuss the matter with Quaison-Sackey, who might have some further ideas.

Ambassador Fedorenko noted the U.S. had suggested a different wording for the reference to Article 19. He wondered what the point was.

Governor Stevenson said there was a difference between saying that Article 19 would not be raised and a wording merely referring to our desire to avoid confrontation. We did not see how one could state that a provision of the Charter should be ignored.

The Secretary pointed out it would be risky business if the Assembly were to be allowed to amend the Charter by a resolution of this kind.

Mr. Gromyko said he did not attach particular importance to phraseology, but he did wish to repeat that Quaison-Sackey's draft was unacceptable.

Governor Stevenson asked again what the Soviet Union's difficulty was with the draft which we believed met the points made by the Soviet side.

Mr. Gromyko said that as far as the Pazhwak draft was concerned, he did not wish to create constitutional difficulties and now saw the point raised by the U.S. regarding reference to Article 19. He said he would consider the U.S. suggested wording on this point. As to a report by the Secretary General, he reiterated he did not see why such a report was needed but was not strongly opposed to it. He thought perhaps provision for such a report might be included in the Pazhwak draft. He suggested that the Pazhwak draft be adopted as the basis for proceeding further and repeated that the Quaison-Sackey draft was not acceptable.

The Secretary said his impression was that Quaison-Sackey's draft included a great deal of what was in the Pazhwak draft. Perhaps with amendments both sides had suggested the Quaison-Sackey draft would not create difficulties.

Mr. Gromyko reiterated the Quaison-Sackey draft was not acceptable. However, he did now understand the U.S. point regarding reference to Article 19. We should take the Pazhwak draft and perhaps change the language of the reference to Article 19 if the U.S. attached importance to that point. Moreover, if the U.S. believed it was important to have a report from the Secretary General, that could be considered too. The U.S. should think this over. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it had understood long ago the difficulties the U.S. had and this was why it had made this step of good will.

The Secretary pointed out we had also made a step to meet the Soviet Union in moving from compulsory to voluntary contributions.

Mr. Gromyko argued that the Soviet step was greater because the Soviet Union now agreed to make a voluntary contribution.

/4/A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, CF 2449.

Washington, December 24, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4. Confidential.

1632. Subject: Article 19.

On basis of most recent developments, situation can now be summed up as follows:

Over past two weeks UN has been engaged in exercise to find formula under which Soviets could make early payment without loss of face and without sacrifice their publicly announced position of principle.

This effort has now broken down because Soviets apparently insist that whole Article 19 question be dismissed from consideration, and that Assembly decide to take up business as usual, before sufficient payments are made by delinquents to avoid application of Article 19. US and others, on other hand, have been unable to agree that Article 19 has no application, until sufficient payments have been made to bring about this result under terms of article itself.

In light of foregoing, Department believes we should defer any further US initiatives on planting shrubbery to serve as face-saving rationale for action by USSR and other delinquents. We should now concentrate on adopting US position most likely to produce necessary payments to avoid application of Article 19. In next few days mission should reiterate our fundamental view in corridor discussions: We wish GA to get on with normal business as soon as possible, but this can only be done--without Article 19 confrontation--if sufficient amounts forthcoming from delinquents to remove loss-of-vote issue. Perhaps Soviets could now be persuaded to concentrate on private commitments which might be given either to SYG or GA President.

We have no need at all for statement by GA President re contributions, so any further initiative on this score should come from USSR or others. But in all discussions we must make clear no statement will be acceptable to us which tends load scales in favor of conducting GA business by voting prior to satisfactory resolution of Article 19 problem. While we do not insist on statement by GA President affirming our position and indeed question need for any statement, we can not accept one which prejudices it. Accordingly, most realistic course would seem to have statement which is totally neutral on the point, if in fact Soviets wish any such statement at all.

/2/December 29.

"Since the opening of the 19th Session of the General Assembly on December 1, members of the Assembly have engaged in useful discussion of ways to meet the present financial difficulties of the United Nations.

As the Assembly now recesses the 1964 part of its 19th Session, I am addressing an appeal, as President of the General Assembly, to all member states to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations in a cooperative effort aimed at bringing the financial situation of the organization to solvency, with the clear understanding that such contributions would not be construed as changing the basic position of principle of any individual member.

Having made this appeal, which I commend to the most earnest consideration of all member states, I declare the 19th session of the General Assembly recessed until January 11 (or 18)."

As part of closing statement, we assume Quaison-Sackey would read to GA appropriate language of authorization of continuing expenditures by SYG.

While it is possible that another delegation (such as Sweden) might usefully discuss above course of action with Quaison-Sackey, we inclined to think it desirable for mission to take this matter up with him direct. In any event, it is most important to discuss on basis of precise text for presidential statement, our suggestion for this is given above.

Rusk

Washington, December 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Developments at the UN

Stevenson returned from Lebertyville this afternoon (I think at the Secretary's insistence) in order to attend a meeting with Quaison-Sackey at 3:45. Quaison-Sackey had met with Fedorenko earlier.

At the 3:45 meeting, it appeared that the Russians had become more reasonable on several counts:

1. They now are willing to have Quaison-Sackey take informal soundings from the members in order to ascertain whether Mali or Jordan have a majority for a contested Security Council seat. Earlier it had seemed the Russians might be willing to risk a vote. (There is a widespread feeling among the members that new Council members should take their seats before the end of the year on a "no objection" procedure. Actually, the Charter does not require this.)

2. The Russians are willing for the SYG to make a simple appeal to the GA for funds, but they are attempting, at the same time, to get the SYG to say that, when the GA reconvenes, business will proceed normally. This we cannot buy and we have said so--firmly. We would have to know that the Russians had paid--not merely pledged--enough to accept such language in the SYG's appeal.

3. The Russians also have agreed to allow the SYG to continue spending at the present level, on a "no objection" procedure, until the new budg-et can be voted on. They have said, however, that they will wish to record a reservation following the "no objection" procedure. This reservation presumably would have to do with expenditures for UNEF.

/2/December 30.

If you fly down with the Secretary, and should this subject arise, you might express strong suspicions about accepting pledges instead of cash from the Russians. I mention this because no one has been able to find out just where the Secretary stands and we are afraid he might be a bit soft on this one point.

In direct answer to your question about a head-count on the Article 19 matter, should it come to a vote within the next day or two, both the Department and New York believe we are still safe in getting an easy simple majority, but are increasingly less sure that we could get an easy 2/3 vote to support enforcement of Article 19. It is unclear just how much erosion there has been among the African states because of the Congo affair. The Department has asked New York today for a hard count and we should have their reply tomorrow.

SEB

Washington, December 28, 1964, 3:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Judd. The memorandum is Part I of II. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA

UK
The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Michael Stewart, British Minister

Lord Harlech said he had had a call from London. The British Government would like to know before tomorrow's discussion what the current attitude of the U.S. was on the Article 19 question. It seemed to HMG that if the Soviets maintained their present position of saying they would pay but not how much or when, this would be unsatisfactory from the British point of view. The problem would be holding the waverers in line.

The Secretary said that we had made major concessions to the Soviets. There had been some slight movement on their part as well. The major problem was how to get more time, perhaps two or three weeks, to try to get things settled. A plan was currently being discussed for an adjournment, perhaps combined with an appeal for voluntary contributions. The trouble was that a resolution was needed to provide funds for continuing operations, including UNEF. The Soviets might not let a "no-opposition" resolution go through. If not, we would have a nasty row on our hands.

Lord Harlech said he had the impression that the Soviets have been losing ground with the neutrals. Secretary Rusk replied that it did look that way but we would still prefer that Article 19 not come to a vote. However, we were not sure that the Nineteenth General Assembly could continue if the problem were not settled.

Lord Harlech asked if he was correct in assuming that the U.S. position was that ordinary business within the Assembly should not go on unless the Soviets made a payment of $17 million or more. The Secretary affirmed that this was our position. Lord Harlech then asked if the UN authorities were aware of how much the U.S. thought the Soviets should pay. The Secretary answered that neither Quaison-Sackey nor U Thant had mentioned to us any figure less than $17 million.

Washington, January 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Situation Report on the UN Financial Crisis

Harlan Cleveland spent the day with the Mission in New York yesterday drawing up plans for the period between now and January 18 when the GA is scheduled to reopen. With U Thant in the Virgin Islands and Quaison-Sackey in Palm Beach, it was agreed that we should begin this week to work hard bilaterally with the Russians in both Washington and New York. Stevenson and Plimpton have been in town today working out further details with the Department. The following views will be taken to the Secretary this afternoon:

It was agreed that we should begin immediately to destroy any hope on the part of the Afro-Asians that the Pazhwak Plan (which would set aside Article 19) will be acceptable to us.

/2/Circular telegram 1225, January 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4)

/3/January 13; see Document 328.

There also has been some discussion of requesting the President to intervene by sending a message to Kosygin. I have discouraged this, for the time being, on two counts: (1) the Department must once again, here and in posts abroad, make our position clear to the members of the Organization; (2) January 18, when the GA is scheduled to reconvene, is on the eve of the Inauguration and this is scarcely the time to involve the President personally in a confrontation with Russians.

On the assumption that the Russians do not pay up by January 18, my prediction is that the Afro-Asians again will find a way to avoid a confrontation with the Russians. This they could do either by postponing the opening of the GA until later (March 1 already has been mentioned) or by continuing to do what business they can do on a "no objection" basis. Neither course embues the Organization with very much nobility, but short of adequate Soviet payment, this is probably what will happen.

I also should add an encouraging note from the French Delegation (the Financial Counselor) who has said that the French intend to pay up. However, whether this intention is shared by De Gaulle remains a crucial unknown.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, January 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
UN Miscellany

Article 19: As you probably know from the press, the Committee of 12 (Afro-Asians) have called on the U. S. and the USSR to get together and solve the problem bilaterally. This is typical of this group who seem to become more and more uninformed on what is going on. U.S.-USSR bilaterals have been going on for the past ten months and are continuing still.

/2/January 5; no record of the meeting was found.

/3/See Document 325.

Both in New York and in a circular to all posts, we already are making a strong effort to knock down the Pazhwak Plan (the Afro-Asian formula for side-stepping Article 19). Another circular is being prepared instructing Ambassadors to make another d?marche to foreign ministers emphasizing our determination to apply Article 19 if adequate payments have not been made.

/4/For text of the briefing, see Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965. (Washington, GPO, 1990), pp. 1-34. According to The New York Times, January 7, Senator Fulbright, upon exiting the meeting, told reporters that Rusk had not been hopeful of resolving the Article 19 impasse.

There is no further word from the French.

/5/January 5; Stevenson's notes of the meeting are in Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. 8, pp. 667-668.

/6/Not attached. Replying to reporters questions following his meeting with the President, Stevenson commented that he intended to stay on at the United Nations through the end of the current General Assembly session and had not discussed his future with Johnson. On the Article 19 issue, he commented: "I think it would be well to avoid a confrontation on this, win or lose," adding that the U.S. position would win the support needed to prevail but its victory might not be as conclusive or unanimous as the United States would like. (Washington Star, January 6, 1965)

Stevenson is still determined to give a speech during the remaining part-about one week-of the general debate. The Department quite correctly is holding him off for now. This is a statement we will wish to examine closely if and when it is made.

SEB

New York, January 13, 1965, 8:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority.

2647. Article 19--Conversation with SYG. Stevenson, Plimpton and Noyes called on SYG, Bunche was present.

/2/The informal proposal was being circulated by the African-Asian group.

/3/In a handwritten note on the telegram, Belk commented, "Still no report of this meeting. SB"

/4/In an attached January 14 memorandum to Bundy, Belk commented: "The critical paragraph is number 3 where Stevenson badly erred. The Department (Sisco) quite rightly has told him that we cannot buy his position as stated for all the obvious reasons. The Department's position has been and continues to be that the amount contributed by each country must be made public."

4. SYG said his hunch was USSR would pledge less than $25.2 mil which was necessary. He didn't know how much less. Stevenson said if SYG was not satisfied, there would then be no bais for settlement, to which the SYG agreed.

5. Stevenson indicated our view that a simple appeal by the SYG would be a better procedure than a statement based on Algerian text. He thought SYG was probably right in estimating that USSR was not prepared to contribute enough to satisfy Art 19. SYG indicated there was also the problem of the French. In this connection he said they had instructions not to participate in any discussions or negotiations. If there were a system for whispering pledges, he felt it would have to apply to all the states subject to Art 19, since they would all have to be treated alike, to which Stevenson agreed.

6. Stevenson asked what we could do in present situation if there were no agreement. SYG replied that we would presumably have a showdown although there was talk of a postponement. Quaison-Sackey (GA Pres) was strongly opposed to postponement because it gave a picture of UN as a paralyzed, futile organization in the jaws of death. As a practical matter SYG thought there were many difficulties in working out a postponement until the next session on a no objection basis, and said there were ten important items which had to be dealt with, including assessments to the regular budget and UNEF, UN Institute, International School, ECOSOC elections, UNCTAD and UNWRA. SYG also pointed out a single state could destroy the whole plan by objecting to one or more of these actions being taken.

7. Stevenson said that postponement was not a wise course. We felt it would discredit the UN by indicating that it was unwilling to face the issue and to apply the Charter. It could also mean that we would have to get along without the Assembly in case of an emergency requiring UN peacekeeping activities. We had deferred confrontation since Dec 1 and now were in the same situation we were in then. We did not see any point to further delay. He understood full well that a confrontation was serious and might do damage to UN but we felt that postponement would also damage UN. Bunche interjected it seemed to be six of one and half dozen of another.

8. There was discussion of motives for USSR position. Stevenson indicated we thought their face could be saved by going along with any one of the proposed plans which had been put forward. Bunche expressed the view that issue was fundamental and was the same one that arose in the troika fight, i.e., whether the UN should be an action organization or not. Stevenson agreed and speculated that the USSR preferred to fight not on the question of future procedures where they were opposed by the majority, rather than on the question of Art 19 where they had some support from the AAs. Those AAs who supported the Pazhwak plan did not understand what was at stake. If Art 19 were not applied, all assessments would be put on a voluntary basis where everyone would pick and choose what he wished to support. Peacekeeping of UN would be seriously diminished, the organization would be discredited, and the implications were very serious.

9. Stevenson asked SYG his personal views as to what course should be followed. SYG said if arrangements could be made to dispose of the 10 essential items of business, he would personally prefer a postponement to a confrontation. He did not plan to press this position on others, however. There was a discussion whether a postponement to June 1 or to the fall would be preferable from this point of view. He agreed that the June 1 date would enable GA to proceed without a new budget, ECOSOC elections, UNWRA and perhaps other items. Stevenson said that while some might favor postponement to one of the other dates and it was arguable that smaller countries needed time to realize the full implications of the issue we faced, we felt it was better to go to a confrontation which we expected to win.

10. SYG indicated he preferred to talk to Fedorenko before recommending a course of action. He said the Russians had paid $3.5 mil more towards their 1964 regular budget assessments. It was agreed that this left about $21.7 mil which needed to be paid to satisfy Art 19. SYG said Turner (UN Controller) had asked him whether he would accept a pledge of payment over a two-year period if the amount was satisfactory. Stevenson said Soviet credit was good and if the payment was to be made in days or weeks this would be one thing if over a period of years, it would be more difficult. He thought it would be for SYG to decide. Plimpton pointed out that this would involve next year's assessment and that in interim before payment by SYG's books would show arrears beyond Art 19. It would take a GA decision to get any assessments off the books.

11. Stevenson said he was concerned that the USSR really wanted a showdown rather than that they were simply trying to save their face. He thought they hoped they might win on the issue and having won would produce a situation in which all assessments were voluntary and peacekeeping activities would have been eliminated except for those approved by the SC. They had been talking about voluntary contributions primarily to minimize AA reaction. SYG felt this was possible. Stevenson said if this was true state of affairs we faced a major crisis in which further documents and paper work would be useless. We had to face this crisis and we thought we could get a two-thirds vote. If we won we would have saved the structure of the organization. We could then be magnanimous about reaching a solution. If we lost the confrontation, the structure of the UN would be undermined. We had recognized in our proposal to the Russians that we needed new procedures for the future which did not involve enforcing peacekeeping assessments against major powers. We ought to be able to solve these problems if we could get over the immediate issue. He thought the AAs would also be willing to negotiate new arrangements for the future along the same lines.

12. Discussion returned to the Pazhwak plan. Plimpton indicated that we had been told that there was a firm understanding that contributions would be substantial. He had also been told by some members of the Comite of 12 it was part of their plan that private assurances would be given to the SYG as to the amounts and nature of the payments to be made by the states in arrears. SYG indicated he had never been informed of this fact.

13. Plimpton suggested that if no agreement could be reached on the Pazhwak plan, the SYG should make an appeal anyway on 18th. SYG said Fedorenko had earlier objected to his making an appeal unless it was in same terms as Pazhwak plan. Stevenson said he thought it would be difficult for USSR to disregard an honest plea from SYG. SYG did not commit himself but said he would get in touch after his discussion with Fedorenko.

Stevenson

Moscow, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USUN.

/2/Dated January 2, it reported on the contents of a 25-page letter from Khrushchev to President Johnson, December 31, 1964, regarding the use of force in the settlement of disputes. The letter was delivered on the morning of January 2 by Dobrynin to Rusk. The telegram summarized Rusk's initial response. (Ibid., POL 32-1) No instructions were transmitted in this telegram. Subsequently, circular telegram 1255, January 14, transmitted the draft text of a Johnson response and circular telegram 1254, January 14, provided instructions for its presentation. (Both ibid.)

Gromyko said he failed understand why Secretary should be disappointed since Sovs have accepted proposal of non-aligned nations which he felt was in line with Secretary's suggestion as to how problem might be solved made to Dobrynin before beginning GA. Sovs were prepared to make voluntary contribution but insisted that this should be purely voluntary and no one should tell the Sovs how much they should pay or purposes for which their contribution should be spent. Sovs felt strongly these matters their own business. Gromyko felt suggestions as to size of Sov contribution were both "unrealistic and ridiculous" and in any case represented wrong approach to problem. He felt US should recognize that the Soviet agreement non-aligned nations proposal represented major concession and hoped it could form basis for realistic solution of problem to permit us get on with discussion more important questions.

I said we recognized that both we and Sovs have made moves to reconcile strongly held positions of principle and each should recognize these as concessions by other side. This problem is to agree on a compromise solution which would permit both sides maintain substance their positions--i.e. Sovs position would be met by voluntary payment agreement and our position to be met by assurance that payment was sufficiently large obviate Article 19 application. Briefly our position is that the Sovs are entitled to decide the form they prepared to pay and objectives for which contribution should be spent but such sum must be large enough to meet arrearages problem.

Gromyko said obviously we in best position to know how our requirements can be met but equally the Sovs in best position to know how their requirements can be met. One thing is clear: "We know what we can do and what we can't do; we have made concession and we cannot go further." He admitted that the latest version of non-aligned nations proposal was not completely satisfactory to Sovs. They objected particularly to clause calling for "substantial" payment and provision that contribution would result in solvency of organization. Amended to meet these points the proposal would be acceptable. Gromyko felt US should stop raising impossible demands, agree to the substance of proposal and help to remove problem from agenda in order to permit us tackle really important questions either under UN aegis or in other channels. He would note that while President and Secretary speak of need to improve relations situation in UN is becoming aggravated and this somewhat inconsistent with professed aims US leadership. I noted that the latest version non-aligned resolution was not totally acceptable to US, particularly clause providing for suspension of Article 19. To US basic problem is to discover solution which would not violate position of principle either side. UN was drowning man but no use throwing preserver only half way.

Gromyko ended conversation by noting that it was Sovs who had life preserver and pointing out that he felt not much purpose carry on conversation since both sides could only repeat initial positions.

Kohler

Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on January 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part I of III.

SUBJECT
Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
The Undersecretary
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Ronald I. Spiers, EUR:RPM
Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands
Ambassador Carl W.A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador to the U.S.

/2/The text of U Thant's statement in the UN General Assembly, January 18, is in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations, U Thant, 1965-1967, pp. 27-29.

The Secretary said that we would be disappointed if this report were correct. Our position on this issue has not changed. Essentially we believe that the Soviets should come up with enough money by one means or another to avoid the voting problem. We do not see the outcome very clearly, and we do not know whether the Soviets, if they are outvoted, will stage a walkout. We do not believe, however, they would withdraw from UN membership.

Luns said that since his last talk with the Secretary the Dutch position had hardened. The Netherlands would not pay one dollar under any voluntary contributions formula. This would only serve to bail the Soviets out.

The Secretary noted that we and the Dutch had different assessments as to the outcome of a vote, and the Dutch and US delegations in New York were now comparing notes. He recalled that the US judgment was that the vote would be approximately 58-28-28. The Dutch estimate was less favorable.

Luns asked what the US position would be if a 2/3 vote were not achieved. The Secretary said that a severe view is taken of this issue, and at minimum support for the UN would become "voluntary" for everybody, including us. The General Assembly might be confronted with an amendment to the Charter explicitly removing the obligation in Article 17 and making an appropriate change in Article 19 in the event this question is unfavorably resolved.

Luns said that he had been giving this matter careful thought. He thought it would now be better for the UN to face a real test and that the Afro-Asians should feel the heat of this problem. This would be healthy for the organization in the long run. The Netherlands might elect, without reducing the amount it spends for technical assistance, to pay the same sums it now channels through the UN through other bodies. He asked what the US position would be if the Soviets, after winning a vote, paid their contribution voluntarily. The Secretary said the US would probably find some way to put proportionate amounts into a general fund, provided the Soviets "pay enough." This might be accomplished in part by canceling some bills due. Luns said that the Netherlands would not follow this course. The Secretary said this was a very disagreeable problem. If the UN's financial base is changed from a mandatory to a voluntary one, the result is certain to be resentment and uncertainty. Mr. Ball noted that the UN would have to be sustained by a succession of charity drives.

Luns noted that he disagreed with the point made by the Italian representative in the Western European group discussion in New York to the effect that a firm position could not be taken because of the French. The Secretary noted that the problem for France was only a matter of a million dollars, when possible refunds and reductions were considered.

Washington, January 18, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 142, Frames 506-509. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco on January 18.

SUBJECT
Session with Ambassador Stevenson on Article 19, 3:00 p.m. January 19th

/2/On January 2 President Sukarno announced in a speech that his nation was withdrawing from the United Nations.

On the other hand, the more likely situation is that once the Soviets have been denied the vote, the Assembly will be paralyzed by at least a walk-out, there will probably be appeals for the Soviets to return, there would probably not be any kind of a Soviet contribution, and the onus and the pressure will in considerable measure be on us. Of equal importance, Article 19 and the principle of collective financial responsibility will have been confirmed but without making progress on future arrangements to increase the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping and to set into train procedures designed not to deny the residual power of the Assembly but to promote the more responsible exercise of that power.

If we press the confrontation and lose the vote, in the words of Senator Frank Church, we will have the worst of both worlds and there will be a sharp diminution of support in this country for the UN. More important, the Johnson Administration will have taken a licking on a fundamental foreign policy issue just a few days after the Inaugural.

Our tentative voting estimate is 58 in favor of application of Article 19, 28 against, and 28 abstaining. USUN is making a final check of the accuracy of this estimate. This is too close and uncertain for us to be confident of winning the vote. Equally relevant is the question of whether we have the simple majority required to insist that a vote on the application of Article 19 be taken, even if we wanted confrontation now. USUN is not sure we have this simple majority, believing the pressure will be strong for postponement.

In these circumstances, I believe we should:

(a) Continue to maintain the posture in favor of applying Article 19; and

(b) Be prepared to acquiesce in an unprejudicial postponement, preferably until June, if a majority desires.

During the period of postponement we would then have to make a major effort in linking the past debts with future arrangements, even though prospects for an Agreement are admittedly very slim.

If it is agreed that we should proceed along the above lines, we should give advance notice to key members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees.

Before arriving at the above judgment, we have explored the following other options singly or in combination and found them wanting one way or another.

Ambassador Thompson has suggested we might promote or sponsor a General Assembly consensus or resolution which would declare that any future peacekeeping operations to which the major powers have not given their assent or acquiescence would be financed by voluntary means. Such a proposal could be given quietly to the Secretary General for negotiation or announced by Ambassador Stevenson in a general debate speech. This would get the Assembly as well as the American people focusing on future arrangements and help to get us away from the present "no-pay no-vote" straight-jacket we are in. Such an Assembly decision has the obvious advantage that we would be in no danger in the future of being assessed for a UN Force in the South Africa, the Portuguese Territories, or Cuba if established by a 2/3rds GA vote contrary to our wishes.

The difficulty is that this proposal is unlikely to work. It meets the Soviets only part way and therefore is not likely to result in a contribution to meet the Article 19 minimal limit. More important, it might well cause a crisis of confidence among our closest European and Latin American allies who, while not precluding such a proposal as the ultimate outcome of negotiations, would see this as a sharp reversal of our position in favor of Articles 19, 17 and collective financial responsibility and a move of weakness. Finally, it is unlikely that the Assembly would be willing to adopt this proposal, since a good many small countries would not distinguish between this proposal (which seeks to separate out the financial aspects) from the kind of proposals the Soviets have made intended to negate entirely the future power of the General Assembly in the peacekeeping field.

/3/None of the tabs is printed.

I have previously sent you a brief memorandum regarding this possibility (Tab B). While some awkward circumstances would result, it is technically feasible. Its weakness is that it would be a further retrogression from the position we have taken on Article 19 without any real prospect that this would in fact bring forward the required financial contribution from the USSR.

In order to avoid Article 19, the amount of payment required from the USSR was $26.5 million--$17 million for peacekeeping expenses and $9.5 million on the regular budget. In the last two weeks, the USSR has paid $4.9 million on the regular budget, which leaves a required payment of $21.6 million in order to escape Article 19. The UN Comptroller has been examining the availability of ONUC and UNEF surpluses, made up of the excess of these assessments over the actual obligations incurred, with the thought that the surpluses might be applied in some form to all UN members. Our estimate is that this could reduce the overall Soviet arrearage by a minimum of $2.2 million. If the Soviets were willing to make a substantial payment of about $20 million (which is still below the minimal figure it now owes in order to escape Article 19) it could contend that its contribution was not related to the removal in principle of the application of Article 19. The $2.2 million reduction could them be applied subsequently and thereby eliminate the Article 19 problem without the Soviets having made the minimal payment directly. While I see no objection to having the Secretariat explore this proposal, provided it is clearly understood it is not a US suggestion, my judgment is that it is unlikely the Soviets would be willing to make such a substantial contribution and lend itself to this kind of a bookkeeping device.

Washington, January 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Developments at the UN

/2/Reported in telegram 2876 from New York, January 25. (Ibid.)

/3/Churchill died January 24.

/4/Not found.

SEB

New York, February 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. No classification marking. The memorandum was given to Bill Moyers of the White House staff who forwarded it to President Johnson on February 5. (Memorandum from Moyers to Johnson, February 5; ibid.) The President passed the memorandum to Bundy. In a March 2 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented, "I don't think there is anything for us to do on this one right now." (Ibid.)

This a purely personal statement. The viewpoints are my own. U Thant has not been consulted about it, nor is he aware of it. The same applies to Adlai Stevenson.

The plight of the United Nations today is desperate; its future is gravely threatened. Never in its history has the Organization been in such dire trouble, the representatives of its Member States so frustrated or its effectiveness so diminished. This critical situation must be weighed against the indispensability of the United Nations if peace is to be saved and the world is to survive in civilized form.

The salient facts of the deep United Nations crisis over the arrears in payments and Article 19 of the Charter are the following:

1) The General Assembly has been in session for two months but has been unable to take up any of the urgent work on its agenda. Consequently, the United Nations has already suffered a severe loss in both effectiveness and prestige throughout the world; and it could be reduced before long, if the present impasse continues, to a completely ineffectual body which would sooner or later wither away.

2) The conviction is growing, I believe rapidly, amongst the Members of the United Nations that there is very little basis for hope that an accommodation can be achieved on the issue of the arrears and the application of Article 19 through negotiations at the ambassadorial level here at the United Nations. This unavoidably leads to the conclusion that only the President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union, acting either separately or in direct communication as in the case of the Cuban crisis, can resolve the difficulty and thereby save the United Nations.

3) Although the problem itself is important in terms of principle and morality, of Charter interpretation and application, it does not affect directly any vital security, political or economic interest of the United States as, for example, Cuba, nuclear testing or Panama would and did, or of France and the Soviet Union.

4) After prolonged negotiation, the specific issue on which the future of the United Nations now depends is the following:

The Russians, although refusing to admit any legal obligation to pay the special assessments for the United Nations peace-keeping operation in the Congo and in Gaza-Sinai, have stated a willingness to make a substantial voluntary contribution of an unspecified amount which, however, would not be pledged or paid until the General Assembly actually resumes its "usual procedure" (meaning voting) and until assurance is given that the question of the applicability of Article 19 will not be raised during the current session of the General Assembly. But they flatly refuse to disclose to anyone beforehand the amount they intend to contribute. They say to do so would be submitting to unacceptable "pressure".

The United States, on its part, refuses to accept as good enough the Soviet promise of a contribution, even though publicly declared, since no indication is given of the amount to be contributed and no assurance is provided as to when anything will be paid. The United States insists that at least the Secretary-General and/or the President of the General Assembly must be informed of the amount which the Soviet Union intends to pay and must determine this to be satisfactory in the context of Article 19 before any voting can take place in the General Assembly without Article 19 being invoked. The United States, as Adlai has put it, doesn't take to the idea of buying a "pig in a poke."

Almost everyone at the United Nations, Delegates and Secretariat officials alike, has been seeking intensively to find a way out of this dilemma with, regretfully, no success.

I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind about the soundness, legal and moral, of the United States position on Article 19. I have great doubts, however, that the United States position can attract enough votes in the General Assembly to sustain it conclusively. This is because it is almost certain that many member states will abstain on a show-down vote, even though they accept the United States interpretation of Article 19 and are sympathetic to the American position. They would be motivated, I believe, not by lack of courage or principle, but by a conviction that if France and the USSR and other financial delinquents should be actually deprived of their vote under Article 19, they would walk out of the Assembly if not the entire Organization, rather than pay up their delinquencies under what they would consider to be conditions of duress and humiliation. This would reduce the General Assembly, and possibly the whole Organization, to futility, since it would no longer be representative of the main groups of powers in the world.

The membership of the United Nations, of course, is sharply divided over the proper interpretation of Article 19, with a significant number, including France and the Soviet Union, vigorously opposing the American interpretation of the Article. It is not, therefore, an open and shut case.

The United States has made important concessions on the issue. It has gone along with two postponements of the Assembly. It did not force the issue at the outset of the Assembly's session and permitted it to get partially organized and under way through actions by consensus, acclamation and informal procedure. The United States does not demand actual Soviet payment in advance of the resumption of the formal voting, if a formal pledge of an adequate size is made. It is not insisting that the Soviet Union pay up to the very last cent of its arrears. The United States has also declared its wish to avoid a confrontation on this issue.

The Soviet Union contends that it also has made important concessions, but can go no further. Soviet spokesmen assert that the original Soviet position, as stated emphatically to U Thant by Mr. Khrushchev himself last August, was that the Soviet Union would pay "not one kopek" to the United Nations for the "illegal" United Nations peace-keeping operations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union agreed to make a voluntary contribution for an amount which would not be disclosed until the Assembly resumed its normal procedure. Later still, the Soviet Representative indicated that this would be a substantial contribution; and then announced it publicly. A Soviet contribution of any amount in this context does, it would appear, compromise the original Soviet position. He also agreed to the postponements of the Assembly and he claims to wish to avoid a confrontation on the issue.

There are not a few at the United Nations who reason that the present paralysis of the General Assembly suits quite well the inner policies of the Soviets in that they have always favored the Security Council with its veto over the Assembly, and therefore they could be only happy at seeing the United States at least sharing the blame for the Assembly's plight, if not taking the major part of it.

Contrary to popular notion, no formidable sums of money are involved. The United Nations indebtedness to Governments and for replenishing the Working Capital Fund, other than the unamortized principal of the United Nations Bonds, amounts to 86.7 million. Of this amount, $6,642,000 is owed to the United States, principally for the Congo operation. A contribution of $21.7 million from the Soviet Union would meet the existing requirements of Article 19. This is not primarily a financial problem, therefore, although because of the impasse over this issue of Article 19 the United Nations is in most serious financial shape.

It is tragic that the bright future of the United Nations should thus be darkened by an issue that derives from its past. The arrears relate primarily to the huge Congo operation, which is over, since the United Nations Force left the Congo at the end of last June. The Gaza-Sinai Force remains, but is not very costly. There is ample reason to believe that agreement between the United States and the USSR on future peace-keeping operations and their financing could be reached in time once the issue of the arrears on past operations would be settled. France, presumably, would then come along, albeit reluctantly.

In the prevailing circumstances, there would seem, on this issue to be mainly the following courses of action open to the United States Government:

a) To proceed to a direct confrontation on the issue in the Assembly, bearing in mind, however, that any clear-cut "show-down" on this issue is unlikely since it is certain to become enmeshed in an endless and acrimonious procedural wrangle, with confusion compounded by the injection into the debate of a multitude of inefficacious proposals for solution of which there is already a profusion. Moreover, the voting, when ultimately reached, would almost certainly be inconclusive in resolving the issue, which-ever way it went--and it might well go against the United States because of the necessity of mustering a two-thirds vote.

b) To accept, although not initiate, another extended postponement which, however, may not hold much promise while holding the United Nations up to ridicule, unless the purpose would be to afford an opportunity for a direct appeal to the President of the United States and to the leaders of the Soviet Union to collaborate in finding a solution.

c) To adopt a possible "summit" approach to the Soviet Union, with a view to a dialogue between the President and the Soviet leaders, as there was between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis.

d) To test the good faith of the Soviet Union on its promise of a substantial contribution by announcing a willingness, in the interest of preserving the United Nations and reviving the General Assembly, to accept the Soviet announcement of their intention at its face value and act accordingly. This would mean agreeing, before the Soviet contribution is actually made or formally pledged, not to invoke Article 19 for the rest of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. There would, naturally, be those who would decry such a course as a "surrender" to the Soviet Union, particularly if the Soviet contribution should then turn out to be not substantial enough to be satisfactory in the context of Article 19. But there would be many others, including, I believe, the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Organization, who would consider this to be an act fully justified by its purpose of salvaging the international organization, and who would see it as a gesture of magnanimity and statesmanship worthy of the richest and most powerful country in the world. There can also be little doubt that the Soviet Union would be the target of severe disfavor from the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations should it not then live up to the expectations aroused by its promise to contribute.

In taking such a step, the United States could, in fact, largely cover and safeguard its position on Article 19 by an explanatory statement which could include all necessary reservations and which could emphasize that from the beginning the sole purpose of the United States in raising the issue of Article 19 has been to protect the Charter and the strength of the Organization in its peace-keeping role, and that its present step is a continuation of this policy. At the worst, the United States would be holding up on Article 19 only until September, when the next session of the General Assembly convenes. The principle of collective financial responsibility should, naturally, be strongly reasserted. The supporters of the United States position would need to be consulted so as to avoid any feeling by them that they were being "let down".

Fully recognizing the risks in pursuing this latter course, I would nevertheless think it worthy of serious consideration.

The United Nations unquestionably has been, and will be further, weakened because some of its members fail to meet their Charter obligations by refusing to pay some of the assessments due. But the very nature and existence of the United Nations is rooted in the fact that some states, members as well as non-members, cannot always be relied upon for good and honorable conduct. The "good guys" seem always to carry more than their share in any organization or institution, domestic and international alike. Moreover, it is only realism to face the fact that a United Nations, even with some delinquent members, particularly if these should be France and the Soviet Union, is still preferable by far to no United Nations at all, or to an ineffective one, as it would surely be without those two countries.

The domestic political repercussions to the suggested course would probably be strong, at least for a while. For even in the United States today, magnanimity can be mistaken for weakness and statesmanship for lack of nerve. In this case, however, so much is at stake that risks of some kind are not only inescapable but justifiable. After all, twenty years of achievement and advance in international organization and order, as well as the future effectiveness of the United Nations, are in serious jeopardy over an issue which does not directly affect the vital interests of any of the countries mainly concerned.

It would not avail very much to save the Charter and lose the Organization.

Ralph J. Bunche

Washington, February 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Virginia Hartley (IO/UNP) on February 5. Handwritten annotations on the memorandum read: "Very interesting JJ [Sisco]" and "Might be useful to have this document translated into form usable for educating Hill and public. But it raises question--'How and when did we get into our extreme position?'"

SUBJECT
Background on the Financing of UN Operations

We have recently made a new search of our early files to see if there is any additional light that can be thrown on the thinking with respect to the financing of UN operations in the peace and security field at the time the Charter was drafted.

We have found nothing that would in any way tend to invalidate the Court's Advisory Opinion or acceptance of this opinion by the Assembly (with U.S. concurrence). Neither, however, have we found anything indicating that the "Founding Fathers" actually contemplated the financing of such operations through the budgetary powers of the Assembly. Rather, it appears, there was not any real consideration of this question. In connection with the Article 19 impasse and your interest in how we handle forthcoming Congressional consultations on the subject, the following analysis of early Charter developments relating to this question may be helpful.

Strangely enough, at no time were the budgetary arrangements for the future organization a matter of serious controversy or lengthy consideration by the Department, by the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, or in connection with ratification. Discussion in the Department prior to Dumbarton Oaks revolved almost entirely around whether the League precedent should be followed and all budgetary powers vested in the Assembly or whether these powers should be shared with the Council. This question was resolved by providing, in the U.S. Proposals at Dumbarton Oaks, for a system of weighted voting in the Assembly on budgetary matters. However, we did not press this proposal at Dumbarton Oaks, and the question of budgetary arrangements presented no problem there. Similarly there appears to have been practically no discussion at all of budgetary matters by the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, despite the fact that two members of the House of Representatives (and two Senators) were on the Delegation. Nor did the question of the Assembly's budgetary power arise in the Big Five consultations during the Conference. In the Department's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with ratification, the Assembly's powers under Article 17 are noted but not elaborated on and gave rise to no questions from the Committee members.

Budgetary discussions at the San Francisco Conference itself centered around whether the method of apportionment should be specified in the Charter, whether the method of preparing and examining the budget should be specified in the Charter, and whether a penalty should be provided for members that failed to meet their financial obligations, (which the League Covenant had not done). Given the fact that any operation involving substantial numbers of troops is bound to be costly, this general lack of concern on the part of the U.S. and others with the financing of such operations can only be explained in terms of the difference between the powers of the Assembly and of the Security Council and in the context of Article 43.

The only discussion of use by the Organization of armed force was in connection with preventive and enforcement measures undertaken by decision of the Security Council. While the Assembly was given residual powers of a recommendatory nature in the peace and security field, on which it was later possible to build the Uniting for Peace procedure, there is nothing in the early record to indicate that it was ever contemplated that the Assembly would undertake, on a recommendatory basis, actual military operations even of a peacekeeping character. Therefore, we can only conclude that the possibility was not foreseen that Assembly recommendations involving costly operations might be given a mandatory character so far as their financing involved the Assembly's power to assess. So long as the use of armed force was thought of solely in the context of Security Council action, where the veto applied, the United States and the other great powers had no reason to be concerned about the financial implications for them of such action.

This safeguard was reinforced for the great powers and extended to other members by Article 43 of the Charter which made the actual provision of "armed forces, assistance, and facilities" to the Council contingent upon the subsequent conclusion of "a special agreement or agreements" between the Council and Members or groups of Members subject to ratification by the signatory states. The legislative history of this article seems to indicate that the question of the financing of any military operation by the Security Council was also deferred pending the conclusions of these agreements.

The US Proposals at Dumbarton dealing with the provision of forces stated that the Council "should be empowered to call upon the member states for economic, financial, and commercial and other assistance necessary to support and to supplement international action involving the use of armed force", and that member states should undertake to give such assistance, "the terms to be determined in consultation between the executive council and member states." This provision is dropped in the Proposals as agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks but the paragraph dealing with the special agreement or agreements, which in the original US proposal referred only to "forces and facilities" now refers to "forces, facilities and assistance" as it does in Article 43 of the Charter.

The original US proposals also stated that members should agree "to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in security measures involving the use of armed force instituted by the executive council." This provision is broadened in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and in the Charter (Article 49) to declare the members should (shall in the Charter) "join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council". Thus, while the principle of common responsibility for collective action was recognized, there appears to have been no effort made to spell out exactly how the burden of such action was to be shared. The only amendment offered at San Francisco was South Africa's unsuccessful proposal to put the burden on the aggressor state.

An interpretative statement by a Canadian Delegate at San Francisco declares that in his opinion it was not possible to draft a text on the payment of the costs of enforcement action that could lay down definite rules for application in all types of cases that might arise. He thought Article 49 quoted above and Article 50 (providing for recourse to the Council in the event of "special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures") "taken together would permit arrangements to be made for sharing the costs of enforcement action among the members if this proved desirable. Otherwise an inequitable financial burden might be placed on certain members who were acting on behalf of the Organization."

In reading this statement it must be borne in mind that when the Charter was drafted it was thought that the principal burden of any enforcement action would fall on the five permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, under the Charter, decisions of the Security Council are to be carried out by all members or only some members as the Council may decide and carried out by the members "directly."

The contemplated Article 43 agreements have never been concluded but the UN action in Korea, of all UN actions to date, seems most closely to approach the type of enforcement action contemplated in the drafting of the Charter. Here the United States controlled the action and paid the lion's share of the costs. The idea of trying to assess the UN membership generally for the costs of the Korean operation was never contemplated, since members participating in the action were doing so on the basis of a recommendation of the Security Council, not a decision (in the absence of Article 43 agreements). Had the Assembly's budgetary powers been generally recognized as clearly extending to the costs of the Korea action, it seems unlikely that the US would have willingly assumed such a large share of the costs or that John Foster Dulles, who played an active role at San Francisco, in answering criticism of the Korea action in the Foreign Relations Committee, would have said:

". . . If, for instance, the expense of that could be spread over the United Nations in the same way that the budget is met, or something of that sort, some formula might be found so that if an emergency came, nations could act knowing that that would not necessarily involve them in an expense which they could not foresee, or perhaps could not bear if they did foresee it."

From the above it seems clear (1) that, as originally contemplated, preventive or enforcement action under a Security Council decision was not to be financed through the Assembly's power of assessment, and (2) that preventive (peacekeeping) or enforcement action under an Assembly recommendation was not contemplated at all and that therefore no thought was given to the financing of such action. On this basis, it might be argued that although the Assembly does have the power to assess under Article 17, to consider this power mandatory in the case of the costs of operations undertaken on the basis of an Assembly recommendation is within the letter but goes beyond the original intent of the Charter. This would apply in the economic and social as well as the peace and security fields.

February 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Stevenson, Tape 65.06, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. The President was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York City. There is no indication of the time of the conversation. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

LBJ: Yeah.

AES: Hello?

LBJ: Yeah, yeah.

AES: --and we're not going to have to ask you whether-to take any political heat because there isn't any. . .

/2/Document 332.

AES: Well, the trouble with that is . . .

LBJ: . . .tell him I'm just as distressed as he is.

/3/No record of a February 5 telephone call or meeting was found. However, according to the President's Daily Diary, Stevenson and Johnson met on February 4 at the White House between 12:19 and 12:24 p.m. "The President and Mrs. Johnson presented him a small cake, decorated with one candle, reading, 'Happy Birthday Adlai.'" (Johnson Library) No further record of this meeting was found.

/4/All brackets in the source text.

LBJ: Well, you know the situation there better than I do. Let me transfer you and you dictate this memo. I've got a group here . . .

AES: I will, I will, Mr. President.

Moscow, February 6, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to New York and passed to the White House.

/2/Dated February 6, it read: "I agree with Ambassador Stevenson conclusion no point pursuing UN finance question further with Gromyko here. Personally feel forward prospects for agreed solution negative and showdown in UNGA better now than after adjournment present session without settlement this question." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2)

On further reflection and after rereading entire file recent messages on Article 19 exercise, I have come to conclusion that perhaps we should make final high-level approach to Sovs before showdown in GA, not in Moscow but in Washington. I continue to believe, as indicated reftel, that postponement is not in our interest and obviously in putting suggestion outlined below I assume we are both willing and able block any GA ground swell in favor of postponement.

/3/Dated February 5; it reported on Stevenson's discussions with Fedorenko regarding a compromise on the Article 19 issue. (Ibid.)

I suggest, therefore, that Secretary may wish to summon Dobrynin in final effort break log-jam. At such meeting, I would think it essential that Dobrynin be told unequivocally that Sovs have choice between fair settlement (on terms put by Stevenson) or showdown with inevitable implications for our bilateral relations and that they must make up minds without delay. Posing problem in this way could not be read by Sovs as weakness and while approach may net us nothing it may conceivably smoke out ultimate Sov position.

Kohler

Washington, February 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret. Bundy wrote "Good work" at the top of the memorandum.

SUBJECT
Article 19

The following reports on Article 19 events over the past few days and indicates where we now seem to be heading:

/2/February 3.

/3/None of the tabs was found attached.

/4/Reported in telegram 3059 from New York, February 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2)

/5/See footnote 3, Document 334.

/6/Telegram 1945 to New York, February 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2)

/7/See footnote 3, Document 335.

/8/See footnote 2, Document 335.

/9/Document 335.

5. As of noon on Saturday (before the second cable from Kohler), State's rough guess for the future scenario was as follows:

(a) On Monday (February 8), the Assembly will convene at 3:00 P.M. The Secretary General will recommend that the General Assembly take action, by the "no objection" procedure, on 4 or 5 items (e.g., elections to fill 6 vacancies in ECOSOC; appeals for payments towards the 1965 budget).

(b) The Assembly will then probably recess for a few days. During this period 2 items will be thrashed out: First, the General Assembly will have to decide on how long the adjournment should be. If there must be an adjournment, we, the Latinos, and West Europeans are generally in favor of a short adjournment with a specific end in sight (May 1); we want to keep pressure on the Russians. U Thant seems to prefer to not set a date. The Africans, who once seemed to want a short adjournment, now seem to be favoring a longer adjournment; they feel that it will cost too much money to meet in May, go home, and then come back again for the fall session. The Russians probably don't care as between May or September; their primary concern (as is ours) is to not get tagged with the blame for causing the adjournment. Second, the group will have to decide on the type of forum to be used to carry on the talks about Article 19. The Western group prefers that the Committee of 21 take on the Article 19 problem--because the membership could simply not be better from our point of view. For roughly the same reasons, the Soviets prefer to have Article 19 discussions held in a smaller group.

/10/The General Assembly adjourned its work on February 18 and set September 1 for renewal of its discussions. No agreement had been reached on the Article 19 dispute.

GC

Washington, February 12, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Eyes Only. Pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum are dated February 13.

SUBJECT
Article 19, Harlan Cleveland, and Meeting with President

Early this week I went over to State to meet Harlan Cleveland. We talked at some length about Article 19. I think the following represents the bare-bones of his present thinking on the subject, which, in general, still seems to be quite fluid.

1. If there were a confrontation at the UN, we could get our 2/3 majority and win it. It is, of course, debatable whether we "win" if we take away the Soviet Union's vote.

2. The important point, however, is that a confrontation will never take place. The GA will simply not give us the majority of votes we need to get to the point of having one. (Dick Gardner, to whom I spoke later in the week, disagrees. He feels that, by September, the Afro-Asians will see that the GA is being hamstrung indefinitely, and will probably be willing to face a confrontation.)

3. Interminable postponements suit the Russians just fine. In effect, it makes the General Assembly a "no power" unit and leaves all the power with the Security Council; this, of course, is what the Russians have wanted all along. On the other hand, interminable postponements don't suit us--we want the GA to have a peace-keeping function.

4. How do we get out of our dilemma? One possibility--we let the present impasse continue for a while and then make a unilateral statement to the effect that if the GA is not willing to enforce compulsory contributions from its reluctant members, then we, too, will have to work on a voluntary contribution basis. While we would say this in sadness, in fact, this voluntary system, once achieved, has a distinct silver lining. First, a voluntary system will make it easier for international development and international peace-keeping operations to be undertaken; put another way, getting everybody to participate in UN operations is possible only at the costs of drastically limiting the size and scope of UN operations and of limiting such operations to those which the Soviets are prepared to back. Second, a voluntary system will allow us to avoid paying for a UN operation to which we fundamentally object.

5. If we decide to go ahead on this tack, we are faced with some tactical problems. For example:

(a) Won't the Hill say that we've caved to the Russians? Probably--but there would be several mitigating factors. First, there is a strong feeling on the Hill that no one wants to see the UN bust up for "a lousy $20 million bucks." Second, a system of voluntary contributions will be very appealing to some. Senator Lauche, for instance, is always throwing up the bugaboo that the UN, some fine day, is going to force us into some peace-keeping venture to which we fundamentally object.

These built-in mitigating factors plus a series of strong consultations with appropriate Congressmen to argue the logic of points 1-4 above could make the Hill problem a tolerable one.

(b) What about the American public? We would probably have to begin quietly playing a somewhat different tune than we have been playing (no more--"put the Russians' feet to the fire"). It is pertinent to note that the same built-in factors which will tend to mitigate Congressional reaction against a caving on Article 19 and a system of voluntary contributions will also mitigate the public's reaction to it.

6. In closing, Harlan indicated that a meeting with the President on this subject and on other basic UN subjects might be useful. For one thing, it might be good to expose the President to some of the above-type argumentation; this has not yet been done. For another thing, with his long parliamentary experience, the President might have a real contribution to make on this problem, which involves a parliament in New York and a parliament on the Hill.

7. My view--From a couple talks that I have had in IO, I get the sense that the people there feel that the UN is at an important crossroads (e.g. power of the GA vis-?-vis the SC; the balance of power in the UN between little and big nations); that the President is not entirely up on these issues; and that, in general, he is not being exposed enough to non-Adlai-type UN thinking.

While I have no real way of knowing the state of the President's UN education, I am persuaded that there are in the air some important basic UN issues and that it might be well for the President to put aside an hour, sometime during the next couple weeks, to hear about these issues and the possible U.S. options for dealing with them. If you agree, I think the first step is to get informally from State a clear idea of exactly what the substance of such a meeting with the President would be. We can then decide whether or not we want to go through with it.

GC

/2/Bundy checked this option.

Let's leave it alone for now.

Ambassador Stevenson and Secretary General U Thant discussed the possibility of a Security Council meeting on the Vietnam issue on February 16. The U.S. Permanent Representative sought to discourage the idea of a public discussion at that point. In a February 17 memorandum to the President, Stevenson outlined his talks with U Thant and suggested alternative means to utilize the United Nations to advance the search for a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam crisis. The Stevenson-U Thant memorandum of conversation and the Stevenson memorandum to the President are printed in the Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. 8, pages 700-704. Additional documentation relating to the Secretary General's role in the Vietnam crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume I, Document 427, and ibid., volume II, Documents 161 and 164.

Washington, February 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
U.S. Pledge to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund

/2/President Johnson checked the approve option.

While most other countries previously contributing to these programs have announced their pledges for 1965, the U.S. deferred making its pledge, pending developments with respect to the resolution of the UN constitutional and financial crisis. Now that the General Assembly has recessed without prejudice to the application of Article 19, I believe that we should go ahead with our pledge of up to $60 million. These funds are available within the FY 1965 appropriation in the A.I.D. program for voluntary contributions to international organizations.

Any further delay in the pledge is likely to produce a considerable amount of disorder in the implementation of technical assistance projects already underway. It will likewise inhibit the program planning process of the Special Fund. I believe that the point has been made that the United States should not be taken for granted. I feel that any further delay will only complicate our position rather than helping it.

Dean Rusk

Washington, March 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
U.S. Pledge to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund

/2/February 27.

/3/Document 339.

2. With the General Assembly adjourned and with the Article 19 discussions deferred, I agree that we probably have to go ahead with the pledge. At the same time it might be worthwhile to emphasize to State that they should be careful to explain this one publicly in such a way as to minimize the possibility of a charge that our pledge means that we have given up on Article 19. Accordingly, unless you have any objections, I will pass this word to State if and when you get the President's approval on the Rusk memorandum.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

TDCS DB-315/00729-65

New York, March 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations

DATE OF INFO.
Late February 1965

SUBJECT
1. Activities Affecting the United Nations
2. Views of the United Nations Secretary General and Assembly President on Chances for a Successful Negotiation of UN Financial Problem

PLACE & DATE ACQ.
1 March 1965

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

[8 lines of source text not declassified]

1. United Nations General Assembly President Alex Quaison-Sackey and Secretary General U Thant are currently wondering if the newly-formed United Nations Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations (Committee of 33) will be able to operate effectively in the atmosphere created by the Vietnam crisis. United States military operations in Vietnam seem to be bringing about a hardening of the Soviet attitude toward the United States. The situation appears to be getting worse despite the fact that the United States made a major concession to the Soviets by agreeing to exclude Nationalist China from participation on the Committee.

2. U Thant and Quaison-Sackey originally planned to contact personally the French, Soviet, British and United States permanent missions to the United Nations in order to lay a solid groundwork for the Committee of 33 prior to the Committee's meetings. However, U Thant and Quaison-Sackey now feel that in view of the Vietnam crisis, it is pointless to approach the Soviet Union because the Soviets will probably not be very cooperative. Under these circumstances, Quaison-Sackey and U Thant feel that the Committee of 33 will not accomplish anything. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Comment: According to the intermediate source, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] heard that an unknown country has already advised U Thant and Quaison-Sackey that the Soviets will not be receptive to any approaches on peace-keeping matters at this time.)

3. Field Dissem: Sent USUN.