U.S. Department of State

Washington, March 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
UN-Miscellaneous

1. Article 19--Preliminary thinking seems to be that the best way to get out of the present financial crisis is to set up a voluntary fund to collect about $105 million (i.e., the UN owes member governments about $45 million; about $40 million is owed to the Working Capital fund; the cost of UNEF this year will be about $20 million). While this fund will not be ostensibly related to the Article 19 problem, the Article 19 problem will be avoided if the Russians come through with at least $20 million. The chances are about 50-50 that the Russians will come through. In any event, the establishment of such a voluntary fund is probably the best way to build up pressure on the Soviets.

The best guess as to the scenario over the next couple months is as follows: First, the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly would meet individually and informally with members of the Big Four and with other key parties. These key parties would agree to the establishment of a voluntary fund; even the Russians would have a hard time refusing. Second, the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly would then propose to the Working Group (the 33-member monstrosity set up to deal with Article 19) that a fund be established. Third, the Working Group, by mid-April, would have studied the proposal and reported back favorably on it. Fourth, the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly would then make a pitch to members for voluntary contributions.

The fund concept might have implications for future peacekeeping operations. For the future, however, we might conceivably want to depart from the voluntary concept and go for a different format in building up the fund--e.g., a combination of voluntary contributions and assessments.

2. Chairmanship of UN Day and Presidential Proclamation--State will be sending over to the White House, at the end of the week, a Presidential proclamation regarding UN Day (in October) and an announcement regarding the appointment of Robert Benjamin as Chairman of UN Day (already approved; Benjamin notified).

3. Charter Amendments--State is still working on a Presidential Message regarding charter amendments. I expect to get a copy of the draft message Tuesday. The problem--When to send the Message to the Hill?

/2/Labouisse left Greece on May 8.

/3/The International Cooperation Year, designated as 1965 by the General Assembly on November 21, 1963. For text of G.A. Res. 1907 (XVIII), see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, pp. 117-118.

GC

Washington, March 11, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
UN Problems

/2/March 12.

/3/Not further identified.

1. State will recommend that you transmit to the Senate, for ratification, the first amendments to the UN Charter since 1945. The amendments, primarily of benefit to the Afro/Asians, would enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 Members and ECOSOC from 18 to 27 Members.

2. In support of the substantive case, State will probably cite such factors as the following: First, the UN has grown from 51 to 114 Members in the past 20 years and the new Members demand more adequate representation. Second, the U.S. has consistently supported enlargement since the matter was first raised in 1956. Third, if there is no enlargement, the Afro/Asians will increasingly "raid" W. European and Latin American seats in the two organizations. Fourth, the new voting alignment in the Security Council will not differ materially from the present line-up and is probably the best we can get. As for ECOSOC, while the alignment could be better, we are not really worried, especially in view of the fact that all ECOSOC can do is make recommendations.

2. State, in discussing the tactical side of this issue, will recommend that you send the amendments to the Senate in early spring. First, the General Assembly, which adopted the amendments in December, 1963, has set a target of September 1, 1965, for ratification by Members. Second, ratification by other countries is proceeding apace. 60 of the necessary 76 have already ratified; of the Permanent Members of the Security Council (all of whom must ratify), the Russians have reversed their previous position, primarily because of Afro/Asian pressure, and have ratified; the British are willing but, out of courtesy, are presently waiting for us; the Chinese and French, in the end, will also probably ratify. Third, if we fail to submit the amendments to the Senate this spring, we are likely to bear exclusive blame for delaying the coming into force of the amendments and for the Afro/Asian "raids" which are likely to ensue. Fourth, there is bound to be a debate on the Hill this year about the UN; the Charter amendments in the Senate provide a better framework for this debate than, say appropriations in the House. Fifth, recent consultations indicate that the Senate will probably ratify the amendments.

3. State will probably also want to brief you on the Article 19 situation. Present thinking seems to be that the best way out of the present financial crisis is to set up a voluntary fund to collect about $100 million. While this fund will not ostensibly be related to the Article 19 problem, the Article 19 problem will be avoided if the Russians come through with a sufficiently substantial contribution. Some say the chances are about 50-50 that the Russians will come through. In any event, the establishment of such a fund is probably the best way to build up pressure on the Soviets between now and the reconvening of the 19th General Assembly on September 1.

If the Soviets do not pay enough, we must then face the issue of whether or not to try and apply Article 19 when the Assembly convenes in September. Since experience in the last session showed that practically no one wants a confrontation, our wisest course in September might be simply to indicate (a) that this is a decision for the Assembly to make, (b) that we hope the Assembly will uphold its mandatory financial authority and impartially apply Article 19, and (c) that, if the sense of the Assembly is otherwise, we will draw the consequences for our own future contributions. In short, we would not invoke Article 19 and assume no one else would do so.

McG.B.

Washington, March 12, 1965, 8:19 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, International Year of Human Rights. Confidential. Drafted by Louise McNutt of IO on March 10; cleared in IO, EA, SEA, FE, SPA, ACA, AF, and EUR; and approved by Marshall Green (FE). Sent to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Vientiane, and repeated to Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, and USUN.

1682 1. Dept. has under consideration proposal for establishment new UN post of High Commissioner for Human Rights (HC). It envisaged that HC would be in position remedy current imbalance in UN consideration human rights issues. Presently most of almost all focus is on racial discrimination. Little attention given progress we have made or to human rights violations other fields, such as Soviet treatment Jews. Moreover HC might be able to highlight violations in closed societies which by their very nature do not get same attention as human rights problems free world.

Character incumbent any such post obviously crucial to above purposes. Plan calls for him be nominated by SYG and confirmed by GA for term of possibly 5 years. It also proposed that SYG choose network of 10-20 experts in all parts world who would report to and assist HC as appropriate.

2. Functions of HC would be three fold. Firstly prepare annual report to Human Rights Commission (and thence to ECOSOC and GA) on situation on human rights in states members of UN system. Report would be based on variety of sources, governmental, reports from UN specialized agencies, info from UN Secretariat, contributions from correspondents, communications from non-governmental organizations, writings of recognized scholars and experts and other public sources.

In order safeguard member states it planned that prior publication HC's report governments would have reasonable time comment on reference to their countries. Also report would follow outline articles in Universal Declaration Human Rights in order avoid undue concentration any one country. Moreover HC would not make on-spot-investigations (unless invited by State concerned) nor would he hold hearings or initiate queries to governments.

Secondly it is planned that HC would assist SYG in "critical situations" and give advice both on "human rights aspects of peacekeeping" and on economic and social development programs.

Finally he would be available at SYG's direction, to provide his good offices on request from member states.

3. As presently conceived plan does not cover situation in unrecognized Communist regimes. On other hand such coverage, while bringing within HC's purview some of worst offenders human rights, would raise problems for ChiRep and other representation issues since extension HC's scope might involve communications between UN and regimes and efforts have regimes participate in any discussions relating their areas. Precedent thus created for other bodies.

4. It of course not at all certain that proposal would eventually emerge in above form or with presently sought safeguards. It also possible Soviets and/or militant neutralists might seek mold this idea or use it to detriment free world in order deflect attention from situation in their own countries.

At same time it probable that if US does not take such initiative, others will; specifically at forthcoming meeting UN Commission on Human Rights opening March 22. If plan approved by Commission, it would then have be considered in ECOSOC and by GA before being put into effect.

/2/In telegram 2261 to USUN, March 20, the Department of State authorized the Mission to the United Nations to support the proposal for a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (Ibid.)

Rusk

Washington, March 19, 1965, 4:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10.

/2/Albert Bender of USUN.

/3/Not found.

We are deeply concerned that nothing come out of Committee of 14's work that will permit political conclusions to be drawn: (a) that juggling-of-figures exercise has in effect put Committee on record as writing-off past arrearages of Soviets, French, and others; and (b) that figure arrived at as contributions still required to restore solvency (in range of about $50 million in majority view) not be used to pressure US to match any voluntary contributions by Soviets and French on more or less comparable basis. In other words if political effect of Committee 14 report were to lead to notion that all that is needed to bring UN to solvency is about $50 million and that a $5 or $10 million contribution by Soviets and French respectively requires that US do similarly, it would turn pressure on us in a context where the Committee and subsequently Assembly will in effect have forgotten that cause of deficit and those really responsible for restoring solvency are countries which have not paid their duly levied assessments. FYI. As USUN recognizes we have always assumed that if we get to point where it proves desirable for a US voluntary contribution to be made we would in first instance consider waiving credits due US from surplus accounts and/or possibility of waiving reimbursement from UN for approximately $5 million owed us on peacekeeping accounts.

Rusk

Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2482. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on March 31. The memorandum is Part 1 of 5. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room.

SUBJECT
UN Peacekeeping

Foreign Secretary Stewart gave his impressions of the current Soviet position on UN peacekeeping and Article 19 in the light of his conversations in London last week with Gromyko. Mr. Stewart said that Gromyko had made it quite clear that the Soviet Union is not disposed to take advice from anyone on the size of its voluntary contribution and is adamant in its insistence that there can be no peacekeeping operation against the will of a permanent member of the Security Council.

The Secretary commented that what the Soviet Union is attempting to do is to amend the Charter by interpreting the "primary" responsibility of the Security Council in peacekeeping to mean "exclusive" responsibility. He reiterated our view that the General Assembly should retain its residual peacekeeping powers. Mr. Cleveland said that there is a danger that the General Assembly may be prepared to downgrade its authority in return for a Soviet payment. The Secretary called attention to the problem which would be created if the Soviets were to make a substantial contribution but a contribution insufficient to satisfy the Article 19 requirement.

The Secretary emphasized the importance in any discussions of peacekeeping arrangements under Article 43 of the Charter of keeping within the existing UN framework. Otherwise the discussions could be used by the Russians to strengthen their contention regarding exclusive Security Council responsibility for peacekeeping activities. Mr. Stewart repeated his view that the Soviet Union will stick to its position on the question of exclusive jurisdiction. Mr. Cleveland commented that in his opinion it is not in our interest nor in the interest of the Soviet Union to negotiate a peacekeeping compromise based on Article 43. The Uniting for Peace resolution still permits a majority of the General Assembly in a given situation to recommend peacekeeping action when the Security Council fails to do so. Mandatory assessments for peacekeeping, however, probably would not be practicable for the immediate future.

In discussing whether there should be two separate peacekeeping funds to take care of the existing situation, the Secretary and Mr. Stewart agreed that it might be helpful to the Secretary General to confuse the situation by having one rather than two funds. Mr. Stewart recalled that Gromyko had implied the Soviet Union in making its voluntary contribution would prescribe the purpose for which it was to be used. At the same time Gromyko had made a vague reference to the ability of the Secretary General to make exchanges between his right and his left pockets. It was agreed at the suggestion of the Secretary that Mr. Cleveland would talk with the British about the best means of handling the fund question. The Secretary recommended a pragmatic Anglo-American approach to the problem.

Washington, April 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department. Limited Official Use.

SUBJECT
Proposal for a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

/2/The authorization was transmitted to New York in telegram 2261, March 20; see footnote 2, Document 344. On July 6 Costa Rica formally requested inclusion of the High Commissioner position on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights. Text of the Costa Rican proposal is UN doc. E/L. 1080.

We consider it inevitable that the United Nations will become more deeply involved in human rights problems. The question becomes therefore, not whether the United Nations should concern itself with human rights questions but how it will do so. The United Nations' involvement with human rights in recent years has been characterized by a heavy preoccupation with race issues. Too little attention has been given to the fundamentals of human justice everywhere and the record of our own progress has not had the consideration it deserves.

The Costa Rican proposal envisages the appointment of a distinguished elder statesman as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to advise the Secretary-General, provide good offices in response to requests from member governments, and prepare an annual report to serve as a focal point for United Nations human rights discussions.

While there is some risk involved, if the issue is raised, we intend to support this initiative.

We believe participation in the development of the proposal will give us a good chance to steer the institution into a pattern acceptable to us. On the other hand, opposition or aloofness would entail unfavorable consequences for us in the United Nations, quite apart from the adverse repercussions among domestic organizations interested in human rights.

/3/Grant Hilliker signed for Reed.

TDCS DB-315/01286-65

Washington, April 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations, USSR

DATE OF INFO.
20 April 1965

SUBJECT
1. Activities Affecting the United Nations
2. U Thant's Attitude on United Nations Peacekeeping Activities and on the Application of Article 19

PLACE & DATE ACQ.
20 April 1965

REF
IN 48716

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. In private U Thant is very critical of United States policy on Article 19 and the peacekeeping questions. He believes the United States has assumed much too rigid a posture and thus has lost its freedom of maneuver. He believes there have been too many public statements by too many United States spokesmen and that American policy is unclear and apparently confused.

2. U Thant does not believe the Soviets will contribute enough to moot application of Article 19 at the next United Nations General Assembly. He states the Soviets definitely do not want Article 19 to stand. He believes Article 19 is almost dead as far as peacekeeping is concerned and considers that in the future all efforts must be directed toward voluntary contributions from the Soviets. U Thant believes there is some possibility of success for voluntary Soviet contributions for past peacekeeping operations, but little or no chance of contributions for future peacekeeping operations unless there is a settlement in Vietnam.

3. U Thant several times has asked Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko about the amount of the "substantial contribution" to the voluntary fund which the Soviets promised during the 19th General Assembly. Fedorenko has been unwilling to make any definite statement and U Thant believes Fedorenko himself does not know. Tewfik Bouatoura of Algeria has volunteered to U Thant the statement that the Soviets will contribute up to twenty million dollars.

4. U Thant and his staff consider the "opting out" concept for peacekeeping satisfactory, certainly better than the veto. U Thant believes that in a crisis such as Cyprus, countries will pay. U Thant is against long term peacekeeping operations as in the Gaza Strip.

5. Field Dissem: None.

Washington, April 22, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
My Day at USUN

/2/April 21.

/3/Information on the drafts submitted is in Report of Conference of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, UN doc. A/5986 (DC/227).

In fact, the opening session of the UNDC turned up no surprises by the Albanians or anyone else. The only business was the election of a chairman from the U.A.R.; the chairman is tolerable and we couldn't stop it anyway. Pederson felt that the chances are good that the Chinese participation issue and Vietnam will come up next week.

With regard to the Monday session, the Russians are expected to lead off, with us second. If the Russians bring up Vietnam, Stevenson's follow-up will probably be in two parts--a Vietnam rebuttal and then a talk about disarmament. If the Albanians bring up Chirep, we will probably be able to fend it off.

/4/Reference is to charges of U.S. use of gas warfare in Vietnam. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, footnote 2, Document 210, and Document 216.

From Stevenson on down, there is pretty general agreement that we are probably not going to resolve the Article 19 question, by September 1, in a manner satisfactory to a hard U.S. position. Pulling the various views together, a rough consensus scenario seems to be as follows: First, the present consultations on future peacekeeping will poop along for a couple more months until it is obvious that nothing regarding the future will get settled by the fall (U.S.S.R. and France insist we talk about the future before we talk about past). Second, renewed pressure will build up again this summer to resolve the arrearages problem through voluntary contributions. Third, at the last minute, the Russians will probably contribute $10 to $15 million which will not be enough to settle Article 19 but which will be enough to ensure that the Afro/Asians won't be too mad at the Russians. The chances of a Russian cave-in are not good. In this regard, Stevenson feels that Vietnam and the deepening cold war make a cave-in even less likely.

On the matter of what we should do, USUN and IO seem to be unanimous in the view that we should not go to the mat with the Russians on arrearages--we would probably not be able to win; the issue isn't all that big; the American people are not demanding a confrontation "over a measly $20 million"; and, in fact, some Americans might like the flexibility a more voluntary system would give the U.S. Yost thought that we might have a chance of getting $30 million from the Russians (enough to avoid Article 19 for a couple years), if the pitch is made purely on a financial solvency basis, if we make a big contribution ourselves, and if we stay away from constant reiteration about Article 19.

Note: I have been holding off on a memo to the President until I could see a little more clearly the direction we are heading in. I think I shall do the memo after we get the results of today's meeting of the Committee of 33.

3. Vietnam--Stevenson mused unhappily about Vietnam and made such points as the following in a very low key (I put them down a bit reluctantly because he speaks very softly and I had a hell of a time hearing him). First, it might not be such a bad idea for U Thant to call for a cease-fire. We could stop bombing for a few days. If the Communists don't obey, we can resume bombings and, to boot, be in a much better position before the world. Second, we should have started the talks about peace at the time we started the bombing--not weeks later. Third, we should talk more peace and bomb "more in sorrow than anger." Also, we should not beat our chest publicly that we are "stepping up" our effort; in this regard, McNamara's recent statements do not seem wise. Fourth, the real issue in the world is the cold war--the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Vietnam is driving the U.S.S.R. and China together and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. apart. The deepening cold war is disturbing. Fifth, it is disturbing that the Japanese and Indians, the people who flank China, are getting more and more unsympathetic with our policy. Sixth, it might be conceivable to negotiate with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese jointly. We should look into this possibility.

The purpose of Tex's visit was to make a plea on behalf of a Mekong tributary project in Laos. Tex said that the IBRD does not want to finance the project because it is in an unstable area. He added that the project itself seems worthwhile. First, it might help stabilize the area. Second, all of the factions in Laos agree that it should be done. Third, it will provide electricity to Vientiane and other places (including parts of Thailand). It will also provide irrigation to substantial areas. Fourth, all the surveys have been done and the project is all ready to go. Fifth, if we get involved, we would show the doubters that we are ready to put our money where our mouth is.

/5/Arthur "Tex" Goldschmidt, Director of Technical Assistance, UN Special Fund Operations.

The project will probably cost about $35 million. As Tex sees it, the U.S. could provide about $18 to $20 million and get countries like Japan, Canada, the U.K., and West Germany to provide the rest. Some grant money would probably be best. However, if this is not possible, very low-interest-rate money would also probably do the trick. The project could be done under a UN umbrella.

Note: I will pass on this item to Francis Bator.

GC

New York, April 28, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U.S. Representative--Stevenson. Confidential. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: "Dictated via telephone." Printed in the Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII, pp. 746-748.

SUBJECT
Secretary General's proposal for temporary cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam

Although the Secretary General has so far deferred to our wishes by delaying his appeal for a cease fire in Viet Nam, I cannot be sure that he will defer some action indefinitely following his return from Europe on Friday, May 7th. He is acutely conscious of his responsibilities as Secretary General, troubled by criticism that he as Secretary General and the UN as an institution have not been able to contribute to a solution in Viet Nam, and strongly convinced that the continued use of force holds no promise for a settlement but only the ever-increasing danger of wider warfare, as well as a re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy from limited d?tente with the West to close cooperation with Communist China.

Given this estimate of the Secretary General's mood, we have set down below some of the advantages and disadvantages of acquiescing in an appeal by the Secretary General for a cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam.

1. If we are receptive to the idea of the Secretary General's appeal, we will obviously be in the best position to influence its contents and timing.

While we do not exclude an appeal to cease all hostilities, the Secretary General may not think it wise to make an appeal broad enough to cover the fighting within South Viet Nam because North Viet Nam could more easily reject this appeal on the grounds that it does not control the Viet Cong. Moreover, we doubt if it would be in our interest to accept an appeal which would prevent us and the South Vietnamese from continuing the war against the Viet Cong.

We believe the Secretary General would be willing to make an appeal which principal paragraph would be along the following lines:

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1546.

/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399.

3. Rejection of the Secretary General's appeal by North Viet Nam would do serious damage to the Communists' international posture and, at the same time, provide us with further justification in the eyes of the world community for continuing our air strikes against the North.

4. An appeal from the Secretary General would place him on record as implicitly admitting that North Viet Nam is engaged in the use of force against South Viet Nam.

5. The Secretary General, by making such an appeal, would become the center of the effort to terminate hostilities in Viet Nam, a fact which would facilitate a later move on our part--should we so desire--to involve the UN in the role of supervising or policing a negotiated settlement.

1. International pressure on the US to cease its air strike against the North will probably increase rather than decrease, and a favorable US response to the Secretary General's appeal might be interpreted by some as a sign of weakness. This would not, however, be the case and could be counteracted by vigorous prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong.

2. Another possible disadvantage, one we are unable to assess, is the adverse effect the temporary cessation of air strikes against the North might have on the morale of the South Vietnamese.

3. If air strikes against the North were stopped in response to the Secretary General's appeal, I suppose we would be subjected to pressure not to resume them even if we subsequently found that the North was continuing its infiltration of the South.

4. In this connection, our judgment (and the Secretary General's) is that unilateral surveillance by the US and South Viet Nam is the only practicable means available for the immediate future. To police a cessation of hostilities an effective international police force could not be agreed on and established fast enough to deal with this situation.

We are also frankly dubious that surveillance by some international body--whether the UN or some other ad hoc body--would serve our interests at this stage. While it could easily check whether air strikes against the North had been halted, it would find it very hard, if not impossible, to check whether infiltration from the North had stopped. We might find ourselves in the position of claiming that the North had not lived up to the cease-fire bargain without confirmation from the international body. However, an international force to police an agreed settlement would be quite a different thing.

There is one fundamental strategic and political factor which underlies the whole problem.

The border objectives of US policy are, in general, to demonstrate that Communist conquests, labeled as "wars of liberation", cannot be carried out successfully and, in particular, to "contain" Communist Chinese ambitions to dominate Southeast Asia and North Vietnamese ambitions to absorb South Viet Nam.

The United States has the force to carry out these tasks, if the American people have the steadfastness to pursue them over many years. Experience in Europe shows that the job can be done, but also shows that it can be done much more successfully as a cooperative venture by many threatened states than by the U.S. alone.

The same applies in large degree in Asia. One vital practical factor must be so to carry out our operations there as to contribute to rather than to inhibit the eventual creation of a great defensive coalition. Essential members of an effective coalition in Asia would have to be, among others, Japan and India, the absence of which has made SEATO of limited value.

Our tactics in Viet Nam so far, necessary as they are from other points of view, have not generated wide-spread Asian support, except among the small, weak states directly under the gun. This may not seem to matter at the moment, but how long will the American people be willing to carry almost the whole burden of containment in Asia.

On the other hand, our bold, determined action in Viet Nam in the past three months has probably already persuaded the major Communist powers that they can no longer pursue "wars of national liberation" in Asia, even in a relatively covert form without very grave risks to themselves; the risk for the Soviets of a total breakdown of their policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West, the risk for the Chinese of an unequal direct conflict with the United States. This realization is too recent to have yet produced a visible effect, but it is probably there and will give some pause to further Chinese expansionist plans.

It may be, therefore, that the lesson has already, or will soon, be driven home sufficiently so that we might begin to tailor our tactics more specifically to the longer run objective, that is, to creating an Asian consensus and eventually an Asian coalition for the containment of China, a coalition in which the United States would of course participate heavily but which it would not have to carry almost entirely on its own back.

Another paramount political consideration is, of course, to reverse as quickly as we can, without other major drawbacks, a situation which tends willy-nilly to drive the Soviets into following a common policy with the Chinese, rather than Khrushchev policy of open hostility to the Chinese. This of course works against our interests everywhere and, inter alia, inhibits the Soviet Union itself from participating in the containment of China, as it might otherwise wish to do to some degree.

Washington, May 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Financing of UN Peacekeeping-Status Report

1. When the 19th General Assembly adjourned in February, the Members generally agreed that an energetic effort should be made to settle the impasse brought about by the U.S.S.R.'s refusal to pay its share of past peacekeeping assessments. Accordingly, over the past couple months, there have been some talks about the problem in two UN forums--(a) in private consultations by the Secretary-General and President of the General Assembly with the leading powers and (b) in the Committee of 33, a large, bulky group, expressly set up by the General Assembly to deal with the peacekeeping/financial problem.

2. The substance of the talks can be divided fairly neatly into two parts--future peacekeeping, and arrearages for past peacekeeping. With respect to the talks about future peacekeeping, the effort essentially has been to find a system which would define, in a manner acceptable to the leading powers especially, the respective roles of the Security Council and General Assembly in future peacekeeping operations (including financing). Generally speaking, the Russians have been sticking to their line that the General Assembly has no action role in peacekeeping operations while we have been sticking to our line that the General Assembly does have a role even though the Security Council's role is primary. As for financing, the Russians generally say that this is also a matter for the Security Council to decide, while we say that all options on financing should be kept open, including assessments as laid down by the General Assembly.

The upshot of the discussions on future peacekeeping is that we don't expect the question to be solved any time soon. This does not bother us very much--e.g., we don't think there is a direct relationship between this question and an Article 19 solution; also, the General Assembly will be able to operate without coming to an early agreement on future peacekeeping operations.

3. But the question of arrearages for past peacekeeping operations does bother us since this, of course, is the essence of the Article 19 impasse. Up to now, there has been some talk, but no real action, about setting up a voluntary fund and getting a large enough contribution from the U.S.S.R. to settle the Article 19 problem.

4. To guess about the future, the scenario at the UN on the peacekeeping/financial problem may turn out to be roughly as follows: First, the talks on future peacekeeping will tail off when it becomes obvious that nothing will be settled soon. Second, as the September deadline gets close, real UN pressure will build up to solve the arrearages problem through voluntary contributions; this is beginning to happen. Third, if we are getting nowhere by mid-summer, we may try to work out some sort of package deal with the Russians--e.g., in return for adequate, Soviet contribution, we would promise to insure that the Russians will not be assessed for future peacekeeping operations to which they fundamentally object. Fourth, if the Russians do not buy our package, they will probably wait until the last minute and then contribute $10 or $15 million to the voluntary fund--which will not be enough to settle Article 19 to our satisfaction but which will tend to persuade many UN Members that the "reasonable" Russians should not lose their General Assembly vote.

5. If the Russians fail to contribute enough and the General Assembly appears unwilling to invoke Article 19, what then? The most prevalent view these days is that we should probably not try to force a confrontation with the Russians, which we probably couldn't get and which we well might lose if we did get it. Instead, we should probably indicate, before or during the debate, (a) that the decision about applying Article 19 is one for the General Assembly to make; (b) that we hope the Assembly will uphold its mandatory financial authority and impartially apply Article 19; and (c) that, if the decision is otherwise, we will draw the consequences for our own future contributions. In short, we would not invoke Article 19 and assume no one else would.

6. The reaction to such a U.S. posture might be relatively tolerable. In general, most foreign countries would welcome it as an end to General Assembly incapacitation. Domestically, we could probably sell the line, either publically or on background, (a) that the decision not to invoke Article 19 is a General Assembly, and not a U.S., decision, (b) that it does not make good sense to "ruin" the UN over a few million dollars, and (c) that this particular cloud may have a silver lining--i.e., there may be times when we, too, will not want to pay assessments for certain UN peacekeeping operations.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

New York, May 12, 1965, 2200Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority.

/2/Dated May 3, it discussed the latest maneuvers by "African nationalist states" seeking to resolve the Article 19 impasse. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 RHOD/UN)

/3/Seymour Finger of USUN.

/4/Reference is to the Committee of 33.

/5/May 10.

Quaison-Sackey started meeting with statement along lines described reftel. Said SYG intends to present draft report to committee by June 1 and President expects committee hold intensive meetings, perhaps twice a day, in order reach agreed report by June 15. Content of such report with respect to future might be "few paragraphs of guidelines" which might be general enough to achieve acceptance.

It was clear SYG and Quaison-Sackey expected little progress re future and concentrating principally on achievement solvency. They said all members of committee agreed there should be "normalization" of work of GA. Small countries urged US and Sovs agree on formulation.

In reply Stevenson query re Sov and French willingness to contribute toward solvency, Quaison-Sackey said Fedorenko reiterated Sov readiness make "substantial" contribution on basis Afro-Asian proposal and on understanding contribution should fully eliminate question of "so-called arrears." French position much more difficult; Seydoux maintained peacekeeping operations, past or future, not subject to GA assessment and agreement on future must precede any French contribution. He was not explicit exactly what agreement on future required nor did he promise any French contribution even if their conditions met. SYG and Q-S affirmed Sovs attached no such condition re agreement on future.

Q-S also impressed by difference in French and Sov reactions to his presence in Vienna June 15. French reply very formal, pointed out occasion is purely ceremonial and other matters had no place. Gromyko sent Q-S message that he looking forward to meeting him in Vienna and to talking.

/6/Reference is to General Assembly Resolutions 1994 (XIX) and 1995 (XIX), adopted unanimously. For texts, see GA docs. A/C. 2/224 and A/C. 449.

"However, taking into account the financial difficulties of the UN, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to make a voluntary contribution on the basis of the proposal of the African and Asian countries of 30 December 1964, on the understanding that our voluntary contribution, the size of which will be decided by the Soviet Government itself, should fully eliminate the question of the so-called arrears of the Soviet Union and the question of the application of Article 19 of the UN Charter to the Soviet Union."

Fedorenko first set adoption of res by Comite of 33 as precondition but, when Q-S suggested statement by Pres embodied understanding as proposed in comite by Argentina, Fedorenko did not reject this possibility.

In optimistic vein Q-S said he was sure Sov contribution wld really be substantial. Told Stevenson "you hold whip hand." Stevenson said he was not sure what SYG and Q-S were asking US to do and how we held whip hand. Sovs were clearly asking we renounce for all time application Article 19 in connection their past arrears and in advance of our knowing how much they wld contribute, whether or not UN involvency wld be overcome, how UNEF wld be taken care of and whether Sovs wld support regular budget including servicing of bond issue, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, etc. SYG said latter subjects not yet discussed with Sovs but indicated he might explore them shortly. Stevenson also pointed out Congress aiming for adjournment July 15. US hopes be able make contribution but before discussing with mbrs Congress we would have to know other elements of package. We wld need this in latter part June in order hold necessary Congressional consultations.

SYG made clear he did not feel he could launch appeal for contributions until requested do so by Comite of 33. He and Q-S agreed appeal shld be launched during latter part June. Q-S said most comite mbrs expressed preference for ltr of appeal from SYG rather than pledging conference. (Obviously he held that view.)

Q-S then expressed view key to solution might be omission any ref to Art 19 but stress on "normalization." He then read from notes on proposal made earlier same day by Pazhwak (Afghanistan) based on three points: (1) "we" must do everything in our power before resumption GA so that "it should function normally"; (2) solvency shld be achieved through voluntary contributions; (3) comite shld try develop "guidelines" for future peacekeeping, then submit them to all mbr govts of UN for comments and resume to discuss these comments. Q-S had impression Pazhwak formula discussed with other African and Asian dels. (Earlier in day mbr Indian del had urged US consult Pazhwak.) We expressed interest in this Pazhwak formula but also noted it unlikely Sovs would be satisfied with it. (Later Vellodi told MisOff Pazhwak wld not provide text nor wld he confirm Vellodi notes; he said he had just been speculating out loud.)

While vague on total contributions expected, contributions Sovs might make and any understanding concerning UNEF and bonds, SYG and Q-S seemed unaccountably suphoric [sophomoric?] about possibility solving financial crisis. This based on feeling Sovs showing signs of desire to solve crisis. In response our query, SYG said Sovs had said nothing directly to him about $108 million target figure but noted he had heard from several quarters that Sovs talking in terms of total required as less than half that amt. Apparently SYG and Q-S do not consider much more difficult French position as insuperable obstacle, their main concern being agreement by "two super-powers."

On question of future, Q-S said French del had requested comite meet May 17 when it wishes make policy statement. Mtg, which will be chaired by Argentina, may also hear from Iraq, UAR, Netherlands and Algeria. Seydoux had mentioned possibility of establishing a finance comite responsible to the SYG and this will probably be in French statement. Seydoux expressed opposition to collective responsibility for financing any peacekeeping operation. Said there must be no compulsion to pay, whether operation mounted by SC or GA. In curious twist of logic Seydoux said UNEF operation might be considered collective responsibility because it is observation, not peacekeeping, whereas UNFICYP involves contingent use of force, is peacekeeping and therefore not collective responsibility. SYG noted there has actually been more shooting in UNEF than in UNFICYP and suggested French position is rationalization of their payment for operation arising out of Suez.

Comment: It is obvious that we risk deadlocking in old chicken-egg controversy which stymied GA. SYG and Q-S apparently think agreement by Comite of 33, to be embodied in its June 15 report, on Sov stipulation concerning normalization work of GA and waiver application Art 19 is likely to be essential prelude to SYG launching appeal for vol contributions shortly after June 15. They probably will seek further info from Sovs regarding related financial problems but would not expect receive any notification of size Sov vol contribution until it is made. We urged they concentrate in talks with Sovs and French on adequate assurances UN solvency will be restored as necessary prerequisite to Art 19 waiver. However, unless new Pazhwak formula proves firmer and more salable than we expect, chicken-and-egg seems to lie directly in our path.

Stevenson

New York, May 26, 1965, 2130Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis.

4694. For Secretary from Stevenson and Foster.

/2/Dated May 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 UN)

2. In considering ways to head off world conference, we have considered several possibilities:

/3/Dated May 20. (Ibid., E 5 SEADP)

B. Another possibility is to let it be known that we would be prepared to see an enlargement of ENDC to include ChiComs and one or more others for balance. Since it is generally assumed here ChiComs and French would continue boycott ENDC even if enlarged, however, this would not strike many as a viable alternative. Moreover, once ENDC membership opened up, there is no telling how long it would take to get agreement on new composition, nor what composition might ultimately emerge. These considerations will occur to most representatives here and, while we feel this idea needs further study, we strongly doubt that ENDC enlargement proposal here will serve to head off a call for a world conference. Indeed proponents of world conference view it, inter alia as aimed at reconstituting disarmament negotiating forum.

C. As we see it, our broad objectives in present situation should be: (1) to deprive Soviets and Chinese of forum which would be responsive to their propaganda on disarmament as well as other issues, and (2) conversely, to attempt to engage both of them in a dialogue, preferably private, on the various outstanding problems. Neither A. nor B. above would in our opinion meet these objectives.

/4/No copy of the communiqu? was found. A Pravda article summarizing the Soviet delegation May 19-31 visit is in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 17 (June 23, 1965), p. 19.

Moreover, it occurs to us that there is at least a possibility that a five-power meeting called to consider nuclear disarmament questions might serve as a forum for quiet exploration of other current questions in which the five have, or at least have asserted, an interest.

3. Our support for a five-power meeting would, of course, irritate India which dislikes the prospect of ChiComs being "rewarded for their nuclear tests." It would also risk conjuring up image of "big five" which would be unsettling in terms of ChiRep situation in UN. We should therefore seek to have India included in such a meeting. However, we must recognize that efforts to include India from the outset would make it easier for the ChiComs to reject such a meeting, would probably not be acceptable to the French, and would raise questions with other would-be participants, e.g., Japan or Sweden. Therefore, we should also be prepared to exclude India at the outset. Once a five-power meeting was in progress, we could seek broader participation, including India, in light of matters under discussion.

/5/Not found.

Stevenson

New York, June 4, 1965, 2200Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis.

4856. Subj: Canadian Position Article 19.

/2/Peter Dobell, a member of the Canadian delegation.

/3/A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2.

Plimpton

Washington, June 13, 1965, 5:41 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on June 13 and approved by Cleveland, cleared in substance by Plimpton, EUR, and in draft by Rusk. Also sent to London and Ottawa.

/2/The Department of State reported on the British approach in telegram 7833 to London, June 11. (Ibid.)

While timing British move still unclear, British may move early this week prior to their Commonwealth meeting later in week. Some Commonwealth members may prefer that British float this idea first in Commonwealth meeting so that initiative can be by group of Commonwealth countries.

Canadians have been wanting to take similar initiative and have in addition said they could no longer support invoking of Article 19 against current delinquents.

Dept now considering possible moves on Article 19 issue as such, and hopes Canadian and British Governments will not publicly break that line without further consultation.

We see no objection to, and some advantages in, initiatives by British, Canadians, and others to offer voluntary contributions restoring UN to solvency. Addresses are authorized convey this word to UK and Canadian Governments.

However, those governments and others approached by them should realize we have not yet decided on circumstances that would make it possible for us to make comparable offer, and there should be no implication that they are serving as bellwethers for US contribution to a solvency fund. Indeed, there are grave difficulties in asking Congress for funds to meet crisis produced by refusal of other members to pay.

In discussing matter with British and Canadians, you should make clear that we see little prospect of US voluntary contribution that can be applied in any way to past peacekeeping expenses. Any US contributions for peacekeeping would have to consist mostly of further bond purchases and/or provision of support for current and future peacekeeping operations of UN in conjunction with other UN members, such as in strengthening UN's working capital fund.

/3/June 13.

Rusk

New York, June 22, 1965, 1815Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

/2/Reference is to the President's June 25 address in San Francisco commemorating the 20th anniversary of the United Nations. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706.

In other words UK strongly urges US to make unconditional voluntary contribution as UK has already done and leave questions of setting aside Article 19 or cancelling unpaid assessments for UNOC and UNEF for later bargaining for concessions from Soviets and France. British feel strongly that to make any concessions at this time would be a mistake.

Save for UK unanimous view expressed to USUN is that statement by President leaving no doubt US will not object to GA resuming business as usual, whatever happens during summer, would break deadlock, increase pressure on Soviets and France for large contributions, prove US determination to save UN and be widely welcomed by membership.

USUN believes UK position animated by desire to avoid blanketing their initiative by more dramatic US initiative. Also only pressure on Soviets that would work is Afro-Asian pressure, which would be set in motion only by US agreeing to normalization GA and in effect agreeing not raise Article 19.

USUN accordingly still urgently recommends President announce 25 million dollar voluntary contribution plus either a) support for cancelation UNOC and UNEF arrears when GA determines UN solvent (thus avoiding impairment of Article 19) or b) agreement no raise question applicability Art. 19 in language form proposed by USUN.

If deadlock not broken now, convinced we will miss chance to dissipate present depressed and anxious situation and to get universal credit for doing so. Our firm judgment is that we cannot win vote in either Committee of 33 or in GA on enforcing Art. 19 and that continuing uncertainty will not budge Soviets from their refusal to contribute voluntarily until assured that Art. 19 will not be invoked. Hence we will have to face reality later and yield on Art. 19 to get any Soviet contribution.

Therefore we repeat that we should do now what we will have to do grudgingly later, when we will derive no advantage. Further bargaining, in our judgment, would get us nowhere. Moreover, virtually whole UN membership expects us bite the bullet at San Francisco and there will be grave disappointment if President does not.

Stevenson

Washington, July 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
US Position on Article 19

Ambassador Stevenson and I have reviewed the Article 19 issue and recommend to you the course of action described below. If you agree, we would discuss it with key members of Congress and subsequently with our allies over the next few weeks. Our allies can in general be expected to react favorably.

Following is the course of action to be discussed with Congressional leaders:

1. Ambassador Stevenson would inform members of the Committee of 33 just before it reconvenes in early August that the US position is as follows:

a. If, when the Assembly reconvenes, the UN membership is not prepared at this stage in the UN's development to require the major powers to pay assessments levied for major activities which they do not wish to support, we would note this conclusion and consider it applicable to the US. On this understanding, we would acquiesce in the Assembly resuming its normal business when it reconvenes in September.

b. We would oppose proposals to write off the Soviet and French debts, preferring to leave these on the books even though the GA is unlikely to enforce their collection.

c. The Assembly will still have the problem of restoring UN solvency, and we believe it should make every effort to raise sufficient funds, especially from those who have not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations.

d. We would also state in general terms our willingness to join with the membership in helping to strengthen the UN and to assist in future peacekeeping operations.

e. The integrity of the regular budget should be sustained.

2. We will continue to insist that the amortization of bonds is an obligation of the organization properly funded from the regular budget. Most members will agree with us on this point. But the USSR will probably continue to refuse to pay this portion of their regular budget assessment. As a result, repayment of the bonds may have to be made in part from the UN's miscellaneous income. If this succeeds, it would have the effect of making the Soviets indirectly help pay off the bonds.

3. The procedural choices are: (a) a vote deciding not to apply Article 19; or (b) letting the GA simply go ahead with its normal business without a vote on the Article 19 issue. We conclude it would be disadvantageous to seek a vote since the more likely result would be a consensus which favored letting the Soviets and the French off the hook; we do not think the Assembly would be willing to say formally that failure to uphold the "loss of vote" sanction and its mandatory taxing power has weakened its Charter powers in this regard for the future. It is therefore preferable for us to draw and state our own conclusion and act accordingly in the future in light of the dictates of our national interests.

The above is recommended in light of some hard, unattractive facts. Both Adlai Stevenson and I are convinced that our position on Articles 17 and 19, which was supported by the World Court and an overwhelming majority, will now not be supported by the Assembly. Lester Pearson recently informed us that Canada can no longer support us on the application of Article 19. The U.K. has urged a course of action which even goes beyond the limited one described above by proposing, in effect, that the GA not apply strictly the past GA resolutions on financing the Congo and UNEF. This could mean Assembly exoneration of the delinquents.

The recommended course of action would help break the deadlock while cutting our losses in that the United States would draw the conclusion that the Assembly's unwillingness to apply Article 19 means that we would not feel bound to pay for any future major activities voted by the UN to which we might have objection. This would make the above package palatable on the Hill and offer further protection for us against a possible ganging up by the Afro-Asian majority in the Assembly. It is also designed to shift the burden from ourselves to the Assembly for failing to apply Article 19, by making it clear that the decision is one for the membership at large. It would tend to desensationalize the issue by defusing it in a sub-organ of the UN during the summer doldrums; and would give us a "quid pro quo" by making clear that a double standard cannot be applied for major activities.

Dean Rusk

Washington, July 19, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol . 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by S on July 23. In a July 22 memorandum attached to a copy of this memoranda of conversation sent to Arthur Goldberg, Cleveland wrote: "I think you will find it useful as a summary of the kind of dialogue we have been having with the Secretary General right along. But this was the sharpest confrontation yet." (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject File, Reel 127, Frame 302)

SUBJECT
Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary General of the UN--U Thant
Under Secretary--Ralph J. Bunche
Under Secretary--C. V. Narasimhan
Under Secretary--J. Rolz-Bennett

/2/Ambassador Stevenson died in London July 14.

/3/Not found.

/4/No record of the President's talk with U Thant was found. According to President Johnson's Daily Diary, he met with U Thant between 1:10 and 2:15 p.m., June 25, for a private discussion dealing with Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and the UN debt issue. (Johnson Library) A record of the Stevenson-U Thant meeting is in Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII, pp. 813-814.

/5/During Harriman's July 15-22 visit to Moscow; the statement was reported in The New York Times, July 19.

The Secretary said this was not a deliberate act of policy, but was consistent with our general thinking. Peace could come in one of two fashions. There could be a Conference, called in any of a number of ways; but there seemed little interest in conferring as far as Hanoi is concerned. Or peace could come de facto by parallel decisions to let the fighting "peter out," as in the Greek guerrilla case in the 1940s.

We have had frank talks with Moscow, the Secretary said. But Moscow is unable to take the initiative so is being dragged along. Washington and Moscow are unable to strike a relevant bargain, since Moscow cannot deliver. Nor can we talk bilaterally with Hanoi, without involvement of the Saigon Government.

Dr. Bunche asked about dealing with the Viet Cong. The Secretary said we are in South Vietnam because Hanoi is there. We perceive no large-scale political movement associated with the Viet Cong. If there is a pull-back by Hanoi, the National Liberation Front could take its proper place as one of a number of parties in a South Vietnam political framework.

/6/See footnote 2, Document 350.

There followed a brief argument about facts in Laos. The Secretary General said that CIA was working against Souvanna Phouma, and for Phoumi Nosavam. The Secretary said this was simply wrong, that indeed, we had restrained Phoumi from conducting a successful coup.

As the discussion reverted to Vietnam, the Secretary General conceded that the Communists' basic condition--that the U.S. should be willing to get out--has been met. But he said it is too late because Hanoi is now following the Peking line.

/7/Regarding this approach, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 228, section 2.

The Secretary asked whether it would not be better to have a conference at which a cease-fire is the first item on the agenda. The Secretary General held to the view that a "Geneva Conference" with a cease-fire ahead of time "if possible", would be the best arrangement.

The Secretary commented that it was certainly news to him if Hanoi had ever been prepared to be "neutralized".

There followed another discussion on the issue whether Hanoi's infiltration or the Americans presence in South Vietnam had started it all. The Secretary General said the United States had military advisers and were providing military assistance from the outset after the 1954 agreements. The Secretary said the Communists began immediately to provide military assistance. "But it was the military advisers that made all the difference," the Secretary General said. The Secretary said that at first they were only advisers on logistics and supply matters. Only after President Kennedy came into office were other advisory elements added, to frustrate the growing threat from the North.

The Secretary said we must have a further discussion of the facts in the Vietnam case.

The Secretary General, returning to the proposed Geneva Conference, raised again the issue of representation. "Is there a government in Saigon?", he asked rhetorically. He also said there was a clear difference between the NLF and Hanoi; for example, in a letter to U Thant, Prince Sihanouk had said the National Liberation Front was tougher than Hanoi. Perhaps the right answer was the one suggested in London by Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago: That three Vietnamese groups (Hanoi, Saigon and the NLF) should be represented at a conference. The Secretary General said that he and many UN members were bothered by analogies: Would the recently expressed American doctrine mean that if there was infiltration anywhere in Asia or even in Europe, that the United States would bomb the country of the infiltrators? He then rehearsed his familiar line that the answer in Southeast Asia was for the United States not to be involved in a military way, and to stick to economic aid.

His reference to Burma's success in remaining non-Communist without aid, brought a reminder from the Secretary that Burma had been getting military aid. The Secretary General said the Burmese had assured him last year that there was no U.S. aid, but now told him it was a special arrangement for creating counterpart funds and buying military equipment at a discount. He said he was not sure this should be called military aid, but in any event it was not visible and did not involve a military presence.

The Secretary said we would like to make progress toward convening a Geneva conference with a cease-fire first on its agenda. Alternatively, peace could be made by the de facto route. But the difficulties of the de facto route were illustrated by the recent pause in our bombing. On the very first day of the pause, perhaps by coincidence, Peking said that if bombing stopped it would make no difference. On the third day of the pause, the Secretary was in Vienna and saw Gromyko who said that to stop bombing in these circumstances was an insult. In all equity the Secretary said, Hanoi would have to get its 325th Division out of South Vietnam and the contiguous areas of Laos. Maybe the Communists miscalculated, feeling that our election speeches about not wanting to widen the war made it possible for them to widen the war on their side with impunity. But the fact is we mean business. They will not be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force.

After another excursion into the history of Vietnam, the Secretary General rather suddenly asked what reaction the Secretary would have to getting both South Vietnam and North Vietnam into the UN. The Secretary said he would ponder it.

The Secretary said we do not think the Chinese Communists want to carry things to the point of a general war. But so far they are in the position of being able to "fight to the last Vietnamese". The Secretary General agreed, commenting "Yes, they are having a heyday".

The Secretary asked whether it would be useful, short of calling for a Security Council meeting, to bring our reporting to the Council on Vietnam up to date--sometime within the next week or ten days. The Secretary General said he thought that it would be useful.

In a brief discussion of the Harriman mission to Moscow, the Secretary said the conversations so far showed no serious advance. Indeed, he thought that the Russians were rather embarrassed to be caught talking with us about Vietnam.

The Secretary General suggested we might want to talk with Nakrumah before he leaves for Moscow on his announced mission. The Secretary said we had that very much in mind.

In his talks with Ambassador Stevenson in Geneva two weeks ago, the Secretary General had taken under advisement the idea of a Security Council meeting in which, by advance agreement, there would be no polemics and simply a consensus that the Vietnamese situation requires the convening of a conference of the Geneva powers. Ambassador Stevenson's understanding was that the next step would be for the Secretary General to take this up with the Soviets, presumably through the acting representative in New York, Platon Morozov. Evidently, the Secretary General has not pursued this with the Soviets, and does not now think a Security Council meeting of any kind would be useful.

SC 00680/65A

Washington, July 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The charts included in this report are not printed.

THE UNITED NATIONS FINANCING AND PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS

The financial and peacekeeping problems which have hamstrung the 19th session of the UN General Assembly are still far from resolution. The resulting paralysis of the assembly in a year of deepening international crises has caused many members to fear for the future of the United Nations as an effective world organization.

As the date 1 September for reconvening the assembly approaches, the members are increasingly anxious that its work proceed normally, and there is no longer majority support for any attempt to deprive financially delinquent members of their assembly vote by enforcing Article 19. However, even if the Article 19 issue is papered over and the UN's solvency restored by voluntary contributions, the basic constitutional question of the General Assembly's right to initiate peacekeeping operations will remain to plague the UN long after the 19th General Assembly is ended.

The drafters of the UN Charter intended that the Security Council should have pre-eminence in peacekeeping matters and that its permanent members should have the special responsibility for maintaining the peace. The falling out of the Allied powers after World War II, the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union, and the flood of new members from the Afro-Asian bloc all served to bring the General Assembly to the fore as the only effective alternative when the Council was deadlocked. The Uniting for Peace resolution, voted in 1950 by the General Assembly, authorized it to undertake the peacekeeping role in certain circumstances and provided the sanction for such later assembly-sponsored operations as the UN Emergency Force in Palestine (UNEF) in 1956 and the UN Congo Operation (ONUC) in 1960.

France has refused to pay for ONUC and the Soviet Union refuses to pay for both ONUC and UNEF on the ground that they were illegally authorized. They have persisted in this refusal despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1962 that the expenses for these operations fell within the regular assessments of UN members, and despite the fact that the UN has been brought close to bankruptcy.

Both France and the USSR are now two years in arrears and must, according to the letter of Article 19, either pay or lose their voting rights in the General Assembly. When the 19th assembly met last December, however, it evaded the issue of voting rights by taking no votes on issues of substance. When the assembly finally adjourned in February, a last-minute attempt by Albania to break the no-voting moratorium and provoke a showdown was defeated only by US agreement to consider the vote to adjourn a "procedural" one.

Since then, the whole question has rested with the 33 members of a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations established by the assembly. After numerous meetings, however, matters stand about as they did when the committee was set up. The meetings served as another vehicle for Soviet propaganda attacks on US policies in Vietnam. Few if any new ideas emerged from either the open sessions or the informal private consultations.

In order to meet its 15 June deadline for a report to the General Assembly, the Committee of 33 merely drew up a report calling for "normalization" of the assembly's work and restoration of the UN's solvency through voluntary contributions. It also asked for more time in which to devise a formula for future peacekeeping. The committee has now adjourned until August, evidently hoping that one of the big powers will come up with something which would break the impasse and create a better atmosphere for tackling the long-range problem.

In the present situation it is the prevailing view of the UN membership that the most urgent tasks are to pay off past debts and to avoid any new confrontation. The majority of members has not more stomach now than last fall for threats to deprive the USSR and France of their votes if they do not pay up. Many genuinely fear that if the Soviets are in fact so treated they will pull out and perhaps bring about the demise of the UN.

The Afro-Asians in particular have diligently sought to avoid a confrontation. Last December they proposed a plan whereby past debts would be settled by voluntary contributions and Article 19 would not be invoked. This plan was approved by the Soviets who have since urged that this is the only possible solution. An Ethiopian resolution presented to the Committee of 33 is in essence the Afro-Asian plan. Although this resolution has not been voted on in the committee, it remains the most popular solution proposed to date.

Many members feel that if voluntary contributions are sufficient, the question of the applicability of Article 19 can be bypassed. This view and the US opposition to the Ethiopian plan led the British and the Scandinavians to open their campaign last month for donations by pledging almost $18 million over and above regular annual assessments. They hope that other developed countries will soon follow suit in whittling away at the UN's deficit of over $108 million.

This resort to "passing the tincup," however, may not suffice. The response has come mainly from members of the Atlantic community--excepting, of course, France. Some nations such as Italy are reluctant to make a contribution until confident the Soviet and French contributions will be sizable ones. The Soviets, who are very much interested in the amount of the donation the United States will make, say that they will make a significant contribution only when assured that Article 19 will not be invoked. It is doubtful that the French will contribute at all as long as no formula for the future has been worked out.

If the Soviets refuse to make a voluntary contribution until the US gives in on Article 19, then the US is likely to face increasing pressures in September to do just that. Canada, for example, is one of the members that feels Article 19 is "dead," and President Quaison-Sackey of the 19th General Assembly claims that, if the US would only agree to remove the Article 19 question, the Soviets would contribute a significant amount.

Even if the problem of past debts were alleviated by voluntary contributions, there would be still other issues to settle. The constitutional relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to peacekeeping matters would need to be clearly defined, with agreement reached on the crucial question of ultimate authority for the initiation of peacekeeping operations, and decisions taken on how these operations are to be financed.

The Committee of 33 has scarcely dealt with these problems, feeling that they might be left in limbo for a while. The only significant effort toward working out an acceptable formula was a plan offered by Secretary General Thant which in effect only served to point up the wide divergence of views.

Thant's proposals, based on ideas of the Norwegian delegate Nielson and of Quaison-Sackey, center on the so-called "shuttle procedure." If Security Council is unable to act on a matter of international peace and security, the General Assembly could take it up as provided for in the Uniting for Peace resolution. If a two-thirds majority of the assembly favored a peacekeeping operation and the Security Council still failed to act, then the assembly could itself authorize the operation.

The proponents of the plan believe that recommendations supported by a large majority of the UN's members would tend to be of sufficient weight to push the Security Council into taking action. It is questionable, however, to say the least, that France and the Soviet Union, for example, would in fact change their votes on questions of vital national interest because of pressure from the General Assembly.

On less important questions, however, the plan does have a feature that might incline such countries to less rigid postures. This feature would permit a permanent member of the Security Council to opt out of paying any share of the expense. Members thus assured exemption from financial liability could choose abstention as an attractive alternative to paralysis of the Security Council by outright veto of an important peacekeeping matter.

Despite the opting-out privileges of permanent Security Council members, every effort would be made to maintain the principle of collective UN responsibility in future financing. However, a scale of assessments would be worked out with those states which have requested a peacekeeping action or have a special interest in the operation.

Recriminations over events in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic blocked serious consideration of Thant's plan when it was presented, but support for it in any case was not strong. Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko charged that the proposals represented only the views of the West and reiterated that the Security Council should have sole responsibility in the field of peacekeeping. He did add, however, that if the Security Council failed to act on a peacekeeping issue then "nothing can prevent the General Assembly from considering the whole question anew." Soviet officials at the UN subsequently made it clear that this represented no change in the standard Soviet position that the power of the General Assembly for peacekeeping is limited to recommendations.

Although the Soviets have concentrated their discussions on past debts they have come forth with one proposal for the future-to strengthen Article 43 of the Charter. This article calls on members to make military forces and facilities available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining peace and security under the enforcement measures of Chapter 7. By introducing this idea, the Soviets strengthen not only their argument that the Security Council should have exclusive jurisdiction, but also their claim that "socialist" contingents should be included in future peacekeeping forces. The Soviets ruled out participation by permanent members of the Security Council.

The French, who have endorsed the Soviet proposal on Article 43, also rigidly maintain that the Security Council should have exclusive power to authorize and finance a peacekeeping operation. They would permit the assembly to make recommendations only before the Security Council had discussed a question or after it had failed to reach a decision. This position seems motivated primarily by fear of the numerical strength of the Afro-Asians in the General Assembly, which the French would restrict to a forum for the expression of international public opinion. Paris concedes, however, that the General Assembly should have a voice in assessing peacekeeping funds and suggests that a special financing committee in that body be set up. The French expect that voluntary and compulsory assessments by a special scale would be used.

Many West European countries favor some sort of plan that would allow the General Assembly the right to authorize peacekeeping operations after going through the shuttle procedure. They also favor automatic opting-out for a permanent member, a special scale of assessments, and the earmarking of troops for Security Council use as implied in the Soviet suggestion.

The Afro-Asians naturally contend that the General Assembly should retain an important role in peacekeeping operations. These countries are anxious to exert the power and influence their increased membership in the United Nations gives them in the international arena. Even though Charter amendments will soon give the Afro-Asians increased representation in the Security Council itself, they still have reservations about a body which will be dominated by the big five. They accordingly favor some sort of a plan which includes the shuttle procedure, but they oppose any proposals for opting-out by permanent members of the council. Such a privilege for the major powers would mean a larger financial burden for the smaller nations and would be contrary to the principle of collective responsibility, according to the Afro-Asians.

Other proposals which have been advanced go so far as to suggest that the Charter be amended and adapted to the "political realities of this age." The Brazilian delegate, for example, has suggested the need for a clearer distinction between "enforcement measures" which are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council under Chapter 7 and "peacekeeping operations" of Chapter 6 in which the General Assembly now has the powers of discussion and recommendation. To achieve this, Brazil has suggested in the Committee of 33 that a new chapter entitled "peacekeeping operations" be inserted in the Charter. It would provide for peacekeeping operations by military contingents designated in advance by medium and small powers and undertaken in response to and within the states which request them.

In lieu of revising the Charter, Ireland suggested recently that the Uniting for Peace resolution be modified. It proposes that the resolution not be implemented unless supported by two thirds of the members including at least two of the permanent council members. Financing would be by special scale: 5 percent for less developed nations, 25 percent for developed nations other than permanent members, and 70 percent for those permanent members who vote for the operations.

There is widespread apprehension among the membership of the UN that if the upcoming General Assembly session is like the last one, it could be disastrous for the organization. The appeal for voluntary contributions will ease the financial situation, but it is uncertain whether the USSR and France will contribute. If they do, it is doubtful that they will contribute enough so that the applicability of Article 19 would not be raised. Majority sentiment in the General Assembly is for nonenforcement of this article of the Charter for the sake of averting the sort of showdown that could damage the UN beyond durable repair.

On the deeper constitutional question of authority over peacekeeping operations, it appears likely that the General Assembly will have to give up some of the muscle it acquired under the Uniting for Peace resolution. Unless the big nations agree to some form of shuttle procedure to pacify the small nations, then exclusive jurisdiction over peacekeeping operations will probably revert to the Security Council. Unless the members can agree on a special scale of assessments, such operations may have to be financed by voluntary contributions.

The earmarking of national troops for UN use could offer some possibilities for the longer term future. Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and some of the neutrals have shown increasing interest lately in this approach to the problem of providing the UN with readily available forces, and the recent Soviet references to Article 43 may lend some encouragement to this trend. This trend would not necessarily eventuate in a "permanent peace force" since the obstacles to its creation seem as formidable as ever. The emergence of regional forces--such as that now contemplated in the Organization of American States--is a possibility, but it is a moot point that they can substitute for UN peacekeeping operations without detracting from the effectiveness of the world organization.

Should the difficult problems associated with UN peacekeeping prove intractable, there are those authorities who believe that the world organization could still play a useful role in keeping the peace by exploiting more fully the opportunities to conciliate and meditate.

Washington, July 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Article 19

I was talking to Bill Buffum in State who gave me the following scenario for Article 19 activities over the next couple months:

1. Between now and about August 5, State will be consulting with key Congressional leaders about our proposed course of action.

2. Assuming the consultations with Congress turn out positive, State will probably consult with selected UN members and the Secretary-General. Particularly, State will want to touch base with those members who have supported us in the past; we owe them the explanation. These consultations will probably end by about August 12.

3. The Committee of 33 will meet about August 16. At that time, we will make a statement which will indicate our willingness to avoid an Article 19 hassle.

4. As a result of our statement, we can expect a certain amount of pressure to build up on the Soviets to be more forthcoming on the matter of paying up certain of their regular budget assessments and on the matter of making a voluntary contribution over and above the assessments.

(a) On the matter of a voluntary contribution, Buffum guesses that the Soviets will kick in about $5 million, which will probably be just enough to make the gesture amenable to the Afro/Asians and not enough to be anywhere near meeting their obligations. (It would take $20 million to save us from a back-down on Article 19.)

(b) On the matter of certain regular assessments, which the Russians have not paid, the latest indications are that the Russians will probably balk on some of them--e.g., the bond issue, since some of the proceeds were used to pay for UNEF and the Congo.

5. At the present time, there is no inclination in State to have the U.S. come up with a voluntary contribution.

GC

Washington, July 31, 1965, 2:24 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stephen Schwebel (L), cleared in L and UNP, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London.

/2/Dated July 23; it forwarded the text of a British note regarding peacekeeping. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-4 UN)

We find proposed text of UK letter to SYG in response SYG's request for comments on "guidelines" excellent, except in one important respect. Request you indicate to UKUN our strong reservations concerning second sentence in fourth para, which we suggest be deleted in its entirety. We believe it would be most undesirable for UK to suggest that GA's authority cannot embrace operations "of coercion of any state" and is limited to measures "to preserve international peace while settlement of a dispute is being sought," for three reasons:

First, we think it not in predominant interest of West that GA's authority be so limited. E.g., if Indonesia should attack Malaysia, and USSR should veto SC measures, GA should have authority to recommend--not order, but recommend--collective measures to restore international peace and security. Such measures would not be limited to "preserving international peace while settlement of the dispute is being sought." Rather, they would involve exercise of collective security character, in defense against Indonesian aggression, which clearly would call for use of coercion against aggressor. Dept recognizes that there are risks in this approach, such as misuse by GA of recommendatory authority in, e.g., Rhodesia or South Africa. But we think we should assume this risk, on ground that two-thirds voting requirement in GA, and West's political and financial leverage, should be enough to prevent GA recommending coercive operations which West opposes. If we do not assume risk, it follows that UN's capacity to undertake resistance to aggression is subject to veto in SC.

/3/Dated November 3, 1950; for text see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, vol. I, pp. 187-192.

While, as first sentence of fourth para UK draft rightly states, only SC may undertake enforcement measures, this is properly understood to mean measures which are binding on Members, not measures of merely coercive character. As ICJ pointed out in Expenses Case, ". . . it is SC which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance if, for example, it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. It is only SC which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor." However, while GA cannot require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor, it certainly can recommend coercive action. (Should be noted that, even if GA measures were limited to "preserving international peace while settlement of dispute is being sought," they would imply possibility of coercive action against a state to whatever extent its actions might be in breach of peace.)

We would suggest UK could meet this point either by deleting fourth para or by deleting second sentence of fourth para and inserting in first sentence after "Council" phrase "and are of a binding character."

Third, we see no point in West bidding against itself in negotiations with delinquents. USSR and even France have shown almost no interest in reasonable, procedural limitations on GA action. Why should West propose to make concessions of GA's authority with no quid pro quo? While, in any event, we would think it undesirable to surrender GA's authority to recommend collective security operations to resist aggression, and believe attempt to surrender such without Charter amendment would be of dubious effect, we see no point in offering such concessions to Soviet view at this juncture.

Rusk

Washington, August 2, 1965, 5:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on August 10. The memorandum is Part 2 of 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Article 19

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Nigel C.C. Trench, Counselor, British Embassy

Ambassador Dean inquired as to the current U.S. views on the Article 19 controversy. Secretary Rusk informed him that we were willing to concede that Article 19 cannot be applied at this time. This would apply not only to peacekeeping operations but to all operations of the UN. If, for instance, the UN membership wished to launch a costly UNCTAD program with which we did not agree, we should be in a position where we could refuse to participate. The French and the Soviets should not be the only ones who could decide when they would participate and when they would not.

Ambassador Dean asked if the U.S. would make a voluntary contribution. The Secretary replied that we probably would not. It would depend on what the others did. We might be prepared to contribute on the basis of an assessment to refinance the UN.

The Secretary went on to say that if the General Assembly wished to give up its prerogatives, that was for the General Assembly to decide. He reiterated the U.S. view that if the USSR and France were to be given the privilege of nonpayment for what they objected to, the U.S. would want the same privilege.

New York, August 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Goldberg Correspondence. No classification marking. President Johnson appointed Arthur Goldberg as Permanent Representative to the United Nations on July 26 and Goldberg presented his credentials on July 28. Goldberg's nomination took place against the background of a further escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Documentation relating to the escalation and Goldberg's initial efforts to seek a solution through the United Nations is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, Documents 82, 99, 106, 114, 116, 119, and 129.

SUBJECT
Legislative Reaction to U.S. Position on Article 19

/2/Document 357.

1. The Secretary arranged a breakfast meeting with the Chairman and ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a similar special breakfast meeting with the Chairman and the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. I attended both meetings as did Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador MacArthur of the State Department. Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Church and Hickenlooper participated in the breakfast meeting for the leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman Morgan and Congressmen Zablocki, Fascell, Bolton, and Adair

At both breakfast meetings the Secretary, the Under Secretary and I reviewed the proposed U.S. position on Article 19 in detail. In general the response of the members of the Senate Committee was favorable. While Senator Hickenlooper was somewhat more reserved than the Democratic members he nevertheless acquiesced in the proposed course of action.

At the House breakfast reaction was likewise favorable although Congressmen Adair and Fascell seemed harder to persuade. My conclusion, however, is that they will go along.

2. I personally met with the leaders, both Republican and Democratic, of the Senate and House. On the Senate side I met with Senators Mansfield, Aiken and Dirksen. On the House side I met with the Speaker, Mr. Albert and Mr. Ford.

Save for Mr. Ford, who while cordial was noncommittal, the leaders both of the House and Senate will support the U.S. position. Ford said that he would consult with Senator Dirksen and his other leadership colleagues as well as the leading members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee about formulating a joint position on our recommendation. His general personal reaction was not unfriendly and assuming that the reaction of his colleagues will continue to be favorable, as I believe it will be, my conclusion is that he will go along.

Our next step is to discuss our position with our allies. This I shall do next week in New York.

Our position will be made public when the Committee of 33 reconvenes on August 16.

New York, August 12, 1965, 2350Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow.

354. Article 19. Goldberg, Sisco, Plimpton and Yost saw Morosov (USSR) to explore Art 19 situation.

1. Goldberg said US was considering its position as to whole problem, and wld like an idea of Sov frame of mind toward common object of getting the UN back into business. He mentioned we have domestic political problems, and fact that indication of Sov attitude wld be helpful to President in making final decision.

2. Morosov recalled para 11 of the report of the Comite of 33 (A/5915, 15 June 1965) reading as follows:

"11. The members of the Special Committee agreed that the UN should be strengthened through a co-operative effort and that the GA when it reconvenes must conduct its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedures."

3. He said that this agreement was not bad as a starter, and that it was very important that the provision as to the GA's conducting its ordinary business be implemented. US knew Sov position on substantive matters involved, and there was no point in his repeating it.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 321.

5. Morosov continued that there shld be no variation from Afro-Asian proposal as basis for settlement. The res introduced by Ethiopia in Comite of 33 deviated and therefore had been criticized by Sovs. They wld not accept a substitute or an improper interpretation.

6. Morosov repeated that there had been no change in fundamental Sov position. Any contribution must be voluntary since there is no Sov obligation. They wld not pay for UNEF or UNOC. It is not only a matter of principle but a problem of commercial importance since they prefer to use their money for other purposes.

7. Goldberg said that the important thing was to get the GA in business without prejudice to either viewpoint. However, to get UN back into business, it must have the necessary finances. What was Sov attitude of mind as to this necessity? The organization cld not function unless it cld meet its obligations. No one shld be regarded as having prevailed or retreated. The issue shld be viewed as one facet of over-all US-Sov relations, although an important one.

8. Goldberg continued by asking whether Sovs and US cld unite on (a) putting GA back into business, and (b) making the UN financially able to carry on its business, since UN cannot function unless it meets its obligations.

9. Morosow misunderstood (?) Goldberg's reference to UN obligations and reiterated that Sovs did not admit there were any obligations. They agreed that GA shld resume its normal business. There was a good beginning in para 11 of Comite of 33's report. Afro-Asians and LAs were impatient as to the impotence of the 19th GA, and US shld not destroy para 11.

10. Goldberg said US will do its best to solve whole problem.

Comments: 11. Morsov continued to refer to Afro-Asian proposal, which only provided for not raising Art 19 during "present session," but talked about necessity of "guarantee" that Art 19 not be applied ever.

12. Morosov ducked Goldberg question as to Sov frame of mind or spirit regarding amending UN finances.

13. There was no threat, overt or implied, that Sovs were withdrawing their "acceptance" of the Afro-Asian proposal. During Comite of 33 mtgs and in corridors, Fedorenko had occasionally hinted that it might be withdrawn.

14. There was no mention of regular budget or bond issue.

15. There can be no guarantee that, if US were in effect to agree not to raise Art 19, Sovs wld make really substantial voluntary contribution. However, chances certainly are that they wld make a contribution, and certainly Afro-Asians pressure on them wld be considerable. Opinions vary as to what amount wld be; perhaps $10 million or more, but small likelihood of any amount exceeding Art 19 benchmark.

Goldberg

Washington, August 16, 1965, 4:26 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pelcovits on August 16; cleared in AF, NEA, EUR, ARA, UNP, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco.

/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, pp. 454-457.

1. FYI: In light consultations and proceedings Cmte 33 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), we conclude that requisite majority not available support enforcement Article 19 against USSR and France when GA resumes. We believe it not in our interests any longer carry ball on Article 19. Even closest allies are changing course and number have informed us they unwilling support us any further. End FYI.

2. Following are main points in our statement Cmte 33:

(a) Principle of collective financial responsibility and right of GA to assess for "expenses of the Organization" under Article 17 is clear. Art 19 clearly applies to Congo and Middle East peacekeeping assessments.

(b) We continue adhere to Articles 17 and 19, and believe various GA decisions taken to establish and finance peacekeeping and to protect GA prerogatives were sound and remain valid.

(c) However, responsibility for protecting GA assessment power rests on membership at large. Issue of applicability Art 19 in this situation is for GA to decide. From history of 19th GA and membership attitudes we conclude that at this state GA not disposed apply loss-of-vote sanction to present situation.

(d) "The United States adheres to the position that Article 19 is applicable in the present circumstances. It is clear, however, that we are faced with a simple and inescapable fact of life which I have cited. Moreover, every parliamentary body must decide, in one way or another, the issues that come before it; otherwise, it will have no useful existence, and soon no life. Therefore, without prejudice to the position that Article 19 is applicable, the United States recognizes, as it must, that the General Assembly is not prepared to apply Article 19 in the present situation and that the consensus of the membership is that the Assembly should proceed normally. We will not seek to frustrate that consensus, since it is not in the world interest to have the work of the General Assembly immobilized in these troubled days. At the same time, we must make clear that if any Member can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the Organization, the United States reserves the same option to make exceptions if, in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no double standard among the members of the Organization."

3. Important this not be interpreted as retreat or capitulation by US on principles involved. We adhere to position Art 19 applicable in present circumstances and we disclaim responsibility for GA's attitude which had developed contrary to views we still hold valid. Responsibility for decision not to enforce Art 19 rests on Membership. We prepared see principle collective financial responsibility put into practice to extent requisite majority will support. But if principle not upheld by GA there can be no double standard.

4. We believe UN must not be hamstrung and that its full capacities for peace, including residual GA peacekeeping powers, must be available, particularly at this time of world tensions.

5. No attempt should be made to elaborate or speculate on fuller meaning of our action or reservation we making re future as set forth in Cmte 33 statement, para 2d, above. Wording carefully designed put responsibility for applying Art 19 on shoulders GA, reserve options for future, maintain flexibility re exceptions we might make in future re payment for certain activities "if, in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so."

6. On related aspects following is our position:

(a) We oppose cancelling or reducing debts of delinquents directly or indirectly even though these debts remain uncollectable.

(b) UN still has problem of restoring solvency. Every effort should be made to raise sufficient funds, especially from those who have not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations.

(c) We are willing to join in helping strengthen UN and assist in future peacekeeping operations. If raised, you should say that there are no present plans for the US to make a voluntary contribution.

Rusk

New York, September 10, 1965, 2312Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Limdis.

713. Subject: Financing of UN Bonds.

/2/The Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly.

/3/Brackets in paragraphs 1 and 11 are in the source text.

2. Many developing countries can be expected support proposal remove bond financing provisions from expenditure sections of budget since they contend bond proceeds were used primarily for financing ONUC and UNEF (and this is true) and that expenses of these operations should not have been included in regular budget and assessed on basis of regular scale of assessments, but should have been financed on same special basis used for financing ONUC and UNEF during other periods--under which LDC's paid far less than regular scale.

3. There is considerable sentiment among developed countries and more responsible developing countries to find new way to handle financing of bond issue which will:

(A) Ensure repayment of bonds,

(B) Avoid question of applicability of Art 19 arising in future with respect to nonpayment of assessments for bonds, and

(C) Be acceptable to Sov bloc and France as well as majority of membership.

4. SYG has been studying this problem and possibility of financing bond issue from misc income of UN. He has run into problem that annual principal and interest payments amount to about $8.6 million, whereas annual misc income amounts to about only $6.5 million, and as result he has indicated belief solution through use of misc income would be feasible only if period of amortization of bond issue extended another five years, i.e., to thirty years. We opposed any such extension.

5. In our view, misc income approach--properly used--has fair chance of resolving problem in manner highly desirable in terms of US interests. Objective should be to find solution which:

(A) USSR and France can acquiesce in and agree to, with as little loss of face as possible, as part of overall solution of UN financial problem;

(B) Does not require changing UN bond Res 1739, i.e., continues basic responsibility for repayment of bonds as obligation of regular budget;

(C) Does not impair provision that US "deduct from annual payment of assessed share of United States of budget of United Nations an amount equal to corresponding" amount due US each year on bonds. (P.L. 87-731, Oct 2, 1962);

(D) Does not change term of bonds, e.g., from twenty-five to thirty years maturity; and

(E) Gives added security to repayment of bonds and to integrity of regular budget.

6. It should be quite possible to use misc income approach to achieve objective provided there is agreement to use, in addition to misc income, the annual regular budget surpluses, plus whatever small additional amount of staff assessment income might be required. Annual regular budget surpluses have varied in amount from $1.3 to $2.6 million in the 1960-1964 period and have averaged about $2 million. Thus, use of surpluses should substantially fill gap between total of misc income and amount required for annual principal and interest payments. However, should some portion of gap remain, we calculate it should be possible to draw annually on staff assessment income for this purpose to extent of $1.2 million without creating any income tax reimbursement problem for tax equalization fund into which staff assessment income normally channeled.

7. We are aware of history of UN bond legislation in UN [US] Congress and fact that it not desirable change present UN financing procedure for bond issue if this can be avoided. Accordingly, believe our first position should be that, now that Art 19 problem has been removed with respect to ONUC and UNEF special accounts, SYG and Afro-Asians should try induce Sov bloc and France to pay assessments for all items in regular budget including bond financing. However, we have little hope of success on these efforts and believe we must be prepared move rapidly to fol position in order have any control over developments.

8. US should be prepared:

(A) Agree to use misc income, regular budget surpluses, and staff assessment income--in that order--to pay interest and amortization on UN bonds, and

(B) Directly, if necessary, but preferably through dels such as Canada, Mexico, and Sweden, attempt persuade SYG put forward such proposal.

9. Although there are reasons to support this proposal even if it stands alone, we should also try make it part of package. Other parts of package would be:

(A) That Sov bloc agree pay all costs remaining after removal of bond issue, including peacekeeping items they have so far refused to pay, i.e., TSO Palestine (about $1.6 million), UNCURK (about $150,000), Korean Cemetery (about $50,000), and UN field service (about $1.5 million).

(B) That Sov bloc agree pay for Part V (technical assistance) of regular budget in dollars or convertible currencies as they are obligated to do by UN financial regs. (Alternative would be to take this item out of regular budget altogether. Since many developing countries would strenuously object to this, we should be careful make clear that responsibility for deletion of item--should Sov bloc and France so elect--rests with Sovs and France.)

10. We should try get as much of (A) and (B) as possible but should not insist on making them conditions to agreement on bond financing per para 8.

11. We recognize it may be argued that suggested new financing approach is not consistent with bond res [A/RES/1739(SVI)] and Dept's commitment to Congress that bonds would be financed from regular budget of UN. However, we believe there are several very satisfactory answers to any such contention:

(A) Present proposal would give more security that payments on bond indebtedness would be met;

(B) Proposal which designates misc income, surpluses, and staff assessment income as sources of funds for financing bond issue are within intent of A/RES/1739 that an amount sufficient to pay principal and interest on bonds be included annually in regular budget. Misc income, regular budget surpluses, and staff assessment income are all dealt with each year in UN regular budget appropriation res, and they all enter into calculation of regular budget assessment of each govt; thus, use of these sources of funds produces no materially different effect from that resulting from including amounts for bond principal and interest payments in expenditure section of regular budget as is now done; and

(C) If for any reason full amount due annually to US for principal and interest installments has not already been paid in cash, US can, and must under its authorizing legislation, deduct amount due from its annual payment of assessed share of UN regular budget. Thus, repayment to US would not be affected by manner in which UN accumulates funds for repayment of principal and interest.

(D) This is best way known to date for getting effective, even though camouflaged, Sov bloc and French contributions to paying off bonds.

12. In order eliminate any question about regular budget being ultimately responsible for bond repayments, it would be desirable for GA action to state this specifically. But facts of life are that this compromise too must allow face saving by all parties. Therefore, we would expect somewhat ambiguous statement by SYG to Fifth Comite that, in its report to GA, Comite include recommendation along fol lines: ". . . funds available from UN income or regular budget surpluses of staff assessment income should first be used to pay interest and principal on UN bonds."

13. We believe it important that this proposal not be considered as emanating from US. However, as mentioned above, SYG and number of dels, specifically Canada, Mexico, and Sweden, have shown great interest in finding some method of financing bond issue which would avoid further accumulation of arrears and Art 19 problem. We believe it possible, with help these dels, sell proposal outlined above to SYG and have him carry ball with reference to it. If this is be done, it should be done quickly before other and less sound proposals put forward formally. This is almost certainly our best hope for preserving financial soundness of UN. It may not be acceptable to Sov bloc or French, but we believe effort must be made.

/4/In telegram 628 to New York, September 24, the Department of State approved the general approach set out and indicated that Sisco would meet with Goldberg to discuss implementation of Mission recommendations "prior to any action." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4)

Goldberg

Washington, September 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Cooper, Johnson, Keeny, and Komer.

SUBJECT
20th General Assembly--Strategy Session

/2/Llewellyn Thompson, Thomas Mann, and Adrian Fisher.

1. Major U.S. Themes at the Session and the U.S. Opening Speech--The group discussed the themes we should try to sell at the General Assembly, sporadically linking this subject with the content of the U.S. opening speech--scheduled for delivery on September 23 by Goldberg, Rusk, or conceivably the President. Rostow said that we ought to get off the defensive and be as positive as we can. First, we should stress U.S. faith in self-determination and in government by the consent of the governed; in this context, we can even use the Dominican experience positively. Second, we should be forthcoming on disarmament--e.g., willing to share responsibility and willing to guarantee those who don't have a nuclear capability. Third, we should take the lead in dramatizing the food part of the population explosion equation. Fourth, we should try to use the Great Society approach overseas. In this regard, it is important to note the major impact of the President's August 17 Alliance for Progress speech in which he made a link between the Alliance and the Great Society.

/3/G. Mennen Williams.

Butch Fisher described a number of disarmament proposals that could be made, many of which already had considerable interagency agreement.

Goldberg said that he likes all the general themes which have been described but added that what really makes an impact is a specific, hard proposal; it matters little whether it is big or small. One possibility is to offer something specific on food or health in our opening speech. Another possibility is to propose something in the way of linking our whole aid program to the UN--i.e., the UN, acting as a sort of clearing house, would come up with lists of projects from which the U.S. could pick and choose. To a certain extent, we are already doing this sort of thing with the Mekong. Mansfield's proposal on Kashmir is also pertinent.

Tommy Thompson said that we can anticipate some strong Soviet attacks on "the U.S., which regards itself as the gendarme of the world." We should get ready for these attacks.

2. Vietnam--The group discussed the recent article by Lin Piao. Goldberg said that the paper has caused great alarm among small countries and that we should hit it hard. Rostow said that we can focus on two points with respect to the paper. First, we can show how it is an obvious attempt to exploit small nations. Second, we can put a positive tone on our attack by making the pitch that the author is not a real revolutionary, that he is only a tactician and that we are the real revolutionaries.

Rusk said that, at the General Assembly, we must do a lot of lobbying with small nations on Vietnam. Moreover, we must give them a position which they can support--e.g., support of negotiations and the 1954 agreements.

3. Presidency of the General Assembly--Goldberg noted the present dilemma--in the wake of Article 19, we are anxious to keep the job away from the Eastern Europeans; our last best hope seems to be the West Europeans, but they are dancing around the issue and have not yet come up clearly with a candidate. Goldberg went on to describe an approach from the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs tell us that they want the job; they argue that they are not members of the Bloc and that they have paid their UN debts.

Rusk thought that this might not be as bad as it looks. A Yugoslav might, for a while at least, take care of East European demands for the Presidency; among East Europeans, we can hardly do better than a Yugoslav. Moreover, the rulings of the President of the Assembly are not so important with Article 19 in the ice-box. Sisco agreed, and noted that, in the past, Bloc chairmen of UN bodies have been very "correct." Tony Solomon added that the Yugoslavs will be dependent on us for assist-ance over the next couple years.

The group decided to look more closely into the possibility of a Yugoslav in the Presidency. Among other things, we will have to check with the West Europeans, to whom we are committed if they come up with a candidate. Also, we will want to know whether a Yugoslav will or will not reduce future pressures for a "real" East European in the job.

4. Conference on Outer Space--Goldberg, Sisco, and Meeker felt that we should respond affirmatively to a proposal for a Conference. This proposal has been in the works for a long time and we will be in a bad light if we don't respond affirmatively; moreover, we have plenty to crow about in this field. Rostow and a NASA official pointed out that there are some drawbacks. Inter alia, the Conference will be proposed for 1967 and this year will probably be a good one for the Russians--it marks the 10th anniversary of Sputnik and the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Also, the rhythm of our space program as opposed to the Russian space program is such that we will probably not look our best in 1967.

The group agreed to study this one some more, keeping in mind the possibility of shifting the Conference to 1968. Rusk noted that, in this review, we should take a hard look at what such a conference will cost.

/4/The long simmering Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir escalated into armed conflict on September 1 when Pakistani forces attacked Indian positions. For documentation regarding U.S. efforts to achieve a cease-fire, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXV. After prolonged talks, the two states agreed to and implemented a cease-fire on September 22.

/5/Chief S.O. Adebo of the Nigerian delegation to the General Assembly, Chairman of the Fifth Committee's Working Group.

Rostow (with Mann concurring) made the point that we have to be very careful how this one comes out--in effect, whatever comes out (a) should be politically tolerable for Shastri and (b) should not make it seem as though Ayub's aggression "has worked," and that he can "have all this and China too." In this regard, we should work on ways of putting Kashmir in a larger package, which will include a few costs for Pakistan.

6. World Disarmament Conference--Goldberg pointed out that there is strong sentiment for this sort of a Conference in the General Assembly and that we probably can't head it off. We should work hard in channeling this sentiment into the direction we want.

7. Chinese Representation--Goldberg said that USUN is more pessimistic than Washington and thinks that our chances are no better than 50-50 that we will be able to win a simple majority. We may well have to rely on the "important question" route. And, if this happens, we better watch out--the psychological impact of losing a simple majority could change the whole Chirep equation. Goldberg went on to say that we ought to be doing some very hard thinking on this entire question.

Some members of the group noted that the present particularly bellicose attitude of the Chinese should help us on this issue. Others disagreed, noting that some General Assembly delegates feel that this is precisely why the Chinese should be in the UN.

8. UN Finances--Goldberg said that there is support in the Secretariat for using the miscellaneous income of the UN to pay off the bonds; assessments could be increased to make up for this transfer. Rusk noted that this is a flim-flam which the Russians will put up with only if they want to. Goldberg thought that the Soviets might be willing--in view of the facts (a) that the Secretariat is pushing the idea and (b) that it is probable that the Secretariat has already sounded out the Russians on the question.

With regard to the annual UNEF expenses, Ambassador Yost noted that we would like to cut down the annual cost from $18 million to $10 or $11 million and that we would like to arrange it so that this is an assessment, or at least an apportionment. Rusk said that this is precisely the kind of problem that should be thrown to the Secretary-General. We are not the bill-collector for the UN.

9. South Africa and Apartheid--Goldberg said that we must do something about our posture on this issue and went on to propose that the U.S. Government announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U.S. investment in South Africa. The proposal brought forth a number of reservations. Rusk said that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses some tough problems and wondered what we are prepared to do about, for instance, Eastern Europe, Liberia, and countries with one-party regimes. Ball said that we could not expect the British to join us in this effort, and that the South Africans would surely retaliate in one way or another; as a matter of fact, there might be actions South Africa could take in the economic field that would really hurt. Ball went on to say that a voluntary program wouldn't work anyway. Others noted the ambiguity of the Africans themselves, some of whom still trade with South Africa.

/6/Presumably Charles W. Englehard, Jr.

10. Rusk and the General Assembly--Rusk said that he plans to be in New York for about ten days.

GC