U.S. Department of State

September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m., Tape 65.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. Goldberg called the President from New York City. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to United Nations issues.]

LBJ: Now, two or three things on my part.

AG: Yeah.

LBJ: You got a pencil there--

AG: Yes, I do.

LBJ: You want to take some notes? I said to the group the other day that we are not pro labor--the steel people or pro business. We are pro--

AG: [Inaudible]

LBJ: --pro freedom, pro freedom. Now, we're not pro Pakistani, we're not pro India, we're pro freedom in the world.

AG: Right.

LBJ: We're for any nation--every nation--determining what it wants to do and then being left alone--

AG: Right.

LBJ: --free from aggression. We're not even going to tell the North Vietnamese what they got to do or the Chinese what they got to do--

AG: Right.

/2/Warren Austin, Representative to the United Nations, 1947-1953.

/3/Henry Cabot Lodge, Representative to the United Nations, 1953-1960.

/4/Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon).

AG: Yeah.

LBJ: But now, when I asked you to go off the Court--

AG: Yes.

/5/Reference is to the Article 19 dispute.

/6/See Document 365.

AG: Right.

LBJ: So the President of the United States, the most powerful country in the world, and the United States is standing there and getting down on its knees, and not standing ten feet tall, but even standing lower than U Thant of Burma, to support him all the way on this thing. And we are transferring from the White House, up to the United Nations, our positions. So I told Bill Moyers to tell these folks that we can't be dealing under the table and carrying on little private negotiations with Pakistan, a little private one with India and a little private one with somebody else who is dealing between the two of them, while this man, his prestige, and his organization, and all of them are trying to work with the other nations of the world. We are really leaning over to try to go along with DeGaulle, to try to go along with the Russians if there is any way in the world we can.

Now, in that process, it's very important that you educate--and I think the basic qualification that you've got that the others have not had is two-fold. One is you don't point up the areas of disagreement, you find the areas that we can agree on and any damn fool can disagree on forty things.

AG: Yes.

LBJ: But the few things we can agree on, you search them out. Second is, I think that you can get over your viewpoint better to the country and to the public. So, I would like for you to say--Moyers said it this morning--"the position of the United States is as communicated by Goldberg yesterday upon advice and counsel and instructions of the President."

AG: Right.

LBJ: That's being done up there. We're not going to do it here. We're not going to do it at the State Department here, not going to do it with Ambassadors here, not going to do it with Pakistan and India here or out there. It's going to be done up there. So you and Rusk get together. Be sure you are in agreement then [break in conversation] even after the Council meeting, and any time you can, I'd give them the damnedest slug of information that they ever got about the United States supporting the United Nations and trying to build up the United Nations every way in the world you can, and then you try to be on that front page every morning right along with the Russians--

AG: Right.

LBJ: --in language that the cab driver can understand better than he can the Russians about how much you want peace. They say we don't want peace because I don't give out an interview every day.

AG: Right.

LBJ: Now, I don't give out an interview every day because it makes you look like a midget if I'm handling down here and you're just popping off up there.

AG: Right.

LBJ: So I'm trying to get it transferred where you speak for us--

AG: Right.

LBJ: --that we pull all of our folks together.

AG: Right.

LBJ: But in order to do that, you've got to get out all these columnists--now, you were going to do that for me on the steel thing, you never did get around to doing it because it never did come through and you got busy in India and Pakistan, and I never saw all these liberals--

AG: Did you get the letters that--

LBJ: I got the letters, but I'm talking about the columns.

AG: Yes.

LBJ: You remember what I told you. You got involved in Pakistan. We struck out on that. We'll do it again next time. Let's don't strike out on this though.

AG: Did Drew come through?

LBJ: No, ain't nobody come through. You just get busy on this--

AG: Yeah.

LBJ: --and be sure that before you go in your Council, after you get out of your Council, wherever you are--

AG: Yeah.

LBJ: --that you're backgrounding, talking to them and having hopes and strengths--

AG: Right.

LBJ: --here's the problem and that you are saying every breath "we think the Pakistan people ought to have a cease-fire until we can pull this thing. We think India ought to do it." What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Hold the two of them, be equal to both. Strictly neutral. Pull them together. No threats. But they've got to--they just can't afford to have this World War III and they just--people are still paying for World War II and World War I, and they can't have that kind of crime around their necks.

AG: Right.

LBJ: And you give plenty of information. And every day, say "I just talked to the President, I just talked to the Secretary of State," and you can talk to Bundy and to Bill Moyers, when I'm in other things. And to me.

AG: Right.

LBJ: But be sure that you are talking to them every day so that we can put everything we've got behind the United Nations in this endeavor. Now Bill wants to say something.

[Bill Moyers on the telephone, LBJ reading news article]

LBJ: "The arena is at the United Nations--"

AG: Right.

LBJ: "--Moyers said."

AG: Right.

LBJ: This was his--where I asked him to do yesterday and today. "Meanwhile, the official said, Johnson, for the President, was avoiding any specific comment on India, Pakistan, Red China, lest he create an inaccurate impression on U Thant that this country is proceeding on one course while the Secretary General has embarked on another."

AG: Right.

LBJ: "Our attitude, Moyers said, is that the entire proposition rests in the UN where it should be. Moyers added that the President continued to hope that the UN could produce a quick and positive result which would lead to restoration." I want him to quit hoping so much. "Johnson's time was greatly occupied with studying," and so forth. "Barring a change of heart, he will stay here." Now, I think you ought to use this with U Thant. I think you ought to just say "this represents a dramatic"--

AG: Yes.

LBJ: --"constructive move on the part of my government, that the President and the Secretary of State have said that where he leads us, we will follow. We will support this man." They turn him down and kick him in the ass, but we're going to put our arm around him, and you just tell us which way you'd go, and we'd support you as best we can.

AG: Right. Now, Mr. President, have you seen me on television on this subject?

LBJ: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

AG: All right.

LBJ: I think it's good, too.

/7/No transcript of the Goldberg speech was found. President Johnson also addressed the group. For text of his September 16 address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 999-1002.

LBJ: No. I can tell you. Bill, he's asking you?

BM: Yes, sir?

LBJ: Bill is busy talking with a more important--

BM: I, I saw it Mr. Ambassador--

AG: Yeah.

BM: --in The Washington Post this morning. There is a fuller account of it in the Star this afternoon.

AG: Yeah. Get a hold--I made a complete statement on this Kashmir thing where it's just what the President has been saying--

LBJ: Well, you get the Pauline Fredericks in and you get all of them in and you saturate--

AG: Right.

/8/Former Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.

AG: Mr. President, I'll do that. I'm doing it every day.

LBJ: Good.

AG: Can you do something for me?

LBJ: Yes sir.

AG: What the hell is Wayne Hays carrying a torch against me?

LBJ: No, he can't. Well, because, it's like saying what the hell is Wayne Morse against--

AG: Right.

LBJ: --steel companies.

AG: No, I'll take care of Wayne Morse.

LBJ: Yeah.

AG: I've taken care of him three or four times.

LBJ: Well, there ain't nobody can take care of Wayne Morse or Wayne Hays.

AG: Well, I'll take care of him partially. At least he didn't jump on us over the UN business.

LBJ: No.

AG: And, he was, he threatened to. And I'll get a hold of him.

Washington, September 20, 1965, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Meeting at 5:30 PM-Kashmir and 20th UN General Assembly

/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, he met in the Oval Office from 5:58 to 6:42 p.m. with Rusk, Bundy, Goldberg, McNamara, Ball, and Moyers. (Johnson Library) No record of the conversation was found.

1. Kashmir--It is likely that Goldberg will want to give you a current report on and talk about Kashmir. In fact, this item may take up a large part of the meeting.

/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1965, pp. 578-587.

(a) Forthcoming noises on certain disarmament questions--e.g., nuclear safeguards for non-nuclear countries; destruction of nuclear weapons; a World Disarmament Conference which would include the Chinese Communists. In this latter regard, there are those who would argue that soft noises to the Communist Chinese on the heels of a Chinese threat to the Indians would constitute poor timing.

(b) Proposals to channel more aid through the UN mechanism--e.g., an expansion of the Mekong idea.

Note: In the event Goldberg does raise these specific proposals in the context of his opening speech, you may want to discourage Goldberg from making any bold specific proposals which could be more usefully made by you from either an appropriate Washington or New York forum. On disarmament, I fear there is not much we can wisely add to our present position. On AID we must be careful to protect your right to review next year's programs and reach your own decisions. If you are pressed for time, Goldberg says you can stop with these matters. If you want to hear further discussion, it will probably be on the subjects as follows:

3. Presidency of the General Assembly--State will probably want to report to you on the status of the fight between Fanfani (Italy) and Popovic (Yugoslavia) for the Presidency of the General Assembly. The latest word today is that Popovic has withdrawn and that the way has been cleared for Fanfani.

4. Vietnam--While not inscribed as a General Assembly agenda item, State will probably want to red-flag the Vietnam issue, which will provide an important backdrop to the General Assembly session. In this regard, Chinese threats and/or moves, against India can be expected to mitigate the heat we receive on Vietnam.

5. Chinese Representation--State may want to report to you that we are safe on this issue for another year. Goldberg, while agreeing, may make the point that we have no better than a 50-50 chance to get a simple majority against the entrance of the Communist Chinese and that the psychological impact of losing a simple majority could conceivably make it tough for us to get the necessary votes to uphold the "important question" principle.

/4/The section of Goldberg's speech dealing with this question had been subjected to some editing within the Department of State. Komer supported, and President Johnson approved, the modifications. (Memorandum from Komer to Johnson, September 22; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2)

While my own sympathies lie with Goldberg on this issue I do not think we should consider anything drastic until later on when we have had a chance to take the UN temperature and when the International Court of Justice finishes with the related South West Africa issue in the spring of 1966.

7. Miscellaneous Issues--Rusk and Goldberg may want to take the opportunity to brief you on such miscellaneous items as UN financing and UN outer space problems (e.g. World Conference on Outer Space).

McG.B.

Washington, September 29, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential.

SUBJECT
U.S. Payments to the UN

1. Because we had a "no vote" 19th General Assembly, the UN has been operating during calendar year 1965 on a regular budget which has not yet been approved by the General Assembly. To get money for this budget, the Assembly, in February, asked members to make advance payments toward the 1965 budget to the tune of 80% of their 1964 assessments.

2. So far, 43 governments have made some sort of advance contribution to the 1965 budget, including the Russians who have so far kicked in an advance of roughly 30% of their assessments in 1964; the Russians are expected to pay the bulk of the balance of their regular budget assessments in 1965 as they have in the past (but not peacekeeping-related expenses). Up to now, we have made no advance contribution.

3. This afternoon Goldberg is going to make an advance payment of $24 million towards our 1965 assessments; this represents 80% of our 1964 assessments, plus $4.5 million for UNEF, less $3.9 million owed to us for bond repayment. We are doing this now because (a) the UN needs the money and (b) we want our name to appear on a financial statement which the Secretary General is putting out in the very near future.

State feels that our skirts are relatively clean with regard to Congress. We have notified Congress about what we are doing. Moreover, State points out that when Congress appropriated money for the regular UN budget and UNEF, they knew that the UN budget had not yet been approved and that the General Assembly had asked for advance contributions. Nevertheless, they made no stipulations about advance payments and were aware that they might occur.

4. State wanted us informed on this issue on the very slight chance that Goldberg's delivery of the money (which will be low key) causes any adverse reaction in Congress or in the press. If it does, we will take the line (a) that our payment, in line with a General Assembly resolution, merely represents an advance payment on assessments which we are going to have to pay this year anyway, (b) that the UN needs the advance money, and (c) that 43 other countries, including the Russians, have joined us in this effort.

GC

Washington, October 22, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential.

SUBJECT
UN Financing

In the event you are interested, here are some points on the UN's financial problems. Essentially, there are two fairly important issues at the present time--(a) repayment of the bonds and (b) the Secretary General's efforts to get $100 million from the UN membership.

1. The Bonds--Under present procedures, the UN budget assessment for the repayment of the bonds runs at the rate of $8.6 million per year (of which $3.8 million is owed to the U.S.). The UN is now in the fourth year of a 25-year repayment schedule.

The crux of the present problem is that the Russians and some others have been refusing to pay their share of assessments for the bonds on the grounds that they are a peacekeeping expense and should be paid for by voluntary contributions. We disagree; among other things, if a system of voluntary contributions is instituted, we conceivably may have trouble getting the $3 million per year which is owed to us and which we get now by simply subtracting this amount from our annual UN budget assessment. Also, a voluntary system might give us trouble with Congress, which approved the original bond purchase on the understanding that repayment would be from the regular UN budget.

The bond problem will probably be resolved, one way or another, in Committee 5 within the next couple weeks. Present indications are that there may be an attempt to use the UN budget's "miscellaneous income" to pay off the bonds. This is a flim-flam which would not pain us and which would provide a fig leaf for the Russians if they wanted to be forthcoming on the bonds. We don't know yet, however, whether the Russians in fact want to be forthcoming. If they are not forthcoming, we still think we will be able to avoid the unattractive voluntary contribution system for bond repayment--e.g. at worst, we can probably continue with the present arrangement which means that we get our $3 million per year and that the Russians keep piling up a debt on bond assessments.

2. Secretary General's Efforts--The Secretary General has said that the UN needs roughly $100 million. About $80 million of voluntary contributions are needed to pay old bills ($5.3 million is owed to us) and to restore the UN Working Capital Fund, while $18 million of voluntary contributions and assessments are needed to pay UNEF expenses for 1965.

So far, U Thant has collected $28 million, which includes $4.5 from us for assessed UNEF expenses. The Secretary General still feels he needs about $70 million. His chances of getting this amount depend in large part on what the Russians do--i.e. if they come through with a large voluntary contribution, others may follow close behind. The Russian contribution, in turn, probably depends partly on how the bond repayment issue comes out in the GA; if the Russians are fairly satisfied, there are some indications that they are prepared to contribute as much as $15 million.

The U.S. position at this time on voluntary contributions is fairly relaxed. While we are not saying it publicly, we think that U Thant's statistics have holes in them. Even if they are correct, the UN financial situation is not very desperate. It has been much worse in the past.

At this time, we are not thinking about giving any voluntary contributions to U Thant; we feel that we did our bit when we caved on Article 19 and that others should do their part. Only if voluntary contributions start coming in from everyone else (including the Russians) might we be willing to help. In this regard, one painless way of helping would be to simply waive reimbursement on the $5.3 million which is owed to us.

GC

New York, October 27, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 3. Confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

/2/For text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 125-129.

/3/None of the attachments is printed.

This Convention was submitted to the Congress in 1947, and it was deferred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They issued reports recommending approval. However, no final action was taken.

The principal effect of accession to the Convention would be to provide full diplomatic privileges and immunities for the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretaries of the United Nations and to provide immunity from arrest for delegates to the General Assembly and other temporary meetings. I am advised that the Justice Department has some reservations about extending immunity from arrest to General Assembly delegates, but I do not share these. I am attaching a memorandum of my views on this matter.

The United States has been criticized both privately and publicly at the United Nations for its failure to accede to the Convention, particularly since 92 other Member States have acceded to it. Lists of those acceding and those not yet parties are attached.

/4/In a November 9 letter to Goldberg, Bundy reported on the state of efforts to steer confirmation of this treaty through Congress. He also stated that Goldberg's letter had not been forwarded to the President pending completion of staff work. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3) Goldberg concurred in this decision in a letter of November 12 to Bundy. (Ibid.) The Senate did not take action on the treaty.

Sincerely,

Arthur J. Goldberg

Washington, November 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret. For additional documentation on the U.S. position on a world disarmament conference, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI.

SUBJECT
World Disarmament Conference

/2/Not found.

/3/McGeorge Bundy wrote "OK" in the margin next to this sentence.

On the other hand, if we continue to give the impression that we are not willing to have the Chicoms participate in disarmament outside the UN, it will only increase the determination of the WDC supporters to bring the Chicoms into the UN.

/4/William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

/5/November 21.

GC

New York, December 7, 1965, noon.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
UN--Secretary General U Thant
UN--Under Secretary Ralph Bunche
State--Under Secretary George Ball
USUN--Ambassador Goldberg (in part); Mr. Richard Pedersen
State--Assistant Secretary Sisco
State--Mr. George Springsteen

Mr. Ball opened his courtesy call on the Secretary General by telling him there was a solid group of admirers of the Secretary General in Washington, and that we believe he is doing a difficult job admirably. We want to be helpful to him in achieving his objectives. Mr. Ball explained that his visit was part of a program of more regular visits to the UN by high level officers from the Department, including regional assistant secretaries over the next ten days.

The Secretary General thanked Mr. Ball warmly and commented how very helpful Ambassador Goldberg has been and how quickly he has grasped the essentials of the work in New York. He asked Mr. Ball to convey to the President the Secretary General's belief that the President had made an excellent choice in bringing Ambassador Goldberg to the UN.

The Secretary General then immediately launched into Viet-Nam at his own initiative, inviting Mr. Ball to make any comments that he wished.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, Document 223.

/3/In a December 4 letter to the President, Goldberg reported that during recent talks with the Secretary General, U Thant had expressed the conviction that a cease-fire in Vietnam would be seen as proof of U.S. good will. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 127, Frames 722-724)

The Secretary General, almost without interruption, then went into a detailed rundown of the efforts he has made in the interest of a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem, since August of a year ago, expressing regret that they did not succeed. He said pointedly one thing continues to trouble him: was the President aware of his suggestions? Mr. Ball responded that the President was aware of the Secretary General's suggestions and that they were considered in the light of diplomatic possibilities then pending--though perhaps these suggestions might not have been as clearly explained to Washington as they should have been.

The Secretary General said he didn't know what role he now could play since indications are that Hanoi would not respond to any attempts by him now. He has not made any attempts to contact Peking in the last two years. He had felt that there was some prospect of contact with the Chinese in Algeria this past year since Ben Bella had invited the Secretary General to go there. When Chou En-lai arrived in Algeria, however, he told Ben Bella that he would object to meeting with the Secretary General as Secretary General, though he would not object to seeing him as an individual. This attitude on the part of Peking was confirmed when Chou left Algeria and stopped off in Burma to see Ne Win who advised Chou that he should see the Secretary General. The Secretary General indicated that he knows both Chou and Mao Tse Tung very well.

He also knows Ho Chi Minh. He recalled that he spent two days with Ho in 1954 when he accompanied U Nu to Peking, and he had a three-fold impression of him at that time: (a) that Ho Chi Minh was not a communist, (b) that he was not pro-Chinese (this fact was confirmed to the Secretary General by all of the ICC representatives, particularly the Indian), and (c) that he had a strong attachment for everything French.

/4/The French President made this proposal in a number of fora; see de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 217-219 and 234-237.

Finally, General de Gaulle had accepted the principle that a sovereign state must have the right to call for outside support if threatened by aggression.

But, said Mr. Ball while De Gaulle was prepared to concur with an acceptable definition of neutrality he did not offer any workable means of bringing about a peace based on these principles. The result was a point of divergence between ourselves and France. General de Gaulle's only procedural proposal was the calling of a big conference of 30-35 nations in which the problems of Southeast Asia could be submerged. Mr. Ball said we could contemplate a conference if it would be based on the principles he cited above and if the conference dealt realistically with the cessation of infiltration and aggression in South Viet-Nam.

It was on this point that De Gaulle's answers were unsatisfactory. The General's only proposal was that a cease-fire should begin the day the conference convened. De Gaulle was confident that once a cease-fire was called Ho Chi Minh would not fire a shot thereafter. Mr. Ball had replied that this was not in accordance with experience. What we faced in South Viet-Nam was not the classical confrontation of armies in regular formation but a war in which the aggressors and the defenders were all mixed up geographically. Under those circumstances it was very hard to see how a cease-fire could be effectively arranged--and once arranged how it could be policed. Mr. Ball was confident that unless a cease-fire was enforceable Ho Chi Minh would continue his guerrilla warfare and thus make a mockery of the negotiation.

The Secretary General said that his July meeting with De Gaulle had not dealt with these difficult modalities, and he had the impression that De Gaulle had in mind an Austrian-type neutrality. Both the Secretary General and Mr. Ball agreed that General de Gaulle in these respective conversations had not given any indication that he had had any kind of positive signal from Hanoi or that the views expressed regarding the neutralization of Southeast Asia were anything other than the views of General de Gaulle.

/6/August 6; see ibid., footnote 1, Document 298.

As soon as he had returned from his Washington talks he arranged to contact Ho Chi Minh through the USSR. He had informed the USSR that he wanted only Hanoi contacted with a view to seeing whether it was possible to get the Americans and North Vietnamese together in exploratory talks. He was confident that Peking did not know of this at that time and that the secret was kept from Peking for many months.

He said he had received a reply in three weeks through the USSR (September 1964). The USSR had informed him that Ho Chi Minh would be glad to send a representative anywhere the Americans wanted. The Secretary General also said that the DRV was thinking in terms of Ambassadorial level talks through each country's local representatives.

The Secretary General had asked Stevenson to convey this to Washington and both he and Stevenson had agreed that this was an opportunity that should be seized.

/7/See ibid., Document 427.

On December 2 Thant entered the hospital to have his ulcer treated and he and Stevenson lost contact three weeks. At the end of December he asked Stevenson if he had received a reply and Stevenson said he had no reply as yet.

The Secretary General said that after his return from Jamaica he met again with Stevenson on January 11 or 12. Stevenson had then asked the Secretary General at what place and at what level the conversations might take place. The Secretary General said he discussed four possibilities with Stevenson (Cambodia, France, Burma, Pakistan). He and Stevenson agreed that Burma would be best--with the level of representation to be the Ambassador on the spot since this would reduce the visibility. (Moreover, the Secretary General said that he held Ambassador Byroade in highest regard.) The Secretary General said that he directed a query to Rangoon and that Ne Win had replied, within 24 hours, that he would be willing to provide facilities in Rangoon. This was on the 16th of January.

During this period the Secretary General said he kept the Soviets regularly informed. The Soviets asked him on occasion for information regarding the United States reaction. The Secretary General said that on the 29th or 30th of January Stevenson gave the reply. Stevenson said that Washington had considered the Secretary General's suggestions fully and that it could not agree. The reason given the Secretary General by Stevenson was that the United States could not engage in discussions without the South Vietnamese since this would demoralize them and might result in another fall of the Government there. The Secretary General said that both he and Stevenson had agreed that, in view of the fact that there had been so many governmental changes in Saigon, the argument regarding the fall of government was not a persuasive one.

The Secretary General said that at the end of January he transmitted our reply to Hanoi. He has since found out that Peking did not learn of all this until February of this year at which time Peking then blasted Moscow. Without mentioning the Secretary General specifically, Peking started attacking him in June or July of this year.

The Secretary General said that his message must have gotten to Hanoi about February 5 when the bombing started.

/8/Extracts of U Thant's February 24 press conference are in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations, vol. VII, U Thant, 1965-1967, pp. 42-50.

/9/Apparent reference to a report that U Thant stated that the United States turned down a peace proposal he had forwarded. The reports grew out of oblique comments by the Secretary General during his February 24 press conference that the U.S. Government was holding back the truth about the possibilities of negotiated peace from the American people. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Documents 161, 162, and 164.

/10/See ibid., Document 233.

He said that when he saw Stevenson in Geneva in July the latter had said he had no reply from Washington on the cease-fire proposal.

/11/See ibid., vol. XII, Document 327.

/12/See ibid., vol. III, Document 119.

After having run through the above chronology in very considerable detail, the Secretary General reflected for a moment and said he wanted to go back even farther. He recalled that in November, 1963, after Diem's fall, he had told Stevenson that the US must do something and had told him that every effort should be made to establish a national government in which all sections and all groups of Viet-Nam would be represented. He suggested the US should contact Tran Van Huu in Paris and ask him to return to Saigon to form such a government. He reported that Stevenson was enthusiastic over this proposal and had transmitted it to Washington.

/13/For text of the Four Points, see ibid., vol. II, Document 245.

Mr. Ball assured the Secretary General that we had looked long and hard at the proposal for a coalition government in 1963, and reiterated that the US could not accept it since it opened the door to a Communist takeover.

Several times throughout the conversation Mr. Ball reiterated that on the basis of evidence available to us, there had been no indications from the other side of a willingness to sit down unconditionally. Mr. Ball cited Seaborne's reports to us running from the Fall of 1964 to May of this year. The Secretary General's response was that Hanoi would not be as frank with the Canadians as with him.

Mr. Ball turned the conversation to the current situation. He said that, no matter how historians might sort out the past, the present reality was formidable. He stressed we are actively pursuing every possibility for a peaceful solution and reiterated our strong desire for unconditional discussion.

While the foregoing follows very much the same lines of what the Secretary General has said to Goldberg in past weeks, the most interesting aspect of this conversation relates to the Secretary General's current views. The Secretary General said the Chinese in the past two months have been giving massive aid, both in small arms and food, to North Viet-Nam. He doubted the reports of direct Chinese Communist involvement with troops. Mr. Ball suggested that perhaps some Chinese Communist personnel were involved in technical and engineering work, bridge building, and repair of the railroad.

In view of this massive aid, the Secretary General indicated that he had information that the Soviets were nearing a big decision. They must show solidarity with Peking or go the other way. (He seemed very clear on this point.) The Secretary General felt that this decision would be related to the possibility of the Soviets having to honor their mutual security pact with China. The Secretary General indicated that he was aware of rumors floating around the UN corridors among the Eastern Europeans of such a decision but he doubted that the Eastern Europeans really had any inside information. He also felt that the change in Indonesia would play a big part in present Soviet thinking and would have a key effect on the Soviet decision. He implied, but did not say so directly, that if the Indonesians continued to move away from Peking this might help the Soviets to move away or break with Peking.

The conversation concluded with the Secretary General responding to a question regarding his actions at the time of the non-aligned appeal. He reported that while he had been asked by Stevenson to follow-up and that he had done so with the Soviets, he found that the Soviets were unwilling to put any pressure on Hanoi at that time.

Mr. Ball thanked the Secretary General for receiving him and reiterated the US Government's regard for the Secretary General. He also noted his intention to report this conversation to the President.

New York, December 22, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Twentieth General Assembly--An Assessment

/2/During its September 21-December 22 session.

The so-called Cold War items met increasing resistance and apathy, Tibet and Korea suffering accordingly. Moreover, there was a significant and dangerous erosion in our position on Chinese Representation. While by very hard lobbying we maintained a thin majority, we must seriously reconsider our policy on this subject if we are to avoid a major defeat in the Assembly next year. This is particularly true because there was a disturbingly dangerous tendency in this session to treat more and more items which clearly involve substantive matters as being purely procedural and, therefore, requiring only a simple majority to decide.

Disarmament, which occupied more than one-half of the Political Committee's time, was one area where we can perhaps take the most satisfaction with the outcome. With near unanimity, the General Assembly agreed with our view that disarmament questions should be negotiated in Geneva and that priority attention should be given to efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is particularly reassuring since when the session opened it was unclear--in view of its previous lack of progress--whether the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee would even be continued. We were able to vote with the overwhelming majority in favor of a World Disarmament Conference which was designed to bring the Chinese Communists into the disarmament picture, but we must proceed delicately on the follow-up steps. We are trying to organize preparations so that any such conference would be productive and that, if it should fail, the onus would rest with the Chinese Communists.

The Assembly regrettably made little headway in clarifying how future peacekeeping operations can be financed in the aftermath of Article 19. The entire problem was remanded to the Committee of 33 for further study. The one bright note in this regard was the Assembly's willingness to continue the apportionment of UNEF costs for 1965 and 1966 among the entire membership. If this pattern can be maintained in one form or another, United Nations peacekeeping will be more effective and the United States will have less to pay than if the United Nations should have to rely solely on voluntary contributions. We were pleased with a French initiative establishing a study committee to examine how the budgets of United Nations agencies could be brought under tighter control.

A related and equally important item, introduced by the United Kingdom, on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, unfortunately suffered a sudden demise when the Africans vented their spleen on the British for Southern Rhodesia by deciding not to consider it further in this session.

/3/G.A. Res. 2103 (XX).

/4/On November 5 the General Assembly approved a resolution calling on the United Kingdom to use "all necessary measures," including military force, to subdue the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The white colonial administration of Southern Rhodesia declared its independence on November 11. On November 20 the Security Council voted to impose an embargo on Southern Rhodesia. (S.C. Res. 217 (1965))

We remain in a very small minority on subjects like apartheid and Portuguese Territories where African demands for sanctions go far beyond our views of what is fitting and proper. Our large investments in South Africa are under particularly heavy attack and, if our opposition to apartheid is to remain credible, we may have to take steps to reduce future investment. Should South Africa and Portugal flout the oil embargo on Rhodesia, pressure for further action against them would be particularly difficult to resist.

Over the coming year, we will still be faced with troublesome colonial problems in several General Assembly sub-organs such as the Committee of 24 and the Apartheid Committee.

The merger of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund into the United Nations Development Program with a program target of $200 million designed to carry out the United Nations work in the fields of technical assistance and preinvestment had overwhelming support, including that of the United States, as did the decision to establish within the United Nations a United Nations Organization for Industrial Development to assist the developing countries. The fact that the United States and other Western countries were able, after intensive discussion and negotiation, to convince the developing countries to support the latter as a reasonable alternative to their idea of a new Specialized Agency for Industrial Development is encouraging.

/5/Documentation on U.S. policies on human rights is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 315 ff.

Many of the new members will from time to time misuse the Assembly and over-ride its rules on matters in which they are emotionally involved. Nevertheless, the Assembly will continue to be useful to us not only as a forum for exchanging views with friends and enemies alike, but also as a fallback for peacekeeping operations blocked by a veto in the Security Council. We should look to the degree feasible to the Security Council as the primary instrument for accomplishing major peace and security business, despite the fact that the veto and the recent expansion of the Council from 11 to 15 members will limit its utility. Already during this session we have seen how the Council can perform important tasks in this area even while the General Assembly is meeting, since it dealt successfully with such critical problems as Kashmir, Cyprus and Southern Rhodesia.

Arthur J. Goldberg

New York, January 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U Thant, Vol. 1. Personal.

My Dear Mr. President,

I am asking Ambassador Goldberg to be so kind as to deliver this message to you personally, since he has told me that he plans to go to Washington tomorrow.

/2/The meeting took place on January 4. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 127, Frames 832-833)

My position on the various aspects of the Vietnam question has been made known to you and your distinguished predecessor over the past two years through my discussions with your representatives at the United Nations. You will readily appreciate, therefore, that I warmly welcome every effort designed to move the Vietnam conflict from the battleground to the conference table. I most earnestly hope that the efforts which you are now making in this direction will lead to a peaceful settlement of this tragic problem.

You are, of course, well aware also of my position with regard to the cessation of bombing and therefore you will know that I look with favour upon the present pause in the bombing; the more particularly so, since no time limit has been indicated for the present pause, which is consistent with my conviction that any such pause, if it is to have the intended effect must be of indefinite duration.

I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for keeping me fully informed of your efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Thant

New York, January 12, 1966, 2322Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential; Exdis.

3079. Subject: UN Peacekeeping and Attitude of SYG.

Yost expressed to Bunche yesterday our view that it is important that work of Comite of 33 be commenced promptly and be pushed forward vigorously. We expressed hope SYG wld cooperate in this endeavor and mentioned that Fanfani might be most effective chairman of Comite if he is available.

Bunche agreed most heartily. He went on to say that he has been attempting for some time to persuade SYG that UN peacekeeping is in state of most acute crisis that he, Bunche, has ever seen during his long tenure and that, unless it can be promptly revived, there is grave risk that it may almost entirely fade away. He added however that he has been unable to convince either SYG or Rolz-Bennett that situation is so serious.

/2/Made during the October 25-28, 1965, Security Council debate on the Kashmir issue. The Soviet delegate accused the UN of overstepping its authority.

Yost pointed out that Sovs had for a period of weeks endeavored to persuade Council to take action which wld bind SYG in this way but that Council had refused to do so and hence had in effect rejected any such modus operandi. Bunche agreed entirely and said that he had made this point repeatedly to SYG but without effect.

He added in strictest confidence that Thant is simply too good-natured and too "soft" to deal effectively with peacekeeping crisis which now exists. He, Bunche, has definitely decided to leave UN in Feb 1967 when his commitment to Thant expires. It was clear that his determination to do so arises from his frustration in current situation.

Yost asked whether he thought Thant expects to seek another term. Bunche replied that he believes Thant wld much prefer to retire but that, on the other hand, in view of hostile situation in Burma, it wld probably be impossible for him to return there, and he might therefore feel that, having no place to retire to without loss of face, he might end up by staying where he is.

Yost

Washington, January 25, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, U, G, FE, H, and S. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Goldberg's Meeting With the House Democratic Study Group

/2/For text of the January 21 letter signed by 77 House members, see the Congressional Record, vol. 112, pp. 897-898.

/3/For documentation regarding the peace offensive of December 1965-January 1966, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes III and IV.

/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706.

The thrust of the questions was directed at why the Administration has not used the UN more on the Vietnam matter. The following questions are illustrative:

1. Why not convene the Security Council and, if there is a veto, call for a special session of the General Assembly and present a resolution recommending that the Geneva Conference be convened and calling for free elections in Vietnam?

2. Why reject Thant's suggestion that the Viet Cong be made a party at interest and be given a role in the Government?

3. Why not find a way to get North and South Vietnam into the UN?

There were several questions regarding the resumption of bombing of the North and in particular what our assessment was as to the effect of resumption on future prospects for negotiation with the other side.

In general, the questions were balanced and searching. The overall impression was an expression of concern that the Administration's efforts should continue in pursuing its peace initiatives. No member of the group, either directly or indirectly, called for escalation.

Joseph J. Sisco

TDCS DB-315/01186-66

Washington, April 21, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations, USSR, France

DOI
Mid-April 1966

SUBJECT
Factors Influencing the Secretary General of the United Nations in Determining Whether He Will Run for Reelection

ACQ
(15 and 19 April 1966)

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[3 lines of source text not declassified]

1. United Nations Secretary General U Thant will probably reach a decision by the end of June as to whether he will run for reelection. He is confident he has the support of the French and British Governments. He is uncertain of Soviet support and says he has had some "differences" with the Soviets that have not been altogether healed. He is unsure of the attitude of the United States. If the United States is satisfied that he is the best man available, some indication of this to him would influence his decision.

2. U Thant will take soundings during the next two months to determine his support. Among his objectives will be assurance of a free hand in effecting an internal reorganization of the Secretariat to rid it of much "dead wood." If his soundings indicate a willingness on the part of those queried to give him the requisite prerogatives, this will be another contributing factor in his decision to remain in his position.

3. The Secretary General's wife is violently opposed to this decision by her husband. She dislikes New York and life in the United States and exerts every pressure she can on her husband to return to Burma.

[1 paragraph (10-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. Field Dissem: None. Also sent USUN.

Washington, April 23, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential.

Secretary Rusk informed me as follows on the U Thant matter.

1. He shares your view of U Thant.

2. He has personally boxed the compass in recent weeks looking for an alternative in ways that would avoid a leak.

3. The central problem is the Soviet veto. This eliminates: a Western European; a Latin American; or an Asian ally.

4. An African was conceivable; but the Secretary is convinced a good African would not be acceptable to Moscow; for example, Robert Gardner, able head of the Economic Commission for Africa.

5. The Secretary and Arthur Goldberg reluctantly concluded that U Thant was better than a weak African acceptable to Moscow.

6. As for a Presidential letter, the Secretary was initially skeptical. He felt a verbal message of U.S. support would suffice. Goldberg argued strongly that a letter would:

--earn us a little future credit with U Thant;

--convince U Thant he was in and would not have to accept any conditions from the British and French on his trip to Europe beginning Monday.

7. Secretary Rusk would be pleased to discuss this further, if you desire. I'm, of course, at your disposal.

Walt

New York, May 4, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

I believe the time has arrived when your Administration should move ahead on international human rights conventions, as it has so effectively on human rights in the United States. Accordingly, I urge that you use your leadership, persuasiveness and skills to assure the approval by the Senate of the ratification of certain United Nations human rights treaties.

/2/For text of President Kennedy's letter to the Senate on these treaties, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 586.

/3/For text of P.L. 88-352, July 2, 1964, see 78 Stat. 241.

Ratification of these treaties would require no changes in domestic law in the United States. But it would be of immense value in helping to set and uphold international standards--a fact that the United States accepted when it ratified the UN Charter. Moreover, ratification of human rights conventions would represent a new, liberal departure in our international relations. It would also enable us to answer Soviet criticism in a psychologically important area of international cooperation.

You may recall that the Bricker amendment controversy was a principal factor in our unwillingness to participate in international human rights conventions under the Eisenhower Administration. President Kennedy decided to consider each such convention on its merits and, accordingly, transmitted the three conventions mentioned above to the Senate.

Ratification of human rights conventions is the logical complement to the domestic effort in the racial field begun by President Kennedy and brought to fruition under your leadership. In the present circumstances we are losing much of the international advantage that could be gained from a truly exceptional domestic record.

A number of non-governmental organizations in the United States have joined together in an Ad Hoc Committee on Human Rights and Genocide Treaties, to urge the ratification of these instruments. Among the members of the Ad Hoc Committee are the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Democratic Action, the United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO, and various religious organizations. I am confident that, with your encouragement, these groups could contribute to understanding in the Senate and the American public of the importance of US ratification of human rights conventions. I urge that you meet with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee.

There are two frequently advanced arguments against ratification of human rights conventions; first, it is said that such treaties are an improper use of the treaty power. I cannot imagine the Supreme Court would hold that the protection of the flight of birds is a greater national concern than the protection of human beings. Yet the United States has ratified bilateral treaties on this subject with Mexico and Canada. Second, it is argued that such treaties may require domestic legislation which would distort the normal state-federal relationships. I cannot accept this argument. In any case the human rights conventions currently before the Senate, except for the Genocide Convention, would require no implementing legislation.

/4/For text, see 78 UNTS 27.

It is my fervent hope that you will take a strong stand in favor of ratification of human rights conventions. I would myself be glad to undertake advance consultations with members of the Senate before any public statement is made and to testify in support of ratification.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

TDCS DB-315/01304-66

Washington, May 6, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations/USSR

DOI
Early May 1966

SUBJECT
Comment of Soviet Employee of UN Secretariat on Soviet support for U Thant's reelection and on Soviet desires for personnel changes in the Secretariat

ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (3 May 1966)

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[3 lines of source text not declassified]

1. [3 lines of source text not declassified] said in early May 1966 that the USSR will support the reelection of U Thant as United Nations Secretary General. The USSR does not regard U Thant highly, he said, but it sees no alternative candidates. The USSR does not wish to cause a fight on this issue.

2. If U Thant stays in office [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes he will revamp the personnel in the United Nations Secretariat. The USSR wants the retirement of Ralph J. Bunche as Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs and Paul Hoffman as director of the United Nations Special Fund. The USSR also wishes the removal of some other Americans and Western Europeans from the Secretary. The USSR will urge U Thant to appoint more officials from Socialist countries, but not the USSR, to the Secretariat. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said, as an example, that not one Cuban was employed in the higher echelons of the United Nations.

3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] commented that if the United Nations Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan resigns, present Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs Jose Rolz-Bennett would be a likely candidate to replace him. If Rolz-Bennett is promoted, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes the present Mexican permanent representative to the United Nations, Francisco Cuevas Cancino, would be a prospective candidate for the position as Under-Secretary in Charge of the Office of Public Information. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] spoke highly of Cuevas Cancino.

[1 heading and 1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

/2/This telegram reported on personnel changes in the UN Secretariat. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UNP-3)

C. Another source who has reported accurately in the past on contacts with the Soviets, but who also seems to reflect the Soviet "line", said on 28 April 1966 that, according to a "report" he had heard from unnamed persons (whom he insisted were not Soviets), the Soviets recently discussed a second term with Secretary General U Thant and attached the following conditions for their support:

(1) C.V. Narasimhan should no longer retain the dual responsibility of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs and Chef de Cabinet. The Soviets feel that Narasimhan has too much influence on the Secretary General and they wish his functions split, with Narasimhan retaining the position of Chef de Cabinet and someone else taking the portfolio of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs.

(2) The Secretary General in the future should be counselled by an advisory board that could consist of Ralph Bunche, Jose Rolz-Bennett Narasimhan, and Aleksey Nestorenko. (Headquarters Comment. Bunche and Rolz-Bennett are both Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs and Nestorenko is Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs.) The Soviets claim that Nestorenko is never "brought upstairs" by the Secretary General for major policy discussions. The Soviets, according to this "report," would seem to prefer cabinet type meetings giving them a chance to know what others are saying. The Soviets do not feel that they have an appropriate voice in the Secretary General's formulation of his policy decisions. According to this same "report," the Secretary General found the Soviet conditions unacceptable and told the Soviets that if they had a better candidate to offer for his position, they should do so. The source concluded his account of this "report" by saying that the Soviets obviously do not question the Secretary General's sincerity and have no one else to offer as a candidate.

5. Field Dissem: None. Also sent USUN.

Washington, June 3, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential.

WWR:

The White House has a choice on how we handle the UN account.

With sporadic exceptions, we have generally left the job to State. There was a time when Arthur Schlesinger (Sam Belk helping full-time) made it his part-time account. Otherwise the UN account has been "additional duty" for an NSC staffer with other responsibilities. There have been brief spurts of high-level attention like the 20th Anniversary speech last year. But I think it is fair to say on balance that there has been no Presidential policy toward the UN and international organizations, at least since the end of 1963.

/2/Not printed; the April 25 memorandum was entitled "Forward Planning: United Nations."

There are several current opportunities to show this leadership:

1. We can bury or build from the ICY experience. I will lay this choice out for you and the President in more detail shortly. But the question is whether the President wants to capitalize on a great deal of citizen interest in practical international problems and try to direct it into useful channels.

/3/Dated March 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Unarranged Files, NSC Miscellaneous Memos and Reports, 1965-1968)

3. The President has the usual choice of making a speech to the UNGA in the fall. Now is the time to begin vigorous staffing (see my memo).

4. Ambassador Goldberg has proposed we host a UN seminar on eliminating racial discrimination in connection with the Human Rights year (1968)--a terrific opportunity to marry the President's domestic and foreign programs.

In short, there are exciting opportunities. There is probably more day-to-day slogging than dramatic achievement in them, but a good substantive speech to the UN and a decent response on ICY could be a very good six months' work in brightening the President's image.

How do we do this? You either have to sell the President right off or gamble on selling him case by case until he excites himself. Either way, if you want to make this presidential, you need a full-time staff man. Here are some of the choices I see (keeping the budget in mind):

1. Budget has a very good man (David Stottlemeyer) working on the international organizations. He has academic study in the field and has seen a lot of the operation on the ground. He wants to make his career in this field. Would it be possible to work out some arrangement with Schultze like you have with Hornig on Keeny--you buy half his time? The Budget half of his time would give him needed depth on the programs.

2. I could detach myself from NEA and tackle this, though I wonder whether it makes sense to sacrifice over four years of experience in the area and start over again. We are just digging into the new idea business in NEA.

3. A combination of #1 and #2 would be for Stottlemeyer to spend the NSC part of his time working with Howard and me, at least until he learns how to handle the President's business.

4. I don't know enough about the Johnson-Keeny enterprises to know whether there's as much duplication there as appears. Could Chuck tackle this?

5. If you can afford another full-time staff member, the field is wide open.

/4/A handwritten note by Saunders at the end of the memorandum reads: "Afterthought: A long shot might be to put a good White House Fellow on this next season. But he'd be handicapped with IO."

Hal

Washington, June 24, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. A copy was sent to Charles Johnson. For text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, signed January 27, 1967 and entered into force for the United States on October 10, 1967, see 18 UST 2410. Documentation relating to the negotiation of the treaty is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI.

SUBJECT
Celestial Bodies Treaty

/2/None of the attachments was found attached.

Although the substance of this Treaty is somewhat remote to our current problems, it has special significance in that it may well be the only agreement the President can hope to get with the Soviets in the near future. However, we are concerned that, even though the U.S. and Soviet positions do not appear to be very far apart, the question could easily get tied up in the prolonged negotiations over the details of the wording.

I found the attached instructions much too concerned with the question of pride of authorship. If the President wants a quick agreement, we cannot insist that every word have a U.S. stamp on it, particularly when there is no substantive objection to some of the Soviet language. In any event, the impact will come from the fact of agreement and very few people will read the text carefully enough to have any idea as to the nationality of the drafters. I have discussed this point with Len Meeker and he has agreed to soften the language in the instructions.

I also think we have unnecessarily introduced the inspection issue in a meaningless manner by insisting in Article VI that we have a Treaty right to access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies. At the same time, the U.S. delegation is empowered to agree to inclusion in the Treaty of the substance of the "no bombs in orbit" U.N. Resolution without provision for inspection. Since some people consider "bombs in orbit" a real threat, I would not advise opening up this can of worms before the Senate by focusing attention on it through its specific exclusion from the inspection provisions of the Treaty. If we simply ignore the inspection issue in the Treaty, we can easily take the position that we will unilaterally take whatever actions we choose both in space and on celestial bodies to verify the peaceful nature of foreign activities. Len Meeker has agreed to explore this problem further with State and DOD with the thought of dropping the Article entirely. I have also asked him to make sure that the negotiations both here and in Geneva are properly coordinated with ACDA which has not really been involved in the problem to date.

The State Department is talking about negotiating all summer on this with the thought that the Soviets want to refer it to the General Assembly this fall. If the President would like to see a quick agreement on this subject, we would recommend that, in addition to the formal instructions to the delegation, the President make this wish clear to Rusk and Goldberg prior to Goldberg's departure for the negotiations so that he will be in a position to move for a quick deal if this is possible.

Spurgeon

Geneva, July 6, 1966, 1958Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the telegram indicates it was forwarded to President Johnson.

61. For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg. Subject: RE Viet-Nam.

1. I had hour's private conversation with U Thant on number UN matters, but wish report promptly significant part of this talk as it relates to SYG's primary preoccupation--Viet-Nam.

2. I smoked him out indirectly regarding any possible plans he might have to send Rolz Bennett to Hanoi and Peking in near future and I am satisfied based on what he said that he has no such present plans. It also became obvious during conversation that while there is no formal agenda for his talks in Moscow late this month, Viet-Nam would be one of the subjects discussed. I urged that he confine this discussion to support Prime Minister Wilson's longstanding proposal that the co-chairmen join in reconvening the Geneva Conference rather than exploring SYG's three-point peace proposals, emphasizing that as he knew his proposal for a unilateral suspension of bombing would not be acceptable to the United States. He in turn indicated that he really expected nothing more from the Soviets on this issue than a reiteration of their frequently stated position in support of the total program of Hanoi and the Viet-Cong.

3. I found SYG remains quite concerned as he has been for some time over the course of events in Viet-Nam. He remains convinced the course of the war in Viet-Nam will push the North Vietnamese closer to the Chinese camp which he maintains Hanoi has been resisting. SYG also remains convinced that Ho and Pham Van Dong do not want to be dominated by Chi Coms but that there are elements in the Communist Party, particularly its secretary, who lean in that direction. He said he has unverified reports that they will make a trip to Moscow, presumably before SYG himself goes there.

4. He also informed me that he had recent report from Algerians about which I indicated great skepticism, that during the last bombing pause Ho Chi Minh had advised UAR Ambassador that he had withdrawn some of his regular forces from the South as a concrete manifestation of Ho's desire to move toward a negotiated settlement. I commented we had received no such indication to my knowledge from the UAR, and on the contrary our intelligence reports indicated a build-up by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces and supplies to the South. The Secretary General himself seemed to indicate skepticism concerning the Algerian report. Moreover I also pointed out the United States, having established direct contact with the North Vietnamese during that period, received no such indications from them.

5. SYG informed me that on recent visit to Italy Fanfani reported to him that Pol[ish] ICC Ambassador had had conversation with Ho Chi Minh on June 27 in which Ho presumably said that they would be prepared to engage in serious discussions with US, notwithstanding Chinese and Soviet objections, if bombing were suspended and if Viet-Cong participated in talks. According to Thant, this information relayed by Pol ICC Ambassador to Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated it to Fanfani. Thant further reported that Fanfani believed message contained two new elements: (a) that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of bombing, merely a suspension; and (b) Ho not insistent that Viet-Cong be sole representatives of South Vietnamese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told the Secretary General that he thought this message of such importance that it warranted sending a special Italian emissary to Washington to communicate the substance of it to United States officials. SYG said Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in Washington to remain there pending a probe through Fanfani of the word, suspension, and also to inquire what Ho meant by saying Viet-Cong would have to participate in the talks. Fanfani swore U Thant to secrecy and the Secretary General therefore imparted this information to me in the strictest confidence saying he had not communicated to anyone in Secretariat. He asked in particular that I not raise this with Fanfani, but if latter mentioned it to me, I should disclaim knowledge of it from SYG, except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington.

/2/The instructions were contained in an unnumbered telegram from the Mission to the United Nations in New York to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject File, Reel 95, Frame 1553)

Tubby

New York, July 15, 1966, 1521Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Department.

122. For Goldberg from Finger. Re Geneva query on Waldheim's qualifications, mission personnel who know him best are probably you and Tacher, who in Geneva. Amb Yost whom we have consulted feels Waldheim, if elected with broad support, would be "safe" SYG in sense that he could be trusted resist direct or indirect pressures on his office or authority or actions contrary to US interests. On other hand, does not believe Waldheim has qualities of strong leadership which would be desirable in getting UN out of doldrums on peacekeeping problems. Waldheim's cautious nature and likely inability mobilize ASAFs effectively even if originally supported by them may, in Yost's view, limit his capacity for leading UN toward more positive development its potential.

/2/John Baker of USUN.

Of poss interest is statement to MisOff July 14 by Lessiowski (UN Sect) who just back from Moscow where he participated for 4 days in June in preparations for SYG visit which then envisaged for early July. He claimed Sov Govt supports continuation of SYG and putting no qualifications or reservations on it. He personally believes SYG will decide continue for three years but does not claim any inside info and admittedly he is influenced by his own hopes of being appointed UN Rep at D-2 level in Moscow in Dec.

Anderson

Geneva, July 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Repeated to NASA, DOD, USUN, and Moscow.

/2/Concerning the Celestial Bodies Treaty; see Document 384 and footnote 1 thereto.

1. I met this morning with Morozov at his suggestion for approximately two and one-half hours. The meeting was essentially negative in result; he remained insistent on essential elements of Soviet positions where we have had differences. Detailed account follows.

/3/For text of the treaty signed January 27, 1967, see 18 UST 2410.

Next, Morozov said the USSR accepted the idea of a provision on reporting information relating to the physical safety of astronauts; however, such information should be furnished directly to governments and not through UNSYG. Then, Morozov said USSR was waiting for US concession on access, reporting, and military equipment.

3. I said we had hoped for a more forthcoming response since the US has been entirely forthcoming on the major issue of scope; Soviet response this morning had simply not met our needs.

/4/For text of the resolution adopted October 17, 1963, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, pp. 133-134.

/5/For text of the treaty, signed at Washington, December 1, 1959, see 12 UST 794.

6. I reminded Morozov that non-space powers would ask for reciprocity in regard to launchings if MFN obligations should be laid on non-space powers re furnishing of tracking stations. Morozov simply said that this would be an unreasonable demand: if US and USSR agree, there will be no problems here. He justified the MFN provision as contributing to cosmonaut safety. I observed that his proposal was politically impractical, and that Soviet space program had been highly successful in absence of international MFN commitments on tracking stations.

7. Morozov said USSR insisted on the voluntary character of reports; US formula would lead to mutual accusations. As to Japanese proposal on access, it would let visitor decide on safety precautions; they are not able to do this alone, and there must be joint efforts. I then sounded him out on rewording of Japanese amendment as follows: "Such representatives and those of all other states parties concerned should take maximum precautions to protect the safety and the normal functioning of activities therein." As for reporting, I said the US takes a position of principle not of self-interest; there would not be great arguments; the world scientific community can judge, and the reports of other countries will be a standard for determining adequacy. I emphasized that we considered reporting on a voluntary basis unsatisfactory. In reply, Morozov said the USSR insisted on voluntary. As for amended Japanese language on access, he could agree to it if this were an addition to the Soviet language on visit by agreement. I said I thought this Soviet proposal was illogical. I went on to say that advance notification is different from agreement, and perhaps we could get together on this. We could also say that visitors and visited should "join in taking maximum precautions." Morozov then proposed advance notification for the timing of a visit agreeable to both sides. I said this defeated the purpose of our suggestion, and asked whether he would accept "advance notification sufficient to ensure safety." Morozov rejected this on ground it would permit visitors to determine timing.

8. I asked Morozov whether his understanding of "military equipment" would exclude a launching rocket and a capsule. His reply was "this goes without saying" i.e., it is permissible to use an ICBM rocket for this purpose. I pressed him as to whether he meant a rocket usable also for military purposes and he gave the same reply.

9. At conclusion of meeting I asked for his conception of how we should proceed on bilateral discussion and in the subcommitee. Morozov said he was willing to follow any reasonable procedure. He suggested we present a commonly agreed text where possible, and report the results from the working group to the subcommittee, and later from the subcommittee to the full committee. I said this would not be very constructive; it would mean no agreement but instead a report of failure. I suggested we consider the matter further and also advise the chairman at an appropriate time. Morozov simply said the Soviet delegation was ready to continue the efforts at agreement; there was no need for pessimism; only four items remain: access, reporting, military equipment, and equal conditions. We agreed to be in touch later today.

Tubby

Geneva, August 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President.

For President Johnson and Secretary Rusk from Goldberg (Geneva, 676).

As you know, the Outer Space Committee has recessed Space Treaty negotiations which will be reconvened in New York before or early during the forthcoming General Assembly. In addition to detailed reports which the delegation has made concerning the negotiations, I wish to make the following comments:

On the whole, we can regard the negotiations to date as reflecting great credit upon the United States, for the following reasons:

/2/For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 487-488.

2. The attitude of the U.S. delegation in accordance with Department instructions has been forthcoming and this too has resulted in very favorable claim on world opinion both diplomatically and in the world press. Intelligence reports confirmed that it is the shared opinion among the delegations irrespective of ideology that Soviets have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of forthcoming and conciliatory attitude of the U.S. delegation.

3. In final statements by delegates winding up this phase of deliberations, only Hungary and Bulgaria fully supported Soviet reservations which for time being blocked a treaty. It is interesting that statements by Poland and Romania did not expressly support key Soviet reservation on equal access and reporting. Unless the Soviets remain unwilling because of Vietnam to conclude an agreement in General Assembly, I see no reason why a final treaty text cannot be speedily concluded once the Committee reconvenes in New York.

My own analysis of Soviet actions here is that Morozov, the Soviet representative, was acting under instructions not to make a final agreement in Geneva but to reserve a few points as a delaying maneuver. It is my impression that Soviets were unwilling because of concern about Chinese criticism to make it appear that they were agreeing with us too readily on an international treaty of this importance. An alternative explanation is that Soviet delegation at Geneva was concerned about the possibility of a government shake-up and desired to confirm their instructions in Moscow personally before making final agreement. Although present government was confirmed by Supreme Soviet during last stages of our negotiations in Geneva, Morozov in private conversation with me several times referred to the necessity of consulting with "new" government.

Whatever the cause, it will be very difficult for the Soviets in the light of the great support the U.S. received in the Committee among other delegations including all non-aligned countries to block an acceptable treaty draft at General Assembly.

Finally, I want to convey to the Department the excellent cooperation I received from all members of the U.S. delegation, particularly Meeker, Reis, Helman (State Department); Thacher (USUN); Sohier (NASA); Graybeal (ACTA [ACDA]); Moroncew (ACTA [ACDA]); and Captain Cole (DOD).

They were a superb and hardworking team and contributed greatly to the progress we made in Geneva.

Washington, August 10, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Negotiation of an Outer Space Treaty

Background--On May 7, President Johnson asked Ambassador Goldberg to undertake the negotiation of a treaty governing the uses of celestial bodies. After some initial private conversations, and a letter from Gromyko to U Thant which indicated that the USSR was interested in such a treaty, both the U.S. and the USSR tabled drafts. Ambassador Goldberg proposed a meeting on July 12 of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN's Outer Space Committee, and the USSR agreed. The meeting took place in Geneva between July 12 and August 4.

Negotiations--We agreed at an early stage to expand the scope of a treaty from celestial bodies to outer space generally. The Soviet draft Treaty had proposed this broader scope with which we were prepared to go along, as the Soviet text was drawn in large part from UN resolutions which we had taken the leadership in obtaining. We held a number of private bilateral discussions with the USSR in which points of agreement and disagreement were defined. The proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee reflected the results of these discussions.

/2/Neither tab was attached.

There are two principal issues which divide us at the moment:

a. Access--We insist that the principle of free access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies be reflected in a treaty, subject only to reasonable safety precautions. The USSR has sought to qualify the right of access with such concepts as "reciprocity" and agreement as to the timing of visits.

b. Reporting--Our treaty article as tabled provides for compulsory reporting to the Secretary-General on the nature and location of activities on celestial bodies and publication of information on the results of these activities for the benefit of the public and the international scientific community. The USSR insists that the reporting obligation should be voluntary.

There are two other differences which should not prove as difficult. One relates to the types of military structures to be prohibited on celestial bodies and the nature of the equipment to be permitted. We are substantially in agreement with the USSR on permitted and prohibited structures and equipment, but have not been able to reflect this in treaty language. The other difference involves a USSR proposal which would require a state hosting a tracking installation to grant similar facilities to other space powers. We suspect that the USSR tabled such a provocative proposal to serve as a barrier to the conclusion of a treaty until they are ready for one.

We received generally strong support from members of the subcommittee for our position on the disagreed provisions. Tab B contains a chart of agreed and disagreed principles.

Next Step--The results of the subcommittee's work will be reported to the Outer Space Committee. The subcommittee also decided to hold further negotiations before or during the 21st General Assembly. We will be pressing for early talks but recognize that the USSR has the capacity to delay negotiations and agreement.

BHR

New York, August 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President.

For the President from Ambassador Goldberg (USUN 383).

In a lengthy conversation with the Secretary General on several subjects today, I asked him specifically, pursuant to the Secretary's request, whether he could further enlighten me about his intentions to stand for re-election as Secretary General.

The Secretary General stated he was definitely of the mind that he would not stand for re-election for various reasons assigned to me in our previous conversations and reported by me in earlier telegrams. The Secretary General further stated he would make this decision known by letter to members of the Security Council shortly following his return from South America, scheduled for later this month. This would mean probably during the first part of September.

I told the Secretary General that undoubtedly there would be a general feeling at the U.N. that he should be drafted, notwithstanding his personal disinclination to run.

The Secretary General indicated he would resist a draft and would urge in the strongest possible terms that the Security Council proceed with its search for an acceptable candidate. He again, as he had once before, indicated his belief that no available African or Asian would be found acceptable and that the choice ought to come from a neutral European country, such as Finland, or from Latin America. He spoke in enthusiastic terms about Ambassador Jakobson of Finland, saying he had a high regard for him as a person and as a diplomat. The Secretary General hastened to add this was purely a personal reaction to Jakobson and the Secretary General was not advancing his candidacy.

Comment: It is my impression, reinforced by each visit on this subject, that the Secretary General is becoming more firm in his resolve not to stand for re-election. This does not mean, however, he would not submit to a draft for a relatively short term if no other suitable candidate were found. It is still Ralph Bunche's view, repeated to me in a visit I made to Bunche this morning at the hospital where he is convalescing from his recent accident, that the Secretary General would, however reluctantly, agree to a draft for a limited term.

Finally, the Secretary General went out of his way to say to me that stories which have appeared in the public press assigning reasons for his reluctance to stand, for example, to our attitude concerning Vietnam, Soviet criticism of his role in peacekeeping, the financial situation of the U.N., Soviet pressure on the Secretariat for additional posts, etc., are stories not based upon any statements authorized by him. Today he emphasized to me personal and family considerations which he said have led him to this conclusion not to run plus his conviction that any Secretary General expends himself physically and by way of influence in a single five-year term.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
UN Secretary General

/2/Document 390.

If U Thant announced his decision to step down early in September, two months before his term formally expires (November 3), many hats will immediately be thrown into the ring for his job. It is very important to us that any candidate selected be as sympathetic as possible to our views, but we recognize that over the long run an objective and impartial UN Secretary-General is essential for the good of the Organization and its work. It is highly important the new man be a good executive and administrator; the UN Secretariat badly needs administrative pruning and a strong guiding hand.

While it is too early to say much about individuals, a good many names have been mentioned as possibilities. Among the stronger prospects are:

1. Robert Gardiner (Ghana)--He is probably the most outstanding African administrator on the international scene.

2. Kurt Waldheim--Austrian UN Representative. (He told me a considerable number of Africans want him to take the job if U Thant will not.)

3. Francisco Cuevas Cancino--Mexican UN Representative.

4. Max Jakobson--Finnish UN Representative.

5. Majid Rahnema--Iranian Ambassador to Switzerland and member of a number of Iranian delegations to the General Assembly.

6. Sadruddin Khan (Iran)--UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Arthur J. Goldberg

Washington, August 27, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted in IO on August 27.

SUBJECT
SYG's letter of Resignation

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Pedersen
William B. Buffum

/2/Released September 1; for text , see UN doc. S/7481.

(2) He will continue to try to get U Thant to write a shorter letter citing merely personal reasons for wanting to resign and making it less categorical. (The earlier draft was a six-page affair dictated by the SYG. It was poorly written and could damage the UN because it highlights the UN's current ineffectiveness.) Viet-Nam is mentioned but not in a way to criticize the United States; he speaks, rather, of the inability of the UN to contribute to a solution.

(3) To be certain that we are not caught flat-footed on a possible insertion by U Thant of an unhelpful reference on Viet-Nam, USUN will draft two contingency statements next Monday which might be used after the SYG's letter is released. Buffum said we would wish to review these statements carefully in Washington, and Pedersen promised to send them down.

(4) Goldberg must still talk to Federenko early next week and see if he would be agreeable to a quadripartite meeting with the SYG August 31 to try to dissuade him from resigning. Goldberg and Caradon already have individual appointments with U Thant on that date.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Drafted in IO on August 31.

TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The forthcoming General Assembly Session, faced with the Secretary General's intention not to continue in office, will open in an atmosphere of uncertainty and depression. Moreover, the outlook is for a good deal of sharp discussion of the hardy perennials on the General Assembly's agenda, particularly African questions, and for hard slogging on those few items which have moved into a substantially different stage. Controversy over Viet-Nam, which is not now on the Assembly's agenda, will figure heavily in the general debate and will probably preclude substantial Soviet-American cooperation in the Assembly, except possibly on outer space matters.

The annual assemblage of prominent figures from all over the globe will afford an excellent opportunity to restate the fundamentals of our policy on Viet-Nam. We shall stress our desire to open channels of negotiation with the other side and remind UN members where responsibility for continuation of the war lies. Nevertheless, we will be subjected to heavy pressure to cease the bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In the absence of such a gesture, there is no indication that the discussion on Viet-Nam would result in anything other than a stand-off.

The voting power of the Africans and their Asian friends will again dominate the Assembly's decision-making activities. The Africans enter this Session in a mood of frustration and bitterness. No headway has been made on the hard core problems of Southern Africa--the Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and apartheid--and the July 18 decision of the International Court of Justice has at least temporarily blocked off one route toward the mandatory sanctions which the Africans seek to apply. We need to consider carefully how we can best channel African thinking in the direction of constructive and effective measures, and how we can counteract the African tendency to vote on non-African issues not on their merits, but in terms of the attitudes of governments towards South African problems.

Disarmament will occupy much of the session.

As usual, we shall have difficulties in keeping disarmament resolutions within limits acceptable to the United States, especially in the areas of nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing.

Chinese representation will remain one of the critical issues, and it will be more difficult to protect the position of the GRC. We will seek to place the onus for the exclusion of Communist China on the Communist Chinese themselves and stress our determined opposition to any move to replace the GRC by the PRC.

Beyond these contentious issues, we will continue our support for the important ongoing work of the UN in the peacekeeping field as well as its economic and technical assistance programs.

One of the few areas which may offer an opening for a new U.S. initiative is the field of marine resources; appropriate proposals are being developed.

(A) Rhodesia--The failure of UN-supported sanctions to bring down the Smith regime, and the interminable and inconclusive British negotiations with Smith, have strengthened the Afro-Asian distrust of British and, to some degree American motives in respect to this problem. It seems unlikely that the British can present the forthcoming Assembly with any solid indications of progress. Our own position is difficult. We must keep the British in front on this question; the resources we can devote to a solution are very strictly limited. Recognizing the British Government's difficulties in dealing with the situation, we must press it not to make concessions which will undercut the six principles on the basis of which they started the negotiations. At the same time, we must help the UK in its efforts to prevent the Assembly from moving on to more extreme anti-Rhodesian measures until the negotiations have reached some conclusion.

(B) South West Africa--The failure of the International Court of Justice to grapple with the substance of the South West Africa case in its July 18 decision has at least temporarily blocked a promising road for forward movement on this problem. Resort to South West Africa proceedings under Article 94 of the UN Charter to mobilize the international community against apartheid in South West Africa is now impossible. The possibility of bringing the West and the Africans together in a course of constructive action is perhaps smaller than ever.

The Assembly will give priority attention to South West Africa, with discussion of this item running concurrently with the General Debate. The Africans will undoubtedly press for an early decision on revocation of the mandate. While we would not wish to take a stand which appeared merely a spoiling or delaying action, our interests would be best served if the initial phase of debate resulted in another Assembly appeal for South Africa to comply with its reporting requirements, and establishment of a Committee to make recommendations during the final weeks of the session in light of South Africa's response. It would also be in our interest if the Africans would agree to ask for a further opinion from the reconstituted ICJ as to whether the Assembly has authority to revoke the mandate. It is questionable, however, whether the Africans will be patient enough for either of these moves, and we must be prepared to take a stand at the opening of the session on the question of revoking the mandate. While it would be desirable for political reasons to support revocation, we would need to assure that such a stance would not imply a commitment to take the enforcement action which would probably be required to give reality to revocation.

(C) Apartheid--The prospects for forward movement in the Assembly with respect to apartheid are equally slim. There is no sign that the Verwoerd Government has any intention of relaxing its apartheid policies in any way. We must continue to register our strong opposition to the policy of apartheid. We will have to decide how to vote on a resolution which, as in 1965, would "take no decision" on South African credentials in the General Assembly. There is a risk that if such action is taken, South Africa will withdraw from the Assembly and perhaps from the UN this year.

(D) Portuguese Territories--The African racial problems which center on Rhodesia and South Africa have their colonial complement in Portuguese policy, which remains comparably unyielding. The Africans are expected to press for a total arms embargo and the application of economic sanctions against Portugal itself. We must again oppose such moves while continuing to press Portugal to move toward self-determination for the peoples of her African territories, including an option for independence.

(E) A Possible Next Step in Africa--Confronted with these intractable African colonial and racial issues, on which emotions run so high and the scope for future action is so limited, we need to demonstrate our concern over the lack of progress. Otherwise conditions in southern Africa may deteriorate even more rapidly; and the Africans' exasperation over what they regard as our immobility will force them into a position highly unpalatable to us on matters like Chinese Representation, Viet-Nam and disarmament. In the longer range, this situation would weaken our position in Africa, stimulate increasingly radical initiatives by the Africans regarding southern African problems, and further diminish the UN's credit not only in Africa but across the board.

In order to help meet this situation, consideration should be given to an announcement in our General Debate speech that in the light of our opposition to minority governments in southern Africa and the unwillingness of these governments to open the way for orderly transition to majority rule, the United States considers further American investment in the area economically risky and politically undesirable; for this reason we will no longer guarantee American investment or credits there, and will warn American business interests not to invest further. We should also consider whether to stop encouraging trade with southern Africa and whether to oppose further investment of funds there via international agencies, including the IBRD. Such a policy would apply immediately to the Portuguese territories, South West Africa and South Africa; but only provisionally to Rhodesia pending the outcome of UK talks with Smith.

In addition, we should announce whatever follow-up is possible to the President's proclaimed intention to increase cooperation with African states. The Korry report provides useful proposals in this field, especially with respect to measures for agricultural research and development.

In view of the failure of the ENDC to register progress on any issue since the last General Assembly, we must anticipate increased restiveness about the need for movement. This is particularly true with regard to the dangers involved in the probability of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Failure of the United States to take the initiative and give a new lead in the disarmament area would give us no counter to unpalatable but superficially attractive Bloc or non-aligned proposals. Accordingly, we should advance some new proposals publicly along the lines described below. In addition discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will afford an opportunity to probe other possibilities (this will be covered in another paper).

A. Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. To help discourage non-nuclear powers such as India from seeking acquisition of nuclear weapons, we could volunteer to join in support of an Assembly resolution which would give assurance to non-nuclear states that others would come to their assistance in the event they are the object of nuclear attack. We would need to hedge this sufficiently so that we are not committed to a particular type or scale of assistance in any given situation. Moreover, we must anticipate a Soviet riposte based on their non-first-use proposal.

B. Extension of Test Ban Agreement. Efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty remain deadlocked on the issue of verification. Our past position has required on-site inspections. In the meantime, our seismic detection capabilities have so improved that we can detect and distinguish from earthquakes almost all man-made underground explosions above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. For a new impetus in this area, we could propose extending the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to prohibit underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75.

President Johnson's proposal for a treaty to govern the exploration of outer space and celestial bodies was greatly advanced by the work of the Legal Subcommittee of the Outer Space Committee this summer. A few substantial points of difference remain between the USSR and the majority of the Subcommittee, led by the United States. Whether these differences will be ironed out before the Assembly or aired in it remains to be seen; in either event, our posture should be good. We already have agreement within the government on several fall-back positions which can be used to good public relations advantage whenever appropriate in the negotiating situation in New York. For example, these include such points as readiness to delete an explicit provision in the treaty authorizing the use of military equipment and personnel in outer space, as well as more flexible language on access to installations on celestial bodies.

We can expect no progress on new arrangements for authorizing or financing peacekeeping operations. Given the stone-wall attitude of the USSR, the report of the Committee of 33 will contain no substantive recommendations for improving peacekeeping preparations or devising reliable and practical measures for financing. In addition, the continued failure of the USSR and France to come through with their long promised voluntary contribution to restore UN solvency casts a shadow over the fiscal integrity of the organization.

Our interests lie in preventing a regression from the UN capacity to meet threats to the peace, in improving the psychological climate in support of peacekeeping operations, in keeping open options for peacekeeping even where there is no unanimity, in assuring the widest possible cost sharing in the financing of UN peacekeeping. We should also seek to increase the pressures of the members on the delinquents to persuade them to come through with their contributions.

Four possible steps we could take to strengthen peacekeeping possibilities and as an earnest of our continued support of UN peace actions are:

In the past our crucial contribution (apart from money) has been airlift and other types of logistical support. We have said we need not earmark particular units since we can call on the vast range of our military capabilities to respond to a UN call on short notice. However, as a concrete and dramatic manifestation of our support, we could announce the earmarking of specific air-transport units to be available on short notice to airlift UN troops.

Last year we proposed a UN program to help countries that are unable to assume the full burdens of training and equipping units for UN service. We could follow this up by proposing a US program to train and equip UN-committed units by earmarking nations. This program might initially be linked to the military assistance program (MAP) which provides a statutory base for such assistance to certain countries.

We could propose that the GA examine the possibilities of establishing a peace fund, available for the initial financing of UN peacekeeping operations and as a supplement to other financing methods. Voluntary contributions and perhaps independent sources of income could feed revenue into such a fund. A US proposal for a peace fund for the UN would imply our readiness to make a contribution.

The Irish delegation will probably again propose a special scale of assessments to be applied to major peacekeeping operations. As we said last year we could not agree to a mandatory assessment above one-third to be applied to all operations which we politically support (as the Irish propose). However, we could agree to a fair apportionment above one-third, considered as a non-mandatory contribution on our part. This would follow up our commitment last year to the principle of a special scale. In practice we have paid more than 40%--in some cases close to 50%--of the cost of certain operations through combined assessments and voluntary payments. We could indicate that for major operations we supported we would be prepared to pay our share of a special fair-apportionment scale--up to 40% of the cost. As in the case of UNEF apportionments, we could treat such payments as voluntary contributions so that the question of the legislative limit does not arise.

In the meantime, important UN peacekeeping work goes on in the Near East, Cyprus, and Kashmir. While grumbling about their costs will increase, we expect the Assembly will again adopt a budget for UNEF close to its present level; and when the mandate of the Cyprus force requires extension again in December by the Security Council, we assume that the previous contributors or most of them will once more reluctantly find the necessary financial means to keep it going.

According to our present count, there are 35 UN members whose votes are uncertain on Chinese representation. The situation is increasingly volatile, and the uncertain votes will determine the outcome. Our objective will be to prevent the replacement of the GRC by the PRC.

The Secretary General has announced his intention not to accept another term. Whether he may be responsive to a more limited draft is problematical. If he is not, a major dispute over a successor is possible, and we may face a new crisis in the UN. Our planning must cover this contingency. In such circumstances our strategy would be to press for the maintenance of the office of Secretary General in its full integrity. We would urge U Thant to continue in office on a temporary basis until a successor is found.

Hardy perennials such as Palestine refugees and Korea will continue to engender much heat but little progress. On UNRWA we will again have to challenge provision of rations by UNRWA to the PLA and take a middle position between the maneuverings of Israel and the Arab states for political advantage over the refugee issue. Having turned down Israel's unrealistic proposal for a solution of the refugee problem based on compensation (paid by the US) without repatriation, we must expect Israel to dig in and say no forward movement is possible. But based on previous history of Assembly action on this subject, it also seems unlikely the Arabs can expect their position to be materially improved by Assembly action.

Recent noises from Pyong Yang raise the prospect of a more flexible approach by North Korea to the traditional item on Korea, which is likely to be more difficult to cope with than in recent years.

In the economic sphere, the most notable proposal will be that for the adoption of the Charter of the UN's Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID), a proposal which we will support (perhaps with certain amendments if these have general support). We shall continue to oppose establishment of a UN Capital Development Fund or the UNDP's transformation into one. We shall also wish to emphasize the importance of agricultural development and family planning, particularly in the LDCs.

In the social sphere, the major challenge will be that of adoption of implementing procedures for the Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. While the drafts of the covenants contain implementation procedures which appear to be in advance of what the UN traffic will bear, we will probably wish to press for implementation procedures which, though less far-reaching than the present drafts, will still be substantial.

In the legal sphere, we shall seek to prevent adulteration of Charter principles in the context of "friendly relations" and, more broadly, will endeavor to hold the Assembly to appropriate standards of constitutionalism and orderly procedure. In view of the practical inability of the Assembly to influence the major political problems of Viet-Nam, colonialism and racism, restricting the consequent frustrations to constitutional channels may prove to be one of the major challenges of the 21st Session. This problem will be magnified as a result of disillusionment with the ICJ ruling on South West Africa. In fact, the election of new judges to the Court will be heavily influenced by the outcome.

Washington, September 2, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret.

/2/Reference is to USUN 582, September 1, not attached. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 8-3)

Goldberg is seeing Fedorenko at 4 p.m. this afternoon, both to sound out Soviet views and to see how far Fedorenko is willing to go as this month's President of the Security Council.

Although the Soviets have publicly supported U Thant for a second term, it looks as if they might be just as happy to see the UN in a period of turmoil and, therefore, may not want to push U Thant hard to stay on. The Russians with their constant efforts to hamstring the SYG and their failure to pay their debts have contributed more than their share to U Thant's disillusionment. Their support for him now looks pretty hypocritical.

This increases my own fears about our getting too firmly tied to the idea of drafting U Thant for another term. We may have to fall back on this--at least for a partial term--if we can't agree on a successor by November. However, I have the uneasy feeling that State has since April put too many eggs in the U Thant basket. They certainly got the President tied to U Thant in an exercise that didn't pay off. I am wondering now whether we shouldn't, at least for in-house talking purposes, argue with State that we should cut our losses and begin looking early for a successor.

Brom promised this morning to ask S/S to send over for the President a memorandum on State's current succession thinking. He was going to say that the President is deeply interested in this problem and hint that the Secretary might want to volunteer something on the subject at next Tuesday's lunch. If that conversation materializes, I tentatively suggest that you might take a pretty hard line against State's current tack of pursuing U Thant to the end.

Hal