U.S. Department of State

CSDB-312/02578-66

Washington, September 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations

DATE OF INFO.
12 September 1966

SUBJECT
Secretary General U Thant's Willingness to Retain Office; Procedures for Draft and Re-election U Thant Considers Acceptable

SOURCE
A Source who is intimately familiar with the subject matter, who conveyed this information to a representative of this Agency, whom he knew as such, with the hope and expectation that it would reach the highest United States Government officials and would assist them in their approach to the problem. There is no indication that Secretary General U Thant intended that this information be passed to us. Our experience with the Source, however, leads us to believe that it is essentially accurate.

1. United Nations Secretary General U Thant is prepared to continue in office, but it is vital to him that his expression of willingness to do so come as a result of appropriate representations by the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly. He is neither accepting nor laying down any conditions to his continuing in office. At the same time, it must be perfectly clear that he is reacting to pressure from no nation or group of nations but to the persuasion of the international community as a whole as expressed in the United Nations General Assembly. Further, U Thant is willing to accept the office for the full term, realizing that a shorter term would quickly render him a "lame duck." However, if such outstanding issues as Vietnam, peace-keeping and finances were to be resolved, and an acceptable successor were at hand, he might leave before the expiration of his term.

2. A suitable timetable and procedure would be: (1) an interim statement by the Security Council reaffirming its faith in the Secretary General but requiring no reply from him; (2) a statement by Amintore Fanfani, President of the 20th United Nations General Assembly, at the opening session of the 21st General Assembly scheduled for 20 September 1966, in which he would emphasize that the Secretary General's continuance in office will not resolve the important issues and that it remains the responsibility of the General Assembly to dedicate itself to their solution. An arrangement along these lines is already being worked out with Fanfani; (3) an exchange of letters between the Security Council and the Secretary General about mid-October, in which the Council's letter would stress the responsibilities of the international community and the Secretary General would announce his availability; (4) disclosure of this exchange to the General Assembly on October 24, United Nations Day; (5) re-election of the Secretary General on November 3.

3. The Secretary General is desperately anxious that his availability be a closely guarded secret since advance knowledge could cause various nations, and specifically the Soviet Union, to pose conditions. Similarly, to safeguard the universality and impartiality of his position, there should be the least possible evident participation of the major powers in the steps leading to his decision. The Afro-Asians should "carry the ball." The Secretary General wants nothing to happen, or to be said, that could make his decisions and actions seem to be in any way a response to any pressure other than that of the whole international community acting through the General Assembly in the interests of mankind. As far as the major powers are concerned, including the United States, the watchword should be: "Easy does it."

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. The President met with the National Security Council on September 15 from 11:19 to 11:55 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

NSC MEETING ON 20TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The President called on Acting Secretary Ball for introductory remarks and Ambassador Goldberg for a fuller presentation.

Both Ball and Goldberg noted that the General Assembly is a recommending, not a decision-making body. It is useful as a forum and a safety valve. Seventy foreign ministers will assemble in New York, and this provides an opportunity for the broadest high-level consultations.

/2/No other record of this conversation was found.

Ambassador Goldberg explained why we continue to favor U Thant as Secretary General. He noted that the probable alternative would be an Afghan, whose country lies on the Soviet border, or an African, who would be subject to intense pressure from the African Bloc.

Ambassador Goldberg outlined probable Soviet plans for Vietnam debate.

Ambassador Goldberg praised sense of responsibility of African and Asian Commonwealth members and Wilson's handling of the issue. Goldberg expressed concern that the Africans might not have the patience to wait out the proposed 90-day cooling-off period, and described the mounting emotional pressures.

Ambassador Goldberg referred to the Soviet push to get most-favored-nation rights in tracking stations. He described his consultations with countries which might be involved and asserted that the Soviet demand is totally unacceptable.

He described how he had offered the Russians a chance to have joint tracking stations in the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Russians would not agree.

He said there were two interpretations of the Russian demand: (1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring their own initiative at a later time in the General Assembly, claiming credit for the agreement for prestige purposes. Ambassador Goldberg said prestige should not be the overriding consideration, but he was protecting our prestige to the extent of putting proposals on record, and insuring that they would have to be surfaced along with the Soviets'.

Ambassador Goldberg touched briefly on general disarmament questions, Chinese representation, Korea, peace-keeping, etc. The President asked Secretary McNamara if he had any comments, which he didn't, and the President closed the meeting.

ND

SC 00787/66B

Washington, September 16, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence.

THE UN'S PROBLEMS ON EVE OF 21ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 21st session of the UN General Assembly, convening on 20 September, could be the most difficult and rancorous in United Nations history.

The foremost of many problems facing the membership is finding a successor to Secretary General Thant. Thant, who says he will not offer himself for another term after his present one expires in November, has become increasingly concerned about the major powers' failure to make greater use of the UN organization and especially of the office of the Secretary General. He has also deplored the atrophy of the UN's peacekeeping function, as evidenced by its inability to bring about a settlement in Vietnam, its minor role in the Dominican crisis last year, and the present ills of its operations on Cyprus and the Middle East. In part because of such operations, the UN is still in the red financially. It will remain so as long as the USSR and France, the principal debtors to the UN, fail to make voluntary contributions to relieve the situation.

Serious though these issues may be, they are likely to be overshadowed in the coming session by still others of a substantive nature. The Afro-Asians, who can now dominate the assembly by virtue of their numerical superiority, are expected to tie up most of the coming session with a bitter campaign against what they consider vestiges of colonialism on a variety of African problems. The question of the future of the disarmament negotiations will also need to be faced, however, as will the recurring problem of Chinese representation.

Among the African problems, that of South-West Africa will be given priority. African delegates remain determined to loose the Republic of South Africa's hold on the territory, despite their recent failure to accomplish this through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's principal judicial body. The court refused to rule on the merits of the case, insisting that the plaintiffs--Liberia and Ethiopia--had no legal right to require South Africa to meet its League of Nations mandate obligations in the territory.

The UN Secretariat has suggested that the afternoon sessions be devoted to the South-West Africa question, with the rest of the general debate held during the morning meetings. The African group is pleased with this plan since it will dramatize the urgency of the problem and will give the foreign ministers who usually participate at the beginning of the general debate an opportunity to speak out. The discussion will cover the report of the Committee of 24 on the subject of South Africa and the secretary general's report on the educational and training programs for South-West Africa, but it will concentrate on the situation arising from the recent ICJ judgment.

The Africans will attempt to pass a resolution stripping South Africa of its League mandate and placing South-West Africa under UN administration. Such action, however, is of questionable legality and might precipitate South Africa's withdrawal from the UN. Another tactic would be a request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether South Africa has breached its mandate. However, at the present time the anti-ICJ sentiment prevailing among the Africans makes it doubtful that they would go to the court again. During the ICJ election the Africans plan to "purge the court" by filling the five vacancies on the bench with judges more sympathetic to their views. In addition, they plan to introduce an amendment to the UN Charter enlarging the court to give Africa and Asia more representation, as was done for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council last year.

Considerable sentiment exists for an attempt by the assembly to revoke South Africa's League mandate, but a strong condemnatory resolution, which would have no juridical consequences, might be enough to satisfy the Africans. Ernest Gross, the legal counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia in the recent ICJ case, proposed that a UN commission for South-West Africa be set up to supervise the administration of the mandate and work toward ultimate independence for the territory. Such a maneuver would be a delaying tactic and would rule out any action by the assembly to end the mandate.

Other African issues will involve Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa's apartheid (racial segregation) policies. The General Assembly will consider the report of the Special Committee on Colonialism which recommended mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and called on the UK to take all measures including the use of force to abolish Ian Smith's rebel, white-minority regime. The Africans are like to attempt to pass an assembly resolution requesting that the Security Council take stronger mandatory action under Chapter 7 than the voluntary measures under Chapter 6 that the UN took last year.

The noise and heat generated by the African debates are likely to dissipate what little impulse exists to deal with UN finances and peacekeeping. The members have little stomach for tackling these problems. There are deep divisions among them on political principles as well as interpretation of the UN Charter's articles on peacekeeping functions. The feeble Committee of 33 set up to deal with the question is now on its last legs. After many months of discussion no new suggestions have been presented and the apathy of the Afro-Asians has brought the meetings to a quiet close. The committee's report to the General Assembly will contain little of substantive value.

Only the Irish have shown any interest in searching for a solution. Even though their proposals were shelved by the last assembly and hardly considered by the Committee of 33, the Irish intend to present them to this assembly. Their plan for financing future peacekeeping operations allows any of the permanent members (US, USSR, UK, France, and China) to avoid sharing the cost of a peacekeeping operation by simply not voting in favor of it. The Canadians are thinking about presenting their formula on financing which apportions the cost of an operation among the members according to a special scale.

Over a year ago an appeal was made for voluntary contributions to relieve the growing UN debt. However, the major debtors--the Soviet Union and France--have as yet given no sign that they will make a contribution.

The UN's financial conditions are contributing to the ills of the present peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. The secretary general has had to pass the "begging bowl" to keep the operation alive. Members with forces on the island continue to threaten to pull out unless they are reimbursed for their expenses. This has led some countries to suggest that the forces be reduced or replaced by an observer mission-a change which might endanger the shaky peace now maintained on the island.

The UN operation in the Middle East (UNEF) is suffering from the same ills. Here too there is considerable support for a major reduction in troop strength. The majority of members hold that unless there is some demonstrated progress toward easing Arab-Israeli tension they will be unwilling to continue contributions. The general view is that future financial support for UNEF should be through voluntary contributions.

The numerous disarmament items on the agenda for the 21st General Assembly will be time-consuming and difficult to handle. At last year's assembly these same items--nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear-free zones, and others--were discussed and then handed over to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) for further study. However, the ENDC's failure to make progress on any of these issues has led many Afro-Asian countries to question the value of continuing it.

East-West differences over a nonproliferation treaty and the diminishing support from the ENDC's nonaligned members for the Western formula have stalled the negotiations. The deadlock has caused the eight nonaligned members to consider presenting their own version of a treaty at the next ENDC session. Their draft would call for a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons to states not already having them, a cutoff on the production of fissionable material for weapons, a reduction of stockpiles by nuclear states, and the universal application of international safeguards to all nuclear activities. The eight have drafted a memorandum reaffirming their conviction that a nonproliferation treaty should be concluded and should include these restrictions or be accompanied with or followed by other measures which accomplish the same goals.

Of even more interest to the nonaligned countries is the proposal to extend the limited test ban treaty of 1963 to cover all testing. The nonaligned group sees this issue as the one on which the ENDC might make progress. The nonaligned will argue that improvements in technological capabilities to monitor underground explosions has reduced the need for on-site inspections, hitherto one of the stumbling blocks to such a treaty.

Other possible disarmament topics are a Latin American nuclear-free zone and abolition of foreign military bases, another favorite of the Afro-Asians as well as the Soviet bloc.

While there seems to be little progress toward settlement of the various disarmament issues, there is one bright spot in the related subjects of outer space: the treaty draft now approaching completion in the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet Union may, however, seek to extract certain propaganda advantages.

Another go-around on the question of seating Communist China is expected to occur at about mid-session. The vote was a tie last year and a close vote is expected this year.

Secretary General Thant's reasons for not accepting a second term include a reference to the Chinese representation issue. He reiterated his dissatisfaction that the world organization has not yet achieved universality of membership. It is generally known that Thant has supported the admission of China but his listing it as one of the reasons for his resignation will probably cause some members to reconsider their position on the issue.

However, the recent developments inside China which have further tarnished its international image, together with its leaders' statements disclaiming any desire to come into the UN, will possibly affect Peking's chances of winning more votes.

Last year the ruling that admission of Communist China was an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for passage was upheld. This year the importance of this procedural ruling is even greater owing to the likelihood of some changes in the voting pattern. Iran and Senegal intend to vote for admission. Canada is wavering and may abstain. However, Chad and the Maldive Islands, which abstained last year, are expected to support Taiwan. The outcome will depend on the Afro-Asians, who control the most votes in the General Assembly, and their attitudes on the Chinese issue may be affected by the outcome of the debate on South-West Africa and Rhodesia.

Although Vietnam will not be on the agenda, it is certain the foreign ministers will discuss it in their opening speeches. There is also a rumor that the Afro-Asian nations will introduce a resolution at the end of the general debate either on their own or at the request of the secretary general. This resolution would merely call for the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations. However, the Soviets have recently been making it clear to their friends at the UN that they want no resolution of any sort on Vietnam.

Another kind of admission problem-UN membership for small states ("the bits and pieces problem")--may receive further airing at the 21st General Assembly. The admission of the Maldive Islands last year caused concern that numerous small entities might aspire to UN membership upon becoming independent. Such territories, too small to carry out charter obligations, could find their way into the assembly to the detriment of states with major responsibilities. It has been suggested that there should either be a minimum standard on the size of the states becoming members, or some form of associate status. It has also been proposed that the Security Council committee on membership be revived in order to prevent acceptance of small states simply because no one wants to oppose them.

The Korean question will again be on the agenda but will probably not come up until the end of the session, in which case it would be brushed aside. Saudi Arabia will probably introduce a proposal to invite North Korea to attend the assembly discussions. There is a strong feeling among the nonaligned members that this should be done and that direct talks between the parties should be held.

Overshadowing all of the numerous problems the UN faces is Secretary General Thant's decision not to offer himself as a candidate for another five-year term. There is a possibility that after a formal appeal by the Security Council, Thant will decide to accept a shortened term for perhaps two or three years. Many of his colleagues feel that Thant genuinely wants to leave his post, but they also hope he will not leave if the leadership crisis has not been resolved by 3 November, the day his term expires.

If Thant adheres to his decision to leave, the UN will face the difficult problem of finding a qualified successor acceptable to all major powers. At present there are no strong candidates, and the search is likely to be long and rigorous. Possible candidates that have been mentioned are Prebisch of Argentina, Garcia Robles or Cuevas Cancino of Mexico, Adebo of Nigeria, Slim of Tunisia, D'Arboussier of Senegal, Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala, Enckell of Finland, and Pazhwak of Afghanistan. The Afro-Asians have agreed among themselves that Thant should be pressed to stay on for an extension of his term if no suitable replacement can be found.

New York, September 27, 1966, 2242Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 5. Confidential; Exdis.

1058. Secretary General. At private meeting between Fedorenko (USSR), Caradon (UK), Seydoux (France) and myself this afternoon we agreed subject to confirmation by Seydoux and Caradon before 10 a.m. tomorrow morning on following procedure to be followed with respect to status of SYG at private meeting of Security Council which will be called on Thursday, Sep 29 at 3:30 p.m.

After SC approves its report to the GA which will be the officially stated subject of meeting, the President will submit for approval of members the following statement:

/2/At a press conference that day.

"Taking into account the great positive role played by the SYG U Thant in the activities of the UN, the members of the SC further express their confidence in him and consider that if U Thant should express willingness to serve another term as SYG it would fully meet the desires of the Members of this Council."

I indicated approval of this statement on behalf of US Government and Fedorenko on behalf of Sov Union. Seydoux approved it personally but stated he desired to consult and would give final word before 10 a.m. tomorrow. Caradon approved statement but following Seydoux' statement indicated he would also give final answer tomorrow morning.

/3/September 29.

Comment: It is to be noted that this statement at this time does not recommend to Assembly extension of present term to the end of the session. It was the view after considerable discussion that this would set off long Assembly discussion on entire problem which would be premature and that if necessary formal recommendation could be made by Council reasonable time before Nov 3 to cover remainder of Assembly session.

Goldberg

Washington, October 4, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Bator and Keeny.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg called and wished you to know the following.

This afternoon the Soviet representatives in New York came in with space treaty proposals "which go a long way to meet our requirements." They will be meeting tomorrow to see if it is the real thing.

He regards it as "interesting" that they have moved on the space treaty because he feared after his conversation with Gromyko yesterday they would try to hinge progress on this treaty to other matters.

/2/President Johnson and Gromyko met on October 10; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 178 and 179.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, October 10, 1966.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon on October 18 and cleared in S and S/S on October 19.

SUBJECT
United Nations Problems

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
William C. Foster--ACDA
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Governor Harriman
John M. Leddy-EUR
Malcolm Tonn--SOV

/2/In an October 17 memorandum to Goldberg, Sisco reported that Rusk had told him that during a private discussion following this talk Gromyko had indicated "the likelihood of a Soviet voluntary contribution." (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 76 D 435)

CSDB-312/02855-66

Washington, October 13, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.

COUNTRY
United Nations

DATE OF INFO.
10 October 1966

SUBJECT
Continued Interest of the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, in a Second Full Term

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[4 lines of source text not declassified]

1. The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, is still thinking of serving another full term but, for tactical reasons, wants to defer his decision to a time beyond the expiration of his present term on 3 November 1966. For the time being he is interested in an extension until the end of the year. He envisages that the extension would be recommended by the Security Council to the General Assembly and would be granted, without a vote, by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the President of the Assembly, who would announce that the extension would be in accordance with the wishes of the Secretary General.

2. About the end of November the Secretary General would advise the Security Council of his willingness to accept a new full term. His thinking assumes some progress by that time on the question of voluntary contributions and possibly on Vietnam.

Washington, November 7, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Bator.

SUBJECT
Goldberg Trip to the Ranch

/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, Goldberg and Komer arrived at the LBJ Ranch around 9:40 a.m. They apparently spent much of the rest of the day with Johnson and accompanied him during afternoon trips to Cotulla and San Antonio. (Ibid.)

/3/November 8 was election day.

/4/Not attached.

/5/In a November 9 memorandum to Rostow, Davis reported that the President and Goldberg had discussed Vietnam and Goldberg's trip to Asia, the Chinese representation question, and the Outer Space Treaty on which substantive agreement existed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5)

ND

New York, November 10, 1966, 0045Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Confidential; Exdis.

/2/Apparently the second report with recommendations, submitted July 17; for text, see UN doc. A/6343.

Seydoux said his instructions were as fols: (a) that solution should cover the full amount of the $31.9 million deficit; (b) that contributions of states involved should be "in harmony" with each other; (c) that announcements of contributions should be made simultaneously.

Seydoux said he had been asked to get our reactions. He said words "in harmony" meant that relative payments of those participating should be in general proportion to their respective ratios of contributions in other matters, but that it would not have to be precise.

Goldberg said we of course regarded deficit as being in $52 million range and that even with that figure there would still be future problem of additional deficit coming essentially from bonds. We regarded those who were delinquent as the ones who should make contributions; lower figure in itself would be asking US to forego refunds due it and thus increase its share of expenses. Said US could not be expected to do anything simultaneously with those who were delinquent, but as he had already said in past if others were generous in meeting UN financial problems US would not thereafter be found wanting any more than it had in past.

Seydoux said he knew from Fedorenko that Sovs had conveyed to US amount of contribution they had in mind. Fedorenko had told him that US had not reacted and Seydoux had impression Sovs thought amount they had suggested was therefore acceptable to US. He went on in course of discussion to add that Sov figure of $7 million was in his view not sufficient as it would not eliminate deficit which he now thought must be met.

Goldberg told him we had no knowledge of any Sov notification to US of $7 million or any other figure, and that we would not regard $7 million as an appropriate amount. Seydoux asked that we not reveal that figure came from him in light of his "indiscretion."

Conversation ended with Goldberg statement that we would give French official reply to their approach to US. While request made to US in French instructions was for comments on specific points set forth above it was clear from Seydoux's handling of discussion that they were very much interested as well in questions of how much, when and how US might participate.

Goldberg

New York, November 23, 1966, 0130Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Nodis.

2564. For the Secretary and Sisco. I sought a meeting with SYG this afternoon for purpose of specifically ascertaining his intentions about extending his term as SYG. No one except SYG and myself were present at his conversation which was frank and extremely candid.

I told SYG that time had come when it was necessary for him to make final decision as to whether he was willing to stay for another term. I said that he knew our govt's position and that of other members of SC, as well as the overwhelming sentiment in the Assembly and that it would be pointless for me to review the many discussions which had taken place on this subject. I also said that while I knew his strongly held views about Vietnam, he could not anticipate that our govt's course would be changed in the interest of inducing him to remain in office. I thought it necessary to be very forthright and candid with him on this point. I did say that he knew we desired a peaceful solution but that it was not our considered view that the course he specifically recommended would bring this about.

I reiterated to him what we said publicly, that it would be by mutual reciprocal actions only that a diminution of hostilities could occur. I added, however, that this did not mean that we did not believe that he could play an ultimate role in bringing about an honorable settlement. He is an Asian who by virtue of his office and his own personality enjoys prestige in SEA and it was my personal view that circumstances might be such that his good offices could be helpful to both sides. Despite our differences concerning Vietnam, our govt held him in high regard and believed strongly that the interests of the world organization would be impaired if he did not agree to continue on. I further emphasized that campaigning had already commenced and that names of various candidates were being bandied about. This, in my view, was undesirable and made it even more imperative that a final decision be reached now about his status.

SYG said he appreciated the extreme candor of my statement, particularly my frank exposition about his views concerning Vietnam. He said he had never intended his expression on this subject to constitute a condition for reconsideration on his part. He commented that he was too aware of the political realities to believe that his reappointment would affect our deeply held views on this tragic conflict. He said, however, that since he had stated in September that he would not stand, some concrete step would have to be taken other than Vietnam, in order to make it possible for him, with dignity and face, to accept an appointment. I in turn stated that the time had come when subtlety and indirection had no place, and that it would be necessary for him to be specific. He replied that he understood this and that he would talk specifically but only on the level of personal confidence with me and as a friend whose judgment and discretion he valued. On that basis he stated that if the financial problems of the UN were alleviated and if on my initiative as President of the Security Council a private meeting were held where the Council would determine their inability to agree upon another candidate, this would afford him the basis to accept reappointment.

I expressed appreciation for his candor and said that I would undertake to see what could be done about the financial matter. I added that I saw no difficulty in getting the SC to agree at a private meeting to the lack of ability to find a suitable successor, and a unanimous desire to extend his term.

On the financial matter I indicated disappointment with the Russian proposal to contribute seven million dollars. SYG inquired whether I knew what amount the French had in mind and I said I did not, and he in turn said that the French had never indicated to him what contribution they were willing to make. SYG further emphasized that if action was to be taken by SC, he would hope it could be taken during my Presidency. He said that while the next President, Amb. Berro of Uruguay, is a fine mean, he would not feel comfortable or trusting enough to have him handle this delicate matter, nor would he feel warranted in confiding his innermost thoughts to the Amb of Uruguay. SYG and I noted that this leaves us with only one week to conduct this very delicate operation.

Comment: The significance of this conversation is, of course, self-apparent and in my judgment requires a re-evaluation on our part of our willingness to make a financial contribution in concert and in harmony with Soviets, French and British, plus such others as may like to join. I know deeply held views of Dept. We are not defaulters, and the French and Russians are. On other hand it seems clear that unless we act quickly and in concert with them, it is very likely SYG may conclude that there is no dignified basis for him to stay on. If he does leave, the conclusion among a considerable body of responsible American opinion as well as world opinion is that he will be leaving his post because of frustrations over our Vietnam policy. It is in my considered view a cheap price to pay to guard against this type of reaction, for US to come up with a contribution to the UN deficit. I have in mind our attempting to get agreement on matching contributions between the four permanent members based upon what the British have already paid, namely, 10 million dollars. This would mean an additional 30 million from the US, USSR, and France, since the British have already paid their contribution, plus what can be collected from other members. It should be possible if the permanent members each contribute 10 million dollars, to raise better than 5 million dollars from all other members who have not yet contributed to the deficit. While this would not solve the financial problems of the UN, it would contribute considerably towards their solution and would enable the SYG to conclude that a substantial response has been made to his appeal to keep the UN house in order.

In making this recommendation I do not mean to say that I would start on this basis with the Russians. I would ask them for the contribution they originally implied--15 million. For this, state our willingness to contribute 10 million. My judgment is, however, that after initiating such negotiations, what I have recommended is the only feasible course for bringing the matter to a speedy conclusion.

Goldberg

New York, November 30, 1966, 0340Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis.

2793. Continuation of U Thant as SYG. Series of three meetings (Nov 28 a.m. with nonperm members SC; Nov 28 p.m. with full SC: Nov 29 at first with full SC and then with USSR, France, UK, Uruguay) culminated in presentation of following statement to SYG 6 p.m. Nov 29:

"The members of SC have been meeting informally. They wish you to know that, after taking all considerations into account, they unanimously wish you to continue for another term in office. They believe this would meet the best interests of the organization.

"Pending SC action in a formal sense, which it would plan to take on Friday of this week members of Council hope you would postpone any public statement in reference to this matter."

Goldberg read statement orally, and SYG made no substantive reply other than to say he would postpone press statement scheduled for Nov 30. To SYG's question what would be occurring in interim between now and Friday, Goldberg replied that there would be consultations among SC members and with him. After meeting with SYG, UN press officer announced that U Thant would not make statement of future plans until later this week, and specifically, not tomorrow.

General summary of meetings as follows:

1. Goldberg several times mentioned his reasons for convocation of Council: In meeting with SYG as US rep and not as Council pres, he had derived impression that U Thant amenable to remaining in job provided matter handled in proper way. Goldberg suggested that SC draft statement noting Council had considered whole situation concerning office of SYG and had arrived at unanimous decision to invite U Thant to remain. Statement would be informally checked with SYG before being formally presented to him in mtg of Council. Since SYG had not mentioned serving for less than full term, and since full term was the norm, Council invitation would be for full term. Statement suggested by Goldberg as follows:

/2/For text, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, p. 204.

/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 204-205.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 392.

"Members of Council have accordingly examined situation with this statement especially in mind. They have attached great importance to consideration that organization should continue to be served by a SYG who has capacity to evoke cooperation from all members and confidence of their peoples. They have taken into account need of ensuring that interests and purposes of organization are furthered and strengthened by this recommendation of Council. They have weighed SYG's wish that members examine possibility of reaching agreement on another nominee against advantages to organization of continuity and stability under current conditions.

"SC, meeting in private session, and after giving consideration to all these pertinent considerations, has decided to recommend as most conducive to interests and purposes of organization appointment of U Thant for another term in office as SYG of UN".

2. Goldberg's position met with several lines of objection. French, with Sov support, professed desire keep U Thant in office while arguing vociferously for weakest possible Council statement to SYG. Their initial move was for draft simply noting that SYG scheduled to issue statement Nov 30, asking him to postpone the statement, and informing him that Council would be formally considering SYG's reappointment on Dec 2. (Adebo (Nigeria) read text to this effect in meeting Nov 29, Sovs and French had text before meeting began.) Argument made in favor of such move was that SYG must be headed off before he committed himself in Nov 30 statement, that Council must for the moment concentrate upon agreeing to this, that procedure for choosing SYG fairly complicated, involving not only SC but GA, and that attempt to formulate full position for presentation to SYG would involve waste of valuable time. To Goldberg's statement that Adebo draft too negative, that it regarded U Thant as candidate, Fedorenko said man of SYG's caliber would understand and be cooperative. View that initial Council statement should be warmer than as proposed by Adebo received support from Corner (NZ) and Caradon (UK). Gradually, agreement reached to include language re unanimous support for SYG in statement.

/5/December 1 and 2.

4. Several reps concerned that dignity of Council not being taken sufficiently into account. Kironde (Uganda), El-Farra (Jordan), Tarabanov (Bulgaria) among those initially believing that SYG's availability should be ascertained before any statement drafted. But all agreed time was of the essence, and by time of meeting Nov 29 this line of argument maintained only by El-Farra. Kironde willing accept Goldberg's belief that SYG available. Goldberg said he thought SYG would react negatively to preliminary approach by Council to rely on his impression, but said that presentation to SYG on draft Council invitation, along with request for U Thant's approval, would ensure that no formal move of Council would be rebuffed. Maintained that he too concerned with dignity of Council.

5. Brief argument ensued over whether presentation to SYG should be oral or written. When Berro (Uruguay) claimed written approach would be more dignified, Fedorenko said U Thant would understand in either case, Seydoux worried that draft would be made public (while US still Council pres), Ruda (Argentina) noted that submitting draft for approval very far away from Council's usual duties. Consensus finally obtained for oral presentation of written statement.

6. Discussion of who should represent Council to SYG ended in consensus choice of four major powers plus next Council pres (Uruguay.) These five reps remained Nov 29 after others left and drafted the statement that was used.

7. Same group of five plans convene tomorrow to work on draft invitation to SYG.

Goldberg

New York, December 1, 1966, 0122Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis.

2820. Talk with Kuznetsov (USSR). At suggestion of the Secretary who thought it might be useful, I had a private and rather prolonged discussion of approximately one and one half hours with Deputy FM Kuznetsov at the Soviet mission this morning.

/2/Reference is to a seven-power resolution introduced by Canada and adopted on December 14; for text, see UN doc. A/SPC/L.130.

2. I told him in friendly but in categoric terms that our govt completely rejected his arguments. I pointed out that the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion had sustained our interpretation of the Charter in the Article 19 dispute, and that we had gone as far as we were prepared to go in not seeking the applications of the Charter's provisions against the Soviet Union, France and other defaulters. I further said that we still maintained our position in principle concerning the Article 19 matter but that this was not the current issue in the Canadian res. On the contrary, the Canadian res sought merely to repair the damage done by the Soviet and French unwillingness to give genuine support to the necessary peacekeeping activities of the UN. I emphasized that even where our interests are parallel, as in the India-Pakistan dispute of last year, the Soviets had insisted in the Security Council upon a position which would have paralyzed Secretary General's necessary efforts to maintain the fragile peace which the SC by resolution had brought about. I said that we would persist in our support of the Canadian res but that we were perfectly willing, following its adoption, to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and with France, if the dialogue would lead to a concert of opinion in support of genuine peacekeeping activities by the UN.

3. Kuznetsov, in reply, asked whether this could not be done by sidetracking the res and by referring the matter again to the Committee of 33. I in turn pointed out our experience in last round involving Committee 33 which had led us to conclusion that Soviets were not genuinely interested in viable peacekeeping and were only proposing the reference to Committee of 33 as a burial ground for genuine peacekeeping.

Comment: Canadians have told us Kuznetsov made a similar pitch to Paul Martin and Martin replied in terms similar to mine.

/3/Incorporated during the drafting of UN General Assembly Resolutions 2221 (XXI) and 2222 (XXI), both December 19.

Comment: It seems perfectly clear that Soviets wish to maintain posture of accepting French proposals to put onus on US of rejecting them.

5. At conclusion of space discussion we then turned to question of non-proliferation negotiations. Kuznetsov said that he thought good progress was being made and that currently they were awaiting a reply from US concerning the most recent discussions.

6. Finally, I asked Kuznetsov how long he intended to stay and he stated that in all probability he would stay throughout the rest of the General Assembly.

Comment: As indicated above, the meeting was very cordial in tone and when I was leaving, Kuznetsov in particular asked me to remember him most cordially to the Secretary.

Goldberg

Austin, Texas, December 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings, Dec. 17, 1966. Top Secret.

PRESENT
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Goldberg
W.W. Rostow

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and NATO matters.]

Amb. Goldberg then reported on UN matters. The Space Treaty was completed and would move forward.

/2/For text, signed at Washington January 27, 1967, and entered into force October 10, 1967, see 18 UST 2410.

The President recalled Amb. Goldberg's success with Article 19 and was warned that "a stitch in time saves nine" in dealing with Congress.

Under Secretary Katzenbach said he hoped Congress would be friendly to the Space Treaty but we must rap on wood because he saw difficulties with this Congress on East-West trade.

Amb. Goldberg then said the Soviets evidently want a non-proliferation treaty. Roschin will be going home on Tuesday and we should get a message to him in the wake of Secretary Rusk's consultations in Europe. Amb. Goldberg believes the non-proliferation agreement should be negotiated by the Foreign Ministers, not by the ENDC, which is too slow.

On the UN issues of Korea and China, the vote was better than last year, in part because we were more flexible, in part because of the trouble inside Communist China.

/3/December 2.

With respect to Rhodesia and Southwest Africa, we cannot wash our hands. The Soviet Union would exploit any opening we gave them by our getting out of Africa. He had talked with Senator Russell who was troubled about our Rhodesian position but when he understood that we under no circumstances planned to use force to make sanctions effective he pronounced himself satisfied. Amb. Goldberg said he told Senator Russell we would use a veto if necessary to prevent the use of military force to enforce sanctions against Rhodesia.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, January 31, 1967, 10:15 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. Secret; Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

I had a long talk with Joe Sisco who gave me, I am sure, as honest a picture as he could of Amb. Goldberg's mind and feelings.

1. Amb. Goldberg stepped down from the Supreme Court and remains conscious of the height he had achieved in our society.

2. Like his predecessors, he did not, at the beginning, understand the extent to which the job in New York is and must be limited in its authority and, ultimately, subordinated to the Secretary of State. He has come to understand the inherent limitations of the post.

3. On the other hand, he is intensely loyal to you personally and to the Administration. He does not wish to take any action which would hurt us between now and 1968. Sisco tells me that he put the question directly to Sisco who told him flatly: You cannot leave the Administration before 1968.

4. Goldberg has been searching for a way to leave his post with appropriate dignity: he inquires as to the successor to Mr. Justice Clark. He asks whether Phil Jessup's post on the International Court of Justice at The Hague may soon be vacant.

/2/For text of the speech, delivered February 10, see Department of State Bulletin, February 27, 1967, pp. 310-316. The Constituent Assembly was elected on September 11, 1966, to draft a new constitution to provide for the re-establishment of an elected government in South Vietnam. The new constitution was promulgated April 1, 1967, and took effect on May 1.

6. Sisco said that he believes his greatest possible service to you and the Administration will be to give us a warning if Arthur's mood gets desperate and he comes close to a decision. I told him to stay close to Arthur; let us know how it goes; and suggest as many ways as he can of letting him feel he is in on the substance of policy.

I will try to have him over for an early lunch here when he is in town.

Walt

Washington, February 8, 1967, 7:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 6. Confidential. This memorandum was included in the President's night reading.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Goldberg's Speech at Howard University

/2/Rostow crossed out "I have" and replaced with the handwritten annotation "Bill Jorden and I have."

It deals more gently than I would with Hanoi's equating of our bombing and their willingness, perhaps, to talk (see page 14). I believe the analysis used may leave some of his listeners thinking that Hanoi's position is not so unreasonable.

The formulation (on page 15) might be strengthened. He says we would stop bombing if Hanoi assured us a "tangible response toward peace." Some people might well consider the starting of negotiations as that kind of response. Perhaps it should be something like "a corresponding action to limit the conflict."

On page 16, he mentions our points, Hanoi's points, and the Liberation Front's points. He should note that the Government of South Vietnam will undoubtedly have points it will wish to discuss.

The discussion of the Liberation Front is weak. The main argument used to question its role is that it did not exist in 1954 when the Geneva Accords were reached. He really ought to point out with more emphasis that the Front speaks for only a limited number of the people of South Vietnam, as the dismal failures of its efforts to launch general strikes and disrupt elections have demonstrated so clearly.

In conclusion, I do not think this address will raise any particular problems as far as present efforts to achieve peace are concerned. I doubt it will raise any trouble in the public affairs area. But it is a lot softer on Hanoi than I would be.

/3/Rostow added the P.S. by hand. Goldberg delivered the speech February 10; see footnote 3, Document 410.

Walt

Washington, February 17, 1967, 3:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Arthur Goldberg. Confidential; Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

You should know that we have a quite serious problem with Goldberg.

/2/Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach.

I was asked by Sisco and Ben Read to talk to Goldberg before he saw the Secretary General at lunch, which I did. His points are these.

1. He took his job on the assumption that in major matters involving his work, he would have a chance to express his views before decisions were made.

/3/Reference is to the "Sunflower" peace initiative of winter 1966-1967. By early February the British Government was actively engaged in the effort to find an agreeable basis for a cease-fire in Vietnam. On February 8, during a bombing pause for the Tet holidays and while Prime Minister Wilson was holding discussions with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, President Johnson sent a message to North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh offering to make the pause permanent in exchange for a guarantee that North Vietnamese infiltration of men and materials into the South would cease. On February 10 Ambassador Goldberg, in a speech at Howard University, stated that the United States was ready to halt the bombing on a permanent basis as soon as it had assurances from Hanoi that infiltration would cease. Meanwhile the White House communicated its views through Wilson to Kosygin for the North Vietnamese. Kosygin failed to provide the concrete guarantees Washington wanted from Hanoi within the time frame it insisted upon. On February 13, after the Wilson-Kosygin talks finished, the President ordered the bombing resumed. Documentation on the Sunflower initiative is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V.

3. He does not now believe his Asian trip is worth while. It will be taken as a peace mission no matter what we say. He is inclined to cancel it.

/4/Harold Wilson of Great Britain.

He seemed quite dug in, saying several times that Stevenson had the same problem; implying that it was probably inevitable and he thought that the man in New York should be a professional rather than a public figure who would insist on having his views heard before decisions are made.

/5/A covering sheet attached to this memorandum reads: "Put on desk for mtg w Goldberg, LBJ/JJ/mf, 3-8-67, 11:05 a." According to the President's Daily Diary, March 8, Johnson and Goldberg met from 11:41 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. for a discussion that "included the Ambassador's future plans." Speaking to the press after the meeting, Goldberg stated that he had reported on his Far East trip. (Johnson Library)

Walt

Washington, February 24, 1967, 7:33 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 9 UN. Secret. Drafted by Jones; cleared in EA, H, L, ARA, UNP, EUR, and the Department of the Interior; and approved by Popper. Repeated to London, Wellington, and Canberra.

/2/Dated February 18; it provided an analysis of meetings of the Committee of 24. (Ibid.)

/3/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 19 UN)

(a) UN Charter does not obligate US to admit VM's to our NSGT's. US regularly submits information to UN on developments in US NSGT's, including information on political developments. US territories part of open society and therefore, there little additional relevant information which Comite might develop which not already available in press and public proceedings of US and territorial legislatures.

(b) Past performance of Comite of 24 provides no reason to believe Comite would submit objective report. Rather some members can be expected to use occasion to reiterate dogmatic views already expressed towards traditional colonial situations.

(c) Reception of UN VM in US territories would provoke considerable criticism both in the islands and in US. Islands are inhabited by US citizens or nationals, and despite designation as non-self-governing territories, Guam and the Virgin Islands are already largely self-governing. Removal of last major obstacle to internal self-government for Guam and the Virgin Islands, through election of governors, can be expected in near future. In addition, Samoa legislature has just completed review of its governmental machinery.

(d) Question of VM's to US territories must be viewed in context their effect on policy of US allies. Forthcoming Quadripartite Talks on Pacific Islands expected discuss, among other topics, question of VM's.

(e) Even if US could hope for relatively favorable reports, particularly on American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, acceptance of VM's would probably have unhelpful effect of leading to more detailed Comite of 24 consideration of US territories than we anticipate in case of refusal. End FYI.

2. After discussing US position with UK, Australian and New Zealand missions, believe USDel should inform Comite of 24 Chairman Malecela that US not prepared to receive VM's to US territories. In doing so, the delegation should point out US submits complete information on US NSGT's and that US reports combined with public information freely available to Comite, including free press and proceedings of popularly elected legislatures, provide full picture on developments.

3. USDel may add that while US not prepared to receive VM's as such, USG and Governments of the territories ready to extend official courtesies to individual UN Reps who may wish to visit US territories, subject, of course, to applicable travel regulations.

4. If necessary USDel may reiterate to whole Comite points in paras 2 and 3.

Rusk

Washington, March 1, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 9 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hargrove on March 23.

SUBJECT
Three political-legal items in the U.N. General Assembly (Friendly Relations, Non-Intervention, Use of Force and Self-determination)

PARTICIPANTS
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Patrick Dean
Assistant Secretary Sisco
L/UNA-Herbert Reis
IO/UNP-Gerald Helman
L/UNA-Lawrence Hargrove

1. Ambassador Dean stated that he wished to ask the Under Secretary to review the proceedings of last fall's General Assembly on three related items: principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states; non-intervention; and the Czechoslovak item on use of force and self-determination. While the views of the U.K. and the U.S. in this field were identical, we had differed on tactics and our votes had on some occasions diverged. We could expect a steady flow of such items in future Assemblies, with the basic objective of causing embarrassment to the West. The British view was that, where it is arguable that a resolution is a statement of law, we should not accept that it can be adopted in a hurry without due deliberation in subsidiary bodies. This was important because, while both the U.S. and the U.K. reject the view that Assembly resolutions make law, the fact is that they are regarded as sources of law by some Members. In the light of this fact, when resolutions are adopted without significant opposition there is a strong tendency later to claim for them the status of a sacrosanct legal text. The choice facing the U.S. and the U.K. seemed to be either to adhere to the strict view that General Assembly resolutions are political, accepting a resulting deadlock in subsidiary organs, or to take the more flexible view of "opposing the process" in the plenary and dealing with the issues on their merits in the subsidiary organs. The U.S. seems to have favored the former view, the U.K. the latter. Ambassador Dean stated that he wished to leave the Under Secretary an aide-m?moire setting out U.K. views on this matter.

2. The Under Secretary noted that items of this sort were inherently mischievous--they would be mischievous whether designed to be or not. They could create very troublesome problems and warranted close attention and co-ordination by the U.S. and U.K. The Under Secretary raised the question as to whether the International Law Commission might be considered as a forum for further consideration of such topics as Friendly Relations, particularly in view of the length of time which the I.L.C. consumes in completing any item on its agenda. Mr. Sisco stated that we had tried this approach some time earlier but had been unsuccessful. In response to the Under Secretary's inquiry as to the chances of killing the Friendly Relations item out-right, Mr. Sisco estimated the maximum support for such a move as 1/3 of the Assembly membership.

/2/Neither printed.

/3/Not attached. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 21 UN)

Washington, March 15, 1967, 5:42 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 37-4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, USUN, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco.

155593. Subject: UN Peacekeeping--Committee of 33. Following summarizes our objectives and strategy re peacekeeping for Committee of 33 and Special GA as developed in March 13 discussions in Department between IO (Assistant Secretary Sisco and staff) and USUN (Ambassadors Buffum and Finger):

1. We believe it would be useful for special GA to (a) adopt Canadian resolution as way of maintaining prospects for future peacekeeping and of laying groundwork for non-mandatory special scale, and (b) terminate Committee of 33. However, in view continued Soviet and French objections we recognize likelihood that GA majority will back away from showdown on peacekeeping. In any event we do not consider key elements of Canadian res involve US interests so directly as to warrant lobbying efforts on our part. Our primary objective is to maintain practical peacekeeping prospects rather than to reaffirm existing residual GA role.

2. Consequently, US posture in Cmte 33 should be continued support for approach in Canadian res, recognizing however it is Canadian initiative on which they should take lead while we remain in background. Similarly, it is up to non-aligned to come up with proposals they believe could serve as basis for accommodation on peacekeeping. US prominence could have backlash effect by making bridging of differences more difficult. We should indicate our readiness to examine specific proposals by nonaligned but underscore that, as history Cmte 33 indicates, stumbling block has been Soviet-French intransigence and that absent constructive response from them US reserving position.

3. Future of Committee of 33. We see no advantage in continuation Cmte 33. We will wish to work toward termination of Cmte 33 in special GA, irrespective of whether Canadian resolution or something like it is adopted.

4. Authorization and Constitutional Elements. While we continue to adhere to principles in preambular paras of Canadian res we see no advantage in attempting formulate in more precise terms complementary GA-SC roles. Any attempt at redefinition of competence of GA could curtail peacekeeping possibilities. How far GA can go will be determined case-by-case. Also, since we have misgivings about possibility future undesirable GA action in this area we prefer leave limits ambiguous.

/2/Apparently the 18-power resolution approved by the General Assembly on December 19, 1966; for text, see UN doc. 2220 (XXI).

/3/For texts of two proposals made November 30, and adopted by the Special Committee on December 14, 1966, see A/SPC/L 133 and Rev. 1.

/4/Dated March 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-4 UN)

7. We oppose suggestions that Cmte 33 focus on Article 43 talks since this province of SC. As indicated in SPC and in our support of Canadian res, we can acquiesce in proposals for SC to explore prospects for Article 43 agreements. However, Article 43 forces are for use in enforcement action and do not meet problem of manning consent-type peacekeeping. If there is general agreement in Cmte 33 on eliminating para 4 we could acquiesce, provided Article 43 provision also dropped.

/5/Dated March 10. (Ibid.) Francesco Cuevos Cancino of the Mexican delegation served as chairman of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

9. We have following specific objections to Cuevas proposal (USUN 4313):

(a) In principle servicing bonds through miscellaneous income is not to our disadvantage if necessary safeguards applied to ensure that bond servicing remains charge on regular budget and at regular scale rates. But it is totally unrealistic to assume that Soviets would agree to consider this proposal except on basis of concessions by us that are out of question. Effect of Cuevas move would be to spur attempt to pull bonds out of the regular budget, apply special scale, and generally compromise integrity of bond repayment. We therefore oppose any Cmte 33 action on bonds.

(b) While in principle we see advantages in excluding $6.4 million TA item from regular budget, we doubt this could be done without at the same time excluding contentious peacekeeping items and bond repayments from regular budget. Elimination from regular budget of peacekeeping items would erode principle of collective financing for peacekeeping, might lead to attempts to apply special scale to such small operations, and could stir up sensitivities re sharing of costs between parties concerned (for example UNTSO).

/6/Dated February 23; it evaluated the domestic political impact of a special U.S. contribution to assist the United Nations. (Ibid., UN 10)

10. In sum we should refrain from taking lead in Cmte 33, while indicating our support for Canadian resolution and readiness to discuss non-aligned proposals. We would hope by remaining in background we might establish cooling off period in differences with Soviets over peacekeeping, perhaps improving possibilities for future dialogue. However, we see no possibilities for useful US-Soviet discussions on peacekeeping at this time.

Rusk

Washington, March 17, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 7. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bromley Smith.

SUBJECT
U.S. Delegation to the UN GA Special Session

With the exception of Ambassador Rogers, the proposed list of representatives for the UN Special Session is a strictly "in-house" group. For a debate that will be dominated by the racial situation in South West Africa, the delegation is notable for the absence of any Negroes. It also has no Congressional members.

Apparently IO originally intended to include Senators Church and Case (who were at the last General Assembly), and perhaps one or two public members. Joe Sisco recommended this to the Secretary. The Secretary then called Goldberg, and the upshot was to cut the delegation back to the regular New York staff plus Rogers, who has been our representative on the Committee on South West Africa. The reasons were: The IO budget is strapped for funds; we have not generally appointed full delegations to special sessions; we are trying to keep the whole session in low key and would be just as pleased, in fact, if the Special Session were called off. Moreover, the extra public members would not be read-in on the complex problems under discussion, and might find themselves fifth wheels. Case and Church might not want to leave Congressional business to go to New York, and Case might not want to be closely involved in defending U.S.-African policy (he begged off a major speech on that subject last fall).

I think it's usually not helpful to try to change this sort of recommendation--particularly when the Secretary and Goldberg have been personally involved. However, I'm not particularly impressed by the reasons given. I should think we could at least ask the Congressional leadership if they'd like to have some participation. After all, Congress was in session during part of the last General Assembly; and the Congressional delegates probably would be back and forth any how. The following are several public members it might be worth thinking about:

1. Whitney Young of the Urban League.
2. Marvin Wachman, President of Lincoln University.
3. John Mosler of the Mosler Safe Company (he has substantial African connections).
4. Mercer Cook.
5. Patricia Harris.
6. John Spencer, a young Rockefeller son-in-law who lived in Nairobi for two years--an African specialist for Ford.

(Incidentally, I understand Stanley Marcus would be happy to serve on the U.S. Delegation next autumn if he were asked again.)

ND

Washington, March 29, 1967, 7:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. An annotation on the memorandum indicates President Johnson saw it.

Mr. President:

/2/A copy of the full text is ibid.

Bromley Smith

March 29, 1967.

/3/Secret; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Hanoi Reply to U Thant's Latest Viet-Nam Peace Proposal

/4/On March 14 U Thant proposed a three-step process to end the war: "(a) a general stand-still truce, (b) preliminary talks, (c) reconvening of the Geneva Conference." For text of the proposal, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1967, p. 624.

The first point of the reply indicated that Hanoi had apparently thought that U Thant would not deliver his proposal to any other party until after Hanoi had replied to him. This was a misunderstanding: U Thant believes that he was told in Rangoon not to make the proposal public before Hanoi made a reply.

The second point made in the reply was that the first step proposed by U Thant (a stand-still truce) equated the aggressor and the victim of aggression and was advantageous to the United States. Hanoi made no comment on the second and third steps proposed by U Thant.

The third point in the reply was an expression of thanks for U Thant's interest in and desire for peace, and an appreciation of his motives. The Secretary General's interpretation of this is that Hanoi does not want him to carry on his efforts. He noted that this is the first written reply Hanoi has ever made to him.

The fourth point was the one made publicly that the U.N. has nothing to do with the Viet-Nam problem.

Ralph Bunche believes that the tone of the reply is friendly.

The U.N. interpretation is that nothing further can be done now, and that things must be allowed to settle down for several months. Ambassador Goldberg agrees.

Washington, May 1, 1967, 7:02 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by William Gleysteen (UNP); cleared in AFI, EA, ARA, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco.

/2/Dated April 24; it reported the British decision not to participate in the Committee of 24's African trip. (Ibid.)

1. Although we have great difficulty in determining balance of arguments for and against participation in this year's Committee of 24 trip to Africa and Near East, we are particularly interested in the opportunity which non-participation would provide for us to underscore our dissatisfaction with Committee's behavior.

2. We are especially reluctant to pass up this opportunity for a mild remonstrance since we doubt next 6-12 months will prove suitable time for us to register our objection in a more forthright way. As you know we have been reconsidering more fundamental question of our continued membership on Committee of 24 in context our growing doubt that membership is net benefit to our influence in UN. In fact we are by now reasonably certain that any advantage in terms of our status as an anti-colonial power is offset by our evident inability to moderate Committee behavior from within. Nevertheless, possible convergence over the next few months of crises over Rhodesia, South West Africa and various problems of apartheid may make it a particularly difficult time for us to extract ourselves from Committee membership. This probability increases our interest in lesser step which could be taken now.

/3/In telegram USUN 5150 from New York, May 4, the Mission to the United Nations expressed doubt that non-participation in travel would produce the effect desired by the Department of State. (Ibid.) In telegram 191658, May 10, the Department of State replied that it accepted the Mission's judgment. (Ibid.)

Rusk

During May 1967 tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors intensified. On June 5 citing Egyptian and Syrian actions that threatened its national security, Israel launched attacks on these states. War also erupted between Israel and Jordan. Israeli troops defeated all three states within a few days and a United Nations brokered cease-fire went into effect on June 10. Documentation relating to the origins and causes of the war, U.S. efforts to achieve a cease-fire through UN mediation, and subsequent discussions regarding the peaceful solution of outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes, including the genesis of UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, that set parameters for a peaceful settlement, are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. Forwarded to members of the National Security Council by Bromley Smith under cover

MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 22nd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Four principal issues will tend to dominate the proceedings of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly which convenes on September 19th, whether or not these issues become a formal part of the agenda.

It is still possible, though unlikely, the Security Council will meet before the Assembly opens. If it does and reaches agreement on some forward movement (e.g., the appointment of a mediator), there will be less focus in the Assembly on the Middle East. In all likelihood, however, there seems no way to avoid full dress consideration of the whole range of Middle East questions in the Assembly. The Emergency Special Session is likely to be reconvened before the regular Session and, after a brief discussion of Jerusalem and possibly of the refugee problem, to refer all Middle East items to the regular Session. There, our main problem will be to insure there is no erosion in the position of the majority of the Emergency Session that a Middle East settlement requires at a minimum both the withdrawal of Israeli forces and acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, free of claims or acts of belligerency. Proposals of the type advanced by Tito will pose serious tactical difficulties. As time goes by, with Israel continuing its occupation of Arab territory and with some conciliatory statements by countries such as Jordan, pressures will mount on Israel to show greater magnanimity than they are now showing. The Israelis' position has hardened and the Arabs show no sign of a willingness to make a concrete act of renouncing belligerency.

We are exploring the feasibility of the Security Council adopting a resolution calling for a conference to achieve a permanent settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the Geneva agreements. We will know before the opening of the General Assembly whether we are able to mobilize the necessary nine votes to inscribe the matter on the agenda. If the Security Council should decide to consider this matter, which is doubtful, the likelihood of formal substantive results is not great in view of the continuing negative attitude regarding UN involvement held by Hanoi, Peking, Paris and Moscow.

In any event, Vietnam will be on the minds of most delegates. Over 100 Foreign Ministers will at one time or another be in attendance, and this will afford Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg the opportunity in private discussions to make our policy clear. Last year the fact that we put forward a new proposal, consistent with our overall basic approach, provided many of our friends with the opportunity to come out publicly in the general debate in support of our position. We will want to make a positive statement of our position on Vietnam in the general debate speech. This statement will be prepared over the next ten days and submitted to the President for review.

The best result would be if the ENDC over the next four to six weeks could achieve agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article 3, and therefore be in a position to present it to the General Assembly for its endorsement at a late stage in its proceedings. This has been our prime objective. However, the more likely situation will probably be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the NPT in the Assembly will be in circumstances in which there is no agreement on Article 3. Some of the non-aligned will seek to mobilize support for inclusion of a security assurances article in the Treaty. Our objective should be, in concert with the USSR, to maintain the present Non-Proliferation Treaty intact, to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of a UN resolution. We ought to be able to manage the debate, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, so as to give the non-aligned an opportunity to express their views and make their criticisms without upsetting the agreement thus far achieved between the US and the USSR. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article 3 and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of a UN resolution.

The pattern of these questions in the UN is relatively unchanging. In their desire to produce movement and to force changes in the status quo, the black African delegations press for measures which go beyond what we can accept despite the fact that we are in general agreement with the goals. Our failure since the 21st GA to meet African expectations that the US would be more forthcoming on southern African issues will make us a target for more widespread attacks than in the past. Nonetheless, we should continue with positions that discourage illusions, among others, that the US might be willing to move further than we know to be the case.

The Special Assembly Session in April-June 1967 established a UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory which was instructed to report to the 22nd General Assembly. Its activities so far have been confined to preparing a letter to the South African Government requesting its cooperation in implementing UN resolutions on South West Africa. If the Council limits its report in this way, it may be that the Assembly will simply recommend cooperation with the Council and be willing to hold off on other action pending further Council activity. In view of the new proposals for legislation of South West Africa made by Vorster, it can be anticipated the Africans will press for stronger measures this year. Since we have gone as far as we can in meeting African demands on South West Africa and are not in a position to support recommendations for more forceful measures against South Africa, such as sanctions, we plan to try to persuade the Africans that the best interim course is to permit the Council to undertake such activities as it can, to maintain pressure on South Africa and to discourage it from further implementation of the Odendaal plan calling for establishment of "bantustans" in the Territory.

The Security Council imposed selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in December 1966. The Assembly will be convening at a time when the sanctions will have been in effect about nine months without any visible effect. Consequently, we can expect further African demands for broader sanctions, and for the use of force, as well as condemnation of those countries who appear to be violating them. Our efforts in the Assembly will be to cooperate with the British, whatever the state of their own discussions with the Smith regime, in counseling moderation and in seeking to prevent the Assembly from recommending measures that go beyond what we consider reasonable.

For the first time in its history the Assembly will have a Communist President, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manescu. In the absence of any other candidate, we expect to support him and he is likely to be a competent and objective presiding officer.

Developments on the mainland continue to work in our favor on this issue which should be manageable this year. We will seek as pro forma a consideration of this matter as possible. The present vote count indicates sufficient support to defeat the traditional resolution seeking to substitute Red China for the Republic of China and to reaffirm that this issue is an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. However, we will have to watch carefully to see whether there are significant Arab defections as a result of bitterness over the Middle East which, combined with a few changes in the African line-up, could jeopardize our position. In view of the uncertainty of the tactical situation, we have kept open the option of going alone with an Italian Study Committee. This proposal was welcomed last year as some evidence of forward movement and was useful in helping to mobilize a substantial vote in support of our position.

We will continue to give strong support to the United Nations peacekeeping role demonstrating this through our financial contributions to pay for the costs of the United Nations force in Cyprus and the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and Kashmir. Fundamental constitutional differences between the US and the USSR will not be bridged, and we can expect no lightening of the financial burden of the UN from the Soviet Union or France who have been unwilling to make any voluntary contributions to date. We would welcome the demise of the GA committee studying this problem.

We are developing a possible US proposal which would call for: (i) GA establishment of a Committee on the Oceans similar to the Outer Space Committee; (ii) an outline for a Declaration of Legal Principles to Govern the Activities on the Ocean Floor; (iii) a proposal for a marine science reserve in the Pacific; and (iv) a suggestion for a Decade of Exploration and Development of the Resources of the Deep Sea to begin in 1970. This proposal is still being cleared in the interested parts of the Government.

Washington, September 13, 1967, 12:32 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. The notes were forwarded to the President in the form of a memorandum from Jim Jones of the White House staff.

SUBJECT
National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room--Wednesday, September 13, 1967

Meeting convened: 12:32 PM

President departed meeting 12:58 PM

Attending were: The Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, General J.P. McConnell, Leonard Marks, Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Paul Nitze, CIA Director Dick Helms, Secretary Henry Fowler, Joe Sisco, Bromley Smith, Walt Rostow and George Christian.

The President opened the meeting calling on Under Secretary Katzenbach.

Katzenbach pointed out that Secretary Rusk will be going to the United Nations for the usual meetings of Foreign Ministers. He said these are very helpful and useful to have these bilateral discussions, although it is very wearing on Mr. Rusk. Katzenbach said that the Africans are better than they used to be. They held together well, and they are more realistic than they used to be. Katzenbach said the President's announcement of the U.N. Delegation with new and different people is very helpful politically both to the United Nations and to this Administration domestically. Katzenbach said that Joe Sisco briefed the NATO people on the Middle East and this was helpful, but he is not sure that they will stay considering the pressure the NATO countries are under. On Vietnam, Katzenbach said Goldberg has been having discussions with the U.N. delegates.

The President said he appreciated what Katzenbach said about the United Nations delegation. The President then called on Goldberg for discussion of the major issues facing the United Nations General Assembly.

Goldberg said there are about 100 items on the General Assembly agenda, many of these are repetitious. The principal issues listed by Goldberg were Middle East, Vietnam, non-proliferation, Chinese representation, oceanography and African problems.

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 630-635.

Goldberg then turned the discussion to Vietnam. He said he has not discussed this with all members of the Security Council. Our friends are timid and reluctant. They don't want to come along. They don't think the Security Council will reach a settlement. If they are solid in this belief, nothing could come out. He said Canada, Great Britain and the Danes have shown great diffidence. Russia says don't get into this. They said they would veto a straight resolution.

The President asked who feels we should go to the Security Council.

Goldberg said the general feeling is that we ought not to do it.

The President asked how many on the Council.

Goldberg replied 15. Goldberg pointed out that Argentina, Brazil and China are with us on going to the Council. Bulgaria is lukewarm, Denmark would rather not be involved, Ethiopia is a question mark, France is no, India is against us, Japan will go along but they are not enthusiastic, Mali is against us. Nigeria wants planes, and if we give them planes they will do whatever we ask. Russia is against us, United Kingdom is against, but will vote with us if pressured.

The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us.

Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations with this. Goldberg pointed out that this will be the last time we can manage the Security Council. He said that we could probably maneuver the Council if we put the maximum pressure, but that after January, this would not be possible, because we lose Japan for Pakistan, and Pakistan is no friend. We lose Mali. We lose Bulgaria for Hungary; Nigeria for Senegal; Argentina for Paraguay. Goldberg also pointed out that Russia may be playing a waiting game. They may try to go before the new Security Council with a Resolution condemning our bombing.

The President asked what was thought of our going to the U.N. and getting defeated.

Goldberg said I don't think this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff.

The President asked can we close off . . . .

Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have nine votes, but they don't want to be involved.

The President asked what Goldberg's recommendation was.

Goldberg replied I would go recognizing the great dangers. We could not come out with anything that would hurt us. I don't think anything would come out at all. There would be some who would say this was a rebuff, but this would show to the Mansfields and that group that we at least tried.

Secretary McNamara said I'd be for going before the United Nations if there was any possibility that it would pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgment.

Goldberg said I don't agree.

Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara. If we got Ethiopia in and got the nine votes to inscribe it, and the question was on unilateral cessation, I figure there would be five in favor, five against, and five abstaining. Probably Algeria and Ethiopia would abstain. That would put Canada and the United Kingdom really on the spot. I think a 5-5-5 situation would be no gain for us.

McNamara said he believes such results would feed the Mansfields et al with new fuel to tell us to stop the bombing.

The Vice President said it depends on what the issue is. If we are rebuffed, the reason may be phrased because we held our old position of quid pro quo. While I am anxious to have the United Nations have some involvement in this, I don't think we should do it if we don't have the votes.

Goldberg said one thing that has been overlooked is that we may not get to the resolution at all. Russia will not support a move to amend on the bombing. Hanoi has already said this and Russia has picked up this line. In my judgment the resolution would just flounder into a state of disagreement and we would get credit for having tried.

The President asked, is that a plus in relation to where we are now? I feel that Mansfield might think that would be a plus, the President said.

Katzenbach said Mansfield would regard those evils as we do.

The President said you should talk to Mansfield when he gets back from Japan.

Goldberg then began discussing the non-proliferation treaty. Saying the likely situation will be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the non-proliferation treaty in the assembly will be in circumstances which there is no agreement on Article III. Our objective should be in concert with the USSR to maintain the present non-proliferation treaty intact to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of the U.N. resolution. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article III and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of the U.N. resolution.

The President departed the meeting at 12:58 PM, and turned the remainder of the meeting over to the Vice President.

New York, September 20, 1967, 1404Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Confidential; Exdis.

/2/See Document 372.

/3/September 15.

2. Fact that convention was sent up 20 years ago as companion piece to headquarters agreement in form of joint res was not considered to be persuasive on method to be followed now and House members felt that using different method now would not provoke controversy in House. Rationale is simple, i.e. except that it was part of a package then, it would have been sent up as a treaty and this appears to be proper method now.

3. Sen Clark emphasized that treaties should be ratified by body where they properly belonged. House members appeared to feel this might well relieve House of "hot potatoe" in view of present mood of House outside Foreign Affairs Committee.

4. Strongly recommend Dept review proposed method, conduct additional soundings in Senate immediately, and, unless there persuasive evidence to contrary, that convention be forwarded soonest.

5. As Dept fully aware, I attach great importance to submission and accession to this convention. It appears that we have strong support now in Senate Foreign Relations Committee: during and subsequent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee visit this spring, Fulbright and others indicated support. Passage in Senate--unless soundings surprisingly negative--seems likely if we are united in our support. Subject to result of sounding, I am willing undertake further discussions with President.

Goldberg

New York, October 2, 1967, 2142Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)

There is an increasing tendency of committee, under its radical Afro-Asian leadership, to disregard not only UN rules of procedure but also basic parliamentary principles of fairness and equal treatment of delegations. This tendency has at times interfered with ability of US delegation to record US positions promptly and effectively. Dept will recall that chairman's anti-Western bias became extreme enough this session to warrant formal objection by US del. Even though we might not wish to press this point in UNGA statement, leaving the committee at this time would be interpreted as impressive indication that the US not prepared condone departures from procedures and principles which we consider essential to the UN's future healthy functioning.

Observations made last year about committee's role and achievements remain pertinent today. It is difficult to point to one "colonial country" which committee has helped on path to independence. What has happened in recent years is that general tenor of committee's debate and resolutions has become increasingly and aggressively anti-Western. Serious consideration of colonial questions has diminished to point where only pro forma attention is given to problems of the populations and to actual developments in areas concerned. This trend is probably a natural consequence of frustration resulting from discovery that administering authorities will not accept direction from Committee in matters concerning their own colonies. This mounting ASAF condemnation of "imperialists" has made committee ideal vehicle for Soviet bloc propaganda attacks on West. Soviet bloc dels not only help lead chorus but vote resounding "yes" to virtually all of committee's draft resolutions. There is solid evidence that Tanzanians, plus certain other ASAF delegations, conspire frequently with the Soviet del, and it is sometimes difficult to determine which is the leader.

By contrast, role of US on committee is essentially defensive and negative. We seek, within limitations mentioned para (1) above, to straighten record insofar as US policies toward colonial areas are concerned. However, given inherent conservatism of these policies as well as radicalism of committee, there is little if any possibility for US initiatives and positive role. We consistently abstain on or vote against Committee's resolutions, since we are unable accept extreme measures proposed.

There seems to be little grounds for hope that situation in committee will improve substantially. While present chairman, Malecela of Tanzania, will not remain indefinitely, it is generally assumed that chairmanship must go to an Afro-Asian. Moderate Afro-Asians of Committee not only appear have no interest in job but seemingly feel it is inevitable and perhaps appropriate that militant "anti-colonialist" hold down job (Iraq is currently most frequently mentioned as replacing Malecela when he steps down).

Claim is often made that ASAF's would interpret US abandonment of committee as sign lack of interest in solving problems of Southern Africa. Indeed, Soviet bloc would seek to place such interpretation on our action, and to obtain maximum mileage from it. I would expect sharp reaction from certain militant ASAF dels at time announcement made, milder criticism from some others (although some moderate ASAF's would probably rejoice quietly over blow to Committee 24 prestige). I doubt that reaction would be long-lived. Committee by now fairly widely known as outlet for views of Soviet bloc and ASAF radicals rather than as effective instrument for solution African and other colonial problems. Hence I doubt that many ASAF's would seriously consider US move as diminishing what chances there may be for progress in this field.

Conversely, under circumstances described para 1-B above, it can hardly be argued that US continuation on committee helps us in our relationship with ASAF's. Instead, contrary is true: membership continually highlights conflict between US positions and those of ASAF's, especially on African issues which are of basic importance to many of them. If we left Committee 24 we would still have occasion express US views on colonial problems in Fourth Committee, but would not be forced argue these questions at UN repetitively throughout the year.

Another argument sometimes raised against leaving is that as member US can hope exert some influence on Committee action on agenda items like Fiji, Gibraltar, and other small territories, i.e. items which are of secondary importance to ASAF's but quite significant to certain Western members. This argument obviously more valid for UK than US. In any event, past experience suggests that while Western dels may secure changes of peripheral importance in these lesser agenda items, even here they cannot deflect main thrust of committee action.

It can of course be argued that our ability keep Puerto Rico off committee agenda would be jeopardized if we were not on committee. Obviously we would not be in position exercise rights of reply when Soviet bloc and other dels raise question suddenly, although we could ask to take part if and when debate scheduled. To date our ability resist unfavorable decision has stemmed from fact that slim majority in committee appears sympathize with US. Provided we continue lobbying as necessary here and in capitals, this favorable voting line-up need not change. We could probably count on friendly dels committee working group as well as on Secretariat sources to warn us in advance if chairman proposes new step.

Possibly one or two other Western members of committee might not welcome US decision to leave committee. However, most likely any disagreement would focus on timing rather than principle. As Dept aware, UK and Australia already considering same step, and have urged we consult closely. Australia might well decide join us. UK has apparently decided tentatively take no action until after XXII GA, although UKUN says US decision leave during GA might influence UK thinking. In any case, US need not feel honor bound to act in concert with UK, since UK in past two years has avoided debate on major committee problems by boycotting Africa trip despite US urging to contrary. Italy, Finland both known to be "fed up" with committee, although we do not know their current views on resigning.

It will be clear to Dept from foregoing that I have been led to conclusion that continuing participation by US not in our net interests. By remaining on the Committee we highlight our differences with the ASAF's, costing us in terms bilateral relations ASAF countries and also in terms ASAF support for UN measures we consider important. Moreover, by participating in committee's work we are contributing our support to a body which no longer merits it.

/3/In telegram 78188, December 2, the Department of State affirmed its general agreement with Goldberg's recommendations and sketched out a series of approaches to take prior to formally withdrawing from the Committee of 24. (Ibid.)

Goldberg

Washington, October 29, 1967, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. An annotation on the telegram indicates President Johnson saw it.

CAP 67907. Eyes Only for the President from Secretary Rusk.

/2/Not found.

/3/November 1 or 2. Goldberg's November 2 testimony is in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to the United Nations: Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967).

2. I am sending you my comments as background for a telephone call before you return to Washington.

/4/Reference is to S. Res. 180, introduced by Mansfield on October 25 with the co-sponsorship of 59 other Senators declaring the "sense of the Senate" that the United States should seek the involvement of the United Nations in the solution of the Vietnam conflict. The Senate adopted the resolution on November 30 by a vote of 82-0. For more information, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 915-922.

4. There may be ways in which we can delay action in the Senate, both in the Committee and on the floor, to take account of the private contacts now in process. There will be some advantage in delay but I do not look upon this as an overriding consideration. What is fundamental in my judgment is that we ourselves not appear to be fearful of the UN approach to Viet-Nam.

5. Looking ahead to possible action in the Security Council, Ambassador Goldberg and I see the situation as follows:

A) There is almost no chance that there would be nine votes for inscription of the item on the agenda at this time. The present prospect is that negative votes will be expected from: Bulgaria, France, India, Mali, Nigeria and USSR; abstentions probably from Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, and the UK (though Canada, Denmark, and UK might shift to affirmative under pressure); affirmative votes: Argentina, Brazil, Japan, China and the US. In other words, there are just not nine votes today to inscribe the item. This resolves the problem of whether the Security Council would take some hostile action, but, in all honesty, it raises the possibility that the absence of nine votes for inscription would mean a UN repudiation of the US position. Goldberg would develop the point before the Senate Committee that the absence of votes has to do with the forum and the timing and not with the merits of the question. This is, in fact, the true situation. Further, I challenged Mansfield directly on this point and asked him whether the absence of votes in the UN would be then used by Senate doves to claim that we had been repudiated by the UN. Mansfield replied that this would not be the case, but that the burden would be carried by the UN rather than by the US. Frankly, I took his statement on this with a grain of salt because Morse, Young, Hartke and others may well take the other view.

B) If by some chance the item is inscribed, the overwhelming prospect is that the Security Council would do what it did in January and February 1966, namely, to recess the debate for consultation among members. Such consultation would produce nothing and we would not hear the matter again for months.

C) The remaining issue is whether there is any possibility that there would be a resolution tabled in the Security Council calling upon the US for a unilateral cessation of the bombing without any corresponding action by Hanoi. For such a resolution to have any prospect whatever would require a major change of view by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, France and a number of others about the jurisdiction of the UN to deal with this question. But if, through some wholly surprising development, even this should occur, Goldberg and I agree that such a unilateral resolution could not get the necessary votes. Goldberg and I cannot imagine any resolution which would get nine votes for inscription.

6. On balance, therefore, I believe we should not object to the Mansfield resolution and that we are on safe ground in letting the Security Council demonstrate that it is unwilling to take up the question or to take any action on Viet-Nam.

Rusk

New York, November 7, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 9. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

/2/March 22. For notes of the meeting, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Conversation with U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, 92nd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, 1972).

Obviously it is now too late to submit the Convention to the Congress during the present session. And I fully appreciate your view that you would not wish to submit it now without some assurance of substantial Congressional support. It would, however, be most helpful to me to have a statement of intent from the Secretary of State indicating that the Convention will be submitted early in the next session.

This matter is of particular importance right now in view of the impending debate in the General Assembly on diplomatic privileges and immunities. As originally proposed by the Secretary General this item was confined to specific immunities of representatives to the United Nations; however, we were successful in broadening the focus so that it will now encompass incidents such as attacks on our diplomatic missions abroad--a subject in which the United States has a deep interest. Nonetheless, the United States will be under heavy attack with the usual charges on host country problems. Our failure to ratify the Convention on Privileges and Immunities gives each nation so inclined an irrefutable springboard from which to attack us.

/3/Attached but not printed.

While I would, of course, prefer the original and stronger version, I strongly recommend that you approve the Secretary's addressing to me one or the other of these letters. I propose in turn to convey its substance as a reply to the latest inquiry from the Secretary General, and also make use of it, as necessary, to deflect criticism of our position during the forthcoming debate on privileges and immunities.

Respectfully,

Arthur J. Goldberg

Washington, November 27, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Gleysteen. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary.

SUBJECT
Future of the Trusteeship Council

In light of your question to Dave Popper, I am submitting a review of where we stand on the future of the UN Trusteeship Council.

With the termination of the Australian-New Zealand-UK Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru on January 31, 1968, New Zealand will drop off the Trusteeship Council and it will no longer be possible to maintain parity between administering authorities and non-administering members as stipulated in Article 86 1(c) of the Charter. The composition will then be as follows: Australia and the U.S. as administering powers; the Republic of China, France, USSR, and UK as Permanent Members of the Security Council; and Liberia as the only elected member under Article 86 1(c). Moreover, there will only be two remaining Trusteeship Agreements, i.e. Australia's Agreement for New Guinea and our own strategic trust with the Security Council for the TTPI.

/2/Not attached.

We are not certain how this problem will evolve. Many of the former colonial states which are so heavily represented in the Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly would like these bodies to take over as much as possible of the Trusteeship Council's residual activities. While we are prepared to discuss our dependencies as appropriate in the General Assembly, neither we nor the Australians are willing to have the Committee of 24 become the UN's agent for surveillance in our trust territories. Full controversy may not develop until Liberia's term on the Trusteeship Council expires on December 31, 1968, but we cannot rule out considerable difficulty beginning within the next few weeks when the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considers the question of Nauru's independence. Hopefully, however, the UN Legal Adviser's opinion and its acceptance by the Soviets will help hold controversy to manageable proportions for the time being. As far as we are concerned, we have an important protection in that our Trusteeship Agreement is with the Security Council. We would prefer to continue reporting to the Trusteeship Council but we could very properly decide to begin reporting to the Security Council if the Trusteeship Council ceases to operate.

Washington, January 10, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Edward T. Long (ARA/CAR). Copies were sent to ARA, IO, UNP, L, USUN, and the White House.

SUBJECT
Puerto Rico and the Committee of 24

Acting under Mr. Sayre's long standing instructions and after consultation with Mr. Ward Allen, I telephoned Angel Calderon Cruz, Assistant Secretary of State for External Affairs, Puerto Rico, to pass on the following message: the United States was actively considering withdrawal from the UN Committee of 24 and would shortly commence consultations with the membership of that Committee on this subject. Briefly, the reasons for which the U.S. was considering this action were as follows:

1. The increasing tendency of the Committee to disregard UN rules of procedure and basic parliamentary principles.

2. The Committee's debates and resolutions have become increasingly anti-Western.

3. The Committee has become a vehicle for propaganda attacks on the West.

4. The U.S. role on the Committee is essentially defensive and negative.

5. There is little, if any, possibility for U.S. initiatives and a positive role.

6. There seems to be little grounds to hope for the situation to improve substantially.

In view of the above, the U.S. is contemplating withdrawal from the Committee. Because of the Committee's previous desires to place the Puerto Rican problem on its agenda, the U.S. wanted to let Puerto Rico know ahead of time what course of action was being contemplated. Dr. Calderon whistled when he was told about our plan. He took my explanation in good form but said this was a most important action from the Puerto Rican standpoint. He wondered what would happen, assuming U.S. withdrawal, if Puerto Rico were attacked by members of the Committee. I told him I thought the U.S. as a member of the UN would have the right to reply to attacks of this nature if the U.S. desired to do so.

He said that from Puerto Rico's viewpoint and speaking off the cuff it would be best if USUN could avoid precipitate leaks concerning this pending action. The "independentists" groups in Puerto Rico would be happy to use this contemplated action to their own benefit. I explained that as soon as consultations started in New York we anticipated that there would be leaks about this possible withdrawal.

/2/In a January 24 memorandum for record, Long reported that Calderon Cruz had replied stating that the Governor's position was that the Committee of 24 issue fell within the purview of U.S. policy regarding the United Nations. "Puerto Rico's only concern was that [its] views be considered and defended if the issue came up in the Committee of 24." (Ibid.)

Washington, January 25, 1968, 1430Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Popper and Donald

104302. Subj: Committee of 24.

/2/Transmitted in telegram 3450 from New York, January 23. (Ibid.)

2. In circumstances, we think question boils down to how we can best continue to exercise our leverage to produce more satisfactory conduct in Committee. While argument can be made either way, we believe it is better for us to stay with Committee, while making it plain that we reserve right to withdraw if unsatisfactory practices continue, than to absent ourselves from opening meeting. Latter course puts wrong foot forward at outset. It is not clear what Committee could or would do to meet our needs that could not be done by our representations from the floor of the Committee and privately. In short, unless or until we actually decide to withdraw, we think it preferable that we continue to participate.

3. Accordingly we propose that US Del attend opening meeting and at suitable opportunity make statement along following lines:

USG welcomes Chairmanship of Makkonen (or Mesteri). As Committee members know, at last session of Committee and more recently in private consultations US expressed serious concern about some aspects of Committee's work. US looks forward to working with new Chairman in the hope that these problems can be worked out in course of current year.

4. Promptly thereafter USUN should privately inform Committee members as well as others previously consulted that consultations had produced expression of understanding and statements that efforts would be made to adopt more satisfactory approach to work of Committee. Members had expressed hope that the United States would remain on Committee. On this basis US will defer its decision as to its future course, reserving the right to review the situation at any time.

Rusk

On February 21, 1968, President Johnson and UN Secretary General U Thant met for a discussion of the Secretary General's most recent effort to find a solution to the Vietnam war. U Thant reported that the North Vietnamese were willing to begin talks "immediately" upon the cessation of U.S. bombing raids on their territory. The Secretary General urged the President to undertake another bombing pause to test the sincerity of the North Vietnamese. The President expressed his doubts about North Vietnam's objectives but encouraged U Thant's efforts. A tape recording of their conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings, Tape C002A-1D. A 3-page summary of the meeting and an unedited transcript are ibid. Johnson discussed the meeting in The Vantage Point, page 395.

New York, April 4, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting took place at United Nations headquarters. It lasted from 3:47 to 4:30 p.m. Another set of notes of the meeting taken by President's Special Assistant Jim Jones is ibid., Meeting Notes File.

/2/Delivered March 31; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-1969, Book I, pp. 469-476.

The President: That is encouraging. We tried to convince our people some move had to be made. We felt this was a step. I hope conditions will permit it to be a big step. If there is any recognition of it we will take another one. I will not do anything to endanger my men. We are hopeful it will permit initiation of some exchange. That will be encouraging.

I have asked Ambassador Goldberg to brief you on the speech.

U Thant: Thank you for that. As I indicated to you it is important that Peking has not broadcast Hanoi's statement up to 1 a.m. today. Hanoi ignored Peking.

Peking Radio never broadcast some statements. Hanoi doesn't care about Peking's attitude. These are factors that indicate Hanoi is somewhat independent of Peking. This indicates relative independence of Hanoi from Peking. You should keep this in mind. It is difficult for even doves in Hanoi to come in with a statement like they did yesterday.

On Monday I transmitted a message to Hanoi:

Not to react negatively immediately to the President's speech.

Please consider it carefully and react after very carefully reading it.

Also told General DeGaulle not to react negatively.

I have nothing to advise on the next step. But this is a very important step. Hanoi really wants to talk to you.

There are some procedural questions. I think Geneva would be the best place since Geneva has historically been involved. When I was in New Delhi, if parties agree to talks, she will be privileged to have them in New Delhi as Chairman of the ICC. The French also said, not officially, the French Government would be privileged to host talks in Paris.

I am at your disposal. My sole concern is to contribute as best I can to bringing about peace. Coming from the country I do, our experience in Burma in World War II--95% of our people were elated--we worked for them. The more they stayed, the more Japanese stayed on, the more bitter the feelings were. We began to regard the Japanese as foreigners--just as the British. Now our relations with the Japanese are excellent. Now all my people are very anti-Communist. The Communist backbone was broken in Burma with advisers.

/3/Mai Van Bo, Paris-based diplomatic representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

There is no immediate prospect for a resolution. I may talk to Bo.

/4/March 31.

The Soviets thought we would never get out of Vietnam because of investment and bases there. Rusk and Clifford and I put in a plan--a modification of the Goldberg plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us.

/5/For documentation on the June 1967 meeting of President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217-238.

I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most of the people, and it continues only where these efforts directly threaten our men.

I stretched this as far as I could. Goldberg wanted to stop it all. But I could not endanger our men. If they would not have a crash program, O. K. But now they are desperately rushing in supplies. Ninety percent of the population is above the 20th parallel.

Secretary Clifford feels we have 9-10 months to do what we can for this world. We have to take some chances.

New York, June 14, 1968, 2015Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 10. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

5606. Secretary, accompanied by Amb Goldberg and Sisco, called on SYG who was joined by Bunche.

Secretary, after thanking SYG for receiving him on short notice, said he would be meeting with Kuznetsov today to discuss two serious matters, Vietnam and Berlin.

/2/For extracts from both statements, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1968, p. 513.

SYG recounted info he had recd. He was informed by Hanoi during first week of May through a third party that while bombing of North Vietnam had been restricted in area, its intensity has been more severe and more numerous than previous. In March bombing over whole of North Vietnam was about 2,000 attacks; in spite of the restricted bombing area, it was up to 3,000; this represented 50 per cent increase in intensity. He further understood that during the first week of May the intensity of bombing was more than the first week in Apr. Point he was making was that although area had been restricted, intensity of bombing was greater.

/3/Reference is to the three-point proposal U Thant first introduced on June 20, 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 819.

SYG said that Hanoi felt that it could not be treated on a par with "aggressors." He admitted he had not been able to convince Hanoi to take steps of de-escalation, and that he did not know whether there would be a "revised" position on de-escalation by Hanoi if all the bombing has stopped. He felt this could be found out only after we had stopped all of bombing. As to third point of his three-point proposal, SYG felt question of participation was in Pres Johnson's words "not an insurmountable problem." He maintained he had told Hanoi it was unrealistic for only one side to de-escalate. Hanoi's response was that there must be American withdrawal, which SYG said he had never advocated.

Secretary said level of bombing is directly related to level of infiltration. Number of sorties are seasonal, and if there is comparison with previous season, there is not an escalation in that sense. On the other hand, escalation on the ground in South is very marked, especially since Mar 31. It is difficult for US and for South Vietnamese to understand why Saigon can be bombed every day whereas Hanoi is immune.

SYG opined that Hanoi's objective was probably to get new government in Saigon. Secretary asked what would be situation if we adopted objective of a new govt in North Vietnam. Where is reciprocity in that? Amb Goldberg added we could all agree that escalation is not a proper framework for negotiations. SYG's three-point proposal was directed towards de-escalation. SYG has said it is not realistic for one side to de-escalate while the other side increased its activity.

Secretary said 80 percent of casualties are in First Corps near DMZ, and that this means that area north of DMZ is integral part of entire battlefield. We cannot tell our Marines not to shoot until trucks and personnel are within mile of them. There are dozens of ways in which Hanoi can let us know what it is willing to do to de-escalate and what would happen if we stopped all bombing of North.

SYG said Chi Comms are 300 per cent against Paris talks. Fact that Hanoi is talking in face of Peking opposition is something. He noted that North Vietnamese del was not received by any officials in Peking on its way to Paris Talks. He noted too that Peking Radio avoided broadcasting about Paris Talks. He underscored it is important that we understand Hanoi's difficulties. He described Tho as a super hawk, and he thought that perhaps he had been sent to Paris to make Peking happier. He has met with French UN rep Berard this a.m. and urged French to help bring about private contacts which he believed important.

Secretary concluded this part of conversation by saying we would continue our efforts in this distressing situation.

/4/A memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Kuznotsov is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XV, Document 270.

SYG limited himself to saying he was not familiar with situation and therefore cld not react or assess it. He understood, however, its seriousness. Secretary pointed out that Sovs have supported East Germany publicly, that East Germany had probably discussed this matter with the Sovs when Ulbricht was in Moscow. Secretary said that maybe Ulbricht was afraid of a poss d?tente and was concerned over developments in Chechoslovakia and Rumania. SYG viewed Czech developments as much more fundamental than those that have occurred in Rumania. Secretary indicated he was calling on Manescu this afternoon, and he felt he had done good job as GA President.

In response to Secretary's inquiry as to why Tanzania and Zambia voted against NPT, SYG attributed it generally to Chinese influence. Bunche added he thought it was primarily Chinese Communist influence on Nyerere and in turn Nyerere influence on Kaunda.

Suggest Dept decide on distribution.

Goldberg

Washington, June 25, 1968, 1831Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, UNP, and L; and approved by Sisco.

190014. Subject: Voluntary Contributions to Overcome UN Financial Deficit.

1. We doubt that Cuevas' initiative on voluntary contributions is likely to be constructive. Indeed, it appears designed primarily to put pressure on US to move first on a contribution and make us share onus for Soviet-French stalling on making substantial voluntary contributions.

/2/Ambassador Goldberg left post on June 24; Ambassador George Ball presented his credentials on June 26.

3. Suggest following stance be taken.

a. We recognize that UN financial problem is key concern both in terms of overall UN capacity and in its effect on financing future peacekeeping. US prepared to cooperate in restoring UN solvency, and can be counted on to meet our fair share of UN costs. We believe it could be useful for Secretariat to update the current deficit estimate of Committee of 14. More than two years ago Committee 14 established low "current deficit" figure of $31.9 million and high figure of $53.3 million, after deducting voluntary contributions already made or pledged. We continue to accept higher figure which embodies "surplus accounts" since we believe UN has real obligation to refund credits owed countries that paid their peacekeeping assessments in cases where appropriations exceeded actual expenditures. Although SYG in introduction to Annual Report for 1966-67 presented revised estimate for lower deficit figure he failed to update high figure incorporating surplus accounts.

b. At very outset of any discussions on deficit it is important to put matter in correct perspective. Entire responsibility for meeting deficit through voluntary contributions rests on Sovs, French and others who refused to pay their peacekeeping expenses and thus brought about the financial crisis. Understanding in 1965 was that USSR and France would make substantial contributions as quid pro quo for not pressing applicability of Article 19 to ONUC and UNEF arrears. Though face-saving language called for substantial contributions from highly developed countries without distinction, clearly our position is very different from Soviets and French. We particularly reject new interpretation of history that Soviet-French contributions should be contingent on ours, or that contributions should be "harmonized," which Sovs and French have inspired in recent years.

c. FYI. Reasons for insisting on setting history straight with Cuevas and others is not only to avoid sharing onus with defaulters for UN financial plight, but also to reject suggestion that any US contribution would be equated or "harmonized" with theirs. As you aware, if contribution ever eventuates it will consist of write-offs on bills due us for Congo support ($4.5 million) and waiving all or part of $9 million due us on ONUC surplus accounts. Soviet-French contributions would necessarily be new money. To put us in same frame of reference would make our contribution look phony or paltry. End FYI.

/3/ Dated April 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-4 UN)

e. In interest of restoring UN solvency and moving on peacekeeping, once Sovs and French make firm commitments we would examine seriously and speedily what US could do.

4. FYI. We would have Congressional problems with any voluntary contribution to UN at this time in view of budgetary situation and continued memories of unfortunate history of GA refusal to force Soviets to pay peacekeeping arrears. A substantial Soviet contribution would take some of the edge off this criticism. Even so, as you aware, rationale and public presentation of our contribution would need to be carefully framed (for example we would maintain that the arrears remain on the books). We recognize that, irrespective of merits, dispute over UN finances and UN peacekeeping has had cold war overtones and impaired UN effectiveness. We are prepared to cooperate in efforts to return the UN to a sound financial basis. However, the responsibility and the first move is up to the other side, and any approach to be practical must take account of above realities. End FYI.

5. Welcome your comments.

Katzenbach

September 23, 1968, 9:37 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation of September 23, 1968 with Secretary Rusk. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The President called Rusk from the LBJ Ranch. A tape of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F MISC. 05.

/2/The Security Council debated the Czech situation five times between August 21 and 25. No debate took place in the General Assembly. A complaint of U.S. and South Vietnamese incursions into its territory was brought before the Security Council by Cambodia in June. No General Assembly debate on the Vietnam war took place that year.

The President in further discussing the resignation of Amb. Goldberg [Ball] said:

"I had this reaction. I told him I appreciated the things that motivated him and I thought it was very unselfish but his willingness to refuse to take any position under the Humphrey administration. I don't know how likely that is . . . but that that was just going to help Mr. Humphrey and I thought he should think about what the real reaction it is going to have and whether that reaction is going to be a plus for the Democrats or not. My own judgment is that it is going to be a big minus. I imagine the first thing they will say is that the President and Secretary Rusk recommend a man, pick him, call him back to a Cabinet status job, with the most important thing in the world being peace, then he leaves in a few weeks and gets off on a political campaign. That just sounds erratic.

"Humphrey has turned his campaign completely over to Larry O'Brien. My judgment is that George Ball would just get himself in a mess because I think he will talk to Humphrey every night, maybe even have some influence although I don't think he can be effective if he does this and he will be explaining every time why he left, what the differences are and what he and the President disagreed on. So first, I do not think he can be effective if he does it, second, it will leave the appearance of being erratic with the Administration, with the President and with the Secretary of State."

/3/No record of these discussions was found.

/4/September 25.

/5/According to the President's Daily Diary, the three men met "Off the Record" at 1:43 p.m., September 25. No other record of the meeting was found. (Johnson Library)

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and other subjects.]

/6/See Document 433.

Secretary Rusk asked:

"I think George Ball was planning to see Humphrey tonight. Do you think I should suggest to him that he postpone this for a couple of days?"

President Johnson replied:

/7/According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson left the LBJ Ranch at 8:50 a.m. September 24 and arrived at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington at 12:57 p.m. EST. (Johnson Library)

Secretary Rusk advised he would do this.

Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05-1:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 6. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another set of notes for this meeting, prepared by Tom Johnson, is ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings.

The President: The purpose of the meeting of the Council is to review the issues before the current United Nations General Assembly and to discuss our position on these questions. Secretary Rusk will comment in general on the General Assembly meeting and Ambassador Ball will deal with the specific problems.

Secretary Rusk: Suggested that Ambassador Ball lead off and he would comment later.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The following major issues will be raised:

1. Czechoslovakian Situation

a. A specific General Assembly agenda item on Czechoslovakia is unlikely, especially if the Czech delegation takes the position that it does not want a separate item.

b. There is very little support from NATO members for a specific Czech item.

c. The Czech situation will be fully debated under other agenda items which will make it easier to avoid Soviet rebuttal by citing Vietnam and other world problems.

d. If there is further Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia, the situation in the UN could change drastically.

2. The Middle East

a. We have the last clear chance for an Arab-Israeli settlement in the next few months.

b. Ambassador Jarring will be in New York and will be meeting with Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister. The work on the Middle East will be done in hotel rooms, not in the United Nations Assembly.

c. Currently, the Arabs appear to the public to be readier to settle than the Israelis.

d. There is very small chance for settlement unless we push on the Israelis and the Russians push on the Arabs. Even if this were done, a settlement is doubtful because the two sides are so far apart. This is a sad prognosis.

e. Unless action comes within the next few weeks, Jarring will be ending a year of activity without results. If he cannot advance toward accomplishing the objectives of the November 22 resolution, he may quit. The problem then becomes even more difficult for us because it will be returned to the UN Security Council. The subject is complicated by the U.S. election.

3. Biafra

a. The sad situation in Biafra is a result of federal Nigerian leaders who are willing to sacrifice millions of lives to gain a military advantage. Efforts of the Ethopian Emperor to bring the two sides to an agreement have been unsuccessful. The result is a human tragedy in which thousands are starving.

b. It is difficult to get the Biafra problem into the United Nations because the African members say the OAU should handle the case. Asian members side with the Africans in opposition to UN intervention. Despite world pressure, the General Assembly cannot act because of this African opposition.

c. To handle the humanitarian aspects of this problem, we should name a man to coordinate U.S. Government assistance to the Biafrans.

4. Chinese Representation

There is no change in the U.S. position of opposition to the admission of Communist China. The voting pattern of past General Assemblies is likely to be repeated. There is therefore no serious problem this year.

Secretary Rusk: The general debate of the Assembly is beginning later this year than usual. The debate will occupy the Assembly during most of October. Consequently, GA votes on major issues are unlikely before our election is over.

/3/September 23; summarized in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1968, pp. 22982-22983.

Assistant Secretary Sisco: U Thant's statement on Vietnam will not change the direction of the General Assembly. However, some 80 foreign ministers who will be in New York will all be asking Secretary Rusk whether progress is being made in the Paris talks with the North Vietnamese.

The President: The U Thant statement was certainly not helpful. It added further confusion. Even the enemy must be confused by the various statements, including that of Representative Laird (reported plan to reduce by 90,000 the number of U.S troops in Vietnam).

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.]

The President: Asked whether the appropriate Congressional Committees had been briefed on UN problems. Secretary Rusk said he or Assistant Secretary Sisco would brief the proper Congressmen. Ambassador Ball pointed out that there are two Senators on the U.S. delegation who will be in New York this week and will remain for a few days of the General Assembly.

Secretary Rusk: Mentioned to the President that many of the Foreign Ministers coming to New York would want to come down to Washington. He said he would speak to the President later about those Foreign Ministers whom the President should see.

Secretary Fowler: Said that he wished to add to the list of those wanting to come to Washington who wanted to see the President, 110 Finance Ministers and over 100 representatives of central banks.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.]

Bromley Smith

Washington, September 25, 1968, 2:04-2:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A copy of the statement and transcript of the subsequent press conference in which Ball outlined the reasons for his resignation are in the Princeton University, Ball Papers, Speeches.

ATTENDING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson

Clark Clifford: George Ball called me. I saw him this morning.

He said he had "reached a decision."

I listed the reasons he should continue in the job. Ball also said:

I cannot permit myself to remain quiet any longer about Nixon. He is a liar, dishonest, and a crook. This is my country. We would get poor leadership. He said, he must be free.

--Speak out myself
--Help Humphrey say what he should
--Bring in people to help

He said he couldn't live with himself if he didn't work to defeat Nixon.

Secretary Rusk: He said the same things to me. He is misestimating the political situation. It would be interpreted as "break" with the Administration.

Clark Clifford: He said he does not intend to "break" with Administration.

/2/The word "leaves" was crossed out and replaced with "takes."

Clark Clifford: He has an excellent statement.

The President: The time when he should have decided this was when he agreed to serve.

The President: I talked to Dirksen yesterday.

/3/General Earle Wheeler.

--The 3rd offensive being blunted.
--SVN strength improved.

Clark Clifford: Better press tone because of

--General Sidle's approach.
--General Abrams' doesn't "sell" it.
--Facts are on our side.

Secretary Rusk: Bunker would try to go along with anything, but he puts priority on GVN presence at table.

Secretary Rusk: To replace Ball, Cy Vance would be ideal.

Walt Rostow: I expect within 2 weeks to know what will happen in Paris. They are getting their military dispositions. Detailed messages on exactly what their strength is in the field.

The President: Ball's going to Humphrey is part of movement to "dove" side--special sale number one. McCarthy is an admirer of Ball's.

Clark Clifford: This may be a desperation move by HHH. They talked on the phone Monday.

[Omitted here is discussion of Spanish base negotiations.]

New York, October 1, 1968, 2052Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

6765/Secto 6. Secretary, accompanied by Buffum and Sisco, had about an hour's discussion with SYG on Sept. 30 (accompanied by Bunche) on a number of matters relating to current GA.

Following are principal points which emerged:

1. In response to Secretary's inquiry on how SYG sees upcoming GA, Thant singled out as important Assembly discussion of disarmament, ENDC report, results of non-nuclear conference, seabeds, outer space, and UNCTAD items.

/2/Between January and May 1968, Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations Special Representative in the Middle East, met with Arab and Israeli officials in Cyprus. After his return to New York Jarring continued secret discussions relating to a Middle East peace settlement at the United Nations.

/3/ October 1.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 432.

/5/For text of the 1954 Geneva Accords, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1546. For text of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083.

4. In response to further queries of Secretary which focused on Communist action necessary to restore effectiveness of the Geneva Agreements on Laos and to respect territorial integrity of Cambodia, SecGen would not be drawn out. Moreover, he said he could not say for how many days or weeks US should stop the bombing. When Secretary asked whether SYG would support resumption of bombing of North if Communists took advantage of situation, Thant refused commit himself and limited himself to saying this depended on circumstances. Secretary stresssed that US had taken first step pursuant to President's March 31 statement and that North Vietnam had not responded constructively to it. Secretary again returned to query as to what SYG in good conscience thought Hanoi should do to move towards peace and pointedly told SYG this lacking in his statements. Secretary said SYG had not been authorized by an organ of SC nor had there been an expression by majority of UN on basis which SYG expressed his views in favor total cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam. SYG said he had authority under Article 99 to bring matter to UN, but that he had not done so. He underscored his strong anti-Communist views, while expressing strong disagreement with methods we were using in Vietnam. He said he would be happy to have UN consider Vietnam problem, preferably in SC, but he recognized that both Hanoi, French and Soviets were opposed. He would be happy to have Czechoslovakia matter brought to UN but Czech opposition prevented this. On ME he noted neither Arabs nor Israelis wanted matter of settlement discussed in Assembly at present time.

5. Secretary explained the current state of play on Foreign Aid Bill, pointed out that impression from press might be that US was not doing great deal in this field. He singled out our support for Asian Bank, IDA, PL 480, and our hope there will be a substantial contribution made to UN development program.

6. In response to Secretary's query, Thant had no new ideas to offer regarding possible UN involvement in Nigerian matter. Expressed hope that UN would be able to send anything it wanted by way of help in agreement with govt in Lagos. He is waiting further reports from Gussing who presently in area.

7. Thant raised question of four-power conference and said he sending a letter to ForMins on Tuesday with some modest ideas. Letter Thant apparently had in mind was one in which he would suggest four powers not try to discuss major difficult problems such as ME, Vietnam or Czechoslovakia, but rather would exchange views on how UN could be strengthened. He hoped that such a meeting might help devise ways and means to move UN forward and in particular arrive at some kind of solution of financial difficulties. Such meeting would give lift to UN, he said Secretary reacted strongly to sending formal letter of this kind to ForMins without prior consultations. Secretary said four-power meeting, in which no progress made, would set things back rather than move them forward. He insisted there should be prior consultations with ForMins before any such letter is sent. Secretary pointed out he consulting with other ForMins and Thant should do so before any such letter sent. Secretary stressed we living in highly dangerous world in which USSR nervous and afraid of something. Any move, such as four-power meeting, should be taken only with great care and after full consultations. To hold such a public meeting at which differences would be aired would be unhelpful. Effective diplomacy by SYG required prior consultations. Thant then backed off and said he would consult beforehand with four powers. Bunche later confirmed to US that SYG had definitely decided not send letter for time being pending consultations.

Rusk

New York, October 4, 1968, 2343Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

6862. Subject: SYG's Four-Power Proposal.

1. Bunche gave us informally foll ltr for comment prior to formal transmission from SYG to US, USSR, UK and France. Bunche assured us, SYG would not transmit ltr until he had received our comments. As Dept will note, SYG has in mind a four-power mtg as prelude to possible summit mtg in 1969. He suggests that agenda might deal in first instance with ways to strengthen UN, including finances and peacekeeping, and leaves open the possibility that discussion would include "reaffirmation of charter principles", advice to Jarring, and certain aspects of disarmament. Dept should note penultimate para in particular where SYG says it may not be necessary "that the four Fon Mins should meet as a group."

2. We will be studying ltr carefully and make recommendations to Dept on how to handle it.

My Dear Fon Minister/Secretary,

/2/Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1967-1968 (Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1969), pp. 1-44. The ideas referred to here are in Section X, Other Questions.

It may also be recalled that at an informal dinner I gave for the Foreign Ministers of the four major powers last year, I discussed some of the ideas which were at the back of my mind when I made this suggestion. Since I put forth this possibility last year the international situation has further deteriorated and the hopes for an East-West d?tente have been seriously set back. I feel that some special effort should now be made in spite of the present unfavourable atmosphere--or, indeed, because of it--to identify some important issues where a community of interest may facilitate big power agreement irrespective of the adverse circumstances.

It is with this thought in mind that, in my latest introduction to the Annual Report which was issued last month, I proposed that it might be useful to take advantage of the presence of the Foreign Ministers of France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States during the current session of the General Assembly so that they might meet and discuss some common problems. I felt that such a meeting would help to halt the growing feeling of insecurity in the world and provide some antidote to the feeling of pessimism about the future of international peace and security that is now so widespread.

Let me state, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I am well aware of some of the risks involved in organizing such a meeting. Amongst these may be mentioned the real risk that hopes may be raised which may not be realized. However, I believe that some concrete results might be achieved if an agenda could be agreed upon which would be realistic and not over-ambitious.

If the idea of such a meeting is acceptable, I shall be happy, if so desired, to prepare a draft agenda. I realize that at the present time spectacular results in regard to the serious developments in many parts of the world may not be achieved. However, I believe that a modest start could and should be made in an attempt to deal with the basic problem facing the organization, namely, how can the United Nations be enabled to develop into a really effective instrument for peace and progress as envisaged in the Charter. This, of course, is my main concern; but one cannot ignore the existence of other problems which also have a bearing on the effectiveness of the world organization. I may mention amongst these the financial solvency of the United Nations, and its peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions. These problems can be solved only if, to start with, the big powers could agree amongst themselves either on the general principles of their solution, or on a pragmatic approach which, without prejudice to the respective positions of principle, may allow the organization to function effectively. Another thought I have is the need to reaffirm the Charter principles and the accepted rules of international conduct. One could hope also that such a meeting might give attention to ways of more helpful collective guidance and support for Ambassador Jarring's vital mission. It may also be opportune to discuss certain aspects of disarmament at such a meeting.

In the introduction to the Annual Report, I had stated that hopefully a meeting of the Foreign Ministers could lead to a meeting of the heads of state and government of the four major powers. I know it requires most careful preparation to arrange such a meeting. I also recognize that, in view of the current political situation in individual countries, such a summit meeting could hardly be envisaged until some time in 1969. I cannot help feeling very strongly that the mere fact of agreement in principle to hold such a summit meeting would shine as a ray of hope in the presently clouded sky and bring a sense of relief to human beings all over the world who are deeply concerned about the trend of international developments today.

Let me add that in my thinking it is not necessary that the four Foreign Ministers should meet as a group. It would be equally effective if they were to meet individually with each other, taking advantage of their presence at the current session of the General Assembly. Preliminary discussions now initiated could be followed up by subsequent meetings at a time and place which would be mutually convenient. In all such efforts I shall of course be happy to be of help, if so desired.

/3/In an October 5 memorandum to the President transmitting both the text of this telegram and of the proposed State Department reply, Walt Rostow requested and received approval for a response "based on the proposition: We are not prepared at this time to in effect commit a new administration to a summit in 1969." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11)

Buffum

New York, November 26, 1968, 2318Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN. Confidential.

/2/Documents 421 and 426.

On basis of our experience in Comite of 24 this year, we believe US should now proceed to leave Comite as was contemplated last January. Comite has produced absolutely no positive results, multiplies points of friction between US and Afro-Asian Group, and generally detracts from effectiveness and credibility of UN in whole colonial arena. Our decision should be made known in the final days of this session, either by a letter to the Pres of GA or by a statement in plenary; or, depending on circumstances, shortly after GA adjourns. Considerations are as follows:

1. There has been some improvement in procedures this year, which may be attributed in part to the consultations we held in January when we were considering leaving the Comite and in part to the chairmanship of Mestiri (Tunisia).

(A) The Comite's public proceedings have been improved compared with previous years. Mestiri has been a fair and competent Chairman. He has generally agreed to our requests that draft resolutions and other proposals not be put to vote in same meeting at which presented. He has also consistently upheld our right to speak and has been consistently fair when points of order were raised.

(B) After we made known to Mestiri our opposition to an African trip this year, he succeeded in delaying the question and finally in avoiding any decision to go on such a trip in 1968.

(C) The Comite met less often and displayed less energy during meetings. Since general product of Comite is bad, this diminution in activity may be considered an improvement.

2. Nevertheless the substantive work of the Comite of 24 continues to be very bad. It produces the worst resolutions in the United Nations and thus contributes to depreciation in the currency of resolutions, which would be serious enough even without the Comite of 24. Such resolutions are drafted primarily by radical Africans--e.g., Foum (Tanzania)--aided by the Soviets and radical Arabs such as Syria and Iraq. Moderate members in the Afro-Asian caucus sometimes try to tone them down, but they are almost invariably cowed into submission by the extremists. On certain flagrant miscarriages, such as a paragraph declaring US use of military bases in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as contrary to the UN Charter, moderates will screw up the courage to abstain; the result is that such outrageous provisions are adopted by a plurality instead of a majority. Paragraphs that are bad but not outrageous will usually carry by an overwhelming majority, due to simple fact that they emerge from Afro-Asian caucus, are supported by Communist members and acquiesced in by LA's. Once AA caucus, which is dominated by extremists, presents a text to Comite, no change of any consequence is possible. As a result the US role is essentially defensive and negative while the Soviets have a propaganda field day. Pet Soviet items, such as foreign military bases and foreign economic interests which allegedly impede attainment of independence, continue to be subject of bad recommendations by Comite. Some moderates hold their [noses] but they do not oppose. Latin Americans in Comite are completely submissive to AA caucus. Such minor improvements as we are able to achieve are not worth the effort and are far overshadowed by generally bad product emerging from Comite on which we are a member.

3. Comite has accomplished nothing of substance during its entire existence. It is difficult to point to one independent territory which Comite helped on path to independence. Serious consideration of colonial question has diminished to point where only pro forma attention has been given to problems of populations and actual developments in area concerned. Comite recommendations are drawn up without consulting administering authorities and rammed through against their objections; consequently they achieve no result. Thus Comite's product consists largely of unrealistic recommendations and anti-Western propaganda.

4. Based on this and previous years' experience, there is little hope that situation in Comite will improve substantially. It is evident to us that Comite itself serves no useful purpose. A fortiori US presence on Comite is of no value, waste of our resources, and to use a clich?, counterproductive.

5. We recognize that there will be some adverse reaction from some of our African and Asian friends when we announce our decision to leave. We believe this could be minimized by discussing with them in advance the reasons for our decision. We can point out to them that our trial extension of our membership during this year produced no evidence that there could be any material improvement in Comite's work. Furthermore, members of Comite are by now fully aware that it produces nothing of consequence and we doubt that their disappointment over our decision will be long lived. As for product of Comite it is not likely to get appreciably worse than it is now, whether we stay on or leave. In any case, we can participate on items involving US interests, as other non-members of Comite do. Moreover, we shall have an opportunity to participate in GA consideration of all these questions, and recent developments in Fourth Comite suggest that our chances for meaningful influence are better there than in Comite of 24--a point we can make in explaining our move to friendly Africans and Asians.

6. There is one point on which our withdrawal might have a disadvantage for US--Puerto Rico. We have until now been able to muster a majority against efforts to have Comite of 24 take up Puerto Rico. If we leave Comite, and--as is probable--our example is followed by Australia, Norway, Italy and perhaps UK, voting picture will change substantially. But the fact remains GA would have to reverse its earlier decision that Puerto Rico is not a dependent territory and we could concentrate our efforts in blocking a change there.

/3/In telegram 285062, December 10, the Department of State concurred with the Mission recommendation to withdraw from the Committee of 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 UN)

/4/President Johnson appointed James R. Wiggins to succeed Ball on October 4; he presented his credentials on October 7.

Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential; Exdis.

SUBJECT
Letter from Tex Goldschmidt

/2/Attached but not printed.

Tex suggests that you authorize a transfer of $5 million from other AID accounts. He assumes that there will be leftovers here and there by the end of the year and that Gaud could commit himself now. If that is impossible, his compromise would be to turn $37.5 million over to the UNDP now, as a six-month payment at the past annual rate and say that our pledge for the whole year is $70 million but we'll try to find a little extra money at the end of the year to climb back to $75 million.

Charlie Zwick is opposed to any action at this time which would tend to lock in the new Administration or to pass along to it a disproportionate share of the FY '69 cutback problem.

On the question of committing the full $75 million now, Charlie believes this would deprive the new Administration of flexibility later in the year. Tying up even $5 million more from this year's reduced AID appropriations now would restrict the new Administration's flexibility in meeting serious unfunded contingencies in Nigeria, the Indus Basin, Dominican Republic, to name a few.

On Tex's idea of splitting our pledge, Charlie points out that moreover this unusual approach would produce this effect:

--A $75 million rate for January-June 1969 ($37.5 million), and
--A $65 million rate for the last six months of 1969 (32.8 million).

Zwick believes we should make a straight $70 million pledge with the promise to look into the possibilities of additional funds later on.

The important point in this is that the 1969 figure results primarily from Congressional reductions. Your record is in good shape because you requested $80 million for 1969 and your 1970 budget will include $85 million. It will thus be obvious to critics that the cut is Congress', not yours.

I would leave this to Charlie's judgment, but I promised Tex I would put his argument up to you. He and Wiggins feel strongly that splitting our pledge would have some value in appearances in New York. I must admit that it looks pretty marginal from here, and Charlie feels strongly that you would be narrowing your successor's flexibility.

Walt

/3/Johnson checked this option.