U.S. Department of State

Washington, January 16, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. A copy was sent to Jernegan.

/2/Reference is to the January 15-February 5 meeting of representatives of the Guarantor Powers, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey with Greek and Turkish Cypriot spokesman. Documentation on the United States role in the Cyprus crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XVI.

/3/Turkey was being governed by a minority government.

/4/A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2.

Bob

Washington, January 18, 1964, 8:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1161-1162. Confidential. Drafted by Paul Jones and George Moffit (UNP); cleared in NEA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN as telegram 1879, which is the source text, and repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for TOPOL.

/2/Telegram 3220 from London, January 14, reported on a meeting of the British and Turkish Foreign Ministers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP) Telegram 2726 from New York, January 15, transmitted Dean's comments on the Secretary General's Cyprus initiatives. (Ibid.) Telegram 2744, January 16, discussed plans to put a UN force into Cyprus. (Ibid.)

1. We can understand UK concern re their responsibility for keeping peace in Cyprus. However, we have some misgivings as to UN's undertaking any substantial peacekeeping operation there. We have in mind current UN financial situation; fact UN already stretched thin in such operations as Congo, Yemen, UNEF; and possibility UN might have to assume a peacekeeping role in one or more other trouble spots in world today (e.g. Angola, Malaysia), where alternative peacekeeper such as British might not be available.

2. We note from USUN's 2726 that Cypriot UN del Rossides said Cyprus would pay cost of UN mission even if this required "as many as 100 men." Given size of UK military force now committed and apparently necessary to maintain peace between Greek and Turk Cypriots, and potentialities for renewed violence by trigger-happy extremists, Dept doubts 100-man UN group or even double that number would be adequate insure peace if situation deteriorates. Moreover it seems doubtful, despite Rossides statement, GOC could undertake finance UN operation of any substantial size.

3. Re possible Sov attitude to UN peacekeeping operation, evidence suggests they taking side of Greek Cypriots in Cyprus dispute and, thus, if Makarios favored UN peacekeeping force, might go along in Security Council. This more likely be true if cost of operation borne by interested parties and not assesed on UN membership.

4. UK, Greece, and Turkey have treaty obligations and direct interests in solution Cyprus problem. UK, in addition, has sovereign bases on island. As Dept has frequently emphasized, three countries have primary responsibility for Cyprus problem, and we feel should make every effort settle it with Cypriots, even if London conference collapses. We can, however, if situation continues to be critical, see usefulness of modest UN presence, primarily to help offer assurances of objective appraisal of situation to world community and thus be of some value in deterring military action by either Greeks or Turks in support contesting Cypriot groups. While such modest presence would not replace military contribution of UK, it might be helpful in moderating attitude all parties concerned by assuring that international spotlight will be shown immediately on any derelictions.

Dept notes (USUN's 2744) that, according UK del New York, HMG may shortly propose joint US-UK contingency planning re UN peacekeeping force for Cyprus. We would hope, and you requested so inform UKUN and UK FonOff, that HMG will not consult others before taking matter up with US. In so doing, you may point out that we have reservations re desirability saddling UN at this time with what could become major peacekeeping operation, drawing as appropriate on foregoing.

Rusk

New York, January 25, 1964, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara.

2851. Cyprus.

1. When and if London conference breaks down, (which increasingly predicted) or when new communual troubles break out on island, it seems certain Cyprus problem will be brought back to SC by GOC. Each of parties to dispute likely want despatch additional outside forces to help control security situation. UK particularly anxious spread responsibility for law and order, and HMG seems determinined at least share, if not pull back from, responsibility for rapidly deteriorating security situation, lest it be obliged inflict and incur serious casualties in UK pre-electoral period.

2. UN force for Cyprus: Possibility suggested here most frequently has been that SC might send UN "peacekeeping force" to Cyprus. Whatever may be reasons arguing for eventual deployment of substantial UN force to Cyprus, there are serious practical difficulties to getting any UN force to Cyprus in time to prevent widening of communal disorders, which if not promptly controlled would almost certainly lead to early intervention of Turkish forces from mainland. In first place, UN would simply not be in position logistically send major force to Cyprus on short notice. Further, SC authorization would depend on who asks for force, on methods of financing, and on terms of reference. SC (and in first instance Soviets) would probably never authorize UN force unless GOC (with at least Turkish Cypriot acquiescence) asked for its despatch. It is questionable whether member states would provide forces which would clearly be required shoot civilians. Re financing, with fight on Article 19 with Soviet bloc in offing, doubt that financing by all UN members is practicable. Financing from contingency funds would not be appropriate or acceptable for despatch of substantial peacekeeping force. Thus only real possibility re financing we see is for Cyprus, UK, Greece and Turkey agree to share costs. This they would not want to do unless costs were manageable and unless there were acceptable time limit.

/2/Dated January 23, it transmitted the text of a British aide-memoire regarding Greece. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Cyprus)

/3/Dated January 23, it reported on British discussions with the Turks and concerns regarding their intentions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

4. In contrast, primary US and general NATO interest is to avoid war between two NATO allies over Cyprus. We calculate it would be easier restrain Turks and Greeks with force of NATO members than with UN or Commonwealth group. With these factors in mind, we believe Dept should give careful consideration to allied contingent alternative, including US, as long as Greeks willing and able to obtain Cypriot approval. We doubt such force could be put together without US participation.

5. UN Observer Force: It may well develop however that because of difficulties outlined above, it will not be possible to line up support and despatch either UN, allied or Commonwealth force to Cyprus prior to breakdown of London conference and outbreak of new fighting on island, accompanied by new appeal to SC by Makarios. Under circumstances, SC might be called upon to establish some kind of expanded "presence" in Cyprus before irrevocable acts take place. Best course would seem to be immediate expansion of UN "Observer Group" already operating on Cyprus under Gyani, perhaps by immediate and temporary detail of officer observers from UK force on island or from UNEF and UNTSO. We can also imagine (particularly if Secretariat's Military Staff makes appropriate quiet contingency plans) almost immediate despatch of additional military observers who could be stationed at neuralgic points on island and with UK, Cypriot , Greek and Turkish forces. Their responsibility would be to observe and report to SC through SYG and in meantime endeavor work out local ceasefires wherever possible.

6. Despatch of expanded Observer Group or any larger forces to Cyprus should be supplemented by SC request to parties to enter into further negotiations leading towards more firm settlement. Presence at such conference of "special rep" designated by SYG at request of parties, might be helpful in getting over sticky moments. Also such a rep and head of observer force should have enough authority and freedom of communication to blast Makarios and/or Kutchuk when obviously responsible for demagoguery or incendiary action.

7. There is some question whether it would be feasible to retain UN Observer Group if allied force despatched, but we are inclined to believe some token UN presence could be continued if Makarios so requested as he probably would.

8. US appeal to Makarios: I have known Makarios for many years and Sir Hugh Foot, now in New York, confirms view that regardless of above contingencies he is real key to peace in Cyprus. He has repeatedly showed himself prepared to shed blood, Greek or Turkish, in order achieve his political objectives. His tactics worked before and he probably calculates they will in present situation. He is undisputed leader of four-fifths of Cypriot population and, while he cannot prevent minor incidents, he can prevent major hostilities. At present he probably calculates this not to his advantage.

9. In light of very grave consequences to US and Western security which would very probably follow further major hostilities on the island, more positive US action seems called for, though of course not of a sort which would interfere with British efforts now underway. Specifically we recommend prompt high-level d?marches to Makarios to effect that (1) we believe further outbreak of violence would be tragedy for Cyprus and for all others involved, (2) we are confident Makarios as chief of state and as leader of four-fifths of population has necessary authority and power prevent such a tragedy, (3) US and whole world cannot but hold him and Greek majority in Cyprus primarily responsible if this tragedy occurs, but (4) if he prevents it we will assist in checking any outside intervention in Cyprus and, as appropriate, in finding an equitable and generally acceptable solution for the problems which have given rise to present unrest. We should at same time inform Greek Govt of this d?marche and urge them support it.

Stevenson

Washington, January 27, 1964.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

New York, January 27, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1188-1189. Confidential.

2862. Re: Cyprus. Dept rpt fol as desired:

Rolz-Bennett (UN Secretariat) told us today SYG very concerned about deterioration in Cyprus, expects return within matter of hours from African trip if needed in NY. Rolz said Secretariat continuing with its contingency planning for possible expansion observer or peacekeeping force. He remarked, however, that under circumstances it would probably be necessary get SC approval send even expanded observer force to Cyprus. Stated flatly nothing could be done in Cyprus without new SC meeting, adding that GOC has made it very clear it expects call SC if London conference breaks down. Comment: Rolz seemed be hinting that some kind of pledge had been made to Sovs re holding of formal SC meeting before UN takes any further steps in Cyprus.

Re possible UN peacekeeping force, Rolz said he had impression Makarios probably no longer inclined request SC establish such a force in first instance, but would confine self to request for UN blessing for abrogation of Zurich agreements. However, what Cypriots really want is UN guarantee for Cyprus' territorial integrity, and once this agreed to GOC likely to acquiesce in dispatch of UN peacekeeping force. Rolz said under circumstances Sovs likely approve if, once GOC's approval and statement on territorial integrity having been secured, acceptable financial arrangements could be made.

/2/Dated January 25, it summarized the results of a Rusk-Ormsby-Gore meeting on Cyprus. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

Plimpton

Washington, January 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret.

US ROLE IN CYPRUS

I. Whether or not the US joins an allied force, we're almost compelled to take a major role in finding a Cyprus solution. This is because only we have the power (and aid leverage) to influence Athens and Ankara. UK can't force a settlement precisely because it lacks this power. And even if we stood aside and let the issue go to UN we'd be blamed by Greeks and Turks (or both) for whatever we let happen.

Moreover, Cyprus is of major strategic interest to us, because of its highly strategic location, US and UK bases, and fact of our closest allies being so emotionally involved.

We can only get UK to stay in if we participate in some way. UK is determined either to share this problem with us, or dump it on UN.

Dumping Cyprus into UN is worst solution because Communists and Afro-Asians will all buy in and force a settlement to our disadvantage and that of Greeks and Turks too. Only beneficiaries will be Makarios and the Communists. And we'll have to take a stand in UN too.

II. For all these reasons the US cannot really avoid being drawn into the Cyprus affair. Indeed I feel we and UK let the problem drift until too late. We had plenty of warning, and if we'd tried preventive diplomacy we might not be in present fix. But this is water over the dam. Now the situation calls for quick US action. But the real issue is "what kind of action?"

A. An "allied" peacekeeping force, including US, would tend to forestall more shooting on Cyprus, and block Turk intervention. But it might not help move settlement closer because the very threat of Turk intervention is what is restraining the Greek Cypriots from demanding the whole loaf. So unless we're prepared to apply real muscle (perhaps getting Greeks and/or Turks very unhappy with us), we might be on Cyprus for many moons.

B. On other hand, tensions are so high on Cyprus that without a larger UK, UN, or allied peacekeeping force, fighting could break out again. If so, Turks would almost certainly intervene (so their Cypriots wouldn't be massacred). Then Greeks would move, though I personally doubt regular Turk and Greek forces would actually go to war (we could probably stop this by threatening to cut off all aid).

III. The best course I see is to prepare for prompt "allied" intervention if necessary, but meanwhile try an all-out diplomatic effort to forestall this need:

A. Make all preparations for quickest entry of "allied" peacekeeping force if tragedy looms. Promise UK we'll act in this case (which should calm them).

B. Put maximum diplomatic pressure on Turks, Greeks, and Greek Cypriots to accept in principle Sandys' compromise solution, arguing that it really gives both sides what they want. Why shouldn't some higher degree of local Turk Cypriot autonomy be acceptable to Greek Cypriots? I doubt that we could get early agreement, but at least we might be able to get both sides talking again. We could send Ball or Harriman on a quick trip to area for this purpose--authorized to lay it on the line. The very presence of our man in the area would be a factor for restraint, as everyone would be waiting to see how he came out.

The above course would both prepare for the worst, and not jump the gun until absolutely essential. The risks are that fighting would break out before we got there, or that Makarios would rush to the UN. But both risks seem acceptable to me on present reading.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, January 28, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential. Prepared by Bromley Smith.

Ambassador Bruce telephoned at 5:45 PM to urge that a decision be taken immediately, one way or the other, on U.S. participation in an allied force to reestablish order in Cyprus. He expressed deep concern that the situation in Cyprus would soon be out of control.

The Ambassador said he favored U.S. participation. He opposed taking the problem to the UN.

The Ambassador said everyone was waiting for a decision from the U.S., the British, the Greeks and the Turks. He feared that the Turkish Foreign Minister would leave London Thursday, thereby breaking up the London conference. The only hope was for the U.S. to take the major role in trying for a solution.

B. Smith

Washington, January 29, 1964, 10:05 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved in U on January 30.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

U.K.
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Christopher Everett, Second Secretary, British Embassy

U.S.
The Acting Secretary
John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

/2/A copy of the proposal is contained in telegram 1998 to New York, January 28. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Cyprus) Bruce reported on the British response in telegram 3597 from London, January 29. (Ibid.)

The Ambassador observed that we were sticking to the mediator. The Acting Secretary replied that we recognized the disability under which the British labored in keeping the peace because of the burden of history. The same disability applied to British ability to make the peace. This was especially true in so far as the Turks were concerned. The Turks were convinced the UK favored Greece. The US did not want to become tied in through a troop commitment when we could not see clearly the path along which progress toward a settlement could be made. The Ambassador acknowledged the point. He had no instructions about the mediator. However, he suggested it might cause difficulty because of the rights conferred on the guarantor powers under the Zurich agreement. The UK would not object to a mediator if the London Conference were clearly stuck. There might be difficulties at home if in the first instance Britain abandoned its responsibilities. He was not sure to what extent Turkey was talking to advance its own position. Anyone trying to compose a settlement would be open to such accusations. The Acting Secretary commented that we felt a new face might help. He emphasized that obviously there was nothing in a mediator concept prejudicial to British rights in the sovereign areas. The Ambassador thought that under our concept the UK would almost certainly lose control of the negotiations at some stage. The British bases were not an issue now. However, their renunciation could become an element in any solution. The Acting Secretary stated we would not support that. It should be made clear in the mediator's terms of reference that the sovereign areas were not affected. From the NATO point of view the sovereign areas were important. We also had our own facilities. The mediator would be from a NATO country.

/3/Reference is to Spaak's 1958 efforts to mediate a Cyprus settlement; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, pp. 672-734.

At this point Mr. Everett entered and reported that he had received from the British Embassy a summary of telegrams from Paris and Rome. The British Ambassador had spoken informally to Couve about the peace-keeping force. Couve gave no inkling of what the French response would be if French participation were requested. He said France would wait for a formal request. When approached in Rome Saragat asked how large an Italian contingent was involved. The British Ambassador explained the magnitude of the force envisaged. Saragat mentioned one regiment as the possible Italian contribution but without commitment. He received the approach sympathetically and said he would bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister. Schroeder was at the time in Rome and the Ambassador was trying to see him.

/4/See footnote 11, Document 448.

The Ambassador asked about UN aspects and the Acting Secretary said we had instructed USUN to coordinate with UKUN. The Ambassador questioned whether we could ask the Secretary General to continue keeping an observer in Cyprus. This would be difficult for him. Perhaps we should not be altogether sorry to see the UN disappear from Cyprus. It would be difficult to ride both the NATO and UN horses. The Acting Secretary agreed.

There was an inconclusive discussion about informing the Russians.

The Acting Secretary expressed doubt over the extent of Athens' control over Makarios. The Ambassador said the British shared this doubt. Makarios was subject to many pressures. The Acting Secretary and the Ambassador agreed that the pressures ran in both directions. The Ambassador observed that the communists would exert every effort to avoid Makarios' acceptance of a peace-keeping force. There was a discussion of what other NATO countries could bring influence to bear on Makarios. The Acting Secretary said we would ask the views of our Ambassador in Nicosia. He also mentioned the possibility of a message from the President to Makarios.

The Acting Secretary asked about approaches in other capitals. The Ambassador replied that after London had studied the proposal we would have to see what could be done with respect to Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. The Ambassador said that Ankara would be the first obstacle. The Acting Secretary thought that the one thing which would bring Turkey around is the mediator concept.

Washington, January 29, 1964, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco; cleared in NEA, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Ball. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

1999. We wish to avoid SC consideration of Cyprus question. Since Allied response would be at the request of Makarios, we believe any UN problems would be manageable.

/2/Article 51 of the UN Charter required members to report exercises in self-defense against armed attack to the Security Council. Text of the Charter is in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Revised Edition), pp. 95-110.

However, our judgment is that it will probably be politically desirable to do so, precisely to make point under UN dateline that this is not NATO action but ad hoc response by group of Atlantic nations at request Government of Cyprus. Request USUN consult with UKUN and report joint judgment as to whether reporting this action to SC would likely stir up USSR or other uninvolved UN members.

Our present judgment is that if strong pitch is made by USSR or other UNSC members, we would not fight inscription.

In event SC meeting is called, either because unfriendly members wish to complain of Allied action or because Makarios believes he needs UN meeting to keep his Afro-Asian friends from objecting to Allied intervention, our present thinking is along lines following guidance. Request you discuss with UKUN on contingency basis and comment:

1. We would of course oppose any SC action designed to inhibit Allied action.

2. Best outcome would be SC consensus taking note of Makarios' request, Allied response, and mediation effort, and urging all concerned to keep shirts on. USSR would probably not be willing to go this far.

3. In absence of consensus that blesses action being taken, any resolution should be limited to asking all concerned to avoid any action designed to exacerbate the situation.

4. Failing this, we would seek to limit SC consideration to speeches with SC remaining seized of Cyprus question, but without taking any formal action.

/3/In telegram 2895 from New York, January 29, the Mission to the United Nations reported on its talks with British and UN representatives. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2)

Ball

New York, January 30, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara. A note on the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House, DOD, JCS, CIA, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCEUR.

2903. Cyprus.

Rossides (Cyprus) called Stevenson by telephone at 1 PM to say he had just received telephone call from London to effect that force in Cyprus must be UN force, and that he wanted our reaction.

Stevenson pointed out emphatically that: (1) If UN force included Western powers such as UK and US, it would be difficult if not impossible to exclude USSR; (2) if force comprised, as in previous cases, of units from small countries, there would be no basis for excluding Eastern Europeans; (3) debate over composition of force, terms of reference and financing would take long while; (4) recruitment might present many difficulties if great powers excluded; (5) precipitating debate on article 19 and whole problem of financing at this time would be most unfortunate, with unpredictable consequences; (6) allied force could be organized and landed swiftly to prevent communal fighting; (7) UN could keep observer there and preserve UN involvement.

Rossides seemed to retreat rapidly from insistence on UN force, and promised to report Stevenson's preliminary and unofficial reactions to London by telephone. He seemed particularly concerned with Turkish pressure to concentrate Turkish population by force and terror, thus achieving de facto partition. Also seemed concerned about possibility of Communist units in UN force. Obviously implications of an SC debate and a UN force have not been carefully considered in Cyprus, and Stevenson had impression that Makarios sudden announcement re UN force was impetuous response to rumors of allied force plan.

Stevenson made clear that these were his personal and immediate reactions and would defer asking Department for instructions pending formal presentation by Cyprus.

Stevenson

Washington, January 31, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. No classification marking. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Komer for the President's use.

CYPRUS

/2/For Ball's memorandum of the January 25 conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 2.

/3/See ibid., Document 3, footnote 2.

/4/According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson talked with Ball twice that day, at 2:05 and 6:29 p.m. (Johnson Library)

3. Sunday--Ball and Komer reported to me on exchanges with the British. I sent out messages to our ambassadors in Ankara, Athens, Nicosia to tell all concerned at my request to stay loose and keep London conference going.

/5/For a memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 3. The "AG" is Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The orginal of the memorandum of conversation at the LBJ Library is dated January 25, but other evidence that has come to light indicates that the meeting took place on Sunday, January 26.

/6/January 27.

/7/There is no record of an evening discussion between the President and Ball. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the President and Ball met from 11:40 a.m. to 12:09 p.m. The President subsequently met with Secretary of Defense McNamara from 5:25 to 5:40 p.m. No other record of these discussions was found.

/8/January 28. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 9:50 a.m. (Johnson Library) No other record of discussion was found.

/9/January 28, 6:35 p.m. Recordings of this and subsequent telephone conversations with McNamara and Ball are in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1,2,3.

/10/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 5.

/11/Lemnitzer's report was contained in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2) According to the President's Daily Diary the Johnson-Ball conversation of January 29, took place at 9 a.m. No other record of their discussion was found.

/12/According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Ball and other senior advisers at 5 p.m. Subsequently at 6:12 p.m. he discussed the Cyprus issue again with Ball by telephone. A recording of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.09, Side A, PNO 2.

/13/A copy of the January 30 message is ibid., National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus.

TDCS-3/571,670

Washington, January 31, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret: No Foreign Dissem.

COUNTRY
Cyprus

DATE OF INFO.
30 January 1964

SUBJECT
Views of Patriotic Front Official on Archbishop Makarios' Stand Regarding NATO Involvement

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DATE ACQ.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (31 January 1964)

REF
IN 10061

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. Archbishop Makarios will find it very difficult to accept the involvement of NATO in the Cyprus crisis either with troops on the ground or in the search for a political solution. This is because articulate opinion among the Greek Cypriots and among the masses insofar as this can be ascertained has taken a sharp turn towards reliance on the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of right-wing nationalist opinion, formerly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, which has undergone an emotional trauma under the fear of Turkish invasion and the official pronouncements of Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause. Many prominent and representative Greek Cypriot nationalists assert that now that the Soviet Union has stepped in, Cyprus has no need for NATO, which has done nothing to restrain the Turks. Calling in NATO will thus be strenuously opposed by Greek Cypriot Communists, nationalists, and even right-wing extremists.

/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765-775.

3. Some formerly Western-oriented leaders are so virulently opposed to the involvement of NATO that, should he assent to it, they are capable of turning on Makarios and trying to depose him. He is aware that this is a possibility. It is conceivable also that, barring a turn of public opinion, some irreconcilables who are sufficiently well armed will provoke incidents against elements of the NATO forces if they do come to Cyprus.

/3/Reported in telegram 579 from Nicosia, January 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

5. Field Dissem: State, Army, EUCOM, CINCSOUTH (personal) and CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCMEAFSA.

JSCM-74-64

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret. A covering memorandum is dated February 4.

SUBJECT

Proposed Multinational Force for Cyprus (U)

/2/Not attached.

2. The British concept provides for a multinational force from NATO countries to deploy to Cyprus to maintain the peace there. The concept envisions a force of approximately 10,000 personnel with the United States providing one-third of the force, the United Kingdom one-third, and other NATO countries one-third. The force would not, however, be deployed under NATO auspices.

/3/Lemnitzer reported on his talks with Turkish officials in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2)

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a multinational force could maintain order in Cyprus by serving as a peace-keeping force to prevent a renewal of intercommunal strife. However, it is their view that such a force may find itself in Cyprus for an indefinite period with no end in sight because of failure of the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots to reach a political solution to the Cyprus problem. Additionally, there is some doubt that the force proposed by the British will be effective in meeting the objective of fully maintaining the peace in Cyprus. Even if intercommunal fighting is not resumed, the force may still be unable to restore Cypriot morale and mutual confidence between the two communities sufficiently to permit the re-establishment of normal community services and commerce.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is militarily undesirable for the United States to participate in a multinational force for Cyprus, as this could result in maintaining an occupation type force, such as in Korea, for a prolonged period of time. Such action on the part of the United States could set a precedent in that other countries would believe that the United States would participate in future such contingencies throughout the world.

6. Nevertheless, on the assumption that the United States will participate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that US ground force participation be limited to a reinforced battalion of approximately 1,200 troops. They consider that the US forces to be employed should be drawn, in order of priority, from one of the following sources:

a. The Long Thrust IX battalion, now in Germany, appropriately reinforced.

b. A reinforced infantry battalion from USSTRICOM.

c. Appropriate elements of the Marine Corps battalion landing team now in the Mediterranean.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following modifications of the British concept are appropriate:

a. Participation by the British up to one-third of the total force does not appear to be adequate participation by that country since they are one of the guarantor powers for keeping the peace in Cyprus. In any event, it is considered that the bulk of overhead and administrative troops for the force should be provided by the British.

b. The British propose that the commander of the force report to an Ambassadorial Group in London, this group representing all the contributing nations. This command organization would be extremely unwieldy. A better plan would be to designate the United Kingdom as Executive Agent for the countries involved much like the United States is designated the Executive Agent for the United Nations in Korea. It is assumed that political guidance to the commander in the field will be provided through the Executive Agent.

/4/Not attached.

/5/The memorandum is unsigned.

Washington, February 5, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files. Secret.

/2/Dated February 4; for an excerpt, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 557.

I don't think Kyprianou's remarks to Sandys offer much hope. In any case, Kyp doesn't count. He's a 32-year-old messenger boy, whom Mak uses as a front man. The job to be done is still in Nicosia, where we must convince Black Mak to reverse course.

The Brits are still determined to pull us in, which makes London a problem too. Here the trick is to keep UK from giving up, while still not letting them commit us to anything Sandys dreams up.

Ankara is our problem. The Turks will only listen to us. Moreover, they'll keep their mouths shut, which means we can talk tough privately, if we must. But we must offer the Turks some hope too, because they rightly see themselves the losers if we let Makarios dictate the terms.

The following scenario attempts to meet the above criteria. It's admittedly thin, but little more so than State's idea of putting UN shrubbery around US/UK proposal.

1. Keep the European mediator idea. It helps keep issue out of UN and helps limit our liability (in forcing a solution).

2. Tell all parties that unless and until mediator idea worked out it's essential to keep London Conference going. The more we keep talking, the less likelihood of violence.

3. Mount a major effort with UK to keep it from running to UN. LBJ/Home letter--saying don't act till we can talk here on 12th--might be in order. Tell UK we must act together.

4. Since some kind of stronger peacekeeping force on Cyprus seems essential, largely to forestall bloodshed precipitating Turk move, explore urgently possibility of (a) Commonwealth reinforcement (Canadian, Aussie, plus Pakistani or Sudanese to give Moslem flavor); (b) proportional reinforcement of Greek/Turk/UK forces; or (c) beefing up of UK forces alone. Even if none of these work, talking about them keeps the ball in play.

5. To keep Makarios out of UN, convey to him forcefully but discreetly that Western powers won't play ball, and that in courting Bloc and AsAfs he'll lose his Western friends. We could also raise spectre of Turkish move saying it perfectly legal under Zurich treaty. We should attempt to box in Makarios by (a) getting to his more pro-West colleagues; (b) threatening to reveal their NATO offer; (c) talking up Grivas, etc. Only if we cool Mak and his extremists down can we keep lid on.

6. Use every private argument to keep Turks from acting, saying on plus side that we'll make sure Turk Cypriot position will be protected (vaguely) but on negative side that if Turks move without consultation we'll stop MAP cold to both them and Greeks.

7. In Athens we must convince Greeks they can't let Makarios steal the play. They must talk up NATO solidarity too. As leverage we use above MAP argument, but also say we're ag'in partition (since Turks admit they're ag'in it too).

8. To get above across forcefully we may have to send a senior man out, especially to Nicosia. Wilkins just doesn't carry weight with Makarios, and is temperamentally reluctant to use tough talk. In any case, sending a man from Washington conveys impression we mean business.

Above moves should at minimum have calming effect, and buy us some time. If they don't work, we haven't lost much, and can still retreat to modified US/UK proposals or let Mak go to the UN route. It would be very hard to sell this line (especially 4 above) to UK, but we could do the others while negotiating on 4 with Brits.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, February 6, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Points to Make to Denis Greenhill-U.K. Embassy

/2/See footnote 3, Document 453.

/3/According to a February 6 memorandum from Komer to President Johnson: "Sandys suggested we could live with (a) SC resolution 'approving' international force; and (b) due recognition that mission of force would include preserving territorial integrity of Cyprus, i.e. against Turks. We'd specifically warned against both." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus)

3. While Sandys admittedly was speaking on a personal basis, he made specific reference to willingness to include territorial integrity in the terms of reference for the Peacekeeping Force which would undoubtedly result in the Turks going up in smoke. Moreover, this is an obligation which the United States itself would not be prepared to undertake if it were committing troops to this exercise. I think many other NATO members would feel the same way.

/4/According to telegram 4904 to London, February 6, Ball told the British Ambassador: "We thought it would be a formidable error to hold meeting scheduled February 7 between Sandys, Bruce and Kyprianou. We urged strongly postponement of meeting until US and UK in position [to] present agreed position." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

5. We are deeply concerned about the Turkish attitude. Frankly, the Turks have been highly suspicious of the UK in this matter and knowledge of the Sandys conversation with Kyprianou will undoubtedly increase the nervousness in Ankara. The Turks have been very strong against putting the Peacekeeping Force under Security Council control.

6. We agree fully that the U.K. should continue to take the lead in negotiating this delicate matter. However, positions put to Makarios must be fully concerted so that Makarios is not given any opportunity to make a difficult situation even more difficult by exploiting differences among us.

London, February 7, 1964, 1 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, RG 59, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 9:10 p.m. February 6. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR also for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE also for POLAD.

/2/Dated February 6; it contained the text of the Sandys' counter proposal. (Ibid.)

1. I had lengthy session this evening with Sandys, Caccia and others to go over Sandys redraft (see reftel) of our package proposal on Cyprus. We again agreed on operating arrangements that once US and UK agreement is reached, our respective Embassies in Ankara and Athens should discuss redraft with GOT and GOG. Thereafter, following their acquiescence, it might be presented to Makarios and Kutchuk.

2. Meanwhile, Sandys suggested meeting with Kyprianou be held tomorrow as scheduled, but without attempting to give him any piece of paper at that time. Purpose of meeting would be to elicit Kyprianou's reaction. Sandys thought some slight advance on Kyprianou's previous position might be gotten out of him. At that meeting, however, Kyprianou will be given no indication of what is being considered by US as next step. Once clearance is obtained from US, UK, GOT and GOG, he might be given agreed paper later in day or following day. Time of meeting tentatively set for noon tomorrow. In accordance my telecon with Burdett, I suggest Dept discuss with Gore or Greenhill desirability postponing Sandys meeting with Kyprianou. If he still decides to go through with it, unless Dept objects, I think I should attend. It might be useful hear what Kyprianou has to say, and my presence might serve to restrain Sandys a bit.

3. With respect to Brit redraft, Sandys described his efforts as a "tidying up" operation. Following points deserve specific mention:

/3/Dated February 5; it contained the U.S. draft of an adjusted proposal for a peacekeeping force. (Ibid.)

/4/Dated February 2; it contained the text of the British proposal for an international force on Cyprus. (Ibid.)

C. Brits believe para 6 of covering document will be acceptable to Makarios, though GOG might conceivably be slightly unhappy not to have an absolute assurance from Turks re no intervention.

D. Sandys prefers omit bracketed para after para 6, but has no objection if Dept desires include it.

E. In Annex A, Sandys would like to omit para 1(C), which he considers restrictive rather than helpful and which he expects will be difficult to negotiate.

F. Having in mind our objection to any commitment re protection of external security of Cyprus, Brits have redrafted para 5 of Annex A to limit such obligation to those who already have it, namely signatories of treaty of alliance with Cyprus. By thus citing treaty obligation, Sandys hopes make clear to Makarios that he is not losing anything by accepting proposal. Caccia noted, however, that Brits would not regard Turk intervention under treaty of guarantee of aggression.

G. Re para 9, I made very clear to Sandys that we cannot accept anything that smacks of Security Council approval (as opposed to "take note of") for peace-keeping force. Caccia indicated FonOff shares this view. Present wording also refers to "consensus" rather than "resolution".

/5/Dated February 2. (Ibid.)

/6/Not found.

I. Sandys believes Annex C, i.e. mediator's terms of ref, should be as simple as possible. He has attempted meld our earlier draft with FonOff/CRO working level draft. He believes bracketed phrase following para 2 of Annex C might be deleted, but is agreeable to retaining it if Dept so wishes.

4. Sandys is disturbed over possibility of any delay and is as anxious as we are to move forward. I also taxed Sandys on Pickard's giving text of unapproved talking papers to Makarios. Sandys made no comment.

Action Requested.

1. I shall appreciate having Dept's urgent comments on Sandys' redraft. If redraft is acceptable or once any minor changes have been worked out, we should inform HMG that US Ambassadors in Athens and Ankara may as next step urgently concert with their Brit colleagues to obtain GOG and GOT concurrence.

/7/In telegram 1459 to London, February 7, the Department of State provided changes in the suggested wording of Sandys' proposal. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

Bruce

Washington, February 6, 1964, 10:35 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Cleveland and cleared by Ball.

2129. For Stevenson from Cleveland.

1. In present state of Cyprus question, it is especially important that Secretary-General hew to the line that Security Council session should be called only after parties most concerned (including Cypriots) have fully consulted with each other on practical arrangements for mediation and peacekeeping.

2. It would be unhelpful for U Thant to make any public statement commenting on any of the points that are mainly at issue here: degree of Security Council jurisdiction, composition of a peacekeeping force, relation of a mediator to Secretary-General, etc.

3. Hope you can see U Thant earliest to emphasize these points.

Rusk

New York, February 7, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

2992. Cyprus. Rossides approached Stevenson after SC this afternoon to make following points. It was not entirely clear to what extent they stemmed from his govt and to what extent they were his own personal ideas.

He emphasized that in Cypriot view there must be SC res which would reaffirm independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. As to peacekeeping force, this should be comprised of some NATO and some non-NATO states. He mentioned specifically UK, three Scandinavian states, Ireland and Austria. He argued that UN force with above-mentioned mandate would have such prestige that it would not be challenged and hence could be much smaller than we had contemplated, perhaps three or four thousand.

Rossides assumed that this "UN force" would have to be paid for from UN funds. He had spoken to Federenko earlier today and inquired whether Sovs would object to expenditure UN funds for this purpose. Federenko had been evasive but had said any expenditure UN funds would of course have to be approved by SC. We asked whether if SC approved Sovs would pay their share. Rossides replied he had not asked this question but he assumed they would.

/2/It reads: "A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of the arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member."

Comment: We note with considerable apprehension that substantial UN role in Cyprus operation is more and more assumed in NY and speculation and discussion of modalities stimulated by Rossides and Sovs is creating climate which will no doubt encourage Cypriots to emphasize and expand UN role. We fear that cumbersome and time-consuming quadripartite negotiation which we are now conducting between each formal approach to Cypriots may drag out negotiation with latter to our disadvantage in view of climate developing here. We suggest that effort be made very rapidly to drop any points in our current position which are not absolutely essential, to decide just how far we can go in terms of SC res (consensus is almost certainly not sufficient), to decide with Cypriots appropriate composition of force, and to present agreed plan to SC in nearest future.

Stevenson

Washington, February 7, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8, CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Helseth. The Greek Ambassador was called to the Department of State for a similar discussion. A memorandum of that February 7 conversation, which includes a copy of the draft proposal, is ibid.

SUBJECT
Redraft of Proposal on Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu
Mr. Ilter Turkmen, Counselor of Turkish Embassy
NEA-Phillips Talbot
GTI-William A. Helseth

Mr. Talbot noted that Mr. Sandys had spoken to Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou on February 5 on a personal and exploratory basis. He had informed us, and we understand also the Governments of Greece and Turkey, subsequently about the conversation and said he had agreed to meet again with Kyprianou on February 7 to learn Makarios' response. We did not think this was a good idea and we understand that the Turkish Government also suggested the meeting on February 7 not take place; consequently, the meeting with Kyprianou has been deferred.

/2/Not attached.

/3/Documentation relating to the mediation is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XVIII.

/4/It reads: "The Government of Cyprus will ask the Security Council to take note by consensus of the arrangements made for the creation of a peacekeeping force and for the appointment of a mediator. The Government of Cyprus will also request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to arrange for his representatives to remain in Cyprus, so that he may keep in continuous touch with developments and may maintain liaison with the commander of the peacekeeping force. The parties concerned will instruct their representatives at the United Nations to support these arrangements in the Security Council. " (Attachment to memorandum of conversation with Greek Ambassador Matsas, February 7, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

/5/For text of Khrushchev's February 7 letter and the President's reply, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1964, pp. 446-448.

/6/Reference is to the September 10, 1957, letter from Prime Minister Bulganin to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes accusing Turkey of planning an invasion of Syria. (For extracts, see Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1957, p. 15811.) Subsequently Soviet naval forces made a show of force and Syria brought its complaint before the United Nations. Turkey denied the accusations.

The Ambassador said that he was "keeping his fingers crossed" about the future of this document and that it might need a little touching up here and there. Mr. Talbot noted that we had flatly rejected some of Makarios' points.

/7/Apparently after a return to the United States for consultations. Hare presented his credentials on April 5, 1961.

Nicosia, February 8, 1964, 4:45 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. and passed to the White House.

685. Personal for the Secretary from Amb Wilkins. With all due respect our position in Cyprus is too rigid; we have lost flexibility. We are now supporting UK force plan which will be anathema to average Cypriot even if GOC accepts it and which will create situation in which Sovs can maneuver to their advantage. We are commonly believed here, rightly or wrongly, to favor NATO force and imposition of solution favoring Turkey, that is partition, under shield of this force; and to be blocking reference to UN where Greek Cyps believe they could establish their right to unified democratic state with guarantees for individual and with no foreign interference. Greek Cyps ask why we withhold this right from Cyprus.

/2/Dated February 8; it reported on the deteriorating Cypriot situation and the need for U.S. action. (Ibid.)

/3/Dated February 8. (Ibid.)

We are moving far too fast. We should, in my opinion, at least delay presentation of new UK-Greek-Turkish proposal supported by US and discuss alternative courses with Greece and Turkey before going ahead.

If we force new tripartite proposal on Makarios Greek Cyp Communists and other enemies of WEU will be able to take advantage of situation. Turkey and Greece will be forced to intervene with unforeseen consequences.

Pickard clearly believes we should now be thinking about alternatives to tripartite proposal in event it proves unacceptable to GOC. We discussed several on informal basis without commitment (Embtel 680) and agreed to discuss them further later.

Wilkins

New York, February 8, 1964, 5:15 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs.

3004. Cyprus. Yost brought SYG, Bunche and Rolz-Bennett up to date in general terms today on where Cyprus negotiations stand. Since SYG seemed apprehensive discussions with GOC for establishment peacekeeping force might be reaching impasse we reassured him that we remain hopeful of agreement within next few days.

SYG was pleased to hear that we wished delay SC meeting until we could come in with fully agreed plan which would be presented by GOC. He said he had given Rossides similar advice yesterday and had suggested he assure himself "four permanent members" are prepared to approve plan before it is submitted to SC. We emphasized our discussions with GOC are being carried out in London and Nicosia and not through Rossides.

SYG said points on which Cypriots seem most insistent are:

(1) SC reso approving arrangements;
(2) Some sort of continuing SC control of force so that it does not infringe Cyprus sovereignty;
(3) Mention in reso of independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; and
(4) Mixed force of NATO and non-NATO contingents.

/2/In parallel notes to the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Greece, the Soviet Prime Minister warned against establishment of a NATO force on Cyprus and expressed support for the government of Archbishop Makarios. Regarding the Khrushchev letter, see footnote 5, Document 456.

SYG said he had also emphasized to Rossides that UN financing of force is totally out of question and force will have to be financed by those who participate.

Yost

Athens, February 10, 1964, 4 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs.

/2/For documentation on Ball's missions, January-June 1964, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Documents 1 ff.

1. After a day of meetings with the British headed by Duncan Sandys and a meeting with Kyprianou, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, I have formed some tentative views of the overall situation.

2. I am meeting today in Athens with our Ambassadors to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The discussions at these meetings may lead me to modify these impressions. Subject to this caveat, however, this is how I see our position emerging at the moment:

A. The US should not put troops in Cyprus even as a minority component of an international force. The anti-American feeling in Cyprus stirred up by the Communists--and probably by Makarios himself--would tend to make our troops a special target. This is one situation from which we should seek to stand down.

B. But I do not propose to announce this position as settled US policy. We have from the first made clear that we would consider participating in an international force only if all parties wanted it. I am accumulating evidence that Makarios does not want it. Wilkins, our Amb in Cyprus, thinks that an American component would be a bad idea. His views are shared by Pickard, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia.

C. If I were to make it clear now that we were not prepared to participate, it would:

1. Give the British a chance to get off the hook;

2. Alienate the Turks and tempt them to move unilaterally against Cyprus--which could start a Greco-Turkish war;

3. Destroy the effectiveness of our influence while strengthening Makarios' efforts in the UN to bring in the neutralists and the bloc.

D. I plan, therefore, to let the logic of our situation emerge from the accumulating facts, thus leading naturally to an international force without a US component. At the same time I shall take steps to keep the Turks from exploding.

/3/February 11.

F. Thursday I plan to consult with the British in London and return to Washington.

G. As I see it, this activity should--if successful--pave the way for an international force without US participation.

This force would be agreed to before presentation to the Security Council. It should contain units from the UK, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, and possibly Canada. It would be under British command, would be approved by the Security Council, but would not be under the direction of the UN. Nor would it be financed by the UN, since all participating countries would be required to pay their own way.

H. The course of action I have outlined must be measured against the following emerging facts:

1. The British want us in badly, but they are beginning to see the difficulties involved for us in participating in an allied peacekeeping force. My impression is they will have to settle very reluctantly for an international force linked to though not under control of the Security Council.

2. I am beginning to doubt that Cyprus wants any peacekeeping force. Makarios' primary objective is beginning to stand out in sharp relief. He hopes to involve the UN in a political settlement designed eventually to change the present constitutional setup. His representatives are now talking about a two phase operation in the SC. They want the Council to go on record for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. They pretend that they wish to have the Council get into the question of a peacekeeping force at a later stage. But it has become clearer that they do not want US in, and I expect that Makarios will confirm this fact.

3. The Turkish, of course, are a major problem. They have put great store on US participation. We have got to let them down easily in order to keep lid on the situation. I propose to stress with them the Cypriot opposition to our participation--while putting the best possible face on some modest UN force as a supplement to the present UK, Turk and Greek contingents in Cyprus in which our contribution might be limited to an airlift. At the same time, I do not believe we should encourage augmentation of Turkish and Greek forces since this would only exacerbate Makarios' ire and trouble.

4. I shall try to place on Makarios' shoulders the primary onus for our non-participation.

5. Although I share Sandys' views that "Cyprus question is insoluble" at least in foreseeable future, the possibility of a moderate UN peacekeeping force with a close link to UN may buy all of us some highly useful time. This I shall endeavor to achieve.

6. But it will require hazardous operation of walking on eggs with golf shoes.

Labouisse

Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 10:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1289-1292. Secret; Flash. Also sent to London, Athens, Ankara, and USUN.

747. For Secretary from Ball. In further session with Makarios, Kyprianou, Clerides and Papadopoulos at four this afternoon we reached complete deadlock. In essence, issue is between establishment of peace force now under aegis we propose and establishment of force only after passage of Security Council resolution which directed against threat of Turkish aggression. We have another session tomorrow at 10.

/2/Regarding Makarios' paper, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 11, footnote 2.

In response, I reiterated that first task is end of bloodshed. I rang all possible changes on argument that SC res re aggression and territorial integrity is unnecessary if peace force is brought in quickly and GOC cooperates to preserve peace; there would then be no question of foreign intervention. Further, I pointed out that role of peace-maker is to prevent conflict, not to side with one party or another. On SC res, I reiterated points I made yesterday that debate would be long, acrimonious exchange of charges and counter-charges, including that of genocide, and that it would be a spectacle that would bring shame to all parties, inflame passions and make no useful contribution to basic security problem of Cyprus. Pickard pointed out a key stumbling block in kind of res Cypriots want will be insistence of members that res be "subject to existing treaty rights".

/3/Telegram 748 from Nicosia, February 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

At one point Kyprianou said there was no purpose in further discussion on this basis, and Makarios said he did not think they were prepared go beyond what was suggested in their paper. In view of your instructions, I did not accept this obvious breaking point, urged them to study our new redraft of the force proposals, and arranged to meet Makarios again tomorrow.

GOC line as disclosed by paper given us today is same one they have pursued from beginning of our conversations. They are committed to a strategy--which, after our discussion of the last two days, I think they should believe is silly--of trying to neutralize Turkey by a Security Council resolution condemning aggression and guaranteeing territorial integrity. In this manner they hope to eliminate the one defense of the Turkish Cypriot population so that the Government of Cyprus can proceed happily with systematic genocide without outside interference.

Makarios today stuck rigidly to the paper that had obviously been drafted by his three young ministers (unhappily all lawyers) of whom he is a prisoner. From time to time he glanced uneasily at them to see if they gave him the nod. It was clear that they are calling tune and that he fears both for his job and his life.

I cannot play this drama out beyond tomorrow morning. At same time, we cannot leave any impression that Makarios' proposals are serious basis for further negotiation, and I intend to point out our objection to it, and how unrealistic it is. I shall, however, tell him again that the stakes are too high for my government to give up.

I intend to fly to Ankara tomorrow, since Government of Turkey is anxiously awaiting results of these talks. Again I shall do my best to restrain them and shall repeat performance in Athens later.

Duncan Sandys has indicated that he wants a full review of situation in London, which probably means that I shall be there most of Saturday. I think that even Turks will agree that we have given this matter as hard a try as was possible. We have certainly earned additional confidence by doing everything we could to work this problem out, but we must face fact that Cyprus is an island infected by a blood lust and that there is no government that seriously wants to maintain order. Its only desire is to liquidate Turkish Cypriots.

I can best sum up prevailing attitude by quoting a Greek Cypriot who, when asked this morning about the bloody fighting in Limassol, dismissed it with a wave of hand, saying "when you are already soaked, the rain makes no difference."

If there is not a progressive development of widespread carnage in next fortnight, it is possible that we could push GOC into a more tractable position by making sure that they get a bloody nose in Security Council next week. Following that we might be able to establish an international force and begin to inject an element of sanity into situation. If that is so we might theoretically try to give a slight nod to Makarios' paper with necessary modifications. This might enable us to go forward toward creation of an international peacekeeping force that could move into island as soon as Security Council discussions were concluded.

Another possibility we should seriously consider with UK and--at right point--with other guarantor powers is for US to move immediately into Security Council seeking creation of an international force. Such a move would have virtue of taking Makarios off balance and would possibly enable us to present Cyprus problem in an advantageous manner.

I leave aside for moment possibility of arranging for a joint intervention of guarantor powers since this seems to me fraught with danger and at best a last ditch expedient.

Wilkins

Washington, February 15, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret.

Mac--

To get it out of my system, let me say that I'm most uncomfortable that I'm not able to do a better job of keeping you and the President clued on Cyprus mess.

I'm well aware that you're not asking more of me, and have naturally not been pressing since you returned, understanding that we'd have to leave this one to State for the nonce. Beyond this, of course, State is deliberately neglecting to keep me at least informed. From the very beginning, almost all contacts have been at my initiative, and subject to repeated delays. It is almost as if Talbot has been told "Let's keep this one to ourselves." He is obviously embarrassed by this, but it reflects a general tendency, as you know. I hope Rusk is at least keeping you or LBJ broadly aware.

In fact the 7th Floor isn't using even its own experts. The Office Director commented to me the other day that in the first week (before Ball left) they weren't even in the act.

With due allowance for my own feeling of sour grapes, I still find State's handling of Cyprus a very poor example of crisis diplomacy. First, we let this crisis creep up on us, even though fully warned. Second, from a posture of let the UK do it, State suddenly panicked in response to UK panic and reversed field by urging we send troops. Third, having sold this decision, State flubbed on the essential prerequisite, i.e. scaring the Greek Cypriots enough beforehand so they'd buy. Fourth, even though getting us out of the peacekeeping force (which we haven't yet told the Turks, who bought our original proposal solely on the grounds that we were in it), Ball gave away most of our anti-UN position via a series of concessions.

These so eroded our position that only extremists like Clerides could fail to see they'd won the ballgame. But the Brits see it all too well, so they're going to the UN instead of being dragged. Now we'll get the worst of both worlds--UN intervention plus everybody sore at us. True, we've wriggled out of troop offer, but we're still committed now to play a major role--if only to save face with the poor old Turks, who'll rightly argue we hornswoggled them. Meanwhile, of course, Greeks will go on killing Turks on Cyprus.

The above is crudely oversimplified, but it's painfully close to what happened. Now we'll be worrying Cyprus in the UN through 1964 at least, and knowing we're likely to end up with something quite unsatisfactory because in passing the baton to the UN we're likely to lose control.

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Washington, February 17, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret.

George Ball returns gravely concerned over the Cyprus crisis; he regards the risks involved as second only to those of the Cuba missile crisis. Ball sees a "50/50 chance" of Greek-Turkish war if we don't forestall it quickly.

Only two options open to us now, in Ball's view. First we can involve the UN and seek UNSC sanction for a peacekeeping force. Since we've in effect withdrawn from any force, the UK seems resigned to this route. But, as Ball puts it, the Turks will move if the UN leans toward Makarios (as is likely). Moreover, the Western powers will tend to lose control, and the Soviets have a field day in the UN.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 463.

While Ball may be a bit alarmist about a Greek/Turk war, he's dead right in saying Turk intervention on Cyprus could be triggered any moment--only one more incident is needed. Moreover, we've little to lose by trying his gambit--it limits our liability, takes the play away from the two irresponsible Cypriot communities and forestalls the UN. As Ball says, the Greek Cypriots might resist even agreed Turk landings--but this should be manageable.

Problem is that it may be too late either to turn off the UN or to sign on the UK and then Greece. But the threat of imminent Turk intervention may be enough to bring them around. At any rate, it seems well worth trying.

If you accept Ball's plan, it's imperative we move fast to: (1) short-circuit the UNSC by getting it to dump the problem back in the guarantor powers' lap; (2) force the UK's hand by telling them the Turks are ready to move; (3) do the same with Athens.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, February 17, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret.

SUBJECT
Under Secretary Ball's Report to the President on his Cyprus Peacekeeping Mission

PRESENT
The President
McGeorge Bundy
R.W. Komer
Under Secretary George Ball
Asst. Secretary Phillips Talbot

Mr. Ball described the critical nature of the situation as he saw it, underlining his belief that this was the most dangerous confrontation since the Cuba missile crisis of October 1962. We were close to a major disruptive war. Ball was convinced the Turks were not bluffing; Inonu had made clear he'd have to move if there were another incident like Limassol. The Greek PM had said the same; he'd have to move if the Turks did. And the Chief of the Greek General Staff had sent Ball a message (through our Ambassador) that if the government didn't move, the Greek military would get a new government that would. There was a 50/50 chance of a Greek-Turk war, which could easily get out of control.

The Cyprus Government was unable to control its own people; its only interest was to get UN protection against Turk intervention so the Greek extremists could go on killing Turks. The UK ministers did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation when Ball saw them in London over the weekend, but he'd just had word that they now had their own reports and fully agreed.

/2/Ball outlined the plan in telegram 3961 from London, February 16. (Ibid.)

The President told Ball the latter had done all that was humanly possible; the President was only sorry he didn't succeed. The President fully agreed as to the gravity of the situation. He thought a Greek-Turkish war was inevitable unless we sidetracked them in some way. He was prepared to try out the Ball plan if all his advisers agreed it was our best bet. Ball indicated that Rusk was in favor; so was Adlai Stevenson. The President said Stevenson had seemed less alarmed than Ball the previous evening, and instructed Ball to reach a meeting of minds with him.

Bundy thought the odds of a Greek/Turk clash a little less than Ball, but agreed that his plan was the best idea available even so. We should act on the worst assumption in any case, and try to get our allies signed on as soon as possible. Ball said we should pressure the UK to call a summit meeting as soon as Papandreou was sworn in. He and Inonu were the people to deal with. We should have an "observer" present to make sure the UK didn't falter. Ball thought it might be best if he went himself. It might also be a good idea to send General Taylor to talk to the Greeks and Turks about the military side, since the chief risks were that the Greek Cypriots would oppose a Turk landing or that Greek and Turk forces might clash.

The President agreed Ball should go if necessary. Bundy interjected that Ball's mission had been a success in that if he hadn't gone the Greeks and Turks might have been at war by now. The President reminded Ball he'd been in favor of Ball's going a week earlier. As the President saw it, we might have to tell the Turks "it's goodnight, nurse" if they did move. We were in a position to force them to settle the issue peacefully. If we told Inonu we'd cut off aid, he'd have to back down. Ball pointed out that Inonu, great man though he was, wasn't a free agent; he led a minority government. Also his own military might force his hand.

The President directed that we talk in the toughest language if necessary to all parties. Ball assured him that he'd minced no words. Turkish restraint so far had been admirable, but they'd have to move now if there were another incident.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 16 and footnote 1 thereto.

/4/See Document 464.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, February 18, 1964, 11:17 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138-1347. No classification marking.

Mr. Greenfield: Good morning. The attribution on this one will be US sources. And I think it might help if the Under Secretary opens with just a short general review of the situation as we saw it and see it now, saw it last week and see it now.

Under Secretary Ball: Gentlemen, I might start with the situation on the Island, as I found it.

As I am sure you know, the original constitution, which went into effect in 1960, has broken down, largely as a result of the fact that the Archbishop, who is the President, decided in December that it was unworkable and proposed amendments which were not accepted by the Turks, and today the Government of Cyprus really represents only the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot community is not effectively functioning as a part of the government, and the decisions are being made by the Greeks. And even the authority of the government does not extend fully to the Greek Cypriot community, because there are independent bands of Chinese warlords, who have their own private armies that are not taking their direction from the state.

As a consequence, while there is authority in the government of Cyprus with respect to the Greek Cypriot community, it certainly is not fully effective authority, and there is a problem as to how well the government can control the Greek elements in incidents such as have recently occurred, the latest of which was at Limassol.

On the Turkish side, I think there is also a breaking down of the authority of the Turkish Cypriot leadership over the Turkish community. But the Turkish community, as you know, is only about twenty per cent of the population; the Greek is eighty per cent. The incidents have continued, and while they are not spectacular ones within the last two or three days, there are killings every day, and the bloodshed goes on.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Documents 306-309.

A proposal was made, as you know, for an international force. This proposal was accepted in some detail by all of the parties concerned, the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cyprus, and the only remaining interested party that had not acceded to these plans was the Government of Cyprus itself, under Archbishop Makarios.

/3/See ibid., 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Documents 11 and 13.

It was interested, first of all, in a plan which it had worked out, the effect of which, as it saw it, would be to nullify the rights which the Turkish Government had as a guarantor power to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee.

Under the Treaty of Guarantee, which was an integral part of the organic constitutional arrangements that were made in 1960, there was a provision that any one of the three guarantor powers, Greece, the United Kingdom, or Turkey, could intervene to restore conditions under the constitution. And the Turks have been seriously considering the need to intervene in order to provide protection to the Turkish Cypriot population, and the Greeks have been considering intervention, certainly in the event that the Turks intervene.

Now, under these circumstances, we have a potentially dangerous situation, which obviously could become very much larger than the problems in Cyprus itself. Because it could involve a conflict between two NATO partners, and indeed those partners which represent the right wing of the NATO defense. So this is a matter which perforce the United States has felt it necessary to interest itself in.

The refusal of Archbishop Makarios to go forward at the present moment with an international force meant that the matter had to be transferred to a different arena. The Archbishop's position was that after some debate he accepted the idea of an international force. And this was, I think, progress. And there was even some talk about the composition of the force, and an indication of certain countries, particularly the Commonwealth countries, from which he would be willing to see such a force drawn.

But he was determined to try, first of all, to secure the neutralization of the Turkish Cypriot community by some kind of action in the United Nations, which would bring about, as he saw it, an effective nullification of the intervention rights of the Turks, under the Guarantee Treaty. For this reason, he wanted to postpone any serious discussion of the international force until after he had succeeded with this ploy.

So that when it became apparent that he was determined to go ahead in the Security Council and try to work out a resolution, to obtain a resolution which he had been advised, I think quite mistakenly, would have the effect of nullifying the unilateral intervention rights, it was necessary for Britain also to make a move to the Security Council, in order to mobilize world opinion in favor of a unilateral force, I mean, an international force, and to try to bring about the restoration of conditions of peace and order.

I may say that the American position, which was urged strongly at Nicosia, was that we had to get on with first things first, that the prime cause of all the difficulty was the fact that law and order had broken down, that the government appeared either unwilling or unable to maintain order, that some larger outside force, objective, neutral force--neutral in the sense that it was neither for one unit or another--was necessary if order were to be restored, and that once this were done, and order was restored, then the possibilities of the need for the utilization of the intervention rights would disappear. But that we could not permit this, the world would not permit this killing to go on on an extended basis, and that this was the point at which the problem must be tackled.

The Archbishop did not see it this way. He felt that it was much more interesting from their point of view to try to neutralize the Turkish community than it was to create an international force to restore law and order. And to some extent this may reflect the lack of control by the government over the situation, and the interests of some of the armed forces, which are not directly under government control, in trying to work toward a policy of dominating the Turkish community, dominating and perhaps even liquidating it.

What we are seeking in the Security Council, and what I think the Security Council will come up with, is in effect a mobilization of world opinion behind a scheme which is essentially the one that was agreed upon by all of the parties except the Archbishop. So that in a very real sense this is simply the transference of the same effort into a somewhat different form.

All of the discussions which are going on in New York concern the creation of a force, the composition of which would be agreed to by the interested parties. This is not the pattern of the force that was employed in the Congo, where the Security Council itself created a force and where it was financed through the UN.

Let me say that no one who is interested in the creation of such a force is talking about it being financed through the UN, and all of the plans which are floating around in New York at the moment contemplate that the force would be one in which the parties would agree as to its composition. So that I think we may say that the force would clearly exclude any Bloc elements, and would be composed of forces from such areas as the older members of the Commonwealth, and perhaps some of the neutral countries in Western Europe, and perhaps some of the NATO members; and certainly the British would remain in it.

Well, this is the situation as of today. The Security Council is going to be meeting this afternoon and I hope the debate will not be protracted, but one cannot be sure. There are some procedural problems which will have to be disposed of, such as the seating of delegates from the Turkish-Cypriot community, or representatives of that community at least, to provide information to the Security Council; the disposition of an effort of the Government of Cyprus to obtain a resolution against aggression, which to its mind, based on the advice it has received, would have the effect of nullifying the intervention rights of the Turkish Government, and so on.

But I did want to make the point quite emphatically that this is simply a further phase in the same effort, which is an effort to obtain an effective international force which would be composed of elements provided by the countries prepared to pay for them, would be composed of elements on which the parties agreed, and which could bring about a restoration of law and order in Cyprus, and create the conditions which would make it possible for the parties to get together and try to work out a political solution.

So far as the formal shape of the political solution is concerned, from the point of view of the United States Government, this is a matter which the parties themselves will have to agree upon. We haven't attempted to impose a solution or even to suggest one. I think this is something which will have to be left up to the parties, although one of the elements of the scheme calls for the appointment of a mediator, and we are hopeful that there can be a mediator designated who can serve as a kind of catalyst in bringing about a meeting of the minds of the parties concerned.

[Here follows a question and answer exchange with the press on the Cyprus situation.]

London, February 26, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and New York. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA and repeated to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

4127. In talk with Wood of FonOff Central Dept this morning, following emerged:

/2/Dated February 25; it reported on Turkey's UN position and speculated on how long the Turks could hold this position in the face of Cypriot maneuvering. (Ibid.)

/3/Dated October 29, 1963. (Ibid., POL 15-5 BR-GR)

3. FonOff working level thinking is now leaning toward SYG's suggestion that early meeting of Papandreou and Inonu be arranged. Such meeting might later be expanded to include Makarios and Kutchuk and perhaps HMG as well. Problem is how to hold such meeting in constructive atmosphere as long as pertinent SC talks continue. FonOff working level has been thinking along lines that SC might adjourn its consideration of Cyprus issue later this week, following which summit meeting outlined above could be held. Thereafter, depending on outcome such meeting, Ball might be put back into play in SC.

When leaving FonOff, EmbOff met Rennie of FonOff UN Dept who confirmed discussions still taking place between FonOff and CRO on next steps. Said FonOff hopes be in touch with US again on question sometime this afternoon.

Bruce

New York, February 26, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, and CINCSOUTH. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

3201. Re: Cyprus.

/2/Reported in telegram 3200 from New York, February 26. (Ibid.)

/3/Summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, pp. 153-154.

3. During course of last week Cypriot position in UN has progressively improved due to fol factors: (a) belief Cyprus is "small" state under armed threat from large neighbor, (b) automatic predilection for unqualified territorial integrity and sovereignty of members, (c) long-standing opposition to Turkey by Arabs and because of its membership in NATO, (d) SYG's efforts, which included reference to territorial integrity but nothing on treaties, (e) Cypriot challenge that treaty grants no right of military intervention at all, (f) solid support from Greece on same point, thus creating explicit alignment of Greece with Cyprus on key points. However, this does not mean Cypriots have gained or can gain total victory in SC. SC members also generally recognize (i) SC cannot challenge or modify treaties, regardless of what members think of them, (ii) that root causes of present issue lie in communal fighting in Cyprus and (iii) that establishment of UN force is practical way in which issue can be overcome.

/4/Telegram 3179 from USUN, February 25, transmitted the text of the Cypriot Security Council resolution. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

5. If present effort fails, number of possibilities for next step are then open.

6. These are: (a) effort to bring about "summit" meeting either of Turkey and Greece or of 4 guarantor powers; (b) Cypriot move to convene special GA; (c) further effort by US with Makarios to obtain SC solution; (d) further efforts in SC on new lines, such as Norwegian idea of simply asking SYG to appoint mediator.

7. Re summit conf our assessment is that bilateral Greek-Turkish meeting highly unlikely at this stage in light current efforts Greeks to maintain their influence in Cyprus. Four-power summit conf would without any doubt be useful and we hope soundings in regard thereto are being taken. However, we are now far from certain that Cypriots would again meet with guarantor powers and, even if they did, that Makarios would agree to Kutchuk being represented in any equivalent status with him at such summit conf. In their present mood Greeks would probably support Cypriot position. Summit might therefore not be feasible at all or, if it were, it might turn on how far we (and Turks) would insist on equal participation of Turks.

8. Re GA we believe it is open question whether or not Cypriots could get necessary 57 votes. Much would depend upon case left from SC breakdown. There would be reluctance on part many members, even including many Afro-Asians, to have special or emergency GA in light Article 19. On other hand, if situation in SC and in area veered toward one in which failure to convene GA would appear to be acquiescing in Turkish military action, Cypriots might well get their votes. Even Sov bloc might vote for such session if it felt psychology of session would be anti-Turk and correspondingly anti-US and UK, in hopes our prospects in forcing Article 19 would be at minimum in such circumstances. At very least we should not conclude that Sovs would be working against GA because of Article 19. While situation not therefore certain, and while feeling Cypriots must be quite unsure of their prospects obtaining GA session, we cannot exclude it and must in our tactics acknowledge so as to minimize its prospects.

9. We consequently feel further efforts should be made within SC context to reach agreement on SC action even if initiative non-perm members breaks down and even though Greek-Cypriots are using time to increase their own armed strength. Given UK reluctance to continue job itself and mounting evidence Makarios will increasingly focus pressures against UK direct role, key both to restoring law and order in Cyprus and keeping Turks out still lies in international peace-keeping force. If this can be achieved it should be much more satisfactory to Turks than any direct intervention on their part, which would be bound to result in heavy slaughter of Turkish-Cypriots and virtually untenable long-run job for Turkish army. This would, of course, play into Sov hands.

10. Consequently believe next step if non-perm members break down would be for US make final high-level appeal to Makarios to agree to SC solution which would create UN force, keep Turks in fact out, and appoint mediator. Exact details of approach would have to await result of non-perm members negots. We have in mind tentative idea of asking him accept mention in res both of "territorial integrity" and of treaty or constitution, in exchange for explicit Turkish commitment not to exercise its rights under treaty (whatever they may be) as long as UN force is on island and is effectively protecting Turkish lives and property.

11. If this does not work believe next string on bow might be Nielsen (Norway) approach, preferably on basis direct suggestion from SYG to Makarios. Idea of this would be that other issues in SC be set aside for the moment while SYG sends mediator or good officer to consult with govts concerned in area, on basis SC res to this effect. Implicit would be concept that UK force would continue on island with function maintaining present uneasy peace. Presumably any such action would be accompanied by renewed SC and SYG appeal to all concerned, including communities, to refrain from violence.

Plimpton

New York, February 27, 1964, 2:40 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

/2/Telegram 3200 from USUN, February 6; see footnote 2, Document 466.

1. Prior Feb 27 SC mtg, Yost checked with Bernardes (Brazil), Bitsios (Greece), Menemencioglu (Turkey) and Dean (UK) on prospects of Bernardes draft res. Bernardes felt discouraged with negative reaction to draft by Cypriots and Turks. Bitsios unwilling to get involved in haggling over draft. Menemencioglu strongly opposed text of res: He willing to drop paras 2 and 3 of preamble or to substitute for them para reaffirming Art 2 para 4 of Charter and para on Treaty of Guarantee.

2. Bitsios told Yost he "not aware of anything which would be considered final draft res." Bernardes had briefed him on discussions of his draft and of various suggestions on wording. He had told Bernardes his govt considered matter very serious but did not want to get into business of haggling over words. Though discouraging Bernardes in this way from showing him draft res, Bitsios stated he told Bernardes he would consider anything that SC members working on this problem produce as final text. Bitsios stressed that important task is now to establish international force on Cyprus and start negots. Said it impossible to remove ref in res to idea of territorial integrity now that matter raised. Did not think treaty should be mentioned in res, however, in view of differing interpretations of treaty. Bitsios emphasized that Greek Govt does not believe failure SC mention treaties affects their validity and that they remain fully valid. Bitsios had no suggestions to offer on what should be next step if SC failed to agree on res.

/3/It reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or act in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

4. Dean worried that Bernardes effort would fail and seeking ways to keep UN efforts going. Suggested possible new try by SYG.

Stevenson

London, February 27, 1964, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and New York and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

/2/Dated February 27. (Ibid.)

Lewis Jones and I met with Sandys, Carrington and Snelling this evening. I said I had spoken with you short time ago, and you had said we morally certain Cypriots plan move on abrogation treaty today. We have strong feeling next 24 hours may be crucial and require immediate action along lines your message. There is likely be impasse in SC with subsequent quick build-up for special UNGA meeting. Hence, rapid movement on some other track necessary to forestall such development.

Sandys said HMG understands US anxieties and shares them. There is no difference between us re seriousness situation. HMG does not think that we will advance toward our common objective by calling guarantors meeting now. There are several difficulties. First, Greeks will refuse to attend. They have already taken a decision not to do so and will support Makarios to the hilt. Here Carrington interjected latest Brit info they will support him in going to UNGA. Sandys continued that it looks to Brits as though Greeks will henceforth support Greek Cypriots as much as Turks do Turk Cypriots. Greeks will do nothing that is not acceptable to Makarios.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 19.

Sandys continued that only circumstance under which guarantors meeting might be called is if Turkey clearly intends to intervene militarily. Under shadow of such a crisis, it might work.

Greeks might in that event get cold feet and cooperate.

Carrington then outlined HMG's assessment of likely UN reaction to call for guarantors meeting. He thought this might differ from US assessment. Brits believe such call would be viewed as "ganging up" of guarantors against little GOC. Effect of this on Afro-Asians and others might precipitate precisely what we are seeking to avoid. Snelling added that such call would make situation more difficult for Brits on the ground. Greek Cypriots would see such call as precursor to intervention. They would take out their ire on Brit troops in Cyprus. Snelling also noted that latest Brit info does not suggest any advanced state of Turk readiness. Indeed, he had impression Turks were not as ready as they were two weeks ago. I suggested Turks are certain to react strongly to any abrogation statement. A guarantors meeting might not have those consequences feared by Brits, but would be useful to help hold situation.

Sandys replied that he doubted Greeks willing to participate in preparatory planning for such contingency. I said that if abrogation statement is made, Turks may be expected make clear their intentions and Greeks would face need to reconsider. Sandys reiterated HMG does not think guarantors meeting possible with any hope of success except in crisis conditions.

Carrington thought not much separates our two positions. It was a question of who calls meeting and when. We are both agreed meeting should not be called until after SC impasse. I noted this cld occur almost immediately. Carrington continued that HMG believes we should suggest to SYG that meeting be called at high level, whereas USG suggests HMG call meeting of guarantors. I said abrogation is key moment. If we allow it to pass without reaction, there is little we can do later to preserve treaty rights. A statement by Kyprianou on abrogation will set off chain reaction.

Sandys doubted that Cypriots will announce abrogation. They are more likely to ask SC to declare military intervention rights under treaty as inconsistent with UN Charter. Snelling observed that any such Cypriot action as announcing abrogation would be contrary to what Sandys had gotten Makarios to accept several weeks ago.

Sandys also expressed Brit concern at Makarios "respectabilizing" EOKA gangsters by putting them into police force. He expects Makarios make formal request of Brits next day or so to take a more active part in helping Cypriot police to maintain law and order. This would mean asking Brit troops assist Greeks against Turks. Brits cannot accept this. Hence, he thought a crisis might be developing in Brit relations with Makarios. I pointed out that crisis might develop along several fronts. In addition those cited by Brits, danger of situation moving to UNGA equally great and Turk reaction might be extremely serious. All of this could start in next 24 hours or so.

I recalled SYG had earlier turned down Brit suggestion call meeting of interested parties, including Makarios and Kutchuk. Carrington thought SYG might reverse his position. SYG is duty-bound to do something. I said none of us wants to see matter referred to UNGA. To do so would raise controversial question of Article 19 and voting rights.

Sandys said it hard to see what one might do at such a guarantors meeting. It would not be possible get Greeks go along with intervention. I suggested Turks might arrive with an announcement of intention to intervene. Carrington noted that former UK Amb to Turkey, Sir Bernard Burrows, believes Turks will not move unless there is another Limassol. As long as matter is before UN, Brits doubt there will be any further bloodletting in Cyprus. Once it gets out, it could start again. In response my suggestion that problem would become even more difficult for Brits if Turks move in, Carrington said emphatically it would not. Brits will not fight Turks. I said point was that if Turks moved in, then Greeks would do same which could quickly lead to collapse NATO southeastern front. If in those circumstances, Soviets threaten Turks we would have to warn Soviets and situation could quickly reach Cuba confrontation proportions.

Sandys concluded conversation by reiterating Brits fully alive to danger of situation. Unfortunately, they do not see any more clearly than do other parties way out of this "haze." He thought it might be useful to talk to SYG in advance along lines that if Turks did move, he should call summit meeting of interested parties and also tell him Brit PriMin would attend such meeting. He thought that Turks will not do anything next day or so.

Carrington noted that Caccia had called Dean in New York after my talk earlier today with Caccia. Dean had said there is no evidence Greek Cypriots will take action to abrogate treaty today. I said, nevertheless, time to save situation likely be extremely short.

Comment: I sense some difference of assessment exists between Brits and ourselves. Brits do not seem to have our concern about Cypriot intentions unilaterally to abrogate Treaty of Alliance. They are also considerably more relaxed about danger of Turk intervention. Their primary concern is increasingly difficult position of Brit troops in Cyprus which leads them to cling to UN involvement as long as possible, however, forlorn this may be.

Bruce

Washington, February 27, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Rundown of how we now stand on the matter of Cyprus in the Security Council

/2/Not attached; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765-775.

/3/Brackets in the source text.

/4/Telegram 2290 to New York, February 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

As a backdrop of the Security Council's consideration of the problem is the possibility that the matter might get into the General Assembly. This would happen in case there was a veto and as many as seven Council members (permanent or non-permanent) voted to send it to the Assembly or, alternatively, if a simple majority of the Assembly (57) voted to accept the problem in the Assembly. Should this happen, we would be in a most awkward situation, with the whole issue of Article 19, financing and Chirep suddenly placed before us. There is good reason to doubt that this will happen. Although opinion is divided, there is reason to believe that the Russians are not yet ready to face up to these problems in view of their repeated statements that they would like to enter into bilateral negotiations with the US on the matter of financing. Also, if the Russians cast a veto on behalf of Makarios and allowed the matter to get into the GA, they would be acting counter to their often stated position that the right place for peacekeeping operations is in the Security Council, not in the GA.

There may be some hope in a draft resolution sponsored by the six non-members of the Council which is now under discussion in New York. However, if Makarios holds to his past position, he will reject it because of references to the Treaty of Guarantee. On the other hand, there is reason to believe, from a statement by the Cypriot Delegate to Stevenson yesterday, that the Cypriots may be concerned lest they move too far in aligning themselves with the Soviet Union and, as a result, might be moving toward some sort of compromise.

The next Council meeting is tomorrow, when the UK and Turkey will be hard pressed to answer the Cypriot inquiry as to their interpretation of the Treaty.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature.

Moscow, February 28, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Nicosia and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

2693. Gromyko on Cyprus.

/2/Telegram 2692 from Moscow, February 28. (Ibid., POL 7 US-USSR)

Gromyko said he was discouraged by my remarks. Obviously, Soviet objective is peace and quiet on island but interference from without cannot achieve this. Soviets attach more credence to assessment of situation by Cyprus Government than by outsiders, and Cyprus Government believes outside interference can only worsen problem.

I pointed out that in assessing position of Cyprus Government necessary take into account views of both elements this government--Turkish minority as well as Greek majority.

Gromyko remarked that certainly US, like Soviets, have nothing to gain from continued tension in Cyprus area. If regard for treaty obligations and not assurance of Cyprus right to independence and territorial integrity is cornerstone of US policy, then Soviets could not agree with US position. We must be aware that where treaties are in conflict with UN Charter, latter must prevail. Since Cyprus has requested SC to insure independence and integrity, UN responsibility and not treaty obligations must be cornerstone of policy.

I again pointed out to Gromyko that Cyprus has two voices and both must be taken into account--and statement by Makarios without concurrence of Kutchuk cannot be regarded as position of Cyprus Government, as Soviets contend. In any case, it is vital that we avoid massacre on island and this is precisely aim of our, as well as UK, policy.

Gromyko said outside interference inflames emotions of two communities and this makes situation more precarious. We should not accede to "one-sided" demands of UK and Turkey.

I ended conversation by reminding Gromyko that it is only natural that Greece and Turkey should be partisan, but UK is strictly neutral, its aim is to avoid bloodshed and war danger, and it is incumbent upon Soviets to join us in supporting British efforts toward this end.

Kohler

Washington, February 28, 1964, 8:12 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Jernegan (NEA) and Moffitt, cleared in IO and UNP, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to New York, Ankara, and Nicosia.

/2/Dated January 28; it reported on Greek unhappiness with U.S. efforts to secure Denktash's right to speak before the Security Council. (Ibid.)

/3/A reference to Article 39 of the UN Charter that outlines the role of the Security Council.

Dept officer expressed surprise at GOG surprise, pointing out from beginning we had made plain to all parties, including Cypriots, that any Security Council session on Cyprus problem must hear representatives both communities. Ambassador admitted this but said trouble was we had taken initiative.

/4/Dated February 17; it instructed the Mission to the United Nations to vote in favor of seating a Turkish Cypriot delegation for the Security Council debate. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

At opening of meeting February 27, SC President said he had request from Turkish del that Council hear Denktash, "Representative of Turk Cypriot Community." Kyprianou, Soviet and Czech dels all spoke in opposition. Moroccan del then suggested Denktash be heard under Rule 39 SC Rules Procedure. When SC President appeared not to take this as formal proposal Stevenson said:

"I thought the motion had been made by the Representative of Morocco. If it has not, in order to facilitate the question before us I would move that the Council invite Mr. Denktash to present his views before the Council in accordance with Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure."

Moroccan Rep confirmed that his suggestion intended as formal proposal. Soviet del continued try obfuscate issue by arguing that, in light Moroccan proposal that Denktash be seated as an individual, Sovs concluded that request he be heard as "Representative of Turkish community" had been declined. Stevenson then said:

"I participate in this procedural debate with reluctance and with the hope that we can proceed rapidly with the business before the Council. I must say, however, that I was surprised by conclusion of Representative of Soviet Union that the Council had declined request of Representative of Turkey. No such decision has been made. There is only one proposal that has been made, and that is proposal of Representative of Morocco to invite Representative of Turkish Community in Cyprus to address Council under Rule 39. A motion has been made to that effect; it takes priority over all other matters, and until disposed of it is not appropriate to discuss any further matter. I would suggest, therefore, that if members of Council share my view that it is important and urgent that we attend to the substantive business before the Council, we can dispose of this procedural point with expedition."

Moroccan proposal later approved without vote when SC Pres said if he heard no further objection he would consider proposal adopted.

While Dept recognized that hearing for Turk Cypriot would annoy GOG, and while we did not want take lead on debate in this issue, we did feel would be only fair and appropriate for Denktash to be heard. Under Secretary Ball had made clear to Makarios in Nicosia that in any debate in SC a Turk Cypriot would undoubtedly be heard. Article 39 provides that Council may invite persons it considers competent to supply information in matters which Council has under consideration. As Embassy aware Kyprianou, though participating in debate as GOC representative, is presenting strictly Greek Cypriot case. Since Cyprus dispute is essentially one between two communities, it only reasonable that second community be given opportunity express its views.

FYI. Through Turk UN del we have urged that Denktash be calm and dispassionate in his remarks. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, February 29, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret.

/2/S/5571, adopted as SC Res. 186 (1964) on March 4; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566-567.

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Documents 15-20.

/4/No discussion of Cyprus took place at the February 29 or the March 5 meetings of the NSC.

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, March 1, 1964, 2:56 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Jernegan, Cleveland, and Moose. Repeated to Athens, New York, Nicosia, and London.

890. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Will you please deliver the following message to Foreign Minister Erkin from me soonest: Begin Verbatim Text.

I have been following the developments in New York on an hourly basis and I should like to give you my personal assessment of the situation as I see it. I would appreciate it if you would communicate this also to Prime Minister Inonu with my warm regards and admiration:

1. I promised the Prime Minister and you that the USG would use its best efforts in the Security Council to defeat the attempt of the Government of Cyprus to obtain a resolution undermining the Treaty of Guaranty. I promised also that we would agree to nothing that would derogate from the Treaty rights of your Government.

2. I am persuaded that the present draft resolution achieves both of these objectives. The Greek Cypriots have been frustrated in their effort to obtain Security Council action that would change the treaty. Not only does the resolution contain nothing which derogates from either of the treaties, but it provides for a peacekeeping force and mediator which were the essence of the original proposal with which your Government was associated.

/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765-775.

4. The present draft resolution is, in my view, the best we can obtain from the Security Council. It represents a victory for the principles we set out to establish.

5. We intend to make sure Turkey's concerns are taken care of by making it crystal clear in the Council that the second preambular paragraph of the resolution refers to all relevant provisions of the UN Charter, including the Charter Preamble which speaks of "respect to the obligations arising from treaties," as well as to the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 relating to human rights. We shall also make clear that the necessary assumption of paragraph 2 is that the Government of Cyprus will act strictly in accordance with constitutional procedures. We shall further interpret the reference in paragraph 7 to "the people of Cyprus as a whole" as meaning "all of the people now living on Cyprus" and as not importing any conclusion as to the form of the ultimate solution.

6. With these considerations in mind, I urge that your Government--if it cannot obtain the acceptance of the amendments you are proposing-should acquiesce in the draft resolution in its present form. We shall do everything possible to persuade our British friends to join with us in reinforcing the proper meaning of this resolution.

7. The effect of prompt acquiescence would be to put a peacekeeping force on the Island as quickly as possible and thus bring a stop to bloodshed, and also to arrange for a mediator whom we shall all support in developing an equitable and hopefully permanent solution to this troublesome and dangerous issue.

8. I recognize the difficulties which this whole situation presents to your Government. We all admire the forbearance and restraint that you have displayed in this matter. We shall continue to work closely with you in order to keep the peace and to find the most equitable and compassionate solution to the problem of Cyprus. End Verbatim Text.

/3/Dated March 1; it reported on Cypriot desires for changes in the draft and commented on their possible impact on Turkey. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP)

Rusk

New York, March 2, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

/2/Telegram 3246 from New York, March 1, transmitted a draft resolution on Cyprus. Telegram 3255 from New York, March 2, contained Stevenson's report on a meeting with Greek Cypriot representatives. (Both ibid.)

/3/The Soviets had expressed reservations regarding the text being circulated and subsequently announced that they would not vote for the fourth (operative) paragraph.

2. From Cypriot and Sov viewpoint, adjournment SC connected mainly this problem (although Turks also asked Bernardes (Brazil) to request adjournment SC mtg presumably so they could get Ankara reaction to revised preamble of res). Cypriots uncertain if terms of reference for force (op para 5, reftel 3246) acceptable to GOC. Clearly they not pleasing to Sovs. Federenko (USSR) asked Bernardes seek adjournment Mar 2 SC mtg (and when this done, he only one urge mtg be afternoon Mar 3 not morning). According Algard (Norway) Sovs also requested Nielsen and Bernardes permit para by para vote so they could abstain on op paras 4, 5, and 7 and then vote for res. Bernardes and Nielsen have told us they firm on no para by para voting and no amendments. Hajek (Czechs) told newsmen he did not believe amendments would be moved. Riha (Czechs) indicated he expected no negative votes on res which he said had clear majority. Indicated Czechs would abstain with clarifying statement on para 4 being in contravention Charter provisions for SC.

3. SYG, aware of need for shaping up peace force rapidly called in Finnish, Irish, Swedish, and UK reps afternoon Mar 2. Rikhye had staff mtg his Comite. Scandinavian permreps had heads together in lounge after SC mtg., Hedin (Sweden) said his govt reluctant but Astrom planning give it arguments in favor, principal one being that other participation would be importantly influenced by Swedish role. Algard (Norway) said Nielsen gave Astrom "third degree" in favor Swedish participation. Also said now that force in UN, not NATO context, Norwegian contribution, if asked, less likely if Swedes refused. Danish MisOff said same thing although less certain of this since Danish had unit ready go in "ten hours." All agreed Finns, who Rolz Bennett told Yost had legislative restrictions consider (as well as Sov pressures), would not go if Swedes refused and Algard (Norway) noted Irish and even Canadians would be unlikely contribute if Swedes not in. Bitsios (Greece) told Yost Cypriots no longer pressing for Yugos. Indians still appear to be negative in spite Kyprianou's reported contrary impression.

Comment: Clear that rapid composition of Cyprus PKF desirable both for purpose SC res and to avoid obstacles its creation. Swedish contribution appears be key to formulation international force. Recommend Dept instruct Emb Stockholm make this situation clear to Swedish FonMin and that Embs Copenhagen and Oslo do likewise with view of coordinating pressure on Swedish Govt act rapidly and favorably this matter.

Stevenson

Washington, March 3, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential.

SUBJECT
U.S. Support for UN Cyprus Force

Assuming the resolution goes through the Security Council this afternoon, the Secretary General will be trying to organize the UN Cyprus Force.

We need to make clear, if possible today, what we are prepared to do in support of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Cyprus. We have the legal authority, in the UN Participation Act, to transfer supplies and services to the UN without reimbursement.

The Department of Defense tells us that the troops of other nations can be airlifted, upon request of the Secretary of State, with the cost absorbed by Defense.

When it comes to transferring equipment and supplies to other countries or to an international organization, the Defense Department would have to seek reimbursement. This could be done:

a. Through the military appropriation process;

b. Through a special appropriation requested under the Foreign Assistance Act; or

c. Through the use of the FY 1964 AID Contingency Fund.

If a U.S. voluntary contribution were required in the form of cash--a distinct possibility if the operation is prolonged--it would have to be funded from this year's AID Contingency Fund or from an item added to Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1965.

/2/Attached but not printed.

We recommend, therefore, that when it becomes necessary Ambassador Stevenson be authorized to say something like this to the Secretary General--and in his discretion in the Security Council:

/3/For text of the Stevenson statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1964, pp. 465-466.

Washington, March 3, 1964, 1:06 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Buffum, cleared in IO and NEA, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, USUN, Nicosia, and London.

/2/Dated March 1; it reported on Turkish Security Council maneuvers designed to slow adoption of the draft resolution on Cyprus. (Ibid.)

/3/Dated March 3. (Ibid.)

Rusk

Washington, March 4, 1964, 8:14 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland and Jones; cleared in NE, DOD, and AID; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Dublin, and New Delhi.

2335. Re: UN Cyprus Force.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 472.

/3/No record of this conversation was found.

We see three possible levels on which SYG may ask our assistance:

1. Transport. We see no problem supplying troop airlift free of cost to UN where countries contributing forces unable furnish own transportation. To extent British can handle airlift particularly of non-British forces from Europe, we should of course press for that to be first option. Would hope Canadians would also be in position to transport at least their own contingent. We would therefore want to be reasonably forthcoming on this level and with President's approval, you may at your discretion inform SYG.

2. Supply of equipment and logistic support. Seems likely we be asked by SYG supply such things as helmets, perhaps communication equipment, vehicles, helicopters or other items not quickly obtainable elsewhere. We would be much more reluctant engage in this sort supply where we would be asked bear cost without reimbursement. Furthermore, we do not believe situation justifies argument for uniformity of type of equipment, which almost surely would mean greater requirement placed on us. Request you consult with UK as well as SYG with a view to assuring that UK equipment used to maximum.

We would want therefore consider such requests on individual basis and would scrutinize them carefully with view assuring ourselves there no reasonable alternative source of supply for UN.

If proposals are made for urgent supply particular items, military staff group attached to USUN (supplemented as necessary by people from DOD) should develop detailed requirement rationally related to total military planning. US decision to participate in furnishing supplies and equipment would be made only on basis of demonstration that reliance on US is really only feasible recourse.

FYI: Funding presents most complicated legal and financial problems on any considerable logistic support. Modest voluntary contributions in kind can be made if absolutely necessary. End FYI.

3. Financial contribution. There already indications we might be asked make monetary contribution for payment peacekeeping forces from areas such as Brazil. We would not be agreeable to undertake fulfill such request. Would reopen whole question percentage contribution to peacekeeping forces with attendant difficulties. We would hope therefore no such requests would be made of U.S.

In talking with SYG you authorized use above in manner you believe tactically most advantageous.

We note SYG thinking in terms of peacekeeping force of about 7000 and that he envisages new UN forces of about 4000 as substituting for equal number British troops. We believe SYG and British should be strongly discouraged from acceptance this principle of substitution, certainly at least for initial stage and until situation on ground with respect restoration of law and order and ability maintain law and order is more apparent. We inclined agree with Gyani estimate that at least 10,000 are needed. Would be unwise in view difficulties UK already experienced with present force level of about 7000 to begin to build UN force by substituting for UK troops.

Rusk

Washington, March 4, 1964, 3:36 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Text received from the White House and approved by S/S.

995. From the President to the Ambassador. Please deliver following private message to Papandreou soonest:

"I am very pleased that the Security Council has adopted a resolution on Cyprus providing for a suitable peacekeeping force and for appointment of a mediator. Something like this is in effect what you and we have been seeking from the first, and I am grateful for your important contribution to this result.

The important point is that prompt creation of a peacekeeping force should stop the bloodshed, and create an atmosphere in which progress can be made toward a settlement of this agonizing issue. The United States will do all it can to help, but your own efforts in this direction will be of critical importance."

Rusk

New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

3292. Cyprus.

Bunche called Yost late last evening to say that in course SYG-Menemencioglu mtg yesterday afternoon latter had expressed objection to (1) appointment Gyani as commander UN force, (2) presence Indian contingent in UN force, and (3) proposed appointment Rolz-Bennett as mediator.

As to "(1)", Bunche said SYG takes position approval interested parties to designation UN commander not required by SC res and he was merely informing Turks as courtesy. As to "(2)", approval of parties is required and, in view Turk attitude, SYG will not seek Indian contingent.

As to "(3)", Bunche said he was not sure, since SYG had been somewhat reticent in his explanation, that Menemencioglu understood SYG intends himself to play major role in mediation and that Rolz-Bennett would be merely his representative. Bunche requested US help in making this point clear to Turks. Yost agreed to pass on this point but made no commitment to support proposed appointment.

This morning Yost called Menemencioglu to get his reaction to yesterday's interview. Menemencioglu said he had objected to designation Gyani because he is Indian and because he considered his report on Polis affair to be biased. He recognized, however, that SYG was not formally seeking Turkish agreement to his designation. Menemencioglu was gratified at SYG's decision not to seek Indian contingent. He said that he had been astonished by SYG's proposal to appoint as mediator Rolz-Bennett, who had been working very closely with Cypriots all through recent weeks. He had assumed that figure of world stature who would report only occasionally to SYG would be appointed. Yost informed him of SYG's intention himself to play major role in mediation. Menemencioglu said he thought this unwise in SYG's own interest. He had expressed objection to Rolz-Bennett appointment but is seeking definitive instructions from Ankara on this question. (His objection must have been mild since British tell us SYG remarked to them that Menemencioglu, while raising questions, had not dissented strongly.)

Upon checking with UKUN, Jackling informed us that they had been equally surprised by SYG's proposal to appoint Rolz-Bennett and himself to play major role in mediation. They shared our doubts as to wisdom this arrangement from SYG's own viewpoint. However, they had sought instructions from London and London is not disposed, in view of delicacy of matter, to raise any objection. Dean proposed to inform SYG later in morning that HMG has no objection. Pursuant to Yost-Sisco telecon, Yost called Jackling again and urged UKUN not convey HMG approval to SYG until Dept had had opportunity to review question at higher level and until we knew whether GOT reaction would be mild or serious. Jackling said he would check with Dean, who was not immediately available, and, since telegraphic confirmation their oral instruction not yet received, recommend they say at this morning's meeting they are not yet ready to reply on this point. Jackling thought they might at minimum say that, while HMG has no objection to appointment, it would feel that any mediator would have to be fully acceptable to all parties concerned. Subsequently, Dean informed us he had taken this line and had moreover added that UK would not wish to express final opinion on this point until other parties had been heard from.

In conversation with Bunche this afternoon Yost stressed our belief that mediator in order to be effective must be fully acceptable to all parties. Bunche concurred entirely and said SYG would not appoint Rolz-Bennett if Turks presented strong objection. On personal basis, Yost raised question whether it was desirable in SYG's own interest for him to be so deeply involved in this highly controversial and time-consuming assignment and whether he would not be better protected by appointing someone like Plimsoll, Schurman or Boland to carry main burden. Bunche replied that, since SC res provides mediator report periodically to SYG, latter would in any case have main responsibility and preferred to have mediator who would keep him closely informed at every step rather than have someone who might turn out to be prima donna and make SYG's role more difficult. As to other individuals suggested, he was sure because of Makarios' attitude toward NATO force that he would object to any mediator from NATO country, Turks would certainly reject Boland, and Plimsoll is no better known outside UN circles than Rolz-Bennett. (Bunche was quite clear that, while Rolz-Bennett would not be appointed if Turks objected strongly, otherwise he would be. It appears SYG wishes keep firm hand on rudder and may have judged from Yemen experience he can not control mediator not directly under his authority.)

As to Gyani, we understand that SYG had wished to announce today or tomorrow that he is immediately assuming command of "UN" (i.e., British) forces in Cyprus. HMG is objecting very strongly that this is premature, at least until composition of UN force, including number of British participating, is known. Bunche indicated SYG also wishes give Turks opportunity comment further even though their approval is not required. However, it is hoped to make announcement tomorrow that Gyani is being appointed and will assume command at early date. Appointment UK Gen Carver as Deputy Commander will be announced at same time.

Plimpton

New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs.

/2/Document 477.

1. Transport: Agreed with US approach. Said SYG already recommended Canadians supply own air transport. (Dean (UK) told MisOff UK prepared provide transport and indicated this would be for units from Europe.)

2. Logistics: SYG stated three men UNSEC Recon Group consisting of Feiffer (UN Comp Office), Maj Mariz (SYG Mil Staff) and Lansky (UN Field Serv) plan trip Cyprus determine PKF logistics needs, UK ability provide local support such as vehicles, qtrs, rations, etc and develop feel for situation. (Group will depart New York 6 March PM for 5-7 day visit on island with return via London possibility, according Rikhye staff.)

Bunche stressed that to maximum extent possible force would try fill needs from UK equipment on Cyprus. Noted only right-hand drive vehicles allowed on Cyprus and hoped expensive problem bringing vehicles into Cyprus could be minimized.

Extent UN needs would not be known until survey mission returned and no requests to US should be expected until then.

3. Finances: Bunche indicated US position on monetary contribution expected. Said SYG decided today send ltr all UN members and all spec UN agencies describing Cyprus operation, giving rough estimate of costs, and requesting contributions. In addition, he said, special approaches would be made to UK, West Germany, Switzerland, and perhaps others. West Germany would be told her readiness contribute unit appreciated but in view circumstances monetary contribution would be most welcome form participation. As for UK, SYG would be "tough" saying UN getting UK "off hook" in Cyprus and expected monetary contribution. (Rikhye told Yost at lunch Greece and Turkey would also be asked specifically for contributions. Acland (UK) told MisOff contribution of troops, air transport and equipment would be all UK can manage and Dean told this to SYG today.)

4. Bunche stated SYG thinking in terms 7,000 man force initially. (According Acland SYG told Dean this is in response to GOC view that 7,000 troops enough now.) Bunche said Cypriots agreed to renew question of size of force if after initial period Gyani (who with Rikhye has favored force of at least 10,000) recommended increase.

Bunche stated SYG suggested to Cypriots that Greek and Turk contingents be included in UN force, pointing out this one way get them back to barracks. Although Cypriots oppose this, Clerides immediately saw advantage this plan and said GOC reconsideration this point would be sought. (As for status other elements of force, SYG told Dean (UK), March 4, according Acland, Irish participation doubtful, Finnish and Brazilian forces possible only if financing made available.)

Bunche commented Astrom (Sweden) forwarding some rather impractical conditions for Swedish participation, such as SYG obtaining specific approval Cypriot VP Kutchuk. Yost suggests channeling request through Turks. (Canadians, according Acland, pressing for definite directives to UN forces to disarm Greek and Turk Cypriot irregulars. Acland said UK reports from Nicosia indicate Gyani favors this as well as disbanding 5,000 Greek Cypriot special constables.)

Bunche remarked problem disarming Cypriots difficult one to which close attention being given. Also said he intrigued by enthusiasm of British, not only FonMin Butler, but also Dean and Harold Wilson who recently saw SYG, over idea UK troops under UN command. This sharp contrast with their reservations over UNOC and its action in Katanga. Bunche observed troops of large power are in this case under UN command solely by virtue fact they already there.

Comment: Manner in which UK appears accept GOC and SYG decision start with force of 7,000 suggests once responsibility in UN hands UK not as concerned with need for larger force and are more attracted by chance withdraw, as other contingents arrive, up to 3,000 men.

Plimpton