U.S. Department of State

Washington, October 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Task Force Reports. Administratively Confidential. The President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization was a subgroup of the President's Task Force on Government Organization organized in late 1966 primarily to review domestic agencies (see footnote 2, Document 118). Ben Heineman chaired both groups. Heineman forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 1 memorandum in which he noted that Katzenbach had attended and participated in all of the task force meetings and was in general agreement with the report's recommendations. Califano forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 14 memorandum in which he summarized its contents and noted that the Task Force on Government Organization considered it "the second most important report they have submitted." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 749)

ORGANIZATION FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

I. To provide day-to-day leadership in policy and to insure that the diverse programs and activities of the agencies concerned with foreign affairs support established policies, the President needs a strong chief subordinate--an individual, not a committee--who can both advise him and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities.

II. In our judgment the Secretary of State should do this job. He should be the President's first adviser on foreign and national security affairs, and under the President he should coordinate the programs of all U.S. agencies which support our foreign policies.

III. If the Secretary of State is to discharge these massive responsibilities regularly and systematically, organizational changes must occur. These changes fall into two categories:

A. Those which require direct Presidential determination, and

B. Those which should be left to the executive judgment of the Secretary of State.

IV. At the level of Presidential determination, we recommend that:

A. Secretaries of State, now and in the future, be authorized to free themselves personally, to the maximum extent possible, of social and ceremonial functions and participation in overseas conferences. They should also be encouraged to reorder their relations with Capitol Hill so as to reduce their pro forma appearances and increase their real political effectiveness.

B. The second-ranking position in the Department of State be elevated to "Deputy Secretary." This proposal, which would require Congressional approval, would provide the Secretary with a true "alter ego" and provide the President support from a top team.

C. The Secretary and his Deputy be authorized and instructed to establish a substantive, analytic staff to serve them directly, somewhat comparable in character and function to the White House/NSC staff.

D. The Department of State be directed to establish, over time in close consultation with BOB, programmatic budgetary review of the proposals of other agencies whose activities support U.S. foreign policies to insure that all available resources are programmed to support priority foreign policy objectives and requirements. The Task Force believes that the process of establishing a Foreign Affairs budget should be evolutionary in character. The group unanimously recommends that the President direct the State Department to develop the analytic capacity and procedures at the regional level at an early date to discharge this assignment vis-?-vis the AID, MAP, USIA, and Peace Corps programs.

V. At the level of decision by the Secretary of State, we make the following recommendations, recognizing that one or more of them may be subject to sharp modification in the light of the President's broader decisions and the specific preferences of the Secretary of State.

A. The Secretary rely upon regional officers even more heavily than presently for inter-departmental coordination and operations within their geographic jurisdictions and provide these officials with planning and analytic staffs unburdened by day-to-day operating responsibilities.

B. Several independent functional activities now in State be regrouped under the Department's two Under Secretaries.

C. The current system for training foreign service officers be opened up to transfer out of the system and admit into the system more individuals at the middle and upper grades and to provide a broader apprenticeship in operating foreign affairs agencies and Executive-Legislative Affairs for those persons destined to assume major executive responsibilities in foreign affairs.

Conclusions

In response to the President's invitation, we have reviewed the organization of the government for the conduct of foreign and national security affairs.

In our judgment, that organization is not presently adequate. There are several related deficiencies:

(1) Neither the White House nor the State Department is equipped to provide continuous, clear-cut policy leadership and guidance to all the various agencies of the government engaged in foreign affairs.

(2) No agency in government systematically and regularly provides the President and other key decision-makers with comprehensive analysis of foreign affairs issues--with analyses which rigorously specify U.S. objectives, identify what various U.S. agencies think and why, and assess probable advantages and costs of alternative courses of action.

(3) Outside the annual agency by agency budget review conducted by the Bureau of the Budget, no office or institution reviews the budgets of the foreign and national security affairs agencies from the perspective of the priorities, commitments and requirements of foreign policy.

As a result of these weaknesses, the policies and programs of agencies concerned with foreign affairs frequently diverge--not because there is any intentional departure from policy approved by the President, but because internal inconsistencies are not resolved by prompt and firm decision. There have been difficulties of this kind in our policy toward the multilateral force, toward the Erhard regime, toward India and Pakistan, toward Africa, and toward arms control.

We think the U.S. can do much better:

--in establishing, in a timely and orderly fashion, policies understood and accepted across the government;

--in planning ahead to take advantage of potential opportunities and to meet foreseeable crises;

--in applying the large budgetary resources now involved in our foreign policy towards identified and consistent goals.

Obviously reorganization alone will not solve all the problems of our foreign affairs. The international environment will remain volatile and unpredictable. We have scores of allies and adversaries in a world complicated by change in ways which cannot be readily predicted. We also face internal constraints--set by public and congressional opinion and by the human limitations of any government, however well organized.

Yet within this larger perspective we still believe that organizational improvement is a prerequisite for improved U.S. performance in world affairs.

There are many instruments of American foreign policy. They include policy declarations, diplomatic persuasion and pressure, military strength, technical assistance, provision of food, capital lending, propaganda, arms deliveries and covert operations. The agencies and individuals that operate these instruments inevitably have differing perspectives as to priority of competing regions, functions, and policies. An effective foreign policy requires that the conflict among those perspectives be resolved by reference to broader considerations, and that the uses of those instruments be made consistent with each other and with the dominating purposes of national policy. No such consistency and coherence arises automatically. It must be imposed.

In large part, the imposition of order and cohesion must come personally from the President. Accordingly, since the late 30's every President has been deeply and continuously immersed in foreign and national security decision-making, and future Presidents will give the same priority to these problems.

But the problems have grown and are growing. In 1945 there were 55 countries. The crucial questions related very largely to one region--Europe. The U.S. alone had nuclear weapons. Our foreign policy aims, though challenging, were conceptually simple: to contain one great adversary and to aid in the reconstruction of half a continent of exhausted but advanced and cohesive societies. In 1967 there are 135 nations. The events of three regions vitally affect us. Five nations possess nuclear weapons. And U.S. purposes are more complex and more ambitious: to check several adversaries, themselves in shifting relation, and to aid in the development of three continents of largely backward, fragmented and unstable societies. The future is likely to pose even more complex tasks for U.S. foreign policy.

The consequence is that no President, faced as he will be by other demands on his attention, can alone produce the direction, the integration and the consistency which U.S. foreign policy must have. To be sure, the President will be available in crisis situations. In our judgment, crisis has often produced especially good U.S. performance precisely because it commands the full engagement of the President, who is then available to probe, to monitor, and to decide.

To produce clarity of policy and a coherent relationship of resources to policy in the absence of crisis, however, responsibility short of the President must be assigned to some person or institution. No such person or institution now exercises that responsibility.

The organizational deficiencies that we have identified are not of recent origin. They can be explained, in large measure, by the massive growth of U.S. involvement in world affairs in the last quarter century and by the inability of our institutions to adjust fully to America' s new world role.

There have been other attempts to address these organizational problems. President Eisenhower relied without notable success on formal, multi-layered inter-agency committees. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have formally asked the State Department to provide interdepartmental leadership and coordination, and tended to rely on informal groups, frequently led or strategically managed in the White House. We do not believe that either the formal arrangements of the 1950's or the informal approaches of the 1960's have yet met our fundamental organizational needs.

We do believe that earlier efforts to strengthen the Secretary of State and to energize and redirect his Department have been correct in their aim. In our judgment they have failed because they have not produced the basic changes in the State Department which are required. We believe that a transformation of the State Department is both necessary and possible, and we have set out below the major actions required to produce it.

Recommendations

Both the powers and the responsibilities of the President in foreign affairs have grown enormously since World War II. Only a strong President can hope to exercise these powers effectively. But, in our judgment, even a strong President must have a top subordinate--an individual, not a committee--who can both advise him and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities.

There is no alternative. No lesser office could attempt the task. It is politically impossible to create a new position of supra-departmental authority. And, while the President's personal (NSC) staff can attempt this function, it would perform it only at the cost of an expansion in size and an absorption in general operations that would both diminish the stature of the Secretary and Department of State and compete with its own obligation to serve the personal requirements of the President.

We do not agree with those who argue that narrow, institutional perspectives of the Office of the Secretary of State will inevitably prevent any Secretary from assuming a Presidential perspective. To be sure, there are issues--food aid, international finance, trade policy, the balance of payments--which frequently involve deep conflict between domestic and international interests. Not all of these conflicts can be resolved at the level of the Secretary of State, and some will come to the White House for independent assessment by the President's own staff and decision by the President himself.

/2/The internal logic of our view of the Secretary of State suggests the desirability of transferring from the White House to State the responsibility for chairing the special inter-agency committee which oversees covert action operations. Whether this change is made or not, we recommend strongly that the President direct the Chairman to provide this special committee with a larger staff, without ties or loyalties to any agency. [Footnote in the source text.]

The principal task of the Secretary of State must be changed. The Secretary of State must become not primarily a diplomat, a defender of policy, or an international negotiator (although he will on occasion be all of these) but pre-eminently the director and coordinator, for and on behalf of the President, of all U.S. foreign and national security policy.

If a Secretary is to provide this kind of policy leadership and coordination, he must, to the maximum extent possible, delegate social and ceremonial functions, rationalize his personal appearances before the Congress, and minimize his personal participation in intergovernmental representation and in overseas conferences. These activities currently consume 70% of the Secretary's extraordinary work week, and leave him little time to act as the President's chief agent.

Much of the work of high-level representation at overseas conferences might be delegated to the Secretary's Deputy or to a new official appointed explicitly by the President (with the active concurrence of the Secretary) as a chief negotiator. Such a man might be named our one Ambassador-at-large, or given another appropriate title, if this one has been devalued through overuse. The role and performance of recent U.S. Ambassadors to the United Nations, despite the relatively limited importance of many of their duties, is evidence that prestigious appointees with a recognized personal relationship to those in the highest councils of policy can be accepted as speaking for the United States Government on important and delicate matters.

Ceremonial functions, overseas conferences and, to the extent possible, congressional presentations of a clearly regional nature should similarly be delegated to the Department's ranking regional officials, particularly if these offices are enhanced in stature, as we recommend.

However his job is reshaped, the heavy pressure on the Secretary's time will make it essential that he be provided a true deputy, an alter ego across the whole range of Secretarial responsibilities.

This deputy must be a man of stature, personally congenial to the Secretary (who should have a full share in his selection) and fully capable of sharing the Secretary's responsibilities across agency lines. He should be given the appropriate title: Deputy Secretary. This will both symbolize the change and provide the needed mandate. This change will require legislation.

Such a true alter ego relationship is never easy to achieve. It requires determination and judgment in both men to make it work. But it produces a very large increase in the effectiveness of each. Moreover, despite organizational ambiguities, the position of Under Secretary of State has traditionally been filled by men of conspicuous ability who have commanded considerable authority. We believe the redefinition of title and scope would be readily accepted.

Strong internal management is vital to departmental effectiveness. Either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary, therefore, should have a demonstrated effectiveness in such management. But we are not proposing a "Mr. Outside-Mr. Inside" relationship with management of the Department delegated to the Number Two man. While the top men will doubtless agree to some ad hoc division of labor, we think the Deputy must remain a true alter ego, with coterminous authority and responsibility.

With a single exception, we believe that organization below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary should not be a matter for immediate and direct Presidential action. Presidents who have tried to organize the Department of State around or behind their Secretaries of State have not usually been successful. But on one matter of organization we feel so strongly that we believe the President himself should insist upon it. It is the establishment of a senior substantive staff able to give effective direct support to the Secretary and his Deputy in the discharge of their enormous personal responsibilities.

We recognize that able and experienced men believe that the whole Department, from desk officers upward should be the Secretary's staff. In one sense these men are obviously right. But in a larger sense, we are certain that they are wrong. The Secretary and his Deputy must be able to call upon analytic resources of their own--free from the perspectives of country desk officers or even of Assistant Secretaries.

These staff officers must be wholly free of ordinary day-to-day line responsibilities--on the cables, on the Hill, or elsewhere. Moreover, if thoughtful policy planning and analysis is to affect decisions and actions, the key officials charged with this responsibility cannot be viewed as a "council of wise men" outside the regular chain of command. They must communicate and report directly--in a staff relationship--to the Secretary and his Deputy.

The elements of such a senior substantive staff now exist in the Policy Planning Staff, in the growing staff of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, and in the Staff Secretariat. We do not presume to say in just what way these and other resources should be combined to establish an effective senior staff. Nor do we venture to recommend that the Secretary and his Deputy co-opt senior staff members from other agencies and departments, although many of us believe such a practice would be wise. What we do assert, unanimously and energetically, is that the Secretary cannot serve the President in the terms which this report recommends without a new order of staff work in his own immediate office.

If the Secretary of State assumes the integrating role in foreign affairs, we believe he and his key subordinates will have to become more deeply involved than they presently are in the review of the budgets of other key foreign affairs agencies. The development of a capacity in the Department of State to analyze major issues of budgetary choice in the foreign affairs community would insure, we believe, greater clarity of purpose and consistency of priorities than now exists, in addition to providing State with a powerful instrument to insure coordination.

Budget-making is the action-forcing process par excellence. As large and complex a task as it is, it must be completed each year on rigid schedule. Budgetary influence is power, and modern techniques of budget analysis orient the use of that power toward the allocation of resources in accordance with an explicit set of priorities, and a long-range plan or program of action. The review of budgets, in short, now implies the systematic and routine review of policy and programs. Moreover, budget review conveys an undoubted influence over issues not involving resources, as the evolution of BOB's power demonstrates.

/3/State and BOB have recently agreed on limited State participation in the BOB review process and on joint staff work to precede the review. [Footnote in the source text.]

/4/In time, a majority of the Task Force believes that involvement of the State Department in the budgets of foreign affairs agencies should be extended to include participation in the development of Defense and Intelligence budget programs. The extension of the concept of a Foreign Affairs Budget to include Defense and Intelligence would necessarily evolve slowly, and only as State's analytic and programming abilities develop and there is more acceptance in the Congress and in the foreign affairs community of the Secretary's leadership role. But undertaken progressively, and evolving informally over time, the development in State of the analytic competence which informs budgetary choices across agency lines would become the strongest single instrument of the Department's coordinating charter.

Secretary McNamara states that the complete Force Structure Program of DOD is submitted each year to the State Department for review before it is sent to the President. He doubts the necessity for expanding the Force Structure review into a detailed examination of the Defense Department budget by the Department of State. He also has reservations about State review of the CIA budget. Some other members of the Task Force, notably Mr. Bundy, Director Schultze and Dean Manning, have some reservations about the feasibility of the proposed extension of State's budgetary review to the DOD and CIA budgets, but join the majority on the ground that this managerial innovation can be tested by experience as it develops. [Footnote in the source text.]

The ability of the Secretary of State and his Deputy to lead in the development and coordination, throughout the government, of overseas policies and programs will depend upon their relationship with the President. The relationship must be direct and personal, and sufficiently intimate to enable the President to maintain a steady sense of what major issues are emerging, which are approaching decision, and what decisions are likely to be made, unless he intervenes. The President will then be able to engage in problems selectively at moments of his choosing and to prevent decisions he does not approve.

Even if the job of the Secretary of State could be redefined as we propose, and even if the Department of State were restructured to support the Secretary, the role of the President in foreign affairs will still be large and decisive.

For the Presidency is the only office of the government which can finally assess the relative weight of conflicting foreign and domestic interests on the major issues and challenges facing the nation. Even with an expanded role being played by the Secretary of State, the President--any President--will want to push and probe, to keep open many sources of advice and analysis, and to reserve a wide range of decisions to himself.

If issues are to flow to the President through the Secretary of State, the President must be thoroughly confident that he will have early and ample warning of changes in the international environment, of emerging international crises as well as emerging intra-governmental disputes and splits. The President must retain the freedom to change standard operating procedures, to get advice from external sources, and to handle some issues in a collegial forum, rather than through standard hierarchical channels centering on the Secretary of State. Therefore, the supporting staffs in State must be organized to serve the President and his staff, as well as the Secretary and his Deputy.

Both the Secretary and Deputy, in turn, must receive broad grants of authority from the President, a clear understanding of his personal definition of the limits of that authority, and assurance of support in heavy weather.

From the point of view of the Presidency, the measures we recommend would change the foreign policy machinery in two respects. First, with a control mechanism short of the White House, that machinery would be able to function (except in crises) with less active Presidential participation than is now required. Second, and again because of the existence of leadership short of the White House, Presidential control could be applied more effectively when needed. The machinery, at last, would include a handle.

As a result, some Presidents might wish to deal in foreign affairs problems more selectively, concentrating only on the crucial issues. Alternatively, they might wish to exercise greater authority across the board. In either event, the President would, as he must, remain deeply engaged in foreign and security affairs, and in either event the White House will still require personal staff of the highest caliber.

Concluding Comments

In the preceding pages, we have advanced essentially unanimous conclusions and recommendations for consideration by the President. We believe that our report advances and develops a new concept of the role of the Secretary of State, and of the way in which Presidents, today and in the future, might organize the most important dimensions of the Presidency--the conduct and control of Foreign and National Security Affairs.

/5/Attached but not printed.

We have looked at the organization of the Department of State in the course of this study. In addition to what we have said above, we believe a first-class Department of State, well-organized and stocked with talent at all echelons is also essential to the Nation's future success in international affairs.

We believe that internal organization of federal Executive departments is pre-eminently a matter for determination by top line executives--the members of the President's Cabinet. With clear recognition, therefore, of the primal role of the Secretary of State in ordering the internal affairs of his Department, we have advanced in the attached Appendix one possible approach to Departmental organization that appeals to a majority of us, and that seems consistent with our concept of the government-wide responsibilities of the Secretary of State as the President's first advisor and coordinator in international affairs. We commend these suggestions for review by the Secretary and others who have day-to-day responsibilities for managing the Department.

We concede, in closing, that the management of U.S. foreign affairs will never be tidy or easy. Our necessary engagement with scores of allies and adversaries in a world riven by conflict and complicated by change can never be perfectly ordered. Moreover, it is beyond the power of any government, however manned and however organized, to foresee all events, to prepare for all contingencies, or even, in all situations, to see clearly its own best interests.

But the stakes are high. They are high in opportunities. They are high in responsibilities. They are high in resources. And they are high in risks.

If the complexity of foreign relations makes consistent wisdom impossible, the importance of foreign relations makes consistent adequacy essential. We do not believe that U.S. performance in world affairs has been consistently adequate. We believe, moreover, that improved organization and management of foreign affairs can produce far better performance.

For these reasons, and in spite of existing obstacles to change, forward movement on many of these proposals should begin as soon as possible.

Ben W. Heineman

McGeorge Bundy

William Capron

Kermit Gordon

Bayless Manning

Robert S. McNamara

Charles L. Schultze

On October 5, 1967, the 1967 Career Principals Committee of the American Foreign Service Association forwarded its interim report to Lannon Walker, Chairman of the association's Board of Directors. The committee's chairman, Ambassador William Leonhart, also forwarded the report to State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read under cover of an October 10 memorandum in which he proposed that Read forward it to Secretary of State Rusk if he thought Rusk would like to see it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 1 State) Quoting from one of its working papers, the committee defined its aim in the report as follows:

"The fundamental question to be considered is how the foreign affairs of the United States can best be organized and conducted consistent with NSAM 341 and various other directives related to the pre-eminent authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State? [The Committee] believes that the psychological moment is at hand for a reexamination of the role of the Department of State and the Foreign Service in the over-all 'foreign affairs community' and the structure and organization of the career service or services required to carry out that role."

The report was printed as a supplement to the November 1967 issue of the Foreign Service Journal, pages 30A-30D. In a November 26, 1968, memorandum to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Leonhart explained that the report was "prepared when we thought Senator Fulbright was about to launch Congressional hearings to reform--or revise--the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs community." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 8 State)

Washington, October 20, 1967.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Political Military Group. Secret. Drafted by Joseph J. Wolf (G/PM).

SUBJECT
Weekly Activity Report

/2/Not found. A memorandum of a luncheon conversation on October 3 during which Arthur Foley and John Ausland of G/PM discussed formation of the Political-Military Group with Morton Halperin of OASD/ISA is ibid.

/3/In a letter to John Barrow of the Armed Forces Staff College, August 9, 1968, Donald Lesh of the SIG Staff stated: "Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, with representation from ISA, JCS, CIA, AID, USIA, and other interested agencies, the PMG has been very active since its foundation in late 1967." (Ibid.) Under cover of a memorandum for PMG members, November 20, 1968, Arthur Foley provided a tabulation of major items considered by the PMG in 1967-1968. (Ibid.)

[Omitted here is unrelated material.]

On January 19, 1968, Department of State Executive Secretary Read forwarded to Walt Rostow a draft Presidential letter to all U.S. Chiefs of Mission abroad. In a covering memorandum, Read described the letter as "restating their fundamental role and stressing several themes which the Secretary is anxious to have our Ambassadors abroad urge with greater vigor and effectiveness." Read also noted that both Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach had concurred in the draft letter. Rostow forwarded it to the President on February 27, with about half the lines crossed out. In a covering memorandum, Rostow characterized the letter's purpose as two-fold: "1. To state clearly the Ambassador's responsibility as your agent to supervise and coordinate all the work of his Embassy. 2. To instruct each Ambassador to speak up often and firmly about our role in Southeast Asia and the importance to the entire Free World of our commitments in Vietnam." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Filed by LBJ Library)

Several times during 1964 and 1965, Deputy Under Secretary of State Crockett had urged that a new Presidential letter be sent to Ambassadors restating their authority and responsibility as the President's representative (see Documents 13 and 19). In 1966 Special Consultant to the President Taylor proposed that the President send such a letter in connection with issuing National Security Action Memorandum 341, and the President indicated that he wanted Secretary of State Rusk to draft one (see the attachments to Document 50 and footnote 1 to Document 56). A letter was drafted in March 1966 and revised (see Document 248); however, no such letter, including the letter proposed in January 1968, was ever sent during the Johnson Presidency.

Washington, February 7, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Comment. Confidential.

Dear Mr. Clark:

/2/Not attached. See Document 58.

I am especially happy to provide some current information about the work of the SIG for two reasons: first, I realize that there is very little on the subject available from any other source for use in research or teaching, and second, there is a widespread misconception that the SIG has been either ineffective, inactive, or both. I think that the record will show that the SIG and the IRGs, particularly during the past six months, have come closer to living up to the expectations of NSAM 341 than ever before.

Admittedly, the history of the SIG since the issuance of NSAM 341 has been somewhat mixed. In fact, the irregular pattern of its activity almost justifies the use of such terms as the "First and Second Incarnations" of the SIG. What one might call the First Incarnation began with Meeting #1 on March 8, 1966, just four days after the appearance of NSAM 341, and continued through Meeting #13 on July 26, 1966. These first thirteen meetings, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Ball, dealt with a wide range of problems from purely organizational questions to discussions of trouble spots in Asia and Africa, and from an analysis of possible NATO military balance of payments union to the arrangements required by the SIG's assumption of the responsibilities for counterinsurgency formerly carried out by the Special Group (CI). In general, during this initial period the work of the SIG appears to have emphasized its appellate court function of providing a high-level forum for the resolution of interdepartmental disputes.

After thirteen meetings in roughly five months, the SIG then entered a period of quiescence. From late July 1966 until mid-July 1967 the SIG met only three times; Meetings #14-16 were held in September 1966 and January and February 1967, respectively. It was this hiatus in the operations of the SIG, without doubt, which gave rise to the not uncommon impression that the SIG was dead or dying. This was not altogether the case. Under Secretary Katzenbach was anxious, before finally adopting SIG as his "chosen instrument," to explore other ways of "managing" foreign affairs and achieving interdepartmental coordination. It was during this period that Professor Schelling examined these other possibilities. In the end, the decision was made to use the SIG mechanism with some change of focus and emphasis. I should point out, however, that two of the IRGs remained active in this period and built a solid record of achievement.

/3/In an August 4, 1967, memorandum Katzenbach notified SIG members that Arthur Hartman was replacing Harry Schwartz as SIG Staff Director. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Chron. Mr. Katzenbach-1966-67)

Much of the time of the SIG in recent months has been devoted to the wide range of problems posed by severe Congressional cuts in the Foreign Assistance Act, and to the development of an Executive Branch position responsive to Congressional intent in the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments to the FAA of 1967.

/4/Operation Topsy was an exercise instituted by Ambassador Tuthill in 1967 to trim U.S. programs and reduce U.S. personnel in Brazil.

/5/In a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze, January 18, 1968, President Johnson directed that, as part of his program for dealing with the balance of payments problem, the number of American personnel overseas under the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic missions (except for Vietnam) be reduced by 10 percent and that "very large U.S. missions" undergo "bigger reductions." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 34-35. SIG played an active role in the ensuing exercise, known as BALPA. Documentation on BALPA is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O/MS-Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, BALPA Subject Files, 1968.

In addition, the SIG has dealt with such matters as developing a unified United States posture on the future of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, examining the pros and cons of the sale of jet aircraft to Latin American countries, and defining United States arms supply policy to Middle Eastern countries in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967.

In practice, all SIG members are now asked to hold each Thursday at 4:00 p.m. for a SIG meeting, with the expectation that there will be roughly two a month. As you can see from the record, that frequency has been achieved in practice since last July. Furthermore, there has been an extremely good record of attendance by all members. As envisaged by NSAM 341, the principals themselves virtually always come in person, sending deputies only in the event of illness, travel, or real emergency. Mr. Katzenbach has personally chaired every meeting during his tenure as Under Secretary.

I have every expectation that in the future both the IRGs and the SIG will play an increasing role, in cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget, in the planning and programming of overseas operations by all foreign affairs agencies. As a first step in this direction, there was a series of joint State-Budget consultations during the fall of 1967, in the course of which State Department Country Directors and regional Assistant Secretaries (the latter in their roles as IRG chairmen) were given an opportunity to review the draft budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1969 from AID, MAP, USIA, Peace Corps and CU. These materials were made available by all agencies in order to permit the Country Directors and Assistant Secretaries of State to review the plans for their respective countries and regions, to ensure that the programs were compatible and aimed toward agreed foreign policy goals, and to verify that the supporting data was sufficiently complete and properly organized to make a convincing case to the Congress.

I emphasize that this was the first time that such an opportunity had been available while the budget submissions were still in draft, before the final Bureau of the Budget package had been prepared for Presidential attention. This type of review is needed as agencies prepare their budget justification in the new PPBS form. Each agency must state explicit objectives and these clearly must be part of our overall foreign affairs program.

The consultations, carried on under SIG auspices, culminated in a series of lengthy and informative meetings with each regional Assistant Secretary and his IRG Staff Director and other advisors, together with the Staff Director of the SIG and the head of the International Operations Division of the Budget Bureau. While there were some justified criticisms of this operation--in particular, that it came too late in the budget cycle to allow anything more than a quick look and some hurried observations--there was widespread agreement that this kind of interdepartmental coordination is highly desirable, and that a greater effort will be made to involve the responsible State Department officials earlier in the FY budget cycle, especially at the Country Director and IRG level.

In this context, I should also mention the work of the IRG/ARA, which has been working closely with the staff of the SIG in developing and refining the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) program. This subject is too broad for detailed discussion in this already overly-long letter, but you probably know that the CASP program was carried through its first complete cycle in ARA during calendar year 1967, and that the second cycle has just begun. The exercise is an attempt to obtain from each of our Ambassadors in Latin America an annual coordinated country plan--not merely a summary of the operations of various agencies, but a unified plan. Each of these plans is reviewed and debated in the IRG/ARA, and ultimately approved by the Assistant Secretary as revised or corrected. The goal is that the CASP should become the primary planning document for all foreign affairs agencies for any given country in the area. The experiment has not been undertaken in other bureaus, and in fact the CASP in its present form may not be suitable for direct transplantation, but the concept of unified planning through the interdepartmental mechanisms specified in NSAM 341 almost certainly will spread to other regional bureaus in time.

I cannot do full justice here to the activities of the other IRGs, but they certainly deserve some separate mention since, even with an active SIG, the great burden of the work of interdepartmental coordination will continue to be done on the level of the regional groups. Here again, as might be expected, the record could be called mixed but promising.

Even during the period when the SIG virtually ceased to function, some of the IRGs, as I have mentioned, continued to operate actively and effectively. A host of factors influence the degree to which any IRG is used, chief among them being degree of determination of a given Assistant Secretary to employ this medium of interdepartmental coordination. The most active of the IRGs have been in NEA and ARA, which have met over 50 and 80 times, respectively, since their formation in March 1966. The IRGs in other areas have met less often but, owing in large part to the strongly expressed interest of the Under Secretary, the regional groups in EUR, EA and AF are now being used with greater frequency.

I think you will agree that the picture I have described does not support the conclusion that the mandate of NSAM 341 has been allowed to languish. And there is every expectation that the coming year will see an even higher level of activity in the SIG and IRGs. Those of us on the SIG staff of course are well aware that improvements can be made in the functioning of the SIG. Nevertheless, I feel that the mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination of foreign policy outlined in NSAM 341 are now at the stage where their effectiveness and productivity will become more apparent.

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this regard. Also, as I am sure you recognize, some of the above should be treated as classified--particularly the exact nature of SIG topics. But otherwise feel free to use any of this information as you see fit.

Sincerely,

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, February 27, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 1-1. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates Rusk saw it.

SUBJECT
Allocation of Resources--A Budget for Foreign Affairs and the Relation to National Goals

/2/Authorized expenditures for fiscal year 1968 were as follows: the Department of State: $428.19 million; the Agency for International Development: $1.214 billion; the United States Information Agency: $187.32 million; the Peace Corps: $107.9 million; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: $9.3 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

Ambassador Tuthill's launching of Operation Topsy for the United States Mission in Brazil exemplifies the kind of evaluation that each and every element of the foreign affairs agencies should consider a continuing responsibility. Within the Department of State, presumably the Corps of Foreign Service Inspectors and certain other officers reporting to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration have as part of their responsibility the overseeing of personnel and funds in relation to functions expected of the Department. Other foreign affairs agencies doubtless have inspectorates and management experts.

But no rational judgments can be made about functions and budgets except in relation to standards fixing what the foreign affairs agencies are to accomplish. These standards in turn are related to the view one is going to take of the role of diplomacy in the contemporary world, of the part the United States is to play, of our objectives in foreign affairs, of the human values we aim to protect and increase.

Thus, simply to take the existing budget of the already undernourished Department of State, for example, and make flat percentage cuts in personnel and funds strikes me as irrational.

When the Department of Defense requests additional billions of dollars for an F-111, for an ABM system, or for the war in Viet Nam, the Administration very properly considers the requests in relation to needs, and the Congress appropriates funds on the same basis. There may be debate as to whether the requested funds fit the needs and will meet them. This is proper, and puts the consideration and decision in the right framework.

/3/The State Department budget requests are carefully prepared--we are all urged to cut our budgets to the bone before they are even sent to the Bureau of the Budget. The treatment accorded State Department budget requests in the Congress needs no elaboration. When the budget process is completed, our requests for resources have been refined again and again into smaller figures. [Footnote in the source text.]

Let us look at the needs. The United States has diplomatic relations today with 120 countries; ten years ago the number was 84; in 1945 it was 57. Part of the expense of fulfilling the increased foreign affairs responsibilities reflected by these statistics has been pieced out by closing a large number of American consulates in many parts of the world--an economy that is obviously very costly in political terms.

Moreover, the range now covered by diplomatic relations has greatly enlarged. The U.S. Government has need to know a great deal about the economies of other countries and their trade; about scientific research, developments, and new technological undertakings abroad; the requirements for knowledge and understanding of the political life of other national societies continue to grow.

/4/The Government's budget for the next fiscal year is $186.1 billion. Of this, military expenditures account for $82.3 billion. The total for all the foreign affairs agencies and their programs is $4.7 billion. [Footnote in the source text.]

I should suppose the Department of State ought to have continuing task forces at work on a whole range of questions such as these. They are the Department's province. The operating bureaus are too pressed with the despatch of current business to address the longer problem systematically and effectively. The Policy Planning Council should be at work on them, but should be supplemented by the efforts of task forces drawn from the universities, business, and public life as well as from the current Government service.

In order to fulfill its foreign affairs responsibilities, even when broadly rather than narrowly conceived, the Department of State would not require great appropriations. The amounts would still be minuscule in comparison to the Department of Defense appropriations. But there will be no hope of fulfilling foreign affairs responsibilities unless the resources available to the Department of State are rationally related to its proper needs. A flat percentage cut in existing personnel and funds can only remove to a greater distance the possibility of the Department's doing its job.

Some of the subsidiary devices currently being used in the name of economy deserve to be mentioned here.

I have referred already to the closing of consulates.

Next, there is the substantial reduction in travel funds. The foreign affairs arm of the U.S. Government needs to be able to travel from this country to places abroad; within foreign countries from our missions there; and to attend all kinds of international gatherings. Loss of mobility is disabling. Ability to travel is essential to the Department of State before all other parts of Government. If gaps left by this Department are filled by Defense and CIA--whose appropriations are relatively much more generous--there is an inevitable effect on the power over foreign affairs within the U.S. Government; there is also an effect abroad in the image of the United States thereby created.

Issues of politics and national goals

/5/The choice of May 15 as the date has the effect of discriminating against Civil Service personnel in the Department, since the Foreign Service promotion lists are issued only in the late spring. [Footnote in the source text.]

The foregoing discussion has a budgetary point of departure. It soon becomes involved with large questions of policy. This seems to me intrinsically appropriate.

I recognize the deep political problem created when Congressman Mills says he will not proceed with fiscal measures requested by the President until the Administration has made cuts in non-military expenditures running into the billions of dollars. I wonder if the President would not be wise to reject such blackmail, particularly when it means the sacrifice of funds urgently needed for a meaningful war on poverty in the United States. This seems to me the kind of case that should be taken to the people of the country and made a great campaign issue in this election year.

In fiscal terms, the additional amounts of money properly needed by the Department of State are small--apart from foreign aid. But an excellent Department of State should be seen as national necessity of the first order. If there is difficulty in persuading Congress to increase appropriately the resources available to the Department, it might be helpful to have a survey, report and recommendations by a Presidential task force--on the range of functions the Department ought to be engaged in and the resources appropriate for the enterprise.

I believe the very waging of the war in Viet Nam makes it the more imperative that we improve and strengthen the arm of diplomacy. We need it at its best now and in the future.

Washington, March 6, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, NK Chron 1968. Personal and Confidential.

SUBJECT
Personnel Administration

Now that your congressional hearings are out of the way, I would like to push ahead with some real speed on a number of matters in the personnel field. On several of these I am frankly disappointed that we are not further along already. The first three are these.

1. Several months ago I asked for your comments on a proposal regarding assignments to key positions, the heart of which was that competition for our most important jobs should be open to all our best men--to FSO-3s and 4s, as well as to FSO-1s and 2s. I know you have already been thinking, and to some extent moving, in the direction suggested by the proposal.

In my view, the statistics speak for themselves. As the middle of last year we had only seven officers above the level of FSO-3 who were forty years old or younger, although almost half of our 3,500-man officer corps was less than 40 years old. It simply makes no sense to exclude almost all of the most able officers under 40--and there are some extraordinary ones--from the most responsible positions in the Department. Specifically, we have to be able to tap the 1300 FSO-3s and 4s for any job we have available if, notwithstanding less experience, the best man is an FSO-3 or an FSO-4.

The President, who has been pressing vigorously for younger ambassadorial candidates, wants to review personally assignments to a number of our key positions (DCM and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels). We have to be able to show him that ability is the sole criteria as to assignments, even at this level, and that we haven't created "no poaching" preserves in the Department for part of the Foreign Service.

Finally, unless we adopt ability as the sole criteria, we are going to rule ourselves right out of the market for the most ambitious, talented and able young men graduating from colleges in the next years. I am, of course, not suggesting a preference for youth; I am saying that we will have to end discrimination against youth.

/2/Not found.

2. Several weeks ago I asked for target figures for temporary and permanent out-placement of FSOs; for proposals as to the steps we would have to take to meet these targets; and for comments on the desirability, as a first step, of setting up a separate operation in "O" to handle reimbursable assignments, training assignments, assignments with universities, etc. I want to push ahead with this promptly and would like your specific proposals.

3. If we're really going to deal with the problem of too slow advancement in the Foreign Service and if we want to increase the confidence and independence of our officers, then--far more than incentive retirement legislation--we are going to need a phenomally effective and aggressive out-placement service that can find all-but-irresistible outside opportunities for any Foreign Service Officer, but especially for those in the senior grades. Everything I hear indicates that our present operation, even expanded as it now is, is in the "horse and buggy" stage. In particular, as far as I know, we have no professional assistance and are not systematically calling on the advice and help of businessmen and educators who could assist us in setting up a truly effective operation. I would like some dramatic proposals from "O", as well as your views on whether we will not have to give some general retirement counseling to all officers of retirement age (and encouragement to many) if we are going to really deal with our present problems.

I'd like to discuss these three issues with you at your convenience next week. Then we can move on to additional personnel matters.

Washington, June 12, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo #73. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Planning in Anticipation of Foreign Crises

/2/Not printed. (Ibid., SIG Memo #71)

As you know, this directive has the effect of dissolving the Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) and placing responsibility for contingency planning and crisis management directly on the regional Assistant Secretaries of State and the IRGs. The mandate for contingency studies is broadened to encourage examination of possible political or economic crises even if involvement of United States military forces is not anticipated. These studies often may require the participation of functional bureaus, such as IO and E, as well as other government departments and agencies which are not regularly represented in the IRGs. Finally, to assist the SIG, the Political-Military Group (PMG) will be responsible for reviewing interagency studies which anticipate possible use of United States military forces in situations where the United States national security requires it.

/3/Studies in Anticipation of Foreign Crises, Quarterly Status Report, July 15, was circulated as an attachment to SIG Memo #77, 7/23/68. (Ibid., SIG Memo #77)

/4/Attached but not printed.

Washington, June 20, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Documentary Supplement, The Foreign Affairs Personnel System. No classification marking. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, known as the Herter Committee and chaired by former Secretary of State Christian Herter, was organized in 1961 at Rusk's request. Although unofficial and privately sponsored, it worked in close association with State Department officials. Its recommendations were included in its report, Personnel for the New Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962). For more information on the Herter Committee and implementation of its recommendations, see The Department of State During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, vol. I, chapter 2D, Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System, prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the State Department's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning; and John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), especially pp. 76 ff.

/2/The bill, S. 633, became law on August 20, 1968, as PL 90-494 (82 Stat. 810).

[Omitted here is the report of action taken on recommendations 9-43. Recommendations 35-43 related to AID and were not discussed in the report.]

Washington, July 15, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, BUD 1. No classification marking. Printed in the Department of State Newsletter, September 1968, pp. 12-13.

Dear Senator Jackson:

/2/Jackson requested the evaluation in a June 13 letter to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, BUD 1)

As you will see, the major thrust of my comments will indicate that I believe we need more systematic analysis of:

--the factors (including costs) upon which policy decisions are based;

--alternative courses of action and their possible consequences.

But I do not argue that when we have found a method of improving our analysis we will, thereby, have changed the world we live in. Foreign affairs is inherently an area in which there are a few absolutes and many variables. It is a field in which the measurable and quantifiable can seldom be the determining elements of a decision.

/3/For full text of the President's statement, August 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 916-917.

--identify national goals precisely;

--choose the most urgent from among those identified;

--search for alternative means of reaching those goals more effectively at least cost;

--determine accurately both the short and long term cost implications of the choice between alternatives; and

--measure the performance of programs in terms of objectives attained.

Our success in using PPB techniques will depend on staying as close to these concepts as possible. They are, after all, what we should insist upon in any well-staffed analysis of a problem for decision.

Admittedly, PPB techniques lend themselves more readily to those areas of foreign affairs that are most amenable to quantification. But they can help us arrive at a:

--better and clearer definition of our objectives;

--much more systematic analysis of priorities (getting people to put down on paper some of their often unstated assumptions);

--better interagency policy control and coordination (by looking at all US Government programs across-the-board in particular countries or areas); and

--check on past performance (by relating programs back to our objectives and then testing the validity of those objectives).

Our purpose, therefore, in examining these and other techniques is to find ways to raise issues for decision in a timely and explicit fashion, and to present alternative courses of action for decision up to the Presidential level. We also want to find ways to relate and evaluate agency programs to our over-all foreign policy objectives.

The Department of State is essentially the consumer of the programmed documentation of other agencies. We have been assigned the role by the President of coordinating the activities of other agencies. PPB documentation can become an essential tool in this coordination. By requiring an explicit statement relating the specific program to a broader foreign policy interest, PPB--properly applied--forces into the open conflicting agency objectives and thus helps the senior officers to locate, understand, and resolve these differences.

Abroad, the coordinating role is accomplished under the leadership of the Ambassador. He bears ultimate responsibility for the programs of all agencies in his country; the Washington agencies look to him-as leader of the country team--to present programs and suggestions for activities, as well as to review their effectiveness once approved.

/4/SIG Membership: Under Secretary of State (Chairman); Deputy Secretary of Defense; Chairman-JCS; Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistant to the President for NSC Affairs; Administrator-AID; Director-USIA; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; often attending-the UnderSecretaries of Treasury and Agriculture. [Footnote in the source text.]

Our main effort over the past year has been directed at producing the kind of analysis that will make for better decisions by the Secretary of State and the President. We are particularly interested in establishing guidelines and policy objectives which can then be used as a framework by the individual agencies with programs abroad.

Below the SIG level, each Assistant Secretary of State in the five geographic regions chairs an Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG), with representatives from the same agencies and departments that sit on the SIG. Our effort in the IRGs over the last year has been to make them as management-minded as possible. The natural first step has been for the interagency group to examine objectives, determine priorities and look at the cost implications of their policy choices. Once an Assistant Secretary understands that he has been given responsibility for coordinating major programs in his area, he will actively seek to create the necessary tools to do the job.

The SIG has attempted to develop statements of US policy goals and an agreed inter-agency analysis of situations in several specific geographic areas. We have--over the past year--reviewed the situation in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. When an area analysis has been discussed and agreed, it becomes the basis for the broad outlines of policy for the area. It helps the program agency to decide where to place emphasis, and what specific actions to take in support of that focus.

In the Latin American Bureau, the Assistant Secretary has set up a more formal--albeit experimental--program review system. A Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) is prepared by each of our Latin American Missions at the beginning of the calendar year. The purpose of the CASP is to:

--put together a descriptive analysis of the situation in the country;

--relate the country situation to specific US interests and objectives.

These papers--which suggest future programs and review and evaluate past programs--are then discussed in March and April by the Latin American IRG, under the Chairmanship of our Assistant Secretary. The approved paper constitutes general guidance to the separate agencies operating in that particular country. The agencies, in turn, use this guidance as they prepare their program documentation for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget.

The CASP procedure is still in the experimental state. Its strength is that it forces senior officials--first the Ambassador and then the Assistant Secretary--to review all our activities in a particular country. Such a review will, we hope, help us point our programs at key targets, thus getting at an old bug-a-boo of bureaucracy--the continuation, through inertia, of programs that are either marginally important to our purposes or, in some cases, opposed to them. It will, as well, help us link US efforts to self-help programs of recipient countries.

As a review document, the CASP is weakest in hard analysis (this may well be an inherent difficulty of applying PPB techniques to foreign affairs). To measure program effectiveness there should be a direct link between shared US-recipient country objectives. Yet, in most cases, our programs are marginal to the total effort, e.g., a small agricultural loan in a country with major agricultural deficiencies and large programs of its own. But these marginal inputs can be important, and our analytical tools ought to be designed to tell us where it is most useful to concentrate our effort. Even more important, PPB techniques should make it possible more easily to demonstrate to busy senior officials that a decision or choice is necessary on a particular issue.

I have emphasized the Latin American country review experience as an illustration of our tests of PPB-type techniques. The CASP is systematically applied to the whole area because there is the general framework of the Alliance for Progress.

Elsewhere, where we do not employ the area-wide approach, we have analyzed all our programs in particular countries in ways tailored to the particular issues involved. The most recurrent problem requiring systematic country review, for example, is a conflict between military security objectives and economic development. Where we are giving both military and economic assistance it is essential that the mix of our own efforts and the country's programs is right, and that US agencies are not pulling against one another.

In earlier years agency submissions to the BOB were reviewed by Budget Bureau officials and officials of the agency concerned. Only occasionally was State asked for guidance on matters relating to foreign policy. Last August--as a result of an agreement between the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and me--BOB and State jointly reviewed agency submissions for FY 69. We will conduct a similar review of FY 70 submissions next fall.

The documentation used in these reviews is the PPBS submission of AID, Defense, etc. But this documentation, alone, has proved insufficient for our needs. By offering alternatives, good analysis and stress on issues, PPB material can vastly improve the stuff from which policy decisions are made, but we also need an analytical brief that raises issues more starkly. Program memoranda alone do not provide the vehicles for raising policy issues--further staffing is needed. I have, therefore, set up a small staff that does for me what the staffs of the Budget Bureau Director and the AID Administrator do for them.

/5/Presumably a reference to Schelling's memorandum, PBS and Foreign Affairs, December 14, 1967, published as a Committee Print by the Senate Committee on Government Operations under the title Planning-Programming-Budgeting: PPBS and Foreign Affairs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

Finally, when I argue for a more systematic approach to policy making, this does not mean that I believe that the development of such a "system" is an end in itself. Nor do I believe that the "system" should make the policy decision. What it can do is clarify issues, thus giving the policy-maker greater confidence that he has the information necessary to make the right choice.

I personally have no fear that the use of PPB as a management tool will lead to a breakdown in human and political control of the decision-making process. Quite the contrary. What I do fear is that as our lives--and the world in which we live--become more complicated we will be overwhelmed by the very complexity we have ourselves created.

Sincerely,

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original.

Washington, November 28, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/DOC #47. Confidential. Under cover of December 4 memorandum Arthur Hartman sent copies of the SIG Staff Study to the Staff Directors for each of the 6 IRGs.

SUBJECT
The Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Coordination of Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy

/2/Annex A contains text of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 341. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.]

/3/Annex B describes major items. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.]

The SIG has operated without a new bureaucratic super-structure. Rather, it utilizes the existing staffs of the various agencies. A major part of its work is accomplished through the IRGs. But not all of its work is done through meetings--particularly meetings of the senior group. Occasionally, documents are approved simply by memorandum or telephone when there is agreement that the facts and issues are well understood and there is unanimity on the recommendations.

During its relatively brief existence, the SIG has concerned itself with major operational problems requiring immediate decision; broader questions of general policy guidance; problems of resource allocation in foreign affairs; and a number of managerial and planning functions cutting across agency lines. The product of SIG deliberation frequently has been a memorandum to the President outlining alternative courses of action. At times, consideration of an issue by the SIG has been the prelude to an NSC discussion. The SIG's operating philosophy has been to search out and articulate policy disagreements--rather than burying them in a mistaken effort at bureaucratic harmony. Its objective has been to provide the President and the Secretary of State with a greater range of facts and options on which to base final decisions.

The SIG has not attempted to cover the full range of operational and policy issues requiring interdepartmental concurrence or coordination. To do so would overwhelm it. Rather, it has been deliberately selective--dealing with those major issues where senior policy guidance is called for and leaving to other established procedures the bulk of the day-to-day interagency business. Similarly, once an issue is defined and conclusions are reached in the SIG, its disposition is returned to normal line-operating channels. The SIG continues to monitor the issue in only a general way, watching for possible changes in conditions that would render the recommendations inappropriate and ensuring that recommendations, once approved, are promptly and effectively carried out.

More specifically, the focus of the SIG's work has been on the following:

--To work toward a clearer concept of priorities--of what is essential, important, or merely desirable in United States foreign policy;

--To encourage a more critical attitude throughout the foreign affairs community towards the claims made for particular programs, activities, policies and actions;

--To stimulate more thorough, careful and considered analysis, both in Washington and in the field, of alternative courses of action before particular programs and policies are recommended for adoption;

--To give greater coherence and consistency to our numerous programs overseas, carried forward by a multiplicity of agencies;

--To encourage more and better forward planning for future contingencies and crises;

--To foster greater cost consciousness in the Department of State and focus attention on the problem of resource utilization and management across geographic and agency lines. (In this latter activity, the SIG has worked closely with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.)

Two important aspects of the SIG should also be noted--its relations to the Armed Services and to the White House. The JCS participates in its own right, both in the SIG and in the IRGs. While this has led on occasion to some debate within Defense on the primacy of the civilian voice, it has on the whole been useful to allow the JCS to express its point of view at all stages of policy making. The JCS representatives have exercised their role constructively and with discretion. (In fact, there is some evidence that the SIG/IRG structure may have been, at times, a useful tool--and catalyst--for the coordination of positions within Defense.)

The other aspect concerns relations between the SIG and the White House/NSC Staff. The SIG/IRG channel is one way in which the White House Staff keeps itself informed and influences the handling of major interdepartmental issues before they reach the NSC or the President. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of the SIG, and members of the NSC Staff sit on the IRGs. The NSC Staff has often suggested topics it would like the SIG to take up, and SIG discussion has been useful in defining an otherwise amorphous subject prior to NSC discussion. In other cases, issues are taken directly into the NSC without first going through the SIG.

The SIG is the outgrowth of efforts of the last three Presidents to prod the Secretary of State and his Department to provide leadership in the formulation of interdepartmental policies and recommendations in foreign affairs and national security policy. The foreign affairs community in Washington has come to accept--and indeed encourage--this pattern of policy formulation and review under Department of State leadership. Equally important, Chairmanship of the IRGs has enhanced the stature and authority of the regional Assistant Secretaries. This, in turn, has given them a stronger position:

--To provide more vigorous policy leadership; and,

--To approach foreign affairs programs and activities from a managerial-executive point of view.

In sum the SIG/IRG structure has played a complementary and supporting role to the Secretary of State and the NSC. It has achieved this without requiring a large additional staff. At the same time, it has been successful in easing the burdens of the White House/NSC Staff with respect to interagency coordination and follow-up, permitting them to concentrate on their principal and most important function of meeting the President's needs.

/4/Annex D contains a copy of President Kennedy's letter to all Ambassadors making these responsibilities crystal clear. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.]

The need for a focal point for foreign affairs coordination at a level below the White House has become increasingly apparent since World War II as our commitments have grown in scope and complexity. Our overseas operations, comprising a vast array of programs managed by independently constituted and sometimes competing agencies--each with a separate Congressional mandate, a separate budget, a specific policy orientation, and a somewhat different domestic constituency--demand a central point of coordination and control. The SIG offers one solution to the problem, centered on the role of the Secretary of State as the principal foreign affairs advisor to the President.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group has as its regular members:

The Under Secretary of State, Chairman
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

In addition, other departments and agencies may participate when an issue affects their interests. Treasury and Agriculture do so regularly. The Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice, NASA and the Bureau of the Budget have participated from time to time.

In the SIG as well as the IRGs, the presiding State Department officer has the role of Executive Chairman: he is empowered to rule, even in the absence of a consensus. To protect the interests of the other members, agencies may dissent from the ruling of the Chairman and force consideration of the matter to the next higher level--from an IRG to the SIG, from the SIG to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, to the President.

B. Mode of Operation

Several points are worth noting:

First, the SIG's dual function. The SIG/IRG is both an interdepartmental committee structure and a channel for the orderly interdepartmental clearance and review of important policy documentation. Meetings are generally reserved for topics where there is disagreement or the Chairman feels a discussion is needed to explore the issue. Even without a meeting, processing of a document through the SIG channel ensures that the recommendations have been reviewed in the various agencies at an appropriately high level.

Second, preparations for a SIG meeting. The emphasis is on the sharpening of issues, the identification of options for required decisions. Before the SIG meets, there is an "in-house" meeting in the State Department (including AID). Offices other than the bureau charged with operational responsibility--such as Policy Planning, L and INR--are encouraged to submit their views. Drawing on this "in-house" discussion and on informal soundings in other agencies, the SIG Staff (attached to the Under Secretary's office) prepares an "issues" paper which is circulated to SIG members. This paper focuses on the points in dispute or matters which otherwise require discussion.

Third, informality and confidentiality. These are essential if senior policy officers are to give their views openly and candidly. To this end, attendance at SIG meetings has been limited to the principals and a few aides directly concerned with the SIG. The Under Secretary of State personally has chaired all meetings. Attendance of deputies in place of the SIG principals has been the exception. The SIG Staff's record of meetings, while reporting fully on the discussion, generally avoids attribution of particular views unless the SIG member clearly enunciates an agency position. There have been very few leaks to the press. The SIG's work program--much of it highly sensitive--has remained largely unknown-as, indeed, it should.

Fourth, the question of staff support. The SIG's objective has been to mobilize the existing line-staff structure--rather than to duplicate it. Hence, the SIG Staff has been kept small, mobile, unspecialized--just large enough to meet essentially four functions, viz.:

--Monitor the foreign affairs community for significant developments warranting SIG discussion;

--Coordinate the preparation of appropriate SIG documentation;

--Draft "issues" papers for SIG meetings; and,

--Prepare appropriate records of SIG action and discussion.

This approach has had two advantages: On the one hand, it has precluded the staff from specializing along regional or functional lines, with the attendant risk that staff members would themselves become advocates of a particular point of view. On the other, it has made it more difficult for the staff members to yield to the temptation of undertaking extensive substantive work assignments on their own.

The various projects directly under SIG auspices are undertaken by ad hoc task forces and study groups. In this way, the SIG has been able to draw widely on all the agencies to assemble the best available personnel for the particular studies undertaken.

Staffing practices at the IRG level vary. In several cases, the IRG Staff Directors are drawn from the Assistant Secretary's immediate staff--usually a Special Assistant. In the others, while designations nominally vary, the IRGs in effect are supported by the existing regional policy staffs (all of which predate the SIG and the IRGs). This latter approach has considerable merit. Assistant Secretaries need a strong central regional staff office to assist them in evaluating embassy and country office recommendations and meet staff and planning functions cutting across country lines. It seems reasonable to combine this function with the staffing of the IRG.

Fifth, the SIG's relations with the IRGs. The guiding principle has been to give the IRGs as much autonomy as is compatible with overall policy control. Major issues discussed in the IRGs are submitted for review and approval to the SIG--and, where required by the importance of a subject, through the SIG to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, the President. But most of the IRG's business should be settled in that regional forum. To require submission of all IRG actions to the senior group would undercut the authority of the regional forum and make it impossible for the Assistant Secretary to settle any controversial matter at his level.

Conversely, the SIG is more than a board of review. One of its roles has been to provide leadership. The SIG raises issues on its own, and commissions studies and policy recommendations, relying on special task forces when necessary. Such an approach is compatible with an active IRG pattern so long as the IRG has the opportunity of comment and review.

/5/Viet-Nam, while not formally on the SIG agenda, has been considered regularly and systematically by an informal subcommittee of SIG members, chaired by Mr. Katzenbach and including Mr. Nitze, General Wheeler, Mr. Walt Rostow, and Mr. Helms. While not a decision-making body, this group--encouraged by the Secretary of State--has provided an important forum for the pooling of information and views and the preparation of operational recommendations to the President. [Footnote in the source text.]

The SIG's program of work can be conveniently discussed under several headings:

--"Threshold decisions": i.e., operational problems being dealt with for the first time in a particular context and having important domestic and foreign policy implications;

--Preparation for major international negotiations;

--Long-term policy guidance;

--Foreign affairs management;

--Resource allocation.

Threshold Decisions: In any evaluation of the SIG's utility, its effectiveness for dealing with important policy decisions is a key issue. As shown in Annex B, the SIG has been a useful forum for such decisions on a variety of occasions. For example:

--Before King Hassan's State visit in February 1967 the SIG considered the question of how the President might respond to the King's request for military assistance--taking into account the developing arms balance in the Maghreb and United States relations with these countries.

--In 1966, when Fiat announced plans for construction of an automobile plant in the Soviet Union, the Senior Group considered the Italian concern's request for Export-Import Bank financing of United States-made equipment which the Italians proposed to install.

--In 1967, following De Gaulle's decision to withhold delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel, the SIG considered the merits of a favorable decision on the Israeli request for United States Skyhawk aircraft and Phantom jets, taking into account the Middle East arms balance, the likely Soviet response, and the attitudes of the Congress.

--In early 1968, after an urgent request from Panama's National Guard for tear gas supplies from stocks in the Canal Zone, the SIG reviewed this matter against the background of Panama's then precarious domestic political situation (including the Presidential election and the danger of a coup--which subsequently materialized).

--Following the Tet offensive, when there was mounting concern about our knowledge of the insurgency threat in Northeast Thailand, the SIG commissioned a special study concerning the reliability of our intelligence data.

--More recently, while Jarring negotiated with Israel, Jordan and the UAR in New York, the Senior Group met with our Ambassadors to Amman and Tel Aviv to consider the future of Jarring's mission and what, if anything, the United States might do to enhance prospects for a settlement.

These examples illustrate the variety of action issues considered in the SIG. In the usual case, the result was a firm decision and recommendation. On a few occasions, the SIG felt that the decision was a marginal one between the several options and confined itself to outlining the alternatives for higher-level review.

/6/"Estimate of Major Items on SIG Agenda As of January 1, 1968"; attached but not printed.

Preparation for International Negotiations: A recent example was the package we offered Spain for a five-year renewal of our base rights facilities. As their price for renewal, the Spanish originally proposed a five-year $1 billion program of military assistance, a strengthening of the 1963 communiqu? setting forth the common security interests of the two countries and the relaxation of our controls on direct investments in Spain. The SIG recommended a counter-proposal (later approved by the President) that we hold military assistance to about $100 million but offer phasing out one of the two air bases. The Spanish Government rejected this proposal but talks are continuing. Final decisions on this matter will have to be made by the new Administration.

Long-Term Policy Guidance: The purpose of these studies has been to lay out a policy framework for specific operational decisions, reach interagency agreement on general lines of policy, and provide a critical assessment of the judgments of value and fact on which our policies are based, together with an examination of feasible alternatives.

Major studies in process or completed on behalf of the SIG include:

/7/"U.S. Policy in the Middle East," circulated to SIG member agencies on July 19. (Department of State, IRG/NEA Files: Lot 70 D 503)

/8/"Latin America, a Recommended U.S. National Strategy, April 1968," prepared by a Special State-Defense Study Group under direction of Ambassador Edwin M. Martin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: FRC 73 A 1250, Latin America 319.2 (12 Apr 68) 1968, Attachment 91)

/9/"National Policy Paper on Southern Africa," 3rd draft (Revised), November 1968, prepared by William Witman of the Policy Planning Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Memo #98)

--Review of United States worldwide overseas base requirements (reporting date December 15, 1968);

--Analysis of United States strategy in Korea and possible future alternatives (first stage completed; second stage due in early 1969).

These studies have generally revealed--as indeed they should--sharp policy differences both between and within foreign affairs agencies. An example is the proposed policy guidance towards the southern Africa region (encompassing the ten-country area south of the Congo and Tanzania): Our policy must balance conflicting interests such as our ideological commitment to human rights and racial equality, the importance of black African votes in the United Nations, and our substantial economic and logistical interests in southern Africa. Not surprisingly, different agencies with different policy perspectives strongly disagree on our priorities.

One other aspect of these studies should be noted: They are developing a genuine interdepartmental planning effort, which:

a) Is carried out by an interdepartmental staff; (In the case of the Korea Study, each of the three services as well as the JCS are represented. Analytical techniques are drawn freely from all the agencies and departments.)

b) Deals with policies and programs across agency lines (such as the mix of local military forces structures and United States deployment patterns, or the inter-relationship of political and economic development strategy).

Studies ready for review early next year include: our worldwide base requirements; the new interagency study on Korea; possibly, two new studies on Latin America.

Foreign Affairs Management: The SIG has also been a good forum for managerial problems affecting the interests of several agencies.

One task in this area is the program for the reduction of overseas personnel--directed by President Johnson as part of his balance of payments message in January 1968. The first phase of the program, which was completed last August, reduced American personnel by 18 percent and local personnel by 16 percent. Follow-on efforts to achieve additional savings continue, including possible reductions in our military assistance/advisory groups in Latin America and East Asia, and the combining of Western European MAAGs into regional units serving several countries. Finally, a study now under way examines our massive government-wide overseas reporting requirements to determine where further economies can be made.

A serious policy issue concerns United States efforts to combat insurgency situations overseas. Profiting from the experience of the past eight years in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, the SIG last spring approved new policy guidance, which reemphasized the socio-economic bases of insurgency and the need to determine whether strategic United States interests are affected. Under the new policy, the SIG must specifically review and approve those military and economic programs whose principal justification is counterinsurgency (i.e., the Foreign Internal Defense Action List). An evaluation of seven country programs justified on this basis is now under way. Recommendations for the final list will be submitted to the new Administration early next year.

Finally, the SIG also provides the steering mechanism for forward planning against contingencies and crises. Responsibility for crisis planning and management has now been lodged firmly with the regional Assistant Secretary and his IRG. The new procedures paid an early dividend when the European Bureau, using such advance planning, was able to deal quickly and effectively with the operational problems created by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A series of studies for major contingencies is now under way in the various IRGs. The more important of these will be submitted to the SIG.

Resource Allocation: Another facet of this managerial focus is the SIG's work on allocation of resources. The SIG obviously is not qualified to review technical questions of program development and effectiveness--this being the responsibility of the particular agency charged with these programs--but it is a suitable forum to consider:

a) broad choices and priorities as reflected in the allocation of appropriated funds by country, region or type of program; and,

b) the political, military and security implications of these allocations--especially the broader implications of steadily declining military and economic assistance appropriations.

To this end, the SIG and the SIG Staff have been working closely with the Bureau of the Budget. Each fall, representatives of the Bureau and the SIG Staff jointly discuss with the five regional Assistant Secretaries the budget submissions of AID, MAP, USIA, the Peace Corps and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs. Before the Budget Bureau submits its own recommendations to the President, major issues arising from these discussions are considered at a meeting of the SIG, in which the Director of the Bureau of the Budget participates.

Experience shows, in our view, that the SIG/IRG structure while by no means a panacea, can be an important instrument of policy control, both intra- and interdepartmentally. Used selectively and judiciously, it is well worth the cost in time and effort which is involved. But conversely, an attempt to expand its scope to the bulk of day-to-day interdepartmental business would produce intolerable duplication and waste.

With respect to urgent business of the day, the SIG has been most useful when dealing with "threshold" decisions, i.e., those relatively few major action issues having wide domestic and foreign policy implications.

On a problem of this nature, a properly prepared SIG meeting serves a useful purpose as a vehicle for pooling the diverse appraisals, interests, and considerations which each of the SIG principals brings to the issue. Under the best of circumstances, such a meeting refines the alternatives, options and criteria on the bases of which the Administration--often the President--must make a decision.

Experience also indicates that tabling an issue in the SIG or its regional sub-groups can be a powerful device for forcing into the open hidden disagreements--provided the members are prepared to discuss their views candidly and the Chairman is willing to sharpen the issues rather than engaging in a search for vague compromise. Furthermore, taking an issue into the SIG can--and has been--an effective way to demonstrate weaknesses in the staffing of policy recommendations and to compel operating desks to submit issues to higher policy levels for review.

Needless to say, not all meetings have been a complete success--either at the SIG or the IRG level. But this does not, in itself invalidate the concept. A meeting may be unsuccessful because the subject matter is not suited for--or does not require--a group discussion, such as when there is general agreement on the facts, appraisal and recommendations. Alternatively, preparations for a meeting may have been inadequate--or the group may have been unwilling to discuss the issue candidly. On the other hand, an inconclusive result--despite best efforts--may simply reflect the intractability of the problem--our limited understanding and knowledge about many aspects of foreign affairs and national security policy.

Most issues that come before the SIG are controversial. Therefore it should not be surprising that a good many SIG decisions have not been universally popular. The SIG has not hesitated, on a number of occasions, to rule against the recommendations of the initiating operating bureau or agency. And many of its decisions have evoked a strongly negative response from one part or another of the Washington foreign affairs community.

The SIG has devoted much time and talent to various long-term studies. Has this effort been justified?

These studies have attempted to provide both a general policy context and some specific guidance for particular operational problems. Also, they have been designed to reappraise situations, programs, and policies. The studies have not always lent themselves easily to discussion in committee. But in our view, they have confirmed the value of comprehensive planning by an integrated interdepartmental staff, at least for those countries and areas where major political, military, and economic-developmental programs and objectives are present.

In two respects, however, this planning process under SIG auspices could be improved:

--Greater care should be taken in drafting terms of reference. In several cases, the studies attempted to cover too wide an area of subject matter. A better design, a more restricted focus, might have produced better results.

--Greater thought and effort should be devoted to linking policy and program development. The general policy framework, however persuasively articulated, remains ambiguous, unless it is clearly linked to specific program objectives and these in turn form the basis for military and economic assistance plans (and, ultimately, US military planning).

(While not wanting to prejudge the final results of the follow-on work, we believe an approach notably successful in this respect is the Korea policy study undertaken on the recommendation of Mr. Vance after the Pueblo crisis.)

There are also a number of legitimate criticisms of the SIG's performance to date. Essentially, these reduce to two:

-Uneven, sometimes sporadic, coverage of issues: Many of the issues, which under orderly operating procedures should have gone through the SIG, have been handled on an ad hoc, more personal, basis. There still is considerable reluctance to take complex, highly controversial issues into the SIG. This reluctance can be seen in all the constituent agencies, including the Department of State. Senior policy officers are reluctant to do so because they believe that the SIG, even under its pres-ent restricted membership and attendance rules, is still too public and diversified a forum for the discussion of highly sensitive matters. Similarly, there frequently is resistance from working levels. Review by the SIG cuts into the desired margin of operating and policy autonomy, and it reduces flexibility in seeking a predictable, hopefully sympathetic, forum for appropriate policy review at higher levels. From the operator or country expert's point of view, the decisions taken by the SIG are somewhat unpredictable precisely because the SIG represents a pooling of broader, more varied, policy perspectives.

-The uneven performance of the IRGs: Activity in the regional interdepartmental groups has varied considerably from region to region, depending on the personality of the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, his work style, and his vigor and energy in pressing his mandate for interagency coordination. Several of the IRGs, notably those for Latin America and Near East/South Asian Affairs, have met regularly to consider virtually all the major policy issues requiring interagency consultation. Senior policy officers for these regions have developed a pattern of close cooperation across agency lines. In other regions, use of the IRG has been more limited in scope.

Some of these difficulties could be overcome by more flexible arrangements for attendance and participation. Issues are of varying interest-in terms of their statutory and policy mandate--to the SIG principals. One possibility would be to give the AID Administrator and the Director of USIA the option of not attending meetings that do not significantly affect their interests. Alternatively, the SIG might formally constitute an Executive Committee, consisting of State, Defense, JCS, CIA and the White House representative, that would deal with sensitive security and intelligence matters (similar to the informal group which now discusses Viet-Nam). Another subcommittee might deal with issues having a security-economic component (such as balance of payments implications of United States military deployments overseas).

In conclusion, the SIG can meet the responsibilities and requirements levied upon it by the Secretary of State and, ultimately, the President, both directly and in support of an active NSC, provided two conditions are fulfilled:

First, the Department of State must represent more than a parochial interest in foreign affairs: When the Department acts as Executive Chairman of the SIG/IRG, it must learn to adjust its vision to the problem of decision-making at the Presidential level.

Second, there must be clear and unambiguous encouragement and support from the highest levels of government. The mechanism cannot be really effective unless the Secretary of State and the President keep up steady pressure on the several agencies to staff recommendations through this channel.

Washington, December 23, 1968.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to William Bundy.

SUBJECT
Staff Study on the Role of the SIG

/2/Document 137.

I have only three specific comments on the paper:

/3/Part I, paragraph beginning: "Two important aspects of the SIG should also be noted?"

/4/Part II B, paragraph beginning: "Third, informality and confidentiality."

/5/Part I, paragraph beginning: "The SIG is the outgrowth of efforts of the last three Presidents?"

My own view is that the principal value of the SIG/IRG mechanism, and of the SIG's action on the IRG, derives from its catalytic function. Without exception an expression of SIG interest has resulted in more intensive efforts by EA operating levels to explore the ramifications of problems and to identify more clearly the options available. This procedure might be enhanced if the SIG staff directed more of its efforts through the IRG/EA staff (such as it is!) rather than obliquely and sometimes ambiguously to the Country Desks concerned. I would even expand the point by observing that SIG/IRG relations--both on the formal, and informal staff levels--should be a two-way street, and that past performance could certainly be improved.

Another plus is the multiplier effect resulting from SIG or IRG interest. Let me illustrate. In attempting to produce an SAFC on the Taiwan Straits, the IRG/EA discovered that greater elucidation and precision was required on certain matters involving intelligence estimates and current policy. Accordingly, the IRG/EA directed preparation of ancillary studies which will be valuable not only in preparing an SAFC on the Taiwan Straits, but in connection with a concurrent policy review on force levels and structures in Taiwan.

Finally, I would stress the usefulness of the IRG as an open forum for discussion of problems often dimly perceived. Some of the most fruitful meetings of the IRG/EA have not resulted in specific decisions or in approval of action papers, but rather have clarified and advanced collective thinking within that area of the Government charged with responsibility for U.S. policy toward East Asia.

The experience of this Bureau clearly supports the continuation and strengthening of the SIG/IRG mechanism. The imperfections of the system are as clear to us as they are to you. But the mechanism has had a rationalizing effect on the decision-making process and has helped guard against decisions flawed by imprecision or parochialism.