Documents 101-200
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 2762. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch, cleared by Bromley Smith and with AID, and approved by Talbot.
Washington, January 27, 1962, 2:57 p.m.
1505. Dept wishes take every feasible step exploit first break in impasse to achieve permanent solution. Believe your impending departure/2/ provides favorable opportunity to explore this problem and lines of resolution with Ayub. If your agenda for January 29 meeting crowded, you should seek at least one more session devoted solely to transit dispute. You will be able judge by Ayub's reaction whether you should press for some agreement in principle from GOP on possible solution or confine your efforts preparing ground for your successor. In light vigorous US effort get GOI to negotiating table on Kashmir and in wake successful consortium, seems at least possible Ayub may be in receptive mood on Afghan matter. In mentioning Kashmir and consortium, you might say you would like to leave Pakistan with at least a constructive start towards solution transit dispute. This is particularly true because of President Kennedy's deep interest in issue. It would be gratifying to be able to make favorable report upon your return to Washington.
/2/Rountree left Pakistan on February 7. He was replaced as Ambassador by Walter P. McConaughy, who was appointed on March 1 and presented his credentials on March 20.
At your discretion, present US views to Ayub in following general framework:
1. US considers temporary reopening significant break in dispute and notes with satisfaction cooperative attitude adopted by GOP. In interest of both countries, we think strenuous efforts should be made keep border open permanently on mutually acceptable basis. RGA has made forward step and we are confident GOP can also make step in return without doing damage either to its interests or public position.
2. We are increasingly concerned over way Soviets are exploiting situation. In addition to Soviet gains previously cited, we now have reliable reports of significant increase in Soviet activity with Afghan armed forces. All this helps no one but the Soviets. US belief has been strongly reinforced that best way to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan is with vigorous US presence exemplified by US assistance programs.
3. Before going into specifics regarding possible solutions, at this point you should request Ayub give his present views on situation.
4. If Ayub still appears adamant on possible new moves toward Afghanistan, you should urge him at least make early appropriate public statement expressing his pleasure that border is open for aid goods and reaffirming GOP position on Afghan right of transit.
5. If Ayub appears receptive to discussing ways keeping border open, you should outline proposal in following paragraph and say you are prepared discuss details later at working level.
6. One major obstacle in resolving present impasse is RGA insistence on having Afghan officials performing freight forwarding duties in Pakistan and GOP refusal allow RGA reopen trade agencies and consulates on previous basis because of improper activities reportedly carried out by previous officials. US suggests some arrangement by which GOP would permit small offices officially designated as Freight Forwarding Offices be opened in Peshawar and Quetta manned by Afghan officials with consular status but not designated as consuls. In granting exequaturs, GOP would exercise sovereign right of determining whether any particular official acceptable. It would be understood from outset that if offices functioned mutually satisfactorily for reasonable length of time--e.g., six months--they would be expanded to perform full consular services and redesignated consulates with freight forwarding sections. Trade agencies as previously constituted, would never be reopened, and all functions would be integrated in one office. Again providing everything went smoothly, after reasonable period offices in Chaman and Parachinar might be reopened. US believes foregoing plan would protect GOP security interests and allow RGA retain enough of its public position to accept safeguarding restrictions implicit in exequatur process. At some point in proceedings resumption diplomatic relations would be presumed./3/
/3/Rountree saw Ayub on January 30 and discussed the transit dispute along the lines of the instructions in this telegram. He found Ayub adamant against the idea of establishing freight forwarding stations in Peshawar and Quetta, but willing to consider issuing a statement expressing pleasure that the border had been reopened. (Telegram 1300 from Karachi, January 31; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1 - 3161)
Ball
102. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 2962. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
New Delhi, January 29, 1962, 4 p.m.
2243. Deptel 2541./2/ Desai called me in 3 p.m. today and handed me copy Nehru's reply to President dated January 27. Letter three pages long and contains fourteen paragraphs. In order provide Department soonest with substance of reply, quoted below in full are first two paragraphs and also paragraphs 9 through 14. Paragraphs 3 through 8 are largely historical recital and will be sent in separate telegram./3/
/2/In telegram 2541 to New Delhi, January 28, the Department requested that the Embassy cable the full text or excerpts of the letter from Nehru to Kennedy, which the Embassy had previously indicated had been sent to the Indian Embassy in Washington for delivery to the White House. (Ibid., 690.91/1 - 2862)
/3/Telegram 2247 from New Delhi, January 29. (Ibid, 690D.91/1 - 2962) The full text of the letter is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, India, Security, 1962.
Begin text
[This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government.]
Timmons
103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 3162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Talbot and Horgan, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Manfull (S/S). Also sent to Karachi and USUN.
Washington, January 31, 1962, 12:42 p.m.
2576. President had hour's talk with BK Nehru this afternoon when latter presented Nehru letter stating impossibility GOI accept Black mission. President expressed his keen disappointment, pressed Ambassador as to whether this final word from GOI, which latter claimed was case. At end talk, question of statement to press arose, with problem its negativeness on basis latter. President inquired whether statement could not be withheld here, and GOI itself make statement. He suggested elements for inclusion in such statement as follows: appreciation US concern; admiration for Black; preference for bilateral negotiations; renewal of invitation to Ayub, if possible with Nehru statement he willing meet Ayub anywhere on this problem. Ambassador promised cable Delhi at once urging such GOI statement. USG will withhold statement on meeting with President until reply received.
Ball
104. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/2 - 2362. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi and USUN.
New Delhi, February 23, 1962, 6 p.m.
2621. Ambassador Bowles accompanied by Ambassador Galbraith called on Prime Minister Nehru this noon./2/ RK Nehru, MJ Desai also present Bowles used occasion to give Prime Minister account of political situation in Iran and more briefly on Ethiopia including meeting of Economic Committee for Africa. Emphasis in the discussion on prospects for land and other reforms, more liberal policies in two countries and better balance between economic and military aid. Discussion then shifted to Communist china where Indians share view that food situation is extremely serious and related to organic problems in agricultural organization complicated by rapid increase in population. Passing discussion of possibility of Chinese approach to US for food grains and whether this could be made part of bargain [apparent omission] tension should it come about. In response to direct question by Galbraith Prime Minister said there had been no move by Chinese to resume discussion of the Northern Frontier but in recent weeks the tone of other Chinese communications had become markedly more conciliatory. Bowles took occasion to stress our desire to avoid UN ruckus on Kashmir, relating this to the considerable feeling in US that India and Pakistan were using American aid to arm against each other. Prime Minister noted they had no desire for UN debate and added that Dayal had gone back to Karachi with instructions to renew invitation to Ayub to come to New Delhi for talks after the election. Galbraith noted that we would undoubtedly continue to stress with Pakistanis that this was fruitful alternative to New York debate.
/2/Bowles visited South Asia during a trip that included stops in Africa, the Near East, and East Asia. The trip began on February 8 and concluded on March 19 following Bowles' participation in meetings in Tokyo of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Bowles visited India February 23 - 27, Afghanistan February 27 - March 2, and Paki-stan March 2 - 5.
Discussion touched on other topics including East Pakistan dissent, problems of population policy and election. Atmosphere amiable and provided useful occasion for getting across number of important American views.
Galbraith
105. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 3/1/62 - 3/31/62. Secret. Drafted by Grant. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)
Washington, February 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
Courtesy Call on the President by Ambassador Nehru
PARTICIPANTS
HE B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
The President
James P Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
The courtesy call on the President by Ambassador Nehru before his departure for two weeks' consultation in India started with a brief discussion of Mrs. Kennedy's trip to India/2/ and of the Indian elections. The President then raised the subjects of Kashmir, Vietnam and the resumption of nuclear testing.
/2/Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy represented the President on a trip to India and Pakistan in March. She visited India March 13 - 20 and Pakistan March 21 - 26. Extensive documentation on the trip is in Department of State, Central File 711.11 - KE. See also the full account of the India segment of the trip in John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal (Boston: Houghton - Mifflin, 1969), pp. 275 - 289.
The President asked about the possibility of a meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub on the Kashmir problem. The Ambassador stated that he had seen an unconfirmed press report that President Ayub had accepted the Prime Minister's invitation for direct talks between them and expressed his personal view that such a meeting would be helpful. He then noted that the Kashmir problem impinged on the broader subject of US - Indian relations. The Ambassador said that the major positive factor working for an improvement in relations between the United States and India is American economic aid to India. However, the appreciation for this assistance was more on an intellectual level and actions on an emotional level frequently had a greater impact on relations between countries.
At the emotional level, in his judgment, there were two factors working against improved US - Indian relations. One was of a temporary nature and the other of a longer-run nature. He stated that the temporary reaction in the United States and in Western Europe against the takeover of Goa by India was being widely misinterpreted in India. Indian public opinion is virtually unanimous in the conviction that the Indian action with respect to Goa was right, and the adverse reaction in the United States and Western Europe was being interpreted as support for colonialism. The longer-run problem was the image in the Indian public mind that the United States was giving preferential treatment to Pakistan and the United States through its military support to Pakistan has caused a diversion of Indian resources to defense. This latter problem is further complicated by Kashmir and the Pakistani actions on this subject in the Security Council. The Indian public has the image of United States support to Pakistan on this issue and of Soviet support to India. Furthermore, the Ambassador concluded, as matters now stand, India needs the support of the USSR veto in the Security Council on Kashmir.
The President replied that while we do not support Pakistan per se as a matter of principle in the Security Council on Kashmir, we are aware of the problems that the raising of this issue in the Security Council causes for us and that is a major reason for our reluctance to see the issue debated in the United Nations. On the question of military assistance to Pakistan, the President said it would be better in many ways if all our aid to Pakistan were in the form of economic assistance as it is to India. However, this is not possible for a number of reasons, a major one being that the Executive Branch cannot get enough money out of Congress for economic assistance.
The President noted that the reactions in this country on Goa have been intensified by the preacher role adopted by India on many international issues, and by Krishna Menon in particular. He said, also, that we are in a very difficult position with Portugal because of our statements on Angola and Goa. He noted that the Azores was the site of extremely important facilities for the United States and there were many in the United States who could not understand our jeopardizing such vital facilities for such apparently remote issues as Angola. He thought that the reaction on Goa was now becoming gradually a matter of the past in the United States and hoped that Mrs. Kennedy's trip to India would serve as a major antidote there.
The Ambassador stated that his government had noted and was appreciative of the President's public stance on Goa. His Government also recognized the importance of the Azores facilities to the United States. He expressed the hope that the President and his staff could allay the adverse Congressional reaction to the Goa takeover. The President said it would be most helpful with Congress if Krishna Menon would tone down his statements and actions which create such resentment here.
The President then stated that we would like nothing better than to withdraw from South Vietnam and return to the Geneva Accords but this would be possible only if North Vietnam would withdraw from South Vietnam. As it now stands, we have no alternative to our present military support and cannot disengage until we see the situation improve in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated that we are conscious of the dangers involved in the steps we are now taking in South Vietnam, but we are also conscious of the dangers of non-action.
On the subject of United States resumption of nuclear testing, the President stated a decision was imminent. He noted that unless the Soviets are willing to sign a test treaty of the type presented in April we have no alternative but to resume testing. In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether such tests by the United States were necessary for military purposes, the President replied strongly in the affirmative.
106. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5/3 - 362. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, and Manila for Bowles.
Kabul, March 3, 1962, 2 p.m.
529. On March 1 Ambassador Bowles interviewed Prime Minister Daud and also had talks with Minister Finance Malikyar and Minister of Mines Yusuf./2/
/2/In telegram 527 from Kabul, March 2, Bowles reported on his meetings on February 28 with King Zahir, Foreign Minister Naim, and Minister of Commerce Sherzad. (Ibid., 123 - Bowles, Chester) Bowles summarized his conversations in Kabul and his impressions of the situation in Afghanistan in airgram A - 359 from Karachi, March 6. He emphasized what he saw as the danger that Afghanistan had become "the immediate target for a totally new experiment in Soviet expansionism." (Ibid., 611.89/3 - 662)
In hour and quarter talk with Daud, Bowles gave tour d'horizon stating administration desire reassess problems troubling Asia and Middle East. Re Pakistan Bowles discussed generally theory underlying US military commitments saying that while some had advocated these commitments as essential offset to Soviet pressure, others had feared they might upset regional balance. Any event commitments had been made and must be honored although relative emphasis on economic and military aspects may gradually be changed.
As Daud clearly preferred leave initiative to Bowles to guide conversation latter then moved into specific fields. Discussed historic Afghan devotion to independence and neutrality and hard lessons of Afghan history. Alluding to current problem re transit, Bowles discussed in general terms possible Iranian routes and asserted desire help in Afghan second 5-year plan provided outlook for success of US effort and Afghan independence reasonably favorable. Said while he knew every effort would be made ensure US money would be well spent, there was concern in US over large number Russians in Afghanistan. Stated US does not desire enter bidding game against Soviets. Gave personal conviction that although Afghans have no intention of permitting Soviets take advantage Afghanistan, pressures may increase.
Daud repeated Afghan position that neutrality best policy for this country and that Afghan problems stemmed from area imbalance brought on by US military assistance to Pakistan stating in 1955. Hoped new administration would carefully study implications. Happy with Iranian cooperation and badly needs additional transit route but regards Pak route as vitally important. Said there no change RGA position on principle involved since Merchant mission.
Daud stressed Pushtunistan life and death issue. Pak pressures unbearable for Afghans and effects Pak policies extend far beyond Afghanistan. Reminded Bowles US arms being used by GOP contrary to stated US objectives and that it was these US weapons that had forced Afghanistan to go to Moscow for help after being refused US military help several years ago.
Bowles stressed US influence with GOP marginal and argued for gradual approach in resolving difficulties. US aid to GOP does not buy right to order GOP any more than Soviet aid to Afghanistan buy right to order RGA. Emphasized need for gradual reopening Pak route to meet needs presently beyond capacity Iranian routes. Daud agreed time heals many wounds but said Pak actions deliberately invite reaction and will continue do so regardless what government rules Afghanistan. "These problems cannot be solved by conceit or force." Bowles repeated hope partial crack in door might be widened order help those who want help Afghanistan.
Warming up, Daud vigorously and pithily restated Afghan position: (1) RGA conceded no fault of it sown in current transit crisis which resulted from Pak action motivated by Ayub's conceit; (2) prime consideration in current temporary partial border opening was appreciation American help and friendship and desire not require US undertake circuitous re-routing goods in Pakistan; (3) Afghanistan has access through Soviet and Iran and even allowing for initial problems in utilization, Iranian route is still cheaper than Pak route; (4) RGA position on principles has not changed; (5) RGA needs aid from US and asked information year ago re overall future magnitude but still no answer. Any case this question separate from issues of principle or national honor which are difficult if not impossible to compromise.
Shifting topic Bowles remarked RGA understands US objectives and US understands Afghan objectives and asked Daud's view Soviet objectives here. Daud smilingly side stepped question admitting it difficult know basis Soviet objectives but so far Soviet behavior above reproach. Any event Afghanistan has not agreed nor would it agree accept Soviet programs based on objectives inconsistent Afghan independence. Daud again deplored fact military imbalance in area forced RGA devote considerable resources to military development which economically unproductive. While agreeing with Afghan motives and historical knowledge of Russians Bowles reminded Daud Soviet Russians today much more skillful, subtle and competent than Czarists a century ago.
In departing Bowles deliberately but casually suggested regional problems might be ultimately solved by containing them within larger framework as France and Germany had submerged their historic differences over Saar and Alsace under umbrella Common Market. Similarly common interests Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and even India might be linked in some common market and arms control agreement which could help reduce present tensions in this area. Without commenting in detail Daud responded with rather surprising sympathy and expressed hope future might make such development practicable.
Main part of discussion with Malikyar devoted Helmand Valley development with Malikyar stating Afghan desires complete projects underway, increase production in developed areas by introduction machinery, fertilizer industry more electric power and new settlers. Bowles agreed mechanization might be desirable in such a thinly populated area where according Malikyar farmers average 50 acres per family. In discussing Iranian transit routes Malikyar especially interested in Shahbehar route but acknowledged advantages Bandar Abbas route. Agreed with need for reopening traditional Pak route which Afghans do not want to lose. Other hand he referred to Pak pressure which suddenly destroyed normal relations. Bowles emphasized US cannot control Paks but can only offer moderating counsel.
Following brief discussion second five-year plan Bowles said US desirous help Afghanistan in its plan but does not desire simply enter into an escalating competition with Soviets. If US could be sure that Soviet presence in Afghanistan could be stabilized and not allowed to increase endlessly and that there would be genuine effort to establish businesslike relationships with Paks Bowles would personally be inclined recommend that US help Afghanistan to exercise its right of free choice. While there is a risk such statement might be misunderstood as pressure in support Pak position on transit, Bowles felt there was justification for advancing this rather strong medicine. Malikyar demurred and commented Afghanistan would never submit pressure, was devoted to raising standard living, had provided Embassy information re development plans and would appreciate help.
In talk with Yusuf second five-year plan outlined in terms major financing components with reiteration RGA desire for some indication magnitude future US aid. Bowles outlined criteria on which countries divided in categories for determining whether suitable for long term commitments or modified commitments or project-by-project approach. Relationship Iranian and Pak routes discussed along lines indicated previously. Bowles drew attention risks dependence on USSR and described present Soviet low gear but massive approach Afghanistan as unique in world. We are concerned Soviet may gradually gain dominant influence through increasing number of people, ultimately resulting in absorption Afghanistan. Yusuf nodded understandingly and strongly emphasized Afghan determination secure its independence and explained reasons for avoiding alliances.
Comment: Afghans accorded Bowles a notably friendly and warm reception. They listened to his description of US policies with great interest and were generally responsive in conversation. Apart from discussions of specific topics believe Bowles visit was deeply appreciated by RGA as evidence US interest in Afghanistan and its problems. In responding to Bowles remarks on Afghan - Pak questions including transit impasse, Afghan leaders were particularly cautious to avoid saying anything which might compromise their position. Nevertheless, I believe Bowles comments on importance of fully opening Pak route and on importance maintaining 3 practical routes including Pak route did not fall on deaf ears. In his talks he sowed several seeds but given stoniness of Afghan political soil I expect it will be a few weeks before we will be able to observe any sprouting.
Hannah
107. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/3 - 362. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi.
Karachi, March 3, 1962, 5 p.m.
1509. From Bowles. Re New Delhi's 2621,/2/ 2684, 2685 and 2686./3/ Subsequent to first conversation with Nehru already reported in reference telegrams, I met in New Delhi with Nehru a second time, with Foreign Secretary Desai, General Kaul, Finance Minister Morarji Desai and (unexpectedly) Krishna Menon (at latter's request). Here is brief resume of pertinent points. (Details by Airgram):/4/
/2/Document 104.
/3/Telegrams 2684, 2685, and 2686, all dated February 27, reported on a conversation that Bowles and Galbraith had that morning with M.J. Desai. Telegram 2684 dealt with developments in Southeast Asia; telegram 2685 dealt with the Kashmir problem; and telegram 2686 dealt with Nepal. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/2 - 2762)
/4/Airgram A - 354 from Karachi, March 6, reported Bowles' second conversation with Nehru on February 26. He also met with Kaul on February 24, Morarji Desai on February 26, and Menon on February 27. (Ibid., 611.91/3 - 662)
1. Southeast Asia: All Indian officials with whom I talked endorsed our present efforts in Laos and suggest that political settlement in South Vietnam may become possible if a neutral and independent Laos can be fully established. Even Menon strongly approved Harriman's efforts in Geneva and felt it could have broader implications. MJ Desai believes that if Laos settlement achieved it may be possible persuade Hanoi to agree to ease pressure on South Vietnam. He convinced continuing deepseated North Vietnamese suspicions of Chinese intentions strong restraining factor on all-out North Vietnamese effort. This impresses me as wishful thinking but the view is strongly held.
2. Kashmir: Indians appear reluctant take advantage present Pak difficulties over East Bengal and Afghanistan since they convinced Ayub may be more rather than less difficult deal with if his sense of insecurity grows and his other difficulties increase. Nehru hopeful Ayub will respond constructively to invitation visit India although not optimistic. Nehru convinced further UN discussion will be futile exercise from Pak point of view, and will demonstrate to Ayub his lack of support among Asians and Africans generally.
Comment: My impression is that possibility exceedingly slim achieving any real progress on Kashmir in immediate future unless Ayub becomes convinced by his other difficulties that time has come to cut his losses.
3. Chinese Communists: All Indians with whom I spoke and particularly Nehru showed deep appreciation Chinese threat. General Kaul asked me bluntly in great confidence whether we would come to India's aid in event open ChiCom armed invasion. I assured him that in my opinion we would do so. Kaul then urged that we engage in secret conversations with Indian military on contingency plans for such an eventuality, possibly under cover of three or four day visit New Delhi by some high level US military figure. In response my questions, Kaul insisted such talks should take place even if not fully sanctioned by Menon and/or Nehru. I suggested he pursue subject with Galbraith.
Comment: I was at first skeptical of Kaul's approach, thinking he may have been carrying out some obscure Menon play. However, was assured in New Delhi that Kaul has been showing more and more self-assurance and independence vis-a-vis Menon in recent months and appears to have confidence of the Prime Minister. Approach therefore may have been sincere, and should be given serious consideration.
4. My overriding impression was of tremendously increased Indian self-confidence, both in economic field and vis-a-vis China. Country is moving forward in economic field rapidly; increased decentralization of real political power to elected councils at village level achieved during last two-three years is very impressive sign of progress; problems in many areas which appeared to Indians almost insurmountable only three or four years ago are now being tackled vigorously. In the international field this confidence is greatly bolstering India's resolve vis-a-vis Chinese.
Hall
108. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3 - 462. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.
Karachi, March 4, 1962, 8 p.m.
1523. Embassy telegram 1520./2/ Ambassador Bowles reviewed India - Pakistan relations with Ayub and MEA officials in separate meetings yesterday. Ayub expressed views similar those recent letter President Kennedy concerning Nehru and India,/3/ but indicated he might be prepared meet Nehru on Kashmir if fruitful preliminary meeting first held at official or ministerial level to prepare basis discussion.
/2/Telegram 1520, March 4, reported that, in addition to problems relating to Pakistan's relations with India and Afghanistan, Ayub and Bowles had also discussed a draft of a constitution for Pakistan and their differing perspectives on policy toward China. (Ibid., 123 - Bowles, Chester)
/3/An apparent reference to Document 83.
Ambassador Bowles pressed Ayub and MEA officials to engage immediately direct talks on grounds atmosphere reasonably favorable and 50 - 50 odds Nehru may be forthcoming in discussions. He also urged MEA officials not to press for SC meeting and suggested reliance direct talks in lieu such effort. Foreign Secretary Dehlavi stated emphatically GOP intends press for SC consideration.
Tone Ayub's remarks about Nehru and deep suspicions of Indian long term intentions revealed by Ayub and MEA officers not encouraging, but suggestion preparatory talks at official or ministerial level may offer some hope if specific and satisfactory response forthcoming from Indians.
Full airgram report follows./4/
/4/Airgram A - 358 from Karachi, March 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3 - 662) Airgram A - 357 from Karachi, March 6, reported on Bowles' discussions with Ayub and other Pakistani officials concerning Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. Bowles reviewed his conversations in Kabul, and expressed his concern about increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Ayub shared this concern and agreed that the restoration of normal relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan was important, but he felt that normal relations would be impossible until Afghanistan ceased agitation on the Pushtunistan issue. (Ibid., 611.89/3 - 662)
Hall
109. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 212. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on March 7, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NIE 37 - 62
Washington, March 7, 1962.
AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION/2/
/2/We believe that the fairly detailed analysis and estimate of the internal political situation in Afghanistan which is contained in Section I of NIE 53 - 59, "The Outlook for Afghanistan," dated 22 September 1959, remains valid and that there is little of importance that could be added to it at the present time. [Footnote in the source text NIE 53 - 59 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, pp. 287 - 292.]
The Problem
To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan's international position during the next few years.
Conclusions
1. The relative weight of Soviet influence in Afghanistan has grown in recent years and Afghanistan has been increasingly isolated from the West. These developments have been greatly facilitated by the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan, in which the USSR has emerged as Afghanistan's principal source of diplomatic support. The Bloc has also been the sole supplier of large quantities of arms and a,heavy investor in Afghan economic development. Although there is little reason to believe that the USSR will seek to cash in on its investment at an early date, it is now virtually assured of having the dominant foreign influence on Afghanistan's future. (Paras. 15 - 17, 21 - 24)
2. At the same time, Afghanistan will remain deeply concerned with the preservation of its independence and will continue to exercise its considerable skill in hedging Soviet influence. While probably already convinced that the US role will be a secondary one, Kabul will continue eager for US aid and maintenance of the US presence. In general, we are likely to have with us for a considerable future time an Afghanistan very like that we have known for the past few years. (Paras. 21, 24)
[Here follows a 5 - page discussion section and a 2 - page annex entitled "Pushtunistan."]
110. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 3/62. Secret.
Washington, March 13, 1962.
McGB:
FYI, our efforts resolve Pak/Afghan transit dispute entering new phase. With eight-week temporary border opening expiring 29 March, State has told Embassy Karachi to approach Paks on formula for extending interim agreement several months./2/ (1) US expediters would continue at border posts; (2) Paks would allow Afghan trade commission in Karachi to document transit traffic (we think Paks would buy this); (3) pressure on both sides to explore resumption diplomatic relations and re-opening of consulates (this will be tougher nut, since it related more to Pushtoon issue itself than transit).
/2/Telegram 1788 to Karachi, March 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 989.7190D/2 - 2762)
Above makes sense. I've kept gentle needle in on not losing transit time left to us. If above succeeds we've bought a little more time. But the big questions remain-how do we damp down overall dispute and how much do we spend in effort keep Afghanistan from being swallowed up. I'm still plugging.
Bob K.
111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 66 D 415, Kashmir, January - April 1962 (Miscellaneous Papers). Secret. Drafted in NEA by Horgan, Grant, and James M. Ludlow, and in IO/UNP by Michael Newlin.
Washington, March 16, 1962.
SUBJECT
Suggested Next Steps to be Taken by the U.S. Government in the Kashmir Dispute
Discussion:
At the present moment the Pakistan Government is considering whether to accept Prime Minister Nehru's invitation to President Ayub to come to Delhi, possibly in April, to discuss Kashmir. This invitation was conveyed by Rajeshwar Dayal, Indian High Commissioner in Karachi, on March 1 and allows for lower-level preliminary talks if desired by Pakistan. At the same time, Zafrullah Khan has indicated to us in New York that Pakistan intends to raise the question again in the Security Council "sometime this month," a move which Pakistan states can be carried on in parallel with bilateral discussions with India. The Pakistan Embassy had requested a meeting with the Secretary for the Pakistan Ambassador and Zafrullah this week. In the Secretary's absence, the meeting would be with you. The first mutually convenient time, however, will not be until March 19 or later.
With the recent Presidential initiative on Kashmir, repeated expressions of American concern over the problem by the President, the Secretary and others, the completion of the Indian elections, and the publication of Ayub's Constitution, we believe a possibility exists for meaningful improvement in Indo - Pakistan relations through bilateral discussions on the Kashmir problem. We also believe a simultaneous consideration of this problem in the Secretary Council would be counterproductive and should be discouraged by us.
We, therefore, recommend the following sequence of actions by the U.S. Government. (A more detailed report of recent actions is attached as Tab B.)/2/
/2/Not printed.
Recommendations:
1. That we continue to indicate privately to both the Indian and Pakistan Governments our belief that they should and can at the present time carry on meaningful and productive discussions about Kashmir bilaterally. Ayub should be urged to respond favorably to Nehru's invitation for direct Indo - Pakistan talks. Nehru, in turn, should be urged to respond favorably to any reasonable modifications proposed by Ayub.
2. That while making clear to the Pakistanis that the decision of whether they should press for an early Security Council consideration of the Kashmir issue is one for them to make, we should emphasize to Pakistan our conviction that a Security Council meeting prior to or during bilateral talks would jeopardize the prospects for any real progress in this dispute and would further diminish what minimal support there is for an attempted revival of the UNCIP resolution and Graham's recommendations concerning their implementation.
3. That the U.S. remain alert to identify opportunities whereby we can extend our informal good offices to both parties to get the talks started and to increase the prospects of success once begun. These informal good offices can be carried out through our Embassies in the two capitals, the Department in Washington, and senior U.S. officials traveling in the area.
4. That, if bilateral discussions fail to take place or are unproductive, we again offer U.S. good offices or assist the two countries to find a third party who may be able to assist them in achieving an acceleration of the Kashmir question.
5. That if progress is not manifestly forthcoming in the bilateral talks and the lack of progress is not attributable to Pakistan, should Pakistan--despite the risks and disadvantages inherent in renewing debate in the Security Council--decide on such a course of action, we would be prepared to support the UN resolutions, as the President has indicated.
6. That, subject to your approval of the foregoing, we (a) inform our Embassy in Karachi of the prospective next steps, (b) inform the Pakistan Embassy here that we are prepared to talk to Zafrullah and the Ambassador at their earliest convenience the week of March 19,/3/ (c) convey the substance of our position to Zafrullah at that time, and (d) instruct the Embassy in Karachi now to make points (a), (b) urging Pakistani agreement to bilater talks and, if asked point (c) in the draft telegram (attached, Tab A)/4/ which is submitted for your approval./5/
/3/Ball discussed the Kashmir issue with Ahmed on March 28 along the lines of the recommendations outlined in this memorandum. (Telegram 1994 to Karachi, March 28; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3 - 2862) Rusk discussed Kashmir with Zafrullah on April 12; see Document 114.
/4/Sent as telegram 1966 to Karachi, March 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3 - 2462)
/5/A handwritten note at the end of the source text reads: "All recommendations initialed 'Approved' by Ball 3/24/62."
112. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 3/62. Secret.
Washington, March 19, 1962.
McGB:
Bowles worth reading on US policy toward Afghanistan/2/ (after he returns next Thursday I presume he'll want to talk with JFK on several such matters).
/2/Reference is to the assessment of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan that Bowles sent from Karachi after his visit to Afghanistan. (Airgram A - 359 from Karachi, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/3 - 662)
He makes a powerful case for major US effort to compete with Soviets, e.g., $150 million in development aid over next five years, developing alternative Iranian transit route, and some passenger and cargo aircraft pronto. He justifies all this by stressing the critically adverse effect: on our positions in Iran and Pakistan if Afghans slip behind the Curtain.
Big problem is not whether to invest this much in gamble to keep Afghan free. It is whether to do so until transit issue resolved and Afghans calm down on Pushtunistan. So long as they press this, they tend to force us to back our Pak allies, thus forcing Kabul in turn to rely even more on Bloc support.
Ayub of course advocates scaring Afghans; while granting that if Afghans fell under Soviet control, Iran would soon follow and Pakistan would be in serious difficulty, he thinks Daud will open his eyes to this threat only if West steps back a bit and causes him to feel pressure of full Soviet embrace. Bowles argues that such a policy would merely thrust Afghans even more rapidly into Soviet hands. It is remotely possible that Ayub (a Pathan himself) may have a better idea of how to play his countrymen than we do.
Regardless of this alternative, however, we ought to face up to Afghan aid question shortly, perhaps even using aid prospect directly as lever toward resolving transit impasse. I've talked with Talbot, but you may also want to raise at Planning Lunch.
Bob K.
113. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 869.90D/3 - 2862. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, and Jidda.
Kabul, March 28, 1962, 7 p.m.
565. I was called by Foreign Minister Naim this morning at 11:30. In hour and quarter interview considerable serious ground covered. Will confine this message to subject of restitution normal relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and more immediate aspects of transit crisis.
Naim said Prime Minister and Cabinet had given full consideration to my presentation and recommendations (Embtels 554/2/ and 559/3/ to Department). At outset he said he could not emphasize too strongly how much RGA appreciated US efforts bring about reconciliation. Our good offices activities vital and he trusted we would not abandon them. He reiterated this point at least three times during conversation.
/2/In telegram 554, March 24, Steeves reported that he had called on Naim that morning to review the transit impasse. He noted that during the 8-week period that the border had been open, some 26,000 tons of U.S. aid material had been transferred into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The border was scheduled to close again on March 29. Steeves stated that as much as 225,000 tons of additional material would have to be brought in to complete the currently committed development projects in Afghanistan. He argued that, while some of the supplies could be brought in through Iran, it was essential to continue to use the route through Pakistan in order to meet the goals of the projects. Steeves added that the United States was prepared to continue to exercise its good offices to try to facilitate a settlement of the impasse. (Ibid., 611.89/3 - 2462)
/3/In telegram 559, March 26, Steeves reported on a conversation with Daud that morning. Steeves brought up the demarche he had made to Naim on March 24 concerning an extension of the opening of the border with Pakistan. Daud did not respond definitively to the demarche but, like Naim, he indicated that no progress in the dispute with Pakistan was possible until Pakistan took the initiative to reverse the decision that had caused the dispute. (Ibid., 689.90D/3 - 2662)
As base for his response to me he said that all must understand that should Pakistan and Afghanistan fail in mending relations both would be ultimate losers. RGA fully recognized this; Pakistan must also understand. This view unassailable whether considered from historic, economic, ethnic or cultural viewpoint.
He then launched into careful and detailed reply which he said was final. Minimum upon which RGA willing re-establish relations with Pakistan and of course raise all restriction with respect to matters of transit was re-establishment of Consular and trade agency offices on basis status quo ante. He said firmly that there was no point in attempting begin on basis of trade commission in Karachi with possibilities of gradual expansion. A return of these offices was symbolic restitution their transit rights. These rights must be immune from political considerations. Further the restitution was only proper in view of fact that Pakistan had taken initiative in dosing these agencies and Consulates without due recourse to unilaterally recognized diplomatic usage. He said it was interesting to note that when Pakistan committed this discourteous and undiplomatic act it did not even inform the United States before doing it. If Pakistan were willing to restore these offices, Afghanistan willing reciprocate by allowing establishment similar Pakistani offices in Afghanistan. If such gesture forthcoming RGA would be willing act immediately to restore transit, allowing details in connection with re-establishment of relations to follow in train. (In subsequent telephone conversation with Hannah, Etemadi elaborated sequence of steps implicit in above sentences as follows: (1) Decision by GOP to restore offices existing before last August; (2) RGA immediate action to resume transit; (3) arrangement of details regarding restoration trade and Consular offices within reasonable time; (4) after actual restoration these offices resumption diplomatic relations.) He pointed out that trade commission in Karachi was no new idea as this had been suggested before even during Merchant visit. It would not accomplish what was required and was therefore unsatisfactory and unpromising.
With respect to entire Pushtunistan issue which was discussed at considerable length he insisted this question must be treated as subject by itself, and item for continuing negotiation with the Pakistanis (and by implication with tribal leaders themselves). But difference of opinion on this subject must bear no relationship to permanent transit rights and minimum facilities to maintain that right. He emphasized Afghanistan had no territorial ambitions and made it clear that in holding views they do with respect to welfare of Pushtuns, they did not claim that answer to this problem lay in direct or indirect affiliation with Afghanistan.
So far as closure of border is concerned it will become effective 6 p.m. Thursday March 29. No regular transit of goods will be allowed beyond that point. Diplomatic goods will be subject special permission on basis notification but he indicated that it would not extend to goods other than those considered as personal effects of diplomats. He further asked that no pipeline of supply be allowed to build up backlog in Pakistan until position clarifies. Other items raised during the conversation will be reported in subsequent messages.
Comment and recommendation: There is little doubt in my mind that this is firm decision of RGA and that Naim was speaking on Cabinet instruction.
Nur Ahmed Etemadi was present to be sure there was no misunderstanding in language and careful notes were kept of everything the Foreign Minister told me. It is my considered opinion that Daud government thinks it knows the risks involved and is quite willing to face consequences in pursuit of policy set forth by Naim today. At same time I believe there would be a great sigh of relief if Pakistan could see its way clear to move in this rather far reaching, rather dramatic and probably unexpected act of restoring permission for the establishment of these Consulates and trade agencies.
When I consider far-reaching possible results to free world interests in this area and especially to Pakistan I cannot do otherwise than recommend that we urge Pakistan muster necessary courage, imagination and far sighted self-interest to thus restore her influence in this area. As all concerned will of course know, I make this recommendation with no history of prejudice or lack of understanding of Pakistan's position in our free world affiance and certainly with no disregard for its immediate self-interest. If this moment in history is allowed to pass and Afghanistan thus forced or encouraged to strengthen her orientation elsewhere the non - Communist neighbors in this area will lose far more than they possibly can [gain] through this relatively harmless concession.
I have been much impressed by my recent conversations with German Ambassador who is very strongly of opinion that some dramatic move is needed now to stop the drift in the inevitable direction it [Afghanistan] is taking and even the British Ambassador told me yesterday that while he thought Pakistan's tough attitude had achieved something in the beginning, a continuation of it was counter-productive.
An imaginative move of this nature is the type of which only the free world and its members are capable. To do it in time would take much of the wind out of the Communist sails and would bring great relief to many elements in Afghanistan who only regard with horror the prospect of being forced more closely into the Soviet embrace. A gesture of this magnitude to begin the healing process would enhance Pakistan's prestige as well as our own, placing us in an advantageous role in helping to guide Afghanistan policy through hazardous shoals during this critical period./4/
/4/In telegram 1992 to Karachi, March 28, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Ayub of the contents of telegram 565 from Kabul, and to ask him to consider an appropriate gesture to prevent the closure of the border on March 29. (Ibid., 689.90D/3 - 2862) The Embassy responded that, in light of Ayub's repeated insistence that his government would not accept a return to the status quo ante, there was little point in asking him to agree to Naim's request for reopening the Consulates and trade agencies. The Embassy added that to recommend acceptance of what the Pakistanis would regard as a surrender to Afghan intransigence might impact negatively on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Telegram 1699 from Karachi, March 29; ibid., 989.7190D/3 - 2962)
Steeves
114. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4 - 1262. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and approved in S on April 18.
Washington, April 12, 1962.
SUBJECT
Kashmir
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
The Secretary
IO--Mr. Harlan Cleveland
NEA--Mr. Phillips Talbot
SOA--Mr. John N. Gatch, Jr.
Sir Zafrulla opened the conversation by saying that he had wanted to talk with the Secretary to explain Pakistan's motives for bringing the Kashmir issue before the Security Council. He said that he had had a long talk the previous day with Ambassador Stevenson on the subject of Kashmir and had gone into it at more detail than usual since Ambassador Plimpton was his usual point of contact on Kashmir. The Secretary said he had seen a brief report of the talk but welcomed Sir Zafrulla's willingness to come to Washington and give a full exposition of Pakistan's position.
Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan was not wedded to Security Council consideration, but it seemed that this offered the only way at present to get attention focused on the Kashmir issue. Nehru's recent statements that the only thing that India could consider was an adjustment from the present situation, and, in fact, Nehru's whole performance in the face of Ayub's efforts since 1960 to negotiate on Kashmir had convinced Pakistan that India would not enter into meaningful discussions unless maximum pressure were brought to bear. The people of Kashmir itself were being denied the right of self-determination, and the President of Azad Kashmir, Mr. Khurshid, was full of plans to take unilateral action. Khurshid had pressed Minister for External Affairs Qadir to extend Pakistan's recognition to Azad Kashmir, but Qadir had turned the request down. Qadir had said that the new Pakistan Government which would be formed in June would have a new Minister for External Affairs since he was stepping down. The new Minister might reconsider Khurshid's request. Khurshid had also raised the possibility of seeking recognition from Communist China. Sir Zafrulla questioned the wisdom of all of these plans, but said they were evidence that the situation could develop into something that was more than local if the issue were not settled. For example, if Pakistan became militarily engaged in Kashmir, Afghanistan might be tempted to make a grab at the Northwest Frontier.
Sir Zafrulla then recounted and elaborated on a suggestion he had made to Ambassador Stevenson regarding possible practical Security Council action. India continued to claim that it could not comply with the UNCIP resolutions because Pakistan had not taken the first step by withdrawing its forces from Azad Kashmir. Sir Zafrulla wanted to revive a suggestion made by Swedish Ambassador Jarring in 1957 calling for a commission or an individual to be appointed by the Secretary General to draw up a list of defaults by both sides in non-compliance with the UNCIP resolutions and the several Graham reports. For example, the UNCIP resolutions did not call for unilateral Pakistan withdrawal from Azad Kashmir first without corresponding Indian action as Krishna Menon always claimed. Pakistan would welcome an impartial investigation of the whole issue. Sir Zafrulla had told Ambassador Stevenson that India would not agree to an individual from the West but might agree to a neutral. Sir Zafrulla had made no suggestions to Ambassador Stevenson but now would like personally to say that he would prefer to have the Secretary General himself undertake the task, but would welcome a man of integrity from any nation. He suggested that someone from the new unaligned nations of Africa might be appropriate. He specifically named Mr. Amachree of Nigeria who has virtue in Indian eyes of being a non - Muslim from a country which probably is more friendly to India than Pakistan. Ambassador Stevenson had asked what the United Kingdom's reaction would be. Sir Zafrulla said that he was going to see both Sir Patrick Dean and the Secretary General in the next several days to discuss the proposal.
The Secretary asked whether Pakistan was raising the issue at this time purely on its own merits or whether internal pressures in Pakistan made it necessary. Sir Zafrulla said that he did not sense any more specific pressure than usual but knew that there was a strong official and popular feeling in Pakistan that somehow progress had to be made towards a settlement.
The Secretary then asked how Sir Zafrulla saw the U.S. role. He added that since the United States was trying to play an active part in both capitals in an effort to bring about a solution, Security Council action put us in an uncomfortable position. Sir Zafrulla recounted Pakistan's efforts since last summer to get action on Kashmir, and said that the Indian seizure of Goa had made it even more urgent a necessity. Pakistan wondered whether the United States was being active enough. For example, had anything been done since India turned down the U.S. proposal regarding Eugene Black? The Secretary said we were continuing to examine the matter to see what we could do. He wondered whether negotiations could be carried on bilaterally. Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan considered that a third party was necessary. In response to a question from Mr. Cleveland, Sir Zafrulla said that India did not want a third party in any possible negotiations. The Secretary asked whether a third party from a member of the Commonwealth would be acceptable to India and Pakistan. Sir Zafrulla said this proposal would be agreeable to Pakistan but probably not to India. He added that Pakistan would even accept Nkrumah.
Sir Zafrulla then said that if Pakistan's proposal did not work, Pakistan was faced with two alternatives: (1) to reconcile its people to Nehru's position; or (2) to go along with whatever course Khurshid would take as President of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan did not want the second alternative, and the first alternative in effect provided for a partition without giving the Kashmiris any voice in their own destiny and constituted basically a military settlement of a political problem.
Mr. Talbot asked whether Pakistan's proposed action might not appear vindictive. Sir Zafrulla disclaimed any desire of this nature, and said that Pakistan simply wanted to establish a reasonable procedure to determine the defaults on both sides and get on towards the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions.
The Secretary asked whether it was unfair to say that preliminary negotiation between Pakistan and India was necessary to insure a successful outcome in the Security Council and went on to ask what Pakistan's reaction would be if there were no favorable result from the debate. Sir Zafrulla did not respond to the Secretary's first query, and said that a real failure would increase Pakistan's frustration to a great extent.
Sir Zafrulla then said that it appeared as if April 27 was the first available date. He added that he assumed Krishna Menon would lead India's delegation. The Secretary said that we should all try to reach agreement before April 27 which would make the debate unnecessary. He asked Sir Zafrulla whether his government would postpone the debate if the Indians agreed to negotiations. Sir Zafrulla said he could not commit Pakistan, but thought a postponement could be arranged if the Indians appeared ready to enter constructive negotiations.
The Secretary asked how long it had been since there had been a thorough review of Indo - Pakistan relations by top level people. Sir Zafrulla said there had been none since the September 1960 meeting of Ayub and Nehru.
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed then said that the internal pressures in Pakistan were greater than Sir Zafrulla had indicated. He sketched the history of the Ayub - Kennedy meetings in July 1961 from which Pakistan had gained hope of real progress on Kashmir./2/ If there were further delays, the people of Pakistan would begin to wonder whether U.S. assurances meant anything.
/2/See Document 30.
The Secretary reiterated the difficulties of the U.S. position. Aziz Ahmed said he appreciated these difficulties but his government could not explain this position satisfactorily to the people of Pakistan in view of the popular understanding of the U.S. commitment. Sir Zafrulla said that US. approval of Pakistan's proposal would not mean that the United States was clearly taking the side of Pakistan against India. The Secretary said that we would have to think urgently about whether that would or would not be the case.
Mr. Cleveland said that the Security Council should look forward to solutions rather than attempt to assess blame. Sir Zafrulla said that Pakistan did not want to assess blame but to find out what needed to be done.
Mr. Talbot wondered whether any useful purpose would be served by basing inquiry on outdated resolutions. Sir Zafrulla said that any other course would simply prove to the Indians that their foot-dragging policy was succeeding. He recalled various attempts in the past, notably by Sir Owen Dixon and Mohammed Ali Bogra, to get Nehru to take a new look. Each time Nehru had gone back on his word.
Mr. Talbot asked whether there was any special reason for bringing the matter up now. Sir Zafrulla said that Ayub had really not had time during the first two years of his regime, and last year had hoped that his efforts with President Kennedy would achieve progress. Mr. Talbot asked whether Zafrulla had canvassed the Security Council. Sir Zafrulla said that his canvassing really was circular because the other countries always asked what the US. position was going to be. His personal guess was that the United Kingdom, France, China and Ireland would vote for Pakistan. He was not sure about Ghana and the UAR. He said that really he believed if a reasonable proposal got the necessary majority and was then vetoed by the USSR, Pakistan could go to the UNGA with a resolution that might pass.
The Secretary asked whether there was anything to be done quietly before April 27. Sir Zafrulla said that the Indian offer as relayed by Dayal to Ayub was not sincere since it did not call for adequate preparation. Mr. Talbot said our understanding of the offer seemed different.
The Secretary asked whether there would be any merit in Pakistan's holding secret, discursive, agenda-less talks with India much as we were with the Soviets on Berlin. Sir Zafrulla said that this would only allow India to procrastinate further. The Secretary then said that he would have to get into the matter promptly and Sir Zafrulla thanked him and said that he hoped the United States would give support to Pakistan's proposal.
115. Letter From President Ayub to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4 - 3062. No classification marking. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten. The letter was forwarded to McGeorge Bundy on April 30 under cover of a memorandum from Lucius Battle stating that it was received from the Embassy of Pakistan.
Rawalpindi, April 20, 1962.
My Dear Mr. President, Three months ago, I had the honour of writing to you in connection with a procedural move by Pakistan in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. The Council decided to consider the substantive aspects of the dispute after March 1, 1962. It has since been agreed by its Members to hold a meeting on April 27.
It is our hope that the Council will address itself squarely to the task of resolving the deadlock which has been obtaining for the last several years over the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions.
In view of the disagreement between the parties as to which side is responsible for the deadlock, an obvious step for the Council to take would be to proceed to determine the state of implementation of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948, and to find out what needs to be done by either side so as to make progress towards the achievement of the United Nations objectives in Kashmir.
The Council may well heed the assistance of a suitable person to be enabled to discharge this responsibility. We are inclined to think that at this stage of consideration of the Kashmir question, the designation of a person of integrity and international standing from one of the non-aligned African countries is likely to commend itself most widely to members of the United Nations.
If this proposition fails to obtain the necessary majority, the Security Council could turn to a recommendation of Dr. Frank P. Graham, in his report of 28 March 1958, that the two heads of government should meet, in the presence of a United Nations representative, to resolve the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan on the implementation of the UN resolutions on the Kashmir issue. The presence of the United Nations could be most effectively ensured in such bilateral negotiations, for the reason stated, by the designation of a suitable person from one of the non-aligned African Members of the United Nations.
In expressing these thoughts for your consideration, I am not oblivious of Prime Ministers Nehru's reiterated opposition to the presence of a third party in any talks that may be held between him and myself. I am only too painfully aware of this adamant stand of his on the issue which to me, seems utterly unreasonable. At the same time, I must point out that if the good offices of a third person are not made available to the two of us, no useful purpose is likely to be served by our meeting. Pakistan will be bound to insist that the two UNCIP resolutions should constitute the basis of any settlement of the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand Mr. Nehru has been insisting on the status quo as the only course open for a solution. It is in such circumstances that the good offices of the United Nations through a designated representative, become most essential if not indispensable, to the prospects of a fruitful confrontation. It may be possible for this third person to suggest approaches after taking into account the relevant UN resolutions and the vital interests at stake--without placing any responsibility for his initiatives on either Pandit Nehru or myself--in order to prevent a breakdown in our discussions.
I have ventured to share these thoughts with you in the hope that you will appreciate the reasons why Pakistan feels it incumbent upon itself to ask for Security Council discussion and act:ion on the Kashmir question. I am confident that in our efforts to redeem the promise and pledge of self-determination and justice to the people of Kashmir we may rely on your sympathy and full support.
Pakistan's appeal to the Security Council is in no way incompatible with bilateral talks between Prime Minister Nehru and myself. It follows from what I have said above that the Security Council alone will be able to provide an element to such discussions which is essential to prevent their precipitous breakdown and to keep them going until an equitable and realistic solution of the Kashmir dispute is achieved.
Prime Minister Nehru invited me to visit India to continue our previous discussions on the India-Pakistan questions, including the Kashmir dispute. 'While expressing my readiness to accept his invitation, I suggested to him that it would be advisable first to prepare the ground for a fruitful outcome to a meeting at our level lest a failure result in the exacerbation of relations between our two countries and an aggravation of the existing tension in the sub-continent. To my mind, prudence demands that preliminary talks should take place at the official or ministerial level to explore the outlines and prospects of the negotiations which might be held at the level of the heads of government if they are to lead to a final resolution of this grave and tragic problem.
While agreeing to preliminary talks at official level, India insisted that the move in the Security Council must first be abandoned. What I fear to contemplate is the contingency of interminable meetings at a lower level being protracted for weeks and months to circumvent Pakistan's appeal to the Security Council. A suggestion made by us that we might have such a meeting before the matter comes up in the Security Council in pursuance of the move made by us, was turned down. I see from certain reports that this suggestion is being misrepresented as a demand for the Kashmir settlement within a week or ten days.
Pakistan, throughout the entire period of fourteen years for which the dispute has lasted, has given proof, time and again, of its moderation, patience and faith in the solution of international disputes by peaceful means in the face of provocation, intransigence and threats of violence from our great neighbor.
I realise only too well that without the goodwill and support of the United States in the Security Council, the cause of self-determination for the people of Kashmir will inevitably be lost I am confident Mr. President, that your great country which had done so much for the freedom of men and nations will not let this happen.
Yrs Sincerely,
M.A. Khan
116. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/4 - 2762. Secret. Drafted by Naas on May 2.
Washington, April 27, 1962.
SUBJECT
U.S. Relations toward Pakistan and India
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. M. Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. M.A. Jafri, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan
NEA--Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
SOA--Charles W. Naas
Minister Masood stated that in the two letters of December 23, 1961,/2/ and January 2, 1962,/3/ from President Ayub to President Kennedy and the Aide - Memoire of January 3, 1962,/4/ several questions had been raised. The President had replied in a brief letter of January 26, 1962,/5/ and the Government of Pakistan wished to know whether this brief answer was final as the Pakistan Ambassador had understood that a more complete reply would be forthcoming.
/2/In this letter to Kennedy, Ayub warned that what he saw as Indian aggression against Goa could be a prelude to Indian aggression elsewhere. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 1/62 - 2/62)
/3/Document 83.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 84.
/5/See Document 100.
The four questions were:
1. Should not the U.S. - Indian Military Sales Agreement be terminated in view of India's violation of the terms by its action in Goa?; or, could U.S. economic aid in some way be limited to prevent India being able to spend so much on armaments?
2. Would the U.S. make public its reassurances to the GOP that U.S. assistance would be forthcoming in the event of aggression from any quarter?
3. If the U.S. is not willing to make a ,public statement, would the U.S. at least agree to informing Prime Minister Nehru privately that assurances had been given again to the GOP?
4. In view of the increased threat from India would the U.S. increase its military assistance to Pakistan?
Mr. Talbot stated that it was his understanding the points had been discussed fully by the President and Ambassador Ahmed and that we had promised to consult with the GOP only if there were new developments or changes in policy. At this time we had nothing to add. However, Mr. Talbot agreed to spell out the U.S. position so that there would be no misunderstanding.
We believe that the assurances given President Ayub by President Kennedy meet Pakistan's needs; a public statement or a reiteration to Prime Minister Nehru privately are not necessary and would serve no useful purpose (points 2 and 3).
Mr. Talbot, in referring to points 1 and 4, said the U.S. anticipates no further action. He stated that the U.S. is very conscious of the problem of differentiating between military and economic assistance; obviously large scale economic aid permits a country to divert its own resources to the purchase of arms. The U.S. believes that it is in Pakistan's long-term interest, as well as of the rest of the free world, to have India's economy develop. The U.S. has no reason to believe that, if U.S. economic aid to India were decreased, ipso facto military purchases would decrease. Each nation establishes its own policies and priorities; India would probably decide to maintain its forces and, if necessary suffer the consequences in economic development. The U.S. also believes that economic assistance should not be tied to a particular decision within that country unrelated to the purposes of the assistance. Rather, the best way of meeting the arms race problem is by discussion between the two of their mutual problems. For example, the U.S. is now trying at Geneva to grapple with the arms race; perhaps, the same efforts can be made at the regional level.
Mr. Talbot continued by commenting that in his personal view there are three ways the progress being made in South Asia could be upset:
1. direct Sino - Soviet intervention;
2. major domestic political failures; there remains a certain fragility to the governments, a condition which is natural in view of the manifold problems and the short period of independence;
3. regional disputes become the overwhelming preoccupation of the governments; if this occurred points 1 and 2 easily could follow.
Mr. Masood said that the GOP did not wish to see Indian economic development suffer, but were there not other pressures the U.S. could bring to bear? He noted Pakistan's concern over the Kashmir question and the "30% increase of the Indian military budget" He asked whether, following the ill-fated Black proposal, the President and Department had given consideration to what further steps the U.S. could take in assisting a solution to the Kashmir problem. Mr. Talbot replied that much thought had been given, but that for the time being the Security Council had the issue before it and that further U.S. proposals would depend on the Security Council's actions.
117. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, 5/1/62 - 5/15/62. Secret.
Washington, May 8, 1962.
McGB:
You asked me last week to give you a "sharp needle" in light of Bowles paper on Afghanistan./2/ Have look into matter and found that State/AID have come up with a response to Bowles prodding which has just gone out to field as "To Kabul 346"/3/ attached.
/2/In an April 26 memorandum to Rusk, Bowles argued that it was important to recognize the danger of further Soviet encroachments in Afghanistan and necessary to move vigorously to bolster Afghanistan's traditional neutral status. To that end, he advocated continued support for Afghan development projects and the establishment of an alternative transit route through Iran for U.S. aid materials. He anticipated that the impasse in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan would be lengthy. On April 30, Bowles sent a copy of the memorandum to the White House under cover of a letter to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., 3/25/62 - 4/30/62)
/3/Dated May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0089/5 - 462)
Essentially, they have decided to be reasonably forthcoming with Afghans on various minor projects (air charter help, loan for other air transports, etc.), and to proceed immediately with surveys of alternative Iranian routes and financing of Herat - Meshed segment if surveys indicate it feasible. By telling Afghans all this we will seek to convince Kabul we want to help keep Afghanistan independent
However, State/AID differ from Bowles in several major respects:
1. Bowles wanted a major "psychological" commitment (perhaps $150 million) to new Afghan five-year plan as evidence of our determination to keep Afghans out of Soviet trap. Bowles saw this commitment as a major confidence builder, while actual outlays would still be contingent upon satisfactory project applications. As you know, AID reacts viscerally against such commitments unless forced. Moreover, State is anxious to keep pressure on Afghans to settle Pak/Afghan differences.
2. State/AID are unwilling to go forward full tilt with development of alternative Iranian route, which they regard as highly expensive and unlikely to be ready in time to help Afghans much anyway.
3. Most important, State/AID propose indirect pressure on Afghans by telling them that shipment of large tonnages via Iran is "impractical and uneconomic. Therefore, on any major projects we tell Afghans we propose to ship the necessary commodities to Karachi on assumption they will reopen frontier. Most big US aid projects, e.g., Kabul - Kandahar road, are in this category. Bowles, of course, strongly opposes any such tie between US aid and transit issue.
Steeves has come in with a long dissent to this last; he says Afghans will size it up immediately as US pressure and greatly resent it (Kabul 624 attached)./4/ Therefore, he feels that forthcoming nature of rest of our approach will be largely nullified by news that US will ship in supplies for major projects only through Karachi. He urges that we simply omit this angle. Indeed, he argues that if we are going to use such pressures on the Afghans, we should "light as many fires as possible in all Afghan quarters to bring internal pressure to bear on Daud."
/4/Dated May 6. (Ibid., 811.0089/5 - 662)
As between the Bowles/Steeves approach and that of Gaud/Talbot, I favor the latter. For us to tell the Afghans that we will do everything possible to help them, including an all-out effort to open up an uneconomic Iranian route, is tantamount to telling them that we will support them irrespective of their quarrel with the Pakistanis, thus removing all incentive to compromise. In effect, we'd prolong the dispute rather than damping it down. Moreover, so far as effective help to Afghanistan is concerned we can only provide it over the Iranian route at great excess cost and delay, at any rate for several years until a good road can be built.
Therefore, if we are to compete effectively with Soviets in Afghanistan, re-opening of the Pak route seems essential. We cannot really get the Afghans to do so until we get them to recognize that staying out of the Soviet embrace is more important than pursuing Pushtoonistan dispute. Moreover, with so many problems looming between us and Ayub, should we add to them an insulting indication that we will help the Afghans regardless of what they do on Pushtu issue? In sum, while all concerned agree with Bowles that US should make a major effort to help Afghans stay out of Soviet clutches, the rest of us disagree with him on tactics.
Finally, I gather that Bowles himself is pleased with his half a loaf; he did get a pretty forthcoming set of projects which will clue Afghans that we're still interested, and enough movement on Iran route so Afghans see a partial alternative to total dependence on Pak door to West. True, we thus fall between two stools but the modest bait we're dangling before Afghans may whet their appetite for more.
Ergo, no need for a "needle" on Bowles' behalf. About the only useful handle would be an NSAM requesting State to due the President on US policy, and then a confrontation before JFK (I suspect he'd come down on Talbot/Gaud side too). So I see no WH action indicated at this time, but will keep in close touch.
RWK
118. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/5 - 862. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Canberra for the Secretary and to London. Relayed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the CIA.
New Delhi, May 8, 1962, 7 p.m.
3537. Department pass Defense. Reference Embassy telegram 3505./2/ The moment of truth on the MIG's came at noon when Desai called me in to say that he had not been fully informed on developments when he talked to me on Friday last. In fact he had learned upon return of Menon that exploratory discussions with Soviets had been taking place and were well advanced. Of the three possible planes, F - 104's, Mysteres and MIG's, only the MIG's seemed be available promptly on payment terms which Indians could afford and with prospect of manufacturer and appropriate provision for spares in India. The papers continue to speak a completed deal and I sensed he might be softening me up for such an announcement. I asked him directly if the transaction completed and he said no. I then asked him if a decision had been taken to buy the MIG's and he said not in the sense of a government action, whatever that may mean. I then made the following points with adequate force:
/2/In telegram 3505, May 4, Galbraith reported that he had taken up with Foreign Secretary Desai reports in that morning's local press to the effect that the Indian Government was close to an agreement with the Soviet Union to equip two squadrons of the Indian Air Force with Soviet MIG fighters. Desai said there was no such plan. (Ibid., 791.5622/5 - 462)
(1) I did not like being told on Friday that nothing was happening and discovering on Monday that developments were well advanced. On Desai's presumed information I had reported that no negotiations were in progress.
(2) Our policy was to be tolerant and good humored but he, Menon and above all the Prime Minister should be aware of the limits. We were providing $500 million in economic aid, another $280 million in food. The Indians were saying in effect that this was insufficient so they must turn to Soviets to equip their forces. This was callous of American public opinion and highly illogical to boot.
(3) To reinforce the point, I told him of conversation last night on the plane with L.K. Jha, Permanent Secretary Finance. Jha sought me out to speak of their developing alarm over balance of payments. As matters now stood, this kind of worry came to us while Menon went to Soviets for arms. Such a division of labor would never be acceptable to Congressional or American public opinion for reasons he could well understand.
(4) It was true, as Desai had said earlier, that the Soviets had made an offer and we had not. It was not our policy to merchandise our arms around the world and this was a policy that India should appreciate. I then told him that we had specifically asked Lockheed to exercise restraint. I noted that in the case of the C - 130, a dual-purpose vehicle, we had offered a demonstration and had been refused.
(5) I then took notice of his earlier statement that the Russians had offered better terms including rupee payment and that India could not accept arms aid. Rupee payment was as much a form of aid, and as prejudicial to Indian principles, as acceptance of MAP assistance. Because Russian bookkeeping was more clandestine than ours acceptance of rupees was no less in the nature of a gift. It was the same deal, slightly less generous, as the one on which they got food.
(6) Finally, while noting that I could not promise to match Soviet offer, we did expect to be asked. If it developed that for reasons of policy or security classification we couldn't do business, then at least they would have dealt with us courteously and could go ahead with the Soviets. I took occasion also to observe that there could be no emergency over the licensing of manufacture since planes from this source would not be available for some years anyway.
Desai, who seemed rather ill at ease during this eloquence, was I think impressed. I asked that matter be put firmly and fully before Prime Minister and he said it would be. I then said I hope we might be kept informed.
To pin these matters down I am summarizing them in form of a note to Desai which I am sending over this afternoon./3/ One can never be quite confident where Menon is concerned, but I have feeling this may produce at least temporary block. Although I have avoided any commitment, implications for possible Washington action and decision will be evident.
Galbraith
/3/The Embassy transmitted the text of this note to the Department in telegram 3545, May 9. (Ibid., 791.5622/5 - 962)
119. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 5/62. Secret.
Washington, May 9, 1962.
McGB:
I hope we won't panic at MIG - 21s for India. One can see Galbraith leading up to plea for F - 104s on highly favorable terms.
In time I can see strong case for subsidized arms "sales" to Delhi, but question wisdom at this time:
(1) It would raise hob with Paks who will see in it final confirmation of their suspicions we are shifting to a pro-Indian stance--true, we are but now is not the time to push Paks to wall;
(2) At present Paks have air superiority so Indians are just catching up--we can resist Pak pleas for more 104s on these grounds; we can also tell Paks that if we give them more, Indians will just get more from Sovs;
(3) MIGs for India will encourage Delhi to take strong line against Chinese, even more than 104s would;
(4) I don't think we're in danger of setting a precedent whereby Indians will turn to Sovs for all arms supplies--Indians are too smart for this;
(5) Indeed, I doubt that this transaction will lead to any shift in India's increasingly pro-Western orientation; on the contrary it will make Indians more anxious to show us that it has not;
(6) While it is true that Pak - Indian arms race siphons off benefits from US economic aid, this will be fact of life until Pak - Indian differences resolved.
In sum, while protesting vigorously for effect, I don't think we should break our backs to forestall MIG purchase.
Bob K.
120. Memorandum of Discussion/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/SOA Files: Lot 64 D 571, United States, Jan. - July. Secret. Drafted by Naas on May 19.
Washington, May 13, 1962.
SUBJECT
Discussion on Pakistan - U.S. Relations
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Talbot
Mr. Grant
Mr. Cameron
Mr. Wriggins/2/
Mr. Horgan
Mr. Gatch
Mr. Naas
/2/W. Howard Wriggins, member of the Policy Planning Council.
The meeting was called to discuss the current unsatisfactory state of U.S. - Pakistan - Indian relations. The attached outline/3/ prepared earlier in SOA was followed as a guide to the discussion.
/3/Not printed.
Briefly, the causes of concern to the US. at present are:
1. The drift apart of the U.S. and Pakistan; there is an absence of communication with Pakistan; Pakistan has not consulted with the U.S. on important actions--closure of Afghan offices, boundary talks with Chicoms.
2. There are indications of a possible reappraisal by Pakistan of its foreign policies; Pakistan leaders have made it clear that they are dissatisfied with the extent of U.S. support on those issues--Kashmir and relations with Afghanistan--directly affecting Pakistan security
3. At the same time, U.S. - Indian relations, possibly in the military field, may be entering a new phase as the Chinese Communist threat to India becomes more acute; and the U.S. will need added flexibility. The problem, therefore, is how to gain this freedom.
A. In these circumstances it becomes necessary to examine the following possible lines of action:
1. Fully support, at whatever costs, the political objectives of one or the other;
2. Adopt an attitude of "plague on both your houses" and effect a slow withdrawal from the area;
3. Attempt to treat both countries equally;
4. Attempt to continue, as we are presently doing, "to straddle."
These four lines of action were discussed at length; conclusions are briefly given:
1. The value of our special relationship with Pakistan, particularly in the military field, is such that we cannot contemplate withdrawal. Also, the U.S. cannot yet accept the dissolution of CENTO and SEATO, which might follow if Pakistan withdrew.
On the other hand, India is of such importance that little or no consideration can be given to a major retrogressive change in U.S. policy toward it.
2. Although isolationist sentiment domestically would be satisfied, there is nothing to be gained by such an extreme policy.
3. It was concluded after lengthy discussion that equal treatment for India would be interpreted in Pakistan as a U.S. decision to change fundamentally the relative role of Pakistan and could adversely affect our interests in Pakistan.
4. It was generally agreed that the U.S. approach the current problem by investigating the possibilities of strengthening our relations with Pakistan in order to obtain the additional freedom of action to take the steps necessary to deal with India in the light of our national interests. An improvement in Pak - Indian relations is an essential element in gaining this additional flexibility.
Basically, it was concluded that the U.S. would gain little or nothing by a major shift of our Pakistan policy and a great deal could be lost:
a. Such a move would remove irritations in our relations with India but it is unlikely a meaningful basic change in Indian - U.S. relations would follow:
(1) India's policy of non-alignment probably precludes significantly closer ties with the U.S. Also, for the present, India's policy has advantages to the U.S., such as in the Congo.
(2) India probably is not overly concerned with the threat of Pakistan to its security.
b. The Government of Afghanistan would be pleased by a basic change, but in our estimation would not alter its present policies towards the U.S. and U.S.S.R. In addition, we would gain no significant flexibility in our immediate problems of communications through Pakistan.
c. The area disputes would in our estimation be no closer to resolution. The "Pushtunistan" and Kashmir disputes are deeply rooted and would not disappear if we changed our Pakistan policy. They would continue to threaten area stability.
d. The U.S. would, however, have somewhat increased flexibility in dealing with India, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, but in view of the limitations on our actions placed by both countries the increased flexibility would not be of appreciable significance in the near future.
B. Having agreed that the advantages do not equal the disadvantages to the U.S. of a major shift, the main issue before us is how to maintain our relations with Pakistan and yet gain the freedom to be more forthcoming in relations with India, e.g., possible provision of military equipment. In the long run a basic improvement in Indo - Pakistan relations is a sina qua non for full freedom in dealing with India. In the short run, however, greater flexibility might be gained if U.S. - Pakistan relations could be strengthened; steps in this direction might include:
1. A full and frank exchange of views with President Ayub on our relations in order to pinpoint irritations, to identify Pakistan vital interests which we are prepared to support, and to expound to him our views on area and world problems. We believe the breakdown in communications has been a factor in the present drift.
2. The examination of ways to increase Pakistan's sense of security.
3. A greater exchange of views and information on affairs outside the subcontinent.
4. Take a more positive role in the Kashmir dispute in order to show that an allied relationship does have benefits beyond the military and economic aid spheres.
121. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/5 - 1362. Secret; Niact.
New Delhi, May 13, 1962, 6 p.m.
3598. Yesterday in course of another conversation FonSec Desai told me that following my reps PriMin had told Krishna Menon that MIG deal must come before the cabinet and case would be reviewed with full consideration our points.
I have been worried in this matter lest Menon think I have been fighting him indirectly and by proxy so today I made appointment and had long talk. M.J. Desai was present At times discussion was rough. He once accused me of addressing him as subordinate official of his Min; I said I was refraining from apology only because I had not done so. In the end we parted fairly amicably and I had feeling that I made all the necessary points and, as usual very little impression. Following were the principal interchanges:
1. As earlier to Desai I said we could no explain provision of $850 million in civilian aid while leaving to the Russians the task of giving mil assistance. He bristled and said not one stick of equipment was supplied under mil aid programs. All was paid for. I had hoped for this and pointed out that according to newspaper accounts the Sov equipment was being supplied for rupees. Food Min S.K. Patil could as well argue that PL 480 food was purchased commercially. However we and he considered it aid. Menon then said rupees went into convertible accounts and could be spent by Sovs. I pointed out this only proved that the Sovs were less generous than we. We put our rupees into inconvertible accounts and returned them to the Indians. I then added that if the Sovs gave as much econ aid as we did the Indians would be quite well supplied with dollars from trade and could go in for mil procurement in the US. Thus, even if the transactions with the Sovs were commercial which they are not, they are made possible by American aid. At this juncture Menon said these were considerations for the FinMin, not for him. His concern was only with getting the best possible equipment. One happy dividend of this interchange on the MIGs is that I have at last managed to get Sov sales for rupees on all fours with any other kind of mil aid.
2. Menon then said that as DefMin his task was to be sure Indian pilots flew planes equal those of Chinese. He also made refs but very passing ones to the Pak F104's. The morale effects of inferior equipment was damaging. India he said was not looking for war or conflict but her borders were everywhere subject to almost daily violation or air penetration. She had to show that this could not occur. In a passage strongly reminiscent of some unidentified warmonger he said only strength would ensure peace. He was putting all the data on available arms on the table and they would then reach a decision. I said that we had sympathy for many of India's problems but could not understand how all the data could be on the table since they had not asked about American terms or looked very seriously at American equipment. He said they had gone into detail with Lockheed. I pointed out that they had refused a demonstration of the C - 130 for which he had once asked and noted that Lockheed as a private firm could not talk about any terms or arrangements. These were matters for the USG on which we had never been approached. He said C - 130 not available; Lockheed had had to borrow a test model from the US Army. I pointed out that Lockheed did not keep a private inventory in Europe and pressed him on when he had last asked about delivery dates. He said, a bit reluctantly, that it was three years ago.
3. He then said our security arrangements were too difficult and sent out for and read me the note about the security team when we offered the Mark 44 torpedo. I asked if the Sovs were giving them secret equipment without any security precaution. He said this was an improper question. I then ventured that he was comparing a country that asked for assurances on its classified equipment and a country which did not give out any secret stuff at all. He disagreed.
I then made my principal pitch. As a senior member of the cabinet with a special knowledge of the US he was surely aware of the effect of this purchase on American public opinion and on pending legislation. This was a serious problem for US in which the Indian govt had the greatest possible collateral interest. The prime question was not the by-passing of American for Sov equipment. I was not merchandising American equipment. It was the effect of any action at this juncture on the US public and pol opinion. He said he was conscious of this. I thought it well not to express obvious doubts.
The debate (or bickering) covered Adlai Stevenson, the American press treatment of Nehru and Menon, our alleged refusal of Sidewinders and the improbable contention, which I also did not challenge, that the IAF had the ground radar for aerial control of F104s and MIGs. So passed the Indian sabbath.
Galbraith
122. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.00/5 - 1862. Secret; Limit Distribution.
New Delhi, May 18, 1962, 6 p.m.
3691. Pass Defense. Embassy believes Indian political situation is entering period of transition with major implications for U.S. interests and requiring clear decisions. We are aware that in light of recent Senate action and in face current attitudes toward India the timing of decision could not be more inconvenient than this, and ways of juggling time factor have had our detailed consideration. Unfortunately the tune is being called by others.
The first factor in situation is Prime Minister's age and illness and following possibilities: (a) In immediate future he may not be exercising dominant influence and this gives increased freedom for maneuver to Menon. Menon is dearly determined to exploit situation to weaken American influence and very probably has design to protect his own longer-run position by getting greater dependence on Soviets, (b) Prime Minister may become incapacitated or disappear from immediate scene, which will bring prompt reduction in Menon's influence. During this period the US. must play hand in accordance with underlying realities of situation and not surface influences and specifically must avoid action and forestall steps which would play into Menon's hands and weaken the fundamentally far stronger pro-western members of cabinet and armed forces. Checking any increased dependence on Soviets, with its political consequences, and protecting present western orientation of military forces are thus vital factors. Against this background question of supply of military equipment to Government of India becomes matter of major significance.
2. Second basic fact is intense dissatisfaction of Indian Armed Forces with present obsolete military equipment. Accordingly Indian defense establishment will continue to exert strong pressure on Government of India to obtain modern military equipment through foreign purchase or some sort of direct military assistance. In absence of detente on Chinese Communist border, and in lesser degree on Pakistan border, Government of India will get more modern military equipment one way or another. It must be stressed that in Government of India decision on material prestige and morale factors may well take precedence over question of strict operational role. This is especially case in their decision to immediately obtain high performance supersonic aircraft. This does not lessen force of determination or problem created thereby or open way to dissuasion.
3. Third basic fact is that GOI is unable to pay for substantial quantities of modern military equipment with foreign exchange. Accordingly, Government of India will have to turn to either Soviet or western aid, disguised or undisguised. Some senior members Government of India now recognize purchase Soviet equipment for rupees must be considered form of military aid, and Washington will be aware this has been a major thrust of our recent arguments.
4. Fourth fact is that our intervention and that of United Kingdom have for the moment blocked MIG - 21 deal. Inherent in decision to delay is recognition that insufficient consideration given to United States and United Kingdom alternatives. Therefore, Indian decision to delay requires United States to make decision on its course. We must decide whether Soviets will make important inroads into Indian military with likely far-reaching consequences or whether west will provide alternative and competitive sources of supply. Mission is united in recommending latter course. We recognize public announcement of decision, especially re supply F - 104's, must be related to this year's foreign aid legislation, a point on which Indians, Krishna Menon apart, can be persuaded.
5. We stress now the consequences. In absence of a favorable United States policy India will go to Soviets for military equipment. If Government of India obtains MIG - 21 and/or other types of major military equipment from Soviets, following will result: (a) Large number of Soviet technicians will be introduced into Indian defense establishment. (b)There will be much closer association with Soviet Armed Forces than presently exists. The AN - 12's, MI - 4's, IL - 14's and HF - 24 engines have already introduced some 200 Soviet technicians into Indian defense installations. (c) Position of senior Indian officers who presently pro-west in orientation and who do not want Soviet military equipment will be undermined. (d) Five to ten years from now present strongly pro-west senior officers will be out of picture. Soviet training and technical advisors who would accompany purchase of Soviet equipment will have inevitable influence on younger post-independence Indian military officers now rising to position of prominence. (e) Soviets will emerge as the defender of India against dramatic border enemies. This will be a source of gratitude and esteem outweighing power plants, steel mills or other economic aid. Movement of India toward west during past five years will be arrested and possibly reversed. (f) Action will serve directly interests of small group in Government of India, led by Krishna Menon, who seek break with United States and closer alignment with Soviets. This alignment vital for Menon fortunes as is failure of United States to supply equipment As other telegrams will have told, Menon has invented United States supply reluctance and failure in advance of manifestation. Note that Menon has no future as a pro-westerner and no future in a pro-western India and no inability to understand matters affecting his personal ambitions.
6. Decision to meet Soviet offers will require: (a) Willingness to supply F - 104's from inventory promptly or possibly to convince United Kingdom to offer Lightnings under same terms. Ambassador will discuss this latter possibility on his return to United States. It raises considerations that cannot be judged fully from here. (b) Rupee payment with appropriate price concessions. (c) Licensing agreement for manufacture of F - 104's (or Lightnings) in India. (d) Possible modification of United States security requirements.
7. At first time domestic situation reasonably allows, Ambassador should be authorized make offer on C - 130's to Prime Minister. In event there no alternative to F - 104's Ambassador should be authorized make same offer on these. Way should similarly be opened on other needs. We do not minimize the difficulties of finding a right time and, as noted, if decision is fairly clear we can ask responsible Indians for tolerance on timing. Note also that availability of an alternative that must be technically examined and then considered will have effect of delaying any decision on high performance fighters at least by weeks, perhaps even by months. The chance to shove through MIG's rapidly depends heavily on absence of alternative.
8. Provision of F - 104 and other major items of military equipment should be accompanied by well-proclaimed United States - Indian understanding that they are provided for defense of India's Northern borders. Pakistanis will not like decision urged above, but such line of action would also be for overall protection of Pakistan, which is as vulnerable to Communists as India and perhaps in light of situation in East Bengal more so.
9. Embassy fully aware of varying forms of opposition in United States and need for explanation in light of current attitudes which Menon, we should remind ourselves, has himself cultivated with skill. However we believe all legitimate arguments can be met and that pivotal position of India in Asia justifies decision.
10. Points here reflect fully agreed position of Mission.
Galbraith
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11 - KE/5 - 1962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron and approved by Grant. Repeated to New Delhi.
Washington, May 19, 1962, 5:15 p.m.
2440. Deliver following letter to President Ayub as soon as possible, informing Department of date and time delivery.
"I am very glad to have your latest views on the Kashmir question in your thoughtful letter of April twentieth. /2/ It is obviously of great importance that on this extremely difficult issue we should keep in close contact.
/2/Document 115.
"As I said when we met last summer, we too attach the highest priority to an equitable solution of the Kashmir dispute. It is clearly essential for the peace and security of South Asia that such a solution be found. It was for this reason that I proposed in January that the matter be considered again with the good offices of a third party of the standing of Mr. Black. I must say that I found it hard to understand why Prime Minister Nehru chose to reject this opportunity, and I continue to believe that the time will come when a third party will indeed be necessary. Because of the current position of India, I do not see how we can move to this form of negotiation at present, but we should all keep looking for an appropriate opening in this direction.
"I understand why, in the circumstances, you feel it necessary to turn to the Security Council. Yet I ought to tell you in all honesty that after my experiences of the last twelve months, I do not personally have great hopes from UN action on this subject nor on a good many others. The UN has great values, and we are among its strongest supporters, but I am sure you will agree that we cannot count on discussions and voting in New York to give us much direct help in finding a fair settlement in Kashmir.
"Nevertheless, I understand your own position in the matter, and I have in mind our discussion of the subject last summer. It is good that our representatives are working closely with each other, and we have found your Government's ideas on a possible resolution to be most constructive. On this basis, we are in a good position to cooperate with you during the debate by supporting a suitable text based on these ideas.
"Let me repeat that we deeply share your desire for an early just and peaceful Kashmir settlement. We will keep up our efforts to this end. Obviously, an issue as complex and stubborn as this one will require of both sides the greatest imagination and flexibility if a common basis for agreement is to be found. I cannot quite share the suggestion in the last paragraph of your letter that the role of the United States can be decisive in this matter, but I can and do assure you of our deep interest in a fair settlement.
"In closing, let me speak again of the broad and general feeling of good will and sympathy which exists for Pakistan here in the United States. These are days of tension in your country and also in ours, and I find it helpful that there is between our people and those of Pakistan so dear a sense of friendship.
"Mrs. Kennedy joins me in warm expression of our high and cordial esteem. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."
Original will be pouched.
Rusk
124. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5 - 2262. Secret; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.
Karachi, May 22, 1962, 7 p.m.
2057. Re Embtel 2044./2/ In same May 19 conversation with me at Rawalpindi, President reviewed general state of GOP relations with India, and problems for Pak posed by GOl search for more modern fighter aircraft.
/2/In telegram 2044, May 20, McConaughy reported on a conversation with Ayub the previous day concerning the status of the Kashmir issue in the U.N. Security Council. (Ibid., 690D.91/5 - 2062)
While deploring what he termed growing testiness, duplicity, intolerance and unyielding hostility of Indian policy toward Pak, he emphasized inescapable necessity for maintaining effective diplomatic communication with India--not just pro forma diplomatic contact but meaningful diplomatic intercourse which with time and patience might grow into constructive exchange. He revealed great and growing disenchantment with Mr. Nehru, whom he characterized as arrogant, irritable, truculent, obstinate. He characterized Nehru as a fraud masquerading as an idealistic philosopher who actually plays rawest and most ruthless form of power politics. He dislikes Nehru the more because he feels that he lives a pretense and sham.
When I put in a good word for Mr. Nehru, observing that Indo - Pak relations were certainly better off with Nehru at helm in India than would be case with some other figures he could name, Ayub was rather inclined to take issue with me. After discounting Krishna Menon's chances of ever succeeding to PriMinship, he said that in his view almost any other Indian politician would have less potential than Nehru for doing harm to Indo--Pak relations. He felt that with inevitable not-too-distant step-down of Nehru from PriMinship, a better and more tolerant Indian understanding of Pak legitimate aspirations and desires for satisfactory relations with India could reasonably be hoped for.
President Ayub dwelt at some length on regretability of heavy Indian armament expenditures from resources which were needed for econ development. He thought it unfortunate that American econ development assistance helped India to build up military capability. This increased Indian military pressure on Pakistan.
I reminded him that there was no actual or prospective US military assistance program for India and that our econ development assistance was earmarked for specific and well justified econ projects not related to arms procurement.
President admitted this but argued that indirectly our aid facilitated Indian purchase of arms by swelling pool of econ resources out of which arms purchases had to be financed. He did not know precisely how a change might be effected, but he wished some aid formula could be devised which would make it impossible for India to purchase advanced types of offensive weapons without thereby losing part of the foreign econ assistance on which she depends.
When I pointed out that such punitive provisions would be offensive to national pride anywhere, he replied that Indian dependence on US aid and friendship was so great that India would respond, albeit reluctantly, to influence of this sort. When I pressed him, he admitted that we could not and should not radically alter the pattern of our econ assistance to India. He recognized that stability in India was necessary for the well being of entire subcontinent and did not quarrel with my statement that good US relations with India, including US ability to wield some influence there, was essential to free world interests, both regional and global. I told him that we intended to exemplify in all phases of our relationship with Pakistan the posture of a loyal ally and a good friend, but that we did not intend that this relationship should impair our friendship with India.
President Ayub did not quarrel with this but said his most earnest piece of advice to us on our Indian policy was, "Don't let India take you for granted." He said Indians were all too prone to do this, taking advantage of US generosity good nature and the known high value we place on keeping India non-aligned with the USSR. He said our bargaining position with India is stronger than we realize and that more realistic negotiating with India on our part is needed. He predicted that a firmer line would be successful if we played our cards since India in actuality is dependent on US politically and strategically, as well as economically. He argued that India would "have no place to go" if she turned her back on United States. He emphasized relative degree of isolation of India, assessing that not even non-aligned governments of Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Burma have any real respect or liking for present Indian government. He quoted Soekarno as having used terms of profane contempt in his appraisal of Nehru.
President Ayub feels that case for attempting to deny advanced offensive weapons from foreign sources to India has become much stronger in recent months. He believes recent Indian record shows clearly that India has openly abandoned (if indeed she ever adhered to) principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes. Since India invokes force and threat of force for settlement of disputes, President Ayub feels strongly that any country which directly or indirectly contributes importantly to better armament of India becomes an accessory to Indian power tactics and therefore unhelpful to the security of Pakistan. He predicted that any augmented Indian military capability would be used not against China but to intimidate weaker neighbors.
I am deferring comment on above until my Washington consultations.
McConaughy
125. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 5/62. Secret.
Washington, May 25, 1962.
McGB:
MIG - 21s for India
State is working hard for delay en route on MIG deal. Ball will urge Ormsby-Gore today to offer Lightnings pronto, even as a stall. Our people in Delhi will collar a number of key Indian figures to urge the risks in MIG deal, not least to US aid.
I've been urging State to explore:
(1) Slim possibility of some kind of indirect tie-in which would permit UK to shave Lightning price if we helped UK on some NATO project.
(2) Stronger effort to persuade Delhi to stall at least till after aid bill passes Congress (and border war heats up)./2/
/2/A border dispute between India and China in the Ladakh district of Kashmir flared in the spring of 1962 with repeated hostile exchanges between Indian and Chinese military patrols.
(3) Reminding Delhi that big MIG deal will generate irresistible PAK pressure for more 104s and thus start new arms spiral. I'd even consider telling Nehru that if he'd forego MIGs we'd not give Paks any more 104s, and that so far as Chicom threat is concerned, if this became a real problem we'd consider 104s to India
Bob K.
126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/5 - 2862. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Gatch on May 31 and approved in S on June 12.
Washington, May 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
U.S. Military Assistance to India; Pakistan Concern at Indian Intentions
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. M. Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
The Secretary
NEA - Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
SOA - John N. Gatch, Jr.
The Ambassador presented an aid-memoire /2/ outlining his government's concern at the reported possibility that the United States was thinking of supplying F - 104s to India, and its general concern over Indian intentions towards Pakistan.
/2/Not printed.
He said that Pakistan was particularly worried by Krishna Menon's statement in the recent Security Council debate on Kashmir that implied India was no longer bound by the cease-fire line imposed by UN action and UN resolutions. He said Menon's statement, coupled with the reports that India was seeking to improve its already strong military forces, make it appear that India was considering aggressive moves against Pakistan or was at least preparing to maintain and even increase its intransigence on Kashmir.
In the view of Pakistan, the threat to India from Communist China was really a part of the whole threat to the subcontinent from the Communist Bloc. The continuance or increase of tension within the subcontinent thus made the Communist task easier. The Ambassador said there were two ways to deal with the problem: (1) to back India completely; (2) or strengthen the region as a whole. Pakistan naturally favored the latter course, but the Ambassador said he could detect real concern over U.S. intentions on Ayub's part when he made public statements questioning the worth of CENTO, SEATO and the alliance with the United States.
The Secretary replied first on the subject of F - 104s. He reminded the Ambassador of the President's commitment to Ayub in 1961 that the United States would consult with Pakistan before any change was contemplated in our policy on military assistance to India. He said he regretted that Pakistan felt compelled, on the basis of newspaper reports, to make a query of this nature. In direct reply he said that India had not asked the United States for F - 104s nor had the United States offered them. As far as we were aware, the situation was that India was deter-mined to develop a supersonic capability and was exploring sources of supply, including the Soviet Union. Our Ambassador had expressed his concern to Indian leaders that they might not fully realize the implications of a MIG deal with the Soviet Union. We did not yet know how the situation would evolve but once again could assure Pakistan there would be no change in United States policy without prior consultation.
Turning to a broader aspect of the picture, the Secretary mentioned the possibility that had been discussed in 1959 of joint defense between India and Pakistan and regretted that it had not materialized, in view of the regional nature of the Chinese Communist threat. The Ambassador recounted the history of the joint defense proposal which had come up first after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Nehru at first had rejected it because it would "align" India militarily, but after the Indus Waters settlement had become more favorably disposed towards the idea. The Kashmir's dispute, however, remained the chief obstacle.
The Ambassador then turned to the subject of the Sino - Pakistan border demarcation negotiations. He recalled that Ayub had discussed the subject with the President last summer and had outlined Pakistan's belief that the negotiation of an agreed border would remove a possible threat to Pakistan from Communist China. The timing of the present announcement was entirely at the initiative of the Communist Chinese. He had no doubt that the Communist Chinese had taken this step to put pressure on India, but said Pakistan had no such intention. The Ambassador said that Pakistan believed India's rights in the matter had been well protected by the terms of the agreement which called for the demarcation of a provisional boundary subject to final approval after the Kashmir issue had been settled.
The Ambassador then said it had not been his or his government's intention to question the President's commitment about informing Pakistan of any impending changes in U.S. policy on military assistance to India. He was simply seeking information and clarification because of the many news reports. The Secretary indicated that the Ambassador should not consider his remarks on the subject to be meant in an unfriendly sense.
127. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 0102A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 212. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, AEC, and NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 31, except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
NIE 31 - 62 Washington, May 31, 1962.
THE PROSPECTS FOR INDIA
Conclusions
A. The dominance of the Congress Party in Indian affairs was confirmed in the 1962 elections and during the next few years is unlikely to be threatened by the Communist Party of India (CPI) or by the parties which draw support from their regional or religious appeal. (Paras. 5 - 8.)
B. We believe that the ambitious Third Five-Year Plan will be generally successful, enabling India to maintain a satisfactory rate of investment and at the same time provide a modest increase in living standards. The Plan's success will be heavily dependent on a high level of foreign aid and could be undercut by other factors, such as crop failures, an unexpected decline in exports, or sharply increased defense outlays. (Paras. 9 - 12)
C. India's federal democratic system will be severely tested after the steadying influence of Nehru is no longer available. If the central political leadership provided by his successors should prove ineffective, or in the event of a persistent economic crisis, India would experience severe political and social strains. The forces of regionalism and communism would be strengthened. Should the presently nonpolitical Indian military come to believe that competent government and the integrity of the national state were threatened, they probably would feel compelled to intervene. (Paras. 17 - 20)
D. India is almost certain to continue its nonalignment policy. US - Indian relations have improved in recent years, and probably will continue to be generally satisfactory, but differences in interest and points of view will from time to time create serious frictions. At the same time, India will continue to attach high priority to maintaining good relations with the USSR, to which it will look for aid and trade, for support on the Kashmir issue, and especially for help in India's problems with Peiping. (Paras. 21 - 25)
E. India now recognizes that its major foreign policy problem for the indefinite future will be centered on the threat of Communist China. Neither side is likely to make sufficient concessions to enable a border settlement to be reached in the near future. India's attempt to force Chinese withdrawal from forward positions in the Ladakh section of Kashmir probably will result in border clashes, though the odds are against any major military escalation. (Paras. 27 - 28)
F. Relations with Pakistan, which improved during President Ayub's first two years in power, have again deteriorated. There has been an upsurge of Hindu - Moslem tensions in both countries, and the Kashmir dispute is once more active. We believe a Kashmir settlement is unlikely and that a further worsening of lndo - Pakistani relations is probable. (Para. 29)
G. India is concerned at the establishment of closer relations between Nepal and Communist China. New Delhi will continue its efforts to persuade the Nepalese King of the dangers of this policy and to bring about a rapprochement between him and the disaffected Nepali Congress Party. With respect to southeast Asia, India is unlikely, during the next few years at least, to develop either the will or the capability significantly to affect events in the area, and its policy is likely to amount to little more than urging peace and conciliation. (Paras. 30 - 31)
[Here follows an 8 - page Discussion section.]
128. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 162. Secret. Drafted by Cameron and Horgan and cleared in BNA by Milton G. Rewinkel. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the enclosed telegram was approved as amended and sent on June 1.
Washington, June 1, 1962.
SUBJECT
Proposed Message to Prime Minister Macmillan Concerning Possibility of British Offering to India an Alternative to MIG - 21's
The purpose of this memorandum is to request you to authorize the dispatch of the enclosed message/2/ from you to Prime Minister Macmillan concerning Indian efforts to a acquire Soviet MIG - 21's and the possibility of the British offering an alternative.
/2/For text of the telegram as sent, see Document 129.
The Government of India has decided at the highest level to begin now to acquire a supersonic fighter capability. For this purpose the Indians have looked into the F - 104, Super Mystere (French), Lightnings (British), and the MIG - 21. The Indians are apparently prepared to go ahead with the MIG - 21's on the basis of the findings of an Indian Mission which has just returned from Moscow. Factors which have led the Indians to this point include political considerations, early availability of the MIG's, payment in Indian rupees and Soviet promises of assistance in future manufacture in India.
Should the Indians acquire the MIG - 21's, the Indian Air Force would be compelled to build its whole fighter aircraft weapons system, of which the airplane itself is only a part, on the Soviet pattern. This would lead probably to the adoption of Soviet bomber and missile systems as being more compatible with the fighter system than would be equipment from the West. In any event, the assignment of large numbers of Soviet technicians to the Indian Air Force would force a withdrawal of the West from those areas where security is a factor (the British are already faced with this problem), inviting further penetration by the Soviets. To have this possibility occur at this time would be particularly unfortunate since senior, basically Western-oriented officers will be retiring in favor of a generation which lacks the strong tradition of close ties with the West.
Ambassador Galbraith has been assured by Foreign Secretary Desai that a final decision will not be taken for another ten days. We are certain, however, that Krishna Menon will be working on Prime Minister Nehru in the interval to get him to agree to the MIG transaction. He can be expected to bring the Prime Minister to this decision unless a satisfactory Western alternative can be offered.
The provision of F - 104's is not a feasible alternative at the present because (a) we believe such a move would seriously jeopardize our essential interests in Pakistan, (b)in view of Indian attitudes towards our security procedures we cannot readily provide the necessary associated classified equipment, and (c) India's lack of foreign exchange would make it necessary to provide the equipment under some form of military aid from the United States, a step which would raise major political problems at home and over sea./3/
/3/A handwritten note in the margin at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "a flat decision on this should await results in London."
We have examined other possible Western alternatives and have concluded that we should first explore with the British the possibility of their providing Lightnings. The British traditionally have been India's primary source of modern military equipment. Mr. Ball broached this subject with Lord Hood on Monday./4/ It was suggested that we were prepared to explore ways of helping the British meet whatever problems this might create for them.
/4/A memorandum of Ball's conversation on May 28 with the Minister of the British Embassy is in Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/2862.
We have not received a reaction from London. In view of the urgency and seriousness of this matter, I recommend that you under-score the importance which we attach to it by authorizing me to send the enclosed message from you to Prime Minister Macmillan.
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant and Cameron, cleared by Rewinkel and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk.
Washington, June 1, 1962, 8:52 p.m.
6411. Please transmit urgently following message from President to Prime Minister:
I want you to know personally how much importance I attach to finding an alternative to the MIG - 21s and associated manufacturing facilities which the Indians are now seriously considering. We believe that such a Soviet entry into India's military picture could have very grave long-range consequences for Indian internal politics. Mr. Ball discussed this matter with Lord Hood on Monday and asked whether your Government might be in a position to provide Lightnings as such an alternative. I have thought a great deal about this matter, and this is the only way I can now see to meet a problem which greatly concerns us both. I can well understand that the provision of Lightnings on terms satisfactory to the Indians might give you some difficulties. I should be glad to see how we might assist you in meeting these difficulties.
This is, in my view, a very urgent matter. We have indications that a final decision to acquire the MIG - 21s may be reached in the middle of June so that if at all possible we need to find means of making a counter offer next week.
Rusk
130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Talbot.
Washington, June 4, 1962, 5:17p.m.
6441. Deptel 6411./2/ There follows for your information Prime Minister's reply of June 4 to President's message contained reftel:
/2/Document 129.
"Thank you for your message delivered on June 2 about fighter aircraft for India. We are now looking into this question as a matter of urgency and hope soon to be ready to concert a plan with you. One of our difficulties is that it may take a little time to step up the rate of production of Lightnings. We shall of course be ready to consider diverting existing orders to India, but this in its turn raises very troublesome questions.
In the meanwhile we are asking our High Commissioner in Delhi to talk in general terms to Mr. Nehru when he sees him on June 7, and to say that the Commonwealth Secretary will be raising this substantively when he visits Delhi on June 15."
Prime Minister's reply was sent directly to White House.
Rusk
131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson in draft and with the White House, and approved by Talbot.
Washington, June 4, 1962, 8:29 p.m.
6452. Deptel 6441./2/ There follows for you information text of President's reply to Prime Minister's letter of June 4:
/2/Document 130.
"I am very grateful for your 4 June message about fighters for India. If we concert some plan for a counter offer in time to forestall the MIG - 21 deal it will be effort well spent.
I am concerned, however, lest Nehru approve the MIG purchase before we have time to counter it. Galbraith has been promised no final action would be taken until he returns around 15 June. However, we also have reports that it is practically buttoned up. Therefore I would hope that when Gore - Booth sees Nehru on 7 June, he could at least mention that a favorable U.K. offer was in the wind, and seek assurances that no decision would be taken until it could be fully considered. This could help to get us the necessary time."
President's reply was sent directly to Prime Minister.
Rusk
132. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 212. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on June 6, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
SNIE 31/32 - 62
Washington, June 6, 1962.
PROBABLE REACTION OF PAKISTAN TO THE PROVISIONOF SUPERSONIC FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO INDIABY THE US OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES
The Problem
To estimate Pakistan's reaction to the provision of supersonic fighter aircraft to India by the US as a means of forestalling Indian acceptance of MIG - 21s from the USSR. In addition, to assess (a) Pakistan's reactions to provision of comparable fighters by other Western suppliers; (b) Pakistan's reaction to US provision to India of significant military equipment other than fighter aircraft; and (c) India's probable response to Western offers of fighters or other military equipment.
(Note: This estimate does not consider the future military or political implications for India of the acquisition of supersonic fighter aircraft, either from the West or from the USSR.)
Conclusions
A. US provision of F - 104 fighter aircraft to India would draw a sharply adverse reaction from Pakistan. Though we think that Pakistan would be unlikely to repudiate its Western ties, it would almost certainly manifest a greater degree of "independence" in foreign policy, characterized by a markedly increased intransigence toward the US. In particular, Pakistan would certainly not permit expansion of the special US facilities and would probably impose new restrictions on them. (Paras. 2 - 9)
B. The Pakistanis would probably react less severely if supersonic fighters were provided India by the UK, France, or some other Western source. (Para. 10)
C. We believe that the Pakistanis would react as strongly to sizable and long-term US support for Indian ground and naval forces as they would to the provision of F - 104s. (Para. 11)
D. Under present circumstances, we believe it doubtful that India would accept F - 104s or other Western supersonic fighters in lieu of the MIG - 21s. (Paras. 12 - 13)
[Here follows a 3 - page Discussion section.]
133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 962. Top Secret. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Rewinkel and Bromley Smith, and approved by Grant.
Washington, June 9, 1962, 4:08 p.m.
6560. There follows for your information text of Prime Minister Macmillan's message to President of June 7:
Verbatim Text
We have now had a very thorough examination of the practical possibilities for making a counter offer of fighters for India.
In our view there are two aspects of this matter. One is the question of what fighters the Indians will operate for the next two or three years, and the other is what engines they will use for their own future fighters--H.F. 24. We believe that the most important point for the Free World as a whole is to ensure that the Russians do not secure a position in the industrial and technological field in India by persuading the Indians to accept Russian engines for the H.F. 24. As you probably know, the alternative to this is to develop the Orpheus 12 engine. The cost of this development is expected to be about three million pounds and development of the engine could be kept in phase with development of the H.F. 24 itself. We believe that an agreement for the supply of the Orpheus 12 for the H.F. 24 could be quickly reached with the Indians and we would be prepared to press this on them if your government could renew the agreement to contribute three-quarters of the cost of this development of the engine. In this way I would hope that a joint Anglo - American offer could prevent the main danger from materializing.
The immediate problem of providing modern fighters to offset the acquisition by Pakistan of F - 104's is, I fear, more difficult. At the moment the English Electric Company's production of Lightnings is planned on the basis of Royal Air Force needs for which indeed production is at present barely adequate. We have made every effort with the company but it is dear that they could not appreciably expand their production in time to help India, as well as to meet our own requirements. Now that countries in the Middle East and Far East have modern Soviet aircraft in service with their own forces, the Royal Air Force cannot afford to be behind and so we must have the Mark II Lightnings as soon as they come off the production line. As I understand it the only practical alternative to the Lightnings are F - 104's. I know that the Indians have said that they will not take these aircraft, but I would suggest that you could now put very strong pressure on the Indians to accept F - 104's pending the arrival of their own aircraft. After all, they are getting very large sums of money from you which they could not get from anyone else. Could you not represent to them that if they accept Russian offers Congress might resist your proposals for economic aid to India? I would have thought that this would be a very powerful argument.
I am sorry that we cannot do better about the Lightnings but I do seriously believe that the question of the engines is more important and that it should be possible to persuade the Indians to accept your F - 104's. I would hope that Duncan Sandys, who arrives in India about June 16, might be able to deploy the arguments with good effect. End Verbatim Text.
Copies other messages this series have been pouched.
Rusk
134. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 962. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department of State and to the Department of Defense for William Bundy. The source text is the Department of State copy.
Washington, June 9, 1962, 5:44 p.m.
CAP 5279 - 62. Amembassy London pass action to Prime Minister Macmillan as soon as possible and keep as info for Ambassador. From the President.
Dear Prime Minister,
I fully understand your difficulties over Lightning Mark II's for India. I also share your feeling that we must at the very least try to forestall Indian manufacture of MIG's. However, from the standpoint of US public and congressional reaction and its impact on our aid legislation, an initial MIG purchase will be fully as bad. It may compromise the long-range policy of massive aid to India on which we are embarked.
Equally worrisome, we see Krishna Menon embarked on a vital test of strength over this issue, and reportedly on the verge of success.
Therefore, we still regard it as of the highest importance to get in with at least a spoiling offer of aircraft as well as engines by mid-June. We have again reviewed the F - 104 possibility, but regretfully conclude that it involves far too much risk of a disastrous Pakistani reaction involving the Peshawar facilities. An offer of F - 104 would also play hob on our domestic scene. We are trying out the French on Mirage III's but are dubious that they could come through in time.
All this leads me to try once more on Lightnings. Even an offer which was unlikely to be accepted might at least buy us time to dredge up other alternatives. Perhaps you would consider an interim offer of some of the Mark I's and I - A's I understand you have in service, to be replaced later by new models.
We are prepared to do whatever is necessary within reason to fill any temporary gap in your defenses and to make this tough choice otherwise attractive. Secretary McNamara tells me that there are a number of possibilities to this end, including a loan of F - 104's for your defense, and I am prepared to have him or some of his top people come over immediately to discuss them with Watkinson. Let me assure you that I would not tackle you again on this issue, if I did not feel strongly that the Indian MIG deal will have most adverse effects on the interests of us both.
With warm regards, John F Kennedy
135. Telegram From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962, Vol. III. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The telegram apparently was sent to the British Embassy to be conveyed to the White House.
London, June 13, 1962.
T.293/62. Message Begins.
Dear Friend
1. The more we consider the question of the fighter programme for the Indian Air Force from the point of view of making an attractive offer to India, the clearer it becomes that the Indians must be even more concerned with possible methods of payment than with the quality or even the cost of goods and services supplied.
2. On the particular question you put to me in your last message/2/ I am of course most grateful for your offer of the loan of F - 104s. Accept-ance of this offer would however present us with serious training and logistic difficulties. We are equally grateful to you for offering to deploy fighter squadrons to cover any gap created here. Perhaps I could leave this over for the time being.
/2/Document 134.
3. Lightning Mark I's of which we have three squadrons now in front line service in the Royal Air Force would be most unlikely to satisfy Indian requirements. I cannot see the Indians accepting secondhand aircraft however good; also they would need to be refurbished which would take time.
4. Despite its relatively short range, the Lightning Mark 2 is a better aircraft than the MIG because of its superior night fighter capacity. It will cost about #600,000. At a sacrifice which we would only accept because of the major political factors which you mention, we could let the Indians have every other one off the production line; this would give them eight aircraft by the end of 1962 and thereafter two or three a month up to a total of twenty four aircraft.
5. In order to avoid our own difficulties with Pakistan we should in any case have to look to the United States Government to meet the difference in cost between these aircraft and the MIG 21s at the price for which the Russians have offered these to India. It remains most important in my view that the Indians should go on with their plans to manufacture H.F. 24s and we therefore consider the developing of the Orpheus 12 engine to be the more important part of our counter-offer to India. I should be grateful for confirmation that the United States will contribute 75 per cent of the cost of development.
6. I should add that if the Indians commit themselves to a purchase of Lightning Mark 2s they will also need to buy two dual type aircraft for training; an outfit of Fire Streak air-to-air missile and a flight simulator: the total bill for these additional requirements would amount to some five million pounds.
7. The major problem still remains. It is clearly quite impossible for India to pay us for the aircraft (even at three hundred thousand pounds each) and the training facilities and ammunition to a total amount of twelve million pounds except in blocked rupees, which are of no use to us and with which British firms are already embarrassingly well supplied. In our present economic situation I am unable to agree to what amounts to a free gift to India on this scale.
8. The solution would be for you to meet the full cost of supplying the aircraft. The only alternative that we can see is that these goods and services should be supplied to India in replacements for an equivalent amount of civil aid under existing aid programmes. I suspect that there would be considerable fractional difficulties about this, but in any case it is obviously not a suggestion which the Indian Government would accept unless they realized that by buying MIGs they run the risk of curtailment or cessation of American aid which I mentioned in my message to you of June 7./3/
/3/See Document 133.
9. My conclusion therefore is that the only factor which might bring the Indians to heel would be the fear of losing a substantial part of the large scale aid which they receive from the United States. It seems to us therefore that the best course might be for you to send a personal message to Nehru warning him that a decision by India to buy armaments from Russia might prejudice the attitude of Congress so gravely as to endanger seriously India's future prospects of obtaining continuing aid on the present scale from the United States.
10. I should be glad to have your reactions to the ideas I have set out above, and also to learn what reply you have had from the French about the possibility of their supplying Mirages./4/
/4/The French Embassy informed the Department on June 9 that France would have difficulty in offering to supply two squadrons of Mirage II fighters to India. The difficulty lay in a currency problem. The French were concerned that to sell for Indian rupees or on soft terms could not be kept secret and would have undesirable effects on French sales in other parts of the world. (Telegram 6624 to Paris, June 9; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 962)
Yours sincerely,
Harold Macmillan
136. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/11/62 - 6/16/62. Secret. Drafted on June 15 by Komer. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)
Washington, June 14, 1962.
DECISIONS TAKEN AT PRESIDENT'S MEETING ONCOUNTERING MIG SALE TO INDIA, 14 JUNE 1962
PRESENT
The President
Mr. George Ball
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador Galbraith
Ambassador McConaughy
Mr. James P. Grant
Mr. Robert McNamara
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. William P. Bundy
Mr. R.W. Komer
The President was opposed to subsidizing the sale of two Lightning Mark II squadrons to India for rupees, at a likely cost of around $60 million.
Instead he approved telling Prime Minister Macmillan that we would be willing to share 50/50 the hard currency cost of one Lightning squadron. We would also finance 75 per cent of the further development cost of the Orpheus engine, if the Indians accepted the UK offer. To complete the package, he approved a simultaneous US offer to sell India nine C - 130 transports for rupees. All of the above are contingent upon the Indians not buying the MIG - 21.
The President directed that Ambassador Galbraith make a strong presentation to Nehru on the likely blow to US aid prospects if the Indians bought MIGs. He agreed to send a personal letter to Nehru for Galbraith to present after his first talk with Nehru.
The President desired that we tell Ayub frankly why we were trying to forestall an Indian purchase of MIGs. He expressed willingness to write Ayub a personal letter to try to disarm him. He reserved judgment on the suggestion that we attempt to placate Ayub by offering him the public security reassurances he has been seeking.
RWK
137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy Correspondence with Macmillan, 1962 - 1963, Vol. II. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant, William Bundy, and Komer; cleared by McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Karachi and New Delhi.
Washington, June 14, 1962, 8:58 p.m.
6679. Please transmit urgently following message from President to Prime Minister:
We are most appreciative of your willingness to come up with a Lightning Mark II offer, despite the real sacrifice involved. I am concerned, however, lest Nehru's press conference remarks mean that he has all but made up his mind to buy MIGs. The unfortunate leak to The New York Times from Delhi also suggests that it will be difficult to keep the US role in any counter-offer from being too transparent and exposing us to a strong Pakistani as well as domestic US reaction which may jeopardize other programs.
Nonetheless, I still believe that it is in our mutual interest to forestall if possible a crucial step toward Indian acceptance of the USSR as a main source of arms supply. Even if we fail in this endeavor, we want to deprive hostile elements in India of the argument that India had no reasonable alternative.
Therefore, we emphatically support the Orpheus engine offer, and will finance 75 per cent of the three million pounds additional you estimate is required to develop it.
As you know, we believe that it is equally important to offer some aircraft in order to provide an alternative comparable to the MIG offer. We share your view that reasonably comparable soft currency terms will also carry great weight with the Indians, and that we should allow payment in rupees to the extent necessary.
In reflecting we have looked again at the possibility of offering to provide Nehru transport aircraft, on which his need vis-a-vis the Communist Chinese is much more valid than for the fighters, and where the Pakistani reaction would be minimized. Accordingly, I conclude that the farthest we should now go is to offer to sell India a single squadron (12 aircraft) of the Lightning Mark II, for rupees at a stated price of perhaps 300,000 pounds, plus accessories which we suppose would be about 3 million pounds or a little more than half of the 5 million estimate for the two squadrons. In addition, we on the US side would offer to provide nine C - 130 transports as a sale for rupees. This latter would of course be left to Galbraith, but Sandys could refer to indications from us in this direction.
If you were prepared to do this, we would hope that you could bear one-half of the real cost of the fighters, which would total about 10.2 million pounds. We would make up the rest through some means involving greater participation in military research projects, or through some economic aid sharing, or a combination of the two. Our joint interests are such, as I am sure you will agree, that we should not hesitate to reallocate financial responsibilities in order to advance our common interests or minimize our common difficulties. I trust that these assurances are sufficient so that you can go ahead with an offer of twelve Lightnings as well as the Orpheus.
We are of course anxious to forestall a violent Pakistani reaction, for reasons I have mentioned. In our approach to the Pakistanis, we should both tell them frankly that it is to save them and us from something worse, i.e., a major Soviet re-equipment of the Indians of a nature we cannot control.
Let me also assure you that we are bending every effort to bring home to Nehru how a MIG purchase might gravely prejudice Congressional approval of continued massive US aid. I had already sent a brief message to Nehru, and am instructing Galbraith to make a full-scale assault as soon as he returns. Sandys too could certainly mention the great concern in Washington lest a MIG deal undermine our whole aid program.
The French reaction is negative so far. But I think you will agree that we should give India the impression, if possible, that there is more than one Western alternative to MIGs. Hence we will continue explorations with the French.
With warm regards.
Rusk
138. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/6 - 1562. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and McGhee and cleared by Grant, Cameron, McGhee, and McConaughy.
Washington, June 15, 1962.
SUBJECT
U.S. - Pakistan Relations
There is enclosed a memorandum prepared at the request of Mr. McGhee for the President, outlining the current status of U.S. - Pakistan relations. This memorandum has been approved by Ambassador McConaughy, who is presently in Washington.
Further consideration is being given to moves on our part which can improve U.S. - Pakistan relations, in particular to overcome problems arising from U.S. involvement in the India MIG - 21 issue. The President may wish to have a review of the results of this investigation prior to Ambassador McConaughy's departure.
A.E. Breisky/2/
/2/Breisky signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
Enclosure/3/
/3/Secret.
U.S. - PAKISTAN RELATIONS
We have maintained a close and for the most part friendly alliance with Pakistan since 1954. We and Pakistan have mutually benefited by this alliance, although they and we view it from a different perspective. Recent strains on both partners have caused both to re-examine the value of the alliance. Despite indications that the various causes of strains will not be easy to eliminate, it seems clear that it is in the best national interest of both the U.S. and Pakistan to continue the alliance.
I. The Nature of the Alliance
There exists between the U.S. and Pakistan an extensive range of scientific, cultural, educational, military and political common interests.
The basic objective of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is to insure to the best of our ability its continued existence as an independent nation with a healthy economic development firmly integrated in the non-communist world. We have assisted Pakistan on a massive basis economically and militarily, and to a lesser extent politically. We have guaranteed Pakistan's security against aggression from any quarter. In return we have asked Pakistan to allow us to maintain in the country military communications and intelligence facilities which we consider vital to our national interests. We expect Pakistan to stand with us politically on the major issues dividing the free world from the communist bloc; and stand with us militarily to the extent that it can contribute to regional collective security within the framework of CENTO and SEATO.
The basic objectives of Pakistan policy toward the U.S. are to insure that it can maintain a military capability sufficient to prevent its neighbors, most particularly India, from attempting solutions of outstanding disputes by force; and that it can undertake its much needed economic development under the general protection of the U.S. against the long-range communist threat to its existence.
Pakistan has granted us facilities, the existence of which have brought regional pressure and specific threats of war-like action to bear against it. Pakistan has stood up firmly, after the U - 2 incident for example, to this pressure. Pakistan has stood with us on every major political issue except the question of admission of Communist China to the UN.
In return Pakistan has asked us for economic and military assistance, and strong political and moral support on those issues which it considers vital to its existence as an independent nation, principally Kashmir and to a lesser degree the Pakistan - Afghanistan border problem.
II. Background
The course of U.S. - Pakistan relations has been irregular over the last several years. At times when interests seemed to coincide, or when one of the partners in the alliance had a particular need, relations have been excellent. At other times when doubt and frustration on the part of Pakistan as to the validity and utility of its commitment has caused it to question the alliance, or when our irritation at some particular action of Pakistan's made us do likewise, relations have worsened appreciably. We are currently in a low period similar to the one existing before President Ayub's visit to the U.S. in 1961. At that time Pakistan considered the new Administration to be so biased in favor of India as to be detrimental to Pakistan's interests.
However, U.S. - Pakistan relations improved markedly as a result of President Ayub's visit during which both countries were reassured as to the good intentions of the other. President Ayub left the U.S. with these understandings on the subjects of his main interests:
Kashmir
a. The President would make a major effort in November 1961 to get Nehru to negotiate reasonably on Kashmir.
b. If this effort were unsuccessful, the U.S. would then support Pakistan when it again took the issue to the Security Council.
U.S. Military Assistance to India
The U.S. had no current intention of changing its policy on providing military assistance to India and would not unless circumstances in the area altered--for example, if an increased military threat to India from Communist China became apparent. In any case, the U.S. would not change its policy without prior consultation with Pakistan.
Afghanistan
There was a fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and Pakistan on how Pakistan should deal with Afghanistan, but the U.S. would not stand in the way of a Pakistan attempt to deal firmly with the Afghans.
Communist China
The U.S. knew that Pakistan was planning to demarcate its northern border with Communist China in order to prevent a situation similar to the one in Ladakh from arising in Pakistan.
Economic and Military Assistance
The U.S. intended to undertake a thorough look at Pakistan's waterlogging and salinity problem with a view to seeing whether we could not start a practical program to solve it. The U.S. planned to be similarly forthcoming with regard to its other assistance programs, including our part in the Indus Waters scheme and the Second Five Year Plan. Concerning military assistance, the U.S. planned to maintain its current policy and, in addition, supply a squadron of C - 130 transport aircraft.
On our side we had substantially the same understandings except for the one in Afghanistan. President Ayub left the impression that, when he spoke of dealing firmly with the Afghans, he was referring to military reprisals by Pakistan against Afghan incursions into Pakistan territory rather than any political actions.
III. Pakistan's Policies Since Ayub Visit
Afghanistan
Our relations with Pakistan took a turn for the worse about a month after Ayub's visit when Pakistan unilaterally and brusquely ordered Afghanistan to close its consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan. Afghanistan thereupon broke off relations with Pakistan and sealed the common border, which has remained closed, except for eight weeks, ever since September 6, 1961. Despite our good offices, including Ambassador Merchant's mission, the situation remains unresolved. We continue to consider that, despite Afghanistan's illogical and stubborn policy, Pakistan has played into the hands of the Soviet Union by its pre-emptory action.
Kashmir
The President attempted without success in November to get Nehru to negotiate on Kashmir. Because of this, and spurred on by what appeared to be a genuine fear of Indian aggressive intent after the Indian seizure of Goa, Pakistan carried through on its plan to take the Kashmir issue to the Security Council, although delaying this move several times at our request while we tried various ways of getting Pakistan and India together--including the President's proposal to send Eugene Black on a good offices mission. There is a definite feeling among Pakistanis--officials and private citizens alike--that we have not lived up fully to the President's commitment to support Pakistan in the UN. Recent efforts by USUN may have changed this opinion to some extent among Pakistan officials, but the general belief remains among the people that the U.S. has let Pakistan down.
U.S. Military Assistance to India
Pakistan's distrust of U.S. intentions was heightened in May by reports that Ambassador Galbraith had attempted to counter an Indian plan to acquire MIG - 21's from the Soviet Union by offering to provide F - 104's. The fact that India was attempting to build a supersonic capability revived the fear that had been aroused by the Goa take-over. The U.S. has attempted to allay this fear in several ways after Goa, including a confidential renewal of U.S. security guarantees for Pakistan which were contained in a letter from the President to Ayub last January./4/ Despite these assurances, Pakistanis at all levels continue to distrust India--particularly Krishna Menon--and appear to be genuinely apprehensive at the possibility of an attack from India.
/4/See Document 100.
Communist China
When Pakistan and Communist China announced jointly in May that they intended to negotiate the border between Pakistan-held Kashmir and Singhiang Province, India reacted sharply in the belief that both Pakistan and Communist China were attempting to put pressure on India. Although the U.S. has maintained official silence on the subject, early press reports gave Pakistan officials the idea that the U.S. was displeased at Pakistan action. The Pakistan Ambassador here and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary in Karachi have gone to great lengths to justify Pakistan's policy on this matter.
U.S. Economic and Military Assistance
Pakistan was greatly reassured by U.S. support which resulted in the IBRD Consortium's pledging the full amount requested for the first two years of the Second Five Year Plan. However, the delay in issuance of the report from Dr. Wiesner's office on salinity, and the revisions that have had to be made on the Indus Waters scheme have aroused doubts in Pakistan as to the validity of our commitments. On the military side Pakistan defense officials desire to maintain close association with the U.S. but are worried that we do not reciprocate. Washington rumors and delays in MAAG programming and deliveries have accentuated these fears. Pakistan defense officials have also been putting pressure on us in CENTO, SEATO and within the framework of our bilateral understanding to engage in contingency planning against possible attack from India or Afghanistan.
The accumulation of doubt and frustration in Pakistan as a result of the foregoing has led politically aware Pakistanis to question the value of Pakistan's alliance just at a time when a measure of political freedom returned to the country after over three and a half years of martial law. The newly convened National Assembly will have some restraint on the power of the Executive and Ayub will thus have to be responsive or at least alert to its wishes. He will not be able to make decisions affecting Pakistan's foreign policy posture without being more responsive to the pressure of public opinion than he has in the past. There have been some recent indications of a possible reappraisal by Pakistan of its alignment with the West. Logically, however, it would seem that Pakistan has really no practical alternative to its alliance with the U.S. Despite increasingly bold opposition, Ayub can be expected to follow substantially the same course as he has in the past.
IV. Recent U.S. Attitudes
Beginning with Pakistan's abrupt action against Afghanistan in August 1961, our view of Pakistan's course of action has become more and more critical. It has seemed that Pakistan is asking for more from us than we are prepared to give in order to maintain our special relationship. Furthermore, Pakistan's actions have at times seemed to have been taken without sufficient consultation with us and there has been an increasing breakdown of communication.
Some of the major irritants have been listed above--i.e., Pakistan - Afghanistan impasse, Kashmir, Pakistan - Chinese Communist relations, differing views on CENTO and SEATO. In connection with the latter organization, Ayub recently failed to respond to the U.S. suggestion to send token forces to Thailand.
We too have been taking stock of the alliance in the light of the unsatisfactory relations of the past year. Pakistan seems determined to try to limit U.S. freedom of action with respect to India and to a lesser extent, with respect to Afghanistan. The present judgment is that the value of our special relationship with Pakistan, particularly in the military field, is such that we cannot contemplate withdrawal from the alliance. We cannot, furthermore, yet accept the dissolution of CENTO and SEATO, which might follow if Pakistan on its side withdrew.
Conclusion
We recognize the difficulties which we face ahead in trying simultaneously to maintain our relationship with Pakistan and to develop an increasingly effective relationship with India. Nevertheless, continuation of the alliance is in our interest. Not only is a free and cooperative Pakistan essential to the stability and security of South Asia and to our presence there, but there is no satisfactory alternative site for our facilities which are vital to our national interest.
139. Memorandum for the Record/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 6/20/62 - 6/24/62. Secret. Drafted by Komer on June 20. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
Washington, June 19, 1962, 4 p.m.
Meeting with the President on India-Pakistan Problems
PRESENT
The President
Mr. G. McGhee
Mr. J. Grant
Ambassador McConaughy
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. R. Komer
1. The President approved a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's messages of 18/2/ and 19 June/3/ on a counter-offer to forestall Indian purchase of MIG - 21s. He accepted Mr. McGhee's arguments as to why we couldn't sell F - 104s to India for rupees, even though it was technically feasible to do so. These were chiefly the likely strong Pakistani reaction, which might even lead to restrictions on our key intelligence facilities, and secondarily the likely Congressional reaction. The President agreed to tell Macmillan that we would pay more than half the hard currency costs of a Lightning squadron if necessary, especially if we could find some way to minimize the dollar drain involved.
/2/Macmillan's message of June 18 to Kennedy reported on two "difficult" conversations that British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys had with Nehru concerning the Indian desire to purchase supersonic aircraft. Nehru stated that the F - 104 fighters supplied to Pakistan by the United States had created a strong public demand in India for comparable aircraft. Of the Western aircraft being considered, the Indian military viewed the British Lightning fighter as least suited to their needs. Only the Soviet MIG, in Nehru's view, could be produced and offered at a price India could afford. An offer of Western aircraft at a comparable price would amount to military assistance and compromise India's neutrality. (Telegram 6781 to London, June 18; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 1862)
/3/On June 19, Macmillan informed Kennedy that he had received a further report from Sandys which was more optimistic. Sandys had learned from Indian President Radhakrishnan that Nehru was concerned about the strong U.S. and British reactions to the projected purchase of MIGs, and would be glad to find a way to resolve the issue that did not involve too much loss of face. Radhakrishnan and Desai had urged Nehru to put the question into "cold storage" for several months. (Telegram 6792 to London, June 19; ibid., 791.5622/6 - 1962)
2. Ambassador McConaughy explained how he would propose to explain our maneuvers to Ayub, depending upon the possible outcome in Delhi. The President instructed Ambassador McConaughy to tell Ayub in the event our counter-offer seemed likely to be accepted that we were serving Pakistani interests as well as ours, and that a Western-controlled supply of jets to India was infinitely preferable to uncontrolled reliance on Soviet sources. On the other hand, if the MIG deal went through we should tell them that it didn't change the military balance much (as a hedge against new Pakistani requests for jets), and explain that counter offers to India had been in an attempt to spoil this deal. The President was dubious about giving more jets to the Pakistani regardless of what happened.
3. The desirability of meeting the Pakistani request for bilateral joint planning vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan was discussed. Although Ambassador McConaughy pointed out how the Pakistani argued that this was purely contingency planning of the sort any two allied general staffs would normally carry out, the President was opposed to our engaging in any joint planning which might leak to the Indians and suggest that we were planning with the Paks against them.
4. Mr. McGhee noted the Pakistani desire for a public US guarantee of Pakistan's security against Indian aggression. He felt that reiteration of the Pak guarantee in some form might be essential to mollify Ayub if we and the UK supplied planes to India. The President said he was extremely reluctant to give any new commitments to the Pakistani; he queried why we got into such commitments in the first place. Mr. McGhee briefly explained the history of our past "guarantees" to Pakistan and India.
Mr. McGhee suggested that if we could get the two countries, perhaps in the UN discussion on Kashmir, to make public statements disavowing any intention of attacking each other, the US could then come out with a public statement noting these declarations and "guaranteeing" the security of each in event of aggression by the other. Mr. Grant noted that our main objective in supplying such security reassurances to Pakistan was to forestall their "doing something" to our Peshawar facilities in retaliation for what they regarded as pro-Indian US actions. The President reserved judgment on any such idea, and asked that it be studied further when the occasion arose.
The President said that perhaps he ought to have one more meeting with McConaughy before the latter returned to Pakistan; he also thought that he might write a letter to Ayub.
R.W. Komer
140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 1962. Top Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cameron and Komer, cleared by McGhee, and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, and Paris eyes only for Rusk.
Washington, June 19, 1962, 8:52 p.m.
6801. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Please transmit urgently following message from President to Prime Minister:
"I am much encouraged by your message of June 19th./2/ We too are hopeful that we can shake the Indians sufficiently to get the whole question put into cold storage for a while. However, we are not sanguine at this point that even Desai and Radhakrishnan will be able to match Menon's inevitable counter-arguments. We need to strengthen the hand of our friends as much as possible at this critical juncture.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 139.
Therefore, while I agree with you that we need not reach any irrevocable decisions now about what we are prepared to offer the Indians, I believe that we should dangle a bit more bait before them than Sandys felt able to do. A spoiling offer of this sort seems all the more important to me if we think Nehru is unlikely to buy it. It seems to me that Nehru might best save face by rejecting what both sides have to offer at this point. And even if he ultimately buys MIGs we want to put our friends in India in a position to say in the event of an aid cut or other adverse consequences that Krishna Menon and his supporters brought down disaster on India by pushing through the MIG deal despite the fact of a reasonable alternative.
Galbraith too thinks there is some chance that if we make enough of a fuss about their taking MIGs, combined with a good counter offer, the Indians may end up taking neither in the immediate months ahead. This would be the best outcome by far.
However, Nehru's response to Sandys confirms our feeling that to offer the Orpheus engine alone would not suffice even for our minimum purposes. Therefore, it still seems important to us that some supersonic fighters be at least tentatively offered as well. The Mirage seems out and we are not able to sell 104's for rupees at this time. On the one hand, we fear that if the US provided this type of equipment to India for the first time, Ayub would be unable to contain a Pakistani reaction which might endanger our use of the key facilities of which you are aware. On the other hand, Nehru would be least likely of all, from his domestic political viewpoint, to consider an offer of 104's from us as a real alternative to that from the USSR. We also would have a most difficult domestic problem. Finally, either the Mirage or 104 would involve the same element of subsidy to which Nehru objects. So we are thrust back on the Lightning.
Let me add that Galbraith has just come in from Delhi urging that a plausible alternative beyond the Orpheus remains essential if Menon is not to have a clear hand. As I see it, only Lightnings offer this alternative.
For these reasons, I hope you can agree to indicating to the Indians that if they are interested you are prepared to discuss with them a sale of one squadron of Lightnings on reasonably competitive terms. If the financial side of the package we proposed gives you serious problems, I am prepared to pick up a greater share of the cost, especially if the dollar drain can be minimized; however, I recognize that the Indians might not accept Lightnings in any event.
In the last analysis, you and I share a great responsibility for attempting to forestall an expanded Soviet military presence in the sub-continent. We only press the Lightning offer upon you because a comparable Western alternative to MIGs, even if not accepted, seems so important to keeping up the pressure which we both agree is essential at this point./3/
With warm regards,"
Ball
/3/Macmillan responded on June 20 that he agreed with Kennedy's general assessment and had given instructions for re-examination of the possibility of selling Lightnings with a view to formulating proposals for the Indians. (Telegram 6825 to London, June 20; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2062)
141. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2062. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Secretary and to London and Karachi for the Charge and/or Ambassador only.
New Delhi, June 20, 1962, midnight.
4119. Eyes Only for President. I met Nehru for an hour at 7:15 and, subject to finding a definite alternative to MIGs and Menon's operations on return, I am reasonably encouraged. Though looking tired Nehru was alert and seemed less affected by his illness than I had expected. Except for pleasantries at beginning and end entire discussion was on the MIGs. I made these points:
(1) That our concern was with effect acquisition on Indian reputation for neutrality and nonalignment and political effect in US. Interpretation was more important than the fact. I noted that word MIG like U-boat was highly evocative and that we hadn't raised objection to 12s or helicopters.
(2) That purchase would be for rupees and no one, myself included, would perceive that food sales for rupees was aid while airplane sales for rupees a commercial transaction.
(3) [apparent omission] Expensive and sophisticated weapons in the area, that we continued to believe the main chance lay with economic development which these planes put in double jeopardy by adverse Congressional reaction as well as diversion of resources.
In response Nehru said that MIGs had come to attention in normal course of looking at supersonic fighters. Investigating officers "not at all pro-Soviet" found them simpler and better suited to manufacture in India than American, British, French. He cited particular doubts about the Lightning. Indians were also attracted by the price. He then said he appreciated our reaction and the problem that the purchase would present for the President vis-a-vis the Congress and public.
On the matter of aid he tried somewhat unenthusiastically to insist this was a commercial purchase and the rupees would soon be spent in the normal course of events. I responded with an argument previously used that this put a curious interpretation on our restraint on spending rupees. In the end, I think he rather yielded the point.
Nehru then said that he was of two minds on buying such equipment and perhaps they were safer without it. He agreed only because Pakistan had the planes, recalling his refusal of an offer of planes by Eisenhower. I took the occasion to give him a fill-in on background of arms aid to Pakistanis, the technical limitations of supersonic fighters and to minimize the importance of the resulting Pakistan air power. I noted that we were not offering India 104s because we accepted her policy of nonalignment. We would be in a poor position to protest aid from the Soviets that impaired that policy if we offered it ourselves.
There was a good deal more discussion in this vein but the foregoing will give the general flavor. Toward the end the following 3 points of importance emerged:
(1) Nehru said that no offer has been made by the Soviets and no negotiations have been entered into. In response to a direct question he said that while despatch of an investigating team was being considered there would be "no decision in the immediate future or the near future."
(2) I asked him to consider a British counter-offer on comparable terms, including the Orpheus, and noted our willingness should the need arise to help on dual-purposes materiel relative to the Northern border. While I mentioned the C - 130 as an example, I left the numbers fuzzy, recalling that we had previously helped him out with similar equipment. He said he would consider British offer.
(3) He said that Sandys had reminded him of the promise to consult before going to the Soviets for planes, a promise which he said had slipped his mind. He had given promise at behest of Mountbatten, implying that it wouldn't have been given to anyone else. He left me with the impression that he intends rather reluctantly to honor it.
I have the impression of substantial progress in getting the deal postponed. This is on the assumption of a counter-offer which it will be evident was always essential in the background and, needless to say, Menon will bend every effort to remove the block when he gets back, and his ability to do so is of course related to the Prime Minister's susceptible state of health. During the next few days I will talk with Morarji Desai and, should he initiate the discussion, with TTK, but I must avoid seeming to build up a campaign. The press swarmed over me after my meeting and in view of the special sensitivity of our role in this matter I said nothing either on the record, off the record, or for background and would urge the same curious [cautious?] policy on Washington.
Galbraith
142. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2162. Top Secret; Niact.
New Delhi, June 21, 1962, 11 a.m.
4122. Eyes Only for Acting Secretary. Pass White House for President. Reference Embassy telegram 4119./2/ With President's agreement I would urge a letter along following lines. The purpose as you will see is to confirm the fact of delay and consideration of a British alternative.
/2/Document 141.
"I was very glad to get Ambassador Galbraith's report of his talk with you. The news that the purchase is not imminent and that you will be able to consider an alternative British offer comes to us as a real relief. I am not less grateful for knowing that you are under considerable political pressure on the matter.
"As Galbraith has told you the word MIG arouses special emotion and in this election year here we have been having particular trouble with aid legislation. Apart from the India cut, which we have succeeded for the moment in getting largely restored, and Poland and Yugoslavia where we have come to expect trouble, we had a serious setback on payments to the Philippines. This was particularly indicative of the Congressional mood for our good relations with that country have always been an especial source of pride in the Congress and throughout the US.
"I am sure you realize that we do not want to put pressure on our friends or even seem to do so and decisions such as these are wholly yours. But where, as in this case, they involve matters of deep common concern, and in particular our ability to help each other, I know you would wish me to place the problem before you.
"Ambassador Galbraith told me that he found you looking decidedly more fit than the newspaper accounts of your illness had led him to expect. I am delighted and I hope the improvement continues and that you accord yourself the proper care."/3/
Galbraith
/3/In telegram 4304 to New Delhi, June 21, Galbraith was instructed to deliver the text contained in telegram 4122 to Nehru not as a letter but as a personal message from President Kennedy. The telegram, sent eyes only for Galbraith, cautioned that the White House was concerned that there be no leaks about the message "in view of possible repercussions." (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2162) Galbraith indicated in telegram 4183 from New Delhi, Document 147, that the message had been delivered.
143. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted on July 3 by Gatch and approved in M on July 11.
Washington, June 21, 1962.
SUBJECT
Supersonic Aircraft for India
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan Embassy
Mr. Salman Ali, Political Counselor, Pakistan Embassy
M - Mr. McGhee
NEA - Mr. Grant
SOA - John N. Gatch
Mr. McGhee told the Ambassador that he wanted to describe in general terms the efforts on the part of the U.S. and the U.K. to forestall Soviet penetration of the Indian military establishment by the provision of MIG - 21s. Mr. McGhee said that we saw the situation as follows: India has a threat to its borders from Communist China; to meet this threat and to balance its air strength with Pakistan's F - 104s, India had been seriously considering acquiring a supersonic capability; and we and the U.K. thought that, if India was determined to acquire these planes, it would be better for the planes to come from the West. We believed Soviet influence in the Indian Air Force undesirable, and further believed if there were no alternatives to the Soviets, Krishna Menon's hand would be strengthened in the coming struggle for succession in India.
Mr. McGhee said that, for the foregoing reasons, the U.S. and the U.K. had been discussing the possibility of the U.S. selling India some unspecified transport aircraft and of the U.K. selling some Lightning aircraft. In addition the U.K. was considering the offer of an engine that India could manufacture. He pointed out that both we and the U.K. had supplied India with this type of equipment in the past. He made no specific mention of terms of payment. Mr. McGhee emphasized the U.S. conviction that we and the U.K. were acting in Pakistan's interest as well as our own in this regard.
Ambassador Ahmed said his government disagreed on the seriousness of the Indian threat from the north. Furthermore, India had been informed in May 1960 that Pakistan was going to get F - 104s and was only now raising a howl about it. The Ambassador said his government believed India's real motive in getting jets was to increase its strength toward Pakistan. The Indian seizure of Goa, the several bellicose and belligerent statements made by Indian political leaders during the past six months, and now this attempt to get supersonic planes all convinced Pakistan that India meant to threaten it rather than Communist China.
The Ambassador said that there would be an adverse effect on public opinion in Pakistan if the West supplied supersonic aircraft to India. His government was not really convinced that the Soviets had made a genuine offer, and believed the Indians might be using the threat of an offer as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the West to make a counter offer.
Mr. Grant interrupted to say that, according to intelligence available to us, the Soviets were prepared to supply MIG - 21s to India if asked, and would do so rather quickly if the Indians accepted the offer.
Ambassador Ahmed said that, in any case, a Western offer, if accepted, will amount to a grant of military assistance to India. The people of Pakistan would view this as an unfriendly act perpetrated by two countries--i.e., the U.S. and the U.K., who are supposed to be Pakistan's allies. Pakistan believed that if India was determined to have supersonic jets, it would be better if they came from the USSR rather than the West. This would at least widen the split between the USSR and Communist China. If, on the other hand, the planes come from the West, tensions will mount between Pakistan and India because the latter will feel free to take a tougher line on Kashmir than in the past.
Mr. McGhee said that Pakistan should be less rather than more apprehensive if India got planes from the West since the West would be in a position to limit the supply. He added that the U.S. doubts that India has any intention of committing aggression against Pakistan.
Mr. Grant reminded Aziz Ahmed that on May 28 the Ambassador had expressed the concern of his government that an Indian supersonic acquisition would result in a serious military imbalance in South Asia. The U.S. and the U.K. are trying to prevent just such a situation since, once Soviets are in the field, they can, and probably will, aggravate any imbalance to suit their own purposes. Mr. Grant added that we see three advantages to the Western counter offer: (1) anti-Menon forces in India will be strengthened; (2) there is a possibility of a long delay before the Indians make up their minds to take either plane; and (3) even if the Western offer is accepted there will be less chance of a real imbalance being created.
Ambassador Ahmed replied that a long delay was unlikely, because both Nehru and Krishna Menon had made this a prestige issue. The serious thing, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is that the West is setting a new pattern by this offer to supply arms to India. The West has no assurances that, even if India accepts the Western offer this time, the Indians would not later turn to the Soviets for different types of military aid. India would thus have the means of putting almost unlimited pressure on the West. In Pakistan the difference between U.S. policy towards allies and neutrals would be further blurred.
Mr. Grant said that the central problem remained to prevent a major additional imbalance in the subcontinent. We have had and continue to have the closest sort of relationship with Pakistan as an ally. We believe we are acting in Pakistan's best interests.
Mr. McGhee said there was a basic contradiction in Pakistan's position. On the one hand it wanted to prevent or minimize an imbalance and on the other it believed it would be preferable to have the planes come from the Soviet Union. Such an arrangement would establish an open-ended channel for an Indian military buildup.
The Ambassador asked what specifically he could tell his government. Mr. McGhee said that the U.S. and the U.K. had been discussing means of forestalling the Soviet attempt to provide India with MIG - 21s. Duncan Sandys and Ambassador Galbraith had had separate conversations with Nehru and had each elaborated on the possible adverse consequences for India of a MIG - 21 transaction. They had encouraged Nehru to explore the possibility of Western alternatives before making a decision. No specific offer to India had been made and no financial terms had been discussed.
The Ambassador thanked Mr. McGhee and Mr. Grant for the information.
144. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2262. Confidential.
Washington, June 22, 1962.
SUBJECT
Developments in the Kashmir Dispute Before the Security Council
We thought it would be useful to recapitulate briefly some of the principal developments regarding the Kashmir case in the Security Council.
You will recall that the genesis of our intimate involvement with the Kashmir dispute before the Security Council arose during Pakistani President Ayub's visit to the United States last year. Among other things Ayub felt that he had received a commitment from the President to support Pakistan if the issue of Kashmir were raised by Pakistan in the Security Council. After India had rejected the Black mission, Pakistan, against the advice of the United States, in fact brought the Kashmir issue to the Security Council. It soon became clear that Pakistan expected the United States to assume a major active responsibility for advancing Pakistan's position and that an excessively broad interpretation was being placed by Pakistan on the President's commitment. Accordingly, the Department sought to limit Pakistan's interpretation that the United States should actively manage the Kashmir issue in the Security Council to a successful conclusion (Pakistan is not a member of the Security Council). A working definition of the President's commitment was, therefore, agreed in the Department and transmitted by memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the White House, on May 17, 1962 (Tab A)./2/ The working definition reads as follows:
/2/Not printed.
"With respect to the Security Council, we believe the United States is committed to sympathetic consideration of and support for any Pakistan initiatives in the Security Council which advance a settlement of the problem. This would include sponsorship of a Pakistan draft resolution even if it were to draw a Soviet veto. We would vote in favor of resolutions which are consonant with the earlier United Nations resolutions (UNCIP) and attempt to enlist support among other members of the Security Council for such resolutions. The United States is not committed, in our view, to vote in favor of any resolution which radically departs from the intent of the earlier resolutions, although we would, of course, examine any such resolution on its merits."
Meanwhile, our Mission in New York had been instructed to encourage the Pakistani Delegation to put forward its own proposals and resolutions which we would then hope to be able to support. The reason behind this instruction was that, in view of the excessive interpretation by Pakistan of the President's commitment, it was important to make clear to the Pakistanis that we were in fact discharging the commitment, once and for all. This tactic proved effective and on May 15, 1962, Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistani Representative at the United Nations, presented the United States Delegation with two texts of resolutions. Zafrulla at the same time also informed our Delegation that he would see the Irish representative, Ambassador Boland, on the next day and seek his sponsorship of a resolution (New York's 3745)./3/ On May 17 the Department instructed the Mission to welcome the submission by Pakistan of both draft texts and offer to sponsor and work for the adoption of either (Deptel 2983 to New York)./4/ On May 19 in a conversation with President Ayub and the Pakistani Foreign Minister, our Ambassador underscored our offer to sponsor and work for the adoption of either draft resolution as a significant affirmative decision on our part in implementation of the President's assurances to President Ayub of last summer (Karachi's 2044)./5/
/3/Dated May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5 - 1562)
/4/Dated May 15. (Ibid.)
/5/Dated May 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/5 - 2062)
Pursuant to Zafrulla's initiative, Ambassador Boland of Ireland together with the United Nations representatives of Ghana, Chile, Venezuela, and the United Arab Republic attempted to draft a resolution acceptable both to Pakistan and India. Behind the scenes we strongly encouraged this initiative to have others sponsor the resolution and worked to assure a feasible text. On June 5 the Boland drafting group (the so-called Little Five) made its final drafting concession to the Indian position by changing a specific reference to third-party assistance to a broader reference to Article 33 of the Charter. This was done in an attempt to keep the Little Five together in the face of the wavering UAR Delegate (New York's 3913)./6/ However, unrelenting Indian counterpressure against this resolution was being exerted in the Little Five capitals, in New York and in New Delhi where Krishna Menon charged that the Little Five were fronting for the United States and the United Kingdom (New Delhi's 3944)./7/
/6/Dated June 5. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 562)
/7/Dated June 8. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 862)
By the time Menon had arrived in New York on June 17 the UAR and Ghana had already decided not to co-sponsor the compromise resolution. The Chilean representative had also backed out of sponsorship on his own initiative, thus reducing the Little Five to Ireland and Venezuela. Although the UAR and Ghana defections had been expected to occur despite our persistent efforts, the Chilean action was an unpleasant surprise. Further efforts were being taken to hold the group together when the Venezuelan Delegate, expecting to be a candidate for a high General Assembly office in 1963, showed signs of losing his nerve before Menon's onslaught. Accordingly, on June 19, the Department telephoned the Embassies in Caracas and Santiago to request that the Venezuelan and Chilean representatives co-sponsor, or in the case of the Chilean representative, at least vote for the compromise resolution (Deptel to Caracas 1295, Santiago 1004)./8/ The representations in Santiago appear to have been successful in assuring an affirmative Chilean vote (Santiago's
/8/Both dated June 19. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 1862)
1060)/9/ and Embassy Caracas reported that the Venezuelan Delegate had an absolutely free hand (Caracas 1475)./10/ Presumably in the interests of his personal aspirations this Delegate then exercised his free hand to withdraw from co-sponsorship, at which stage the Irish Delegate expressed unwillingness to be the sole sponsor. Our Mission immediately made a further effort, assisted by the Irish and French Delegates, to persuade the Venezuelan Delegate to co-sponsor but he flatly refused. In order to keep the resolution alive, our Delegation later that afternoon (June 20) discussed the entire situation with the Pakistani Delegation and acceded to its request that the United States sponsor alone, if necessary, the Little Five text (New York's 4071)./11/ Two steps were then taken. In order to maintain pressure for the Chilean affirmative vote, essential to a Security Council majority, our Embassy in Santiago again was instructed to approach the Foreign Office and by telephone on June 21 the Embassy reported the Chilean Delegate had a free hand. Meanwhile, the Irish and British Delegations had, at our Mission's behest, recommended to their governments that they be permitted to co-sponsor with the United States. A rapid response was received the morning of June 21--the Irish could not co-sponsor with the United States; the British would if we requested them to do so. Simultaneously our Embassy in New Delhi warned against US - UK co-sponsorship (New Delhi's 4131)./12/
/9/Dated June 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 2062)
/10/Dated June 19. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 1962)
/11/Dated June 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 2062)
/12/Dated June 21. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 2162)
At this point, the White House was consulted directly and the President decided personally to persuade the Irish to sponsor the compromise resolution alone./13/ He was successful and a favorable Irish reply has now been received. Meanwhile, the Department instructed our Mission in New York to seek a 24-hour postponement of Security Council consideration of the Kashmir debate. Accordingly, at the afternoon meeting of the Council on June 21, against Soviet and Indian objections, the United States proposed and the Council approved by a 7 - 2 - 2 vote that the meeting be postponed until 3 p.m. on June 22. We expect the Irish to put forward the compromise Kashmir resolution at that time.
/13/According to a telephone conversation on June 21 between Cleveland and Ball, President Kennedy phoned the Irish Ambassador in order to get Ireland "back on board." (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subjects, India, 1961 - 1963)
As you can see from the above, we have operated on two basic assumptions: (a) that it would be strongly preferable to have other Security Council members sponsor the resolution; and (b) that if this did not prove feasible, the commitment to Pakistan required us to sponsor a reasonable resolution.
145. Editorial Note
On June 22, 1962, the U.N. Security Council met to conclude the debate on Kashmir which grew out of the initial request by Pakistan on January 11 for a meeting of the Council to consider the issue. (See Document 89.) Frederick H. Boland, Ireland's Representative to the Council, submitted a draft resolution that made reference to earlier resolutions adopted by the Council concerning Kashmir and, in light of those resolutions, urged India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations to seek a settlement to the dispute. (U.N. Document S/5134) After a lengthy debate, in which the Indian and Pakistani Representatives repeated well-established positions, the Council voted in favor of the resolution by a vote of 7 - 2, with 2 abstentions. (U.N. Document S/PV.1016) The United States voted in favor of the resolution, which was vetoed by the negative vote cast by the Representative of the Soviet Union.
In India, Prime Minister Nehru reacted to the Security Council vote in a statement made on June 23 during a foreign policy debate in the Indian Parliament. Nehru expressed "deep regret and sorrow" that the United States and the United Kingdom should "almost invariably be against us" on subjects like Goa and Kashmir. He stated that the Kashmir debate had "hurt and injured" India, and had created "doubt in our minds about the goodwill" of the United States and the United Kingdom toward India. (Telegram 4165 from New Delhi, June 24; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2462)
146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and approved in S/S by Rogers.
Washington, June 24, 1962, 1:31 p.m.
4351. Eyes Only for Ambassador From Bundy. President asks your judgment on next steps with Nehru in light of his remarks on Kashmir vote. President questions timing and content of further loan arrangements and is puzzled by Nehru's apparent inability to understand that Pak 104 deal precedes this administration.
These are Sunday morning questions, but I think you can sense their thrust.
In partial response suggest despatch full text of Nehru remarks, but your own comments would be even more valuable.
Ball
147. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2562. Secret; Priority.
New Delhi, June 25, 1962, 10 p.m.
4183. Pass White House Eyes Only for President. Eyes Only for Acting Secretary. Reference: Deptel 4351./2/
/2/Document 146.
I had begun drafting response for what I considered a predictable Presidential inquiry prior to receipt. Nehru was in extremely self-righteous mood reflecting a larger attitude here and since he gives the tone to the press and politicians we will no doubt have more of it.
Obviously it was a nasty accident that our representations on the MIGs coincided with the Kashmir ballot in New York. Both are highly emotional issues here. Nehru had been hit very hard on the MIGs by Macmillan, Gore-Booth, Sandys, myself and by the confirming message from the President./3/ Then came this debate.
/3/See Document 142.
His flare-up is related to at least three matters where I judge our position to be sound and one matter where we might wisely reflect on the wisdom of our course. I begin with the matters which the Indians find distasteful but where the medicine is good.
1. The GOI in general and Nehru in particular clearly dislike suggestions that they should tailor their behavior more carefully to American political and public reactions. This is new idea. Until past year we have been so wary of seeming to attach strings that there has been literally almost no mention to Prime Minister of the effect of Indian actions on aid prospect. Avoidance has become the standard of good manners. Mention of the effect of their actions on aid is by our own standard improper and indecent. This has always seemed to me an intolerable situation. I have made it clear that American public opinion is a highly relevant consideration. Nehru's reference to indirect pressures is his protest against these reminders which he says are an impairment of "India's independence." Obviously no country is that independent.
2. He is annoyed over my labeling of Soviet rupee sales as aid. On this too they have had it ever so good. For if Soviet rupee sales are not aid then dollars and hard currencies can be reserved for economic assistance and the Soviets can be used for military hardware. The uneasiness when I have attacked on this point has been visible.
3. There is the conviction in India as elsewhere that we are so pathologically afraid of Communism that to take our aid and remain non-Communist is a great favor. We have affirmed this by a tendency to a supplicant role in which we take ever so seriously India's problems and never mention our own. This relationship is unhealthy as well as undignified. Yet it conditions Indian attitudes and causes surprising reactions when we depart from our erstwhile meekness.
On the other hand, the Indians have legitimate grounds for objection to the two symbolic battles we have waged on behalf of our allies and against them in the UN this past year. Both of these allies, so far as one can tell, have considered their relationship with us largely important for advancing their private quarrels in the non-Communist world. (Here helping with our anti-Communism is also considered a real nice favor.) And we have allowed ourselves to become involved unusefully in these far from exemplary quarrels. The rewards, while perhaps greater than from our alliance with General Phoumi, give grounds for reflection, to wit as follows:
1. We supported Portugal in the UN on Goa. We succeeded in antagonizing India. We did not "save" Goa. We seem to have partially alienated the Portuguese. We got the Russians a very good press. This would seem a low score.
2. We supported Pakistan in the UN on Kashmir (I am aware of super-innocuity and Irish screen). We recognize, as do even intelligent Pakistanis, the UNCIP resolutions and the plebiscite are out of date and bear in no practical way on a settlement. We got nothing practical for Pakistan. We got a bad press in India. Again the Soviets got a magnificent one. We left the Pakistanis still complaining about Americans, still wondering if Mohammed Ali is too pro-American, still negotiating with the Chinese. This also no high score.
In light of our specific commitments, we had no alternative in this latter case. But clearly we must soon have some concern for the parochial and messy issues in which our lesser allies involve us and the consequences. As soon as military needs can be made to allow we must obviously try to get in a position where we can stand in dignity and some majesty above these disputes. We must recognize that outside of Europe alignment and non-alignment are mostly differing techniques for extracting concessions from the US. We must not be supplicants of the non-aligned or subordinates of allies. Both positions are weak and unworthy. In these precincts when one hears talk of being faithful to our allies we should ask if it means being unfaithful to ourselves.
As to the immediate future, I doubt that there is anything very dramatic we should do. I will downplay aid announcements. I would hope that having warned of what Congress might do as the result of the MIG deal it won't do it anyway. In a calmer time I will go over all these things again with Nehru but I would not think it wise to hit him again right away.
3. I am seeing both Desais in next two days and will weigh in on that part of the Prime Minister's speech having to do with indirect pressure. I will ask them both if they would prefer not to be warned about possible US reaction to Indian moves.
4. I will do missionary work with other members of GOI on the Pakistani 104s. I confess I thought I had made some progress with Nehru on responsibility for the 104s and the accidents and misadventures of history that caused the previous administration to offer them. Incidentally, I did evidently persuade Nehru that these supersonic planes are an expensive novelty which unmanned interception apparatus is making obsolete. He quoted my advance technical briefing more or less verbatim in his speech. Nehru texts being sent Embassy telegrams 4179/4/ and 4180./5/
/4/Telegram 4179, June 25, transmitted the text of Nehru's remarks on Pakistan and Kashmir in the Indian Parliament on June 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6 - 2562)
/5/Telegram 4180, June 25, transmitted the text of Nehru's remarks concerning the purchase of supersonic aircraft during the debate cited in footnote 3 above. (Ibid., 791.5622/6 - 2562)
Galbraith
148. Telegram From the Consulate General at Calcutta to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7 - 162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
Calcutta, July 1, 1962, 10 a.m.
1. From Ambassador Galbraith. Unless Washington has an energetically adverse view based on factors not evident here I consider it desirable that on an early occasion, perhaps in answer to press conference question, I say that as a practical matter, and without reference to merits of the case, we consider plebiscite question dead and that any Kashmir settlement will obviously now have to be found in other directions. The advantages of such a statement are:
(1) It reflects the realities of the situation as even intelligent Pakistanis agree. Myths, such as possibility of plebiscite, no more desirable here than elsewhere.
(2) It will put me back into political operation from which the debate and Menon victory has largely excluded me. This is important for influence on other pending and more vital issues. It is also the reason for saying it here.
(3) It will vitally help pro-American groups here who are now sadly on defensive.
(4) Emphasis on purely practical aspects of position will protect Stevenson.
(5) Statement wherever made will clear our position and insure against another damaging round on this subject a few months hence.
(6) Presumably there will be a Pakistan reaction. That, it will be agreed, is partly because they would prefer to have issue continued ad infinitum, ad nauseum even with no affirmative gain if it provides the negative return of worsened US - Indian relations. This we cannot countenance. Statement here will center at least part of reaction on me rather than President or Secretary State. It will also give measure of freedom from the language--it was Galbraith's. However statement assumes that we have played this game for last time.
You will see need for timeliness for full effect as well as to clear position for work on other issues./2/
Mattison
/2/Galbraith sent an undated message, via a special channel, to McGeorge Bundy to ask him to discuss telegram 1 from Calcutta with President Kennedy. Galbraith stated that, in his view, the statement he proposed to make was "the kind of sensible air cleaning political action which situation requires but which contains just enough momentary static so that working level Department would never initiate or willingly to clear." He felt that all that was involved was a simple statement of the realities of a situation already accepted by intelligent Pakistanis. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 7/1/62 - 7/10/62)
149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7 - 162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted in NEA by Cameron and Ludlow, cleared by Cleveland and Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Calcutta.
Washington, July 2, 1962, 8:49 p.m.
6. For Ambassador Galbraith. Re Calcutta's 1 to Dept/2/ which being repeated Karachi and USUN. The President personally and the Department are energetically averse to your making a statement to the effect that the United States believes that plebiscite question dead and Kashmir settlement has to be found in other directions.
/2/Document 148.
1. It would be unwise to make the statement now even though we may believe that the UN exercise has been unproductive and that we should try to avoid a repetition of it. A statement along the lines you propose would have a strong adverse effect in Karachi and not have countervailing advantages in New Delhi. It would appear to be a retreat under Menon's pressure.
2. Nehru's speech has caused intense irritation in Congressional and government circles here--an irritation which the President shares. The large aid commitments we have recently made to India in no way diminishes the feeling.
3. Judgment here is that your best tactic is to say that the resolution was in fact a moderate one which it would have been difficult for us not to support. You can say privately that we made strong efforts to moderate it, and without these efforts it would have been much stronger.
Finally, it is up to you to show that we are the injured party in this situation, not the Indians./3/
Rusk
/3/McGeorge Bundy reinforced telegram 6 to New Delhi with a July 3 message sent to Galbraith by the special channel which reads: "State's Niact 6 to you does reflect the President's own sentiments. He practically dictated the telegram to Carl [Kaysen], along with some other comments that are too hot even for this channel." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 7/1/62 - 7/10/62)
150. Editorial Note
On July 4, 1962, President Ayub of Pakistan and the Shah of Iran released a statement at the conclusion of the Shah's visit to Pakistan, in which the Shah expressed concern over the state of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and offered his services to mediate in the dispute. Ayub expressed his appreciation and accepted the offer. (Telegram 22 from Karachi, July 4; Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7 - 462)
On July 9, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Tehran to inform the Shah that the United States was gratified at his initiative in the dispute. The U.S. position was to remain in the background and not be identified with the Shah's efforts. But the Embassy was instructed to assure the Shah that the United States was prepared to act in a supporting or complementary role in any negotiations that might result from the Shah's initiative. (Telegram 12 to Tehran, July 9; ibid., 788.11/7 - 762)
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 562. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Rewinkel and Bromley Smith, and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi eyes only Ambassadors.
Washington, July 5, 1962, 6:31 p.m.
91. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Deptel 7062 to London, /2/ 4428 to New Delhi, 2806 to Karachi. There follows for your information text of Prime Minister Macmillan's message to President of July 3:
/2/Telegram 7062 to London, June 30, repeated the text of Macmillan's June 29 message to Kennedy. Macmillan referred to his discussions with Sandys following the latter's return from India and drew the conclusion that Nehru might be thinking of dropping the idea of buying fighters of any kind. But he noted that Nehru might not have the final word on the subject, and added that it continued to be important to coordinate a U.S. - U.K. proposal to put to the Indian Government. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962, Vol. III)
"I have now had a further discussion with my colleagues about this very complicated problem. As I mentioned in my message of June 29 there is quite a chance that the Indians will quietly drop the whole idea of buying fighters; Nehru's recent public statements seem further to support this view. All the same, I think we should both keep up the pressure and leave the Indians in no doubt about the serious effects which their purchase of Russian fighters would have on public opinion in Western countries.
Nevertheless, it is possible, and indeed perhaps probable, that the Indians will ask us what we have to offer. So we must be ready to meet this event.
There are two problems--the physical and the financial. So far as the physical question is concerned, we are ready, in spite of all the difficulties, to make one squadron of Lightnings available and postpone deliveries to our own forces.
Then there is the probable reaction from Pakistan. You mention your natural anxiety about your facilities there. But, as you know, we also have important facilities of a similar nature in Pakistan. Sandys explained the whole position frankly to Ayub, who was very understanding and recognized the seriousness of allowing the Russians to infiltrate into India's defense system. However, whilst the Pakistan Government may understand the problem and acquiesce in our action, there will doubtless be biased criticism in the Pakistan press and Parliament. I am sure you would not wish us to bear this entirely on our own. I suggest, therefore, that any Western offer of fighters to India should be openly seen to be a joint move in which you and we are both associated.
Now for the financial problem. The full cost of the Lightnings including ancillary equipment will run to between 10 and 11 million pounds sterling. As the Indian situation is pretty desperate we shall, in effect, have to make them a credit or a loan or give them some financial help in some other way without much hope of repayment. It looks as though this assistance will have to go further than we have ever been ready to go to help even our allies or members of the Commonwealth to acquire modern armaments. In our present position we really could not put up more than one quarter of this total, which was the proportion which you will remember we agreed on for the Orpheus engine. Do you see your way to meeting the other three quarters either by paying us or by paying the Indians?
Apart from finding the money the complications of your system of grants and Congressional votes, combined with the complications of our system of Parliamentary control will make it quite difficult to work out how payment can actually be made. Perhaps it might be a good plan if you could authorize somebody from your Embassy or someone sent from Washington to discuss with our experts how, if at all, the finance could be arranged.
The Indian Finance Minister is in London this week and will certainly ask for more aid. For financial reasons this would not in any case be easy. But even on matters where we could help we propose for the moment to be non-committal. We shall avoid any quotable suggestion of a link between fighters and aid; at the same time we shall leave Desai in no doubt that the British people are becoming increasingly anxious about India's general attitude towards the West.
I should be grateful if you would let me know how you now see this business."
Rusk
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 662. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Komer, Kaysen, and by Talbot in substance; and approved in S/S by Slater. Repeated to New Delhi.
Washington, July 6, 1962, 10:41 p.m.
141. Eyes Only Ambassador. Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan soonest. Advise date, time delivery:
"July 6, 1962
Dear Prime Minister: Thank you for your message of July 3, 1962./2/ I am encouraged by the prospect of agreement on including a squadron of Lightnings in our spoiling offer to the Indians. This should increase the chance, about which we too are hopeful, that India will end up by delaying indefinitely any purchase of supersonic aircraft.
/2/See Document 151.
We suspect that Air Vice Marshal Dutt's trip to London may be in order to smoke out our position. Therefore I hope you will do what you can to get him interested in the Lightning. Of course, the longer we can draw out the discussions of this matter the better.
We are prepared to send over a small group of experts to discuss in some detail how we might share the cost. If ultimately necessary and desirable, we will find some way to compensate you for three-fourths of the cost of one squadron of Lightnings and ancillary equipment through our participation in joint R & D projects. We would hope to do so in a way which would minimize any early drain on our gold reserves. Having just taken a number of difficult decisions in a variety of fields to improve our balance of payments situation, I would be loath in this case to move too soon in the opposite direction.
I am also concerned over making any offer of Lightnings to India openly a joint US/UK financial responsibility. Lacking as we do any position as "historical supplier" to India, a public offer by us of what in effect would be military assistance to the Indians could have a number of undesirable consequences. The tone of Nehru's recent discussions has been such that it would be most difficult for me to offer him this kind of assistance in competition with the Soviets at this point. As you know, this is a moment in our legislative process at which the very important financial details of the Foreign Aid Bill hang in the balance. The effect on the Congress of my offering military aid to India on top of our already large economic program there might well be very serious. Accordingly, I strongly prefer that any prospective US sharing of the financial responsibility for Lightnings be kept as quiet as possible.
Therefore, I hope that you can go forward and dangle the prospect of Lightnings before the Indians without revealing any US financial role as yet; meanwhile we will send our team as soon as you feel it appropriate to deal with possible arrangements between us.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/7 - 1262. Secret. Repeated to Kabul and Tehran.
Karachi, July 12, 1962, 11 p.m.
104. I had very satisfactory 45-minute private talk with President Ayub in Karachi today. All subjects listed Department's telegram 2807/2/ discussed except Pakistan requests related to security guarantees, contingent planning and increased arms assistance. Ayub did not raise any of these topics.
/2/Telegram 2807 to Karachi, June 30, provided general guidelines for McConaughy's talks with Ayub and Mohammed Ali. (Ibid., 690D.91/6 - 3062)
Remainder this telegram deals with Afghan relations problem which may require immediate action. Other topics will be reported separate messages.
We reviewed present status Afghan issue. I stated my belief that Afghan position may become somewhat more flexible than heretofore. It seemed to us that there may soon be some negotiating room on both sides, and we hoped no opportunity would be lost to press for early solution. President gave me summary of Afghan portion of his recent Murree conversations with Shah of Iran. This corresponded closely with reports from our Embassy in Tehran, although as noted in Embassy's telegram 70/3/ GOP position on Consulates less forthcoming than reported by Iranian Foreign Minister. Ayub said Shah urged him to allow reopening Afghan Consulates and trade agencies under close GOP police surveillance, but Ayub responded that he disliked appearance of making prisoners of Afghan representatives.
/3/Dated July 9. (Ibid., 788.11/7 - 962)
President said he was entirely willing for either Iran or US to attempt good offices and he presumed that we would concert with Iranians. He felt any third party approach to Afghans should be on a very high level and he assumed that if Iran undertook exploratory talks, Shah himself would get in touch with King.
Ayub showed in various oblique ways that he is slightly more inclined to try seriously for a settlement than he has been heretofore. I believe Shah impressed him with growing menace to entire region of increased Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, which is facilitated by Pak - Afghan rupture. Undoubtedly GOP as well as Afghanistan is feeling some cumulative pinch from cessation transit traffic and trade. Finally, Ayub seemed increasingly impressed with argument I and others have advanced that sweeping and abrupt Pak move against Consulates and trade agencies last September encouraged extreme Afghan reaction and prejudiced GOP case. I believe he now suspects that GOP handling of matter last fall may have been mistaken, notwithstanding legitimacy of GOP grievances.
When I told him that I thought some concessions might be elicited from Afghan side if Afghan face could be saved and if some reciprocal concessions could be made on GOP side, he evinced interest. He said he would be willing to consider guarded GOP exploratory conversations with Afghan representatives, but when I endeavored to probe on this he drew back, saying there was at present no place where high level Pak and Afghan representatives could get together and he felt it would be better for first move to be made through Iranians or us. He still insists he must have some sort of assurances of proper conduct of Afghan Consuls in Peshawar and Quetta and decent treatment of Pak Consuls in Afghanistan, but he granted that assurances could be private and in form that would not be demeaning to Afghans.
I outlined to him suggestion for initial attempt at agreement on partial reestablishment of Consular and trade agency facilities, coupled with a joint statement of the two governments to effect that "they have agreed to work toward early full reestablishment of Consular and trade agency offices, to function in accordance with the usually accepted tenets of international practice." I pointed out that this formula could be construed in Pakistan as an implied assurance on part of Afghanistan Government as to the propriety of official conduct of its Consular and trade representatives and correctness of its treatment of GOP Consular offices. I did not of course go into matter of how Afghans could at same time interpret phrase as an implied admission on part of GOP that its abrupt closure of these offices was not in accordance with traditional international usage.
Unfortunately, President still has belief that diplomatic relations should be restored first and that lower level relations should be reestablished afterwards on a step by step basis as relations gradually improve.
I pressed on him my conviction that Afghans would feel that they could not agree to this and that effort should be for reestablishment of Consular, trade and transit relations first, or at least simultaneously with restoration diplomatic relations. While President did not commit himself on this, I believe way is open here for Shah to move discreetly into situation in preliminary way in Kabul, and would hope that Holmes could be authorized to give Shah substance of foregoing for his background use.
McConaughy
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7 - 1362. Secret.
Karachi, July 13, 1962, 9 p.m.
114. Embtel 104 to Department./2/ In course my July 12 conversation with President Ayub, he thanked us with warmth and earnestness for our role in Security Council consideration of Kashmir issue. He asked me to convey his deep appreciation to the President. I told him that I felt SC consideration of matter was not entirely futile exercise, notwithstanding Soviet veto. Reaffirmation of UNCIP resolutions was useful and Soviet position had been exposed through misuse of veto. I said we did not perceive any useful step we could take at this time to contribute to settlement. Perhaps best course would be to stand back for a while and try to gain perspective which might point way to some new initiative. I added that any attempt toward a settlement would have to have Indian as well as Pakistani cooperation. Resort to use or threat of force was unacceptable, as I knew he would agree. Ayub assented and said he too felt that perhaps a waiting spell was advisable for all interested parties. He did not have any immediate motive in mind.
/2/Document 153.
He said that his reports indicated Nehru was a very sick man and that his grip on the helm might be relaxing slightly already. He thought decline of Nehru might be quite gradual but he felt his days as head of Indian Government were numbered. He did not wish any harm to Nehru but he could not help but wonder if eventual successor government might not be more tractable and more inclined work reciprocally toward better Indo - Pak relations.
I said GOP could not be certain of a more cooperative successor government in India after withdrawal of Nehru. It was entirely possible that following government might be more difficult to deal with. I expressed hope that if Ayub had bilateral conversations in mind he would move promptly and not wait for disappearance of Nehru from scene. I expressed view that something constructive might come out of talks and even if talks failed completely at least Paks would have demonstrated willingness to talk and to search for solutions without imposition of any conditions such as 10-day time limit on preliminary talks as was stipulated last autumn. This stipulation had been misinterpreted in some quarters to Pakistan's disadvantage.
Ayub said he was not opposed in principle to high level private talks with Indians and he would be prepared to have a private exchange with Nehru if cause of better Indo - Pak understanding might reasonably be expected to gain thereby. He did not find prospect particularly encouraging or palatable, but he was willing to make any effort which offered fair prospect of progress and he recognized that a seemingly negative position on bilateral talks while Indians maintained a seemingly positive position put Pakistan in an unfavorable light. He simply did not want to enter into an ill-prepared or premature endeavor which was foredoomed to failure, and which would have to be publicized as such, to the detriment of the objective.
I asked Ayub if he did not think any talks which might ensue should cover whole range of principal Pak - Indo problems and not be confined exclusively to Kashmir, which would have to be predominant subject.
Ayub speculated on jockeying for power in India which might be expected to follow departure of Nehru. He seemed to feel that considerable reliance could be placed on Desai to consolidate Right Wing elements and break Krishna Menon's drive for power. He doubted if Desai could win leadership of government but felt he would play influential role. GOP was inclined to give considerable credence to reports that Nehru wanted to pave way for his daughter Indira Gandhi to succeed him at least nominally. Ayub doubted she had qualities required to assume and exercise actual powers of head of government, but she might fill a high titular position. He recognized that accession to power by Krishna Menon would be an unqualified catastrophe, and that nothing should be done which would tend to improve his prospects.
President was strikingly mild and relaxed on subject of supersonic planes for India. I spelled out full rationale of our concern at MIG possibility. He accepted our reasoning substantially in toto. He seemed to feel that matter would probably not come to show-down. He thought Soviet offer might prove to be to some extent a bluff, since Soviets would recognize that full acceptance MIG offer by Indians would isolate India from West and throw heavy burden of economic support and subsidization of India on Soviet Union. He said he was confident Soviets would be unwilling to pick up enormous tab for economic development to India now paid by U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, he thought Soviet Union in show-down would probably welsh on its offer, having better use for its resources elsewhere. He also noted with interest my remark that Nehru seemed disposed to postpone indefinitely a final decision on matter. It was evident from Ayub's moderate view of possibility that UK may feel compelled to offer few Lightning planes to India, that Sandys did excellent job when he saw Ayub last month. Although Ayub was naturally not happy at prospect, he seemed resigned to it and understood reasoning back of it. I made clear to him extent to which we had borne in mind Pakistan's views and interests in our consideration of matter and he was grateful for this. Although he knows we are not entirely disassociated from British in this matter, he evinced no disposition to reproach us. He conjectured that Indians might be tempted to accept Soviet offer to establish an assembly plant for Soviet jet engines in India, with a view to installing the engines in British Lightning air frames.
Comment: Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Hilaly, saw President just before me and tells me that he pressed President to enter into private bilateral talks with Nehru. He feels it is all important for this to be done before Nehru's health fails further. He says President was noncommittal and Hilaly expects to see President again in Rawalpindi before returning to Delhi. President apparently went a little farther with me than with Hilaly in indicating his willingness in principle to consider talks. However, he was quite passive in his attitude and obviously is not now inclined to take any strong initiative. My impression is that he has not thought matter through completely and has not formulated any approach to be used in talks. He is unenthusiastic or at least unconvinced as to merits of talks at this stage but recognizes that an expressed unwillingness to engage in talks is not a good stance. Therefore, we should not take any great measure of encouragement from his attitude, although it does offer a slight opening which might be enlarged by dint of some effort if we believe that our influence should now be exerted actively in favor of talks.
McConaughy
155. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/7 - 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and approved in S on August 13.
Washington, July 19, 1962.
SUBJECT
U.S. - Pakistan Relations
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of State
His Excellency Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mr. M. Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. Salman A. Ali, Counselor, Embassy of Pakistan
The Ambassador called at his request to convey his Government's response to three suggestions that the Secretary had put to him privately on May 28./2/
/2/The three suggestions noted here were not recorded in the memorandum prepared on Rusk's conversation with Ahmed on May 28; see Document 126.
1. The Ambassador said his Government welcomed the Secretary's suggestion for continuing and frank discussions between the two governments to identify clearly areas of agreement and disagreement between the United States and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan did not, however, feel that there were major areas of disagreement, even though the Pakistani press and public opinion at times had been quite critical of American policy. The Secretary suggested further that he and the Ambassador might fruitfully engage in a fairly broad review of matters of common concern and that the Embassy and Mr. Talbot might work out an informal agenda. The Ambassador also welcomed this suggestion.
2. With reference to the Secretary's idea that broadened contacts at all levels between Pakistan and India would demonstrate Pakistan's good intentions and help Indo - Pak relations, the Ambassador said that his Government, considering India's present aggressive mood and the Kashmir position, doubted it could do anything now to ease tensions between the two countries. Rather, it feared that anything it might do or say could well produce the opposite result. It had concluded, therefore, for the time being it was better to say nothing, although unfortunately it was hard to prevent the Central and Provincial Assemblies from breaking silence, especially in the aftermath of communal riots. The current tensions were regrettable, the more so because something might have been done to improve over-all relations about two and a half years ago, when the mood was better. The Pakistan Government would have liked to be able to find some hopeful prospect of opening up discourses with moderate leaders in India at this time when the transition of power seemed imminent, especially as it felt tragedy would ensue if Krishna Menon should gain strength enough to succeed Mr. Nehru.
The Secretary expressed his appreciation of the thought the Pakistan Government had given to this question, adding that there might come a moment, perhaps at very short notice, when effective contact across the border would be important. He recalled that six or seven years ago at a time of trans-Atlantic frictions Prince Bernhard started a valuable program of bringing official and non-official Europeans and Americans together for private and frank talks about trans-Atlantic relations. Would there be anything like this on the Indo - Pak scene that would be worth encouraging to stimulate contacts on a private basis? For example, could the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs make contact with the Indian Council of World Affairs, both being bodies comparable to Chatham House? The Ambassador agreed to consider this question further with Mr. Talbot. In the meantime he suggested that it might be helpful if the American Ambassador in New Delhi could keep in touch with the Pakistan High Commissioner there to consider such possibilities.
3. On the Secretary's third point--that Pakistan might consider making a formal unilateral declaration abjuring the use of force in disputes with India--the Ambassador affirmed his understanding that this was related to Pakistan's aide-memoir of May 28. He assumed that the Secretary had meant that if the United States should, as requested in that aide memoire, agree that it would come to Pakistan's aid should Pakistan be attacked by India, then India would ask the United States what assurances could be given that Pakistan would not launch an attack against India. The Secretary agreed. The Ambassador said his Government feared that if it were to make the suggested statement, India would ask it to sign a "no war" declaration. That would return the two countries to a controversy that had continued for two and a half years over a question of what alternative machinery could be set up, if war were ruled out, for the settlement of disputes existing between them. There had been talk of tribunals but at that time Mr. Nehru had not agreed to the inclusion of an independent member of any tribunal, nor had he any other proposal as to how to proceed if the Indian and Pakistani members of tribunals should fail to agree on any issue. Doubting that Mr. Nehru had changed his views, the Pakistan Government believed that nothing would be gained by reopening the controversy. Also, Pakistan understood that the Indians believed they already had full assurance that the United States would come to India's aid in the event of a Pakistani attack. Mr. Bowles had made this statement in a speech in Delhi last August. The Secretary observed that we had better look at the text of the speech. What bothered him, the Ambassador, however, about our giving assurances to India against a Pakistani attack, along with assurances to Pakistan against an Indian attack, was that it hardly fitted the spirit of the alliance between the United States and Pakistan to assure a non-allied country against aggression by one of the partners in the alliance.
The Ambassador stated that Indian armed forces had doubled in the past five years and that expenses were still rising. Pakistanis wanted to know against whom India was arming itself. Since Goa there had been statements which if not outright threats had been indicative of provocative intentions. The Indians were now saying much that concerned Pakistan; it was not Pakistan that was threatening India.
The Ambassador added that "they" (presumably his Government) had also said that even if India gave the requested assurances Pakistan would still worry about any military assistance that might be given to India by the West, i.e. by the United States, or by Britain, or by France. Such action would be resented by the Pakistani people, since their Government could not tell them of the secret assurances they had extracted from India. The Pakistani Government also would not rule out the possibility of an Indian attack against Azzad Kashmir. Indeed, the Ambassador feared that it had been the encouragement that India had drawn from Western policies that had freed India to get on with its military buildup. The Indians thought they could get away with anything.
The Ambassador then gave reactions to statements he had heard from Mr. McGhee about the idea that the British might give the Indians an alternative to the reported Russian offer of supersonic aircraft to India. Mr. McGhee had made four points, as the Ambassador had understood him. These were: (1) that acquisition of MIGs would open up unlimited opportunities for Soviet involvement in the Indian military establishment; (2) that this would strengthen Krishna Menon's position; (3) that it would jeopardize the security of British military equipment in use by the Indian armed forces; and (4) that the reaction in this country would be very bad if India concluded a MIG deal. The Ambassador felt, however, that actually it would be good if India's actions should bring an adverse reaction in this country, because only in that way would India learn. At the moment India's foreign reserves were in an extremely parlous state. How could it be talking about getting supersonics? None of Krishna Menon's designs could succeed unless India continued to get aid from the United States. The MIG deal would doom him because the Congress Party, which was led and financed by a largely conservative group, would be unhappy with the resulting impact on American aid. As for the question of British military security would not the Russians be taking a comparable risk? Why were they not afraid of such a result? In fact, to the Ambassador these arguments looked wide of the mark. He thought the real explanation of British interests might be found in the comments of two British newspapermen who had told him that "for us this is purely a commercial deal; that is all."
The Secretary interjected that that statement had not a shred of reality.
Continuing, the Ambassador said that the Indians had always maintained a military disparity of about three to one (the United States, he said, had called it two and a half to one but there was not much difference between the two estimates) over the Pakistani armed forces but in aircraft the disparity was seven to one. The Indians had been informed in 1960 about Pakistan's coming acquisition of F - 104s and they knew Pakistan was getting only 12 of them. Why should this number of aircraft trouble the Indians so much? Why should they be expressing their agitation only now?
The Secretary suggested that this could be related to matters concerning China and the northern border of India. The Ambassador doubted this. He said the Soviets had told the Pakistan Ambassador in Moscow that the Indians had deliberately planned the northern border excitement to assure aid from the United States.
156. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 7/62. Secret.
Washington, July 19, 1962.
McGB:
President asked Taylor the status of UK air offer to Indians (I wish that one of these days JFK would call me with such questions). I told Ewell we had no news whatsoever. Of course we've had no reply to JFK 6 July message to PM/2/ grudgingly agreeing to pay three-fourths of Lightning costs.
/2/See Document 152.
I got State and DOD both to tell London last week to find out what's going on. So we should hear soon.
It's also unclear whether reported Indian purchase of MIG engines for HF - 24 is fact or rumor, or what impact it might have. I'd agree with Galbraith that, if true, it means Indian manufacture of MIGs is off. Thus the worst thing we feared has been short-circuited.
Galbraith is most unhappy (Delhi 198)/3/ with State instruction telling him to lay off ginning up Indian requests for US equipment, including C - 130s. When Carl and I cleared last Macmillan message with President, he asked about C - 130s. I told him Indians had displayed little interest and seemed to be buying more Soviet AN - 12s. So he said let's forget about the C - 130s; we'll be paying enough for the Lightnings as it is.
Ken is unhappy at losing any card, however weak, but we're getting word to him that we saved Lightnings by sacrificing C - 130s./4/ Having always thought C - 130s the weakest part of our spoiling offer, I had no hesitation. All State is asking Ken to do is quit peddling C - 130s. If Indians turn around and show interest without further encouragement, that's different; we'll play that by ear.
Bob
/3/Dated July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/7 - 1862)
/4/Telegram 232 to New Delhi, July 21. (Ibid., 611.91/7 - 2162)
157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 2462. Top Secret; Verbatim Text. Drafted and approved by Cameron and cleared with BNA and the White House. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi eyes only Ambassadors.
Washington, July 24, 1962, 8:10 p.m.
498. Eyes Only Ambassador. There follows for your information text of Prime Minister Macmillan's message to the President of July 19:
"Dear Friend
Thank you for your message of July 6/2/ about fighters for the Indians.
/2/See Document 152.
The Indian team were here last week and carried out an evaluation of the suitability of Lightnings for their purposes. Indications are that they would be interested in both purchase of Lightning Mark IIs and manufacture under license in India of Lightning Mark IIIs. It looks as if they would not regard the development of the Orpheus 12 engine for use in their own HF 24 aircraft as an alternative to the manufacture of Lightning Mark IIIs. They might in fact wish to have both.
We are proposing to play the financial part of the discussions long and not to put any specific proposition at this stage. Meanwhile I am grateful for your helpful undertaking that you would find some way to compensate us for three-quarters of the cost of a squadron of Lightnings. I should add that what the Indians mean by a squadron is sixteen front line aircraft plus four back-up aircraft. I also welcome your offer to send over a small group of experts to discuss the matter in more detail and I hope that this can be arranged as soon as possible. It would be helpful if this group was empowered to discuss other possible ways in which you might compensate us as well as the one you have mentioned, which is through our participation in joint R and D projects.
I quite understand the difficulty you would feel at this time, particularly while Congress is still sitting, over making any offer of Lightnings to India openly a joint United States/United Kingdom financial responsibility. There are also difficulties for us in taking the whole public responsibility on ourselves. But I think we can postpone further discussion on this particular issue for the moment."
Ball
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 2462. Top Secret; Verbatim Text. Drafted in the White House and approved by Charles K. Johnson (S/S). Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi.
Washington, July 24, 1962, 10:12 p.m.
503. Eyes Only for Ambassador. Please deliver following letter to Prime Minister from President. Advise date, time delivery.
"July 24, 1962
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I was glad to receive your letter of July 19th,/2/ with the latest word about the activities of the Indian team. Frankly, I am becoming increasingly concerned about the potentially rising financial cost, both to you and to us, if we actually have to make good on our Lightning offer.
/2/See Document 157.
I am dubious about our ability to go as high as the twenty aircraft mentioned in your letter, particularly if it becomes necessary and desirable for us to pick up three-fourths of the hard currency cost. Up to this point, I had thought our offer would be twelve, plus a trainer or two. We are also anxious to restrict the size of any Indian jet buildup, lest it create irresistible pressures for more F - 104s from the Pakistani. Therefore, it might be well for you as well as for us to hint in Delhi that if Indian appetites are too large, it may only lead to a further arms race. I would favor offering India only twelve first, and would consider going higher only after further thought.
I agree that at this stage the best thing is for our experts to get together to firm up the likely cost of a package and possible ways and means of sharing it. I assume that the Orpheus 12 offer is now a nonstarter, which will give us a bit more leeway. We will send a team over promptly to discuss all aspects of the problem.
In the light of our mutual problems, we will also want to reach a clear understanding beforehand on how any offer is to be presented publicly. Even after the Congress adjourns, I would still see major risks of adverse repercussions from open US association with it. Moreover, our current impression is that Ayub would accept with good grace UK sale of Lightnings to India, provided that there were not too many. We will take this aspect up further with Ormsby Gore.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Ball
159. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 2562. Secret; Niact. A handwritten notation indicates that the telegram was repeated to Karachi and London.
New Delhi, July 25, 1962, 8 p.m.
279. Eyes Only Acting Secretary State, pass White House. I have just had several hours luncheon with T. Krishnamachari and I think I have the plane business taped at last. This is information of the highest importance which should be closely protected. We will give general outlines to British here but leave further communication to your judgment. Facts are as follows:
(1) Menon, in effect, shot down the Lightning even before the team departed for London. Team has returned to confirm that the plane won't do. This is the honest opinion of at least one member. Menon presumably instructed the others on the required decision. As indicated in other telegrams Prime Minister and other civilian ministers have access only to Menon's political technique. This holds that Lightnings are heavy, too costly (this of course being in advance of any knowledge of terms) and (he says) unavailable before 1964. The Indian team was declined access to the Mark III: Menon thoughtlessly omitted to mention its non-existence.
(2) Some weeks ago the Prime Minister reached a decision to send a team to Moscow to look into the MIG's and get an offer, unless Menon's then adverse view of Lightning was modified by London visit. (Reflection on odds against such reversal probably unproductive.)
(3) Team according to T.T. Krishnamachari has now gone to Moscow to test fly MIG, negotiate terms for purchase and manufacture. The team does not have power to conclude deal. At this point we are not certain that TTK's information is accurate. Our military people believe that some obvious candidates for any team are still in India.
(4) The pressure leading to the dispatch of this team, again according to TTK, apart from Menon, was the strong sentiment in Parliament for self defense and more recently skillful linking in Cabinet of the China border defense with Pakistan defense. He stresses growing Parliamentary power of Menon. Civilian politicians do not understand these planes are unuseable in mountains against Chinese. (In fact, TTK, who prides himself on Renaissance breadth, thought they had some use and retreated when I showed with Mach 2 data and problem of fields and control.)
(5) Prime Minister was undecided for a long while and Cabinet extensively discussed the American reaction to decision and sending of team. Decision so far has not been between Lightnings and MIGs but as between MIGs and no purchase at all.
(6) There are "always slips between cup and lip" but purchase is now on rails. However, Soviet offer must be obtained and decision taken on acceptance. This will require time--some weeks I would sense.
(7) Making appropriate use of T.T. Krishnamachari's vanity and with appropriate caution considering his ambiguous position while he reaches conclusions on Menon's projects and other questions of principle, I made case for the adverse effect on American public opinion and unleashed other arguments now familiar. I also took soundings on whether another effort with the Prime Minister would be useful.
Without recounting details there is one more gambit which has been on our minds here, which I have tried soundings and which might conceivably work. Pakistan is still the political nub of this problem. Were I to propose that Indians forego the MIG's if we assure of standstill on similar weapons to Pakistanis, they might buy. I am not optimistic but it would strike me as a very good bargain (and much cheaper than Lightnings) if we could bring it off and even the discussion might have a long delaying effect. I gather we are not scheduled to give Pakistanis any further fighter aircraft for another 4 or 5 years so even supporters of Pakistan armed power are giving up nothing of importance. It would give me a handle to explain facts of air power on China frontier to Prime Minister. Perhaps this discussion might lead on to stabilization on tanks which our military people here think will cause more trouble here when known than 104's, God forbid. Also time is running out on past argument that arms aid to Pakistanis was inherited policy. Nehru is leaving town today and will not be back until Monday. I think I had better have another try at him then. While noting doubtless well-grounded Washington aversion to initiatives in this quarter do bear in mind I must have something to talk about. There should, I am sure, be no formal withdrawal of Lightning offer since this would strengthen his position. But unless Indians revive, my judgment would be to let it rest.
Galbraith
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/7 - 2562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron on July 26; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, INR, and DOD/ISA, and with the President; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.
Washington, July 27, 1962, 8:43 p.m.
318. Eyes Only Ambassador. Embtel 279./2/
/2/Document 19.
President and Department believe that, if MIG deal all but settled, we should start disengaging from too vigorous opposition. As we see it, an alternative has been made available for their consideration, they have heard arguments and are in position to make their decision in knowledge of possible consequences. We have therefore accomplished at minimum immediate objective of giving Menon's opponents a stick to beat him with if MIG deal results, as we would expect, in adverse consequences to Indian economic development. We wish to avoid getting any more deeply into this matter, thereby making it more difficult for us to extricate ourselves. If MIG deal goes through, as seems ever more likely, we want to be in position to observe its consequences in detached fashion, avoiding any implication that, as Ambassador Nehru implied, Indians were forced to decision by US pressure. Such a stance will be essential to quiet and restrained work which will be needed to rebuild US - Indian relations.
However if upon reflection you decide that you would like to have another go at Nehru along lines suggestion contained last paragraph reftel Department has no objection if approach is kept in low key. In talk with Nehru you authorized repeat to him as you have done to other Indian leaders (Embtel 4230)/3/ assurances that we do not plan to provide any more F - 104's to Pakistan and that therefore present equilibrium is both most economical and best. FYI--As of this time such statement can be made. Our internal planning for Pakistan calls for replacement of one obsolescent F - 86 squadron in FY 1966 but type of replacement aircraft has not been determined. We are thinking in terms of F - 5A's but Pakistanis have not been told of this. They undoubtedly assume they will receive modern aircraft within general program of modernizing Pakistan armed forces as F - 86's become obsolescent. End FYI.
/3/Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6 - 2962)
If you think wise, you could further point out to Nehru that if Indians acquire or build several squadrons of MIG - 21's, it will create great pressure on us from Paks to provide similar aircraft. We want to avoid another arms race of type which Indians themselves have argued we created by our aid to Pakistan. Therefore, even if Indians determined to go ahead with MIG deal, we hope they will carefully consider how many they buy or build. FYI--Best solution at this point might be if Indians bought a few MIG's but did not build. End FYI.
We also agree it would be useful for you to explain to Prime Minister facts of air power on Sino - Indian frontier. Such a discussion might give you an opportunity to emphasize again to him rapidity with which supersonic planes become obsolescent. By time MIG assembly line could be established in India MIG - 21's from line would already be out of date.
Department does not agree to bringing other major items of military equipment to Pakistan under stabilization umbrella. As far as tanks are concerned we have supplied Pakistan with 230 M - 47 tanks up to 30 June 1962 under our military assistance program. We are committed to supply an additional 274 of these tanks and delivery has been scheduled as follows: 130 in FY 63, 72 in FY 64, 72 in FY 65. GOP has been informed of these planned deliveries and schedule. We do not believe it would improve our standing in Indian eyes to go back on commitment to an ally, not to mention broader implications of such action in entire area.
We agree with your judgment that there should be no formal withdrawal of Lightning offer but that it should be allowed to rest unless Indians revive it. If we push it at this time we might find ourselves confronted with an Indian attempt to straddle issue by taking squadron of Lightnings from West and a MIG manufacturing capacity from Soviets. You will recall [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports/4/ Morarji Desai as talking in these terms. This we want to avoid. You will agree that our efforts with British have been directed towards coming up with an alternative to MIG's not as a prestige stopgap until Indian production of MIG's could be gotten under way./5/
Rusk
/4/Not found.
/5/On August 4, Macmillan sent a message to Kennedy in which he indicated that his government had also reached the conclusion that India had decided upon the MIG aircraft, and there was no point in pursuing the sale of the Lightnings. (Repeated in telegram 735 to London, August 6; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/8 - 662)
161. Editorial Note
The sixth meeting of the India consortium, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, took place in Washington on July 30, 1962. The consortium resumed the discussions which had adjourned without conclusion in May. The meeting was attended by the members that had participated in the meeting on June 2, 1961 (see Document 24), plus Austria, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. The representatives of Austria and the Netherlands attended as observers. Belgium and Italy joined the consortium, raising the number of member countries to ten.
According to the press release issued at the close of the meeting, the consortium considered India's requirements for fiscal year 1962/1963, the second year of its current 5-year plan for economic development. Preliminary commitments for the year had been made at the June 1961 meeting. Because of the addition of Belgium and Italy as contributing members, the total committed by the consortium for 1962/1963 increased to $1.07 billion from the $955 million anticipated in 1961. The U.S. commitment for the year was $435 million. The United States had indicated at the 1961 meeting that it intended to contribute $500 million for 1962 - 1963, but Congressional requirements mandated that the U.S. contribution be proportionate to the contributions of the other members. The U.S. representative indicated that the United States was prepared to match further commitments of other members of the consortium up to a total U.S. contribution of $500 million. (Telegram 340 to New Delhi, July 30; Department of State, Central Files, 891.00/7 - 3062)
162. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/8 - 562. Confidential. Drafted in SOA by Carle and Laise on August 4 and cleared with GTI.
Washington, August 5, 1962.
SUBJECT
Afghan - Pakistan Transit Dispute: Shah's Mission Inconclusive; Future Prospects Not Bright
The Shah of Iran undertook on his own initiative to mediate the Afghan - Pakistan transit dispute. The Shah consulted in Rawalpindi, Kabul, Rawalpindi and Kabul in that order. He returned to Tehran on August 1 after spending about two weeks in the area. His mission was not immediately successful. The Afghan position continued to be that the reopening of Afghan trade agencies and consulates was a prerequisite to the resumption of normal relations. Pakistan's position, as subsequently confirmed to Ambassador McConaughy by Ayub, similarly showed no give. In fact, the account given to our Ambassador to Pakistan takes an even harder position than Iranian sources have reported. The Government of Pakistan at present shows no inclination to restore Afghan trade or consular offices in the frontier region in spite of previous indications that they might be willing to make some accommodation. The Government of Pakistan, however, reiterated its willingness to facilitate Afghan transit trade through Pakistan.
The Shah's efforts, however, appear to have obtained the consent of the disputants to further talks in Tehran under his aegis. The present unyielding attitudes of the disputants, however, does not augur well for the outcome of the talks. The Shah's activity seems to have contributed little to a solution but the Afghans appeared appreciative of his efforts and therefore Iranian - Afghan relations probably benefited. The United States position has been to remain in the background during the Shah's mission but to be prepared to assist if appropriate. We believe for the present we should continue this policy but we shall keep it under close review.
BW/2/
/2/Benjamin Weiner initialed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
163. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy/1/
New Delhi, August 5, 1962.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 4/1/62 - 8/31/62. No classification marking. This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government. The substance of the letter is summarized in Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), Vol. 3, pp. 217 - 218, as follows: "In the same spirit, Nehru wrote to Kennedy thanking him for all the sympathy and friendship he had shown to India, more particularly in regard to aid for development. The United States had not only given India generous assistance but had taken the trouble to induce other countries also to do so. However, it was the friendly and sympathetic attitude, even more than the aid, for which India was grateful. `My colleagues here and I are particularly anxious to have the friendship of the United States in the great tasks that confront us. I believe that this friendship is good not only for our two countries, but also for the world.' This had little to do with aid and, even if circumstances arose which might make it difficult for the United States to help India in her development, the Indian Government would still value the friendship of the United States and work for close relations between the two countries. Differences of viewpoint should not affect this friendship. `I can assure you, therefore, that whatever might happen, our attitude will continue to be to encourage friendly relations between our two countries.'"]
164. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Special Correspondence, John Kenneth Galbraith. Confidential.
New Delhi, August 6, 1962.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I learn in the newspapers of your long summer evenings in the White House and it occurs to me that I should help you out with some good reading.
Politically things remain in a repulsive state. Nehru is still in indifferent health although he has picked up strength during the last few weeks while parliament has been in recess. (It assembles again today.) For years the reins have been nearly all in his hands. Now he neither drives nor relinquishes. The other ministers, with the exception of Menon--and to some extent Desai--are so completely accustomed to passivity that they cannot change.
Menon continues his drive and, I am sure, has considerable plans for an autumn campaign in New York and perhaps elsewhere. He got a large boost out of the Kashmir debate and has certainly considered ways and means of getting another lift including the possibility of some shooting along the Pakistan border. This would also have the merit of taking attention away from China where his sympathies and fellow-travelling instincts make him vulnerable. (He is also I think worrying considerably lest the China border flareup give the Soviets second thoughts on MIG's with the slap at China thus implied.) The snow closes off any danger from the Chinese around the middle of November. Until then last year the Chinese had been dominating the headlines; Menon completely cured that by going into Goa. I would be surprised if the notion of a repeat performance has entirely escaped him. However there are also more risks this time.
I continue to feel fairly clear on the policy we should follow which involves a careful triangulation between Menon and his supporters, his opposition here and your opposition in Washington. We must do everything possible to avoid building Menon up as we have in the past. This includes, to replay a record, denying him the highly emotional issues at UN and concerning Pakistan that we have given him in the past and making it clear that we consider him a kind of antique radical whose tactic of alienating everyone in sight is a diplomatic novelty that does more harm to India than anyone else. In a curious way he is the Hindu Dulles--alienating people as he goes. (Give the phrase Hindu Dulles to someone.)
For Menon's opponents our basic policy is the aid program. It makes them the responsible people who hold the country together.
I am also persuaded that it would have a good effect here and a good ultimate effect in Washington if we were to be cooler in our general technical, economic and cultural assistance to India than in the past and I have been moving along this line. In past years we have sometimes been so eager to help and so anxious to explain ourselves that the Indians have forgotten both how to ask or be grateful and they have come to conclude that it is the business of the world to understand them. Even our friends do not get credit for help that is too eagerly offered--and which the opposition hastens to say the Americans will provide anyway.
I have been making it clear that I think Indian reaction to our problems in getting them aid is exceedingly curious. I am taking up the subject in suitably broad, bland terms in a speech to Indian M.P.'s this week.
Some of this bears on my own role here. Our original conception of Indian policy now going on two years ago was that by aid and the right kind of representation we could get considerable help from the Indians. We haven't got much and I doubt that my high-minded salesmanship of the New Frontier has been at fault. I am enormously admired up to the very moment when I make a request. I will go into my future, a topic which crosses even my totally selfless mind, sometime in the future.
As you will have seen, I have put the MIG discussion on ice. I think it served a useful purpose. We raised the threshold against buying Soviet equipment and we let our friends in the Armed Services here know there was an alternative. However I must say that Menon, with his control of all channels of technical knowledge, shot down the Lightning with appalling ease. In the end I began to develop a few reservations, which I gather you shared, about the cost (in overseas dollars) of this package.
I am still far from certain that the MIG deal is going to come off. I have been spreading the idea that they are useless toys with some success, and I continue to think that the Soviets will be reluctant to arouse Chinese passions at a time when they are pressing the Chinese and Indians to stop playing war with their elbows on the northern border.
[Here follows discussion of issues unrelated to India.]
Yours faithfully,
Ken
165. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 8/1/62 - 8/21/62. Confidential.
Washington, August 10, 1962.
SUBJECT
Possibility of Sino - Indian Negotiations over the Border Problem
Ambassador Galbraith has reported a conversation he had with Prime Minister Nehru on August 6, during which Mr. Nehru indicated the Indians "expect to have negotiations with the Chinese." The talks would be after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in September and would probably be conducted on the Indian side by Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai. Nehru expressed some worry about the number of men up in the mountains "who wonder who is going to shoot first." Mr. Nehru apparently does not expect much in the way of concrete results from the talks, but thinks they will calm the atmosphere.
Prime Minister Nehru was explaining to the Ambassador a statement he had made earlier in the day to the opening meeting of the current session of the Indian Parliament. According to the press, Mr. Nehru told the Parliament that the Indian Government on July 26 had sent a note to Peiping which pointed out the necessity of avoiding incidents and proposed, when current tensions have eased, to resume discussions on the basis of the report on the previous talks held in 1960. Peiping's reply had been received by the Indian Government the day before, August 5. Mr. Nehru read excerpts to the Parliament. The excerpts apparently gave Peiping's approval of the Indian suggestion for further discussion on the boundary question but repeated Peiping's previous charges of Indian advances into Chinese territory. Peiping indicated that there "need not be any preconditions for Sino - Indian discussions." Mr. Nehru characterized the note as rather disappointing but said that the Indian Government was examining the note and hoped to send a reply at an early date.
The full text of neither note is yet available so that assessment of the probability of meaningful Sino - Indian negotiations on the border in the near future must be very tentative.
The GOI has always maintained that it desires to settle the dispute by negotiation; but it has always made plain that it will only negotiate if Peiping is willing to admit there is substantial validity to the Indian position on the border question. The most fundamental aspect of the Indian position is the principle that the border is well-defined by geography, tradition and treaty and that the only matter subject to negotiation is the determination of how the principle applies to certain minor areas in dispute where surveys have not been undertaken. Peiping, however, claims that the entire border is undefined and that the Indian Government should negotiate from a tabula rasa, as it were.
When the Chinese note suggests "there need not be any preconditions" for Sino - Indian discussions, Peiping seems to be repudiating India's fundamental position and insisting on its own point of view as the point of departure, just as in the past. The China border question is such an emotionally charged question of national prestige among such a wide segment of literate Indian opinion that it would be extraordinarily difficult for Mr. Nehru to enter into actual negotiation with the Chinese on the terms Peiping now proposes. However, conversations about the border, short of actual negotiations, could undoubtedly be justified to Indian public opinion as they were in 1960.
We have had repeated indications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] during the last month that the USSR has been suggesting to the Indians the possibility of a friendly settlement of the border issue. The Soviets have made what appear to be offers of mediation for this purpose; Mr. Nehru has reportedly turned down these offers. We have also received reports of renewed suggestions from Peiping to the Government of Burma for it to try to persuade the GOI to hold talks with Red China, possibly in Rangoon.
It should also be noted that the military activities in Ladakh of the past three months appear now to have reached a stalemate. Indian and Chinese outposts are sufficiently close to each other that their mutual presence inhibits significant further advances on the ground by either side along the nearly 200-mile frontier from the Karakorum Pass to the Spanggur Lake. There are no indications that either side wishes to start up full-scale fighting at present.
Therefore, it is understandable that India and Red China should wish to shift from the game of military maneuvering on the ground to the pursuit of their objectives by diplomatic means. It is entirely possible that the diplomatic maneuvering may lead to further official conversations between the two governments.
But we remain of the belief that a greater willingness to compromise will have to be exhibited by Peiping before actual negotiations leading to a settlement can take place.
A.E. Breisky/2/
/2/Breisky signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/9 - 1362. Confidential. Drafted by Naas on September 12 and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi, Kabul, and London.
Washington, September 13, 1962, 2:07 p.m.
498. Re Deptel 471 to Karachi./2/ Following based on uncleared memcon.
/2/Telegram 471, September 7, noted that the meeting between Rusk and Ahmed scheduled for September 11 was the first in what might prove to be a series of meetings designed to explore and define basic areas of agreement and disagreement in U.S. - Pakistan relations. The immediate purpose of the meeting was to prepare for the Kennedy - Ayub talks scheduled for later in the month. (Ibid., 790D.11/9 - 762)
Secretary and Ambassador Ahmed met September 11 for approximately one hour. Following brief exchange on Cuban and Berlin situations and Zafrulla's candidacy, Secretary asked whether Ambassador had received any indication of specific subjects President Ayub wished to cover in his talk with President. Ambassador replied that only specific subject mentioned so far was MAP requirements, but he assumed Ayub wished, among other matters, full survey US - Pakistan - Indian relations including MIGs and Kashmir.
Secretary then stated that perhaps best place begin in discussing US - Pak relations was US attitude toward allies vs. neutrals.
He developed at some length our view of value of alliances to participating countries. Among points made by Secretary were that:
1. Since alliances formed for specific and agreed reasons, success of alliances should be assessed by how well the alliances have fulfilled their original purpose;
2. Essentially various alliances in which we participate were formed ensure independence of members;
3. No member of our alliance system has so far lost its independ-ence;
4. Over years allies have definitely fared better than neutrals in our treatment; and
5. US did not view alliances as meaning members had to agree on all subjects, particularly those unrelated to basic agreed purposes of alliance.
Ahmed commented at length that people of Pakistan believed distinction in treatment of allies and neutrals had become blurred; they demand with increasing insistency to know what special value accrues to Pakistan as an ally. To them it appears that, in fact, India receives same essential benefits without costs and risks of being an ally. He then noted that crux of issue for Pakistan is whether ally supports Pakistan on Kashmir issue. He dwelt at some length on familiar Pakistan views on Kashmir. He repeatedly stated that a Kashmir solution was key to future stability on the subcontinent.
Secretary replied that in his view Pakistan received considerable benefits from alliances and without them would be in isolated and uncomfortable position. In addition, could critics of alliances convincingly show that Pakistan's relations with neighbors would be better if Pakistan were not in alliance? Referring to Kashmir the Secretary remarked that US was caught in middle of problem in which we had no hand in creating. We approached subcontinent as a whole and we saw in Kashmir a problem which was diverting energies and resources of both nations from key problems of development. Pakistan is aware that we have also lost considerably in India because of our support to Pakistan. Pakistan, as well as other countries, should realize that in such matters US leverage and powers of persuasion are limited.
Time scheduled for appointment ended before Secretary could go further into our views Kashmir and other Indo - Pakistan - US problems, and it was agreed he would meet again with Ahmed before President Ayub arrived.
Rusk
167. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 9/14/62 - 9/21/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House on September 19 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy noting that the paper was sent at Komer's request.
Washington, September 19, 1962.
STATUS OF INDIAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR MIG'S
Indian interest in acquiring a supersonic aircraft capability has not abated. This capability appears to include a certain number of supersonic planes, the rights for the manufacture or assembly of jet fighters of foreign design in India, and the manufacture of the Indian-designed fighter HF - 24 and a foreign engine for it in India. India has already announced plans for securing one item in this package. It has signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the manufacture in India of a Soviet jet engine for use on the Indian-designed HF - 24.
Agreement on manufacture of an engine for the HF - 24 has been accompanied by continued attempts by India to reach agreement with the Soviet Union to secure additional items in India's desired supersonic packages. It seems probable that the Indians will reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the purchase of some MIG - 21 fighters before the end of the year. However, it seems less likely that there will be an agreement in the foreseeable future providing for the manufacture of MIG's in India.
At the end of August all members of the Indian evaluation team which had gone to Moscow to inquire into the purchase and manufacture in India of MIG's had returned to New Delhi. We understand that the leader of the team has reported favorably on the aircraft; some members, however, consider the MIG - 21 to have certain serious drawbacks. Ambassador Galbraith has reported that Nehru has become increasingly cool to the expenditures necessary for a MIG deal and his disposition is to postpone it or scale it down. When asked about the MIG deal by reporters in London on September 9, Nehru said, however, that "negotiations have gone a good bit further." He added that India looked upon the MIG deal "as a normal commercial transaction without any political implications." He said India could get better terms from the U.S.S.R. because of the nature of the Soviet economy. Krishna Menon, whose political prestige is intimately involved in the MIG issue, has been steadily pressing for approval.
Because of the absence from India of key GOI ministers, India may not announce a decision on a MIG deal until after Nehru returns to India, if then. (Nehru will make brief visits to France, Ghana and Nigeria prior to his return to India on October 1.)
There are several reasons why an agreement to manufacture MIG's in India seems less likely to eventuate than an arrangement for purchase. On the Indian side, critics of a MIG manufacturing agreement argue that MIG - 21's manufactured in India would be obsolete by the time they became operational, estimated at two to three years from the time an agreement is concluded.
On the Soviet side, there have been indications that the Soviets have been experiencing doubts, for both technical and political reasons, about providing India with a manufacturing capability for the MIG - 21. The Soviets apparently have had some question about Indian ability to handle so complicated a program as manufacturing supersonic fighters. This seems to us to be reasonable caution on the part of the Soviets. Additionally, we have received reports that the Soviet Union has been meeting strong Communist Chinese objections, particularly to the proposal for manufacturing MIG's in India.
The Indians have repeatedly said that the right to manufacture is an essential element in their determination to acquire a supersonic capability. Soviet reservations regarding manufacture might therefore have an effect on the entire MIG deal.
As expressed by Ambassador Galbraith in a recent assessment, "It could be that the MIG deal is expiring not with a bang but a whimper."
168. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 10/62. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy on October 1 and approved by the White House on October 15. Kennedy's meeting with Ayub at Hammersmith Farm in Newport, Rhode Island, grew out of a request by Ayub for an informal visit to the United States following a State visit to Canada. (Memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, August 15; ibid., 7/62 - 8/62)
Newport, Rhode Island, September 24, 1962, 12:30 - 2:45 p.m.
SUBJECT
Kennedy - Ayub Talks at Newport, Rhode Island
PARTICIPANTS
President Ayub
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed
President Kennedy
Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy
The following subjects were discussed:/2/
/2/Memoranda of conversation dealing with items I, III, and IV are ibid.
I. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London: Common Market Problem;
II. Pakistan - Afghanistan Relations;
III. Pakistan - India Relations;
IV. Presentation of President's Science Advisory Committee Report on Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan.
II. Pakistan - Afghanistan Relations
President Kennedy asked President Ayub what he thought the prospects were for some sort of solution of the Afghan problem. President Ayub indicated that he was not optimistic about the outlook for an improvement in relations. He gave a summary of the history and present status of the mediation effort of the Shah of Iran, substantially along lines already reported by our Embassies in Tehran, Karachi, and Kabul. Although the chances for a settlement did not seem promising owing to Afghan unwillingness to show any flexibility, he thought that a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, or other representatives of the three governments, could still be arranged, to take place shortly after they returned from the General Assembly. The meeting would have taken place in Tehran before the General Assembly, if Afghan Foreign Minister Naim had not had to cancel because he wanted to take his son to Europe for medical treatment.
President Ayub said he felt there was little hope for Afghanistan so long as the present Royal Family remained in power. He characterized the Royal Family as being entirely indifferent to the needs and interests of the mass of the Afghan people. He termed the regime as cruel and motivated by expediency. He said the ruling family had formed its opinion that the Soviet Union was going to take over South Asia and was shaping its policy accordingly. He felt that the Afghan Government was influenced by this estimate when it broke relations with Pakistan and terminated trade and transit arrangements with Pakistan. The Afghan rulers had always played one side against another and their assessment of the present situation caused them to lean toward the Soviet Union. He thought they would have given the Soviets an opening, regardless of the policy followed by Pakistan.
President Kennedy expressed the deep concern of the U.S. Government at the adverse trend of events in Afghanistan. It was clear that the extension of Soviet influence was proceeding at a rapid rate. It seemed to the U.S. that the break with Pakistan had accelerated the adverse trend. It had made the Afghans far more dependent on Soviet trade than on the trade route through the Soviet Union. It had tended to isolate Afghanistan from the free world countries and had made it extremely difficult and expensive for the Afghans to receive any free world economic assist-ance. We do not feel that Afghanistan is irretrievably lost, but a major effort must be made to save the situation. Restoration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan seems essential to the success of the effort to counter the expansion of Soviet influence. President Kennedy then outlined, in general terms, our thinking as to how Pakistan - Afghanistan relations might be restored. He indicated the U.S. would be prepared to assist the financing and construction of short rail extensions into Afghanistan from Quetta - Chaman to Spin Baldak and from the Khyber Pass to a connecting point in Afghan territory. With the completion of this rail extension, which would require some months for consruction, it would be possible to send Afghan goods across Pakistani territory to Afghanistan in sealed cars in bond, with no transshipment or handling of the merchandise in Pakistan required. This would mean Afghan Trade Agencies would not be required. Our proposal was that the Pakistan Government allow the stationing of Trade Agencies in Peshawar and Quetta temporarily, such Trade Agencies to be closed as soon as the rail extensions are in operation. Diplomatic relations and trade and transit arrangements under this plan would be re-established immediately, along with the temporary reopening of the Trade Agencies. Consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would not be established now under the proposal, but small consulates would be reopened as soon as the Trade Agencies were closed. Since the number of Afghan representatives would be small, they could be kept under surveillance. The President said that, if desired, we would be willing to assist the Pakistani authorities in satisfying themselves that the Afghan representatives were not engaging in improper activities.
The President observed that this formula would achieve the objective of restoring Afghanistan's access to the free world and would improve the prospects of keeping Afghanistan out of the Soviet camp. It would save the face of both Afghanistan and Pakistan and would give Pakistan reasonable protection against objectionable activities of Afghan representatives among the tribesmen.
President Ayub indicated that he had considerable reservations to this proposal. He was agreeable to the rail extension, Chaman to Spin Baldak, which was already contemplated, but he seriously doubted the financial and engineering feasibility of a rail extension from the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. Nor did he think this was necessary. A trucking service from Peshawar over the existing highway was far more economical and practical. This trucking service had always worked well and could continue to do so. The Afghans could pick up the goods in Peshawar and handle the traffic arrangements in any way they pleased. Every facility would be granted by the Pakistani authorities even to the extent of some sacrifice of Pakistani traffic requirements. He thought the cost of extending the line through the very difficult mountainous terrain of the Khyber area would be enormous and long delayed and impossible to justify. The existing short line west of Peshawar was a difficult engineering accomplishment which was very expensive when it was built some decades ago. Even then the British could justify it only on military grounds.
President Ayub thought that if the Afghan ruling authorities were really interested in restoring trade, they would have accepted the U.S. compromise proposal of last March which Pakistan had accepted and which would have enabled the Afghans to supervise and document the transit traffic in Pakistan (although this was not really necessary), by means of Afghan Trade Agents stationed in Karachi, who would have had the right to travel periodically to the border points in connection with the transit traffic. The fact that the Afghans had rejected this, and had terminated the limited sixty-day resumption of transit traffic which continued through February and March of this year and which had worked very satisfactorily, showed that the Afghans did not really put a high priority on resumption of trade and transit.
President Ayub said that he did not see how Pakistan could safely permit the return of Afghan government representatives to the sensitive tribal area. They were all trouble-makers and they had orders to stir up the tribesmen. There has been great improvement in the peace and stability of the tribal area since the departure of the Afghan representatives last year. Before that, there had been numerous bombing and shooting incidents, some of them rather serious. In one clash, 700 had been killed. Furthermore, President Ayub thought that public opinion in Pakistan was a factor which had to be taken into account, especially since the return of constitutional government last June. The public understood the Afghan problem, and would regard President Ayub and his government as "fools," if the return of Afghan local representatives was allowed on practically the same basis as before. President Ayub felt there would be no legitimate consular work for Afghan consuls in the Northwest Frontier area anyway. They would only be there for subversive purposes. He was willing to permit the Afghans to have all the consulates they wanted in Rawalpindi and beyond, but no closer to the border than Rawalpindi. It seemed to President Ayub that the logical first step would be for the Afghans to agree to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. After this was accomplished, efforts could be made to restore other relations, step by step.
President Kennedy pointed out that the Afghan sensibilities had to be considered. The Afghans had been offended by the Pakistan action of last year in closing the Afghan offices. The Afghans would certainly need to give assurance as to proper conduct of their representatives and they could not expect an exact return to the former situation. With only a small Afghan consulate eventually situated in Peshawar and with the various safeguards, it seemed unlikely that the Afghan representatives could create serious difficulties, or threaten Pakistan security. The U.S. had been able to control Communist consuls in New York without any great difficulty. Mr. McConaughy noted that it was customary for a neighboring country to have a consulate in a nearby friendly city as important as Peshawar. There would be some visa work and other traditional work for an Afghan representative to perform in Peshawar.
President Kennedy urged President Ayub to view the problem from a broad standpoint, bearing in mind the very large stakes involved. He hoped that President Ayub could overlook some of the local factors in view of the much wider implications of the problem. It was our view that the prospects for saving Afghanistan from satellite status were greatly reduced by the continuation of the impasse between Pakistan and Afghanistan and that the security of Pakistan itself would be threatened in a major way by the entry of Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit.
President Ayub said he agreed on the great danger to Pakistan inherent in the present situation and outlook. He said he expected to be confronted with Soviet or Soviet-controlled forces on his border with Afghanistan at some time. He felt that Pakistan's policy was not responsible for the mistaken policy of the Afghan rulers. He felt that a change in the government of Afghanistan and some sort of confederation between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan was the only hopeful way of dealing with the security problem. Under present circumstances, the Soviets were very confident and did not feel it necessary to show their hand openly in Afghanistan. Their technicians and advisors were being very correct and were staying in the background. The Soviets were able to use central Asian nationals to do their work when necessary. These people could hardly be distinguished from the natives of Afghanistan. He thought the Soviets were playing their game very cleverly in Afghanistan and possibly would not have to make a show of aggressive force, which would have a damaging international effect.
President Ayub then said rather reluctantly that, in view of President Kennedy's views, he would be willing to consider permitting the establishment of Afghan "tentacles" in the Quetta - Chaman area, and in the Khyber area, but not in Peshawar itself. He might consider allowing an Afghan representative in say Landikotal, between Peshawar and the border, but Peshawar was too sensitive and he could not consider authorizing the reopening of an Afghan government office there. The Afghans still had permission to station representatives of the Afghan banks there, but official representatives could not be permitted in Peshawar.
President Kennedy noted that there was a basis for discussion in this offer of President Ayub's even though it did not go so far as we had suggested. We thought it was important for representatives of the two countries to get together in the presence of Iranians as soon as possible to try to work out an agreement. He hoped that President Ayub could authorize his people to start the discussions.
President Ayub said that this would be acceptable. He thought the Foreign Ministers might initiate the discussions in Tehran, after an initial preliminary meeting in New York while they are all present at the General Assembly. He expressed his distrust of Afghan Foreign Minister Naim, whom he described as devious and shifty. He said he preferred to deal with Daud, whom he described as tough and difficult, but blunt and forthright.
169. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Security, 1961 - 1963. Secret.
Washington, September 26, 1962.
Your meeting with Naim/2/ will be the first (and perhaps last) real chance we'll have to influence the basic outlook of the Afghan regime.
/2/Kennedy was scheduled to meet with Afghan Foreign Minister Naim on September 27.
All in town are convinced that Moscow is slowly but surely binding Afghanistan to it in a way the Afghans sooner or later won't be able to escape. The latest is a sensitive report/3/ that USSR is insisting on a three-year export monopoly on karakul and rugs, major Afghan exports. Our Embassy claims this would signify the "virtual end of RGA economic independence." Whether or not Kabul is in fact past the point of no return, the trend is certainly clear.
/3/Not found.
Dominant Soviet influence in Afghanistan would so increase the pressures on Iran and Pakistan as to justify a major forestalling effort on our part. Such an effort would involve largely US economic aid. But here we run afoul of the Pushtunistan issue and its derivative, the transit dispute, which prevents us from even getting much aid in.
We've just tried moving Ayub on this issue without much success. He's probably willing to compromise but won't restore status quo ante as Kabul insists.
So we've got to get the Afghans to come halfway too. The only means I see is to drive home to Naim and his brother Daud how dangerous a spot we think they're in and how little we can do to help so long as our entry through Pakistan is blocked.
To me, this requires lifting the discussion above the level of Pushtunistan and transit. There is no purchase in letting Naim give you his usual long harangue on these; he is letter perfect and passionately convinced he's right.
Instead I'd urge stressing our concern over the skillful game Moscow is playing--half a billion in loans and grants, 3 - 4000 Soviet technicians, and reorientation of most Afghan trade toward the Bloc. The Soviets have been very cautious to date, but Naim should ask himself what they might do once they have Afghans in their grasp.
Naim's comeback will surely be to appeal for greater US aid and support. Here I think we should frankly ask him whether he thinks we can desert our ally Pakistan on Pushtun issue, when we fully recognize Durand Line. We can't even continue present aid program effectively till the border is opened anyway.
If Naim shows any give, you could tell him: (1) you personally told Ayub that both he and Afghans must recognize that their common security interest far transcends their lesser disputes--Afghanistan must have a friendly Pakistan in its rear and vice versa; (2) we are convinced that straight restoration of the status quo ante is unacceptable to Ayub, but; (3) he seems willing to compromise and agreed to foreign ministers talks under Iranian auspices in New York; (4) we urge Afghans to pick up this gauge before something sours the prospects again; and (5) there can be a reasonable settlement if both sides will keep their larger mutual interests clearly in mind (pp. 4 - 5 of State's Talking Paper/4/ have more details).
/4/Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, 9/14/62 - 9/26/62)
The Afghans, who are horribly isolated, may just feel that the USSR is coming out on top, and that they have to bend with the wind. So you may want to weave in a few remarks about the Bloc's current troubles and our confidence we're ahead, though pointing out as a fact of life that we would have a hard time helping Afghans if they got too enmeshed by Soviets before they woke up and called for help.
My sense is that you might just be able to break this logjam. As was the case with Sukarno, these proud, sensitive Afghan leaders might take from you what no one else can really get across.
Bob Komer
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/9 - 2762. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by Kettelhut, Cameron, and William Bundy; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi and USUN for the Secretary.
Washington, September 27, 1962, 5:46 p.m.
560. 1. Ayub discussed US military assistance with Secretary McNamara September 25/2/ in frank and cordial atmosphere. Ayub said he did not wish alter scope US military aid nor seek enlargement agreed force base, but hoped US performance on delivery agreed items could be improved.
/2/Ayub met with McNamara in Washington on September 25 and then visited New York before returning to Pakistan on September 27. A memorandum of this conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, SA #47, Pakistan, 200.6 - 333, 1962.
2. McNamara said he would see to it that any serious deficiencies in delivery would be corrected expeditiously. FYI: McNamara undertook that delivery level in FY 1963 would be at least twice, perhaps 2-1/2 times that achieved in FY 1962./3/ However, FY 1962 deliveries were abnormally low because of SEA and Berlin priorities, so that net performance for the two years is not above prior delivery schedule. End FYI.
/3/This undertaking was confirmed in an aide-m?moire signed on October 13 by Talbot, and delivered to Foreign Minister Ali on that date. A copy of the aide-m?moire was transmitted under cover of a January 18, 1963, memorandum from McNamara to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force expressing his concern that the terms of his commitments to Ayub were not being met. (Ibid.: FRC 67 A 4564, Pakistan, 1963, 000.1 - 091.4)
3. No increase in MAP was requested or committed. Under agreed MAP ceiling a submarine for Pak Navy was committed for delivery not earlier than FY 1964. 1961 commitment of 4 C - 130's reaffirmed and UASF survey team will be sent to study how meet remainder Pakistan's air transport needs, and a further increment of transport aircraft will follow, although not necessarily C - 130's.
4. FYI: Current MAP includes delivery to Pakistan of 130 tanks, chiefly M - 48's during FY 1963. 72 tanks are programmed for later delivery. As noted above this does not represent any increase over previous MAP level. There is no increase in fighter aircraft inventory. Attrition aircraft both F - 86 and F - 104 will be provided in kind as required. End FYI.
For New Delhi
Dept considers it possible Ayub may try through press to create impression, as he did in 1961, that his trip has resulted in increased or at least more glamorous US military assistance. If Karachi perceives no objection Ambassador Galbraith may wish forestall effect of such an effort by informing GOI immediately of results Ayub's talks with McNamara. Ambassador authorized pass to GOI information in paragraph 3 only. If submarine is questioned, he could say that it will be used to train Pak Navy in ASW. If it later develops Ayub publicizes commitment to increase delivery, Ambassador also may draw on all of paragraph 2.
Ball
171. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Afghanistan, Memoranda of Conversation, 7/61 - 9/62. Secret. Drafted by Grant. Naim was in the United States as head of the Afghan Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.
Washington, September 27, 1962, 11 a.m.
SUBJECT
Meeting of the President and Prince Naim
PARTICIPANTS
The President
H.R.H. Prince Naim, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for Afghanistan
H.E. Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador of Afghanistan
Mr. James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
The President opened the conversation with an expression of his concern and interest in strengthening relations with Afghanistan, and of his concern with the problems which were arising out of the relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors, and possible means for their solution.
Prince Naim responded, in English and in a very low voice dropping on occasion to a whisper, with a little speech in which he expressed his appreciation of the interest of the President in Afghanistan, in aid for development and in the resolution of the border problem. He regretted the lack of results in the latter area, noting that it appeared Pakistan was not desirous of reestablishing normal relations between the two countries. Prince Naim noted the delicate situation in Afghanistan, and that it was a part of the frontier of the Free World, but in contrast to the United States, a part of the old frontier. Its society was not of the type of its neighbor to the north and, left alone, would not evolve in that direction.
Prince Naim noted that Afghanistan was in a very exposed location, continually confronted with economic and political isolation. He said that the Pakistan policy of denying the true facts and of pressing for the increased isolation of Afghanistan from the Free World was making Afghanistan more and more dependent, and dangerously so, on its northern neighbor. This constituted a dangerous threat not only to Afghanistan but to the Free World as well.
He said there were two principal issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first was the complicated Pushtunistan issue which will take much time and patience to solve. The second was the issue of Afghanistan's access to the sea.
The President interjected at this point that he could not understand why the issue of trade through Pakistan to Afghanistan could not be separated from the other issues between the two countries, and why a solution could not be found for this problem standing alone.
Prince Naim stated that it was more than a problem of just physical movement of goods, that there was a real question as to what kind of trade was possible in the absence of consular and trade offices to take care of the papers and consular activities associated with the movement of goods and people. Without consular facilities it was extremely difficult for traders and other personnel, such as truck drivers, to function. On the other hand, he said, it is possible to separate the border/trade problem from the general Pushtunistan issue and this was what the Afghans proposed. He said that the Pushtunistan political problems raised by the Pakistanis in connection with the consulates were imaginary ones in that the Afghans, given the open border, can pass freely back and forth.
The President returned to the theme that it should be possible for Afghanistan, if it really wants to, to reach an agreement with Pakistan allowing trade and aid to flow smoothly through Pakistan, and that it should be possible to solve that problem without having to solve other problems.
Prince Naim stated that it is a matter of life and death for Afghanistan to maintain its trade and aid ties with the West. Unfortunately Pakistan had mixed the subject of consulates and trade agencies, necessary for trade and aid goods to pass, with the broader political issues. Prince Naim said that Afghanistan was most willing to guarantee that its consular offices would not engage in improper political practices and would abide by conservative international practices. If the Pakistanis had some suspicion of a problem they could declare the person involved persona non grata. Also, the building of one or two rail spurs would help since when finished there would no longer be a need for trade agencies in the frontier area. However, consular facilities will be required for the thousands of Afghans who travel along the two routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
The President then said that he wished to affirm most strongly our friendship for Afghanistan and our desire to be of help. However, he believed that Afghanistan could not long exist in a position of growing dependency on the U.S.S.R., that under the best of circumstances independence of a country cannot be maintained readily by complete dependence on one country. The Iran route was useable to a point but too expensive. In his opinion Afghanistan needed to make adjustments to reach some solution of its problem with Pakistan.
Prince Naim replied that the undesirable and growing dependence on the north is a result of moves by the Pakistanis. He noted parenthetically that when Afghanistan came to the United States for military aid in 1952 - 53 the United States turned down the request even though Afghanistan said it was threatened on both borders. He noted that in education they were still placing their dependency in this field in the West, and on the United States particularly. Progress did need to be made on solving the transit problem and he expressed the strong hope that both the United States and the Shah of Iran would continue their good efforts. However, he doubted whether it was possible for there to be a successful negotiation if the United States gives Pakistan the feeling of United States support for its position.
The President interjected to note that the United States had only a limited capacity to influence Pakistan, that each country seemed to feel that the United States had the capacity to influence its neighbor although not itself.
This brought a laugh from Prince Naim, who then continued that if discussions can continue it should be possible to meet the basic needs of both countries with the possible exception of the question of prestige for each. Prince Naim stated that he had an appointment with the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Pakistan Foreign Minister as soon as he returns to New York, with the Iranian Foreign Minister serving as host. He hoped that at that time he could convince Mohammed Ali that a consulate with a senior and a junior officer is a small matter to be holding up the progress of much larger interests.
He also requested that the United States continue to show its willingness to continue shipping goods through Iran and to provide support for the Five-Year Plan. He noted that a large amount of information had been given to the United States on the plan and many discussions had been held with the AID officials but nothing definitive had yet evolved. He noted that it was extremely important that aid continue to flow over the Iran route if the hands of the Pakistanis were not to be greatly strengthened.
The President replied that the United States was willing to continue shipping through Iran as we have been in the recent past but that we are not in a position to give a long-term commitment in detailed support of the Five-Year Plan. He noted, however, that we are discussing projects with the Afghans and are prepared to continue aid at least previous annual levels subject to the availability of well prepared projects, Congressional appropriation of funds, and satisfactory means of shipment.
Prince Naim stated quite vigorously that shipment through Iran to Afghanistan is possible at the same price as through Pakistan. He said he understood our problem on long-term commitments but he felt that the project approach was not yet working very smoothly, there having been many discussions and examinations already without much action.
The President promised to look personally at the status of the projects in Afghanistan after Congress had appropriated funds. He noted, however, that there seemed to be a real difference between the Afghans and United States officials on the cost and amount of goods which could be shipped through Iran. He again reiterated the need to restore transit through Pakistan. He said that he had talked to Ayub and hoped the countries were not too far apart and could carry out careful discussions in New York and Iran.
Prince Naim stated once again that he would talk to the Pakistanis and was confident of agreement if the Pakistanis would be more flexible and stop their pressure. He noted that the additional cost of shipping goods through Iran was a small cost in comparison with the vastly greater costs if Afghanistan were lost to the Free World. He did not feel safe now as to the future of Afghanistan; it would need the moral and financial help of outsiders if it were to survive.
The President replied that the United States is a long way off and even though it is very anxious to be of help it can at best play a limited role. He stated that he was not convinced, after talking to Ayub and Naim, that it would be possible to reach a general accord but at least it ought to be possible to reach an agreement on how goods from the United States can flow across Pakistan to Afghanistan. The President closed on the question of the source of greatest danger: that arising from complete dependence on the Soviet Union or that from some adjustment with Pakistan to enable goods to flow again.
Prince Naim said, in reply, that dangers are present in any course of action but that his government, as all governments, must maintain its national life. Afghanistan, like West Berlin, is landlocked and dependent on routes through other countries. As with West Berlin, if a landlocked country does not stand up for its rights where does the process of attrition stop?
The President closed the meeting by noting that there was a real problem in balancing the factors involved. He assured Prince Naim of the very strong United States interest in Afghanistan and of our willingness to be of assistance.
The tenor of the meeting throughout was cordial.
172. Memorandum of Conversation
New York, September 27, 1962.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 B 01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 24 Sept - 31 Dec 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Extract--2 pages of source text not declassified.]
173. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 602.8990D/9 - 2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Tehran, Kabul, and Karachi.
New York, September 29, 1962, 4 p.m.
Secto 49. Following Based on Uncleared Memcom. Prince Naim saw Secretary bilateral substantive talk this morning. He took major portion of hour to describe compromise formula he said had been agreed upon previous evening in long discussion with Mohammed Ali at Aram dinner which lasted until 1:30 this morning.
Formula, he reported, envisages restoration consular functions at Peshawar and Quetta but by diplomatic personnel specifically assigned this function. After initial period, which Naim had suggested might be month or six weeks, offices would become regular consulates with regular consular personnel. He had told Mohammed Ali if Pakistan were to have any complaint about subversive activities of consular personnel, GOP should make complaint to him as Foreign Minister about individuals and have them withdrawn in accordance normal diplomatic practice, instead of closing consulates. He assured Mohammed Ali GOA would not use consulates for subversion.
Formula also envisages opening of trade agencies briefly until completion of rail spurs. He stated he expected this would take no more than 3 months in one case and 8 or 9 in other.
Naim indicated his realization Pakistanis had to "save face." He said he felt sure he could persuade GOA accept compromise as stands but he is not sure Mohammed Ali can or will persuade GOP.
(SecDel heard briefly from Aram this morning that compromise proposals aired at dinner. He expressed uncertainty whether they acceptable to both governments.)/2/
/2/Rusk met with Iranian Foreign Minister Aram on October 5 and received a more complete account of the discussion that led to the compromise formula. Aram felt that it might prove difficult to persuade Ayub to accept the formula. He planned to recommend that the Shah send a message to Ayub supporting the proposed formula, and he suggested that it would be helpful if McConaughy was authorized to weigh in with Ayub in the same vein. (Memorandum of conversation, October 5; ibid., NEA/SOA Files: Lot 64 D 544, Naim Visit, Sept 1962)
Naim also reported discussion regarding propaganda problem. He said GOA did not regard Afghan public discussion what is happening to Pushtoons as "propaganda." He apparently took position much GOA "propaganda" mere reaction to what GOA heard from Pakistani propaganda. But Naim said he had agreed not to attack Pakistani personalities in Afghan output.
Secretary said he much encouraged this report of progress in negotiations./3/
/3/The Department of State's position on the compromise formula brokered by Aram was outlined in telegram 599 to Karachi, October 4. The Department felt that favorable momentum pointing in the direction of the solution of the transit impasse should be encouraged. But in this instance, it was advisable for the United States to retreat into the background and let the three nations involved work out a solution. (Ibid., Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 462)
Secretary explained US interests in Afghanistan's freedom and "serenity" and showed how these important to US. An Afghanistan that is serene and free removes possible source of difficulty for US/Soviet relations.
Secretary discussed our firm interest in Afghanistan's economic development but our inability to make commitments of contractual nature. Naim discussed possibly some misunderstanding of work commitment but expressed need for GOA know as precisely as possible areas it can expect US assistance for 5-year plan. Secretary indicated desire be as precise as possible; said we would see, after AID bill passed, how we may make more precise what we can say about assistance to 5-year plan. We hoped be as helpful as possible without making any commitments we cannot be sure to carry out. Throughout this portion of discussion Secretary stressed importance Afghan access to variety of countries in world as one determinant how helpful outside countries, especially US, could be toward 5-year plan.
Rusk
174. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 10/15/62 - 10/20/62. Secret.
Washington, October 15, 1962.
SUBJECT
Fighting on Sino - Indian Border
Fighting on the Sino - Indian border has become much more serious and has imposed a heavy logistical burden on the Indians. Diplomatic efforts to ease military tensions on the border have failed at least for the present. In response to Indian requests, the U.S. is giving assistance to make possible certain limited purchases designed to ease Indian military transport and communications problems. Additionally the Departments of State and Defense are studying the availability on short notice and on terms acceptable to India of transport, communications and other military equipment in order to be prepared should the Government of India request such U.S. equipment to cope with the Chinese threat.
Military Situation:
The focus of military activity has shifted from Ladakh on the western border with China to a point just east of Bhutan on the eastern border along the MacMahon Line. According to the Indians, some 300 to 400 Chinese troops crossed the MacMahon Line on September 8 or 9, threatening Indian outposts near Dhola, one to two miles inside Indian-claimed territory. In point of fact, it is unclear as to whether the MacMahon Line lies north or south of this area. Firing between the opposing forces began on September 20 and continued intermittently, with light casualties on both sides, until October 10 when it became much heavier. Both sides have accused the other of provoking the initial firing on September 20. Nehru announced on October 12 that in the October 10 fighting the Chinese had suffered nearly a hundred casualties, and the Indians, seventeen. He said he had ordered the Indian Army to clear Indian territory in the Northeast Frontier.
This is the most serious engagement of the Sino - Indian dispute. The Indians claim the Communist Chinese were responsible for initiating the fighting on October 10. India, however, may itself have been responsible for this action in order to expel the Chinese from the Indian-claimed territory in this area which is of far greater strategic importance to India than is Ladakh. While we have no confirmation of Indian responsibility, the Indian Foreign Secretary informed Ambassador Galbraith that Indian forces have been under orders to open fire on Chinese on Indian-claimed territory in the Northeast in contrast to their orders to move as possible but not shoot in Ladakh. Moreover, the Indian Army has greater strength and resources in this area than in Ladakh.
Intelligence reports indicate that Indian air transport facilities have been put under severe strain by supply operations in support of the Dhola operation. We have had difficulty in arranging for routine U.S. freight charter flights from Calcutta to Katmandu because of this situation.
In the meantime, there have been no reports of incidents in Ladakh since early September when the Indians state four Chinese soldiers were killed in a still unpublicized engagement near the Chip Chap River.
We consider that the Chinese objective in shifting the focus to the East has been to put additional pressure on the Indians to come to the negotiating table on Chinese terms. We do not believe either side desires the conflict to become more extensive than the present skirmishing on the border. Considerations of "face" could, however, intensify this skirmishing. The Indians are now publicly committed to expel the Chinese from Dhola and the Chinese are equally committed to remain where they are.
Diplomatic Situation:
India's more firm military policy, implemented last spring of stopping or pushing back the Communist Chinese in Ladakh, resulted in several minor military skirmishes. Concerned that the resulting military tensions should not lead to a widening or intensification of the conflict beyond the point of Indian capabilities, India initiated an attempt about two months ago to calm the situation by diplomatic activity. (See our memorandum of August 15, 1962.)/2/ In a series of notes India proposed preliminary talks for the purpose of creating a climate in which later negotiations on the border could take place. Under pressure from Parliament, Nehru's position hardened to the point of insisting that such talks should have as an objective the re-establishment of the previous "status quo of the border," i.e., the withdrawal of the Chinese from the parts of Ladakh which they occupied.
/2/Not found.
The Communist Chinese maintained their position in favor of negotiations on the border, but "without pre-conditions," i.e., without withdrawal or acceptance of the Indian position that the border is delimited. Reasserting this position the Chinese proposed that negotiations be initiated in Peiping on October 15, and that both sides should withdraw 20 kilometers from their present positions prior to negotiations. The Indians agreed to talks on October 15, but on their own terms. With such distance between the two positions, reinforced by actual fighting, the prospect for an actual meeting has been dim.
In its latest note on the subject dated October 6 India repeated its willingness to hold discussions with the Chinese under the conditions previously indicated, but further indicated that it would not enter into talks under duress and that therefore the Communist Chinese would have to terminate their latest incursion across the MacMahon Line first.
U.S. Action:
Since the Dhola activity began, the Government of India has made three requests for U.S. assistance in arranging for Indian purchase of spare parts and military transportation and communications equipment. Recognizing the connection with the border engagement, we have given the requests priority attention.
1. On October 2 the Indian Foreign Secretary asked for Ambassador Galbraith's assistance in urgently procuring C - 119 spare parts for purchase by the Government of India. Although hindered by the chaotic state of Indian supply and procurement procedures, the Air Force determined what parts were needed, made available stocks on hand, and ordered immediate local manufacture of those stocks which were unavailable. These parts, with the exception of two unidentifiable items, are currently in the process of shipment to India.
2. On October 4 the Indian Embassy asked the U.S., in view of the emergency, to agree to divert two Caribou transport airplanes, on order with De Havilland of Canada, to the Indian Air Force for purchase. The Secretary of Defense directed that the Defense Department comply with the request and the Department of State on October 11 informed the Indian Embassy of the U.S. Government's willingness to make the aircraft available for purchase. The delivery date is expected to be in the last week of October.
3. Our Embassy in New Delhi informed us October 3 that the Indian Defense Ministry had directed the Indian Embassy in Washington urgently to request export licenses to permit the purchase of 250 ANGRC - 9 radios for use along the Sino - Indian border. Although the U.S. has not as yet received such a request, the Army is trying to work out problems of availability in advance.
In addition to the above steps taken in response to specific Indian requests, we are attempting to determine what additional steps the U.S. Government might take should the Government of India request further assistance. The Departments of State and Defense are inquiring into the early availability of transport, communications, and other military and quasi-military equipment on terms which would be likely to be acceptable to India. We do not plan to discuss such specific assistance with the Indians, however, unless the Government of India itself raises the subject.
John Lloyd/3/
/3/Lloyd signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
175. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 1562. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong.
New Delhi, October 15, 1962, 6 p.m.
1225. Policy. Given the prospect of continuing and possibly more serious conflict on the Northern Frontier it would seem well that we be clear as to the line being pursued here in dealing with the Indian Government. If the Department agrees we will continue to be guided by the following rules:
(1) We have natural sympathy for the Indians and the problems posed by the Chinese intervention.
(2) We will be restrained in our expressions in the matter so as to give the Chinese no pretext for alleging any American involvement.
(3) We hope for a settlement acceptable to India. We should be careful to avoid any suggestion that Chinese trouble may force a reconsideration of India's foreign policy. If there is such reconsideration it will obviously begin with Indians.
(4) We will not offer assistance. It is the business of the Indians to ask. We will listen sympathetically to requests. Where, as in the case of the C - 119 spares or the Caribous the request is one to which we believe we should accede, we shall move with all promptness and efficiency to supply the items. Mission feels that recent Washington reaction on spares and Caribous was especially impressive to the Indians.
Galbraith
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/10 - 1662. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Gatch, cleared by Laise, and approved by Talbot.
Washington, October 16, 1962, 8:24 p.m.
643. Karachi's 713./2/ Based on uncleared memcons. Following capsule version both conversations may prove useful.
/2/In telegram 713, October 16, McConaughy asked for summaries of Foreign Minister Ali's recent conversations with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) According to an October 15 briefing memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, Ali met with Rusk on October 13 and with Kennedy on October 15. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 10/62)
Secretary
Mohammed Ali discussed three points with the Secretary: (1) SEATO; (2) Kashmir; (3) Pak - Afghan transit.
(1) SEATO
Mohammed Ali explained he had deliberately missed SEATO lunch because venue implied luncheon was an official meeting rather than an informal gathering. Secretary commented on necessity Foreign Ministers utilizing such opportunities as UNGA offered to get together, and regretted any misunderstanding that had arisen over nature of luncheon meeting.
(2) Kashmir
Mohammed Ali emphasized necessity US pressure on India to move towards settlement. Secretary doubted we could apply effective pressure and speculated on the feasibility of: (1) Commonwealth action; or (2) UN action leading towards joint administration of Kashmir. Secretary also asked whether Kashmir issue not simply symptom of deeper communal problem between Pakistan and India. Mohammed Ali rejected this suggestion, and said both countries would welcome with tremendous enthusiasm and relief a solution to Kashmir. Secretary said US would have another look at the problem.
(3) Pak - Afghan Transit
Mohammed Ali said he had found Naim "inflexible" in his insist-ence on return to status quo ante. He believed, however, that railspurs should be built as these would eliminate trade agency problem. As Pak - Afghan subject was raised only briefly, Dept later checked with Mohammed Ali to see whether he had arrived at any kind of understanding with Naim and Aram in New York. He said he has agreed to present a formula to Ayub. His formula differs from that reported by Naim and Aram in timing--i.e., consulates are not to be opened until after railspurs completed, but still appears negotiable.
President
Mohammed Ali discussed three points with the President: (1) Pak - Afghan transit; (2) Pak - Chicom border talks; and (3) Kashmir. Meeting ended with brief private talk.
1. Pak - Afghan Transit
President bore down hard on necessity keeping negotiations alive in Tehran. Mohammed Ali reiterated that Naim was being "inflexible" but confirmed he had sent formula back to Ayub.
2. Pak - Chicom Border Talks
Mohammed Ali at first noted "my enemy's enemy is my friend," thus implicitly admitting that GOP was using negotiations as means of putting pressure on India. Mohammed Ali then voiced familiar line on subject--saying that all GOP wanted was remove possible threat of border trouble with Chicoms. President emphasized that threat of Communist bloc overlies Pakistan as well as India. Admitted that all countries do not view danger alike and it important that those who do work together even though others like neutrals were getting "a free ride." Mohammed Ali welcomed this point of view which he said Pakistan shared.
3. Kashmir
Mohammed Ali reiterated strong plea he had made to Secretary, and solicited US public statement of support but ensuing discussion resulted in no agreement as to possible further steps.
Summary
Both meetings frank and hard-hitting but cordial, and Mohammed Ali obviously anxious convince us that he is still on our side, though concerned about his own political future and problems raised by his pro-American reputation.
Dept believes you should concentrate with Ayub on: (1) necessity keeping momentum on Pak - Afghan problem going by authorizing Mohammed Ali go to Tehran for further negotiations; and (2) excellent opportunity presented by recent Indian overtures for Ministerial-level discussions on outstanding Indo - Pak issues.
Rusk
177. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 1862. Secret. Repeated to Hong Kong.
New Delhi, October 18, 1962, 10 p.m.
1279. I talked with Prime Minister for half an hour this afternoon following his return from Ceylon and anticipating my departure for London. He looked exceedingly well and was in good spirits. Most of the conversation was on the Chinese border situation on which he spoke with great earnestness. The following emerged:
1) The Indians have taken the decision that the Chinese must be driven out whether it takes a year, five years or ten. He spoke with great firmness on this and asked that I make clear this determination to the President.
2) This determination clearly does not extend to any or all methods. It involves rather keeping steady pressure on the Chinese by the ground forces in the area and he implied that this intention now extends to Ladakh.
3) The weather is getting extremely cold in the Nefa combat area and the Chinese came in with better clothing and other protection against the climate. Their supply problem is far easier. Their road head is much nearer--some six miles--and their supply train is simpler. "We learned too many complicated things from the British."
4) The Indians are getting winter equipment to their troops but the losses from air dropping are so heavy they are having to resort to overland supply.
5) He expressed deep alarm about the prospect of war in this area and his discontent with those who had described efforts to avoid it as appeasement.
6) He said the Chinese may have occupied Longju but noting its location immediately on border he discounted its importance.
In general discussion I reiterated our general position of sympathy. I noted that this had been affirmed by the Secretary to Mrs. Gandhi. Of the latter he had not heard and asked what the Secretary had said. I gave him a general account. He said he thought our policy was correct and sound and certainly it was much appreciated by the Indians. I told him in turn that we fully realized the difficulties of the area, and the need for a policy of caution and patience noting that in US one occasionally encountered an individual more concerned with proving his bravery than his wisdom.
Galbraith
178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10 - 762. Confidential. Drafted by Gatch on October 19; cleared by Laise, Bromley Smith, and with GTI; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London, Tehran, and USUN.
Washington, October 22, 1962, 5:13 p.m.
118. Karachi's 715 to Dept/2/ and previous. Following is summary US behind-the-scenes effort over past month move Pak - Afghan transit dispute toward solution, and our estimate of chances of making progress.
/2/In telegram 715, October 17, McConaughy reported that Foreign Secretary Dehlavi had indicated that Foreign Minister Ali was not optimistic about the possibility of a settlement with Afghanistan in the wake of the meeting he had in New York on September 28 with Naim and Aram. Ali's pessimism stemmed from the fact that the Afghan Government was still insisting upon the status quo ante as the basis for the settlement. (Ibid.)
President saw Ayub Sept 24, Prince Naim Sept 27 and Mohammed Ali Oct 15. Secretary saw Ayub Sept 27, Naim Sept 29, Aram Oct 9, and Mohammed Ali Oct 13. Naim, Mohammed Ali and Aram had long dinner meeting Sept 28.
At dinner meeting formula proposed by Aram was reportedly agreed on for referral to Ayub and Daud by Mohammed Ali and Naim respectively. If it appears there is room for further meaningful negotiations, meetings will be held in Tehran under GOI aegis.
Conversations here subsequent to dinner meeting suggest formula proposed by Aram may be subject to different interpretations. He himself says key element in formula is that Afghan diplomats from Karachi should be detailed to Peshawar to perform consular functions. The Persian version does not specify when regular consular personnel might be assigned. Naim's understanding, as described by Ambassador Maiwandwal to us, is that Afghan Embassy officers temporarily assigned to consular functions in frontier offices would be replaced by regular consular officers "month or so" after diplomatic relations resumed. Mohammed Ali's understanding as given to the President is that these frontier offices will be maintained and manned by diplomatic personnel until rail spurs are completed. Then when need for trade agencies is eliminated regular consular personnel will be permitted to establish regular consular posts in Peshawar and Quetta. Since differences in understandings appear to be in detail and timing rather than principle, formula appears promising in that it would seem to allow requirements of "face" to be met. Whether it meets Ayub's domestic requirements is an open question, however.
As indicated in Karachi's 715, Mohammed Ali has sent outline formula, as he understands it, to Pakistan and will discuss it with Ayub upon his return. Mohammed Ali not scheduled to leave New York until October 26. We have no present intentions to make further representations to him on transit problem while he is here. Naim in London and still plans go home via Moscow, arriving in Kabul at the end of the month.
From here it seems we have done all we usefully can do for moment. We are particularly mindful Mohammed Ali's insistence with Ambassador McConaughy evening Sept 24 that US remain in background and Iran's efforts be kept in forefront. So far Pak - Afghan squabble has recently been overlooked in press here, and Tehran meeting would appear natural result of Shah's previous efforts rather than result of US intervention.
We believe Daud can accept principle of formula. As Foreign Secy Dehlavi pointed out to Ambassador McConaughy, Pakistan decision rests squarely on Ayub and thus, ultimately, success or failure also rests on him. Dept is not without hope that he will show at least enough flexibility to authorize Mohammed Ali to negotiate in Tehran.
Rusk
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch, cleared by Cameron and by Jeffrey C. Kitchen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, October 22, 1962, 9:56 p.m.
664. Karachi's 748, Department's 660 to Karachi./2/
/2/On October 20, Chinese forces launched major offensives in the Ladakh area of Kashmir and across the disputed border into India's Northeast Frontier Agency. In telegram 660, October 21, the Department instructed McConaughy to convey to Ayub the undesirability of any action which would prevent India from concentrating on the Chinese attack and to suggest to Ayub that he propose a mutual understanding with Nehru to keep the border between India and Pakistan calm during the crisis. (Ibid., 691.93/10 - 2162)
In telegram 748, October 22, McConaughy stated that the approach outlined in telegram 660 might be taken by Ayub as suggesting that the United States saw Pakistan as responsible for past India-Pakistan border difficulties and suspected that Pakistan might seek to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict. McConaughy thought a more effective approach would be a straightforward appraisal of the serious turn the conflict had taken and the threat it posed to the entire subcontinent. (Ibid., 691.93/10 - 2262)
1. Our suggested approach (Deptel 660) not intended assess blame for past border difficulties but to acquaint Ayub with our views re necessity for all of us to avoid any actions which would add to India's difficulties at this critical juncture in Sino - Indian relations.
2. Dept would naturally wish to avoid provoking unproductive reaction which you predict (Karachi's 748).
3. Ambassador should stress to Ayub our view that Sino - Indian border developments have taken such a serious turn as to threaten security of entire subcontinent.
4. In view of this threat, would hope Ambassador could explore with Ayub what useful gestures GOP might make that would help Nehru and GOI psychologically. For example, Ayub might wish consider sending private message to Nehru recalling many past GOP statements that there would be no recourse to force by Pakistan in attempting to settle disputes with India and assuring Nehru that India can feel secure in putting forward its maximum effort against threat from the north.
5. From standpoint our objectives, we would not wish to elicit at this stage Pakistan proposal joint defense. If proposal made publicly, Indians would likely regard it as primarily propaganda. If made privately, Indians might feel Pakistan trying take advantage India's critical position by forcing India accept what has been clearly unacceptable in the past. FYI. We are exploring on urgent basis what further steps we might take to encourage parties get together in this and other connections. End FYI.
Rusk
180. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/10 - 2562. Secret; Niact. Relayed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House.
New Delhi, October 25, 1962, 11 p.m.
1384. Eyes Only for Secretary. Pass Eyes Only Secretary McNamara, White House for Bundy.
1) While we hold to the estimate that the Chinese have limited objectives in the NEFA, on the other hand today's fighting has brought them still further south and in considerable force. Late reports indicate that Towang, a communications and administration center some 20 air miles south of the MacMahon line has fallen. Our mind must now be open to graver ambitions extending to much of NEFA and eliminating India's natural mountain spine as fortification.
2) We still have had no formal request for assistance. This reflects in our best judgment intention to make one more try for Soviet restraint of ChiComs plus the reluctance of Menon to confess the total defeat of his hopes and policy. On the other hand Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai yesterday and Finance Minister Morajai Desai this evening told me that such a request is inevitable and imminent.
3) According to a wealth of information and most recently this evening from Finance Minister Desai we know that the Indians are fighting with vastly inferior weapons. They have World War I rifles vs. the modern automatic weapons of Chinese, few mortars, inadequate machine gun support.
4) It seems obvious we cannot offer weapons prior to being requested. It would be politically unproductive for us to do so. However, in view of the military and political situation it is plain that we may have to act with utmost urgency when the request is made. Our great promptness will have maximum favorable effect on Indian troop morale, on political climate toward the United States and most important in deterring further Chinese advances.
5) Under these circumstances and in line with present Washington knowledge of forces operating under NEFA conditions, we believe it important that contingency planning for air-lift movement of weapons and ammunition get under way at once. Thinking should be in terms of infantry weapons for immediate use by (say) two divisions plus of professional ill-equipped infantry operating under mountain conditions. This would be with view to moving arms to NEFA base within hours after request. We are fully aware of the many missing elements for such planning but now believe it would be negligent not to make preparation on basis of presently available knowledge.
6) Would you advise us urgently of reaction and of information which we should seek to supply bearing in mind the limitations on our ability in this respect.
7) This reflects view of Attaches.
Galbraith
181. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 10/26/62 - 10/27/62. Secret.
Washington, October 26, 1962.
Mr. President:
Here is some background for you before seeing Ambassador Nehru.
1. The Indians are in retreat along a wide area of their border in both the Northwest and the Northeast. The Chinese have occupied some inhabited places. They are now beyond the territory they had previously claimed.
2. The Chinese offer of a cease-fire and mutual retreat of 20 kilometers from the present line of battle was rejected by the Indians.
3. Pravda characterized the offer as reasonable and urged the Indians to accept it. This and intelligence that Soviets told Nehru they couldn't intercede for him suggest that Soviets have decided to remain at least tacitly on Chinese side.
4. We are now prepared to do the following things if you approve.
a. Help the Indians with arms and equipment on a military assist-ance basis if they ask for it. Up to now, as you know, they [we?] have been dealing with them on a cash sale basis.
b. Make a public statement through Galbraith that we recognize the McMahon line/2/ as the traditional border between India and China/3/ (this is the Northeast border).
/2/The McMahon Line between India and Tibet was negotiated in March 1914 by Sir Arthur McMahon, Secretary to the Government of India, and confirmed in Article 9 of the Simla Convention, initialed July 3, 1914, by representatives of the United Kingdom, China, and Tibet. The Simla Convention was not subsequently signed or ratified by China.
/3/In telegram 1663, October 26, Galbraith was authorized to state that the United States recognized the McMahon Line as the traditional and generally accepted international border and fully supported India's position in that regard. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2562)
c. Approach Ayub with the suggestion that he recognize the danger and make some significant gesture; for example, breaking off in a public way his own negotiations with the Chinese about the border.
C.K./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Kaysen, and approved by Grant. Repeated to London and Karachi.
Washington, October 27, 1962, 2:20 p.m.
1677. Ambassador Nehru saw President afternoon October 26/2/ to deliver letter from Prime Minister/3/ concerning serious developments on Sino - Indian frontier. Letter consists of description of Chinese aggression followed by operative paragraph in which PriMin says that he is confident that India in this hour of crisis "shall have your sympathy and support." (PriMin's letter has appearance of circular communication to friendly heads of state and text being pouched.)
/2/A memorandum of Kennedy's conversation with Nehru, prepared by Kaysen, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 10/26/62 - 10/27/62)
/3/Nehru's letter, dated October 26, is ibid., Nehru Correspondence, 10/1/62 - 11/10/62.
President told Ambassador that he would reply immediately to PriMin's letter assuring him that he of course had our full sympathy and support and that we were prepared to demonstrate this attitude in ways which might be helpful to him within our capabilities. President was receptive to Ambassador's suggestion that reply should contain no reference to arms or to aid. Ambassador said last he had heard from Delhi was that Indian Government still thinking in terms of purchasing arms.
Ambassador was also told that President would instruct Ambassador Galbraith to discuss situation with PriMin and to hold himself available to sort out with PriMin and other Indian officials India's needs and desires and specific ways in which we might be helpful.
President asked Ambassador what would be effect on Krishna Menon's future of Indian reverses. He said that Krishna Menon was an Indian problem and that we were not going to say anything about him but added that he was not an Indian asset. Ambassador replied that political considerations would undoubtedly require that Krishna Menon be kept on as nominal Defense Minister. On basis of his information he judged that PriMin had in fact taken over Defense Ministry and would run it with assistance of defense advisory group composed of senior military officers, all of whom opposed Krishna Menon.
Thrust of President's comments to Ambassador Nehru were that we were ready to be of assistance and when Indians told us what would be most useful we would work out terms and procedures.
For Ambassador: In connection with your determining an appropriate time for you to begin exploration with PriMin of Indian needs and desires and how we may be of assistance Presidential letter/4/ will be sent to you during weekend.
Rusk
/4/See Document 187.
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762. Secret; Niact. Received in the Department of State at 3:09 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi.
Karachi, October 27, 1962, 10 p.m.
764. Deliver Immediately to Secretary Talbot. Policy. Embassy telegram 762./2/ I broached Sino - Indian crisis with President Ayub in same October 26 conversation outlining serious implications of Indian reverses both in NEFA and Ladakh, especially former, and stating our conviction of ChiCom aggressive intent and action, limits of which not yet definable. I stated the strong case for GOP making positive gesture of sympathy and restraint to GOI. Emphasized identity of interest of both great countries of subcontinent in repelling common threat which cast same shadow over both. I spelled out that if ChiComs keep pushing south of McMahon Line in northeast, even graver and more immediate threat to Pakistan existed. I said explicitly that United States shares and sympathizes with Indian anxiety at mounting ChiCom threat. In this context I suggested that it would be helpful and appreciated move as well as major step to improve climate for future GOI - GOP negotiations, for President Ayub to send to Nehru, publicly or even privately, some expression of sympathy, assurance against any GOP diversionary move and understanding of dangerous position faced by GOI. I particularly stressed our view that an action by GOP to renounce opportunity to capitalize on present situation would be in its own interest in making GOI more tractable and flexible in later bilateral negotiations.
/2/In telegram 762 from Karachi, October 27, McConaughy reported on the part of his conversation with Ayub in Rawalpindi on October 26 which dealt with the Cuban missile crisis. McConaughy delivered a letter to Ayub from Kennedy which set forth the basis for the U.S. response to the crisis and indicated the desire to work in close concert with U.S. allies. Ayub responded by strongly endorsing U.S. actions. (Ibid., 611.3722/10 - 2762)
President Ayub assured me somewhat testily that his government of course had not taken and would not take any action which hamper GOI fight against Chinese Communists. However, he firmly rejected any possibility of special GOP message of comfort to Nehru. He did not consider such message would be either helpful or necessary. In first place, he did not believe such message would improve Indian military position vis-?-vis Chinese. Indians knew they did not need to keep existing large concentrations of troops on Pak borders, and could not use or logistically support any greatly increased troop strength in narrow and isolated mountain passes against Chinese anyway. Secondly, while Ayub fully recognized common danger in long-run of Commie China to India and Pakistan, he was not as concerned as we were by current Chinese penetrations since, in Pak view, they probably do not portend major thrust far beyond McMahon Line into India proper or a challenge at this time to fundamental national security of India.
Basically, Ayub indicated little sympathy for Indian position. He felt Indians had handled situation badly, issuing rash and boastful statements on intentions push back ChiComs, giving ChiComs some excuse for countermeasures and then proving totally incapable of handling subsequent military actions.
In commenting on the Indian attitude, Ayub also reverted to several favorite themes, unlikelihood GOI will reduce its military forces on Pak borders despite ChiCom threat and fact that Indians have alienated all their neighbors except USSR. He mentioned that Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan were fed up with Indian treatment of them as protectorates, which policy was throwing them into arms of Commie China. He thought Burmese and Ceylonese were likewise increasingly resentful of India.
Ayub then suggested that this might be an opportune moment for United States to use its good offices to urge India to settle its difficulties with Pakistan. When I pinned him down, he acknowledged that what he had specifically in mind was that we use our influence to induce GOI to proceed now to a settlement of Kashmir dispute. I responded immediately that there was no reason to believe that this emergency was appropriate time for such an initiative. It would undoubtedly be considered by India as effort to take advantage of its extremity vis-a-vis China.
President viewed his proposal in different light, feeling that India, chastened by adversity, might be impelled to honor its commitment. He dismissed all other Indo - Pak differences as relatively trifling. Kashmir was the only really destructive issue.
My comments on general aspects Pak reaction to Indian plight will follow in separate message. I think it is clear however from course of our talk that, despite great seriousness ChiCom threat, it will require a near miracle in both India and Pakistan to wipe away the corrosive bitterness and establish cooperative basis for dealing with the crisis.
We can take some satisfaction in Ayub's assurance, even though privately expressed only to us, that GOP has no intention taking advantage of India's trouble.
Although we are not authorized by Ayub to convey this to GOI, we are not prohibited from doing so either.
If situation deemed to warrant it, I would recommend that we inform GOI of this assurance at high level in strict confidence.
McConaughy
184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Talbot, cleared in substance by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:44 p.m.
680. For Ambassador McConaughy. Talbot - McConaughy Telcon October 27, /2/ Karachi's 764/3/ and 765/4/ to Dept.
/2/Not found.
/3/Document 183.
/4/Telegram 765, October 27, transmitted McConaughy's suggestions for points to be included in a Presidential letter to Ayub designed to "lift his sights above present restricted frame in which he now views Pak - Indian relations and Sino - Indian crisis." (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762)
Text being transmitted septel of Presidential message/5/ you are to deliver to Ayub October 29. You will note suggestions in your excellent 765 have been taken into account including reassurances that any U.S. military assistance to India will be used only against ChiCom threat. We do not however feel it appropriate to make any commitment about Kashmir at this stage.
/5/See Document 186.
In presenting letter you should make following points:
1. If you have heard from Galbraith that Nehru has told him private assurances from Ayub would be welcome, emphasize this fact. (In absence of word from Galbraith, do not mention that we have approached Nehru on this point.)
2. Reiterate our view that Sino - Indian border conflict is second in importance only to Cuba in present global confrontation between the Free World and the Sino - Soviet Bloc. We expect our Allies in both areas will do all they can to meet the Communist challenge.
3. Re President's request that Ayub send a private message of assurance to Nehru, say that we accept without question the repeated GOP statements that it has no aggressive intentions toward India, and have often said so, but emphasize President's view of urgency of reassuring Nehru on this point.
4. As examples of other appropriate actions which GOP might take, suggest
(a) Adjournment Pak - ChiCom border negotiations;
(b) Guidance to Pak press for positive approach;
(c) Private assurances to presently controlling Indian military leaders, eg. Cariappa or Thimayya, not only that Pakistan has no aggressive intentions but that Pakistan willing pull back its troops from cease-fire line in Kashmir as Indian troops deployed away from line.
All that you say to Ayub should reinforce our conviction that Pakistan support for India at this time of trouble will strengthen Free World resistance to Communist threat and ultimately create new and healthier climate in which Pakistan's problems with India could become more manageable. In all candor Paks now have an unparalleled opportunity to transform basic relationships in the subcontinent.
Rusk
185. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Ambassador Galbraith, Special File, Miscellaneous Messages, 10/62 - 12/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. No time of transmission appears on the source text, nor does it indicate the channel through which it was sent.
Washington, October 27, 1962.
Eyes Only for Ambassador Galbraith From Kaysen.
Your message on the private channel,/2/ as well as your 1417 from Delhi/3/ received. We here agree with your assessment of the value of getting Menon out and the possible effect of the timing of our moves in bringing this about. Nonetheless, your argument in Delhi 1417 that political changes of great magnitude are in the wind suggests that Indians themselves will take care of Menon sooner rather than later. The President's letter/4/ with its generalized offer of practical support, leaving next steps up to you to take with Nehru and others in Delhi, need not have the effect of supporting Menon by giving him the opportunity to show his willingness to ask for U.S. aid and ours to give it through him. We again urge the importance of avoiding the slightest appearance of U.S. initiative and responsibility in removing Menon. Our efforts with Ayub will be such as to prepare the way to take advantage of Menon's disappearance without requiring it as a condition of forward motion. Therefore, we do not think you need go beyond instructions in our message of yesterday suggesting you move with discretion and without any public indication or explicit communication to the Prime Minister that Menon unacceptable to U.S. By timing of your moves after you deliver the President's letter to Nehru, you can help to bring about results you desire.
/2/A copy of this message, found ibid., bears a handwritten date of October 25. Another undated copy, found ibid., General, 9/27/62 - 10/5/62, is addressed to "President" and signed by "Galbraith," in an unknown hand. In the message, Galbraith noted that the United States was certain to be asked to supply military assistance to India in considerable volume. He recommended that the United States make clear that "any help will require Indians, in their own interest, to be more considerate of our political and public opinion than in recent past." Galbraith asked for guidance, however, on how vigorously to play his strong hand: "The immediate question concerns Menon. Does important American assistance require his effective elimination from the Defense - UN scene?"
/3/Dated October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762)
/4/See Document 187.
Department will shortly be sending their response to your 1417. This will have been drafted by Talbot in close consultation with me. We are in close touch in this whole matter, and I am the Department's channel to the President. Henceforth, it seems wise to avoid use of private channel unless absolutely critical because confusion of private and State Department dialogue might cause trouble. This the more true in that all officers senior to Talbot and me are preoccupied with other matters. The President, however, is interested and concerned and I am keeping him as fully up on the situation as his time permits.
186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, October 28, 1962, 2:42 p.m.
681. Deptel to Karachi 680,/2/ rpt info Delhi 1682, London 2337 and Deptel to New Delhi 1681,/3/ rpt info Karachi 679, London 2336.
/2/Document 184.
/3/Telegram 1681, October 27, summarizes the letter transmitted to Ayub in telegram 681 to Karachi. The Department noted that McConaughy's effort to press Ayub for the assurances sought in the letter would be reinforced by an indication from Nehru that such assurances would be welcome. The Embassy was instructed to seek such an indication from Nehru. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2762)
There follows text of letter from the President to Ayub which you are instructed to deliver in accordance with Deptel 680.
"Dear Mr. President:
I was heartened by your response to my message on the Cuban crisis that was delivered to you by Ambassador McConaughy./4/ In times like these, the support of friends and allies has a personal, as well as a political, significance.
/4/See footnote 1, Document 183.
We see another instance of Communist aggression almost as close to your borders as Cuba is to ours--the Chinese Communist attack on India. It also concerns me greatly. The Chinese have moved quickly, with large forces to take territory beyond that immediately in dispute; it is no longer a border wrangle. In my judgment, the long-run significance of this move cannot be exaggerated. The Chinese Communists, having established themselves on the near slopes of the Himalayas, will have secured a favorable position for further aggression. Thus they will put themselves in a politically dominant posture vis-a-vis India. But I think that this will be more than counter-balanced if their aggression has the effect of awakening India to the dangerous intentions of the Peiping regime, and turning the attention of the Indian Government and people to their true long-run security interests. These are interests which we all share. Certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm.
Unfortunately, press comment in Pakistan has already produced a negative reaction in India. This is particularly distressing at a time when a unique opportunity exists for laying the basis for future solidarity.
We now intend to give the Indians such help as we can for their immediate needs. We will ensure, of course, that whatever help we give will be used only against the Chinese. You, on your part, are in a position to make a move of the greatest importance which only you can make. This is to signal to the Indians in a quiet but effective way that the concerns--which you know I think totally unjustified--that have led them to maintain the greater part of their military power on their borders with you, should be put aside in the present crisis. Perhaps an effective way would be a private message from you to Nehru. You could tell him that he can count on Pakistan's taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India. No possible outside aid can increase the ability of the Indians to withstand the Chinese offensive as much as a shift in their own dispositions.
Knowing the history of Kashmir, I do not make this suggestion lightly, but in the hope and belief that the painful moments which India is now experiencing will teach them how much more important the threat from the North is to the whole of the subcontinent than any regional quarrels within it. Our own recent experience with the response of our Latin American neighbors when they were confronted with the Soviet threat in Cuba gives me ground for this belief. Action taken by you now in the larger interests of the subcontinent will do more in the long run to bring about a sensible resolution of Pakistan - Indian differences than anything else I can think of.
Further, I am sure that the lesson of such a change in Indian dispositions would not be lost on the Peiping regime. Communism has always advanced in the face of disunity in the free world. This crisis is a test of the vision of all of us, our sense of proportion and our sense of the historic destiny of the free nations.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Signed original being pouched.
Rusk
187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10 - 2862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cameron, cleared by Kaysen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.
Washington, October 28, 1962, 3:01 p.m.
1687. Deptel 1677 to New Delhi,/2/ rpt info London 2330, Karachi 677. There follows text of President's reply to Nehru's letter/3/ delivered to White House by Ambassador Nehru on October 26. You are instructed transmit this letter to Prime Minister:/4/
/2/Document 182.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 182.
/4/Galbraith was instructed, in delivering the letter to Nehru, to tell him that President Kennedy believed that a letter from Nehru to Ayub would strengthen Kennedy's hand in persuading Ayub to act in a helpful way during the crisis. (Telegram 1686 to New Delhi, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/10 - 2862)
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
"Your Ambassador handed me your letter last night. The occasion of it is a difficult and painful one for you and a sad one for the whole world. Yet there is a sense in which I welcome your letter, because it permits me to say to you what has been in my mind since the Chinese Communists have begun to press their aggressive attack into Indian territory. I know I can speak for my whole country, when I say that our sympathy in this situation is wholeheartedly with you. You have displayed an impressive degree of forbearance and patience in dealing with the Chinese. You have put into practice what all great religious teachers have urged and so few of their followers have been able to do. Alas, this teaching seems to be effective only when it is shared by both sides in a dispute.
"I want to give you support as well as sympathy. This is a practical matter and, if you wish, my Ambassador in New Delhi can discuss with you and the officials of your Government what we can do to translate our support into terms that are practically most useful to you as soon as possible.
"With all sympathy for India and warmest personal good wishes.
"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Signed original being pouched.
Rusk
188. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/10 - 2962. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
New Delhi, October 29, 1962, 1 p.m.
1443. Dept's telegram 1687. /2/ Ambassador saw Nehru just before noon to deliver President's letter. Nehru made definite request for US military assistance.
/2/Document 187.
Ambassador and DCM later saw Menon briefly at latter's request. Menon reaffirmed request for assistance and said list of requirements would be delivered to Embassy tonight or tomorrow./3/ Stressed urgent need for automatic weapons and long-range mortars.
/3/See Document 192. The initial U.S. response to the Indian requests was outlined in an October 31 memorandum from William Bundy to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, India, 091.3MSP, 29 Oct 62)
Ambassador is now seeing Foreign Secretary Desai and will draft full and important telegram on these conversations within next hour. /4/
/4/Galbraith's account of his conversations with Nehru and Menon indicates that Menon attempted to take credit for arranging for military aid from the United States by asking to meet with Galbraith before Galbraith met with Nehru. Galbraith responded that he had to deliver the President's letter to the Prime Minister before he could meet with Menon. Nehru then made the request for military assistance. (Telegram 1448 from New Delhi, October 29; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/10 - 2962)
Most important that Department's comments to press stress that request for US military assistance was made by Prime Minister Nehru personally. Embassy taking same line here with press.
Galbraith
189. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/11 - 162. Secret.
New Delhi, November 1, 1962, 6 p.m.
1525. Eyes Only for SecState. Pass Defense Eyes Only DefSec, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The last fortnight has presented us here with an interesting problem in being abreast of and giving a measure of guidance to a great change in Indian policy. To have been ahead of the change would have aroused grave suspicion. To have been behind would have invited the same discredit into which some of India's other professed friends have fallen. On the whole things have gone well. And I have great admiration for the way that Washington, the heavy distractions of the Cuban crisis notwithstanding, has provided intellectual, moral and material support and guidance. This is not the voice of the most banal believer in American perfection in these matters.
In the days ahead I see a new danger. That is that in our natural desire to help the Indians we will overwhelm them. They do not want to break quickly with their past beliefs. Words like nonalignment still have great evocative power. Phrases like military blocs, military alliances, even Pentagon still have a bad sound. In particular a large influx of American military personnel however well-intentioned could have a most damaging effect. And numbers could quickly get beyond my power to control and guide our political posture and response. You will already have seen in my cables indications of my anxiety that I be consulted on all plans to send people here and that it be clear to all who come that they are under my full organizational direction and control and that we select scrupulously for quality as opposed to numbers or conventional tables of organization. This no doubt reflects normal bureaucratic attitudes which I have acquired with remarkable celerity but it also reflects my deep concern for the complex task we face here and my hope that it can be discharged with credit to all of us. At this end we will continue to insure an environment in which the officers we request will function in a closely-knit and harmonious group that will, I trust, reflect full credit on the organization and services whence they come and which fully reflect the concerns and views of the latter. If my requests for help seem unduly modest or even if it should occasionally be evident that larger numbers might produce slightly better guidance to Indians or slightly more refined requirements you will realize I am sure that I am acting in response to overall considerations of our position here./2/
/2/In telegram 1904 to New Delhi, November 6, a joint State - Defense message, Galbraith was assured that there was no intent in Washington to send a large number of military advisers to India. JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor had selected Major General John Kelly to head a small observation group of 12 - 21 people and to advise the Embassy on matters relating to military assistance. General Kelly and his group would serve as part of the Country Team under Galbraith's direction. (Ibid., 791.5/11 - 462) Galbraith concurred in the proposed arrangements in telegram 1675 from New Delhi, November 8. (Ibid., 791.5/11 - 862)
Galbraith
190. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/3/62 - 11/4/62. Secret.
Washington, November 3, 1962.
Mr. President:
Attached is the current situation report on the Sino - Indian border war you requested. It was prepared by the Department of State, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. It represents the agreed views of all three.
I would add one comment on section 3 of the memorandum. Section 3-b (page 5) is devoted to difficulties that the new situation in India will raise for our relations with Pakistan. It seems to me that the problem could be stated a little more sharply in a somewhat different way. We are now faced with the necessity of making the Pakistani realize that their alliance with us had been of immense value to them. This comprises not only the substantial economic and military assistance we have given, but also the general support that the alliance provides in their relations with India. They are obviously the weaker power, and they have been able to maintain as strong a line on Kashmir as they have in part because of the existence of our support in the background. We are now beginning to confront them with the fact that we are really not able to support their demand for a settlement via plebiscite, and that their best opportunity for settlement on terms something like ratification of the status quo may be passing from their grasp. This will be a difficult and painful process, but it is one we must push through.
C.K./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret. A November 3 covering memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, transmitting the situation report from the Department of State to the White House, is not printed.
Report on Current Activity on the Sino - Indian Borderand Estimate of Future Developments
India is facing its most serious crisis since independence. Large-scale Chinese Communist attacks (see map attachment)/4/ in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) have resulted in Chinese advances at a number of points, some of them approximately 15 miles south of the McMahon Line, and in Ladakh the Chinese Communists have overcome Indian forward positions and threaten the principal Indian bases in that area. Moreover, the Soviet Union has supported Peking's proposals for negotiation on terms unacceptable to the Indians. These developments strike at the heart of India's policy of nonalignment and have far-reaching internal consequences. India has turned to the West for assistance in meeting its military requirements. The development of a closer Western relationship with India is causing an almost traumatic reaction in Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign policy over the past decade has been directed in large part towards correcting the imbalance of power with India through the special alliance relationship with the West.
/4/Not printed.
1. What is Going On: A Military and Political Review
Military
The present phase of the Sino - Indian border conflict began early last spring when India decided to put out advanced patrols and outposts in the Ladakh area in an effort to forestall further Chinese advances there and eventually to push back some of the Chinese outposts. In July the Chinese demanded that the Indians withdraw their forward patrols and threatened, if they did not do so, to invade NEFA. Instead of withdrawing, the Indians intensified their forward patrolling activities in the months that followed.
There is now evidence that in August and early September the Chinese concentrated their troops at points along the NEFA border. They launched an attack on October 20. Within a week the Chinese Communist forces advanced at several places within NEFA, reaching at one point near the Bhutan border a position approximately 15 miles south of the McMahon Line. Simultaneously, the Chinese attacked in Ladakh and eliminated the forward posts established by the Indians last spring and summer./5/ Total Indian casualties are in the neighborhood of 5,000.
/5/In the northwest (Ladakh), about 6,000 Indian troops face about 10,000 Chinese. In NEFA there are some 30,000 Indian troops opposing the estimated 15,000 Chinese invaders, with another 20,000 Chinese in reserve across the border. [Footnote in the source text.]
Chinese gains have been a result of a combination of advantages over the Indians, most notably a better supply situation, more modern equipment and larger numbers of men.
At the present time, the Chinese seem to have halted their advance in NEFA. In Ladakh the Chinese have also halted along the boundary line which they claimed in 1960, but they are in a position to move against important Indian positions just west of this line.
As the Chinese have moved further into Indian-claimed territory, their supply problems have increased but even so they still appear to have a limited advantage over the Indians in this respect. The present halt in the Chinese Communist advance may be designed to permit them to regroup, resupply and prepare for further limited advances. At a minimum the Chinese Communists will consolidate, with some minor tactical adjustments, and dig into their positions in preparation for the severe winter. The indications are that they want to hold the territory which they now occupy, at least as a bargaining counter; they show no particular interest in a negotiated settlement; nor do they seem interested thus far in extending their military activities beyond the disputed border areas. Future Chinese Communist military action may well be determined in large part by Indian moves.
Political
The rapid Chinese advances in both NEFA and Ladakh have had a profound effect on Indian political thinking. The Indian leaders are being forced to re-examine some of the basic assumptions which have been central to Indian political life and attitudes. The great exponent of peaceful coexistence has been attacked by a nation which ostentatiously shared this attitude. The effectiveness of nonalignment as a policy has been clearly brought into question. The Soviet Union's action in supporting an unacceptable Chinese Communist offer to negotiate the conflict has led the Indians to rethink their thesis that they could count on the Soviet Union to restrain the Chinese Communists and to provide India with substantial quantities of military equipment.
These developments cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the internal Indian power structure. The demotion of Krishna Menon, who has been widely criticized, from his position as Minister of Defense to that of Minister of Defense Production is one of the first public manifestations of these changes./6/ The position of the Communist Party of India has been undermined. Other important changes will follow and increased strains will be placed on Prime Minister Nehru. We anticipate a long period ahead of adjustment and examination.
/6/On November 7, Nehru announced the resignation of Menon from the cabinet. (Telegram 1665 from New Delhi, November 7; Department of State, Central Files, 791.13/11 - 762)
Also of very great importance, these developments threaten to place a heavy additional burden on an Indian economy already falling short of its economic development goals, and at the very time when the attainment of these goals is more important than ever.
2. What We and Other Western Countries are Doing
In face of reverses both on the border and in Indian foreign relations, Prime Minister Nehru asked for Western assistance. After deliberately waiting for the Prime Minister's request, the United States initiated an air shipment on November 1 of military supplies to India designed to reinforce Indian resistance on the border to the Chinese Communists. These initial shipments include:
|
40,000 |
Anti-personnel Mines |
|
1,000,000 |
Rounds caliber .30 ammunition |
|
200 |
Caliber .30 Machine Guns with mounts and accessories |
|
54 |
81 millimeter mortars with mounts and accessories |
|
100,000 |
Rounds 81 millimeter ammunition |
|
500 |
ANPRC - 10 radios |
|
250 |
ANGRC - 9 radios |
India has also approached the United Kingdom, Canada, and France with requests for various types of military equipment primarily in the field of small arms, infantry support and anti-tank weapons, together with necessary ammunition, communications equipment, transport aircraft, and helicopters. India has also requested rapid delivery of equipment previously ordered, and apparently is making direct commercial inquiries about procuring aircraft in the United Kingdom.
Canada is currently attempting to determine availability of a wide range of equipment which would be useful to India. The United Kingdom has air-lifted a small amount of automatic rifles and ammunition, and is also determining availability of other items. The French have also air-lifted a small amount of small arms.
In addition, Turkey has offered India some light mountain artillery and ammunition. We anticipate this equipment will be available for shipment within the next two or three days, at which time we will airship it to India.
We are making every effort to establish coordination procedures with other Western governments to insure a concerted effort in our joint attempts to meet Indian military requirements.
In addition to military supplies, the United States has undertaken the following actions:
a) We have attempted to get the Pakistani to see that they have a major opportunity to lay a basis for better relations with India. These efforts have not yet been successful, but we believe we should continue to search out ways to get this across to the Pakistani.
b) We have publicly stated that the United States recognizes the McMahon Line as the accepted international border sanctioned by modern usage.
c) We are increasing the flow of intelligence on Communist China to the Indians.
Statements of sympathy and support from Western countries contrast sharply with silence from many important neutral leaders. Some neutrals have been in touch with both sides in an endeavor to lay the basis for a cease-fire.
3. Principal Policy Issues This Situation Raises for the United States
a) We shall have to define a new relationship with India. Our military assistance is designed to help a friend, not win an ally. Western sympathy and support and Western military equipment will profoundly affect Indian thinking. We can expect the Indians to redefine their nonalignment policy, but we do not expect India to abandon this policy. Although India has been forced to re-examine the dimensions of its relations with the Soviet Union, we anticipate that India will try to avoid doing anything which would further restrict Soviet support. India needs Soviet economic aid, will want Soviet support in the United Nations on Kashmir, and still hopes to get a limited number of MIG - 21's.
b) We shall have to devise means to protect our important special interests in Pakistan and to keep Pakistan closely aligned with the West, in the face of our new relationship with India. Despite Pakistan's very great dependence on the United States, this may be the most difficult problem ahead. We had hoped that Pakistan leaders might have grasped the present opportunity to begin to lay the basis for mutually beneficial relations with India. Instead, the Pakistani seem to be recoiling from any reduction of tension with India. The last word is not in on this and Ambassador McConaughy is seeing President Ayub on November 5.
All present signs, however, point to at least a temporary widening of the breech between Pakistan and India, a Pakistani reassessment of the value of its alliance with the United States and increased political tensions within the country. Pakistan, which sought an alliance with the United States chiefly to offset India's preponderant military strength in the subcontinent, sees the value of this alliance much reduced in the face of United States military assistance to India. This situation bears the closest watch because Pakistan is, in fact, going through a traumatic experience almost equal to that of India.
c) We must search out Indian military objectives and decide the extent to which we and our Western allies are prepared to support these. This involves not only Indian policy on the border but also the Indian attitude towards the modernization of its whole obsolescent military establishment. In their current state of disarray, the Indians themselves are not clear about their objectives. This, therefore, will be a continuing problem. In this connection one of the principal factors will be the impact of increased Indian military expenditures on the achievement of Indian development goals. The extent of this impact will depend in large part on how the Indians define their military objectives, the extent of resources diverted for this purpose, and the division of western assistance between military and economic sectors.
d) We shall have to consider bolstering the border states (Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan) to counter Chinese Communist efforts to bring them into the Chinese orbit. This will involve a re-examination of the basis of our current policy towards these states which is to try to fix firmly the major responsibility for these areas on India.
e) We shall need to consider the implications of a possible Indian withdrawal from international responsibilities as the result of a reorientation of India's attention inward under the impact of the Chinese attack. Menon was the great exponent of India's participation in the international force in the Congo. There are already indications that the Indians are considering the withdrawal of their forces from the Congo. We also shall need to be alert to opportunities for capitalizing on new Indian attitudes in such specific areas as disarmament.
f) We must examine carefully the implications of these developments for CENTO and SEATO.
The power relationships which affect the subcontinent have all been shaken up. The old problems there and the new ones should be looked at in this new light, in the days ahead, so that we can see both the dangers and opportunities which are emerging. These will extend far beyond the boundaries of the subcontinent. /7/
/7/A fuller assessment of the Sino - Indian border war and its implications can be found in SNIE 13/31 - 62, "Short-Term Outlook and Implications for the Sino - Indian Conflict," November 9, 1962. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 210)
191. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to New Delhi.
Karachi, November 5, 1962, 7 p.m.
820. Re Department telegram 715, /2/ Embassy telegrams 804, 805. /3/ I met with President Ayub for almost two hours this morning in Rawalpindi. Sneider accompanied me. Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali and Foreign Secretary Dehlavi also present.
/2/Telegram 715 to Karachi, November 3, provided general guidelines for McConaughy's November 5 meeting with Ayub. (Ibid., 790D.11/11 - 162)
/3/In telegrams 804 and 805, both dated November 2, McConaughy requested guidance for his impending meeting with Ayub. (Ibid., 690D.91/11 - 262 and 791.56/11 - 262, respectively)
Ayub had just completed long consultation with his advisers and said he was putting finishing touches on his reply to President Kennedy's October 28 letter. /4/ Ambassador Aziz Ahmed would deliver reply. He opened conversation by giving me gist of letter and reasoning behind GOP position. He said GOP was sad that Sino-Indian border dispute had erupted into open war, but GOP unable on basis of incomplete information available to it assess who initiated attack. Implied some responsibility rested with India. In any event GOP considers conflict limited war. Conflict limited in terms ChiCom immediate tactical objectives, equipment employed and number of men involved. Furthermore, if ChiComs had more than limited objectives, offensive would have been launched in May rather than in October when weather bad and frost already in area throughout day. ChiCom attack also made in mountainous area where large number troops cannot be employed; if ChiComs wished seriously invade India now they would have come through easier traditional route via Burma, which about ripe anyway for communist takeover. Consequently, defense preparations in India and arms aid to it in his judgment far exceed limited current requirements of actual military situation in areas where fighting now taking place. At later point, Ayub reverted to above theme and said as military man he unable understand Indian defeats except as tactical misjudgment of incompetent leadership, since he knew from personal experience good fighting quality Indian forces and satisfactory arms available to them.
/4/See Document 186.
Ayub then blamed Nehru for development of crisis saying that Nehru's policies had always been mistaken. Four pillars of Indian foreign policy--neutralism, isolation Pakistan, opposition western objectives, and anti-Americanism--now demonstrated to be complete mistake. Nevertheless, India still maintains 80 percent of its armed forces on Pakistan borders with remainder 10 days away; almost all Indian Navy in Bombay in threatening posture to Pakistan. Furthermore, Ayub said while one Indian infantry division and one brigade withdrawn from Pakistan border, Pakistan intelligence has reported that one armored division and one armored brigade moving to points close to Pakistan borders.
Ayub said under these circumstances Pakistanis had right to maintain own self-respect in own self-defense. Objective of GOP foreign policy he stressed several times was to free both India and Pakistan from anxiety about each other through settlement of differences including Kashmir. While Pakistan was not going to take advantage of Indian situation, only common sense for it to take precautions necessary for self- defense.
Ayub then discussed recent US actions in response Sino-Indian border situation. He said we have of course right to provide India with arms. However, he feels he has right to complain on the failure to consult with him in advance as promised by President Kennedy. Situation which has arisen is exactly that envisaged in understanding as calling for advance consultation before arms provided. He said he was grateful for assurances of the President on use of US arms only against ChiComs but he would not have asked for such assurances since India not to be trusted. Ayub then complained with obvious personal hurt regarding our pressures on him to make gesture to India. He said patience of Pakistani people who friends of US not beyond limit and they interpreted request for gesture as demonstration US not sympathetic with, nor understanding of Pakistan position and essential interests. This clear in Pakistani press. Although GOP trying quiet hostile press reaction, it difficult resist people's just feelings. Pakistan has free press, learned from US example, and cannot be controlled. Instead of pressuring Pakistan, Ayub urged that we encourage India establish friendly relations with its neighbors and by conciliatory moves which are long overdue court peace with Pakistan. Pakistan was prepared at any time to establish friendly relations with India. Later in discussion, when I pressed him, Ayub was more specific and said that he was prepared to more than reciprocate any change of heart on India's part but that was as far as Pakistan would go since it the aggressed one, oppressed, aggrieved party and since India was a bigger nation. Said GOP was replying at once to Nehru's circular appeal to heads of other governments for sympathy. He cited non-personal nature of this appeal as another example of Nehru's ineptitude and unwillingness to take initiative on specific overtures designed to meet India's problem here. Ayub said GOP would also release official statement on Pakistan position to press this afternoon (Embtel 819). /5/ Ayub concluded his presentation by reiterating Pakistan's right of self-defense, which he felt it would not be helpful for us to deny. (Comment: While Ayub did not make it explicit during conversation, I believe his emphasis on right of self-defense reaction to request for withdrawal Pakistan forces from Indian border.)
/5/Telegram 819 from Karachi, November 5, transmitted the text of the statement issued by Ayub expressing hope that India and China would resolve their differences and confidence that the scope of the conflict would be limited. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 562)
In response I sought convince Ayub of seriousness ChiCom threat to all subcontinent including Pakistan, necessity for US action support resistance ChiCom aggression, and reality of Indian resolve to repel Chinese aggression and to improve relationship with Pakistan. Drawing on material provided in Deptel 715 and Delhi's 1595, /6/ and using specially prepared map, I reviewed exact nature ChiCom attacks. I pointed out serious dangers involved if ChiComs used NEFA footholds as springboard for eventual broader attack on Assam plain, isolating it from rest of India. I also drew Ayub into discussion ChiCom and Soviet objectives, based on material supplied reference telegram, and pointed to possibility of Chinese demand for territorial concessions in Ladakh in return for withdrawal from points taken in NEFA. I pointed to indications that Soviets seem to be hesitantly coming down on ChiCom side against India, and that signs pointed to United Communist Front against subcontinent. Ayub commented that ChiComs particularly interested in Ladakh area to protect road from Sinkiang to Tibet whose construction, he said, Nehru had tacitly agreed to and then two years later had changed his mind.
/6/In telegram 1595 from New Delhi, November 4, Galbraith volunteered lines of argument to be used by McConaughy in his meeting with Ayub. (Ibid., 691.93/11 - 462)
Following this, I urged Ayub to forego reproaching Nehru for his past mistakes which he now recognizes and to take advantage of Nehru's awakening to realities Sino-Soviet threat. I stressed Pakistan and India should now work together to put out larger fire which threatens them both before getting down to settle own regional differences which not small, but not of same order of urgency as a conflagration. I expressed hope GOP would show under these circumstances sympathetic attitude towards India's difficulties which certain to evoke warm Indian response. I implied it would be sportsmanlike to extend hand of friendship to neighbor who was in trouble, letting by-gones be by-gones for a testing period. I said last thought which would occur to us would be a compromise of Pak security interests, and nothing in our policy even remotely suggested this.
Ayub responded by agreeing ChiCom threat matter of great concern of Pakistan and US. He expressed doubt Nehru yet convinced since he still maintained bulk of armed forces on Pak borders and did not seem disposed make any real move to settle Pak-Indian differences.
I then discussed with Ayub our military aid program to India. I disclaimed any US intention withhold particulars and mentioned that I had hoped to consult with him sooner at Hunza on this program. I said we intended to maintain strong controls to assure use US arms against ChiComs and to supply only material demonstrably needed in those combat theaters. When Ayub asked why Aziz Ahmed had been unable obtain details of these procedures, I said that I would provide them [to] Dehlavi. I also briefed Ayub on details of military equipment supplied to India and said we would keep GOP currently informed in future. Ayub commented that he did not think Indians wanted any but defensive arms to maintain present mountain positions, and then later remarked he did not understand urgent need since Indians had most of weapons supplied them as well as manufacturing facilities for automatic weapons. Next, I formally reiterated to Ayub our past assurances of our assistance in event aggression against Pakistan from India as set forth reference telegram and handed him aide-memoire to that effect. /7/ After some discussion, participated in by Dehlavi, of distinctions between first person diplomatic note, note verbale, and aide-memoire, which I dismissed as technical, Ayub expressed appreciation for these assurances and said that if made public by us they would have very healthy and settling effect in Pakistan. I agreed to transmit this request to Department. /8/
/7/The assurance provided in the aide-memoire reads as follows: "The Government of the United States of America reaffirms its previous assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan." The text of the aide-memoire was transmitted to the Department as enclosure to airgram A - 883 from Karachi, February 23, 1963; Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Karachi Embassy Files: FRC 67 F 74, 320 Pak/US Assurances.
/8/On November 17, the Department of State issued a press release that noted the United States had assured Pakistan that if U.S. assistance to India were "misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." (Department of State Bulletin, December 3, 1962, pp. 837 - 838) On November 19, McConaughy wrote to Ayub and enclosed a copy of the November 17 press release. A copy of McConaughy's letter was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 1 to airgram A - 613 from Karachi, December 5. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Karachi Embassy Files: FRC 67 F 74, 320 Pak/US Assurances)
Ayub and I then engaged in further conversation during which I particularly stressed changing Indian attitudes as evidenced by Ghosh paper, Menon demotion from Defense Minister, Times of India editorial, etc, and desirability of GOP not pressuring India now on Kashmir but waiting for more appropriate negotiating climate after emergency. I pointed out we felt GOI would be more forthcoming in future if GOP now sympathetic. Ayub and Mohammad Ali expressed continued suspicion Indian motives, stating conviction that Menon position and influence with Nehru not actually weakened and that his change of portfolios was a mere tactical maneuver engineered by Nehru and Menon so that Menon could escape some of blame for current reverses. I took issue with this interpretation. Ayub restated Pak view that Indians remain hostile to Pakistan and must demonstrate changed attitude first before Paks make reciprocal gesture. Ayub also reverted to complaints that US pressuring Pakistan rather than India. In this connection he asked why Paks as friends of US always expected to make practically all the concessions to unfriendly neighbors who are not allies of US; he referred to the difficult concessions to Afghanistan which the US Government was pressuring him to make, and now again he is asked to make unilateral concessions to India involving, in his view, a certain indifference to essential Pakistani national and security interests. He thought US should instead be pressuring India to make tangible conciliatory gesture to Pakistan if effective effort against ChiComs and disengagement Pak-Indian forces (which he agreed to be desirable) were sought. GOP could not be expected allow its security be jeopardized or to bow to Nehru, who was enemy of India's real interests, as well as Pakistan's. In conclusion Ayub agreed again to reciprocate more equally any change of heart on India's part, stating he would fail in his duty to country if he did not reciprocate since Pakistan's basic aim is to establish conditions where both countries are free from anxiety and fear of the other.
Comment: My fuller comments will follow on further reflection. I had impression throughout our discussion, Ayub was restrained and calm although inwardly angered and upset. I had no chance to change his fundamental position, since decision already made and letter written. However, I believe his view of our action, motivations and attitude was somewhat better at end of session than at beginning. At no point did he threaten change of policy towards US or towards alliances but clearly he felt that Pakistan, and he personally, as friends of US had been let down by US, particularly through failure to consult with him in advance on military aid to India and through our pressures on Pakistan alone to make first gesture towards India.
Although he carefully refrained from explicitly reiterating his October 26 assurance to me about not creating trouble for India at this time, he clearly stated that it would not be common sense for Pakistan to precipitate military action against India, and of course Pakistan did not have any intention of doing so.
McConaughy
192. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, Security, 1962. Secret.
Washington, November 9, 1962.
Mr. President:
You asked two questions this morning about India: (1) What have we done to keep the Paks informed of our military assistance to India? and (2) How much have we actually shipped?
On the first, Talbot has talked to Aziz Ahmed, the Pakistan Ambassador, twice in the last ten days. He has emphasized to him that our help is limited to the problem of defending India against Chinese aggression, and that we were getting assurances from the Indians that were as effective as the assurances that the Paks had given us about the use of our military assistance to them. So far, he has described the nature of the weapons we have shipped, but not the exact quantities. The next time he sees him, which will be shortly, he will tell him something of the order of magnitude of the quantities. This has as yet had no visible effect in reassuring Aziz.
On the second, as of now we have shipped by air about $3-1/2 million worth (including shipping costs) of equipment and ammunition, adding up to some 800 tons. The list in the attached table/2/ shows the consolidated Indian request, what we have already shipped, and what will be shipped this weekend. We of course don't necessarily agree that everything they have requested should be shipped.
/2/Not printed.
C. K./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
193. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 11/62. Secret.
Washington, November 12, 1962.
The Pakistani are going through a genuine emotional crisis as they see their cherished ambitions of using the US as a lever against India going up in the smoke of the Chinese border war. Their plaint about lack of consultation is mere cover for this (if we'd "consulted" with the Paks, instead of notifying them, we'd still be arguing about Kashmir).
Given Pak bitterness, our pitch should be sympathetic understanding and no pressure. We can let the facts themselves work for us.
But I urge equally strongly that there be no give in our position. We have no need to apologize. If we compensate Ayub for our actions vis-a-vis India, we will again be postponing the long-needed clarification of our position, and this at a time when we've never had a better excuse for clarifying it.
Whether Pakistan moves from words to action depends on whether it is willing to risk its relationship with the US. Ayub probably isn't, but he may be a prisoner of Pak public emotions in this case. Moreover, even Ayub has found that a hard line often works well with us. I am convinced, however, that in the last analysis the Paks will realize that they get far too much from their US tie to be able to do without it. So if we can weather the current shock, we should be able to hold on to our assets in Pakistan, while still emerging with the sub-continent-wide policy toward which we aim.
R. W. Komer/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1262. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, cleared by Kaysen in substance, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and to London for Grant, Gaud, and Bundy.
Washington, November 12, 1962, 8:34 p.m.
754. Ambassador Aziz Ahmed presented Ayub's letter (septel)/2/ to President this evening. President confined reply to statement he would be in touch again with Ayub. Ambassador then offered chart titled "Disposition of Indian Forces"/3/ showing three divisions in Kashmir, three divisions and one infantry brigade on West Pakistan border, and one division and two brigades on East Pakistan border, as contrasted to one division and one brigade in Ladakh and three divisions in NEFA area. Navy shown as concentrated in Bombay, except two small ships.
/2/Document 195.
/3/This chart is attached to a November 12 memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Ahmed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 11/62)
President suggested that while still uncertain whether Chinese intentions limited or to dominate area, India taking situation seriously, perhaps more so than President Ayub. Ambassador agreed that even if Chinese take only territory in dispute, it serious for India. Said Pakistan believes China wants to take disputed area, face India with a fait accompli, and then negotiate end of hostilities. Fact that Soviet supplying MIGs indicates Communists don't expect big war in prospect. However, perhaps next spring situation will be clearer.
President said he recognized Pakistan Government's interest in settling Kashmir dispute, asked what Pakistan thinks best course to achieve this. Ambassador answered that Pakistan understands that in India official circles building up a trend of feeling toward rapprochement with Pakistan. Pakistan believes this should be encouraged. Any gesture by Pakistan, e.g. to pull troops back from Kashmir border, would halt this favorable trend. He repeated familiar arguments that whole region will stay insecure, unstable and economically retarded so long as the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled. Pakistani people very much exercised over military assistance to India, he said, because, basing idea of what India might do in future on what it has done in past, Pakistan persuaded that any large scale assistance to India would only strengthen India against Pakistan and India would use this equipment at first opportunity against Pakistan. All political leaders have opposed the grant of military assistance to India by the US and the question of giving any Pakistani assurances to India.
President, replying deliberately and clearly, said question of assurances is matter for Pakistani decision, but US is interested in stopping the advance of Communism in Asia. Amount of US aid, as Ambassador knows, is minimal; if it should grow large we would discuss matter with Pakistan. It is important, President continued, that US indicate its opposition to the expansion of the Communist Chinese in Asia. We understand problem of Kashmir. Possibly out of all this will come some settlement. Can also understand Ayub's feeling that what is happening to India is result of its own foolish policies. On other hand, US cannot stand by idly while China tries to expand its power in Asia.
Ambassador returned once more to argument that if threat is real, what is important is not giving arms but freeing the Indian Army to fight against Chinese. At present, India fighting with hands tied behind back. This not merely question of improving relations between India and Pakistan but of stopping Communists. He did not see how India can accomplish this end unless it settled Kashmir with Pakistan.
President responded merely that he would be in touch with President Ayub again.
Rusk
195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1362. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Naas, cleared by Cameron, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and to London for Grant, Bundy, and Gaud.
Washington, November 13, 1962, 5:37 p.m.
759. Deptel 754./2/ Following is text letter from President Ayub to President delivered November 12. Letter classified Top Secret by GOP.
/2/Document 194.
"From: Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.Pk., H.J.
5th November, 1962
Dear Mr. President,
I am grateful to you for your kind message of October 28, 1962,/3/ which was delivered by your Ambassador.
/3/See Document 186.
For the last fifteen years, India has posed a major military threat to Pakistan. She has built up her forces, may I say, mainly with American and British equipment three to four times our strength and has openly declared that Pakistan is her enemy number one.
Eighty per cent or more of her Armed Forces have already been earmarked against us and the bulk of them remain concentrated on our borders on ten days' state of readiness. We have been exposed to these aggressive designs all these years simply because the Indian Prime Minister himself is not prepared to honour his pledge in regard to so many agreements and especially in regard to the solution of Kashmir in which Pakistan is vitally interested for profound economic and security reasons. Therefore, by and large, we have spent these fifteen years in a state of mobilization which has been forced upon us by India. On top of all this, the recent conflict between India and China has led to developments of grave concern to us.
However, our own information, although meagre, leads us to believe that Chinese intention seems to be to occupy the territory which they believe belongs to them and over which there has been a dispute between her and India. Even Mr. Nehru thought it fit in his wisdom to declare in the Indian Parliament in 1954 with reference to the Chinese position in Tibet that `I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese sovereignty, or if you like suzerainty, was challenged by any outside country. All during this period, whether China was weak or strong, or whatever the Government of China was, China always maintained its claim to sovereignty over Tibet. . . . The British Empire in the days of Lord Curzon had expanded into and made several types of arrangements in Tibet. Now it is impossible or improper for us to continue any such arrangements . . . . These maps and treaties are all prepared by the British Imperialists. These treaties and maps are intended to show that we must act as they did.'
Militarily, however, we do not believe that China can bring to bear against India her major forces through the difficult terrain of the Himalayas to achieve decisive results, and even if she has any such intention the way to do it would be to outflank India through Burma. In our opinion, that would be a simpler way of doing it and in cost it would be cheaper. If the Chinese intentions were more than limited and they were to expand into the territories of Assam, we would have as much cause for concern as India, as our East Pakistan would be directly affected. We are making this appreciation about the actual situation in no light hearted mood.
Why has such a situation developed on this sub-continent and around India? We believe that this is the direct outcome of distorted and fallacious thinking on the part of Mr. Nehru and his associates and a consequence of a baseless foreign policy that he has been following. This foreign policy has been based on the following factors:
(a) bend backwards to appease Communism;
(b) hoist the white flag of Neutralism to appease Communism and get other wavering nations to join him in order to be able to create a world nuisance value for themselves;
(c) intimidate and threaten Pakistan in order to politically isolate it and economically weaken it; and
(d) abuse the West, and especially the U.S.A., in season and out of season.
The events have proved that all that is happening to Mr. Nehru is the direct consequence of this warped thinking. We have been warning and pointing to this all along.
Mr. President, what you now ask of us is to give an assurance to Mr. Nehru of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops at present concentrated against us elsewhere. I am surprised that such a request is being made to us. After all, what we have been doing is nothing but to contain the threat that was continuously posed by India to us. Is it in conformity with human nature that we should cease to take such steps which are necessary for our self-preservation? Or, will our own people ever accept such a position?
According to our information, India has withdrawn an infantry division and a half away from us but there are definite indications that they are moving forward their reserve armoured formations of one division and one brigade to battle locations against Pakistan. Similarly they now have a corps headquarters to control troops deployed against East Pakistan. The bulk of their Navy, barring a couple of small vessels, have been concentrated in Bombay harbour, ostensibly for refit but in reality to pose a threat to us. Under no stretch of imagination, Mr. President, can these moves be described as indications of peaceful intentions towards us by India. So, how can we, in a situation like this, be expected to show our friendship to them!
No, Mr. President, the answer to this problem lies elsewhere. It lies in creating a situation whereby we are free from the Indian threat, and the Indians are free from any apprehensions about us. This can only be done if there is a settlement of the question of Kashmir. This matter is sometimes stated as very difficult to resolve. I do not agree with that. I believe that if there is a change of heart on the part of India, it should not be difficult to find an equitable and an honourable settlement.
Our object is to have peace, and especially with our neighbours. I am very grateful for the assurance you have given that the arms you are now supplying to India will not be used against us. This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of people you are dealing with, whose history is a continuous tale of broken pledges, I would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing situation. India's conduct over the question of Junagadh, Mangrol, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa should be well-known to you. Our belief is that arms now being obtained by India from you for use against China will undoubtedly be used against us at the very first opportunity. However, in the light of the promise that you were good enough to make, namely, that we shall be consulted before you gave any military assistance to India, we did expect to be consulted and also informed as to the types and the quantities of weapons and equipment which are now in the process of being supplied to them. It is regrettable that none of this has been done.
I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that although India today poses as an aggrieved and oppressed party, in reality she has been constantly threatening and intimidating, in varying degrees, small neighbouring countries around her. Let me assure you that in the eyes of many people in free Asia, Indian intentions are suspect and the Indian image as a peace-loving nation has been destroyed.
You have referred, Mr. President, to press comments in Pakistan. While we have endeavoured to restrain expression of extremist views in our newspapers, it is not possible to interfere with the freedom of the press which reflects the real sentiment of the people. It must be realized that public opinion is gravely exercised by the new developments as the result of arms aid to India, more so, as India continues to pose a serious threat to our security. I am afraid it is going to be extremely difficult for my Government to discount public opinion.
With kind regards, Yours sincerely,
Mohammad Ayub Khan"
Rusk
196. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/11/62 - 11/13/62. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that it was taken from the President's weekend reading file, dated November 17.
New Delhi, November 13, 1962.
Dear Mr. President: I have been wanting for the past ten days to give you a more detailed and intimate account of our affairs here. I have been sending rather full dispatches to the Department, some of which you have doubtless seen. But as you will have discovered, few Ambassadors have ever been completely candid in such reporting. There is truth and there is also what one must have believed. I merely try to minimize the difference.
These past three weeks have brought great change here--no doubt the greatest change in public attitudes since World War II. The most treasured of preconceptions have been shattered. The disillusion with the Chinese is of course total. So, save at the top, is that with the Soviets. And the other unaligneds are not very popular. Nehru remains an exception. Even he is now hoping only for friendly neutrality from the Soviets rather than active support. But with him there is another factor. All his life he has sought to avoid being dependent upon the United States and the United Kingdom--most of his personal reluctance to ask (or thank) for aid has been based on this pride. He did not like it because it advertised what hurt his pride. Now nothing is so important to him, more personally than politically, than to maintain the semblance of this independence. His age no longer allows for readjustment. To a point we can, I feel, be generous on this.
The departure of Menon is an enormous gain. I have little doubt that in recent years he was an immediate and efficient channel of communications to the Soviets and possibly even to the Chinese. His departure means, among other things, that we can work with the Indians on sensitive matters--things which I resisted before because of the insecurity involved--although the Indian Government remains a sieve and his men are still around. More important he no longer has the capacity for stirring up action against us or for the Communists. Many people here think that in recent years whenever the Chinese penetrated a little further in Ladakh, Menon arranged some shooting on the East Pakistan border as a diversion. I have no doubt that the march on Goa last year was timed to take peoples minds away from the anti-Chinese syndrome which was developing as the result of last summer's penetrations. It worked. Within a few days last December China disappeared from the headlines and the liberating forces of Menon became the center of attention. The U.N. job was an admirable complement to all this for it made him the defender of Kashmir and gave him a forum for whipping it up against us.
In the United States we no longer think of an individual having this much power. But there is still a role here for a Rasputin. And all of this is apart from Menon's utter incompetence as a Defense Minister and his deeply divisive political influence on the Army.
At one juncture, I feared that Menon might engineer the turnaround and get credit for the appeal to the United States for aid. And it is a measure of his conscienceless gall that he made the effort. I managed to forestall this without any suggestion, even from the Menon kept press, that we had a role in throwing him out. In the absence of your counsel on the matter I might have pressed the point a little harder. But I was also desirous that no one in Washington, yourself included, would think me at all anxious to rush arms to a ministry headed by this man.
The Government is currently in disarray. The Prime Minister is old and tired and angry with events that have treated him so harshly. Chavan, who is coming in as Defence Minister, is young by Indian standards. He is a competent politician and operator. No one need pay any attention to the suggestions that he is left wing--he has merely made his obeisances. Unfortunately he is very inexperienced in all military matters--as are all Indians. T.T. Krishnamachari, who will take over as Minister of Supply, was at one time head of Lever Brothers here and is a man of incredible vanity. He was brought into the Cabinet at Menon's behest but sensed at an early stage that Menon was in trouble. He thereupon broke with him on grounds of principle reinforced by more practical considerations. He tries to live up to his view of himself and about halfway succeeds. So he will be fairly effective. My working relationships with both men are good.
One thing much on my mind these last days has been the American press. We have had a great influx of correspondents plus a large itinerant delegation covering the arms lift. Under Menon the Indian Defence Ministry completely excluded the press from all operational areas--partly so no one would hear the criticisms of Menon. Were they bottled up here, the Indians would get a bad press and so, inter alia, would we. I have now pretty well broken through on this, though I had to go to the Prime Minister himself. There will be many stories on the infirm character of his leadership, but that is not our business. I think Nehru is still playing down our role to protect the sensitivities of the Soviets and perhaps, more especially, to protect his own feelings. I have told him this was something we couldn't take and have pictured the repercussions in the American press. We cannot decently help someone who is afraid to be seen in our company. There will be some damage along these lines, I fear.
The great question is what the Chinese intend. In the beginning I thought that this was essentially a border conflict. The Chinese have a serious claim to the Aksai Chin Plateau in Ladakh. It provides them with a strategic access to Sinkiang and they had been building their road there for two years before the Indians reacted. By getting a good foothold in the east, they could establish a claim for the area they really want. In addition, no doubt, they are motivated by jealousy and dislike plus the feeling that Indians were the world's safest object of animosity. So with their superior ready manpower and equipment they could show the Indians and the Asian countries that in military affairs at least they had superiority. All this could be accomplished by a major border demonstration. I have not entirely discarded the above theory. But last week the trickle of evidence on forces north on the frontier, the concentration in the real danger areas which are the Chumbi Valley and back near the Burma border, the incursions and patrol actions in new places and the drift of Chinese propaganda caused me to conclude that we should assume something more serious. The Indians have consistently underestimated Chinese intentions. In one way or another our estimate influences them. And, of course, we are in less danger if we have to withdraw from a too somber estimate than if we must revise a too sanguine one. In the former instance we shall have at least done some of the right things. My recent estimates have reflected the above considerations. Deep in my own mind I am not persuaded that the Chinese are as ambitious as this implies or that they can be so indifferent to the deterrent effects of our position.
If the Chinese should really come down the mountain in force, there will be more political changes here. Much so-called nonalignment went out the window with Menon. In his pro-Soviet maneuvers and his articulate anti-Americanism he was the counterbalance for five ordinary pro-Western ministers. Popular opinion and our military assistance has worked a further and major impairment. The problem in face of a really serious attack would be how we would react to the prospect of a new, large and extremely expensive ally. I personally hope the Chinese do not force this choice. The Indians are busy worrying about the end of non-alignment. It is we that should be doing the worrying on this.
Generally speaking, I think our affairs here are in good shape. We have managed to appear as a solid and steadfast friend. Even the left press has not seriously pinned on us the charge that we are seeking to entangle or otherwise exploit the situation. On most matters our course has seemed clear. During the Cuban affair I moved ahead but with a fairly good sense of what would be in your mind. The period has not been without interest.
We do have a serious problem next door and this has been much on my mind. The Pakistanis have not taken the attack very seriously and have seen it as the great opportunity to get concessions from the Indians. As I am sure Ayub himself saw, no one could press the Indians in their moment of despair. But instead the Paks were pressed themselves for assurances. And our weapons, in an action not too gracefully cleared with the Paks started coming to India. Their disappointment is understandable. I have worked hard and I think with a certain measure of success here. The Ministry of External Affairs at my behest has asked the press to be very quiet in response to the Pakistan fulminations. I have given strong encouragement to a Congress Party group which is urging reconciliation with Pakistan. I have pressed the Indians to give the Pakistanis information on Indian troop movements and I succeeded last week in getting Nehru to write a long and friendly letter to Ayub on the situation, while their new High Commissioner is proposing the resumption of ministerial talks. Meanwhile McConaughy has been doing noble work in Karachi to calm the Paks and make them see that the threat is to the subcontinent. My sense of the situation is that we should not press the Pakistanis any more in the immediate future. However I should continue all moderating efforts here. Eventually but not too soon the Indians must be asked to propose meaningful negotiations on Kashmir. This should not incidentally raise the question of a plebiscite, an idea in which there is no longer any future. The only hope lies in having a full guarantee of the headwaters of the rivers. Each side should hold on to the mountain territory that it has and there should be some sort of shared responsibility for the Valley. I really don't think that a solution on these lines is impossible. It may be wise incidentally when the time comes to have the British do it as a Commonwealth exercise.
With the great advantage of perspective, I regard the election results as a strong endorsement of the Kennedy Administration, your Cuban policy and the persistence of Mr. Endicott Peabody.
Yours faithfully,
Ken
197. Editorial Note
On November 14, 1962, the Governments of the United States and India exchanged diplomatic notes, signed in Washington, which established a formal basis for the military assistance which the United States had been providing to India since November 3. The U.S. note, signed by Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, indicated that the purpose of the assistance was to lend to the defense of India against "outright Chinese aggression." The only other conditions attached to the offer were that U.S. representatives in India be permitted to observe the use of the military supplies provided and that any excess supplies be returned when no longer needed for the purposes for which they had been supplied. The Indian note, signed by Ambassador B. K. Nehru, confirmed the agreement outlined in the U.S. note. The texts of the notes are printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 3, 1962, page 838.
198. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/16/62. Secret.
Washington, November 16, 1962.
Mr. President:
1. You are having a meeting on the Indian military aid situation with State and Defense at 4:00 p.m., Monday.
2. The immediate subject for decision is the result of our discussion with the UK this past week. A team consisting of Jim Grant from State, Bill Bundy from Defense, and Bill Gaud from AID, has come to an agreed set of recommendations with a similar British group on what we should be prepared to do. These are contained in London 1865, attached at Tab 1./2/ In summary, this group recommends that we agree with the British and, to the extent that we can get them to contribute, other Commonwealth countries, to equip a force of about five divisions and their supporting formations. A preliminary guess is that the equipment involved might cost as much as $50 million. The associated supplies, especially ammunition, might be equally or more expensive depending on Indian production capabilities and present Indian stocks, neither of which are well known at the moment.
/2/Dated November 14. None of the tabs listed in the source text is printed. All are ibid.
3. The rationale of the program is that, with such assistance, the Indians would be capable of holding the Chinese where they are now. If the Indians wish to reconquer the Chinese-occupied area, they would have to use half to two-thirds of the forces they now have on their border with Pakistan (see Tab 2)./3/ The idea is thus to combine a respectable amount of aid to the Indians with a continuation of pressure on them to improve their relations with Pakistan.
/3/The document attached at Tab 2, dated November 16, consists of a 1-page assessment of Indian military dispositions, with 2 supporting maps. There is no indication of origin or drafting information on the document.
4. At Tab 2 is an indication of the dispositions of the Indian forces at two dates, 13 October and 16 November. The latter reflects information given to Galbraith by the Indians. One thing the map does not make clear is that the troops which are on the Kashmir border look to the Indians as back-up for the unit fighting at Ladakh, even though they look to the Paks the way they have always looked to the Paks.
5. At Tab 3 are the recent cables from New Delhi:
a) 1834/4/--Galbraith's latest on the opinions of Foreign Secretary Desai. It shows an increase in the realism of Indian assessments.
/4/Dated November 16.
b) 1835/5/ is Nehru's letter to Ayub.
/5/Dated November 15. Nehru's letter, concerning the Sino - Indian border war, was dated November 11.
c) 1833/6/ relates a conversation Galbraith had with the Prime Minister of Bhutan. It illustrates the problems of the Indian protectorates of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.
d) 1826/6/ is the present state of the discussion on non-alignment.
/6/Dated November 15.
e) 1739 from New York--Some indirect evidence on the effect of developments on Indian non-alignment. The effects have even reached Arthur Lall./7/
/7/Dated November 12. Arthur Lall was a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations.
f) 1726/8/ is an older one which may be interesting, showing the evolution of India's position in its arguments with China.
/8/Dated November 10.
6. At Tab 4 is London 1859, which gives the substance of the Macmillan - Ayub exchange./9/ No surprise.
/9/Dated November 14. The exchange of letters between Macmillan and Ayub concerned the Sino - Indian border war.
7. At Tab 5 is the latest assessment from Karachi./4/ McConaughy obviously is somewhat frightened and thinks the situation is out of hand. Phil Talbot and I do not agree with his suggestion that you reply to Ayub's letter immediately and cordially. We think a much better course of action would be for Secretary Rusk to write to Muhammad Ali, Pak Foreign Minister. The occasion can be the transmission of a copy of our agreement with India on military aid. He can use the occasion to repeat our assurances to the Paks. We propose further, that at the same time we make the agreement public--late Saturday--we make a public statement of our commitment to go to Pakistan's aid if it is attacked, as well as our promise that the help we give to India will be used only against the Chinese Communists. The statement would come from State. It would put on the public record what you have already told Ayub privately in writing and orally several times.
/4/Dated November 16.
8. At Tab 6 is a very interesting report (London 1851)/10/ from Malcolm MacDonald on the Chinese position on the conflict. MacDonald talked with Chen Yi, the Foreign Secretary, on 29 October, and later with Chou En-lai.
/10/Dated November 13.
9. The review will raise the deeper issues of our problems and possibilities on the Indian situation. The approach embodied in the US - UK memorandum is a cautious one. It certainly makes sense as a first step, until events reveal more clearly what Chinese intentions are and how relations within the sub-continent will shift. Still, it is important to take a longer look ahead. Do we want to push the Indians hard enough and give them enough help to make sure that they do not seek a negotiated solution on Chinese terms and lapse back into neutralism? Continuance of the war may serve important U.S. policy objectives: the sharp decline of "positive neutralism" as a foreign policy stance in the unaligned countries, greatly improved relations between India and Pakistan, another setback to Chinese Communist prestige and power with consequences felt throughout Asia. On the other hand, continuance of the war may be increasingly at our expense. Can we and do we wish to bear the costs? Alternatively, it may well be beyond our power to promote a continuance of the war. The direct reaction of the Indians when confronted with the costs of reconquering what they have already lost may lead them to draw back no matter what we do. The effects on Pakistan of our aid to India may continue to be so unfavorable as to become a limiting factor in what we can do. It is neither necessary nor possible to answer these questions now. However, we must certainly begin to consider them and the policy decision we take on the narrower issue which will be before you on Monday is at best an interim one.
CK
199. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
New Delhi, November 17, 1962, 7 p.m.
1853. Policy. Pass Defense for OASD/ISA and JCS. London's 1864 to Department. /2/ The London papers are a valuable guide to policy with which, so far as they go, we are in agreement. Unfortunately issues on which decision will be needed are rapidly carrying us beyond the scope of this guidance. Specifically:
/2/Telegram 1864, November 14, indicated that the next numbered telegram to Washington would transmit the agreed text of the recommendations of the U.S. - U.K. group established to outline Anglo-American objectives and courses of action arising out of the Sino-Indian conflict. (Ibid., 791.56/11 - 1462) Telegram 1865 from London, November 14, is summarized in Document 198.
(1) The London decisions essentially assume borderline ambitions by the Chinese capable of being contained by five divisions. As noted, if anything more ambitious is attempted (Annex A, paragraph 1)/3/ a radical reassessment will be necessary.
/3/The reference is to the agreed set of recommendations contained in telegram 1865 from London.
(2) However the Indians are assuming something much more ambitious by the Chinese. So, on balance, are we here. (Embtel 1727)/4/ As this is written the Chinese seem to have reacted in something close to division strength in the dangerous Walong area.
/4/Dated November 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/11/62 - 11/13/62)
(3) Even if the Chinese have no forward ambitions and even though they negotiate a settlement, no Indian Government can soon assume their peaceful intentions. Public opinion has now taken hold on this issue with the greatest firmness. Any Indian Government must be prepared for the contingency, of a long-continuing forward Chinese military policy in NEFA, the border countries, UP, Kashmir and it must assume that this will be combined with flexible claims as to what is Chinese territory.
(4) In light of our past lecturing on the aggressive designs of the ChiComs, we cannot now reverse the field and tell them to confine their preparations as we will confine our help in accordance with the assumption that the Chinese are basically lambs.
(5) It follows that beyond the equipment for five divisions for the next few months the Indians must have a policy of procuring weapons for regaining ground or holding open terrain, basic transport including transport aircraft, plant for arms manufacture, raw materials for the foregoing, and air power.
(6) We must have a policy on assisting this for they are already asking us for help. There are many reasons for taking a deliberate view of this assistance. But we cannot decline it on the grounds that we do not believe the Chinese are a serious threat to India.
(7) The issue is an urgent one for the Indians are now coming forward with requests of very large magnitude. Some of these I have persuaded them to withhold on the legitimate ground that they are not well considered and that first things be put first and the first thing is ready infantry equipment. But this is not substitute for a policy.
I turn now to recommendations.
(1) The Indians must clearly realize, as they are only now dimly realizing, that our decision to help them beyond the ready combat requirements of the next few months involves political and financial issues of the highest order. This help in the magnitude contemplated will not be easy for us to provide.
(2) This means that very senior Indian Minister should go to Washington (and London) to negotiate the arrangements including political understandings.
(3) Our help must be related to a sense-making defense plan which reflects the realities of the military situation, does not commit the Indians to impossible tasks (e.g. the recovery of all the Aksai Chin), involves a realistic view of the weaponry and is related to actual as distinct from our imagined capacity to assist.
(4) There must be a clear understanding that India (not the US) will take up the Pakistan problem. Pakistan in the past has been regarded as an American problem. Now it is serious Indian business. Our ability to help India is circumscribed while tension continues. India has an exposed flank and is handicapped in helping herself. We can help by restraining the Pak appetite but leadership in the task of making the subcontinent secure and unified belongs to India.
(5) Given the foregoing, we should, I believe, help the Indians on a very substantial scale to organize their continuing defenses and build the supporting industry so far as this is clearly within their capacity. We shall, as the London decisions make clear, have to work with them patiently and with understanding. The major responsibility must remain in their hands. But we shall have to be severe on all wasteful nonsense.
(6) We should be as tolerant as our own political climate allows to obeisances to nonalignment. These will probably disappear in the next few weeks or months. The Indians now want, in fact, an intimate and confidential relationship with the United States. Sophisticated concern is already turning to whether we will insist on nonalignment.
(7) We stand on the edge of great opportunity here--reconciliation between India and Pakistan, security for the whole subcontinent, a decisive reverse for communism in its area of its greatest opportunity. We could lose the chance by not helping the Indians defend themselves according to their view of the Chinese danger. We could lose it by rushing in indiscriminately either with help or with unreal conditions. But given patient work and some luck with the Pakistanis and firm bargaining on essentials we can bring it off.
In light of foregoing considerations, which we know to be much in the mind of the British High Commission New Delhi, we strongly urge that London decisions, especially those in Annex A, be not communicated now to the Indian or Pakistan Governments and we have in mind visit of Duncan Sandys. Instead we urge prompt consideration which obviously must be at highest levels reflecting the foregoing considerations and resulting guidance.
Strictly FYI except for reference to Sandys, foregoing conveyed very informally to British Deputy HICOM.
Galbraith
200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1762. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Rusk. A handwritten note by Rogers on the attached telegram distribution sheet prepared in S/S reads: "Secretary requested specifically that this message not be repeated to London and Karachi."
Washington, November 18, 1962, 2:03 p.m.
2140. Eyes Only Personal for Ambassador from Secretary. (Urtel 1853./2/ Deeply appreciate your handling present crisis. I am convinced that we are on the front edge of large and unpredictable events affecting many parts of the world and that earlier frames of reference will require radical review by many governments including our own.
/2/Document 199.
I wish to underline fourth numbered recommendation Urtel 1853. India's relation with Pakistan is now a central problem for India affecting its own vital security and national existence. India must understand the limits upon our capacity to influence Karachi. We ourselves cannot prevent a Pakistan - Peiping side deal and a withdrawal of Pakistan from CENTO and SEATO if Pakistan becomes determined, however irrationally and recklessly, to pursue that course. Delhi would not be the first capital to make the mistake of believing that we have unlimited powers of persuasion in every capital other than its own.
If the situation in the subcontinent should take a rapid and adverse turn, India must surely recognize that geography restricts our own capacity to act promptly in the area. Further if Pakistan breaks its Western ties and conspires with Peiping against India it would be crucially important for the American people to know that India has taken every possible step to avoid that result. Otherwise our ability to help India would be severely circumscribed.
I am not arguing Pakistan's case nor condoning her effort to extort maximum advantage from India's danger. I am emphasizing utter seriousness your fourth recommendation and necessity for Indian leadership to pursue their newly discovered realism to a full reassessment relations with Pakistan.
Rusk
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