Documents 201-351
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1862. Secret. Drafted by Naas and approved by Talbot and Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, November 18, 1962, 8:46 p.m.
782. It clear that Paks have whipped themselves into near hysterical state and that next few weeks will be very difficult for all of us. In view legacy Indo - Pak relations strong reactions to our aid to India were to be expected. We can tolerate and are prepared for considerable buffeting but obviously wish avoid dramatic reversals of policy. We are presently very concerned by leaderless appearance of GOP. We have impression that GOP at this moment is desperately floundering around, is striking out blindly, and has no idea where it will be next week. The Hindu baiters such as Dehlavi seem to be having field day in absence firm political leadership. We recognize that unstable domestic situation places Ayub in doubly difficult position, even if he were of mind attempt moderate opinion. From Pak domestic viewpoint Chinese attacks and our response could not have come at worse time. At same time it also likely GOP statements and our intelligence "take" to some extent intended by GOP frighten U.S. and force us into certain actions vis-a-vis India. We must, therefore, avoid appearance of over concern and avoid being whiplashed. For example, we must give no encouragement to GOP that we will provide additional military assistance to Pakistan to "balance" aid to India. Full gamut of relations between U.S. and western world and nations of subcontinent is under change. One of our main objectives in next few months will be to do what we can to encourage resolution Indo - Pak differences and we must be careful take no actions with Pakistan which make this task more difficult.
In present situation, we must attempt guide leadership to see through temper tantrums and to recognize Pakistan's basic long-range interests and continuing value of close relations with U.S. and improved relations with India.
We do not underestimate difficulty of your task, but believe our past policies and current actions do give you great deal work with. In discussions with GOP leaders you may wish at your discretion draw on following points:
1. On question of prior consultation we do not believe we need be apologetic. On October 26 you informed Ayub of all actions taken by U.S. to assist India up to that time./2/ Ayub's response was at minimum tacit approval of those steps. Secondly, Talbot discussed matter with Ambassador Ahmed October 29 and President sent letter to Ayub October 28. /3/ Since then we have kept GOP fully informed of details arms aid. As you have informed GOP our assistance is so far relatively small and certainly poses no threat to Pakistan. Impact of our aid to date is clearly of greater psychological impact in Pakistan than of concern militarily. (At same time you will not want to mislead Paks that more substantial aid is not coming. You will receive instructions shortly on this subject.)
/2/See Document 183.
/3/See Document 186.
2. U.S. understands Pakistan's concern. We have, therefore, specifically taken this concern into account in our agreement with India and have made our assurances public in the November 14 Press Statement. In the Secretary's letter to FonMin/4/ this assurance is repeated and the Secretary has referred to previous private assurances. (Embassy has copy of Chayes to McGhee memorandum of February 16, 1962, /5/ summing up our private, treaty, and public assurances and you may wish draw on this paper.)
/4/The reference is to a letter from Rusk to Ali transmitted to Karachi in telegram 779, November 18. In the letter, Rusk emphasized that the United States viewed the military assistance provided to India in response to the threat posed by China as essential to the security of the entire subcontinent. The notes exchanged between the United States and India on November 14 had explicitly established that the purpose of the assistance was to meet the challenge of "Chinese aggression." (See Document 197.) Rusk wrote that he was certain that the military assistance provided to India would not be used in any conflict with Pakistan. But with Pakistani concerns in mind, he reiterated the assurance made when the texts of the November 14 notes were released to the press: "if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." (Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 1862) The full text of the press statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 3, 1962, pp. 837 - 838.
/5/Not found.
In our view GOP has been given every assurance for its security. For them to believe otherwise is simply either questioning U.S. integrity or attempting pressure us into inadvisable actions against India. We do not intend play latter game beyond what we have done in Press Statement and Secretary's letter and you may wish firmly and coldly inform argumentative types we do not appreciate former.
3. U.S. policy over years has been assist to extent possible settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan, Kashmir in particular. Alliance relationship per se has not demanded actions but we have, anyways, worked diligently for solutions problems out of conviction peace and stability subcontinent so demanded. Offer of Black mission is one example and GOP is fully aware that its recent efforts in UN would not have gotten off ground without our help and President's personal intercession.
In letter Secretary has affirmed again that we will continue search for ways to be of assistance. As opportunities arise to take new steps we will not hesitate to do so and will be alert for them.
4. In addition diplomatic support we have given, Pakistan alliance with us has been of great value. Our economic assistance very substantial and Paks should realize that this large amount, in view many demands on us, is directly related to our alliance relationship. Our military aid has been substantial and during Ayub's recent visit we made firm commitments respecting this aid. (Aide-Memoire of McNamara - Ayub talks.) /6/ We intend, despite added demands of Indo - China conflict, meet this commitment to letter. In talking about withdrawing from CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan appears to overlook intricate relation between our bilateral military aid and Pakistan's commitments made under these arrangements. Perhaps they should get the word now that withdrawal from pacts would cause us re-examine basis our military assistance.
/7/See footnote 2, Document 170.
Each of the above points can be elaborated at some length and you undoubtedly can think of many others to help Pakistanis see own best self interests.
Finally, it is difficult assess with confidence many Pakistan hints of much closer relations with Chicoms. Likely that in part these reflect Pakistani frustration and in part crude and obvious efforts to cause us concern. You have full range of argumentation re nature Chicoms etc. and there little we can add to your knowledge this subject. In discussions with GOP you might wish point out that Chicoms made careful preparations for confrontation with India by May border agreement with GOP. Chicoms are cleverly playing one against the other and Paks have fallen for gambit. We have instructed Hong Kong keep you fully informed on current developments. Our policy continues to be not to object to legitimate GOP efforts make boundary settlement. However, to help GOP avoid errors, you will wish make clear that U.S. would not understand entente between two and such action would be viewed most seriously here. At time when Chicoms attacking subcontinent we do not expect nation which allied with us against communist expansionism give aid and comfort to Chinese. This would be a way of beginning to establish the dimensions of our tolerance of Pakistan flirtations with the Chinese Communists.
Rusk
202. Memorandum for the Record/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/26/62 - 11/27/62. Secret. Drafted by Komer on November 27.
Washington, November 19, 1962, 4:15 - 5:15 p.m.
SUBJECT
Presidential Meeting on Sino - Indian Conflict
PARTICIPANTS
Dean Rusk
Phillips Talbot
W. Averell Harriman
James P. Grant
Roger Hilsman
William Sullivan
William Gaud
Robert McNamara
Paul Nitze
William P. Bundy
Maj. General A. Goodpaster
John McCone
Huntington Sheldon
D. FitzGerald
Carl Kaysen
R. W. Komer
The meeting began with an intelligence briefing to explain to the President the locale of the recent Chinese gains. Secretary Rusk asked about Chicom logistic capabilities. Mr. McCone felt that the Chicoms could support about 300,000 men in the fighting area (170,000 in combat), assuming no interdiction of their road net, but that this would take about 35,000 trucks out of a total Chicom inventory of 200,000.
While the meeting's purpose had originally been to get approval of the US/UK Memorandum of Understanding/2/ prepared during the London meetings, Rusk suggested it seemed overtaken by events. The situation was already getting to a point where we and others could no longer act as if it were normal. He agreed that the Commonwealth ought to be moving faster. We were already supporting most of the countries around the Communist Asian periphery, hence there was some advantage to the Commonwealth taking the lead in helping India while we trailed somewhat behind.
/2/The text of the U.S. - U.K. memorandum of understanding concerning the Sino - Indian conflict was transmitted in telegram 1865 from London, November 14. It is summarized in Document 198. A copy of the memorandum of understanding is attached to a November 19 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, recommending the President's approval of the agreed U.S. - U.K. approach to the conflict, subject to some minor suggested changes in language. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/19/62)
McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to Delhi. He doubted that the Indians were asking for enough, but felt that we couldn't appraise their plans without detailed knowledge. Hence the JCS should select 10 - 15 officers to go out to size up the situation. They could be ready in 2 - 3 days.
Rusk queried whether strategic and technical advice shouldn't come from the UK in the first instance, but McNamara doubted whether this would come soon enough. Rusk acknowledged that the Assam Valley could be in Chicom hands within a week and urged that transport aircraft be sent soonest because they would be needed in any case. We needed to get some C - 130s on the way while we were making a more systematic evaluation. Otherwise, the Indians might get kicked out of Assam. Komer argued that doing so would help deter the Chicoms by signaling that we would get involved in a big way if this happened. There was also some discussion of the Indian need for spare parts for their C - 119s.
The President indicated that we should ask Macmillan about Commonwealth plans, what they could do about Australian and other wheat to Communist China and what military missions the Commonwealth might be planning to send out (he had Ormsby Gore called over to meet with him and Rusk).
At the President's request, Grant explained the rationale behind the US/UK recommendations, particularly the five-division package. It was impossible to say what share the UK would take. McNamara doubted that the British would be willing to go 50 - 50 on any such substantial amount. The President agreed that the UK ought to take the lead. This wouldn't last long, but we ought to start them up in front.
There was discussion of whether Sino - Indian negotiations were likely. Rusk said that we suspected Nehru was still hoping for some kind of a deal. We were aware he had proposed one involving a Chinese return to the November 1959 line and an Indian return to the 8 September 1962 line. This might be why Nehru hadn't declared war.
The subject of Pakistani reactions was also discussed. Talbot indicated that there could be a wide swing in Pakistani attitudes if Assam was really threatened.
McNamara again urged getting a high level mission out to Delhi, including State and Intelligence people in order to concert a plan of action with the Indians. We needed a mission on the lines of the Taylor mission to Vietnam. Rusk preferred to see the UK take the lead on this mission, with us participating if desirable, rather than a straight US mission. It was pointed out that the more we got in front the more we would push Moscow toward Peiping.
The President decided that we should: (1) get a mission off to Delhi; (2) send some C - 130s; (3) take care of the C - 119 spare parts; and (4) push the UK to get the Commonwealth in, and decide what we want to tell Macmillan.
Rusk and Harriman showed the President a proposed press conference statement for Tuesday, indicating language which we had used previously in the Cabot - Wang talks to indicate to Peiping that we meant business. The President decided we ought to review the proposed press conference statement and put the Western response on a broader basis than that of the US alone. We should push the UK to get the Commonwealth involved.
McNamara couldn't understand why the Indians didn't use air. They could certainly tear up the Chicom roads.
There was some discussion of the desirability of using Tibetan guerrillas.
Talbot reminded the President of the "gentleman's agreement" limiting FY 63 aid to India. Gaud explained that in the light of new PL 480 needs we would run afoul of this agreement if we spent more than $25 million on military aid to India. The President preferred not to go to the congressional committee yet; however, he told Talbot to bring Senator Symington up to date.
RWK
203. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 1962. Secret; Niact. Received in the Department of State at 4:47 p.m. and relayed to the White House at 5:30 p.m.
New Delhi, November 19, 1962, 8 p.m.
1891. Eyes Only President, Secretary and SecDef. Verbatim Text.
Following is text of message dated today from Prime Minister to President, to be delivered by B.K. Nehru. Copy handed me this evening by M.J. Desai.
Begin Text.
[The letter conveyed in telegram 1891 was the first of two letters sent by Nehru to Kennedy on November 19. The second was delivered to the White House by the Indian Ambassador on the evening of November 19. The text of that letter was transmitted to the Embassy in New Delhi in telegram 2167, November 19. These letters have not been declassified by the Indian Government. In his biography of Nehru, Gopal summarized these two letters as follows:
["Nehru, apparently without consulting any of his Cabinet colleagues or officials, apart from the Foreign Secretary, M.J. Desai, wrote two letters to Kennedy describing the situation as 'really desperate' and requesting the immediate despatch of a minimum of twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till India personnel had been trained. If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air space; but aerial action by Indian elsewhere would be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Nehru also asked for two B - 47 bomber squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the United States. All such assistance and equipment would be utilized solely against the Chinese." (Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 3, pp. 228 - 229)]
Galbraith
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 1962. Top Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted in S by William E. Knepper and approved by Breisky (S/S).
Washington, November 19, 1962, 10:01 p.m.
2167. Eyes Only for Ambassador. The following letter was delivered to the President by the Indian Ambassador this evening, and is transmitted for your information in the event that a copy has not been delivered to Embassy. Department comments will follow in separate telegram.
"New Delhi 19th November 1962.
[This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government. For a summary, see Document 203.]/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that has no signature.
205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/11 - 1962. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Kaysen and approved by Talbot and Rusk. Repeated to London and Karachi.
Washington, November 19, 1962, 11:06 p.m.
2170. Eyes Only Ambassador. Following first Nehru November 19 communication,/2/ your messages to President /3/ and assessment of military events last several days, following decisions taken highest levels:
/2/See Document 203.
/3/Not further identified.
1) Agreed US - UK program no longer sufficient in changed circumstances. Program approved in principle with recognition that much more must be done.
2) We acutely feel lack of information regarding GOI plans and capacity to meet this new situation. Accordingly, we are sending a small high-level team to arrive New Delhi approximately Friday to assess whole situation along with Indian plans and capability for meeting it and return with action recommendations as soon as possible. They may wish to visit scene of action on frontier. Team will include high ranking military officers both Army and Air with appropriate representation from State and CIA. Arranging best coordination we can with UK directly, but not waiting on them.
3) Immediate reinforcement Kelly team to full strength required carry out expanded program. Request your and his urgent recommendations team level required and job specifications.
4) We are prepared to dispatch twelve or more C - 130's at once to assist in any necessary movement of forces and equipment to Assam area or to Ladakh. This would be US operation with planes, crews support. Request your urgent advice whether Indians prepared to use this transport immediately. /4/ Also earliest estimates men and tonnage involved. Special airlift team being dispatched at once. This provides another opportunity for you to remind Indians about importance of moving troops from Pakistan border. Urgency of situation underlines anomaly of Indian reluctance in this respect.
/4/The Embassy confirmed the need for the C - 130s on November 20, and the Department responded on the same day that the Department of Defense was dispatching 12 C - 130 aircraft to India. (Telegrams 1914 from New Delhi and 2191 to New Delhi, both November 20; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/11 - 2062)
5) For continuing build-up Indian airlift capacity we also prepared urgently airlift at least critically needed spare parts C - 119's. Best procedure appears send maintenance team already named at once to assess need and determine effective measures.
6) This as far as we can see to go on basis of facts now available here. However, supply actions urgently needed and assessed as valid need not be delayed despite lack of clear picture Indian capabilities. View possibility India now ready use tactical air, one airlift requirement may be bombs request of UK. London should raise this and ascertain availability and British air shipment capabilities.
Rusk
206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 2062. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by the President, and approved by Talbot.
Washington, November 20, 1962, 12:50 a.m.
2172. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. We have just forwarded to you second letter from Nehru today anticipated in your 1889. /2/ As we read this message it amounts to a request for an active and practically speaking unlimited military partnership between the United States and India to take on Chinese invasion India. This involves for us the most far-reaching political and strategic issues and we are not at all convinced that Indians are prepared to face the situation in the same terms. I recall that more than once in past two years I have expressed to various Indian representatives my concern that their policy would lead to a situation where they would call upon us for assistance when it is too late rather than give their and free world policy any opportunity for preventive effectiveness.
/2/Dated November 19. (Ibid., 691.93/11 - 1962) [Regarding Nehru's letter, see Documents 203 and 204.]
It is not our purpose now to rehash the past but to look at present situation in its fullest reality. The essential question is whether Peiping is now engaged in an all-out assault on India or is pushing its territorial claims up to the extreme limits of Chinese pretentions. Nehru's latest message indicates his assessment that the Chinese are determined to push far beyond disputed areas and that this is in fact a genuine attack on India.
If this is so then it is apparent that India is faced with the necessity of mobilizing every possible resource in its support and that every other question must be subordinated to its own defense and national existence. It seems that, therefore, PriMin must now consider maximum diplomatic, political and military effort to encompass the following:
(1) The enlistment of full Pakistani cooperation at whatever cost in terms of lesser question between the two countries including Kashmir. The United States cannot give maximum military support to India while most of India's forces are engaged against Pakistan over an issue where American interest in self-determination of the peoples directly concerned has caused us since 1954 to be sympathetic to Pakistan's claims. To put it in most brutal terms, India may now face a choice between Pakistani assistance in the defense of India and some kind of satisfaction of Pakistan's interest in the Kashmir question.
(2) We have seen little evidence thus far of India's attempt to mobilize the traditional commitments of the British Commonwealth. We believe the defense of India is in the first instance a Commonwealth problem though there are no formal treaty commitments within that structure. If India considers that it is faced with a war against China, it would be very difficult for the United States to give maximum assistance without the fullest participation of at least the old Commonwealth and without the elimination of such anomalies as normal Commonwealth relations with Peiping and the shipment of large supplies of foodstuffs from Canada and Australia to Red China. India must, we think, insist upon maximum Commonwealth support in its struggle against China. Specifically, any requests for assistance made of us should also be addressed to the British.
(3) A third factor is the United Nations. We can understand that Nehru might have been reluctant to raise question of Chinese aggression in United Nations so long as he had any hope that Russia would not be forced to support Peiping. On the other hand, the full mobilization of world opinion against Red China could bring to bear political, economic and psychological pressures on Peiping which would add strength to the relative ineffectiveness thus far of Indian arms. In any event, full United States support for India would be much easier and more palatable to the American people if there were near unanimity in the United Nations that this was an aggression rejected by the entire world community, and on which India had the widest possible international support.
(4) Further, we have seen little evidence that India has attempted to mobilize the political and practical support of other nations in southern and Southeast Asia also bordering on or near Red China and interested in resistance to Red Chinese expansion. India's heretofore cavalier attitude toward communist penetration Southeast Asia is obviously an obstacle to Asian solidarity in this situation, but a maximum diplomatic effort to trade support for support with these countries is clearly called for.
(5) Latest message from PriMin in effect proposes not only a military alliance between India and the United States but complete commitment by us to a fighting war. We recognized this might be immediate reaction of a Government in a desperate position but it is a proposal which cannot be reconciled with any further pretense of non-alignment. If this is what Nehru has in mind, he should be entirely clear about it before we even consider our own decision.
There are strong reasons why the United States should not appear to be the point of the spear in assisting India in this situation. The most impelling of these is that our role might force Moscow to support Peiping. We shall be considering here whether there is anything we can constructively say to Moscow about China's reckless and provocative action because there is some reason to believe that Moscow is also very much worried about the dangerous possibility. I would emphasize, however, India must mobilize its own diplomatic and political resources, seek the broadest base of support throughout the world and, more particularly, enlist the active interest and participation of the Commonwealth.
Please let us have your comments on the above urgently before we reply to the PriMin's latest letter to the President.
Rusk
207. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 2062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:37 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Karachi, November 20, 1962, 10 p.m.
913. Policy. Department telegram 779/2/ and 782./3/ I had extremely important and useful conversation with Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali this morning after delivering Secretary's letter. Full report follows in next message/4/ but key points made by Mohammed Ali were:
/2/See footnote 3, Document 201.
/3/Document 201.
/4/Telegram 914 from Karachi, November 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/11 - 2162)
1. GOP had reached decision adhere to present basic foreign policy orientation, including pacts, and to support U.S. leadership, largely because no alternative to this policy for present. President would so inform National Assembly in camera but Mohammed Ali would be less frank in public. Difficulties expected in making this decision stick in National Assembly but Government working hard organize pro-Government elements. Our recent actions helpful in some respects.
2. Chinese military victories in India over past few days have had some sobering effect and Mohammed Ali did not minimize Pakistan worry over Indian military situation, or worry over recognized ultimate Chinese threat to Pakistan.
3. Chinese victories have encouraged tendency avoid any provocation Chinese Communists now. I surmised that Pakistanis have had in mind for some time some overture to Chinese Communists, probably high level visit, and that plan has not been abandoned.
4. Timely Indian gesture which in some form indicates Kashmir issue negotiable would be very important in strengthening Ayub's hand in fending off extremists and discouraging gesture to Chinese Communists.
Without directly accusing Government of holding such notions, I hit very hard at view that military aid would continue if Pakistanis left regional alliances and warned against accommodation with Chinese Communists. I think Mohammed Ali fully understood my warnings.
I felt somewhat encouraged after talk with Mohammed Ali but do not feel we are by any means out of woods here. Mohammed Ali may not completely or accurately reflect mood of Government and Ayub may not be able to keep control over National Assembly. Nevertheless, no doubt that Chinese victories have caused some sober second thoughts.
I would suggest in conversation with Aziz Ahmed Department stress military situation in India, but my warnings not reiterated for moment. I think it would be preferable if tougher line restricted to our talks here for next few days.
McConaughy
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 2062. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Komer, cleared by Talbot and Rusk, and approved by the President.
Washington, November 20, 1962, 10:31 p.m.
2196. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Unless you think it inappropriate, please deliver the following message to Prime Minister Nehru as soon as feasible.
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I was on the point of responding to your two urgent letters/2/ when we received news of the Chinese statements on a cease-fire./3/ I, of course, wish your assessment of whether it makes any change in your situation. I had planned to write you that we are ready to be as responsive as possible to your needs, in association with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. We remain prepared to do so.
/2/See Documents 203 and 204.
/3/On November 21, the Chinese Government announced that a cease-fire would be observed by Chinese forces along the entire Himalayan front as of midnight on that date. Chinese forces would be withdrawn and checkpoints would be established. Provided the Indian Government took corresponding measures, China was prepared to enter into negotiations with India to seek a resolution of the conflict. (The New York Times, November 21, 1962)
We had already organized a small group of top U.S. officials, who would arrive in New Delhi Friday,/4/ to help Ambassador Galbraith in concerting with your government how we can best help. It seems useful to go ahead with this effort as planned and we will do so unless you think it inadvisable."
FYI: The team is one described in Deptel 2170./4/ Full details are being sent separately. You might suggest to Nehru that even under changed circumstances the team would be useful as a tangible gesture of US support.
Rusk
/4/The group, headed by Averell Harriman and including Paul Nitze, Carl Kaysen, Roger Hilsman, and General Paul D. Adams, arrived on Thursday, November 22.
/5/Document 205.
209. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 2162. Secret; Niact.
New Delhi, November 21, 1962, 11 a.m.
1973. Eyes Only Secretary. Verbatim Text. Department Telegram 2196. /2/
/2/Document 208.
M.J. Desai handed me this afternoon copy Prime Minister's response, dated today, to message contained reference telegram.
Begin text:
[This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government.]
Galbraith
210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 2362. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy, cleared by the President and Talbot, and approved by Rusk.
Washington, November 23, 1962, 6:09 p.m.
2274. Eyes Only for Harriman and Galbraith from the President. Messages from New Delhi show your watchfulness on the matter but I want to emphasize again that I think it is important that we neither push the Indians forward nor hold them back in the present phase. We do not wish to be responsible either for war or for truce. We should be ready to cooperate with them, subject to obvious limits of our capabilities, in whatever course they choose, but it must be for them to make the choices. Obviously we should not hesitate to give advice against more obvious forms of political or military rashness and our calmness should be a counterpoise to shaken Indian confidence. But we cannot allow them to put off on us the basic responsibilities which must remain Indian. /2/
/2/In telegram 2032, November 24, Galbraith responded: "There are few matters on which I have been so clear as the need to avoid either cheering the Indians on to battle or telling them to make peace, each with its attendant responsibilities for blame." He noted that Harriman agreed. (Ibid., 691.93/11 - 2462)
Rusk
211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11 - 2562. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Karachi and London eyes only for the Ambassadors. A note on the source text indicates that the approved text of the telegram was supplied to the Department of State for transmission by the White House. Komer, Talbot, Rusk, and the President are listed as having cleared it. White House telegram CAP 5551 - 62, November 25, from Komer to the President at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, transmitted the text to the President for approval. Komer noted that the telegram was drafted on instructions from Bundy, who had cleared an earlier draft. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/24/62 - 11/25/62)
Washington, November 25, 1962, 10:40 p.m.
2329. Eyes Only for the Ambassador and Harriman. For Harriman from the President. While the ostensible purpose of your stopover in Pakistan is to inform Ayub generally on your Delhi talks, I also regard it as a major opportunity to show Ayub how radically the Sino - Indian confrontation has altered the situation in the subcontinent from our point of view. We have had to look at this situation in terms of Free World security and we regard it as a major test of our alliance ties as well as Ayub's statesmanship whether he does so too.
Up to this time we have been prepared to disregard as much as possible a basic difference in viewpoint between us and the Pakistani as to what our alliance meant. They have always regarded it primarily as a basis for soliciting support of their aims vis-a-vis India. We have regarded it as part of the total free world defense against Bloc aggression, a contingency that Ayub seems to have regarded as remote. Now that it has actually occurred, however, it must take precedence in our thinking. It ought to do so in Pak and Indian thinking too. As and when this sinks in, our task of promoting Pak - Indian reconciliation will grow easier.
Regrettably, Ayub has elected instead to pursue at least initially a tough line toward India and, for obvious reasons, toward us. Though I recognize that he is under some domestic pressure, at a moment like this there are limits on how far we can live with this attitude. Whether the present Sino - Indian crisis ends in a negotiated settlement or continues to boil, the Indians will almost certainly wish to undertake a major modernization of their forces. We shall be pressed to become the chief underwriter and cannot sustain the additional costs implicit in continued Pak - Indian quarrels. These costs have already been great enough.
I also believe that the Sino - Indian confrontation has given us what may be a one-time opportunity to bring about a Pak - Indian reconciliation. Though this opportunity may be fleeting, we still ought to seize it if we can. Success will require movement in both the Pakistani and Indian positions. Yet unless both Pakistan and India look clearly at their fundamental interest in partnership this opportunity may be lost. We cannot expect quick results, but can hope to set in motion a trend which will bring about, with a lot of nursing along from us, a resolution of such issues as Kashmir.
I do not want to push Ayub so hard as to get his back up, yet I think it imperative that he be under no illusion as to where we stand. Frank talk carries risks, but these seem to me less than those entailed in failing to make our position clear. I count on you to do so. Therefore, while you and McConaughy will of course choose the manner of your presentation, please tell Ayub that I have specifically asked you to make the following points to him:
(1) Whatever India's past follies, the Chicom attack and India's response to it create a basically new situation. We regard this as far more than a mere border squabble, even if it ends in a temporary settlement. By the Chinese action, the subcontinent has become a new area of major confrontation between the Free World and the Communists. We must take this fact into account in our global policy.
(2) The Indians themselves are at long last fully aware of the Chinese Communist threat and appear to be determined to meet it. This creates a recognized community of interest between India and Pakistan, which India is beginning to acknowledge. It provides a basis for the resolution of Pak - Indian differences which did not previously exist.
(3) We for our part have made clear time and again that our alliance ties with Pakistan were for the express purpose of meeting the Communist threat. Now that India too recognizes this threat and is seeking to cope with it, we intend to provide help to meet that threat.
(4) We regard such aid to India as fully consistent with our ties to Pakistan because there is no blinking the fact that the threat to the subcontinent is a threat to the security and independence of both.
(5) Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time when we were assisting India to confront Communist China, it would cut across the deep commitments of the entire free world. We know Ayub has no illusions about the Chicoms, but we would regard such gestures as wholly incompatible with Pakistan's own interests, traditions, and commitments. Pakistan must realize that there are certain limits which should not be overstepped if a fruitful Pak - US relationship can continue. The American people have a million men in uniform outside the United States in defense of the freedom and independence of nations and are taking casualties every week. The esteem and friendship of the American people for Pakistan would melt away if Pakistan elects to draw close to those who are the sworn enemies of freedom.
(6) Indeed we think the opposite course from that which Ayub pursuing publicly is far better calculated to lead to the resolution of Pak - Indian differences which we and Ayub seek. The more forthcoming Pakistan is toward India, the harder it will be for India to avoid movement in its direction. By the same token, the tougher the Pak attitude, the less likely India can risk the humiliation of appearing to knuckle under. Thus the current Pak attitude risks diverting India from primary focus on the Chicom threat, a focus which can only benefit Pakistan in the long run.
(7) The US too will continue to do all it can to bring the two countries together. We have not been pressing Pakistan alone. But we cannot command we can only persuade. This means Ayub as well as Nehru. Nevertheless, we see the current situation as moving both parties toward the point where we can assist in a reasonable compromise involving some give by both parties. Indeed, should Ayub himself be prepared to be forthcoming, we are prepared to tell Nehru that if we give him major military aid he should agree to negotiate at a suitable point on Kashmir. Ayub cannot ask more of us, and we are unable to provide more.
(8) Meanwhile, though we recognize Ayub's public opinion problem, he should bear in mind: (a) that if he lets it get out of hand he may end up losing his room to maneuver; (b) current Pak outbursts make it that much more difficult for India to be forthcoming; (c) the US public and Congress will be adversely affected by what they tend increasingly to regard as irrational Pak outbursts. In fact you might cite the 23 Nov. Washington Post interview in which Eisenhower, whom the Paks regard as a friend, is reported as favoring all-out military aid to India, but warns that any US commitment must be carried through until the Chinese are decisively beaten back.
(9) As to military aid, we are fulfilling our commitments to Pakistan and we intend to help India if it wants our help. Both steps are essential to the security of the subcontinent. We have conveyed adequate security reassurances to both India and Pakistan. We've never committed ourselves to any particular military balance between the two, nor can we do so.
(10) In sum, we intend to stand by our commitments to Pakistan and to protect its integrity. I regard this as more than justifying Pakistan's reciprocal alliance obligations to us. In return we ask Ayub to examine dispassionately the great opportunity he and Nehru have to resolve Pak - Indian difference in the cause of solidarity against the Chicom threat. We will press this case on both powers and be guided largely by their responses.
In requesting you to press Ayub along the above lines, I am proceeding on the assumption that in the last analysis he will go along with us. This is foreshadowed by Mohammed Ali's statement (Karachi 913)/2/ that Pakistan would not sacrifice its alliance with us because it had no sound alternative course. So I am convinced that with the right combination of patience and firmness we can bring Ayub to take a reasonable course in his own interest.
/2/Document 207.
Your mission will be an unqualified success if we can get the following from Ayub: (1) recognition that he must start re-educating his public before things drift too far; (2) indications of his willingness to respond to Indian overtures, so that we can encourage Nehru to make them; (3) minimizing of attacks on the US, which only redound to Pak disadvantage; and (4) cutting off his flirtation with Peiping on matters other than their own border problem. In return we can assure Ayub that we will take full account of Pak interests in our dealings with India.
Rusk
212. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11 - 2862. Secret. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held at President Ayub's residence.
Rawalpindi, November 28, 1962.
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
H.E. Duncan Sandys, U.K. Minister for Commonwealth Relations
W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
On arrival in Rawalpindi (November 28, 5:00 p.m.) I was informed by Ambassador McConaughy that President Ayub wanted me to dine with him and Duncan Sandys alone and that Sandys wanted to see me half an hour before dinner in order to bring me up to date on what transpired. Ambassador McConaughy told me that Sandys had informed President Ayub of Nehru's willingness to start discussions regarding Kashmir without preconditions on any level; Sandys was proposing that first a preliminary meeting be held between Ayub and Nehru at New Delhi, since it was Ayub's turn to go to the Indian capital. President Ayub wanted to talk to me before making up his mind.
In my discussion with Sandys before dinner, he argued for a President-Prime Minister meeting, and I told him that I would think it wise to hold such a meeting only if the communique to be issued at the end of the meeting be agreed to in advance. Without such an agreement it would be dangerous since Ayub and Nehru found it difficult to negotiate due to the difference in the personalities of the two men. Sandys bought this idea. Sandys and I then drove to President Ayub's house and had a long talk with him before going into dinner. Sandys produced a draft communique announcing a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in New Delhi, including a sentence to the effect that the objective of the meeting would be to decide on methods and procedure to settle the differences between their two countries. I then outlined my thought of an agreement in advance on the final communique to be issued at the close of the meeting. After some discussion, Ayub said if we are to agree upon a communique at the end of the discussions, why have a meeting at all--why not agree now on that communique by correspondence between himself and Nehru? I readily accepted this and so did Sandys. Taking the first sentence of Sandys' paper, Ayub dictated, with some discussion of each sentence, the following communique to be issued:
The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that renewed effort should be made without delay to resolve the Kashmir problem so as to enable their two countries to live side by side free from anxiety.
In consequence, they have decided to open negotiations at an early date with the object of reaching an honorable and equitable settlement.
The negotiations will be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub.
Sandys agreed to take this draft to Nehru, attempt to get his approval and signature, and bring it back to Rawalpindi for President Ayub's signature. We all hoped that it might be possible to issue the communique on Friday morning. /2/
/2/Sandys returned to New Delhi on November 29 to discuss the text of the proposed joint statement with Nehru. Nehru accepted the statement, conditional upon one substantive change. He requested that the first paragraph be amended: change "to resolve the Kashmir problem" to read "to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other matters." (Telegram 2158 from New Delhi, November 29; ibid., 690D.91/11 - 2962) With the alteration of "other matters" to read "other related matters," Ayub accepted the proposed change and the joint communique was released on Friday, November 30. (Telegram 964 from Karachi, November 29; ibid.)
While the draft communique was being retyped, we had a discussion ranging over a wide area. In answer to Ayub's questions, Sandys and I expressed our views of the climate of opinion in India on the possibility of reaching a settlement on Kashmir. Sandys expressed himself somewhat more optimistically than I did. I explained that I had been struck by the unity of purpose which had developed in India in recognizing the long-range danger of Chinese Communist aggression. Domestic difficulties were being put aside by the people all over the country. In the villages people were enlisting, contributing funds, and asking what they could do to help in this national emergency. I explained I had found that everyone with whom I had talked, unanimously spoke of the emergency in long-range terms. It was therefore natural that the minds of many were turned towards the importance of settling differences with Pakistan so that their entire energy could be directed towards the Communist menace. I told President Ayub that I thought some further time would be needed to get all the Ministers, as well as public opinion, in a mood to make a reasonable settlement but that I felt the time was running in the right direction and that it was essential to start negotiations which in themselves would focus public opinion on the issue.
Ayub insisted that Kashmir be named as the problem. He rejected the idea of a vaguer reference to "differences between the two countries." Both Sandys and I made it plain that it would be impossible to have a plebiscite, that the Vale as such could not be transferred to Pakistan, but that there was an understanding in India that they had to make certain concessions beyond the present cease-fire line. We both told him we had not discussed details and did not know how far the India Government was ready to go at the present time. Ayub accepted this situation and recognized that the negotiations on Kashmir might last a considerable time, but under the formula it was proposed in the communique there was considerable flexibility of continuing discussions even though the first talks might not reach a satisfactory conclusion.
We discussed Chinese intentions. Ayub said he believed that their intentions were only to insure control of the Sinkiang road and a certain part of Ladakh. I pointed out that this might be their immediate objective but that they did not have to attack in the NEFA area in order to achieve this objective. I underlined the opinion of all the Indians I had talked to that Red China was determined to destroy India's independence and way of life. Ayub did not contradict this and talked as if he recognized the long-range menace of Red China to the subcontinent. There was no suggestion of a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and Red China.
We discussed Khrushchev's motives in Cuba. President Ayub expressed great admiration for the manner in which President Kennedy handled the Cuban question.
President Ayub said he believed the differences between Moscow and Peiping were real but that if Red China got into military difficulties, the Soviet Union would come to her assistance. There seemed to be no intimation that President Ayub thought that Pakistan could make a special deal and thus avoid the dangers of either Soviet or Chinese Communist aggressive intentions.
We discussed at some length the relationship between Nehru and Krishna Menon with general agreement that Krishna Menon had spoken for Nehru. I believe that Sandys and I convinced Ayub that Krishna Menon was out for good, that Nehru did not have, any longer, the unchallenged authority to bring him back.
Sandys and I touched on the military situation in India but did not go into details as I explained that General Adams was here to brief President Ayub the next morning, although we did give some indication of the size of British and American assistance so far. At dinner President Ayub reverted to the subject of our military assistance, turning to me and saying, "Now tell me about this assistance you are giving to India." I gave him the general order of dimensions emphasizing that the loss of the equipment by the Fourth Division alone was far in excess in anything we had delivered or had agreed to deliver so far. I pointed out, however, that India had plans for long-range military build-up which the Government was now determined to undertake in order that they would not be helpless against Communist attack in the future. We left it that we would discuss this subject in more detail the next day. In answer to my question Ayub told me of the commencement of the de-salinization program. He expressed hopes that it would be successful, although it would take a long time. He talked about his visit to the Hunza area and he expressed the hope that he could come to an agreement with Peiping over the boundary but would insist on retaining the Hunza grazing areas.
At one point, touching on Khrushchev's desire to avoid nuclear war, he said, "Yes, I know your views. I read your book which you had sent to me." He did not, however, take issue with this statement and agreed that at the present time Red China was more reckless. Cuba had been proof of Khrushchev's brinkmanship methods, leaving open always an opportunity to withdraw.
He spoke warmly of President Kennedy and with satisfaction of his visit to Washington. He pointed to a framed photograph on the wall.
Dehlavi was present throughout the evening but rarely injected himself in the discussion except at one point he mentioned that they had received an offer from Turkey to undertake mediation on Kashmir. Sandys pointed out that a Turkish offer would not go very well in New Delhi. President Ayub discussed at some length his difficulties with Nehru. He mentioned that when a subject came up which Nehru did not wish to discuss, he simply sat silent, which President Ayub said was most disconcerting. President Ayub asked about the Soviet MIGS. Sandys said that the Soviet Union had declined to furnish them. I said that my information maintained that they had postponed delivery, attempting to straddle the relationship (their "friend" India and their "ally" China).
President Ayub was cordial throughout the evening, relaxed, showed no strain or scars from the debate in the Assembly in the statements of the opposition.
I did not raise any of the other subjects I have in mind discussing, as I felt it was desirable to concentrate on the commencement of negotiations over Kashmir. He may well become more perturbed when we get into some of the questions about which he has been critical of U.S. policy and actions.
213. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/11 - 2962. Secret. Drafted by Harriman on January 8, 1963.
Rawalpindi, November 29, 1962.
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan
The Honorable Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
I called on President Ayub alone Thursday afternoon, November 29, at 6:00 p.m. at his Residence. He asked if I objected to his bringing in his secretary (namely Dehlavi, the Foreign Secretary).
I replied that I did since I wanted to talk personally.
I started in by asking him whether he was concerned over his political position now that he had instituted the constitutional procedures. He replied that he was not. He could count on over 80 votes out of 156 membership in the Assembly. He could not act as freely as before, and it would take him longer to get things done. He commented that this was in the direction of democratic processes that we believe in. We must not expect too rapid development of democracy as in the East people didn't understand it. In reply to my question he said the opposition was largely self-serving politicians. I told him that the President and Secretary of State wanted to do all we could to help strengthen his position and asked what we might do.
He replied three things:
(1) Use our influence to get a Kashmir settlement.
(2) Don't press him for disengagement with India in the meantime.
(3) Go slow on urging joint defense of subcontinent. This would come automatically with the Kashmir settlement.
In answer to my question on what I might say helpfully to the press, he suggested I say "Circumstances force us to give military aid to India but emphasize that Pakistan is our close friend and ally. We realize Kashmir is Pakistan's major problem." I suggested that I might add that since the attack of Red China more and more people in India were beginning to realize the necessity of a Kashmir settlement. It was interesting that he suggested that I use the words "under the changed circumstances more and more people," etc. He obviously did not want me to refer to Red Chinese aggression.
I underlined the damage that the talk about non-aggression pact was to Pakistan's good will in the U.S. He said to pay no attention to such talk, it was unthinkable for him to do such a thing. (Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali confirmed this when I saw him on Friday.)
I still maintained it was dangerous to permit such speculation. Such talk could irreparably damage confidence in Pakistan's responsibility as an ally. He and his country were now considered one of staunchest and steadfast friends. This was an asset not lightly to be thrown away. I also referred to the anti-American press and Assembly speeches. He belittled these, said he had to allow free discussion, and referred to our freedom of press. I urged him not to let it get out of hand as he might become a prisoner of the public opinion that was being developed.
At that moment (6:35 p.m.) a message was brought in from the British High Commissioner, Sir Morrice James, that Nehru had accepted the word "related" between "other . . . matters." I said that I thought President Ayub had been wise in holding out for "related" matters. This was a first test of Nehru's sincerity in starting discussions.
James came in and there were mutual congratulations. I commented that this was a good start but only a start. Ayub replied that he understood that but was counting on our help in getting a fair settlement. He said he understood that any fair settlement would be unpopular in both countries.
After James left, I asked Ayub if there was any particular subject in connection with U.S. aid that he wanted me to look into when I got back to Washington. He thought for a minute and said he couldn't think of anything, although some of our people were unnecessarily suspicious and slow in taking action. He said he wanted me to see his Planning Commissioner, Said Hassan, when I got to Karachi. In taking my leave he asked me to give the President his warmest regards. He expressed the highest admiration for the manner in which the President had handled the Cuban crisis.
214. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1591/11 - 3062. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Hong Kong, London, and Moscow.
New Delhi, November 30, 1962, 5 p.m.
2178. Harriman talks with Nehru.
Harriman met Prime Minister Nehru four times; courtesy call shortly after arrival November 22; November 23 with Ambassador, Nitze, Kaysen and M.J. Desai present; November 25 alone and November 28 with Ambassador. At November 23 meeting in response Harriman question Nehru said ChiCom primary purpose to humiliate India. Nehru then reviewed history of border dispute, recalling Chou En-lai December 1956 statement to Nehru he would accept McMahon line de facto and Chou's later denial of statement; Chou's 1956 offer trade NEFA status quo for ChiCom Ladakh claims which Nehru rejected; unproductive talks by officials following Nehru's rejection Chou's offer. Nehru observed that Aksai Chin and road valuable to ChiComs but rest Ladakh had no value. Harriman asked whether India had ever made offer to ChiComs on that corner Ladakh. Nehru said no, explained his offer of mutual withdrawal to line claimed by other side after which India prepared let ChiComs use road for civil purposes; said this offer repeated May 1962. Nehru emphasized India in undisputed possession NEFA for 50 years whatever ChiComs said about legal basis McMahon line. ChiCom attack in NEFA obviously required long preparation. Nehru several times said ChiCom intention was to deliver hard blow and make it [an?] agreement, then use time prepare for next blow and repeat pattern. Thus October 20 attack followed by October 24 offer, November 15 attack followed by November 21 cease fire. Nehru said India sure ChiComs would look forward to prolongation of truce for while.
Harriman asked whether ChiComs would carry discussions through if initiated now or break off. Nehru replied ChiComs would carry through if they could get agreement favorable them. Harriman asked what Nehru intended do in immediate future. Nehru replied cease-fire now in effect and he assumed ChiComs will withdraw December 1. It Nehru's understanding India could not go into territory vacated by ChiComs. M.J. Desai intervened say India could keep troops up to 20 kilometers south McMahon line and send administrative and police personnel up to line. Ambassador asked whether there had been any actual withdrawals yet. Nehru said there had; Desai said only in Ladakh but in NEFA ChiComs only had said they prepared withdraw. Harriman asked what would happen December 1. Nehru said ChiComs would withdraw and wait for India act. Harriman asked what would happen if India did nothing to which Nehru replied ChiComs would still withdraw. Nehru added it would be foolish for India march forward. Harriman asked whether Nehru inclined change his position on ChiCom offer expressed in his letter of November 14. Nehru said he would not accept ChiCom offer; he must say something but offer had previously been rejected. Ambassador asked about other possibilities, noting that ChiComs had best of propaganda in Afro - Asian countries and suggesting India might call for neutral observers with or without involving UN. Further discussion ChiCom proposal followed and Harriman asked whether cease-fire would last indefinitely if India made no response ChiCom offer. Nehru replied that ChiComs would probably advance further after some interval. Nehru mentioned difficult situation created by Brahmaputra river strike in East Pakistan and its effects on tea exports.
Harriman asked whether Nehru had decided give answer to ChiComs and if so what would he say. Nehru said he obviously had to answer. In three or four days he would say something and raise various objections. Harriman and Ambassador referred to public presentation Indian case and importance of making reasonable counter offer to put onus on ChiComs. At moment ChiComs look reasonable and this advantage had to be taken away from them. Desai reviewed ChiCom offer in Ladakh and indicated why he thought it unacceptable. Nitze gave his preliminary view that it would take at least until end of next year for Indians to get into good military position.
Second Harriman meeting with Nehru alone November 25 was for primary purpose discussing India - Pak relations and possibility of Kashmir settlement. Harriman explained there two aspects: 1) immediate problem of calming Ayub and Paks from their emotional binge against India and US and pro-China; 2) long-run problem of defense of subcontinent; said unless tensions relieved US position untenable if it was asked give aid both Pakistan and India with part of aid being used for defense against the other. In response first point Nehru said he could not make further gesture towards Ayub. He had written letter he considered cordial and had had no reply. In addition, India had been humiliated by ChiCom attack and public opinion would not stand for further humiliation in making concessions to Pakistan. When pressed on this point Nehru went into considerable detail on history negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir and constant failure reach agreement on any basis acceptable to India. If GOI were now to make concessions public would not stand for it. In fact it might touch off violent communal rioting endangering lives of 40 million Indian Muslims. Harriman said number of Nehru's colleagues indicated they thought time right for settlement. Discussion at some length followed on possible basis for settlement. Nehru rejected giving half to Pakistan or independent status for Kashmir but agreed some arrangements such as those proposed by M.J. Desai and Ambassador Galbraith might be acceptable. Harriman pressed Nehru on immediate importance relieving tensions and suggested discussions might begin between two governments. At first Nehru rejected this on grounds that if discussions failed it would make situation even worse. He finally agreed that if Ayub were willing he would join in starting negotiations preferably on Ministerial level.
Nehru indicated that present not best time for settlement from standpoint Indian opinion but agreed that more favorable climate might develop. This climate might be encouraged if Ayub and his colleagues would make some friendly gesture towards India to offset torrent of abuse which had poured forth since ChiCom aggression. Harriman asked Nehru think over situation and expressed hope Nehru could arm him with some proposal before his departure for Pakistan on November 28.
Harriman raised subject Nehru's request to President for air assistance. Nehru said he not pressing matter now as he did not believe ChiComs would attack at least for some months. He thought ChiComs wanted make deal and cited in support this view that ChiComs pressing Afro-Asian bloc to bring pressure on India. Harriman said our military were discussing air assistance request with British and Indian Air Force. If anything to be provided Commonwealth countries should come in first. Harriman explained subject being discussed without commitment.
Harriman told Nehru that Duncan Sandys had been informed by Morarji Desai that Soviets had definitely declined supply MIGs. Nehru replied that Desai could not have had latest information and what he had told Sandys must have been based on earlier talk by Indian Ambassador Moscow with a Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Recently Khrushchev assured Indian Ambassador that MIG factory would be delivered in couple of years and in meantime the few MIGs under discussion would be delivered in ample time for training purposes. Nehru gave impression he trying minimize importance of matter. Meeting lasted little less than hour. At parting Nehru thanked Harriman again for US aid and promptness of US response to India's request.
At final meeting with Nehru November 28 Harriman and Ambassador stressed to Nehru Ayub's domestic difficulties and urged it in India's interest work out settlement with Paks. Also pointed out to Nehru necessity of devising formula that would help Ayub domestically and strengthen him against his critics there. Nehru said he amenable talks but indicated he had very limited concept in mind such as adjustment cease fire line. Ambassador said this not enough. By end of talks Nehru agreed he willing enter talks with open mind and without pre-conditions. Harriman impression of last meeting was that Nehru had become clearer minded and more down to earth than he had been at earlier meetings.
Galbraith
215. Memorandum of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, McCone Files, Job 80 B 01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962 - 3 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone.
Washington, December 3, 1962, 10 a.m.
All present plus Stevenson and Governor Harriman and several members of his mission.
Harriman reviewed in some detail the report of his mission as covered in the written report of 34 pages, undated (issued Dec. 3). /2/ He made a firm recommendation that we support the initial phase of the Indian requirements which were covered in the London meeting, and that careful study be given to phase two which involves the re-equipping of three divisions and setting up three additional divisions so the Indians would have a total of 16 divisions, 15 regular plus one armored division.
/2/A copy of Harriman's report is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Subcommittee on South Asia. The conclusions of the report are summarized in Document 220.
Harriman reviewed the Pakistan - Indian problem in detail, indicating some hope, though quite remote, of a settlement.
With reference to the Soviet position and a question from the President, Harriman advised that apparently the MIG deal was off though Nehru had stated it had merely been postponed. Nehru seemed intent on maintaining a relationship with the Soviets. There were no indications that the Soviets have intervened to stop the Chinese Communists; on the other hand Mr. Harriman reached the conclusion that the ChiComs had only limited objectives which they had accomplished and that they did not at this time intend to attempt conquest of the Assam Plain. It is quite possible their objectives might be extended in the future but only after further preparation on their part.
With respect to the London agreement, /3/ it appears there is no firm understanding of how the costs of the initial phase are to be divided, but the agreement calls for each side to supply the equipment which it is best equipped to supply. The British have agreed on 10 million pounds and may add another 5 million pounds. The Canadians and Australians have indicated modest help. McNamara protested the arrangement, stating that it might require between 120 and 150 million dollars from the United States. The President expressed the belief that we should split on a 50 - 50 basis with the Commonwealth. A subcommittee was appointed to work out details.
/3/Reference is to the agreement transmitted in telegram 1865 from London, November 14, which is summarized in Document 198.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
John A. McCone/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Kennedy Correspondence with Macmillan, 1962 - 63. Secret. Drafted in S/S by Benjamin Weiner, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Weiner.
Washington, December 5, 1962, 8:40 p.m.
2988. Eyes Only Ambassador Bruce. For your information, the following message from President has been sent to Prime Minister via other channels.
"Dear Prime Minister:
You will by now have heard from your mission to India and Pakistan, as I have from mine. The success of their endeavors was far beyond my expectations. Duncan Sandys' effort in getting Nehru and Ayub to make public a statement of their desire to negotiate the Kashmir issue was a fine stroke. Having done so much, I think we must do more to follow up on our initial successes. As leader of the Commonwealth, I think you may well be in a position to provide the continuing push on Nehru and Ayub that will be required to keep the negotiations going with any prospect of a successful conclusion. I see advantages in having someone at a high level specially concerned with this task who can move freely between Delhi and Karachi in a way that your high commissioners and my ambassadors cannot, and yet is not in any formal way a mediator. I would appreciate your thoughts on the possibility of your finding a suitable person to assign to the task.
The time has come when we have to give some thought to putting our military assistance arrangements with India on a more formal basis. Our own thinking runs somewhat along the following lines. We are still in the emergency phase which the original agreement that your people and mine negotiated in London on Nov. 14 was intended to cover. While the character of emergency has changed, I think it is still desirable to build up the Indian forces to the extent possible within the next two or three months. After that, we will enter a phase of longer-run assistance where we must consider carefully the political implications of what we do. Before we embark on this program, we must get clear in our minds both a judgment of the Indian military requirements and a view of the relation between our assistance and the advance of India and Pakistan toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. A more exact judgment on these matters must await a detailed examination of Indian army requirements and plans which our military people brought home. As far as the first, or emergency phase, goes I have come to the conclusion that we should stand ready to offer as much as $60 million worth of assistance, including what we have already shipped. I hope that you and the Commonwealth countries will be prepared to operate with a similar ceiling, and that we can act so as to share the burden roughly equally between us.
A final problem to which I think we must give the closest attention is the question of Indian air defense. It is clear that the Indians are extremely fearful of the possibility of Chinese air attack on their cities. This fear has inhibited them from using their own air force in the tactical support of their armies. My military men estimate that the removal of this inhibition would contribute greatly to the Indian ability to resist a renewed Chinese attack. In view of the great expense and the long interval of the time required to provide the Indians with their own air defense capability, as well as the possible repercussions in Pakistan, it seems to me that we would do well to consider the extent to which we could agree to provide a certain amount of air defense operated by our own forces should the Indians need it. I would suggest that we undertake to provide the radar and other ground equipment necessary while you and some of the Commonwealth countries accept the commitment to send an appropriate number of fighter squadrons to India should the need arise. This is obviously a matter which will require some thought and one which we will wish to discuss when we meet.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/12 - 562. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cameron; cleared by Talbot, Harriman, Rusk, and with the White House; and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi.
Washington, December 5, 1962, 8:58 p.m.
866. Ambassador requested deliver following letter to Ayub from the President at earliest opportunity:
"Dear Mr. President:
"Governor Harriman has told me in great detail of his talks with you and some of your Ministers. I want to thank you for the cordiality with which you received him and the members of his mission to Pakistan and India last week and for the personal message you asked him to give me.
"I am gratified that a start will be made on Kashmir, and I want to congratulate you on the statesmanlike approach you have taken. There is understanding here, of course, that a quick and easy solution to the problem is not possible. As you indicated to Governor Harriman, a settlement of the Kashmir issue will cause dissatisfaction among many in India and Pakistan. Yet you have shown yourself prepared to go ahead with determination to reach a settlement. The coming months will be a test of the patience, perseverance and good will of both countries. I welcome your decision most warmly. We stand prepared to give appropriate support and assistance in the search for a solution.
"Governor Harriman has told me of your appreciation of the threat that Chinese Communist aggression against India poses to Pakistan and, with the settlement of Kashmir, of the long term need of a combined plan for the defense of the subcontinent. Your discernment in this matter, going beyond the passions of the moment, is of the highest importance for your country and the whole free world. Governor Harriman has also told me that you understand the need for the United States and the United Kingdom to give military assistance to India to the extent necessary to make it possible for India to contain and defeat a renewed Chinese attack. This is the purpose for which we have been giving emergency military aid to India, and will guide us in consideration of longer-term programs. We shall keep in touch with you about further developments in our military aid to India./1/
/1/McConaughy delivered Kennedy's letter to Ayub on December 8. At the same time, he informed Ayub that the United States had provided some 5,000 tons of emergency military aid to India. Ayub indicated that this shipment could be taken in stride, but he expressed strong concern about the implications of a major build-up of India's military capability. McConaughy described Ayub as "open-minded and compromising" in his approach to the impending negotiations for a settlement to the Kashmir dispute, but concerned about the potential impact if the negotiations failed. (Telegram 1026 from Karachi, December 9; ibid., 791.56/12 - 962)
"This is a time not only of challenge but also of hope.
"With warm personal regards,
"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
In accordance with usual practice, this letter is not for publication.
Rusk
218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 662. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Cameron; cleared with BNA and by Harriman, Rusk, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.
Washington, December 6, 1962, 11:08 p.m.
2583. President wishes you deliver promptly following letter from him to Prime Minister Nehru:
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Averell Harriman has told me of his good talks with you and your associates. I am grateful to you for the cordiality with which you received him and for sharing with him so completely your thoughts on the problems facing India and the subcontinent. Governor Harriman was particularly struck by the vigor and resolution of your country's response to the long-term Chinese Communist threat. He told me of the courage your people are showing under your leadership and of the high morale of the Indian armed forces.
We are now actively considering what we can do to meet your requirements for military equipment and supplies. We are, of course, consulting with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and I plan to review these matters with Prime Minister Macmillan when I see him in the Bahamas. Our object is to arrive at a general plan for handling your needs quickly from the best source of supply. Our people will soon be in touch with yours on this subject.
I want you to know how pleased I am by the statement you and President Ayub issued concerning your intentions to move forward at an early date towards a solution of the difficult Kashmir problem. We appreciate how difficult it is for you at this moment, when the memory of the recent Chinese attack combines with the prospect of a further one, to turn your attention to the old and troublesome problem of Kashmir. Yet an effective defense against the Chinese threat to India depends on your ability to concentrate your full resources on meeting their aggression. Further, since the threat extends to the whole subcontinent, ultimately the efforts of the whole subcontinent will be necessary to meet it. A full commitment of your own resources and unity of effort against the Chinese can be reached if the issues which divide India and Pakistan, the most important of which is Kashmir, are settled.
I think I understand the depth and strength of feeling in both India and Pakistan about Kashmir. A solution will not be easy and the necessary concessions by each will be unpopular with many on both sides. I am confident, however, that with good will and determination one can be reached which will free the energies of the subcontinent for defense against aggression from the north. As you move down the road, you know you carry with you my understanding, sympathy and friendship. /2/
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
In accordance with usual practice, this letter is not for publication.
Rusk
/2/Galbraith delivered Kennedy's letter to Nehru on December 9. After reading the letter, Nehru considered the difficulties standing in the way of a solution to the Kashmir dispute. To give up the valley to Pakistan, or to countenance its internationalization, posed political and strategic problems for India which, he felt, rendered such solutions impossible. Galbraith saw little prospect for negotiations to settle the dispute. (Telegram 2305 from New Delhi, December 10; ibid., 690D.91/12 - 1062)
219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Schneider and Cameron; cleared with BNA, IO, and FE, and by Ludlow in NEA in substance; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi, London, and USUN.
Washington, December 8, 1962, 1:41 p.m.
2599. Most pressing immediate needs on Kashmir are to maintain momentum generated as result Sandys - Harriman initiative, and to keep responsibility firmly fixed on India and Pakistan for working out solution. Because of Commonwealth ties, and less close British identification with previous efforts to move this problem towards solution, we believe British should be kept in forefront of this effort. Contents of this message have been discussed with British Embassy here and we envisage close cooperation this subject between our Embassies New Delhi and Karachi with respective UK High Commissions. Embassy London should discuss contents this message with appropriate British officials.
Our general approach is that British and ourselves should identify in both India and Pakistan those points at which effective pressure can be brought to impress both governments that it is in interest both countries strive for agreement despite possible political costs. Prospects for settlement will be improved if each side enters talks with eyes open; if each side realizes from outset that it must make substantial concessions which will be unpopular with many in both countries.
In various approaches to GOI and GOP we hope we can get over idea that neither party should tie itself to any particular plan for settlement. To do so would limit possibility compromise which will be essential. Also restriction scope discussions would lessen chances for agreement. For time being we believe thrust of your approaches should be to encourage parties come up with ideas about possible solution. If they want to discuss them with us and British so much the better. In any case we would expect both parties to be candid with us about progress of discussions.
For New Delhi: In India both we and British should make it clear that it untenable for us to continue for long give extensive military assistance to India while it expending efforts on quarrel with Pakistan. Further, we have extended aid to India so far at considerable cost our relations with Pakistan. Both these factors constitute major obstacle in way our obtaining approval for future aid of magnitude desired by GOI. Both U.S. and India benefit from U.S. having both countries on subcontinent as friends rather than just one.
As US contribution this effort Embassy Delhi is authorized at its discretion to bring these and other arguments for early constructive negotiations on Kashmir to attention of GOI in following ways after appropriate consultation UK High Commission:
1) Direct to Prime Minister. Sandys and Harriman have already covered ground well, and President's letter /2/ has added emphasis and authority. You should continue remind Nehru at suitable occasions.
/2/See Document 218.
2) To political leaders below Nehru. We have in mind greater diffusion of power demonstrated by forced dismissal of Menon. Embassy at its discretion should ensure that relationship between US capacity to aid India and resolution Kashmir dispute is widely understood among key political leaders both at center (e.g. Morarji Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri, S.K. Patil, Y.B. Chavan, A.K. Sen) and in states (e.g. Kamaraj Nadar, P.C. Sen, Sanjiva Reddy, C.B. Gupta). Embassy might point out that since GOI cannot make necessary compromise without assurance political support, responsibility for giving that support rests with political leaders who may not feel directly concerned. It is for this reason that US has made effort make known its views among wide circle leaders in hope India will be able reach conclusion which we believe much in its interest.
We of course leave to Embassy determination to whom to make approach and in what manner. While we believe maintenance momentum Kashmir initiative requires early efforts in Delhi, more delicate approaches to out-of-Delhi leaders might be deferred until trips by Ambassador, other Embassy officers, and Congens offer suitable opportunities.
3) At its discretion Embassy might encourage President Radhakrishnan urge Nehru be prepared make concessions necessary for agreement. As Embassy suggested during Harriman visit, Radhakrishnan might make pitch this Nehru's last great opportunity make major contribution Indian foreign policy.
4) Similar missionary work should be carried out among senior officers of Indian military establishment where direct relationship between US capacity extend military aid and Kashmir settlement should be easy to explain.
For Karachi: While need in Delhi is for GOI willingness make concession greater than it has previously been willing consider, need in Karachi is for GOP receptiveness to solution which likely fall considerably short of achieving Pak objectives. Ayub's statement that settlement likely unpopular both sides indicates he is aware of this. In Pakistan we should point out this is probably most opportune time since independence for Pakistan obtain settlement from India. In future India may become less disposed to compromise. Paks should take advantage of opportunity of the moment; to ask too high a price might dissipate chance. By pressing Delhi to come to negotiating table on Kashmir, US is fulfilling promise to make new effort bring solution. This is most opportune moment and we may not again be able to help.
As you believe it necessary and helpful, Embassy Karachi is authorized to discuss Kashmir negotiations along these lines with Ayub and other GOP civilian and military officials. You should coordinate as appropriate with UK High Commission. We do not believe approach in depth suggested for India would be appropriate in Pakistan both because authority to make decisions is limited to much smaller circle and because first and most important requirement for coming negotiations is Indian willingness make concessions.
Since we believe present circumstances offer best prospect for Kashmir solution in recent years, we are prepared to undergo some risk to bring it about. It is not our desire seriously to weaken either Nehru or Ayub and we count on both Embassies to warn us if this likely happen. By way of contingency planning, we are suggesting to British desirability of having high-level representative, preferably a Britisher, available to go to subcontinent for discussions on Kashmir for purpose providing informal link between two capitals if this should become necessary to save talks. As ministerial talks develop we shall keep you closely informed of our thinking and would welcome your ideas.
Rusk
220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1591/12 - 862. Secret. Drafted by Schneider, cleared in substance with FE, and approved by Talbot. Sent to Kabul, Kathmandu, Colombo, Karachi, New Delhi, Moscow, Rangoon, London, Paris, Hong Kong, Djakarta, Phnom Penh, Cairo, and Accra.
Washington, December 8, 1962, 5:44 p.m.
1066. Following is summary of conclusions of Harriman Mission to India:
1. India now recognizes Red China as its principal and long-term enemy, but is less clear about long-term threat of Soviet communism as imperialistic force.
2. Majority of Pakistanis consider India primary enemy of Pakistan. Notable exceptions are Ayub and some of immediate entourage who recognize communist north the long-term threat.
3. Dramatic reaction in Pakistan to US military assistance to India has at least in part been encouraged by Pakistan's leaders, including Ayub, as device for bringing pressure on US and in attempt achieve certain internal political objectives.
4. Only settlement Kashmir can change attitude of Pakistan towards India. There is some movement at least on Indian side towards easing tensions between two countries. Ayub appears believe there is unusual opportunity reach accommodation on Kashmir which, though unpopular with Pakistanis, will be acceptable. Ministerial talks must be encouraged by US and UK. We should continue press both governments persistently to move towards each other even if there some resentment this by both.
5. Indian leadership undergoing changes which should be encouraged. Malevolent influence Krishna Menon officially removed and Nehru's overpowering stature and freedom of action has been diminished to a point which permits rise of younger, more dynamic, generally more pragmatic leadership to top.
6. India is now determined to build and maintain larger military establishment. This determination, and degree of our association with it, are already producing increasing strains on subcontinent. Settlement with Pakistan could produce significant strengthening subcontinent against Communist China.
7. Indian Armed Fores suffered severely under Krishna Menon. Indian Army has shaken up senior commands and is restoring leadership competence. Caliber of fighting men continues good and morale not seriously impaired. Army's plans for build-up appear soundly conceived and within its capacity execute with outside help. The Air Force effective at operational level, still has weaknesses at top. Effectiveness its plan for expansion requires considerable study by US and UK.
8. While India will not accept Chinese "cease-fire" plan, it will probably minimize provocation for resumption hostilities in near future. There is no guarantee Chinese will not initiate new fighting and we must be prepared for surprise Chinese attacks at times and places of their own choosing.
9. In case of further Chinese attacks, Indians should be in position use tactical air. This will require major political decision by GOI and may involve certain contingent arrangements for supplemental US and preferably Commonwealth air activity.
10. It doubtful India can rapidly expand defense production beyond simpler ordnance items. We will need more study before we can decide on degree to which India's intermediate requirements can be met from own resources. We should discourage India from attempting production of sophisticated military equipment and encourage concentration on feasible ordnance items.
11. India's diplomatic and propaganda efforts have been inept. Senior officials realize this and are correcting shortcomings. US and UK should discreetly assist.
12. India's "non-alignment" policy will undergo considerable substantive reinterpretation in manner favorable our interests. However, we should not seek formal association of India with US or West in general. Formal Western guaranty would tend diminish extent Indian effort and force a break with Soviet Union, bringing Soviet Union closer to Red China. However, there is great value in strengthening Commonwealth association both India and Pakistan.
Rusk
221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12 - 862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Schneider, cleared in substance by Komer, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.
Washington, December 8, 1962, 5:44 p.m.
2601. Following presentation Harriman report, Executive Committee of National Security Council established Subcommittee to prepare specific military and political recommendations for the President's consideration. Members are William Bundy, DOD; Gaud, AID; General Johnson, JCS; Komer, White House, and Talbot, Chairman.
Subcommittee recommendations so far to NSC Executive include: /2/
/2/A copy of the December 6 memorandum from the Subcommittee on South Asia to the NSC, which details the recommendations summarized in this telegram, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 209.
1. NSC should approve continuing program US assistance to India during emergency phase over next 2 - 3 months within a ceiling of $60 million, exclusive of air defense, but including $22.8 million committed to date.
2. US target should be to have total cost emergency phase (ceiling of $120 million) shared on as close to a 50 - 50 basis as possible with UK and Commonwealth together with other nations.
3. With modifications of scope of required assistance during emergency phase, London agreement remains valid.
4. US - UK air defense package, under which US would provide radar and UK and Commonwealth would provide manned aircraft, explored, with recommendations to be made later.
Now working on variety of problems which we plan discuss with Ambassadors Galbraith and McConaughy next week. They include: status of Kelly team and ancillary groups in India (privileges, immunities, services, communications and command channels, cost sharing); financial agreement with GOI; coordination of supply and cost sharing with British; increased contribution from Commonwealth and other countries; funding military assistance; and Congressional consultation.
Rusk
222. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy/1/
New Delhi, December 8, 1962.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 11/20/62 - 12/14/62. No classification marking. Galbraith transmitted the text of this letter to Washington in telegram 2303 from New Delhi, December 9. At the request of the Indian Foreign Ministry, he brought the letter with him when he returned to Washington on December 10 for consultations and home leave, and gave it to Ambassador Nehru for delivery to President Kennedy. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/12 - 962) This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government.]
223. National Security Action Memorandum No. 209/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Memoranda, NSAM 209. Secret. Signed by President Kennedy. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Washington, December 10, 1962.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, AID
SUBJECT
Actions on South Asia
I generally approve the courses of action proposed by the NSC Subcommittee on South Asia in their memorandum to me of 6 December. /2/
/2/An apparent reference to the memorandum also sent to the NSC on the same date; see footnote 1, Document 221.
In particular I approve a military aid program for the present emergency phase of up to $60 million, on the assumption that the UK and Commonwealth will provide a like amount. If they prove unwilling to do so, I will reconsider whether to continue with our program in any case.
I would like the subcommittee to submit as soon as feasible its recommendations on the proposed air defense package, a plan of action to encourage a Kashmir settlement, and its preliminary thinking on assistance to India during the intermediate build-up phase.
John F. Kennedy
224. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted in S/S by Johnson and approved by Bromley Smith. Rusk was in Paris December 11 - 16 for the NATO Ministerial Meeting.
Washington, December 13, 1962, 9:56 p.m.
Tosec 28. Eyes Only for the Secretary. For your information, following is text of message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy dated December 13:
"Dear Friend,
I am sending you these further thoughts about the Indian problem. Although I doubt whether we could reach any conclusion until we meet. I am very glad to hear that Harriman is going to be available on Thursday, December 20. Since Sandys is in the area I have asked him to be available also that afternoon.
My first thoughts about the military problem are as follows:
Some five or six divisions are likely to be used against the Chinese in the mountains. All these forces should be equipped not on the scale of continental armies with tanks and armoured cars and all the rest of it for fighting in the plain, but as mountain troops. Some two brigades have lost all their equipment and the rest of three divisions were badly mauled. The initial task is to re-equip these and supplement the equipment of the rest of the force.
The experts are working on this, but I doubt if it will cost as much as a hundred and twenty million dollars. I agree with your suggestion that the bill during the 'emergency' stage should be shared between the United States and Commonwealth countries. Secondly, what sort of army should the Indians have to fill the major role of defending themselves against an all-out Chinese invasion? It is clear to me that any sensible defense, on whatever scale may be agreed, can only be effective if it is organized as a joint Pakistani-Indian plan to defend the subcontinent as a whole. This would be far more effective, less wasteful of troops, and would avoid our chief difficulty which is how to help the Indians without correspondingly upsetting the Pakistanis who are loyal friends and members of the CENTO and SEATO pacts. Therefore, this involves the political problem of an agreement about Kashmir. Thirdly, even if you do get a defence system for the sub-continent as a whole, I do not myself believe that the kind of army which these two countries can sustain would be capable of defending themselves by themselves against any massive attack. If they were complete dictatorships they might try to do it by an absolute priority of guns over butter but their populations and the economies of the countries could hardly do it. Under any democratic system it would be impossible.
This leads me therefore to conclude that what we must aim at is getting first the two parties to agree on the joint defence of the sub-continent as a whole and then perhaps to get them into one of the regional military pacts. This would mean that the Chinese, like the Russians, would hesitate before making a massive attack for they would never be sure that they would not draw down upon themselves the nuclear reply.
Now comes the difficult question--how can we get political agreement between India and Pakistan? In any agreement Pakistan must obviously keep the part of Kashmir she at present occupies (with perhaps some adjustments) and the Indians must keep Jammu and Ladakh. The problem centres on the vale of Kashmir. A plebiscite will never be accepted by the Indians. It is just possible that they might agree to the vale of Kashmir becoming an autonomous state guaranteed by both India and Pakistan.
Now comes the question of how we are to encourage Nehru and Ayub to reach agreement. I have thought over your suggestion of appointing a high-level go-between; but I think this presents difficulties. A suitable individual would be hard to find, and his appointment would be interpreted as an attempt by us to act as mediators which would certainly be resented in Delhi. I doubt therefore whether he would be able to exercise effective influence.
It is the Indians who must make the first move. If they show a disposition to compromise, we can bring pressure on the Pakistanis to abate their extreme demands.
It occurs to me that the best way of keeping up the pressure would be to arrange for a series of visits to both countries by American and British personalities during the next few weeks and months. Without getting too directly involved they could encourage Indian and Pakistani ministers to settle their differences. Perhaps you would consider this idea.
We have one important card in our hands, namely India's independence [dependence] on the West for military aid. But if we overplay the hand we could easily destroy the favourable atmosphere which recent events have created. It will obviously be unwise for us (whether through special envoys or through our regular diplomatic representatives) to threaten the Indians with the withdrawal of military aid if they fail to reach agreement with Pakistan. On the other hand, visiting ministers, who are not directly concerned, Generals or prominent personalities outside our governments could without the same danger more easily adopt the role of the candid friend.
Lastly there is the question of air defence. I think there is much to be said for your proposal to provide the Indians with radar and other ground equipment, presumably to train Indians to use it. You and we might from time to time fly in squadrons of fighters to show our ability to come to India's aid should we decide to do so. But I do not think we should enter into any formal or moral obligation to participate in an Indian war with China. If we did, we should be giving India a greater measure of protection than we have been willing to do for our Allies in CENTO and SEATO. If, of course, India and Pakistan decide to form together a joint defence system for the whole subcontinent, we could bring them under the general western umbrella to the same extent as the CENTO and SEATO powers. All this raises far-reaching issues which we must discuss together. In the meantime, I thought you might like to have our preliminary thoughts.
With warm regard
Harold Macmillan"
Ball
225. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Subcommittee on South Asia. Top Secret.
JCSM - 996 ? 62
Washington, December 14, 1962.
SUBJECT
Air Defense for India (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a separate review of the air defense problem in India in conjunction with their review of the report of the Special Presidential Mission to India (Harriman Report). /2/
/2/See footnote 1, Document 215.
2. Based on the discussion of the various alternatives, as set forth in the Appendix hereto, /3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
/3/Not printed.
a. The United Kingdom should assume over-all responsibility for implementing the air defense program for India, with materiel and training assistance from other Commonwealth countries and the United States.
b. US interests in the Indian situation require that a degree of material assistance be rendered to meet Indian demands for air defense support.
c. Providing a completely self-sufficient air defense capability to the Indian armed forces is militarily, politically, and economically unsound.
d. At this time, the US air defense commitment in the mid-range period (to end of Calendar Year 1963) should be limited to provision of three fixed radars in the Bihar - Assam area, and, on a longer term basis, three mobile radars and retrofit of three squadrons of Indian aircraft with Sidewinder missiles.
e. The United Kingdom, Canadian, and Australian commitment should provide for command and control communications, and fighter modernization (including air-to-air missiles) for 3 fighter squadrons, together with training support and operational assistance.
f. A US - UK team of air defense specialists should be sent to India to refine requirements within this commitment and prepare plans for siting equipment.
g. In recognition of the inadequacies of the foregoing measures, the United States at this time should approach the United Kingdom with the recommendation that the UK and Commonwealth Nations assure the Government of India that they will provide interim air defense forces to India in the event of renewed Chinese aggression if so requested. The position of the US on this matter should be that this Government will entertain requests from the Government of India for air defense forces in the event of renewed Chinese aggression, but that the US Government reserves the right of decision in this regard dependent upon the situation existing at the time of request.
h. Support for the Indian forces should be contingent upon Indian agreement that any Soviet military assistance will be limited to materiel and technical training in the use and maintenance of such Soviet materiel.
3. It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense: /4/
/4/The source text does not indicate McNamara's response to these recommendations.
a. Approve the foregoing conclusions.
b. Request the Secretary of State to initiate discussions on this basis with the Commonwealth nations involved.
c. Also request the Secretary of State to:
(1) Inform the Government of India of US views and intentions with respect to air defense assistance.
(2) Obtain approval for a team of air defense specialists to visit India to work with the Indian armed forces in refining requirements in planning the utilization of US-furnished equipment.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
George W. Anderson/5/
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates that Anderson signed the original.
226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 12/16/62. Secret.
Washington, December 16, 1962.
The attached report of your Sino-Indian Subcommittee/2/ highlights four main issues requiring US decision and then discussion at Nassau:
/2/The undated attached report from the Subcommittee on South Asia to the NSC put forward recommended positions to be taken by President Kennedy in the talks with Prime Minister Macmillan that were scheduled to begin in Nassau on December 18.
(1) How hard should we press the Commonwealth to stay out ahead in help to India? Aside from firming up agreement to a 50 - 50 division in the emergency phase, should we plan to limit our aid in general to what they will match?
(2) Should the US, UK, or both make an air defense commitment to India and provide some form of air defense package for the near and longer term?
(3) What Kashmir strategy should the US/UK pursue? Who should have the laboring oar?
(4) Should we head off any premature UK effort to bring India into alliance status or to raise a fuss over India's taking MIGs?
Our approach to all these tends naturally to caution. The JCS worry over any redeployment of US forces at the expense of existing commitments. DOD seems to look askance at large new MAP outlays, which might involve diversions from other MAP clients and be difficult in any case to justify to Congress. Some in State are concerned lest we get drawn into a major Sino - Indian war. Others fear that our Pak interests will suffer unless we gear our help to progress on Kashmir. Such reservations largely underly our desire to push the UK out in front. But, judging from Macmillan's letter, /3/ the British attitude is similarly cautious; indeed they show less sense of urgency than we.
/3/See Document 224.
Against such concerns that we will overcommit ourselves or waste our substance must be weighed the sheer magnitude of the opportunity handed us by Peiping. If we exploit it fully we may not only bring about a Kashmir settlement and Pak - Indian reconciliation, but induce an aroused and strengthened India to join us in the containment of Red China.
But in deciding how best to promote this grand design, one fundamental must be kept in mind. It was a Chinese blunder which gave us the opportunity and it is only a continued active Chicom threat which will compel Ayub and Nehru to compromise on Kashmir in the interest of meeting the larger threat.
Thus it is as much in our strategic interest to keep up a high degree of Sino - Indian friction as it is to prevent it from spilling over into large scale war. While, in the last analysis, our ability to do so may be marginal as compared to what Peiping and Delhi themselves decide, to the extent that we can reassure India of US/UK support and backing, we stiffen Indian determination not to settle too cheaply.
Yet the cease-fire and Chinese withdrawals have already led to a hiatus period. Peiping, having achieved its objectives and doubtless fearful of over-extending itself, is skillfully disengaging. It has thrown on India the onus of re-opening hostilities, which it knows India is incapable of doing at this point.
While hostilities may yet flare up again, the more likely outcome seems to be a gradual petering out of the Sino - Indian affair. While Sino - Indian relations will never be the same, and Indian public opinion will bar any negotiated settlement, the trend may be toward de facto acceptance of the Chinese terms, particularly if the latter are wise enough to carry out their proposed withdrawals.
Certain US/UK actions might well contribute to this trend: (1) if we push the Kashmir issue out too far in front of the Sino-Indian dispute, thus diverting Indian focus and reviving old Pak-Indian animosities; (2) if the US/UK seem to be holding back unduly on further support, thus rousing Indian suspicions that we are either reluctant to assume major commitments or unwilling to do so until Kashmir is settled.
In short, against the risks of overcommitment are those of loss of momentum--which might contribute to a premature damping down of the Sino-Indian dispute. My comments on the issues before you are framed in this light.
Pushing the Commonwealth to the forefront. The major advantages in getting our cousins to share as much of the burden as possible hardly need enumeration. But, aside from Galbraith's worry lest the British gain kudos with the Indians we want for ourselves, it is open to serious question whether we should (in our desire to keep the UK to the fore) confine ourselves to moving no faster than they. Macmillan's latest note suggests that the UK will be most cautious about committing itself to anything with a large price tag, or about backing India in a Sino - Indian war. It also suggests, despite his reminder that we shouldn't overplay our hand, that the British have in mind setting several conditions--a Kashmir settlement, joint Pak - Indian defense, and Indian membership in our alliance system--as the price for extensive US/UK aid or defense commitments.
Despite its obvious anxiety to keep up its end, moreover, the UK is no doubt concerned lest if the bill gets too large it will strain UK resources and eventually force the UK to settle for a secondary role to us.
The Air Defense Package. Nehru's two letters /4/ citing India's air defense needs require some sort of response. This problem breaks down into two parts: (1) how to meet India's immediate needs in event of early resumption of hostilities--which would require use of US/UK forces; and (2) the longer term need to develop some Indian air defense capability.
/4/See Document 222.
The JCS proposals /5/ add up to making both a Commonwealth responsibility, with our role confined to providing chiefly three (and then three more) radars, to be Indian-manned. This program, which would require two years to complete, would not meet the immediate need. But neither Macmillan nor the JCS want to get involved in any interim commitment to shore up India's air defense with US/UK forces. Nor, as Macmillan suggests, would the JCS division of the longer run effort be acceptable to the UK. We suspect that the financing problem plays a large part in their reluctance.
/5/See Document 225.
Against the risks involved in air defense commitments we must balance the cost of turning down or stalling on Nehru's request. To do so might well rouse Indian suspicions that the West was either unwilling to support India if the conflict escalated or insisted on a high price. In either case, the net effect might be to sap India's confidence in Western support of its position vis-a-vis China. If our interests are best served by continuation of the Sino-Indian dispute, we want if possible to avoid such a development.
Indeed, I believe that the Indians (and probably also the Chinese) already assume from our posture that we are prepared to come to India's help. Our failure to do so would, as Galbraith suggests, be a grave blow to Indian morale. But we will be unable to do so effectively unless prior preparations are made.
Moreover, we must take into account the possibility that our failure to provide air defense support, should it become known, might encourage Peiping to escalate, whereas evidence of such support would greatly deter them from doing so. I fear, therefore, that not providing such support may create greater risks of escalation (and subsequent US/UK involvement) than the opposite course.
As to the US/UK division of effort, I cannot see the UK committing fighter squadrons unless the US does the same. The UK simply will not risk involvement in a Sino - Indian war without the US by its side.
Kashmir Tactics. It is painfully apparent that neither Paks nor Indians are yet ready for compromise. So for either side (or the US/UK) to press too hard at this juncture might scuttle the talks before they really get underway. Nor do we want to divert Indian anger from China to Pakistan.
These concerns suggest that our immediate objective must be, not to promote any particular solution, but to insure that the talks don't break down. We can even insist on this minimum as a condition for our support, without outraging Nehru. Ergo:
(1) We should press Ayub and Nehru to avoid above all the pitfall of a breakdown in the talks, arguing that this could dissipate the last chance for an amicable solution and would inevitably color US/UK support of both countries. You could send letters to both parties along these lines.
(2) Perhaps the best result obtainable would be if the talks ended with a communique expressing: (a) recognition of both parties that an early settlement is imperative; (b) determination to keep talking until one is reached; (c) explicit recognition that any settlement will involve a compromise in some respects unsatisfactory to both parties; (d) intent to create continuing organs of consultation, i.e. technical committees; and (e) agreeing on certain interim steps toward a solution. Galbraith and McConaughy should press this theme.
(3) State's idea of technical committees is good but, by itself, does not entail sufficient momentum toward a solution to satisfy public opinion, especially in Pakistan. So we should examine what "interim steps" might be feasible in addition. I have in mind mutual withdrawals from the cease-fire line, trade concessions, etc. To the extent that such moves had a joint character, they might (though billed as interim expedients) actually start a trend toward an European-type solution by getting people used to it.
The above comments add up to suggesting a more costly and more risky strategy than currently favored by many, but one more commensurate with the stakes. As to cost, there are few places in the Afro-Asian world where we could more profitably employ our aid--let's divert MAP from elsewhere if necessary. As to risks, it is now more and more apparent that Peiping never contemplated a major attack on India. To me, it is all the more unlikely to let the affair escalate if India has visible US/UK support. /6/
R. W. Komer
/6/An agenda prepared for the December 17 meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC lists South Asia as one of four topics slated for discussion. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. III, 12/6/62 - 12/17/62) A memorandum of the conversation at the meeting, prepared by Bromley Smith, indicates that only two of the scheduled items, Cuba and Congo, were actually discussed. (Ibid.)
227. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 66 D 415, Kashmir, May - December 1962 (Miscellaneous Papers). Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was apparently drafted by Talbot. According to the President's Appointment Book, the conversation took place in the White House. (Kennedy Library)
Washington, December 17, 1962.
SUBJECT
Conversation between the President and the Ambassador of India
PARTICIPANTS
The President
His Excellency Braj Kumar Nehru, Ambassador of India
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Ambassador Nehru apologized for requesting an appointment on what he knew was one of the President's busiest days. His Government, however, wished to present some views on the Kashmir problem to the President before the Nassau Conference. The Indian High Commissioner in London was under instructions to make a similar approach to Prime Minister Macmillan.
The Ambassador said that his Government wanted the President to be aware that Pakistan is undermining the prospects of fruitful talks on Kashmir by a steady stream of abusive statements about India emanating from public officials and the press. He said his Government fears that Pakistanis are doing this only because they believe that they have the United States in a position in which it will not give military assistance to India unless India satisfies Pakistan's claims in Kashmir. The Government of India supposes that the United States has not made such a commitment to Pakistan, and believes it would be helpful if the point could be clarified with the Pakistanis. Otherwise the Pakistanis are likely to enter the Kashmir talks thinking they can hold India to ransom. His Government also hopes that the President will realize that the Kashmir problem and other difficulties between India and Pakistan have deep roots and are extremely difficult to solve. The Government of India is prepared to go into these talks in good faith, but the Prime Minister hopes that the President will realize progress may be slow and unspectacular, even if the Pakistanis show more willingness to cooperate than they have done until now.
The President said he would like to make a personal response and then an official response. Speaking personally, he said, he felt the Prime Minister had erred in making a statement in Parliament which would give the Pakistanis a handle to charge that India was not serious about the Kashmir talks. The Pakistanis are not only attacking India, they are also trying to get at the United States. Indeed, the next few months are likely to be a period of continuous effort by Pakistan and by Pakistan's friends in this country to put pressure on him, the President. In this situation he would hope the Prime Minister could ignore the abusive and other unfortunate remarks being made. The best posture would be to enter seriously in the discussions and show the world that India is determined to reach some sort of settlement.
The President observed that the coming period will require the most subtle and skillful policy on the part of India. On the one hand, he supposed that no Indian politician could involve his country in negotiations with Pakistan if Indian opinion came to believe that the West was forcing India to give up Kashmir as a price for helping it to save Ladakh or even NEFA. On the other hand, some progress would be very important. India wants us to understand its problems, and we try to do so. At the same time, the President hoped that India could understand our problems here. Whether we like it or not, the question of Kashmir is inescapably linked to what we can do to assist India militarily. He was sure the Ambassador would understand this and could communicate it to his Government.
The President concluded by observing that we get a lot of abuse, as India feels it does. The problem is how to ignore it and get on with the job that has to be done. He hoped that the Prime Minister would see his way clear to a constructive settlement, because Ayub is the only man in Pakistan who can carry off a settlement that involves heavy compromise of Pakistani claims and it may be that Nehru is the one man who could do the same in India.
228. Letter From President Ayub to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2262. No classification marking. Forwarded from the Department of State to McGeorge Bundy at the White House on December 22 under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck. The covering memorandum indicated that this letter, and an accompanying December 17 letter dealing with the Tarbela Dam project were delivered to Rusk on December 20 by Amjad Ali, a special emissary of Ayub. Both letters are ibid.
Karachi, December 17, 1962.
Dear Mr. President, Thank you for your message dated December 5, 1962, /2/ which was delivered to me by Ambassador McConaughy.
/2/See Document 217.
I appreciate very much that you and your Government have taken a firm and positive decision to take appropriate steps to support and assist towards a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute. As Governor Harriman must have told you, I for my part, found no difficulty in taking the decision which led to the issue of the Joint Communique. We are now getting ready to meet the Indian delegation on the 26th instant in Rawalpindi and sincerely hope that realistic discussions for the honourable and equitable settlement of the Kashmir question will take place. All this will depend on how sincere Mr. Nehru is for reaching such a settlement.
It is most unfortunate that he should have thought it fit to make his statement in the Lok Sabha, on the day following the publication of the Joint Communique, which came as a surprise to everybody and raised doubts in our minds. Governor Harriman must have been as surprised as Duncan Sandys was to read this statement by Mr. Nehru.
Governor Harriman must have conveyed to you my view that a just and equitable settlement of Kashmir is the key to disengagement between India and Pakistan. I told him that U.S. Government should put all possible pressure on India either by refusing to give aid until a settlement on Kashmir is reached, or deciding to give it in small and negligible quantities until India is obliged to see reason in this regard. I am saying this as otherwise the effectiveness of the American aid to India would be lost.
You must be aware, Mr. President, that there is considerable alarm in this country in regard to the arms aid that has been sent to India. Should the volume of aid to India increase without settlement with us, it would result in serious disadvantages to us and is bound to cause greater alarm and criticism in Pakistan.
In the course of my talk with Governor Harriman, Ambassador McConaughy, General Adams and other members of the Harriman Mission, I pointed out to General Adams that it seemed that what India was after was to build up two Armies, one of which would be concentrated against Pakistan and the other could also be deployed against us when they should want to do so. Surely this can't be the objective of the American policy. In this connection, I arranged briefing by our General Staff to Governor Harriman's team. It comes out very clearly that the present strength of the Indian Army is enough to contain the Chinese and contain us should they insist on pursuing this negative course.
I also told him that in the face of India's performance during their engagement with the Chinese, Indian leadership in the field gave a very poor account of itself. I, therefore, advised that the Indians should be encouraged to reach a negotiated and a peaceful settlement with the Chinese and discouraged from launching on a military adventure to 'evict' the Chinese. Such an attempt might lead to a major conflict which it should be the duty of all of us to avert. It might easily spark off a conflagration, not only on this sub-continent but engulf the whole of Asia and even pose a threat to world peace. The Indians have shown that they have become trigger-happy and they should be firmly discouraged from any ideas they might have to launch an attack for the eviction of the Chinese. I believe the British share this view to some extent.
I also pointed out to General Adams that their target of equipping 15 or 16 divisions for action against the Chinese in those mountainous regions did not make any military sense, as more than a very small number of divisions cannot be deployed in those regions. It would, therefore, appear as if what the Indians were interested in was to continue to maintain the bulk of their forces, equipped with modern arms and in greater strength, against Pakistan. That is why I have been urging that until the Kashmir question is satisfactorily resolved, there can be no disengagement between India and Pakistan in order that we may both live free from anxiety from each other. It is, therefore, most important that your efforts should be directed to the early settlement of the Kashmir question and I would strongly urge that any further supply of arms to India is made contingent on this settlement. I am fully convinced that the Indian in his present circumstances is in a mood to listen, provided a forceful and a positive effort is made in the direction to persuade him.
I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for kindly saying that you will keep in touch with us about any further developments in your military aid to India.
I entirely agree with you that this is a great opportunity which circumstances have brought about for a satisfactory solution of Kashmir and that, if resolutely tackled, there is every hope of success. In this I look forward to your personal and your Government's fullest cooperation and help.
With my kindest regards,
Yours very sincerely,
M.A. Kahn
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12 - 1962. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi and Tehran.
Kabul, December 19, 1962, 7 p.m.
261. Embtel 255 to Department/2/ repeated Karachi 95 Tehran 96. I called on Prime Minister Daud at his request December 19 for what proved to be 2-hour exposition RGA view on economic transit, continuing need for USG assistance, inability compromise further on Pakistan - Afghanistan impasse and full recognition what this might mean in terms Afghanistan's economic development and political alignment. Daud was accompanied by Deputy Minister Planning Abdul Hai Aziz, who interpreted, Director General Political Affairs Foreign Ministry Etemadi and acting Director General Economic Affairs Foreign Ministry Rafiq. Brewer accompanied me.
/2/Telegram 255 from Kabul, December 17, reported that the Afghan Government had failed to respond by December 15 to a demarche made by Steeves in a meeting with Foreign Minister Naim on December 8. (Ibid., 689.90D/12 - 1762) Steeves reported on the demarche in telegram 240 from Kabul, December 9. On instructions from the Department, Steeves had pointed to the problems involved in continuing major U.S. aid projects, such as the Kabul - Kandahar road, while the closure of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan prevented the passage of necessary supplies for the projects through Pakistan. Experience had demonstrated that it was significantly more expensive to bring such supplies in through Iran. Steeves asked for a decision by December 15 on a U.S. request for periodic openings of the border to allow the movement of U.S. supplies. (Ibid., 689.90D/12 - 962)
Prime Minister began by referring my talk with Foreign Minister Naim December 8, expressing appreciation continued USG assistance Afghanistan economic development. Daud noted Afghanistan currently in peculiar position regarding its twin needs pushing forward with economic development and maintaining its neutrality and non-alignment. Afghanistans had "kinship" with west and sympathized western "ideology." RGA had always attached importance western aid as evidenced by fact USG had been requested participate in second 5-year plan even before plan prepared. RGA earnestly desired continued flow US help.
Daud continued that unfortunately situation between Afghanistan and its neighbors appeared be slowing down USG assistance. Although never explicitly stated, it appeared increasingly clear to RGA that condition attached to USG aid in form of insistence on better Afghanistan relations with its neighbors. Despite almost daily talks with AID/A officials in recent weeks RGA felt no clear agreements yet reached about future assistance on project basis. Questions economic transit and transportation costs were inevitably introduced and Afghanistanis were led to understand there some sort of precondition to further significant USG assistance. Daud noted in my talk with Naim this had been my most important point.
Admitting some differences exist between costs Iranian and Pakistan routes, Daud said further study by RGA and return Afghanistan Mission headed by Rafiq from Tehran has resulted in additional information making clear cost differences between two routes not of magnitude estimated by USG. There were basic differences in transit costs between goods moving Khorramshahr - Kandahar for USG and for RGA. On basis recent talks Rafiq Mission with Iranians, Daud felt higher USG transit costs could be substantially reduced. For example gasoline was cheaper shipped through Iran while diesel more expensive.
At this point Daud called in Rafiq to give detailed analysis comparative cost figures Iranian and Pakistan routes (details by pouch). Rafiq's main points were that USG had been overcharged on rail freight Khorramshahr - Meshed and on trucking costs Herat - Kandahar. Among other things Rafiq asserted RGA prepared clear and handle all USAID shipments through Iran at one-fifth cost commercial agents now charging. Rafiq cited figures to support conclusion average cost gasoline and diesel needed for our projects approximately $66.38 per ton via Chaman as against $66.34 via Meshed.
Prime Minister then continued that he hoped statistical presentation, and prospective further reduction in cost diesel RGA buying from Iran, indicative what might be done on Iranian route. He then proposed RGA and USG cooperate on experimental shipment 500 to 1000 tons consigned Afghanistan trade agent Khorramshahr for clearing and forwarding. Indicated shipment be composed one half PL - 480 wheat and one half materials for aid projects in order make possible refinement current figures re Iranian route by category and type.
Prime Minister next turned to question future US assistance, reiterating RGA inability pin down extent future support on any given project. I recalled had previously told both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister I would not condone any real complaint regarding substantive lethargy or bureaucratic inaction in aid program. Aziz interjected there were no complaints but simply did not seem possible agree on any project. I noted unresolved problems in many fields such as Kabul University. Aziz replied these difficulties should not cause delays in agreeing future projects. He said RGA currently preparing budget for next Afghanistan fiscal year and needed know on what projects USG would assist. Brewer noted AID/A for its part had to know what projects RGA proposed support with local currency in order determine which ones should be given USG help. Aziz indicated commodity import program could be instituted which would solve local currency problem once USG support for specific projects made clear.
I assured Prime Minister our intention break any bottlenecks that might exist in AID/A operations and noted had been seeing members his Cabinet myself in effort iron out difficulties. Iranian route figures were subject debate in which I was no position participate. Our own statistics were based on our experience where we perhaps had not gotten same favorable treatment in all instances as Afghanistanis. Question possible RGA handling future aid shipments via Iran could certainly be examined and perhaps Afghan - Iran - US meeting might help settle question. However much such discussions and experience might help in future, fact was we had major problem now.
Aziz asked pointedly whether Daud's suggestion re experimental shipment would be referred Washington. Assuring him this would be done, I said wished make several observations on general problem we currently face. I then outlined difficulty maintaining momentum on such major project as K - K road. Recalled I had told Prime Minister last May this situation would develop unless border opened and said that our extraordinary costs now so high that we didn't see how work on road could continue beyond end December. This why USG asked whether there might be some way reopen border temporarily for 30 - 60 days for this road project. While said would naturally report what Prime Minister had already told me, it would create wonderful psychological atmosphere Washington if I were able also report Prime Minister prepared meet our problem on road through periodic border openings. I also noted such action helpful in preventing transit rights across Pakistan atrophying through disuse.
Expressing appreciation my remarks, Prime Minister said his earlier comments could have been given me by Naim and he would now come to real reason he had asked see me, namely political aspects this problem. Without dwelling on details Pakistan - Afghanistan relations, he asserted RGA had gone to limit of what was admissible in Foreign Minister Naim's talks New York with GOI and GOP Foreign Ministers. As result experience subsequent weeks, RGA had concluded not that GOP reluctant solve problem but that Ayub personally unwilling see it solved. Otherwise tentative agreement reached by responsible Foreign Minister with his Iranian and Afghanistan colleagues would have had some result. Re loss Pakistan transit right through disuse, Daud asserted it hard imagine international law principle under which unilateral action one man could erase right which had existed for over thousand years.
Emphasizing he wished me report what he was about to say faithfully to Washington, Daud then said he wished make following points in order avoid slightest misunderstanding between our two governments re various aspects over-all problem:
1. Afghanistan appreciated past USG help and needed it in future.
2. Afghanistan believed its best interests served by following policy neutrality which included sympathy for western "ideology."
3. Notwithstanding points one and two and fully recognizing transit difficulties confronting USG aid shipments, RGA was not ready sacrifice or place in jeopardy future of Pushtunistan question by making any concessions.
4. For Afghanistan this remained "question of honor and life. If on this issue we will now be forced to sacrifice our economic development and much else besides we are prepared to do so."
5. It neither wish nor interest Afghanistan that this occur. RGA does not wish sacrifice neutrality nor be forced towards one side. However American friends should know RGA unprepared move one inch from position which has been reached in this case regardless consequences.
Daud stressed only point he really wished make to me was that there should be no doubt this RGA attitude on part USG. While further USG assistance would be appreciated, if projects must be suspended or abandoned this would be accepted. Whole question had been subject review by RGA after my discussion with Naim December 8 and Daud said he was giving me considered conclusion Afghan Government this matter.
I replied that I appreciated his frankness and would see that Washington was left in no doubt of RGA position. To help explain Afghan attitude, I asked whether he could clarify reasons why movement American freight across Pakistan seemingly had to be connected with Pakistan - Afghan political problem. Also, while I knew RGA position in general on issue, said would appreciate his personal statement as to what his objective was on Pushtunistan problem.
To first question, Prime Minister responded RGA had sought negotiate on Pushtunistan question. However, when GOP took unilateral action with clear purpose using transit issue as tool political pressure RGA had felt it could not submit under duress to suppression national aspirations Pushtun people. Daud stressed it would not be possible permit USG use Pakistan route while denying same access Afghan Government and people. Prime Minister felt Pakistan press was making it increasingly clear GOP using transit issue strangle Afghanistan and this RGA would never accept.
Turning to RGA objectives on Pushtunistan, Prime Minister recalled historic, racial and cultural ties between Afghan and Pushtun peoples. RGA felt Pushtuns would not wish be part Pakistan. Obvious solution would be self-determination. RGA simply desired Pushtun people be given chance determine their own destiny in accordance international law. Should they opt remain in Pakistan, RGA would be first recognize this fact as Afghanistan had no territorial ambitions. Daud noted GOL [GOP] claim Kashmir based solely on religious ground. RGA interest Pushtunistan not only based on common religion but also common ties blood, history and culture. Although earlier had once formed part Afghanistan, RGA making no annexation claim. Accordingly it hard understand why GOP claim Kashmir considered legitimate while RGA desire see Pushtuns given opportunity for self-determination not accepted.
Daud recalled had outlined foregoing at every level USG from President Eisenhower on down. Had also made same points to GOP in past discussions. Referring latter, he said Prime Minister Suhrawardi had once asked if RGA desired annex territory. Daud said he had replied he would give written engagement foreswearing annexation if assured Pushtuns would have self-determination. Daud had suggested GOP itself get in touch with bona fide Pushtun leaders to this end.
Thanking Prime Minister for his frankness, I said our discussions would not be complete were I not to express our great fear that, while working for objective which in their eyes deemed praiseworthy, RGA would leave itself open predatory forces which might one day cause loss not only Pushtunistan but Afghanistan as well. Prime Minister asked how this might occur. I told him we had seen techniques communism had used, including exploitation political issue such as Pushtunistan to serve their own ends. By supporting divisive regional issues communists made neighboring states increasingly dependent on them. This predatory force would take every advantage of country so placed as Afghanistan. There had so far been no single instance in which such a country had avoided communist toils and RGA was taking terrible chance in assuming it might be first not fall prey this technique. I assured Prime Minister USG fully recognized Afghanistanis determined, brave and dedicated people whose society founded on religious principles but reminded him that sometimes even all this not enough prevent disaster. Prime Minister merely remarked with smile in closing that it was precisely for this reason he had emphasized how greatly Afghanistan needs USG assistance.
Comment follows.
Steeves
230. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/12 - 2062. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on January 28, 1963. The meeting was held at Taylor House in Nassau where Kennedy and Macmillan met from December 18 - 21. Their talks covered a range of issues, but focused upon nuclear defense systems. Additional documentation on the Nassau talks is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 1091 - 1128.
Nassau, December 20, 1962, 3 p.m.
SUBJECT
Sino - Indian Dispute
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Mr. Harriman, Assistant Secretary FE
Mr. Talbot, Assistant Secretary NEA
Mr. Nitze, Assistant Secretary Defense ISA
Ambassador Galbraith
Mr. William Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense ISA
British
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Colonies
Mr. Pickard, Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office
The President opened the discussion of the Agenda Item on the Sino - Indian dispute with mention of the Indian High Commissioner's approach to the Prime Minister and Ambassador B.K. Nehru's approach to him/2/ just before the Nassau talks. Ambassador Nehru had complained that the Pakistanis were behaving badly and had urged the United States not to expect much progress on the Kashmir issue. He himself feared that in two or three months India would blame the UK and the US for making a Kashmir settlement their price for providing military aid.
/2/See Document 227.
Ambassador Galbraith saw the immediate danger as an impasse between India and Pakistan, since both cannot possess the Valley of Kashmir. In considering the next steps he felt it should be kept clearly in mind that the principal gain of the new situation is in getting India out of its somewhat feckless mood and turned against the Chinese danger to the world. He felt some concern that in Washington, at least, the great problem seems to be Kashmir rather than China. Mr. Duncan Sandys had achieved a great gain in getting the talks started. Now the problem was to keep the talks going and to keep them from heading into a direct confrontation over the issue of who owns or should own the Valley. One way might be to feed a variety of ideas into the two governments. In the short run India must learn that it must make its case to the American public and Congress, who are concerned about progress on Kashmir. The Congress would not support two sides of the dispute. We must not however tell the Indians that further help is conditioned on a Kashmir settlement. This approach would get their back up and would enable them to assert that the US and the UK are forcing them to compromise Kashmir.
Mr. William Bundy reported that in London the US and UK teams had agreed to recommend that the US and the UK/Commonwealth provide equipment necessary to convert six Indian Army divisions to mountain units, to help India's airlift capacity, and to improve India's air combat ability within the scope of India's present type of aircraft. These judgments had been reached on the basis that the contributions of the US and of the UK/Commonwealth would be roughly equivalent within a ceiling of $60,000,000 for each side and that both the US and UK would encourage other nations to assist India as well. In London the parties had agreed to give the financial figures to the Indians. Subsequently, in Washington, it was decided we had better not tell the Indians at this time just how much money we plan to commit to the emergency phase. On the question of giving this information to Pakistan, it was left open to our representative there. The group had not thought these amounts would prove unpalatable to Pakistan.
The President asked whether this would add any divisions to the Indian Army. Mr. Bundy replied that it would not explicitly do so, though the Indians might well add some divisions outside the US - UK assistance plan.
On air defense, Mr. Bundy said that it was envisaged that a team would go out promptly to look at radar and communications matters and at the possibility of rotating squadrons, perhaps four in number, into India. The President asked questions to confirm that the idea was that the team should go out and that consideration was being given to four squadrons, evenly divided between the US and the Commonwealth, which perhaps would move in and out of India rather than staying there all the time. He observed that their role would be limited to air defense.
Ambassador Galbraith suggested that we should have some understanding with the GOI that it would consult with the UK and US on any decision to commit air squadrons to action. He had pointed out this fact to Foreign Minister Desai who had commented that it sounded reasonable.
Mr. Duncan Sandys called the question of air squadrons a very big issue. The UK - US talks seem to have gone quite a long way toward agreement on helping during an emergency phase. We want always to emphasize that we expect the Indians to do what they can do themselves, with production, etc., and that this will involve sacrifice on their part as well as on ours. It would undoubtedly also involve some slowing down of activities on the civil side. He regarded the agreement that the U.S. and U.K./Commonwealth keep to $60,000,000 for each as a reasonable development. On describing these terms to the Indians, he felt we must play the matter by ear. At the beginning, it would be best not to tell them the exact amounts but we must give them some idea of the dimensions of assistance as they are getting quite big ideas about what is possible. On air defense, he believed it was right to send a mission but wished to make it clear that this did not represent any commitment. Assistance in air defense could easily become a very large commitment. Although we are going on to help the Indian Army through the emergency phase without an Indian commitment on Kashmir, we must make it clear that assistance on the air defense would be impossible without some settlement with Pakistan. Big issues are raised by the question of air squadrons. It is one thing to give rifles, mortars, etc., but another to allow them to base their military plans on the expectation of the UK and the US providing planes to shoot Chinese. That would mean we would be faced with either letting them down or getting involved in war at their choosing. This could be difficult.
Continuing, Mr. Duncan Sandys said that in getting into defense planning the Indians will find that no plan makes sense unless it embraces the defense of the entire subcontinent. He felt they would take this fact better from the military than from political representatives. Therefore, our military people should keep pressing this issue. Also, the defense build up, as the Indians see it, may prove to be much greater than India's capacity to accomplish, even with Western help. This leads to the conclusion that the only economically possible way of defending India is to bring India within the general umbrella of the Western defense community as we have done with the members of SEATO and CENTO. This does not necessarily mean that India should become a member of one of the Pacts; possibly that would be politically bad. However, it must be made clear to the Chinese Communists that India has become part of our defense area.
Mr. Sandys added that the immediate need on Kashmir is to avoid having the parties come quickly to the crunch. Rather, they should go slowly. We should try to avoid their breaking down in the early meetings because of a precise confrontation at the outset. If the talks go on, we can probably exercise a certain amount of influence, partly through official channels and partly through carefully selected visitors--a steady drip of opinion expressed by different people in different places emphasizing the importance we attach to a settlement and the very serious difficulties that would confront us in the absence of a settlement. The first move would obviously need to be made by the Indians, and that is what we must concentrate on. The Indians believe now that something could be done; this is not merely Nehru's idea but that of such people as the Defense Minister, military officers, etc. It is quite fertile ground in which to sow this seed. At some stage, if the talks bog down, without linking the points we could perhaps let deliveries of emergency phase military equipment slow down. The handling of the air mission can be an important influence too.
Ambassador Galbraith observed that it was important to realize that we must do more than talk of the desirability of a settlement. This is already agreed to in India and in Pakistan. The question is, what settlement; India and Pakistan both want the Valley. We won't advance chances of a settlement by making threats. We must remember that the specific settlement is not in the minds of either side now and will come about only through extensive talks if at all. We must also remember that the Kashmir effort is at best a long shot, comparable to the Israel - Arab dispute.
On air defense, Ambassador Galbraith noted that it is expensive. The Indian demand is related to the awful nakedness of the cities, and as non-military people the Indians are acutely conscious of this. Air defense thus is a protection to the country. US - UK involvement would be a deterrent force, more than a protective force. The proposals that have been made in this field will work out more cheaply than would an independent Indian air force. It would be also easier with the Pakistanis for us to take this road. We should know that the introduction into India of C - 130s with American crews was no problem to the Pakistanis, but if we had given the C - 130s to the Indians the Pakistanis would have been furious. The idea of having US and UK squadrons in India would have the same advantage. It would also effectively bring India under the US - UK umbrella.
Mr. Duncan Sandys agreed with the last point but commented that the impression would be left that a non-allied country gets better defense protection from the West than does an ally. Also, he felt that this course of action could get us into a war with China in circumstances which we would not control. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that this could happen but observed that the proposed plan would also be a commitment to keep Indian air action within tactical limitations. Mr. Sandys responded that we also need to be careful not to create a situation in which the Pakistanis would feel that other countries would get all the benefits and more of Western help without ceasing to be non-aligned. That is what the Pakistanis are saying. Mr. Sandys had pointed out in reply that the difference is that if a country like Pakistan is in a Pact with the West, there is less chance that it will be attacked by a Communist country, as India had been attacked.
Governor Harriman said he felt we had not been thinking enough about how to deal with the Pakistanis. There will be a strong reaction in Pakistan. Unless the US and the UK representatives can tell the Pakistanis that we are pressing India hard, there will be trouble. The Pakistanis on their side ought to come away from their extreme position and begin to work seriously at the problem of a practical solution to the Kashmir issue. They perhaps should come quietly to a moderate position, e.g., that they will not insist on a plebiscite. He felt that unless the two countries come together, we will not have a situation in South Asia worth supporting. He agreed that we do not tell the Indians how far we will commit ourselves to their aid, but rather watch the situation carefully, because unless there is progress we cannot go forward.
The President asked what the chance would be that India would make a deal with the Chinese if we press India on Kashmir. Governor Harriman replied that when he and his Mission were in Delhi the Indians were showing themselves to be strongly anti-Chinese. He felt that our target should be joint defense of the subcontinent. When Indians began to realize the enormous costs involved in the defense against the Chinese, he was confident they would see the advantage of making a settlement with Pakistan.
Lord Home observed that we must be extraordinarily careful in dealing with this problem. He thought that the Pakistanis could be close to a decision to leave CENTO.
Governor Harriman felt there would be trouble if we tell the Pakistanis cold what our plans are for military assistance to India. He believed that General Adams, who had gained the high respect of Ayub and other Pakistanis, might have to go out again.
Prime Minister Macmillan said that what worries him is that, as so often before, we support the people who are troublesome, such as Nehru and Krishna Menon, and abandon the people who support us. He was sure it would be dangerous if we let Ayub feel we are abandoning him. The equal danger is that India may be overrun. Nehru, he feared, might be a bit more uppish now that the Chinese have gone away. He liked the idea that we should start slowly and not go ahead building up armies of the people who for 12 years or more have attacked us, have trumpeted the benefits of being non-aligned, have helped build up the neutralist Afro - Asian Bloc, and who have been, how should he say it, contemptuous--like a camel looking down his nose at you.
Governor Harriman reiterated that we must be careful how we tell Ayub of our plans. They must be discussed with him as a soldier in a professional way so that he does not explode. Mr. Harriman believed that we should send Generals Hull and Adams back to discuss, soldier to soldier, what we are doing. It is of the utmost importance, he emphasized, that we deal skillfully with the Pakistanis as well as with the Indians. Mr. Sandys concurred that it is right that the situation in Pakistan is potentially very explosive. He said he would not like the job of telling Ayub of our plans.
Prime Minister Macmillan asked whether it would not be helpful to cut our programs into installments, informing the Indians and Pakistanis of one at a time. Mr. Nitze observed that it would be easier for Ayub if we could identify the divisions we are converting to show that they are old divisions rather than new ones. Mr. Sandys said that the real danger is that the Pakistanis will ask us why we aid India ahead of the aligned countries when we take so much grief from Russia, against whom the aligned countries help us.
Prime Minister Macmillan asked whether the Indians will get MIG fighters. Ambassador Galbraith replied that this was not yet clear. In any case the delivery of a few MIGs would be only a symbolic gesture.
Prime Minister Macmillan said he was not happy about the proposed plan. Money is not the problem, he said, so much as how to explain our actions to the Pakistanis. We should first tell them what we are thinking of and see how they react.
Turning to the unanswered question of Chinese intentions, Prime Minister Macmillan said he does not think that they plan to take over India. What they have done so far seemed to him to be just a punitive expedition. Mr. Sandys said that it had struck home in India, and there is a fear that the Chinese could do it again. Prime Minister Macmillan observed that unless we are careful the Indians will slide back into their same old arrogance and beautifully detached view toward him and the President. He repeated his belief that we have to get them to face up to the fact of Kashmir. In the long run they depend on the West. In the short run they can be helped by the West--on the condition that they settle Kashmir.
Lord Home said he does not believe that the Chinese want to attack India. In his opinion Nehru knows that. At the same time he believes that nothing short of further Chinese attack will get Nehru to move on Kashmir. Mr. Sandys suggested that to get Nehru to move it is not necessary to threaten him. He is a sensitive man.
The President said that it is obvious that Nehru's reason for sending the messages to the Prime Minister and to him was to persuade them not to tie Western aid to the Kashmir question. He asked whether we could start with an understanding among ourselves on the limitations of emergency assistance. Then possibly send out Generals Hull and Adams to talk with Ayub. Mr. Sandys observed that telling the Pakistanis about our assistance plans is a political matter. In saying this he did not mean to decry the ability of General Adams, who had done a good job in the subcontinent. As to how far to tell the Indians what is being planned, he felt that in practice the US and UK will be talking in dimensions that will be clearer to the Indians.
Addressing the Prime Minister, the President asked whether the two of them should get in touch with Nehru, saying how important it is to keep negotiations going. Then they might send out Generals Hull and Adams to talk about the 1963 plan. In the course of that round could not Generals Hull and Adams go up to Pakistan and tell Ayub the sort of things we had been thinking of, adding that it is very important the talks do not break down during the winter. We need to persuade both parties to stay in the talks, even if there is little progress. Otherwise, we would have to threaten to cut off aid to them, and that would not make sense. Let us get a scenario showing what we do, what kind of messages we send to Ayub and Nehru, who goes where, etc. In short, let's get clear where we go in 1963.
Ambassador Galbraith asked rather skeptically whether we should send more high-ranking generals out to the subcontinent. Already there are military teams in Delhi, and perhaps we should send diplomatic representatives to Ayub rather than military men. Nehru, he had reason to know, is a difficult man to deal with on this issue. But in India as a whole there is a large movement in the direction of progress on Kashmir, the movement that forced Krishna Menon out. Beyond Nehru, he felt there is not a man in the government who would not ally India with the West tomorrow. The Indian fright of China will continue.
The President, recessing the session, asked members of the working party to draft proposals for consideration by the Prime Minister and him later in the afternoon.
231. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/12 - 2062. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on January 30, 1963. The meeting was held at Taylor House.
Nassau, December 20, 1962, 6 p.m.
SUBJECT
Sino - Indian Dispute
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Mr. Harriman, Assistant Secretary FE
Mr. Talbot, Assistant Secretary NEA
Mr. Nitze, Assistant Secretary Defense, ISA
Ambassador Galbraith
Ambassador McConaughy
Mr. William Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense, ISA
British
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Colonies
Mr. Pickard, Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office
At the opening of the second session devoted to the Sino - Indian dispute, the working party presented draft proposals for lines of action to be pursued in the immediate phase by the UK and the US. These proposals were discussed and agreed to by the Prime Minister and the President. (See separate paper)/2/
/2/A copy of the paper, headed "Final Agreed Text: Sequence of Actions With Respect to India and Pakistan," is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 12/19/62 - 12/29/62. The text of the paper was transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 2711, December 27. It was also sent to Karachi and London. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/12 - 2762)
The President asked whether we could get the Indians to begin to request more assistance from the Europeans and the Australians and Canadians. Mr. Bundy responded that we had tried this. The French are tepid, the Germans have given winter clothing and have arranged to airlift them to India but there has not been much other assistance. He believed that we will have to keep the pressure on to get more help.
Ambassador McConaughy expressed the view that the Pakistanis would be less sensitive to information about equipment that we choose to provide India than to extremely large dollar figures. He would hope that assistance from countries other than the US and the UK would also be well publicized, thereby taking some of the heat off us.
Mr. Duncan Sandys observed that if India should receive MIG fighters there is a great danger that Pakistanis would react by pulling out of CENTO and SEATO. Ambassador McConaughy added that the influence of three developments, should they occur, would particularly hurt our position in Pakistan. These would be (1) massive assistance to India, (2) no Kashmir settlement, and (3) a pullback by the Chinese. Mr. Sandys observed that if on top of these events the Indians should get MIGs and we should offer US and UK aircraft for use in India, the effect on Pakistan would be disastrous.
The President asked what would be so disastrous if the Pakistanis should leave CENTO. Mr. Sandys responded that it would be a slap in the face to the West and that Iran would doubtless follow.
The President asked what we get from Pakistan. In return for the protection of our alliance and our assistance what do they do for us? Ambassador McConaughy responded that Pakistan had offered help in the Laos crisis and in the 1950s had offered to send two divisions to Korea if we would guarantee the defense of Pakistan in the meantime.
Governor Harriman said that there was some thought that it was better to leave the MIG question on. There would not be many MIGs, at least not soon. In any case the MIG deal would be a black eye to the Russians. Mr. Sandys interjected that there might, however, be a lot of Russian technicians in India. We would have to make clear to the Indians that we cannot help them with a lot of Russians running around.
Ambassador Galbraith observed that he doubts the MIG question is important. Probably he could say to the Indians that a condition of our assistance in air defense would be that India should accept no MIGs. The Indians might welcome this demarche, which would get them off an uncomfortable hook. He was sure the Russians would greatly welcome it. Beyond getting them too off the hook with India and with Communist China, it would be a great propaganda ploy. To his mind, for us to make such an approach to India would consequently be a most unwise thing to do. On the question of Soviet technicians he did not think they would be likely to come to India in important numbers.
Lord Home said that the air defense question alarms him. If we gave air defense to India, he felt certain that the Pakistanis would get out of the Pact at once. Prime Minister Macmillan noted that the proposal to send a team to India does not commit us to any specific further action. Mr. Sandys expressed the view that we ought to go at this air defense question very slowly. It is the only carrot we have left to give India to move on Kashmir. We will have played away our best card; this is the only trump we have left and we should play it slowly. Ambassador Galbraith stated that his view is quite different. The proposal for air defense assistance is the safest way of handling the problem. We are not proposing to put squadrons into India, but only promising that they would come when India was under air attack.
Prime Minister Macmillan observed that like everything else this is a question of balance. He said he has been impressed that there has been a great turning to us in India, and we must not repel it. On the other hand, he judged that it is quite clear that Chinese won't attack India seriously. If we do all that is proposed for the Indians and they do not settle Kashmir then we will have lost the last opportunity and the Pakistanis will turn against us. He said that he would be inclined to play this matter of air defense a little slowly; it is the one thing we have with which to exert influence. And, if we should extend the air defense concept to the subcontinent, this would help our situation in Pakistan. In his view, unless something like Chinese pressure causes it, we will not see a settlement of Kashmir. Ayub is not as strong as he was a year ago, possibly due to his having given expression to some naive ideas about democracies, a parliament, etc. We have to bear in mind all the time the problem of the balance between the prospect of losing the sympathy of India and losing Pakistan. If we lost Pakistan, Lord Home added, Iran would follow.
Governor Harriman said that on the other side, it would seem to him that it would be well for the air defense team to go out to the subcontinent rapidly to show the Indians that we are interested in this very emotional question. Then the governments could take their time in making a decision. He felt that we would lose an opportunity in not giving a quick response to the Indian plea for assistance in air defense. Ambassador Galbraith asked what we would get from delaying the air defense exercise. Governor Harriman added that it is conceivable that the Chinese will attack again and it is therefore important that we know our minds on air defense in good time.
The President summarized the arguments for delays as (1) that air defense assistance is our most important card and (2) it would help persuade the Indians to reach a Kashmir settlement. Ambassador Galbraith noted, however, that the proposed plan is the one solution of India's air defense problem to which the Pakistanis should have the least complaint.
Lord Home raised the question whether in the event a Chinese attack were in our view only a border squabble, the UK and US would under this plan be committed to air defense?
The President suggested that agreement be reached that the mission should go out. The UK High Commissioner and US Ambassadors on the subcontinent could express their views about the timing, which could then be set by a communication between the Prime Minister and him, say about January 10.
The Prime Minister asked whether it is felt that there is any chance of Nehru's moving on Kashmir. Ambassador Galbraith replied that there is no chance if both countries demand possession of the Valley. There may be some sophisticated road toward settlement, on the European model, but the two countries are not ready for this yet.
In closing the session, the President suggested that to help the Indians get a sense of the views being expressed, Ambassador Galbraith could indicate to them the flavor of these meetings on his return to Delhi.
232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Grant and Gatch; cleared with FE, EUR, U. Alexis Johnson, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, December 22, 1962, 11:35 p.m.
938. Ambassador requested deliver following letter from the President to President Ayub.
Verbatim Text.
Dear President Ayub:
Thank you for your two letters of December 17./2/ I will answer you separately on the matter of the Tarbela Dam after I have had a chance to hear the views of my advisors on this difficult and complex problem.
/2/See the source note, Document 228.
I have reviewed your other letter with Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau. After a full discussion of the problems created by the Chinese Communist aggression against India, we have come to what seems to us a prudent course of action at this time to meet the challenge--a course of action which is in the best interests of the Free World. We agreed on a reasonable and frugal program of military assistance designed solely to enable India to defend itself better should the Chinese Communists renew their attacks at an early date.
To deny India the minimum requirements of defense would only encourage further Chinese Communist aggression, an aggression which we both see as posing as grave an ultimate threat to Pakistan as to India. Therefore, the supply of arms for this purpose should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement. Beyond this stage, however, we will certainly take any one-sided intransigence on Kashmir into account as a factor in determining the extent and pace of our assistance.
The Prime Minister and I are fully conscious of the great opportunity that now exists for the settlement of this major issue within the Free World. As you know, our primary concern is the long-range defense of the subcontinent within the context of our global strategy. No single step could contribute as much to the security of the subcontinent as the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Despite the probably painful and time consuming process required, we look forward with confidence to real progress in the ministerial discussions which lie ahead.
Ambassador McConaughy, who participated in all of our deliberations, will give you a full account of the meetings in Washington and Nassau.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy
End Verbatim Text.
In accordance usual custom this letter is not to be published.
Rusk
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/12 - 2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Grant and Schneider; cleared with FE, EUR, U. Alexis Johnson, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.
Washington, December 22, 1962, 11:35 p.m.
2692. Ambassador requested deliver following letter from the President to Prime Minister Nehru.
Verbatim Text.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have thought a great deal about the problems of the defense of the subcontinent since I received your letters of December 8 and 10, 1962. /2/ Ambassador Galbraith has been here and we have had several good talks. I discussed these problems with Prime Minister Macmillan at some length in Nassau.
/2/See Document 222.
Prime Minister Macmillan and I reviewed the urgent problems caused by the Chinese Communist threat to the subcontinent and what best we could do to strengthen India's defenses. On the particular problem of air defense, we propose to send at an early date a joint UK - US team for full explorations with you and your people.
We also discussed what the subcontinent can do to direct its energies more fully toward its defense. We were both greatly encouraged by the historic decision of India and Pakistan to take up in direct talks the great problems which separate you. Protracted and time consuming as these talks may have to be, we were confident that you and President Ayub will be able to work out solutions. Nothing could contribute more to the security and progress of the subcontinent.
I have asked Ambassador Galbraith to go over these matters with you in some detail. /3/
/3/Galbraith delivered Kennedy's letter to Nehru on December 27. He noted the plan to send a U.S. - U.K. military team to explore India's air defense requirements, and he outlined the U.S. - U.K. agreement to fund the conversion of six Indian Army divisions to mountain warfare divisions. He added that the question of longer term defense support would have to be made in light of a further assessment of Chinese intentions and the larger problem of the defense of the subcontinent. (Telegram 2522 from New Delhi, December 27; Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12 - 2762)
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
End Verbatim Text.
In accordance usual custom this letter is not to be published.
Rusk
234. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/12 - 2762. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi and London. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy to the President in Palm Beach, Florida, on December 28. (White House telegram CAP 5665 - 62; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 12/62)
Murree, December 27, 1962, 2 a.m.
8. Department telegrams 936/2/ and 938./3/
/2/Not found.
/3/Document 232.
Late today I met for almost one hour with President Ayub to deliver President Kennedy's letter (Department telegram 938) and to discuss decisions reached in Washington and Nassau on Western military assistance to India and Indo - Pak discussion of Kashmir. Dehlavi present and Sneider accompanied me. I reviewed for Ayub fully deliberations on United States policy to subcontinent and presented justification for our action decisions stressing our concern for GOP interests, and provisions to safeguard those interests. I will follow with full report. Key points which emerged during our conversation were:
(1) Throughout our meeting Ayub remained relaxed, cordial and very friendly. He was very grateful for President Kennedy's letter and for comprehensive briefing I gave him on Washington and Nassau proceedings. Most important he took news of your decision to provide 100 to 120 million dollars emergency arms aid to India without expressing any disagreement. Even when I pressed him for specific reaction, he avoided any expression disapproval. While he did not give specific approbation, he avoided argument against rationale for emergency arms aid and in fact by implication accepted it when he acknowledged that our initial shipment of military aid to India and over all United States involvement in support of India had proved one of two major deterrents, in his judgment, to further Chinese attacks. (Other deterrent was over - extended Chinese Communist supply lines in NEFA.)
(2) On other hand throughout conversation Ayub made clear that he still felt Nehru would not be moved to negotiate Kashmir settlement except under pressure from United States and United Kingdom. While he did not contest our view that emergency arms aid could not be withheld as condition for progress in Kashmir negotiations, he pointedly asked whether we felt failure to make this aid conditional would harden Indian position in forthcoming ministerial talks. I told him that we did not believe this to be true and were emphasizing importance we attached to progress towards Kashmir solution regarding longer range aid to Indian Army and fact that rate progress towards Kashmir solution would be important factor taken into account in considering any second phase program.
(3) On Kashmir negotiations Ayub remained open minded and flexible. He indicated recognition that first round of talks at best would be reiteration past positions/4/ and that at some crucial point compromise would have to be proposed by third party. I gathered that he remains willing to accept compromise solution not wholly satisfactory to either party which would be based on recognition interests of all parties concerned, including assured provision for unfettered Indian line of communications to Ladakh.
/4/The first round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir took place in Rawalpindi December 26 - 29. India was represented in the talks by Swaran Singh, Minister for Railways. Pakistan was represented by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for Industries, National Resources and Works. In five meetings, the two Ministers restated well-established positions on the Kashmir issue. Bhutto pressed for a solution based on a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite. Singh countered that India was a secular state and could not countenance a plebiscite based on religious principles. (Telegram 19 from Murree, December 28; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12 - 2862) The talks adjourned on December 29 and the Ministers agreed to meet again in New Delhi in mid-January. (Telegram 1165 from Karachi, December 29; ibid., 690D.91/12 - 2962) Documentation on the first round of talks is ibid., 690D.91.
(4) At close of our conversation, Ayub intimated that his reaction to our emergency arms aid program would ultimately depend on Indian attitude at ministerial talks and that his current tolerant and non-committal reaction could harden if it appeared Indians were taking unwarranted comfort from our continued unconditional provision of emergency aid and adopting as result completely negative attitude in talks. On other hand if Indians show any inclination to explore avenues to resolution of Kashmir issue, I believe Ayub will continue tacit acquiescence in emergency arms program. In my view this makes it all the more important that Indians here indicate they have come to Rawalpindi for more than courtesy call which is all most Pakistanis now expect.
(5) Ayub reacted well to indication that General Adams or other top United States general visiting India and possibly air defense survey team also could endeavor stop off in Rawalpindi, if desired, for military exchanges of information and views. Any gesture along line of high-level consultation or early conveyance of important information or conclusions is psychologically invaluable here.
Comment: The interview went better than I had dared hope. Evident he had made decision to rely heavily on our assumed influence with Indians, which will make it difficult to keep British "half step in front" of us, as we had planned. British HICOM has not yet been given requested appointment with President, but hopes to see him before President's departure for Karachi tomorrow. Tonight I went over my meeting with President analytically and in detail with British HICOM James, and he can take full advantage of this knowledge in his meeting, which can be useful follow up and consolidation. President particularly asked me to stay here throughout meeting, and to maintain contact with both delegations. I agreed to do this.
McConaughy
235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 463. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by NEA, FE, and with USIS, AID, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.
Washington, January 4, 1963, 8:12 p.m.
2775. Now that Kashmir discussions have gained some momentum, there is need for creating atmosphere in which more progress can be made in succeeding rounds of talks. Agreement both sides in joint communique to take steps this direction is necessary beginning and atmosphere both sides has already cleared somewhat. There have been some jarring notes, however, which indicate Paks, Indians and ourselves might profitably examine what steps necessary to create best conditions for Jan 15 talks.
On Pak side, philandering with Chicoms/2/ presents clear danger to talks. It took forbearance from Indians and some effort on our part to limit adverse effect Sino - Pak border agreement and further steps such as Pak - Chicom trade agreement and talk of Mohammad Ali's visiting Communist China might prove intolerable. Pak statement on Indian invitation to Ayub similarly unhelpful. We would hope and expect Paks could control this sort of activity while concentrating on examination of range of possible solutions to dispute which could be considered during next round discussions.
/2/Reference is to the announcement by Pakistan on December 26 that agreement in principle had been reached with China on the demarcation of the Himalayan border between the two countries. Details of the agreement would be worked out by Foreign Minister Ali on a visit to Peking to be scheduled. On December 28, Swaran Singh stated to the press in Rawalpindi that Pakistan's boundary agreement with India's enemy on the eve of the Ministerial talks was not helpful in paving the way for a mutually satisfactory solution on Kashmir. (The New York Times, December 27 and 29, 1962)
On their side, Indians have shown bad judgment in issuing invitation to Ayub and then jumping gun on announcement acceptance. We hope Indians can keep from rocking boat and also settle down to serious consideration alternative solutions to dispute.
Our role in this process should continue to be one of exercising influence from sidelines. When either side makes faux pas, we should call attention to effect on atmosphere in other country. Embassy Karachi should take up Pak - Chicom dealings with GOP; prospects for talks would be improved if Paks could be persuaded make some showing of understanding of India's defense requirements against China. This might be enunciation to Indians during next round of principle, which Ayub has mentioned to us (Murree's 9),/3/ that Kashmir settlement must take into account India's defense needs in Ladakh. Separate instruction being transmitted this subject. Similarly Embassies Karachi and Delhi should as need arises call to attention of local govts any excessive violations of agreement in communique re atmosphere such as overzealous statements by officials or resumption of press propaganda campaigns.
/3/An apparent reference to telegram 8 from Murree, Document 234.
While playing this watchdog role we should not, however, become directly involved in preparations for Jan 15 talks. We should encourage both sides consider various alternatives, particularly in light of glimpses of principles for settlement afforded by first round. If the occasion presents itself, we might assist Indians and Paks at this stage by reviewing with them the entire range of various proposals which have been made for settlement dispute. We hope that two govts will be able to produce some concrete sign of progress by time Dacca Assembly meeting since Ayub's capacity to continue talks might be limited thereafter if no progress shown. Organization of several technical working groups might be one device by which to make acceptable showing. It might be well to make sure Indians aware of this need. Also probably helpful remind both sides constructive communique would have useful effect. Finally, USG should keep its public comments to a minimum. USIA has agreed limit coverage Kashmir negotiations to official US statements and Indo - Pak communiques.
We should continue to conduct other aspects of our relations with both countries with an eye to their effect on the Kashmir negotiations. While there should be no question of linking between emergency phase military aid to India and progress on Kashmir, it should be made clear to Indians there definite relationship with longer run aid. In this connection it would be useful to know of effect Embassy's efforts in accordance with Deptel 2599,/4/ particularly among military and political leaders below Nehru. It might be worthwhile to continue to point out to Indians that both foreign and domestic resources for strengthening their military establishment limited; relaxation Indo - Pak tensions would not only free resources for defense against Chicoms but would also mean less diversion from economic development.
/4/Document 219.
In Pakistan efforts should continue be made reassure Ayub re US aid to India. We expect keep Ayub informed re arms commitments and deliveries to India. Further, we expect be forthcoming in meeting legitimate Pak request re such matters as MAP deliveries (DOD currently ascertaining, inter alia, possibility of expedited delivery; separate message to follow) and in releasing local currency expected to be made available shortly by AID/W to meet pressing GOP needs. At the same time we should assure Ayub of US determination to push for Kashmir settlement as part of effort strengthen security of subcontinent.
Ball
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/1 - 1163. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cameron, cleared with BNA and by Komer, and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi.
Washington, January 11, 1963, 12:52 p.m.
3623. There follows for your information message dated January 9 which President has sent to Prime Minister Macmillan on Joint US/UK Air Defense Team:
"Dear Friend:
Now that the Indians have let us know that they would welcome the visit of a Joint UK/US Air Defense Team, we are ready to move ahead and get our experts on the ground. In his last letter to me /2/ Prime Minister Nehru said, 'the earlier it comes, the better.'
/2/The reference is to a letter sent by Nehru to Kennedy on December 29 in response to the letter sent by Kennedy to Nehru on December 22 (see Document 233). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 12/15/62 - 2/10/63)
The small group of officers which we are selecting for the Team can come over to London around January 15th if this is convenient. After several days work with your officers, the Joint Team could then go to India. /3/
/3/Macmillan responded on January 13 with a letter to Kennedy in which he suggested delaying the dispatch of the air defense team to India until after the conclusion of the round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir scheduled to begin in New Delhi on January 16. He felt that the Ayub government would be upset if the mission arrived in New Delhi while the talks were in progress. (The letter was repeated to London in telegram 3655, January 13; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan Correspondence with Kennedy, 1963)
I understand that our people are in general agreement about the exact composition of the Joint Team and its terms of reference.
While the odds that the Indians and Chinese will get engaged again on a scale which might involve us seem to be declining, I still believe that an air defense plan of the sort we discussed at Nassau would be a desirable gesture at moderate cost, if satisfactory arrangements can be worked out in detail.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 1/11/63 - 1/15/63. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 12:54 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Karachi, January 11, 1963, 6 p.m.
1258. Verbatim Text.
Acting Foreign Secretary Kharas gave DCM today copy of letter from President Ayub to President Kennedy dated January 2. Kharas said letter had been forwarded to Ambassador Aziz for transmittal to the President. Following is text of letter:
"I thank you for your message of December 22,/2/ transmitted to me by Ambassador McConaughy, who also gave me particulars of the present United States-United Kingdom programme of military assistance to India.
/2/See Document 232.
"Our assessment of the situation in the context of the Sino-Indian conflict has already been conveyed to you. The trend of the exchanges between Peking and New Delhi as well as the recent statements of Prime Minister Nehru clearly indicating his intention of reaching a negotiated border settlement with Communist China, would seem to confirm our own conclusions as to the deeper reasons behind India's request for massive military assistance from the West.
"Ambassador McConaughy has informed me of the extent of your immediate programme of supply of arms to India which you and Prime Minister Macmillan consider necessary to meet India's minimum requirements of defence. You have made it clear that this programme is not contingent on a Kashmir settlement. While the quantum of military support to India which you have decided to extend in the Nassau meeting may appear to be frugal in the context of your global strategy, we fear that it is sufficiently massive to alter the present ratio of military strength as between Pakistan and India and aggravate the danger to our security.
"Only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in the future.
"I agree completely with your judgment that no single step could contribute as much to the security of the sub-continent as the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Despite the discouraging and provocative utterances of Mr. Nehru on the subject, we are pursuing our sincere efforts to negotiate with India a solution which would meet three requirements: Respect for the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir; protection of the vital interests of Pakistan; and due regard for such claims of India as could be considered legitimate.
"It is only with reference to these three basic criteria that a correct judgment can be made as to the one-sidedness or otherwise of the intransigence which India is very likely to show in the negotiations.
"I am confident that you will view with understanding and sympathy our efforts to reach an equitable and honorable settlement with India on the basis of the three essential principles that I have mentioned.
"No country in the world has so much in its power to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute as the United States. If the flow of your arms supplies is so regulated as to influence India to negotiate in a more amenable frame of mind, positive results are bound to follow.
"With best wishes for your health, happiness and prosperity in the new year, Yours sincerely, (Signed) M. Ayub."
McConaughy
238. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 1/11/63 - 1/15/63. Secret.
Washington, January 12, 1963.
Attached is a brief recap of the current status of our Indian projects. Note particularly that we still confront the problem of getting Congress to lift the ceiling on total aid to India.
Also attached are some of Ken Galbraith's reservations (Delhi's 2696)/2/ about letting our air defense for Indian project get too closely tied to the Paks. Most of us share these concerns and will try to avoid the pitfalls.
/2/Dated January 10; not printed.
Karachi's 1258/3/ (attached) is new letter from Ayub, which I for one regard as abominable. We simply must bring Ayub around to realizing the folly of letting his relations with us get out of hand before he gets himself so far out on a limb that he can't draw back. Since you are the only one to whom he'll listen, I propose to submit a vigorous reply.
/3/Document 237.
Meanwhile, the second round of Kashmir talks begins 16 January in Delhi. The first round went off without undue bickering (indeed with glimmerings of hope) but each successive round will be more difficult. Each side is trying to get the other to make the first move. We may have to step in as honest brokers before too long, lest the talks break down in a contest of silence.
R.W. Komer
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret.
Washington, January 7, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT
Status Report of NSC Subcommittee on Military Aid to India and Kashmir
The NSC Subcommittee on South Asia has the following report on the status of U.S. military assistance to India and the Kashmir question:
1. Joint U.S. - U.K. Air Defense Team
We are moving ahead as rapidly as possible on sending, with the British, a team to India to determine air defense requirements. The JCS has approved terms of reference and our component of the team will be prepared to depart from the U.S. on January 15 to join its British counterpart in London. The British have handed us their version of the terms of reference for this joint team which seem generally in line with our thinking.
2. U.S. Defense Production Team
The Department of Defense is organizing a team, with Mr. Carroll Staley of the Army Materiel Command as head, to study how defense production facilities can be developed in India and what foreign assistance is necessary for their development. A similar British team is now in India. While its terms of reference are narrow--limited to ordinance and existing facilities--ours will be broad enough to cover such industries as communications and textiles and to include new facilities. We estimate that our team will leave the U.S. on about January 17.
3. Assistance from old Commonwealth and Western European Nations
The U.K. has informed the old Commonwealth countries of the Nassau decisions on military aid to India and is requesting their cooperation in providing aid within the agreed planning basis. We have no indication of their response or of their willingness to increase their contributions.
We are instructing our Embassy in London to request the British to increase pressures on their old Commonwealth partners.
We are also trying to bring the Governments of France, Germany and Italy more actively into the business of providing military aid to India. The British and ourselves are passing on to those governments the agreed U.S. - U.K. planning basis for such aid and seeking their cooperation in working within the planning basis. We also plan to brief the same Western European governments more fully on our views regarding the Sino - Indian conflict and, as they indicate their willingness to provide military assistance, bring them more fully into our coordination machinery.
4. U.S. Shipments to Date
Military aid to India to date approximates $22 million, and may be roughly divided into three categories: equipment sent by initial airlift ($7 million including transportation costs), that sent by sealift ($12.4 million) and other ($2.6 million). The material sent by initial airlift, comprising urgently needed Army ground equipment, was shipped between November 3rd and 14th. The sealift equipment, comprising the bulk of the aid, also consists of infantry equipment and ammunition. Of the three vessels transporting it, the first arrived in India on January 4th, and the remaining two are scheduled to arrive on the 13th. The "other" category includes: two Caribou (transport) aircraft now en route to India; C - 119 (transport) aircraft spare parts (the majority as yet undelivered); 50,000 pairs of snow goggles (being transported via Air India International); 25,000 sets of winter clothing (10,000 via air, arrived January 3, 1963; balance by sea); and other miscellaneous administration and training type support. Another form of assistance, not included above since the operating costs to MAP are as yet unresolved, is airlift support, i.e., the twelve C - 130s currently in India.
5. Congressional Ceiling on Aid to India
If we meet our commitment of $60 million to provide aid under the agreed planning basis, we will have a leeway of about $15 million under the informal ceiling on aid to India as agreed with Senator Humphrey at the time of the Senate - House Conference on the foreign aid authorization bill. Likely air defense commitments and a continued increase in PL - 480 aid will push us over the top. We are, therefore, initiating consultations with the Congressional leaders regarding the ceiling.
6. Policy Studies and Intelligence
We are looking into the need for policy studies on a variety of subjects such as the U.S. - U.K. relationship regarding military aid to India, our approach to long run military aid, long run Indian requirements for economic assistance, and the implications of the Pakistan - Chinese Communist relationship.
We are also taking steps to improve our intelligence regarding Communist China as it relates to the Sino - Indian conflict.
7. Kashmir Negotiations
We believe the opening round of the India - Pakistan talks on Kashmir went as well as could have been expected. We believe for the present we should continue to concentrate on building an atmosphere in which progress can be made, leaving the substance of the negotiations to the two parties. We have instructed our Embassies in New Delhi and Karachi to take certain steps along these lines.
At the same time we are urgently studying other ways by which the U.S. and U.K. can encourage forward movement, including offering good offices when and if they are required.
We are particularly concerned over the effect on the talks of increased Pakistani flirtation with the Chinese Communists, and have instructed Ambassador McConaughy to speak firmly to Ayub on this.
Phillips Talbot
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1 - 1563. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow and Schneider and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.
Washington, January 15, 1963, 8:20 p.m.
2871. Deptel 2775 to New Delhi,/2/ 991 to Karachi.
/2/Document 235.
Our reading from here of GOP and GOI views and likely negotiating positions in upcoming Delhi talks leads us to conclusion best US course is to continue refrain from making specific proposal at present time. Picture we have is that parties may show some flexibility in this next round; our tactics should be offer friendly off-stage encouragement that they out-vie each other in forthcomingness. We should clearly indicate on both sides that outcome this round will have genuine impact on US and particularly Congressional thinking. Hence, both parties have vested interest in demonstrating disposition to compromise in talks. They should know it remains our conviction most desirable and lasting solution Kashmir question will be that suggested and arrived at by parties themselves. We remain hopeful such solution possible and can be achieved soon.
It most important we make clear to both Indians and Pakistanis that we are not prepared see negotiations break down, certainly not at forthcoming talks. Hence, you should continue to urge respective Governments (1) explore any and all proposals; and (2) at minimum agree to continuation ministerial-level talks, and be prepared in advance with communique which will assure this.
In event there is clear indication talks foundering you, preferably in concert UK HiCom but if necessary alone, should inform both sides we will have concrete proposal to submit in nearest future following our assessment Delhi talks; therefore, both sides should agree to further round talks for purpose examining proposal. We believe it would not be advisable to present actual proposal at time talks collapsing as in atmosphere then existing it might be rejected out of hand.
We realize Indians prefer purely bilateral consideration this question and have always objected to third party intervention. As matter of tactics, it might be well to put them on notice that whereas we now also prefer bilateral approach, if it does not produce results, US likely make proposal for solution. We hope you can lead Indians to conclusion that in order to avoid problems which US proposal might cause them, they should make extra effort reach agreement in bilateral talks. We see no need tell Paks this now for fear they might drag feet in bilateral talks in order to stimulate our intervention.
FYI. We are presently considering specifics of possible US proposal which we plan finalize after upcoming talks. We will be consulting with UK on this and will be in touch with Embassies Delhi and Karachi. Our current thinking is to use this proposal only if bilateral talks on verge breaking down or, after period time, fail make progress. We believe proposal should be single balanced formula which is fair to both sides and would require equal sacrifice. While initial reaction by both parties to such formula might be cool, we believe later consideration would be more serious, particularly as they take into consideration implications rejection re US and Congressional reaction. End FYI.
Rusk
240. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Confidential.
Washington, January 17, 1963.
SUBJECT
United States Policy Toward Afghanistan
Ambassador Steeves was called to Washington to participate in a review of United States policy toward Afghanistan. This review has been completed and a proposed course of action has been developed.
The enclosed memorandum reflects the review and embodies the proposal. We suggest this memorandum serve as a basis for discussion during Ambassador Steeves' meeting with you at 4:30 p.m. on Friday, January 18. Under Secretary George C. McGhee, AID Administrator David Bell, Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot and AID Assistant Administrator William Gaud will also participate in this meeting./2/
/2/No record of this meeting has been found, but the conclusions reached during the meeting were transmitted to Kabul on January 25 in telegram 196, Document 246.
Dean Rusk
Enclosure/3/
/3/Confidential.
SUBJECT
United States - Afghan Relations
Proposed Line of Action
To continue our aid program in Afghanistan using the more expensive route through Iran and taking the additional transportation costs out of the planned levels of aid.
Problem
The impasse between Afghanistan and Pakistan has continued and the border between the two countries is still closed. We have now reached the point where we can no longer maintain an aid program of the dimension necessary to the achievement of our objectives in Afghanistan and in the area unless we decide to make fuller use of the more expensive route through Iran. Our bilateral relations with Afghanistan, but more importantly our interest and objectives in the surrounding area, principally Iran and Pakistan, are being placed in jeopardy. A good United States posture in Afghanistan is insurance for United States interests and investments in Afghanistan's two neighbors Iran and Pakistan.
Ambassador Steeves has come back to participate with us in a review of our policy toward Afghanistan and our objectives there and to work out a course of action designed to achieve these objectives.
Alternate Courses of Action
The instruments available to maintain a United States position in Afghanistan in sufficient force to achieve our objectives are limited. In fact, they revolve around our efforts in the aid field. We have considered four possible courses of action.
1. In view of their stubborness on the border issue, we could inform the Afghans that we would delay implementation of various aid projects until the supply route through Pakistan was open to us for heavy and bulky items needed in various capital projects.
2. As a tougher version, we could let the Afghans know that if the border were not open by a certain date we would terminate our aid activities.
3. We could go to the other extreme and expand the fiscal content of our aid program so that the existing levels of aid could be maintained in spite of increased transportation costs through Iran.
4. We could continue our aid program in Afghanistan using the more expensive of the routes through Iran but take the additional transportation costs out of the planned levels of aid.
Conclusion
Course one is, in effect, what we have been doing over the past 17 months. It has not proved effective in getting the border open.
Course two would probably produce a negative Afghan response and deal us right out of the country. This would greatly accelerate the country's drift toward the Soviet sphere.
Course three would reward the Afghans for their stubborness and remove whatever pressure remains for them to seek a compromise with Pakistan. It would also place us in a very difficult position with Congress.
Course four is, in effect, a holding action. We believe it will slow down but not reverse Afghanistan's slide toward the Soviets. However, it does give us an interval during which more favorable conditions could develop. Such developments could include a more moderate government in Afghanistan. Certainly by retaining an effective position in the country, we will strengthen those elements in Afghanistan who wish to continue close ties with the West. Additionally, we will have more time to work for a constructive approach from Pakistan which we are prevented from effectively doing at present because of the tension over the supply of military aid to India.
We believe course four is the only logical one available to us. Even though its objectives are limited, we propose to move forward with it.
Some Aspects of Implementing This Proposal
The major United States project, the Kabul - Kandahar road, has come to symbolize United States interest and position in Afghanistan. To complete this project will clearly demonstrate United States determination to maintain its position in Afghanistan. We propose to complete this project using the route through Iran. Being aware of the effect of extra costs domestically and the need to demonstrate to the Afghans that their stubborn political policies will cost them, we will take the additional transportation costs out of planned aid levels.
Completing the road will demonstrate United States determination to aid Afghanistan, but the specifications for two-thirds of the road will be changed from blacktop to gravel to bring the project within the $41.4 million obligated. Included in this expenditure by the time this road is completed will have been some $2.6 million of additional transit costs. There are force majeure costs of up to $3.0 million which are additional, but the exact figure will not be known for a considerable period, perhaps years, pending review of claims. Total costs of cancelling the road now without having provided one mile of acceptable road would be $22.0 million.
The approach to the road project demonstrates our approach for the over-all program. Projects will be curtailed or specifically selected in order that the additional transit costs will in effect be borne by the Afghan program. In view of the recent IMF Mission and general Afghan Government agreement to their findings, a slower pace of economic development appears not only in order but mandatory. Therefore, what in effect will be a somewhat reduced level of United States aid will probably appear less unpalatable.
The grant program in Afghanistan in FY 1962 was $38.5 million, including $23.7 million for the Kabul - Kandahar road. In FY 1963, the grant program under consideration is for approximately $15.0 million; in addition, a loan program of $5 million is contemplated. The carryover of unliquidated obligations from previous years is about $44 million. Therefore, the actual expenditures in FY 63 will probably reach $30 million. The grant program in FY 1964 will be of the same magnitude, but United States interest in orientating Afghanistan to the Free World through the building of a road to Iran will increase the loan program to approximately $15.0 million.
Our efforts in the aid field would be incomplete were we to ignore the dangerous increase in Afghan - Soviet trade over the past few years. An important facet of our efforts, therefore, is to increase Afghan trade with the Free World. Accordingly, we are working with the Afghans to improve the quality of their exports so that they will find larger markets in the West.
The increased transit costs make a PL - 480 program impractical and this will be dropped.
In implementing this course of action, Ambassador Steeves on his return, will inform the Afghan Government that the United States has decided to take up the Royal Government of Afghanistan's proposal that the United States avail itself of Afghan forwarding facilities through Iran. In this manner the real costs of this route will be developed so that both we and the Afghans can use it as a basis for discussion. At the same time, the Royal Government of Afghanistan will be informed that additional transportation costs which we expect to range from 10% to 25% will result in a modification of projects to cover that amount.
We believe the foregoing course of action will achieve our limited aims and can be defended as prudent.
U.S. Objectives
Protection of U.S. Investment in Subcontinent and in Iran
Our aim which is to maintain Afghanistan as an independent buffer state stems not from fondness for the Afghans but rather from the strategic importance of the territory they occupy. The security of our allies, Pakistan and Iran, would be gravely jeopardized should a drastic curtailment of the United States position in Afghanistan result in full Soviet domination of that country. Moreover, there would be implications to the security of the subcontinent as a whole should this situation develop. Thus, the safeguarding of our investment in Afghanistan's Free World neighbors is a fundamental objective of our Afghan policy.
Thwart Soviet Aims
Secondly, but of equal importance, we can thwart a major Soviet effort by maintaining an effective position in Afghanistan. We will be demonstrating to the Soviets that the type of operation they have launched in Afghanistan will not be unopposed and will not achieve the results they hope for. To curtail seriously our position in Afghanistan would be a signal to the Soviets that their efforts were succeeding. If we retreated, the Soviets would press forward to fill the vacuum.
In short, our efforts to counter Communist encroachment into the subcontinent as evidenced by our aid to India, would be incomplete should we neglect the vital northwestern flank.
241. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Secret.
Washington, January 17, 1963.
We are at another crossroads on Afghan policy. State has firmed up its own proposals (attached);/2/ which I hope you can read this evening; I suggest we use your 4:30 Friday meeting with Steeves to get your views. Dave Bell, McGhee, Talbot, Gaud and I will be present.
/2/See the enclosure to Document 240.
For years we've been fighting an uphill battle to maintain a competitive presence in Afghanistan vis-?-vis the Soviets. This job has been made doubly difficult by the recurrent Pak - Afghan clashes over Pushtunistan, e.g. border closings which force us to use the expensive Iranian route.
We've been in effect delaying many of our aid projects until the Pakistan route was opened. Since this has failed to move the Afghans, State and AID now propose that we go ahead with what we can within presently planned levels, but deduct from these any additional charges from use of the Iran route. Thus we'll maintain some pressure on the Afghans, but at the same time convince them we'll still try to help them (e.g. by building a new $15 million road from Herat to Iran).
In effect, this policy seeks to buy more time, in the hope that something will give. State agrees that our investment is not big enough to reverse the adverse trend from creeping Soviet infiltration (at best it only slows this down). But it's just big enough to give the Afghans renewed hope that we will continue to back them regardless of their policy toward Pakistan. Here's the rub--I for one simply doubt that we can help the Afghans enough to maintain an already precarious independence unless they're willing to help themselves by composing their quarrel with Pakistan. We've seen few signs of this; in fact, the Afghans just rejected Ayub's latest offer (true, it was a pull-back from the Naim - Mohammed Ali formula).
So long as the Afghans think we'll do all we can to help them regardless of their Pushtun policy, they'll have no incentive to yield. Therefore, if past pressures haven't worked, how about a yet tougher line? Steeves could go back and say, more in sorrow than in anger, that we want to help but simply can't do so effectively while the border impasse continues. Therefore, while we'll finish existing projects insofar as possible, we can't start any new ones (e.g. Herat road) pending a border opening.
Steeves doubts that this would move the Afghans. But what State proposes seems even less likely to move them. And until the Afghans change their own policy, we'll continue slowly to lose ground. A shift may require Daud's removal, but this seems more likely to occur if we don't indulge him than if we do. In short, while I grant that it is more prudent to continue playing for time, I believe you should consider the alternative case.
Bob Komer
242. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D. 91/1 - 1963. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Karachi and London.
New Delhi, January 19, 1963, 9 p.m.
2834. 1. Indians and Paks agreed at last minute today continue talks/2/ through third round in early February probably second week.
/2/The second round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir took place in New Delhi January 16 - 19. As would be the case throughout the six rounds of Ministerial talks on Kashmir, the Pakistani delegation was headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Indian delegation by Swaran Singh.
2. Breakthrough came with agreement by ministers (subject higher approval) on confidential joint statement of objectives. At close lengthy morning session, Indians submitted draft paper. In afternoon Paks put up counter draft. After considerable haggling and Pak rejection of third round negotiations on basis separate drafts, joint statement of objectives agreed to with subpara on Kashmir setting forth differing Indian and Pak views on principles of settlement.
3. Following is substance joint statement of objectives [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:
1) Agree to explore political settlement Kashmir without prejudice to basic positions of parties.
2) Agree to examine proposals for honorable, equitable and final boundary settlement taking into account:
A) India and Pak seek delineation of international boundary in Jammu and Kashmir.
B) Pak Del urged territorial divisions taking into account composition of population, control of rivers, requirements of defense, and other considerations relevant to delineation of international boundaries and acceptable to people of state.
C) Indian Del urged that any territoral readjustments necessary on rational basis take into account geography, administration, and other considerations and involve least disturbance to life and welfare of people.
3) Disengagement of Indian and Pak forces in and around Kashmir is essential part of settlement.
4) Settlement should also embody determination of two peoples live side by side in peace and friendship and to solve all other problems peacefully and to mutual benefit.
5) Ways and means of removing other major irritants and developing practical cooperation between two countries should be considered.
4. Joint statement of objectives not to be made public and to be kept confidential.
5. In brief contact with Gundevia, he said it had been touch and go. He expects next round in Karachi about Feb 8.
Galbraith
243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/1 - 2163. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and approved in S/S by Edward S. Little. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi.
Washington, January 21, 1963, 6:23 p.m.
3827. Eyes Only Ambassador. There follows for your information message dated January 21 which President has sent to Prime Minister Macmillan:
"Dear Friend:
Since the second round of Kashmir talks has ended as successfully as we could expect, should we not go ahead with the air defense team as scheduled. We will send it on the 24th. Indeed, I see advantage in announcing the visit before the 23 January Indian Parliament debate on the Colombo proposals./2/ Our people are in touch with yours to this end.
/2/The Colombo proposals were a set of proposals issued on December 12, 1962, at Colombo, Ceylon, by the Conference of Six Non-Aligned Afro-Asian countries in an effort to promote a peaceful settlement to the border dispute between India and China. The six countries were Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the United Arab Republic. For text of the proposals, which called for negotiations with the existing de facto cease-fire as a starting point, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1025.
I am still persuaded that adding to Indian confidence vis-?-vis the Chinese is more likely to help promote a Kashmir settlement than to make the Indians more intransigent. It appears to us that Nehru is unlikely to settle Kashmir with too obvious a gun at his back.
By the same token, we feel strongly here that Pakistan's rather transparent flirtation with Peiping is harming rather than helping its case. Ayub may merely be giving the Indians an excuse to argue that to make concessions to the Pakistani would be humiliating under these circumstances. I hope you will join us in persuading Ayub that if he wants us to help him settle Kashmir, he must refrain from tactics which make it even more of an uphill climb. Above all it seems to us unwise for him to send Mohamed Ali to Peiping at this juncture, and it would seem prudent for us both to tell him so./3/
/3/Macmillan responded on January 22. He wrote Kennedy that he concurred in the proposal to announce the dispatch of the air defense team to India, and he agreed that there were dangers in Ayub's policy of "flirting with the Chinese." He too felt it was important to emphasize to Ayub that such tactics were harmful to Pakistan's interests, but he did not think that Ayub could be expected to abandon a border agreement with China that had already been negotiated in principle. (The text of Macmillan's letter was repeated to London in telegram 3861, January 22; Department of State, Central Files, 791.5/1 - 2263)
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
244. Notes by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 B 01285A, Box 6, McCone Files, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January - 31 March 1963. Top Secret. According to the President's Daily Appointment Book, the NSC meeting was held from 11 to 11:50 a.m.
Washington, January 22, 1963.
NOTES ON REMARKS BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.
[Here follow remarks unrelated to South Asia.]
Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. The Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free South Asia. The Pakistanis are struggling against the Indians and the Afghanistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistanis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade the Pakistanis or the Afghanistans to change their policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it--we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.
[Here follow remarks unrelated to South Asia.]
245. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.56/1 - 2263. Confidential; Limit Distribution.
Karachi, January 22, 1963, 6 p.m.
1327. Following Foreign Minister's departure for Dacca MEA gave us letter from Foreign Minister to Secretary of State signed just before departure. Letter pouched. Text dated January 21 is as follows, unessential words omitted:
"My Dear Secretary of State.
"I regret I could not reply earlier to your letter of 19th November 1962,/2/ due to numerous preoccupations. These are indeed, as you have rightly stated, troubled and difficult times for all of us.
/2/See footnote 3, Document 201.
"It is, however, source of relief to us that Cuban crisis has been almost resolved and major threat to world peace has thus been averted. It is my sincere hope that this would contribute to general easing of tensions.
"Meanwhile, armed clashes on Sino-Indian border have also, as we anticipated, come to an end. Efforts are now being made by some Afro-Asian nations to enable the two countries to reach peaceful and honorable settlement. We welcome these efforts for we cannot think of an armed conflict between our two mighty neighbors--China and India--which might result in untold bloodshed, cripple their developing economies, disrupt the uneasy equilibrium in this region and even convulse whole world. The interests of world peace demand that far from supplying arms and ammunitions to parties concerned which might lead to resumption of hostilities, every peace-loving nation must exert its legitimate influence to facilitate negotiated settlement between China and India.
"You, in your letter, have dealt with Chinese objectives in Sino-Indian dispute. It appears that you seem to view it 'as stepping stone to next objective.' Whatever ultimate objectives of parties concerned may be, we consider that up to present, Sino-Indian dispute is limited to question of their borders.
"Our President in his letter of 5th November 1962/3/ to your President has already thrown light on consequences of massive military aid to India. It is our firm conviction that this aid would either be used in resuming hostilities on Sino-Indian border with its enormous repercussions on all neighboring countries or consequent military build-up in India might well be used against us in absence of Kashmir settlement. You have correctly been informed of adverse public reaction in Pakistan to your assistance to India. I may add that talk in American press concerning $3 billion five-year arms aid program to India has further alarmed people of Pakistan.
/3/See Document 195.
"I have given thought to assurances contained in your letter that United States military assistance to India will not be used against Pakistan. Government of India, however, appears to be committed to a policy of self-sufficient defense establishment. 'The aid to which we attach greatest importance,' said Minister Nehru according to Washington Post, of January 1, 1963, 'is aid which enables us to develop ourselves, to manufacture, to make araments that we need, because that is permanent help in making us self-reliant in that respect . . . . That means additional machines for our armament factories and our ordnance depots.' Should India be able to acquire such a military capability with foreign assistance, I wonder how any power would be able to restrain her from using output of her own defense establishment in any manner she deems fit. The current United States military aid to India, in above context, is therefore cause of genuine concern to all of us.
"I avail myself of this opportunity to reaffirm that we attach great importance to our long-standing friendship with United States and our common membership in CENTO and SEATO. We are also grateful for assistance we have received from United States. We do believe in you when you say that in recent weeks you have kept in forefront of your minds interests and concerns of Pakistan. I would, nevertheless, in all frankness as desired by you, like to point out that there is genuine fear among our people that your government's preoccupation with Chinese motivations may preclude you in long run to pay adequate attention to vital interests of Pakistan which, it is needless for me to stress, has always given unstinted support to United States.
"The need of the hour is that growing military imbalance in subcontinent, caused by United States assistance to India should be redressed. United States must continue to use its influence to facilitate settlement of Kashmir dispute with view to ensuring lasting peace in this region. Pakistan, which embarked on path of modernization rather late, requires extra assistance to maintain her planned economic growth.
"Finally I would like to say that I also attach great importance to such exchange of views and personal contacts. Looking forward to meeting you in coming months, yours sincerely, Mohammed Ali."
McConaughy
246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/1 - 2563. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Carle and Steeves; cleared with SOV, GTI, U/PR, Cameron, U. Alexis Johnson, Gaud, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, London, and Bonn.
Washington, January 25, 1963, 8:12 p.m.
196. Purpose of this message is to set forth conclusions of full scale review at highest level of USG of our policy objectives in Afghanistan and to outline approved course of action designed to achieve these objectives in light of continuing impasse between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This message constitutes your instructions and is basis for your approach to RGA on your return to Kabul.
Our aim, which is to maintain Afghanistan as an independent buffer state, stems not from any emotional involvement in Afghanistan's area controversies, but rather from our objective assessment of strategic importance of territory it occupies. Security of those to whom we have security treaty obligations, Pakistan and Iran, would be gravely jeopardized should drastic curtailment of US position in Afghanistan result in full Soviet domination of that country. Moreover, there are implications to security of subcontinent as a whole should this situation develop.
Secondly, but of equal importance, we want to thwart major Soviet effort by maintaining an effective competitive position in Afghanistan. We will be demonstrating to Soviets that any plans for monopolistic position in Afghanistan will not escape unchallenged. To curtail seriously our position in Afghanistan would be signal to Soviets that we were abandoning field to them. Our retreat would leave vacuum for them to exploit.
Our efforts to counter communist encroachment into subcontinent through economic aid and security arrangements would be incomplete should we neglect vital northwestern flank.
Most effective instrument available to maintain an effective US position in Afghanistan is our aid program.
We intend therefore to continue our aid program in Afghanistan using Iran route for such time and extent required even though at some additional cost and absorbing such additional transportation costs within currently planned aid levels. We believe this course will at least slow down if not eventually thwart fulfillment of Soviet purposes in Afghanistan. This posture gives us an interval during which more favorable conditions may develop; it could make possible emergence of more moderate government in Afghanistan more allergic to Soviet threat than one now in power. Certainly by retaining an effective position in country we will strengthen those elements in Afghanistan who wish to continue close ties with West. Additionally, we will have more time to work for a constructive approach from Pakistan which we are prevented from effectively doing at present because of its preoccupation with tension elsewhere in area. This policy decision provides us with best discernible course through which we achieve our objectives, placing us in a positive position from which to operate.
Major US project, Kabul - Kandahar road, has come to symbolize US interest and position in Afghanistan. To complete this project will clearly demonstrate US determination to maintain its position in Afghanistan. We intend to complete this project, though to specifications less elaborate than originally planned to minimize additional costs, using route through Iran. To alleviate some of effect of added costs to AID and to demonstrate to Afghans that their political stance imposes responsibilities on them too, absorption of extra transportation costs out of planned aid levels is considered fair and right.
In your presentation manner and method of which we leave to your discretion you should stress our considered judgment that this approach places our relations within framework of understanding where real progress can be made if cooperation characterizes our mutual endeavors. However, you should also point out our continuing belief that Afghan ability to maintain independent position would be greatly enhanced by improvement of relations with Pakistan.
In addition this approach, while taking into account regrettable area conditions which inhibit our fuller freedom of action, does not allow those conditions to distract us from pursuing objectives which are basic to US interests. RGA should find no difficulty in accepting and appreciating this rationale.
Fundamental to foregoing course of action is our conviction that RGA is dedicated to the maintenance of its independence and nonaligned status. Should this prove to be incorrect as evidenced, for example, by RGA complete unresponsiveness to your approach we would be inclined to regard this as an indication that RGA had little intention of, or interest in, maintaining balanced position by continuing effective ties with free world. In these circumstances achievement of our objectives would become remote to point it would be difficult to justify further US investment in Afghanistan and we would be forced to re-examine basis of our relations with Afghanistan.
There follows immediately in a separate message prepared in AID an elaboration of specific AID program activities for your guidance in discussions with RGA.
As part of your presentation you are authorized to extend invitation to King and Queen to visit US at convenient time. If it becomes necessary to discuss availability dates you may say that President's schedule tentatively filled up to September and it would be more convenient plan visit for some time after September 1./2/
Rusk
/2/Steeves reported on his consultations in Washington and conveyed the substance of the policy decisions outlined in telegram 196 in a meeting with Naim on January 29. He also extended an invitation for a State visit to the United States by the Afghan Royal Family. Naim was pleased by the assurance of continuing U.S. aid and delighted by the invitation, which he felt would contribute tremendously to furthering friendly ties between the two countries. (Telegram 324 from Kabul, January 29; ibid., 611.89/1 - 2963)
247. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 1/24/63 - 1/29/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 1/26 - 27/63."
Washington, January 26, 1963.
Herewith a round-up on Sino-Indian-Pak matters, as we're reaching stage where you may want to intervene directly again.
I. Indian reply to Colombo proposals/2/ was notable on two counts. First, Indians shrewdly decided they'd agree to talks only if Chicoms accepted interpretations, which they already knew were anathema to Peking: (1) Indian troops would re-occupy NEFA; (2) Indian as well as Chicom police post must be allowed in Ladakh demilitarized zones. Desai tells us in confidence Indians will do both unilaterally over time. Indian ploy puts ball neatly back in Peiping's court.
/2/See footnote 1, Document 243.
Second, when Nehru tried to get Congress party to vote approval of resuming talks even on this basis, he ran into so much opposition that he settled for Parliament merely "noting" the proposals rather than formally endorsing them. This confirms how aroused Indian nationalism has made Nehru far less of a free agent in foreign affairs.
II. Kashmir talks are approaching a more critical stage. Both sides have agreed to talk about partition but neither has shown its hand. Paks fear that Indians are stalling, and have no intention of settling Kashmir now that pressures from Chinese are off. Ayub personally seems to be reverting to idea of internationalization of Vale and subsequent plebiscite (UK favors and regrettably sounded him out on this). See Karachi 1361 attached./3/
We simply doubt Indians would ever give up the Vale, especially if after ten years or so it would revert to Pakistan. Therefore, we've worked out a partition scheme which we're prepared to throw into the breach if talks seem about to break down. It is quite pro-Indian (map attached)./4/ Therefore Galbraith likes it, while McConaughy thinks Paks won't buy.
/3/Dated January 25; not printed.
/4/Not printed.
As I see it, before Pak Assembly meets 8 March, we must persuade Indians to make some gesture which will be sufficiently forthcoming to convince Ayub that Nehru is not just stalling. One such would be an Indian proposal in third round talks (12 February) which is more than just a minor adjustment of cease-fire line. Ken is working on this. Another would be a Nehru speech arguing that Chicom threat makes Pak - Indian reconciliation essential, that he is going to accept a compromise Kashmir settlement to this end.
If we could only get Nehru to make the first move, it would go far towards creating the essential psychological climate without which neither side will be able to justify the necessary give and take. You may want to weigh in with Nehru along these lines. Then we could press Ayub to make reciprocal noises.
R.W. Komer
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/1 - 3063. Secret. Drafted by Carle, cleared with GTI, and approved by Grant. Also sent to Karachi and Tehran and repeated to London and Bonn.
Washington, January 30, 1963, 7:29 p.m.
201. Deptel 196 to Kabul,/2/ 1124 to Karachi, 550 to Tehran, 3939 to London, 1727 to Bonn. In view recent policy decisions set forth reftel and fact that our previous efforts have been unproductive we have decided to make no further exercise of US good offices in connection transit impasse for present. Good offices should be considered inactive except in unlikely event of major shift by either party. Should GOP or RGA raise question you can reply that US stands ready to assist if mutually agreeable. We of course continue to hope for resolution because we believe it to be in interest of both parties.
/2/Document 246.
We do not wish to discourage Iranian efforts because while we not optimistic their outcome they at least provide useful communications channel between disputants. Therefore GOI should not be informed of our decision deactivate US good offices. We should continue maintain close and sympathetic contact with Iranian activity this matter.
Rusk
249. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 2/63. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Grant on February 8 and approved by the White House on February 18. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book.
Washington, February 4, 1963, Noon.
SUBJECT
Kashmir
PARTICIPANTS
The President
H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. Robert W. Komer, The White House
Mr. James P. Grant, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
The meeting was at the request of the Pakistani Ambassador who was under instructions to request an appointment with President Kennedy to deliver a letter to the President from President Ayub. Following delivery of the letter, which set forth President Ayub's assessments of the Kashmir talks to date and suggested that the introduction of a United States representative in the parleys might effectively bridge the gap between Pakistan and Indian viewpoints, the Pakistani Ambassador also gave the President a supplemental sheet containing an amplification of Ayub's specific suggestions [3 lines of source text not declassified].
After reading the letter, President Kennedy asked what there was in President Ayub's proposals for the Indians given their refusal to consider a plebiscite. The Ambassador briefly reviewed the Kashmir history. He began with UNCIP resolutions and went from there to the Dixon and McNaughton proposals. He stated that the Vale was needed more for the defense of Pakistan than for the defense of India and accordingly should be transferred to Pakistan. Also this would free GOI forces to meet the Chinese on other fronts and would meet the wishes of the inhabitants of the Vale.
The President commented that the Indians now have most of Kashmir, any settlement will call for the Indians to make the concrete concessions, and the real question is how they can be brought to make the difficult and painful concessions which are required. With respect to the second question of United States participation in the negotiations, the President said he would want to get the judgment of Ambassador Galbraith and others as to the extent this would be useful, and the reaction of the Government of India. He said we did not want to be left holding the bag if negotiations were to fail.
The Ambassador stated that there had been sufficient progress made in the last round of talks to justify another meeting, but this had been made possible only by the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom Ambassadors in New Delhi. The Government of India negotiators have been most reluctant, according to the Ambassador, to show their hands and the Pakistani hope is that the introduction of a third party would speed up the negotiations.
The Ambassador said there was a strong desire among some Indian cabinet members, elements of the Indian public, and the Indian military for a Kashmir settlement. Nehru, however, has given no indication of giving in on Kashmir. The Pakistani assessment is that the Indians do not want the talks to break down at this time but will spin them out until they have received sufficient aid from the United States and at that time will settle with the Chinese Communists. It is because of this assessment that Pakistan wants the United States to push the Indians.
The President replied that he and the Ambassador had talked about this question before. There was disagreement between them on the capacity of the United States to influence other capitals. He said that the United States and Pakistan had been through this on the Afghan-Pak issue without any settlement (the Pak Ambassador interjected at this point that Pakistan had made concessions on this issue). The United States can help bring the parties to the table but has far less influence in bringing about a specific solution. [12 lines of source text not declassified].
The President closed the session by saying that he would be replying in the next couple of days to President Ayub's letter after he had had a chance to ascertain the reaction of our Ambassadors.
Attachment
[13 paragraphs (2-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]
Attachment
[1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution, Drafted by Gatch; cleared by BNA, Ludlow, Grant, Harriman, McGhee, and Komer; and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
Washington, February 6, 1963, 10:34 p.m.
1200. For Ambassador McConaughy. In addition to delivering President's message/2/ you should make following points to Ayub regarding the supplementary message he sent to the President by Aziz Ahmed:/3/
/2/See Document 252.
/3/See Document 249.
1. As stated explicitly in President Kennedy's letter, we see no possibility of India being willing to give up all of the Vale. Thus we see no utility in idea of arranging transfer of Vale after duration one year or after any period for that matter.
2. It is not at all certain that it will be clear within a year whether there is any likelihood at all of recrudescence of fighting between India and China on the Ladakh front. We see no prospect that the Chicoms intend, for example, to pull out of Tibet in the foreseeable future. The need for an active defense of Ladakh will be ongoing. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
3. Chinese presence in force at southwestern edge Tibetan Plateau new fact of geopolitical life which must be taken into account by GOP and GOI.
4. If Ayub brings up possibility following West New Guinea pattern in Kashmir, you should say that we believe India, unlike the Netherlands, is unwilling give up possession of what it now holds by such a procedure.
Rusk
251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret: Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by BNA, Grant, Harriman, McGhee, and Komer; and approved by Cameron. Repeated to Karachi and London.
Washington, February 6, 1963, 10:39 p.m.
3098. Delivery following letter to Prime Minister Nehru at earliest appropriate opportunity.
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I've been weighing whether to write you on the subject of Kashmir and am persuaded that a word from me would not be misconstrued at this juncture. Our interest in this subject stems from the same concern for the security of the subcontinent which prompted us to try to be helpful when India found itself under attack from Communist China. Indeed, the US is now so heavily engaged in the effort to assure the economic development and insure the security of the subcontinent, that I hope you regard our interest in this matter as not amiss.
For this reason, I will venture to speak frankly on an issue of such moment as Kashmir. We Americans are perhaps too far away to appreciate fully the passions aroused by this painful issue. Perhaps, however, this also gives us perspective to argue that the great issues affecting the subcontinent's future overshadow in significance the differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
While the history of this problem, and the antagonisms it has aroused will demand statesmanship of the highest order on both sides to achieve such a settlement, the open Chinese Communist aggression against India seems to have provided a new and pressing reason for its achievement. I hope that this opportunity will not be allowed to pass.
What chiefly motivates me to write you are the strong Pakistani allegations, expressed to us in many ways, that India is not serious about negotiating an acceptable compromise settlement. I well realize that the Pakistani may be pressing this point in order to induce the US and UK to intervene. At the same time, however, it does underline the desirability of disposing of this argument to the extent it can be done. To this end, I wonder whether some public gesture on India's part placing a Kashmir settlement and Pakistan - Indian reconciliation in the context of the subcontinent's long term need for security and economic development would not help give the negotiations renewed momentum and provide us grounds for urging reciprocal expressions on Ayub.
Even more important, it seems to me, would be some concrete Indian proposals in the next round of talks which take sufficient account of their point of view to be proof positive to the Pakistanis that you are genuinely seeking a settlement. I believe Ambassador Galbraith has talked more specifically with you on this. President Ayub told Harriman that he recognized any viable compromise would be one unpalatable to both parties. I have no doubt that it will be hard for him too to accept a compromise, but I can assure you that we do not intend to support proposals which lean too far to one side.
Let me close with a private thought. President Ayub is in a weaker position in his own country than you are, and Pakistan is the lesser power. By these tokens it is harder for him to take the first step toward you than you toward him. I too have repeatedly been forced to accept that more is required of great powers than of others. It is always the weaker who must seem unyielding. Of course, I do not mean in any way to discount the importance of Kashmir to India, or the many factors which make settlement difficult. But the costs of settling Kashmir, great as they are, must seem less in relation to India's larger purposes than they are to Pakistan's. If only this issue could be settled, it would open new perspectives in terms of India's role on the world stage, while eliminating a painful diversion which adversely affects the security of the subcontinent and inevitably complicates US - Indian relations in ways disadvantageous to us both./2/
/2/In telegram 3086 to New Delhi, February 5, the Department informed the Embassy that Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was disturbed by the prospect of an increased program of arms aid to India before settlement of the Kashmir dispute was agreed upon. Without such a settlement, Fulbright was concerned that an enhanced military capability might lead India to attempt to compensate for any losses suffered in the border war with China at the expense of Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19 - 3 US - INDIA)
I hope that you will not mind my frankness in this matter. I have been so only because of our great interest in your country, and my own strong feeling that your personal role will be vital to the resolution of this dispute.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"
Letter is designed to lend impact to "joint instructions" you have received, without getting into specifics. It is also designed to impress on Nehru that the President is taking a close personal interest in the talks.
Rusk
252. Letter From the Ambassador to Pakistan (McConaughy) to President Ayub/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Karachi Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, Item 63, 361.1 Kennedy - Ayub, Secret, 1962 - 1963. Secret.
Karachi, February 7, 1963.
Dear Mr. President: President Kennedy has asked me to transmit to you the following message under the date of February 6, 1963:
"Dear Mr. President:
"I hasten to reply to your letter of January 26,/2/ as conveyed to me by Ambassador Aziz, so that you may have my views before the next round of talks with India on Kashmir. I appreciate your giving me your views and I will be as straightforward with you as you have been with me.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 250.
"[1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
"[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Indeed any settlement achievable at this juncture must in some way get around the basic irreconcilability of the present Indian and Pakistani positions on the Valley.
"However difficult this may be, I must say in all candor that I doubt there will ever be a better opportunity than this one. Whether or not the Chinese Communist attack on India is over for the time being, the threat remains and has had a profoundly sobering effect on India. It has led the Indian Government to realize the importance of a reconciliation with Pakistan and to embark upon talks to this end. While the Indians have not yet shown their hand there are indications that they genuinely desire a compromise settlement.
"India's desire for US - UK military aid is also an incentive, since we have made clear to the Indians that their attitude toward Pakistan must inevitably be a factor in our long-term military aid plans. However, if the threat increases or Sino-Indian fighting flares up once more, we may again be faced with the problem of providing India with substantial help.
"If India is forthcoming in further talks, it would appear to be greatly in your interest to respond in the same sense. I recall your prescient remark to Governor Harriman that any settlement will be highly unpalatable to many on both sides. For either side to fail to recognize this essential fact would simply foreclose the possibility of fruitful negotiations, and it is difficult to see how or when they could be reopened under as favorable circumstances. Certainly recourse again to the UN would accomplish little. Thus, however I look at the problem, I am driven to the conclusion that Pakistan should make every possible effort to achieve a compromise settlement now.
"I can assure you that the United States will do everything it can, within the limits of what we conceive to be helpful in bringing about such a settlement. We have, as you know, not been idle up to this point. But, after surveying the matter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], we do not believe the current circumstances are such that a direct U.S. role in the talks would be productive. I think we can be more helpful behind the scenes.
"My sincere hope is that during the next round of talks in Karachi both parties will get down to considering the possibilities for an international boundary running through Kashmir. This can only be achieved through substantial compromises of present positions. Even if this goal proves impossible to achieve in the third round, it would seem essential at a minimum to fix an agreed date in the near future for a fourth round of talks lest the crucial momentum of the negotiation be lost.
"You are quite right about my deep personal interest in resolving this thorny and long standing dispute. Yet I fear that you overstate my influence if you think that it alone can be decisive. The United States and the United Kingdom cannot force a solution on either India or Pakistan. Our influence can only help weight the balance if statesmanship on both sides has brought matters to the point where the gap remaining between the two parties is sufficiently narrow that third-party efforts have some hope of success. We are far from that point as yet, but I am hopeful that it will be possible from the current talks to bring about the settlement which we all desire.
"Mrs. Kennedy and I send you our very warmest regards.
"Sincerely, (signed) John F. Kennedy"
With assurances of my high regard, Mr. President, I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Very cordially and sincerely yours,
Walter P. McConaughy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
253. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 2/14/63 - 2/17/63. Secret.
Washington, February 16, 1963.
Here is a brief updating on our India and Kashmir enterprise. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
DOD is also embarking upon an overt, but hopefully unpublicized Special Forces training effort which will involve 35 of our people initially and perhaps more later./2/
/2/The reference is to assistance in training units of the Indian armed forces in guerrilla tactics and unconventional warfare. Documentation on this training program is in Department of State, Central Files 791.5 and DEF 7 INDIA - US)
We still see little evidence that Peiping is planning any spring attack; indeed the pace of Indian preparations suggests that they don't really expect one either.
R. W. Komer
Attachment/3/
/3/Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 2/16/63.
Washington, February 16, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT
Status Report of NSC Subcommittee on Kashmir and Military Aid to India
1. Kashmir
Some progress has been made in the talks between India and Pakistan. A fourth round has been set for March 9 - 12. In the third round,/4/ for the first time both sides suggested lines by which Kashmir might be divided. Under considerable prodding from us India led off with an offer which included limited but significant concessions to Pakistan beyond the cease-fire line. This offer suggests that the Indians may be willing to begin bargaining on a Kashmir settlement based on territorial division, including the Vale.
/4/The third round of Ministerial talks took place in Karachi February 7 - 11. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who again headed the Pakistani delegation to the talks, was appointed Foreign Minister on February 3 following the death of Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali on January 24.
Pakistan replied with a proposal which would give Pakistan all of Kashmir (including the Vale, Ladakh and even certain Hindu majority areas) except a part of Jammu in the south. This seems to us to be an extreme initial position from which we would expect the Pakistanis to move during later bargaining. Since the Pakistani proposal gives all of the Vale to Pakistan, it provides no clues as to whether or not Pakistan will abandon its insistence on temporary internationalization followed by some sort of plebiscite.
Our role has become somewhat more active, although we have neither become a party to the talks nor introduced specific proposals. Before the third round, we decided that our best immediate tactic was to urge both parties to seek a settlement by partition, and to speed the bargaining process by making concessions. Although the British believe internationalization of the Vale must ultimately be considered, we persuaded them to go along with our tactics. Our joint efforts with the Indians and Pakistanis both before and during the talks seem to have produced some results. We are now tentatively planning similar efforts prior to the fourth round, designed to produce a new agreed course of action.
We continue to believe that with active pressure from the British and ourselves, bilateral talks can produce additional progress. While we believe partition offers the best prospect for a Kashmir settlement, we are keeping our minds open to various possible forms of internationalization.
We believe that while the most difficult stages of the negotiations are still ahead, there is a sporting chance they will ultimately succeed. The immediate hurdle is the next round during which both sides will be subject to pressures generated in the national legislatures of both countries, which will be in session at the time. If the talks can be kept moving through this round and progress further in later discussions, we foresee a situation in which the British and ourselves might submit a proposal for a settlement with some chance for acceptance.
2. U.S. Military Aid to India
Past and currently pending outlays under the $60 million ceiling agreed on at Nassau total almost $38 million:
a) $19.5 million in air and sea shipments to date (mainly infantry arms, ammunition and equipment plus two Caribou aircraft).
b) $5.4 million for C - 119 aircraft spare parts (shipment has begun).
c) $3.1 million (estimated) for the cost of the airlift operations of our twelve C - 130 aircraft in the Ladakh and NEFA areas though 30 June.
d) $5.5 million for small arms, ammunition, and communications and medical equipment just ordered.
e) $4.3 million for related supply operations and administrative costs.
These expenditures will cover a substantial portion of our share of the Nassau commitment to support the conversion of six mountain divisions, and to improve IAF transport capability. We foresee further aid, under the $60 million ceiling, for supporting units for the six divisions, engineering and additional communications equipment, and repair parts, etc.
3. Air Defense
The joint US/Commonwealth Air Defense Team arrived in New Delhi January 30 and we expect it to complete its study about the end of February. Canada and Australia are participating as well as the British and ourselves. We have suggested to the British, Canadians and Australians that the team's leaders stop briefly in Karachi to obtain Pakistan's assessment of the Chinese Communist air threat. We also think the team leaders should be prepared generally to discuss air defense requirements for the subcontinent should a need similar to that in India arise in Pakistan. We hope to get this squared away in the next few days after we hear from the other participating governments.
4. Defense Production
Our defense production team arrived in India February 1, talking in London to the U.K. ordnance team that had visited India early in January. The U.S. team includes experts in the fields of ordnance, communications, textiles, and automotive repair. We expect the team's report about middle or late March.
5. Other U.S. Government Activities
a) A U.S. Army Medical Research Team is in India to conduct a joint study with the Indians of the effect of extreme conditions, especially in Ladakh, on military personnel and equipment.
b) We hope for early Government of India agreement to a visit by a S/DMICC team--a prerequisite to transfer of U.S. classified material. To date, limited amounts of non-sensitive classified information have been made available to India as exceptions to U.S. National Disclosure Policy.
6. Assistance From Old Commonwealth and Western European Nations
The British in New Delhi provided us a progress report on their aid February 13. We have not received details but understand that a ship with military supplies arrived in India on February 13 and also that the British will supply much of the signal equipment requested by India. The U.K. is also considering findings of the RAF Mission to India.
British efforts to encourage substantial Canadian and Australian participation in the Nassau-based effort have been reasonably successful. The Canadians have decided to supply on a grant basis military items India requires which Canada possesses in surplus, and is arranging delivery of certain aircraft and winter clothing. Australia has completed one shipment of defense supplies and is discussing further aid with India.
We and the U.K. made strong demarches to France, Germany, and Italy to enlist their participation. Results to date have not been encouraging. The French and Italians insist on commerical credit terms in their discussions with the Indians. There may be some flexibility in the Italian position so we plan further action in Rome. The Germans, who provided some winter clothing during the hostilities, are discussing further assistance with the Indians but have not yet firmed up their position.
7. Indian Defense Efforts
India's Ministry of Defense under the Chavan - Chaudhuri leadership is engaged in an intensive effort to redefine India's defense plans in the new strategic situation facing the country. They have not yet firmed up long-term plans and will probably be unable to do so realistically until they receive definite indication on the volume of long-term Western aid. In any event, Indian Defense spending will rise appreciably with a 1963 - 64 Defense budget reportedly programed at over $1 billion (approximately one-third higher than 1962 - 63). The Indians themselves are also studying how to increase defense production and have been working closely with visiting foreign teams on this subject.
8. Policy and Intelligence Studies
In connection with AID's global policy review, we are intensively studying India's long-term economic assistance requirements in the light of recent developments. The joint UK/US estimate of Communist Chinese air capabilities against India was completed in late January and transmitted to the Indian Government just before the arrival of the air defense team. The USIB has initiated a similar study of Communist Chinese ground capabilities. We are also doing a number of studies on various aspects of possible Kashmir settlements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been requested to make a strategic appraisal of India and the subcontinent to serve as a basis for the further development of policy for that area.
Phillips Talbot
254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider, Cameron, and Gatch; cleared with BNA and FE; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to London.
Washington, February 16, 1963, 8:13 p.m.
3181. Here are our thoughts regarding tactics for fourth round Kashmir talks in Calcutta. These are based on study your excellent analyses as well as impressions brought back by Talbot and Jackson./2/ You should comment urgently so we have time to coordinate with British and get our lines straight long enough before next round to enable us step up our input.
/2/Elmore Jackson, Special Assistant for U.N. Planning in IO and an expert on the Kashmir issue.
We view talks as having progressed logically, if somewhat slowly. Indians and Paks sloughed off traditional positions at first round, agreed on certain principles in second, got down to maps in third. We agree with Karachi, however, that parties have yet to come to grips with hard realities. Indians have failed so far to signal disposition to divide Vale, and Paks have reserved position on tough choice between an internationalization formula which Indians probably would reject and territorial division plan which would be politically risky for them.
Looking toward round at Calcutta we see two problems. First relates to bargaining positions both sides. Indian proposal at Karachi was step forward which seemed invite Paks into market place. Paks responded with such an inadequate offer that we might have expected Indians to turn it down out of hand. Instead it has probably been left over for final disposition at Calcutta where Indians seem likely start off by complete rejection Pak line. Problem then will be how to get talks moving again. We believe burden will and should be on Paks to restore movement by making a business offer.
This gets us to second problem. We are perplexed by timing Calcutta talks. Pressures on negotiators which may be generated in Lok Sabha and National Assembly seem likely increase difficulties of compromise already evident in press reactions from both sides, particularly in Pakistan. Task therefore is to avoid impasse stimulated by political pressures and produce achievement adequate to justify continuation talks.
It is our judgment that Paks are unlikely to give serious consideration to proposal for partition of Vale until they have introduced their idea of internationalization and had it discussed seriously. If this analysis correct, we see advantage Pak internationalization idea coming in promptly in fourth round. This would have double advantage getting this proposal aired and letting Paks face and cope with Indian objections and its introduction might ease Pak public opinion problem. It will not be enough, however, for Paks to talk of vague idea of internationalization. They must get down to specific, carefully thought out formula if it is to serve as basis for useful discussion.
If our judgment of Pak intentions is correct, we will have to prepare Indians to give fair hearing to internationalization proposal. Providing such proposal includes realistic lines north and south of Vale, discussion of it might serve purpose keeping bargaining going during difficult period when legislatures in session. To counter Pak internationalization proposal, we would hope Indians might come up with refined proposal for territorial division giving Paks substantial position in Vale and incorporating functional arrangements which, as Delhi points out, would divide Vale without denying it to people on either side. We recognize, however, that they may have other ideas about counter proposal at this stage. Such an exchange would give us opportunity throw in more detailed ideas before and during fourth round on functional arrangements. Also it could lay foundations for circumstances in which ultimately we might, if necessary, make proposal cloaked as combination territorial division and internationalization.
Obviously scenario like this calls for increased US/UK input and prodding. Our ideas on tactics for Karachi:
1) We should inform Paks we look for further progress in bilateral talks. We will have suggestions for both sides to consider in these talks and intend to step up our substantive discussions with both. Best course for Paks is to tone down expectations and start looking to fifth round when better groundwork laid for more productive bargaining. Moreover legislatures may not be in session.
2) Make it entirely clear we believe Paks must make first substantial move in next round. We believe that settlement can be achieved only through agreeing upon international boundary running through Kashmir. But if, as we expect, Paks insist they can't go beyond Shahi's "fall back" position, we should emphasize that they must make some negotiable proposal. Although we believe internationalization is not route towards solution, it would be better for Paks to table it than drawing another unsatisfactory line, provided proposal includes realistic borders to north and south.
3) GOP obviously making little effort to prepare Pakistan people for an unpopular solution. We feel there two steps Embassy might take to help this necessary educational process along.
a) We should indicate our deep concern to GOP at lack of effort in this connection. We realize GOP does not exercise tight control over press, but it does lay down guidelines. These guidelines should at minimum point out that interests of India as well as Pakistan must be taken fully into account if workable settlement is to be reached. We are aware of anti-American bias in Information Ministry and believe any approaches on press policy should be made to Bhutto or at minimum at DG level in MEA.
b) Country Team should work out complementary and coordinated approaches pitched at various significant segments of Pakistan society. These approaches should stress that chances for a workable Kashmir settlement are better now than they have ever been, but that if this opportunity is missed, chances are exceedingly dim that status quo ever will be changed. Both India and Pakistan must sacrifice long held positions, but this painful process is a prerequisite for a solution. Military and security aspects of this should be stressed in conversations with Pak military; economic benefits with business community and labor; and whole range of benefits accruing to Pakistan with GOP officials and MNA's including opposition politicians.
In India we propose following:
1) We should make clear to GOI that while Indian proposal was step forward it fell far short of what Indians knew in advance we thought was necessary, i.e., substantial Pak position in Vale. Indians should know that they must be prepared to concede considerably more than symbolic Pak presence in Vale if settlement is to be reached.
2) We should explain to Indians in same manner as to Paks reasons why we believe expectations of Calcutta round should not be exaggerated. Indians should demonstrate understanding of political pressures under which Pakistan delegation will be operating.
3) We should alert Indians to be prepared for likelihood Paks may propose internationalization plan. We should tell Indians that we assume they will give this fair hearing. If they do not believe they can accept such a proposal, they should be prepared to submit a more attractive plan for territorial division.
4) We should suggest to Indians that one way of making such a plan for division more palatable to Pakistan would be by incorporating in it certain functional arrangements designed to minimize inconvenience of division of Vale. FYI: We will be sending our suggestions soon which we expect on basis preliminary studies should be of interest to both parties. End FYI. Obviously such features would be meaningless, however, if Pakistan were not given a substantial position in Vale.
5) We believe circumstances require new campaign in depth to convince Indians of influence in political, military, civil service and business fields of reasons why it in India's interest to make concessions necessary for Kashmir settlement. Emphasis this campaign should probably be on need for substantial Pak presence in Vale since we believe it is here Nehru may balk. We do believe events have indicated Nehru is responsive to political groundswells beneath him. Our efforts to influence those who can influence Nehru might tip balance in achieving settlement. This we believe is worth risk we realize is involved. Our efforts should emphasize importance of Kashmir settlement to India's defenses against Chicoms. Particular emphasis should be given to inescapable relationship between longer run military aid to India and Indian contributions toward settlement Kashmir dispute. We should also stress that general Congressional attitude toward India will be greatly affected by Indian efforts to improve relations with Pakistan.
We again stress that efforts should be made to prepare public on both sides for compromise settlement (Deptel 3153 to New Delhi,/3/ 1235 Karachi, repeated info 4321 London). Also desirable urge each side to try to look at negotiations and formulae for settlement from standpoint of selling job which other must do at home. This particularly pertinent during next round which will take place under wary eyes two legislatures.
Rusk
/3/Dated February 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK)
255. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy/1/
New Delhi, February 16, 1963.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 2/11/63 - 3/31/63. No classification marking. According to a February 27 memorandum from William Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, the letter was delivered to the White House on February 18 by Ambassador B.K. Nehru. (Ibid.) This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government. In his biography of Prime Minister Nehru, Gopal states regarding this letter: "It was now Nehru's turn to complain that Pakistan was not wholly serious and not anxious to come to an agreement." (Gopal, Jawarharlal Nehru, Vol. 3, p. 258)]
256. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Ahmed) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 2/63. Secret. A copy of the letter was sent from the Department of State to the White House under cover of a February 20 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.)
Washington, February 18, 1963.
Dear Mr. Secretary, The President of Pakistan has desired that in connection with his proposal for a Kashmir settlement, the considerations stated below may be brought to the notice of President Kennedy.
2. As the United States Government is aware, the President's proposal is set out in his letter dated January 26, 1963, to President Kennedy, and the addendum/2/ I presented therewith. It was subsequently amplified when Ambassador McConaughy called on the Pakistan Minister for External Affairs on February 7. In the President's view, no Government of Pakistan can accept any settlement of the Kashmir dispute which would leave the Valley with India without any form of reference to the wishes of the people.
/2/See Document 249.
However, he would not insist on an immediate transfer of the Valley, provided irrevocable arrangements are made at this stage for the final disposition of the Valley and the adjoining Muslim territory of Ladakh either in accordance with a plebiscite or some other method, in the latter case bearing in mind that the allotment of any significant part thereof to India would be manifestly contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants.
3. During his meeting with Ambassador McConaughy on February 7, the Pakistan Minister for External Affairs stated that, since it appeared the the Valley was linked in the United States' view with the defence of Ladakh, he wished to make it clear that if Ladakh (which has a 79% Muslim majority) came to Pakistan (as under any equitable settlement it would), the Pakistan Government would naturally assume full responsibility for its defence which attaches to sovereignty.
4. A settlement on these lines would have several obvious advantages.
(i) Such a settlement alone could bring about disengagement of the Indian and Pakistan armies;
(ii) India would be relieved of responsibility for the defence of the Ladakh front;
(iii) She could then withdraw some 5 to 6 Divisions of troops from Pakistan's borders for deployment elsewhere.
5. Any other settlement--even were it possible--would necessitate the continued presence of substantial Indian forces on Pakistan's strategic flank in Kashmir; it would fail therefore to inspire in Pakistan the confidence necessary to bring about a genuine improvement in India-Pakistan relations and a disengagement of their armies either in Kashmir or elsewhere along Pakistan's borders. In terms of the Sub-continent's overall security, it would, in short, achieve nothing.
6. Disengagement of Pakistan and Indian forces is crucial from every point of view.
(i) Only thus could the two countries be freed from mutual fear and tension that plague their relations, and genuine Indo-Pakistan friendship and cooperation promoted.
(ii) Disengagement could enable India to save as much as $300 million in defence expenditure--expenditure which would be bound to go on increasing if there was no disengagement.
(iii) There would also be savings in Pakistan's defence expenditure.
(iv) In consequence of the resulting division of defence responsibilites, which a settlement such as is visualized by the President of Pakistan implies, the defence posture of the Sub-continent as a whole would be immensely strengthened, despite the anticipated reduction in defence expenditure of both countries.
(v) These savings in defence expenditure would, furthermore, help speed urgently needed economic development in both countries.
(vi) Disengagement should also result in a substantial reduction in United States' commitments in the region, more especially, in the calls on her resources for the defence and development requirements of India and Pakistan.
Yours Sincerely,
Aziz Ahmed
257. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Secret.
Washington, February 20, 1963.
We have laid on a meeting for 5 p.m. Thursday/2/ to put before you our ideas on Kashmir strategy. After three rounds of sparring the talks are entering the critical stage. Neither side is yet willing to make the essential compromises. Nehru's and Ayub's latest gloomy letters (attached) make this clear, although their intransigeance may be partly bargaining tactics./3/
/2/February 21.
/3/Reference is to Nehru's letter of February 16 and to the message conveyed from Ayub to Kennedy in Ahmed's February 18 letter to Rusk, Documents 255 and 256.
But we have about reached the point where only a major US/UK effort, involving more direct intervention, will give even a fair chance of settlement. Before we engage in such an enterprise you will want to be satisfied as to whether the chances of success are sufficient to justify the effort, the likely costs if we fail. We also need your general approval of the form and extent of leverage we'll need to apply.
Attached is a State paper addressed to these issues. Talbot's people think we may be able to get through one or two more rounds before we have to start real arm twisting. I feel that we had better start weighing in harder now, lest the talks lose momentum, though holding off on precise proposals if possible till after the fourth round. And since we, not the UK, are the only ones with real leverage, and both sides are in fact looking to us, we ought not to try to stay a half step behind the UK.
The alternative would be to plug for one or two more rounds, but to begin disengaging if there is insufficient progress, and neither advance our own solution (which will inevitably outrage the side adversely affected) nor use forms of pressure which risk serious damage to our relations with India or Pakistan. Moreover, there's no point in signing on to a real effort unless we're willing to go the distance. Injecting ourselves directly into this dispute will buy us trouble with both sides, and plenty of flak from the Hill. Since at best we've got only a 50 - 50 chance of pulling it off, we may end up with a failure to boot.
But we're unlikely ever to have a better chance to settle Kashmir on other than the status quo, and a hard try seems well worth the risks. If you agree, then aside from approving State's recommendations, I'd urge you ginger up State by: (1) telling them you want every effort made to bring off a settlement; (2) explicitly authorizing a hard sell to Ayub on the need to compromise now if he is ever to get one, including warnings that we may be unable to back him if he goes to the GA and that we'll have to go ahead with military aid to India.
Bob Komer
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret.
Washington, February 20, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT
Kashmir
1. Purpose of Meeting.
The purpose of your meeting at 5:00 o'clock Thursday is to decide on future Kashmir strategy. We have reached the point where further real progress is unlikely without increased United States involvement; even with it, a settlement is not a sure thing. Whether we should invest the necessary extra effort, and what leverage we should use are major questions on which we need your views.
2. The Talks So Far.
[Here follows a two-page assessment of the progress of and prospects for the Ministerial talks, which is similar to the assessment contained in the attachment to Document 253. The Department of State assessment is somewhat more pessimistic than that produced by the NSC Subcommittee, but still concludes that "there is a fair chance for a settlement."]
4. Leverage Available To Us.
In India our usable leverage is primarily related to our military aid. The Indians already seem well aware of the link between it and Kashmir. This impression will be intensified as we get more into the aid season. The danger is, however, that if we overplay our hand, the Indians may conclude that the cost of military assistance, in terms of concessions in Kashmir, is so great as to make it necessary to seek peace with Communist China.
We might also link our economic assistance with Kashmir. This would increase the pressures for settlement but, if the Indians failed to respond and we cut aid, the economic and political consequences within India would be serious.
In Pakistan we could also tie military and economic aid to Kashmir. If we did this with military aid we would be resiling from outstanding commitments to Ayub and if we did it with economic aid the same objection as in India would apply. Also we can warn Ayub that the United States will continue to build Indian military strength if the Kashmir negotiations fail because of Pak intransigence. Further, we can tell him that this is his best opportunity for a Kashmir settlement and the United States and United Kingdom will not support him in any other Pak moves on Kashmir (e.g., UNGA). If we carry any of these tactics too far, however, we may either force Ayub to accept a Kashmir compromise which he cannot sell at home, or put ourselves in the position of having further weakened his political position.
5. Our Proposals For Future Action.
a. For Fourth Round
Our involvement in the talks has steadily increased and we believe it should continue to do so. So far we have done a great deal of prodding and some stage managing. At each round our Ambassadors have been credited by one party or the other with "saving" the talks. We plan to continue our prodding (e.g. further Presidential correspondence) and begin making substantive suggestions to both sides regarding aspects of possible solutions (e.g. functional arrangements to mitigate partition of Vale). We would not now offer an integrated proposal for settlement. We plan, however, to authorize our Ambassadors, if necessary to save the talks, to urge the negotiators at Calcutta to schedule a fifth round to consider such a United States-United Kingdom proposal. We will coordinate the details of these tactics with the British early next week.
In India we propose to continue our efforts to insure that the wide range of Indian leaders who can influence Nehru are aware of the relationship between United States capacity to aid India militarily and a Kashmir settlement. We would not similarly link economic aid, but we propose to warn Indian leaders that Congressional attitudes on such aid are certain to be affected by India's approach to the Kashmir talks.
In Pakistan we propose to remind Ayub that we see no prospect of any better result for him than a genuine compromise, and make clear to him our determination to continue military aid to India if Pakistan obstructs the way to a Kashmir settlement. We plan also to signal that we will not in the future take an active role in support of other Pak moves on Kashmir if Pakistan is not forthcoming in these talks.
b. After Fourth Round
In any event, we are prepared to put forward a proposal some time after the fourth round if further bilateral progress seems unlikely, with exact timing dependent upon progress in future rounds of bilateral talks. We are now refining such a formula for possible future use, but its exact content will depend greatly upon the direction in which the bilateral negotiators have moved. Our formula calls for special joint Indo-Pak arrangements in the Vale while reserving to each party respective areas of political control in the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir.
6. Implications of This Course and Risk of Failure.
We are gradually moving toward a degree of involvement in the talks which may vitally affect our relationships with India and Pakistan. While the benefits of success would be great, the cost of failure should be considered. If we tie the extent of military aid to India to a settlement--and we have already done so to a large degree--failure will affect this important component of our relationship. Should India appear responsible for failure, its reputation on the Hill and elsewhere would greatly suffer, complicating our already difficult tasks. If we push Pakistan hard without result, we may damage relations with Ayub and weaken his political position at home. Even if we abandoned our efforts now, some of these same effects would be felt. Yet with further U.S. - U.K. involvement, they could become more severe.
On the other hand, if a settlement is achieved, the prospects for the future of the subcontinent--and our relations with both countries in it--are immeasurably brightened. Furthermore, even a failure could, if the effort had resulted in a narrowing of the gap between them, be used to demonstrate to Congress that an honest effort had been made on both sides and that neither party should be penalized.
7. Recommendations.
We are asking at this time for your specific approval of our stepping up our prodding and advancing certain substantive ideas about possible solutions. We also request your approval of our proposals for use of leverage as set forth in Section 5. We think we see our way clear through the fourth round of talks and perhaps to the fifth. You should know that this course, unless deliberately interrupted, will almost inevitably lead to a greater U.S. commitment. This is bound to raise fundamental questions concerning our relations with India and Pakistan (See Section 5). Failure to achieve a settlement may seriously damage those relations at a time when the Chinese Communist threat is likely to require closer cooperation between us and the nations of the subcontinent. We therefore ask that you consider these aspects of the situation while making your decision.
Dean Rusk/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
258. Notes on Discussion/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 23. According to the President's Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Kennedy Library)
Washington, February 21, 1963, 5:30 p.m.
INFORMAL NOTES ON DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT ON KASHMIR NEGOTIATIONS
The President met February 21 at 5:30 p.m. with Secretary Rusk, Governor Harriman, Mr. Talbot, Mr. Komer and Mr. Schneider to discuss the U.S. role in the Kashmir negotiations.
Mr. Talbot opened the discussion by presenting a resume of the current status of the Kashmir talks. Speaking from a wall map, he explained that in the third round of talks both parties got down to maps and suggested lines by which Kashmir might be divided. The Indians made the initial offer and the Paks responded. The President asked about a third line on the wall map, and Mr. Talbot replied that this was our staff suggestion of a line of possible settlement. We were now inclined to move the line somewhat to the right, in favor of Pakistan, but at any rate we were not planning to make a proposal at present. The talks were continuing on a bilateral basis.
Continuing his presentation, Mr. Talbot said that the latest letters on Kashmir from both Aziz Ahmed and Nehru were quite negative. Nevertheless, Ambassador Galbraith believes India can be moved to give Pakistan a reasonable foothold in the Vale. On the other hand, Ambassador McConaughy feels that the Paks are not inclined to seek a settlement and he finds their position extremely rigid. Nevertheless, Mr. Talbot explained, we believe there is a fair chance we can move the parties to a compromise. We believe the Paks may come up with a proposal for internationalization or autonomy in the fourth round. It is just as well that these be considered so that the parties may then move on to drawing lines on maps in future talks.
Mr. Talbot pointed out that we believe the stakes are high enough to justify an increase in our involvement in the talks. We wished the President's authority to step up our activities from prodding both parties to making certain substantive suggestions regarding aspects of possible solutions. We proposed to begin this prior to the fourth round.
The President commented that he had recently written letters to both President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru. Did we think there was a need for him to do so again? Mr. Talbot said he believed there would be such a need before the next talks, but not right away.
Mr. Talbot described our coordination of our Kashmir tactics with the British prior to the third round of talks and our plans for similar coordination prior to the fourth.
The Secretary intervened at this point to explain to the President that the major problem we may face in the fourth round is how to get through to the fifth. In view of the political pressures which are likely to be generated by both national legislatures, it will be difficult to make any major progress at Calcutta. There could be greater progress at the fifth round which might be held in April. The Secretary also pointed out that the Paks had offered virtually nothing when they put in their line at Karachi. Our efforts at present, therefore, must be concentrated on getting the Paks to be more forthcoming.
The President then commented rather wryly that if Pakistan doesn't come through with a better compromise offer, it will probably try to blackmail us into holding off on aid to India.
It was to deal with this problem, Mr. Komer explained, that we proposed to make clear to Pakistan that if the Kashmir talks failed because of Pak intransigence, we would not feel obligated to work out our military assistance to India in consultation with Pakistan. Speculating on other Pak moves, Mr. Talbot said that they may be thinking of taking the Kashmir issue to the Security Council this fall and, following a Soviet veto, raise it in the General Assembly. We believe Zafrullah's recent tour may have been intended to sound out Afro - Asian opinion with this move in mind. In order to deal with this eventuality, we propose to tell the Paks in advance that if the talks fail because of their intransigence, we would not support them in the U.N. this year.
The President expressed the view that to say this would simply annoy the Paks. They knew perfectly well that they could get nowhere in the U.N. on Kashmir.
The President then turned his attention again to the map, and, in particular, the dividing line which the Department has suggested as a possible basis for settlement. Mr. Komer said that this line represented the most we thought the Indians might give up, since a settlement would depend on Indian concessions.
Mr. Talbot then brought his presentation to a close with a brief review of our complete formula for a settlement, which, he said, would call for special joint Indo - Pak arrangements in the Vale while reserving to each party respective areas of political control in the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir.
As the discussion came to a close, the President asked if we were suggesting some immediate communication or letter. Mr. Talbot replied that our request was for him to authorize us to step up our involvement in the Kashmir negotiations. The Secretary remarked, we were asking permission to get in from up to our ankles to up to our knees.
The President gave his approval.
259. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and approved in S on March 2.
Washington, February 23, 1963.
SUBJECT
Kashmir: Sino - Pakistan Border Agreement
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
Mr. M. Jaffri, First Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan
The Secretary
NEA--Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
SOA--John N. Gatch, Jr.
The Secretary told the Ambassador that we are worried about a Kashmir settlement. It looks to us as if things were getting more difficult. We had sensed some movement during the third round in Karachi on the part of India, but the Pakistan proposals had not seemed to us to provide a basis for further negotiation. Now, Foreign Minister Bhutto's visit to Peking/2/ made things more difficult. The Secretary wondered how Pakistan viewed the picture--had there been any agonizing reappraisals in Rawalpindi? He added that, viewing the Kashmir question from a vantage point 12,000 miles away, there was a tantalizing aspect to it. This was that both sides approached the Kashmir issue as enemies, but the issue itself was the only thing that made them enemies. This differentiates the Kashmir issue from such issues as Berlin and Cuba.
/2/The Embassy in Karachi was informed on February 22 by the Foreign Ministry that Bhutto intended to travel to Peking on February 24 to sign the border agreement with China which had been presaged by the agreement in principle signed by the two countries on December 26, 1962. (Telegram 1603 from Karachi, February 22; ibid., POL 32 - 2 CHICOM - PAK) The border agreement, which delineated the border between Pakistan and China's Sinkiang province, was signed in Peking on March 2 by Bhutto and China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi. (Telegram 1654 from Karachi, March 5; ibid.)
The Ambassador began by stating his Government's position on the Bhutto visit. He had reported our objections to Bhutto and to President Ayub. These had been considered and the proposal to have the Pakistan Ambassador in Peking sign the agreement had been made to the Communist Chinese. They refused to agree, pointing out that the Nepalese and Burmese border agreements with China had been signed by the King and the Prime Minister respectively, and insisted that at least the Foreign Minister sign the Pakistan one. Pakistan was playing down the importance of the trip--the delegation consisted of only four men who would only spend three days in Peking and one in Shanghai before returning to Pakistan. In any case, India should not read too much either into the fact that the Foreign Minister was going, or into the substance of the agreement itself. Pakistan feels it has acted wisely. The border agreement is provisional and does not prejudice India's interests.
The Secretary said that if he were the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister in Peking, his primary policy objective would be to wreck the Kashmir talks. It seemed to us that the contrived way these announcements about the border agreement had been made indicated that the Communist Chinese were actively using their relations with Pakistan to achieve this objective. The Secretary said he was not viewing the Sino - Pakistan agreement against the background of better than a decade of bitter Sino - United States relations. Rather, he was viewing the agreement as something which Pakistan, a close friend of the United States, was doing which, in the context of the total situation in the subcontinent, might be very harmful to the fourth round of Kashmir talks.
Ambassador Ahmed reiterated that they had tried to call off Bhutto's visit but could not. He added once again that the Indians were being too sensitive.
The Secretary pointed out that Pakistan has asked us in the past to influence the Indians on Kashmir. We have been working hard on getting the two sides together. Perhaps the Indians should not get upset by Pakistan's action, but the fact remains that they are. This puts an additional burden on us in a situation where our influence is already limited.
The Ambassador then turned to the Pakistan position on Kashmir. This, he said, had been stated in President Ayub's last letter to President Kennedy and amplified in his own letter to the Secretary of February 18. It represented the farthest limit Ayub could go consonant with public opinion in Pakistan. Pakistan continues to believe the best solution is a plebiscite, or, at least, the Dixon [Sir Owen]/3/ proposal for a limited plebiscite with partition. India says it cannot accept either of these for security reasons--i.e., India needs to maintain military supply routes through the Vale for the defense of Ladakh.
/3/Brackets in the source text.
At this point, the Ambassador digressed from the subject of Kashmir and dwelt on military affairs. He said that intelligence reports coming to Pakistan indicated that the Indian military wanted to get rid of Ladakh as a military liability. If Pakistan took on the responsibility for the defense of Ladakh, it would result in a real joint defense of the subcontinent--i.e., Pakistan would defend the western flank, consisting of Kashmir and Ladakh, and India would defend NEFA. This arrangement would also provide for the disengagement of Pakistan and Indian forces so vital to a workable settlement. Other settlements would not permit Pakistan to disengage because Pakistan suspicions of Indian intentions would be kept alive by the presence of Indian military forces on Pakistan's flank. The Ambassador said that, the merits of the Kashmir dispute aside, Pakistan believed the concept of Indian responsibility for the defense of NEFA and Pakistan responsibility for Ladakh and Kashmir was a good strategic one. If the United States agrees, Pakistan thinks rightness of concept should be emphasized with Nehru.
Returning to the Kashmir issue itself, the Ambassador said that the Pakistan position contained in his letter to the Secretary of February 18 demonstrated a desire to be reasonable, since India's security concerns in Ladakh were taken into account. This position has not yet been imparted to the Indians, unless the United States had told them. Mr. Talbot said we had not. The Ambassador said that even this position would be hard to sell in Pakistan, but Ayub believed he could sell it.
The Secretary said that from a strictly U.S. national point of view, we do not care what sort of a solution is arrived at in Kashmir. We are interested in it only because it is an unsolved problem which affects our other interests because it perpetuates the confrontation of Pakistan and Indian forces. The solution is really up to India and Pakistan. However, it seemed clear to us that India will not give up Ladakh. He wondered whether it would not be useful to try to find an acceptable political line outside the Vale taking the Indian view into more account than was done at Karachi. He realized that one can never say last chance in diplomacy, but he did consider that if Kashmir was not settled now, the situation would become more serious all around, and we would all be set back farther.
The Secretary continued that, for example, a breakdown in the Kashmir talks would be welcomed in Peking as an invitation for more adventures in a disunited subcontinent. Then we and India's Commonwealth friends would feel compelled to provide India with further military assistance. This would inevitably have repercussions in Pakistan because the military balance would be upset.
The Ambassador said he agreed the Chinese Communists would not like to see a Kashmir settlement, but wondered if Nehru realized this. The Secretary said that in his opinion Nehru's ideas on Kashmir were involved with considerations that go far beyond whatever interests Peking (or Moscow) may have in the issue. The Ambassador wondered whether Nehru can afford to be sentimental on the issue. He believed a more realistic point of view was necessary.
The Secretary said that we urge utter realism on both sides. Kashmir is the number one problem. Perhaps the Chinese Communist involvement with Pakistan had elevated Nehru's concern. The Ambassador said Nehru was the biggest stumbling block. Pakistan believed that many other elements in India wanted a reasonable settlement. The Secretary said that if Pakistan was in touch with these elements in India, he would expect that Pakistan would be aware of the lack of appeal its Karachi proposals had. The Ambassador said that his Government had decided not to table at Karachi the plan mentioned in his letter to the Secretary of February 18. Perhaps Indian leaders would be more reasonable if they could learn the details of this plan.
The Secretary said he wanted to get a precise understanding of this plan. We gathered that it meant partition outside of the Vale and Ladakh now, and then a later transfer of Ladakh and the Vale to Pakistan. The Ambassador said that our understanding was correct. He said that the United States should understand that Pakistan and India public opinion on Kashmir were different. Pakistan has a grievance--India does not. Pakistan feels it has been cheated out of what is its rightful territory. Ayub has to deal with this public opinion, but has gone farther than any other Pakistan government before him has ever dared to go. Ayub feels he can prepare the public for a later transfer of Ladakh and the Vale, but if India wants more, Ayub would not be able to convince the Pakistan people.
The Ambassador said that the Pakistan position was firm, and that Bhutto intended not to agree to a fifth round after Calcutta unless the Indians were more forthcoming than simply presenting minor adjustments to the cease-fire line. The Secretary said that Pakistan's line on the map presented at Karachi was much more unrealistic than was the Indian line.
The Secretary went on to say that the stakes were too high to break off the discussions, and continued effort must be made on both sides. A failure at this point would be serious. The Ambassador agreed, but said effort had to come equally from India. He believes the Ayub offer is reasonable and that Pakistan is prepared to wait for Ladakh and the Vale. Mr. Talbot asked how long Pakistan would wait. The Ambassador said that within a year there would be evidence of recrudescence of Chinese Communist aggression if there was to be any, which Pakistan doubted. The Ambassador said that Pakistan would do its best to see that the talks do not fail. Pakistan was anxious that the United States and India understood this.
The Ambassador then reverted to the question of the attitude of the Indian Army towards Ladakh, and wondered whether we had had any intelligence reports that the Indian Army considered it a liability. The Secretary replied that we had no evidence of this nature.
The Secretary then asked why Pakistan and Indian forces could not disengage in connection with a settlement that gave Ladakh to India. The Ambassador said that the answer to this goes to the root of the problem. Pakistan feels that India has not accepted the fact of its existence, and that if India kept an army in Kashmir ostensibly to defend Ladakh, that army would constitute a threat to Pakistan which it could not disregard. Thus, the settlement would be meaningless.
Mr. Talbot said that the Pakistan proposals do not have enough in them to make negotiations towards a settlement possible. Pakistan must be more forthcoming or there will be no settlement. The Ambassador said that he would communicate this to his government but that he was afraid the Pakistan position would be firmer rather than more forthcoming at Calcutta. He sensed a hardening of the Pakistan attitude. Speaking personally he had been surprised that Ayub had gone as far as he had in the proposal on the Vale and Ladakh. It would be hard to explain to the Pakistan people, and this is why there had been so much furore over the Welles Hangen business. The Hangen broadcast could be construed to give away more of the Pakistan position than was desirable.
The Secretary said that the Pakistan position allowing for only one year delay in transferring the Vale and Ladakh to Pakistan was really no position at all--the year would be consumed by the administrative arrangements. The Ambassador said that the year would provide the answer to a disagreement between India and Pakistan about the immediate Chinese Communist threat in Ladakh. Ayub does not believe it a live threat, the Indians do. Ayub therefore is willing to wait a year to see if the threat materializes.
The Secretary emphasized again the importance of the next round to both sides. He said that if the talks failed because of Pakistan, the sympathy that Pakistan has enjoyed from other governments on Kashmir in the United Nations and elsewhere would be dissipated, and these governments would relax into indifference. The Secretary recalled that Ayub had said to Governor Harriman that any workable settlement would be hard to accept in both countries. The Ambassador said that Ayub had sent a clarification of this statement dealing with the interests of the people involved in any settlement.
The Secretary and Mr. Talbot expressed the hope that the United States and Pakistan could keep in continuous and close communication on the Kashmir issue.
260. National Security Action Memorandum No. 223/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs 215 - 240. Secret.
Washington, February 26, 1963.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Appraisal of Sino - Indian Situation
The President would like an analysis of the possibility that the Chinese might return to the attack on India any time this spring. Obviously, the intelligence requirements are essential, but he would like a political and military appraisal as well, and I suggest that an informal and prompt report be coordinated by the Department of State. If there is a prospect of the Chinese resuming the offensive, are we doing enough to help India? If we are doing enough, are we doing it soon enough?
McGeorge Bundy
261. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 3/63. Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Taken from the Pres. week-end reading dtd 3/2/63."
Washington, March 2, 1963.
The waning prospects for a Kashmir settlement have been further dimmed by (1) Pakistan's border agreement with Peiping, which has given India a new excuse for stalling; and (2) Pakistan's still adamant refusal to consider any form of partition which doesn't give it the Vale. Aziz Ahmed's latest talk with Talbot (To London 4566 attached)/2/ shows rigidity of Pak stand.
/2/Dated February 27; not printed.
Meanwhile we have reached US/UK agreement on tactics for the next round (London's 3330 and 3331 attached)./3/ In essence we will press the Indians to show willingness to give the Paks a position in the Vale, and press the Paks to be sufficiently responsive to keep the talks going.
/3/Both dated February 28; neither printed.
The British agreed not to toss in internationalization at this point, but we believe they still see it as the preferred solution, and suspect that they may have talked about it with the Paks. Since the UK idea involves some form of self-determination, i.e. reversion to Pakistan after a few years, it is a flat non-starter. But if the Paks so choose, they can try it out at some point and get an Indian turn-down. Then we can get back to talking partition.
It's hard to tell how much Pak intransigeance is really bargaining tactics and how much a feeling on Ayub's part that public opinion will not accept partition at this point or that by waiting until Nehru dies, the Paks can get a better deal. We are trying to disabuse the Paks on the latter score.
We could probably get a fifth or even sixth round of talks. Since these highly publicized ministerial rounds sharply restrict maneuverability of the negotiators, however, we are looking for a way to get private talks going instead, with the ministerial sessions coming at much longer intervals.
The odds are increasingly against an early Kashmir settlement, but we must play out the hand. At the minimum we must get the Indians to be sufficiently forthcoming that the failure can be attributed to Pakistan. If this is the case, it should ease our problem on going ahead with aid to India. The Paks will no doubt be unhappy, but at least we'll be able to counter that we made a real effort to get India to come to terms.
Bob Komer
262. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 - 4 INDIA. Top Secret; Operational Immediate.
New Delhi, March 5, 1963, 9 p.m.
3432. Department Pass White House and Defense. We continue to have a serious problem here of keeping Indians moving on Kashmir, firm on China and threading our way between Pakistan baiters, anti-American and other local thickets. The Menonites and fellow travellers are working very hard for a comeback. They are naturally discontented with the way Indian public opinion has moved toward the West in recent months and would like to neutralize the anti-communist and anti-Chinese reaction.
This group has a potentially very dangerous argument that the US responded promptly enough with the help when the Chinese came last fall but now we are subordinating Indian aid to domestic considerations, our fear of arousing the Pakistanis and other adverse factors. It follows that India need not pursue an active Pakistan policy for she is not going to get much help anyway. There is further danger of a realpolitik argument that Americans being largely indifferent, India had better make up with the Chinese along Pak lines.
As you will be aware, I have been meeting these arguments with considerable energy and some success. But given the state of Indian alarm over the Chinese there is a feeling that we are being very studious and deliberate. This was reflected, as these things always are, in Nehru's comment this time to Chalmers Roberts. Accordingly, it is very important that we have rapid movement on the air defense matter. Most immediately if I could indicate the prospect of a fairly prompt response, I would be in a far stronger position in pressing at Calcutta on Kashmir. "You must uphold our hand at this juncture while we are getting you air support." I have just been over the intelligence data and it seems clear that the danger of air operations from Tibet is not large. Accordingly, in accepting some commitment to support the Indians against Chinese air attack we are not running an appreciable risk. At the same time, the supporting effect here will be perfectly enormous. Particularly after this Bhutto trip to Peking I need something to work on. Note also value of example to those who seek to move GOI of successful movement of USG.
Galbraith
263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Dacca/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by BNA, Harriman, McGhee, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Karachi, and Calcutta.
Washington, March 9, 1963, 6:17 p.m.
383. For Ambassador McConaughy. Deliver following message from President to Ayub at earliest opportunity.
March 9, 1963
"Dear Mr. President:
I must tell you of my concern over the turn of events between the third and fourth rounds of the Kashmir talks. As you know, we and the United Kingdom pressed for these talks at Pakistan's urging. We have done our best to get talks started and to keep them going. Indeed, I have gained confidence that we are on the right track from the fact that your government has repeatedly expressed its appreciation for our efforts. I also feel we have made progress in getting India to offer terms better than any in recent years. There is a reasonable prospect that under proper circumstances India will go further still. Thus we have hoped that a resolution of the long-standing dispute between you and India was in sight.
Now, however, the timing and form of Pakistan's negotiations with Peiping, however justifiable these might be on other grounds, have had the predictable effect of seriously clouding the atmosphere. The Government of India will now find it more difficult to gain public acceptance of necessary concessions to Pakistan. I know you had your reasons for concluding the border agreement with Communist China. But there is no blinking how adversely it has affected the negotiations.
It was with this in mind that I noted and was encouraged by your statement in Dacca on the next round of talks. You said the agreement with Communist China would not prejudice the Kashmir talks in Calcutta and that Pakistan would enter them with honest intention to seek an equitable and honorable settlement.
To this end, I feel that the Pakistan delegation at Calcutta should take the initiative by advancing a far more forthcoming and realistic position than that adopted not only at the Karachi meetings but also subsequently heard from some of your officials. I can tell you that I am also urging Mr. Nehru to approach the negotiations in a forthcoming spirit.
Any serious effort to settle the Kashmir issue requires the willingness of each side to reckon with the interests of the other in the Vale of Kashmir. Yet at Karachi, neither side came to grips with this central issue. I continue to think that the best solution involves an international boundary through Kashmir. Nevertheless, should you believe some other formula would be workable, I hope you will come forward with it at Calcutta.
Let me again underline my conviction that there will probably never be a better opportunity for an honorable settlement on terms as good as those we think attainable now. If we do not succeed in our efforts this time, it would seem almost inevitable that the issue would, for all practical purposes, be settled on the basis of the status quo.
The Kashmir discussions are a challenge requiring patience and determination along with a high order of statesmanship. I know we can count on you to do your share. I hope that we can keep in close touch as the discussions continue.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by BNA, Laise, Harriman, McGhee, and McGeorge Bundy, and in draft by Rusk; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Dacca, Karachi, London, and Calcutta.
Washington, March 9, 1963, 6:17 p.m.
3366. Verbatim Text. Deliver following message from President to Prime Minister Nehru at earliest appropriate opportunity:
March 9, 1963
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I appreciate your replying to my letter in the same frank manner in which I had written to you./2/ I can understand the discouragement you expressed about Kashmir. I can see, however, how the accumulated tensions and emotions of the last sixteen years make the path of compromise most difficult to tread on either side.
/2/For Kennedy's letter, transmitted to New Delhi on February 6, see Document 251. For text of Nehru's February 16 letter, see Document 255.
If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by American personnel wouldhave to man these fighters and communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till Indian personnel had been trained. I'm persuaded you will agree from your own experience that, in negotiations such as those between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, day to day developments tend to take on an importance they do not always deserve. They sometimes seem to obscure the broader realities which initially caused each party to conclude that agreement rather than difference was in its national interest. As I think you will agree, the realities which dictate India's discussions with Pakistan include the security of the subcontinent from outside aggression, the need to free energies and resources for internal development, and the need to end the fear of one nation and one people of the subcontinent of another. These realities, and the talks resulting from them, provide a historic opportunity for laying the foundations of friendship, well-being and strength in South Asia. India's potential role and responsibility in this historical process is central and your own capacity to exercise a decisive influence is great.
In your letter you described the proposal made by India during the talks at Karachi. While this was a real step forward, I suspect that until India and Pakistan have made serious proposals which take into account the position of each regarding the Vale, they will not have made use of the historic opportunity presented by the talks. Pakistan certainly has not done so. But I hope that India would nevertheless begin discussion of the Vale. It would be tragic if that beginning were not made.
Let me, therefore, renew my urging that India continue to make proposals which will be proof positive to the Pakistanis that you genuinely seek a settlement by signalling a willingness to give Pakistan a substantial position in the Vale. I urge this not only because I hope that statesmanship can yet find the way to honorable compromise that is so much in the interest of the subcontinent as a whole. I urge it also because India would demonstrate to the world its sincerity in seeking a Kashmir settlement, and would clearly show Pakistan India's desire to compromise the central issue of the dispute. You will appreciate the dangers of waiting too long to take this step.
As to Pakistan, I hold no brief for the timing of Mr. Bhutto's visit to Peiping nor the extent to which Communist China has been enabled to use the conclusion of this agreement to serve its interests. We have made this clear to them. But we cannot remake the past. And with patience and tolerance there is still an opportunity for the future. I hope the talks go well at Calcutta and that real progress will be made.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
265. Editorial Note
On March 9, 1963, the Afghan Government of Mohammed Daud resigned. (Telegram 394 from Kabul, March 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 AFG) Daud was succeeded as Prime Minister by Dr. Mohammed Yusuf, who had served as Minister of Mines in the Daud government. Yusuf also held the positions of Foreign Minister and Minister of Mines in the cabinet he formed on March 13. (Telegram 411 from Kabul, March 13; ibid., POL 15 - 1 AFG) On March 13, the Embassy in Kabul reported to the Department of State that a "rash of rumor" was circulating in Afghanistan to the effect that the fall of the Daud government was the result of "adroit U.S. engineering." (Telegram 407 from Kabul; ibid., POL 15 AFG)
The Department concurred with the Embassy's assessment that speculation associating the United States with the change of government in Afghanistan was probably inevitable and largely uncontrollable. The Department also agreed that U.S. actions should provide no fuel for such speculation. Accordingly, the Kennedy administration intended to pursue "cautious and correct" relations with the new Afghan Government. The object was to "neither burden it with embraces nor discourage it with coldness." In line with that policy, the Department informed the Embassy that no new initiatives with regard to the border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan were contemplated. (Telegram 248 to Kabul, March 17; ibid., POL 15 - 1 AFG)
266. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, India, 091.3 (26 Oct 1962), 1963 Papers. Secret.
JCSM - 203 ? 63
Washington, March 12, 1963.
SUBJECT
Report by Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission to India (U)
1. In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, a draft of the report by the Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission to India has been obtained and is forwarded herewith./2/ It is understood that, with the exception of necessary editorial corrections, the findings contained therein will approximate those in the final report of the Mission.
/2/Attached but not printed.
2. Provided there are no substantive changes in its final form and subject to Joint Chiefs of Staff review of the final report of the Chief of the US element, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the findings of the Mission are generally acceptable.
3. With respect to implementing actions to improve Indian air defense capability in the short term, the preliminary views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are that:
a. The United Kingdom should assume over-all responsibility for implementing the air defense program for India, with assistance from other Commonwealth countries and the United States.
b. The United States should be prepared to commit one US fighter squadron and one mobile ground control intercept radar (GCI) to assist the Indian Air Force in air defense tasks in the event of resumption of Sino-Indian hostilities on a scale which indicates the immediate danger of Chinese air attack on Delhi or Calcutta. A US fighter squadron could be deployed in approximately 58 hours, and a mobile GCI would require six days.
c. The United States should not make any commitment, such as 3 b above, to the Government of India involving US combat air defense units unless political reasons therefore are overriding and provided no Constitutional objection exists. Even then, such commitment should be withheld until there is agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom as to contributions and responsibilities in the air defense program for India.
d. In such an agreement, the United Kingdom, in accordance with undertakings at Nassau, should be requested to take immediate action to improve present Indian day-fighter capability to include supply of spares for Hunter aircraft, technical assistance in making the Gnat operational, and supply of attrition aircraft. Further, the United Kingdom should make arrangements with the Indian government for improvements to existing TPS - 1E and type 8 radars.
e. Prior to governmental approval of commitments as outlined above, action will be required to determine the concept for employment and extent of combat involvement of UK and US air defense units. Due consideration must be given the principle that in committing United States Forces to combat, there will be an implied further commitment of US military force as may be necessary for the defense of India.
4. The US fighter currently available for deployment (F - 100 or F - 105) is not a true all-weather interceptor. By reason of its over-all performance, however, deployment of one of these types would add to existing Indian air defense capability. Furthermore, current estimates of the threat do not credit the Chinese with a significant all-weather offensive capability. If the threat changes, plans may be required for deploying some other type, such as F - 102's or F - 4C's, if available at the time.
5. It is recommended that the foregoing be used as a basis for the air defense aspects of the informal reply to the questions contained in NSAM 223./3/ The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on longer range Indian air defense requirements will be submitted when the final report of the Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission has been reviewed.
/3/Document 260.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
267. Telegram From President Kennedy to the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Ambassador Galbraith, Special File, Miscellaneous Messages, 1/63 - 7/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Handwritten notes on the source text read: "Send via CIA channel," and "cite CAP 63143."
Washington, March 22, 1963, 10:45 a.m.
For Ambassador Galbraith From President.
I've just caught up on current status of Kashmir, and am worried lest the Indians have lost their sense of urgency over settlement. Of course, the Paks asked for trouble by Bhutto's trip to Peking, but I gather the Indians did nothing else but play this record during the Calcutta round/2/ instead of moving the ball forward even an inch. At any rate, we can't let them hide behind this issue any longer.
/2/The fourth round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir took place in Calcutta March 12 - 15 without achieving any progress toward a settlement.
I'm also concerned lest the Indians got the idea from my press conference statement on 21 February,/3/ and Rusk's on 8 March,/4/ that we've already decided to go ahead on longer term military aid, so they can relax on Kashmir. Clay Report/5/ may add to this impression. Since the prospect of our aid is still our chief leverage, even though it may be a wasting asset, keep pressing on them that a Kashmir settlement or at least an all-out Indian effort to get one is central to my ability to secure them the massive aid they want; and this is all too true. To add this burden on top of the already staggering economic assistance we give to India may be well-nigh impossible for me to sell the Congress, unless I can point to concrete evidence of India's own seriousness of purpose. We'll have to move fairly soon on the air umbrella and the other Indian military requirements, so we don't have too much time before this leverage on the Indians will no longer be as useful.
/3/For the text of Kennedy's statement on the issue of air defense support for India, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 204 - 205.
/4/Rusk's comment in his March 8 press conference on the question of additional military aid to India is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1963, p. 439.
/5/Reference is to the March 20 report to President Kennedy from the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World. The committee was chaired by Lucius D. Clay, and the report dealt with the scope and distribution of U.S. military and economic assistance programs. The recommendations of the report are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1148 - 1163.
I am counting on you to get these matters moved forward. Remember that you are still my Ambassador until August or so, which time you can become critic rather than executor of our policy, and let GATO/6/ go by the boards. Instead of GATO let's settle for a Kashmir solution as the crowning monument to Galbraith in India. Chester can then move on to grander strategy.
/6/In a January 9 telegram to Galbraith, sent by the same channel, Kennedy referred, with a trace of humor, to Galbraith's "grand design for the subcontinent," which Kennedy styled "GATO--Galbraith's Allpurpose Treaty Organization." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Ambassador Galbraith, Special File, Miscellaneous Messages, 1/63 - 7/63)
268. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 3/22/63 - 3/31/63. Secret.
Washington, March 23, 1963.
I've summarized on attached page State's reply last week to your query/2/ about risks of renewed Chicom attack on India this Spring.
/2/The query was expressed in NSAM No. 223, Document 260.
Just this week Indian sources have been playing up alleged 2 - 4 division Chicom reinforcements and hostile tone of recent Peiping notes. We have no evidence of buildup, have tracked down source of above report, and think it false (see Delhi 3667 and 3637 attached). /3/ Our hunch is that Indians are playing threat up partly as a pitch for US aid, partly to keep Indian people alive to threat.
/3/Not attached. Dated March 22 and March 21, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM - INDIA)
We think Chicoms would lose more politically than they'd gain militarily by renewed attack. It would almost certainly serve our interests rather than theirs.
Bob Komer
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret.
Washington, March 14, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The attached response /5/ to your query about the possibility of renewed Chicom attack on India, and the impact of our aid on India ability to resist, can be summarized as follows:
/5/Not found.
1. We see little likelihood of renewed major Chicom attack this spring. Their withdrawal from areas seized last fall, lack of any subsequent major build-up, and our analysis of Chicom intentions all suggest that the Chicoms feel they achieved their limited objectives, and are unlikely to risk triggering US/UK intervention. There might, however, be a renewal of minor skirmishing.
2. The Chicoms are capable of reoccupying all of the areas they seized last fall. However, the Indian army has elected not to re-occupy and defend these areas. In the NEFA the Indians would defend down on the Assam plain and would give a much better account of themselves in general than last fall. The Chinese logistic problem would also be much more difficult, if they tried to advance out of the Himalaya foothills into the critical river valleys. The Indians might well be able to contain any such Chicom advances, particularly if they used their air, though the Chinese might make some further gains.
3. If the above estimate is correct, our aid has been at about the right pace, considering our desire to use its rate of flow as leverage on Kashmir. Given the present limited absorptive capacity of the Indian forces, they could not really have used a great deal more. What aid we gave did much to meet their emergency needs. The key further short-run step we could take would be to provide the US/UK "air umbrella," which we will be recommending shortly.
4. The longer term military threat to India may be greater than the immediate one, depending on how both sides handle themselves in the disputed zones. Therefore we ought to consider moving shortly on (a) the next tranche of military assistance beyond the $120 million emergency ceiling (b) assisting Indian defense production (c) rehabilitating the Indian air force (which we hope the UK will take on).
R.W. Komer
269. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
New Delhi, March 25, 1963, Midnight.
3693. Dept Pass White House and Defense. I have now settled in my mind on the tactics for the next approach to the Indians on Kashmir. This supplements and extends Embtels 3602/2/ and 3607/3/ to which incidentally I have as yet had no response. We assume here that the Department has not lost its interest in a Kashmir settlement. If this is so would hope there might be more positive indication to this effect in the speed and precision of future comment.
/2/Telegram 3602 from New Delhi, March 18, contained Galbraith's assessment of the Calcutta round of the Kashmir Ministerial talks, which he described as "a frail dish," and his suggestions for tactics to pursue in the wake of those talks. (Ibid.)
/3/In telegram 3607 from New Delhi, March 18, Galbraith outlined what he saw as the unique opportunity to influence India policy offered by the negotiations taking place over the Indian request for air defense support. (Ibid., DEF 1 - 4 INDIA)
As the basic point of departure let me note that I have exhausted my present line of argument. The Indians are listening to my speeches on the security of the subcontinent and the need to placate our Congress with exceptional equanimity. I would attribute this to my own incoherence were it not that the eloquent letters drafted for the President are producing an equal absence of perturbation. At the same time as shown by the past and forthcoming trips of the local power elite to Washington, Indians have a continuing and increasing concern for war production assistance, longer-run defense aid and air defense. There is also (Embtel 3607 again) increasing concern about developing independent strength by the IAF. As the immediate fear of the Chinese Air Force recedes and national pride re-asserts itself they are beginning to think of new equipment. This yearning will continue and increase.
One further point. Instead of waiting for the April talks, there is a chance for speeding up these dreary negotiations by getting the Indians to outline an offer in advance. This would put them in a very good light, and put the Paks in a position where they would have to prepare a responding step. This offer should be fairly definitive and could be wholly contingent on a Pak response. The Calcutta exercise (Embtel 3602) is causing me to have doubts about whether the existing forward process is going forward at all. We need a bigger step. In light of the above I propose:
(1) After preparatory work with Krishnamachari, Shastri and FonSec Desai and possibly Chavan, I propose to go to see PriMin and put forward a plain political bargain. Alternatively, "I may ask" the above cast to do it for me and preliminary soundings with TTK suggest that this could be best course. The deal is that we will give the Indians substantial support on machinery, equipment and raw material for the development of their defense industry. We will give them backup support on air. We will negotiate a sizeable program of longer-term aid. These things we are prepared to work out with Krishnamachari on his forthcoming trip to Washington. But we must however have something from the Indians. That is a clear indication that they will make a substantial concession, not a sliver, in the valley. I shall note that one dominant view, which I happen to hold, is that Vale should be divided with the rights to the valley residents to move and trade freely across the line. There must also be ironclad guarantees to the Pakistanis on the rivers. Something on this line should be offered in advance of Karachi as a major move to settlement. At Karachi Indians should propose a joint team of experts to work on mutually acceptable arrangements in valley for presentation first to ministers and then to summit.
(2) I will stress that early indication of offer along the foregoing lines will serve two purposes: (A) it will set the stage for Krishnamachari's negotiations and enable him to sew up these vital matters, and (B) it will make it possible for us to put the arm on the Paks in an equally serious way. We do not know whether the Paks will accept. But the Indians will have put the ball plainly in their court. If Paks don't respond to a suitable offer, we will of course go ahead with military aid. The Paks will have lost their right to complain.
(3) The foregoing concerns the major step. I come now to a later stage of the bargain. I plan to say that we are aware of the Indians need for transport planes, high-performance fighters and pilot training. The C - 119's we will provide as part of the present program. However, we have no choice but to go slow on high-performance fighters and pilot training and probably C - 130 type transport because of the danger of an adverse and damaging Pakistan reaction. But it should be understood that just as soon as a Kashmir settlement is effective we will provide planes and training so welcome this accretion to the air strength of the non-communist world. I am perfectly aware that this takes us some steps beyond present thinking. Notice however that it is an offer that is contingent on a settlement. Should we get a settlement, some fighters and training would be a small price. And it gives Indians strong incentive for further adjustments and amendments beyond the major step. Once we get the major steps, small changes can follow always assuming the Paks can be brought along.
There are risks in the above strategy and I have no doubt that they will be adequately discussed. This is the first time we have descended to quite such a crude bazaar level with the Indians. They may not like it and the sensitive Nehru soul may be somewhat seared. The Communists and the Menonites will [garble] a barter of sacred territory for the defense and sound off. However, I must stress that I have exhausted the verbal lines of approach including those that are still to be suggested by the Department and this is the most practical next step. Moreover, it might work. Accordingly:
(1) May I have Washington support for the defense production air defense and longer-range arms aid which are our part of the bargain? May I note that if caution causes you to cut back on my offer you will be directly damaging my case. And may I note that these are things that in one form or another we are going to do anyway, so why not use them?
(2) To avoid misunderstanding I should give some indication of the general magnitude on defense production and longer[-range arms aid?]. While these figures need not be precise, I will need guidance and neither vagueness nor parsimony will help me a bit.
(3) May I have specific approval for talking about the longer-run air prospect in event of a full settlement?
(4) May it be understood (Embtel 3607) that air defense deals with procedure but at the moment it seems at all odds the most promising course?
(5) May it be known that I view with continuing alarm the indication in the cables that Sandys may return to the subcontinent and I regard as irresponsible the failure to tell the British when this talk of the glint in Sandys' eye comes up how disastrous this would be. (They are clear here.) I am in fact persuaded that at any time we seem to be close to agreement he will be back with the hope of propping up his admirably unpromising career and presumably with his talk of CENTO, nuclear deterrents and the rest. I must again urge in strongest terms the grievous damage that this would do and the importance of preventing it. If nothing else serves, you must have in mind a direct appeal by the President to Macmillan.
(6) May I have, for God's sake, reasonably prompt reply? If you are very prompt I might plead for speed here so you could put the bite on Bhutto. May I also remind all hands that just as Washington considers it prudent to remind ambassadors to move with all firmness, vigor and determination, so ambassadors are entitled in characteristic humility to ask Washington to collect itself effectively for supporting action. I notice with mild distaste my feeling that while I should be expected to move GOI with some celerity, the tempo USG must be taken as given and very deliberate at that.
Galbraith
270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, India, Security, 1963. Secret.
Washington, March 31, 1963.
SUBJECT
Kashmir: Tactics For Fifth Round/2/
/2/The fifth round of Ministerial talks on Kashmir took place in Karachi April 22 - 25.
1. Our Proposed Tactics
In our efforts to encourage India and Pakistan toward a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, British and United States officials have just agreed, ad referendum, to courses of action described in the attached three papers. Your approval is requested.
2. What Ambassador Galbraith Proposes
Ambassador Galbraith has proposed much different tactics for the coming weeks:/3/
/3/See Document 269.
Prior to the Karachi talks we should strike a "crude bazaar level" political bargain with Nehru. We would offer India defense production assistance, backup support on air, and sizeable long-term aid. We would ask in return that India promise to offer Pakistan in advance of the Karachi talks a substantial position in the Vale and ironclad guarantees on the rivers.
If India accepted, it would be up to Pakistan to respond with a suitable offer. If it did not, we would go ahead with military aid to India.
We would tell the Indians now that when a Kashmir settlement is effective we will provide India with high performance fighters, pilot training and probably C - 130's.
3. Difference between suggested U.S./U.K. tactics and Ambassador Galbraith's Proposal
Our tactics assume that more common ground needs to be built up before the two parties can face the final confrontation without great risk to themselves and to our interests. Ambassador Galbraith's are designed to purchase not a settlement, but an immediate breakthrough from the Indian side. The price is an open-ended military commitment to India. Since this is just the thing which the Pakistanis fear most, we would expect them to react violently. This would reduce the likelihood of a Kashmir settlement and increase Indo - Pak tensions. We would, therefore, suffer a severe setback in our efforts to strengthen subcontinental defense against Communist China. Moreover, we would risk losing the special advantages of our relationship with Pakistan.
4. Emerging Differences with the British
We are agreed with the British on Kashmir tactics through the Karachi talks. You should, however, be alerted to the prospect that differences regarding military aid and Kashmir are likely to arise in the future:
If there is no progress in the Karachi talks, we will encounter increasing difficulty in getting British cooperation on additional military assistance to India.
The British might reluctantly agree to commitments on air defense under the scope of the joint recommendations but would find great difficulty in providing defense production assistance. They have not considered long-range military assistance to India; quite apart from the Kashmir issue it would require a reversal of long-standing policy toward Commonwealth countries.
DR
Attachment/4/
/4/Secret.
SCENARIO FOR KASHMIR NEGOTIATIONS
I. Objectives for the fifth round--April 21: /5/
/5/The fifth round of talks began on April 22.
To get discussions concentrated on the Vale and the possible alternatives; to devise means for pursuing future negotiations more effectively.
II. Suggested action for accomplishing this:
1. U.S./U.K. should agree upon the preparations required and the joint line of action to be followed in regard to the fifth round.
2. An early, high-level approach to President Ayub and to Prime Minister Nehru is probably desirable if U.S./U.K. exploratory talks with officials prior to the fifth round are to be productive.
3. It will be necessary to seek through other forms of diplomatic representation to impress upon both sides the political necessity of making concessions in regard to the Vale.
4. We should seek by quiet behind-the-scenes talking with both parties based upon the joint instructions agreed upon by the U.S. and U.K. to prepare the ground for a more fruitful fifth round. This would include discussions with the two parties of a U.S./U.K. statement of the elements which would indicate the general limits of what we believe to be a practicable settlement. We hope that this might make it possible for the two parties to abandon their reluctance to reveal their bargaining positions.
5. The U.S. has found value in having Embassy efforts supplemented by a single U.S. representative to present the Washington views to the two sides and proposes to send Elmore Jackson back to the subcontinent about April 7.
6. No commitments on air defense, defense production, or long-term military assistance will be made prior to the fifth round, but urgent planning and continuing consultation will be necessary in order that decisions can be taken at short notice if developments in the negotiations make this desirable.
III. Post-fifth round follow up:
The presence of the UK and US officials in the subcontinent for the CENTO meeting in late April will provide an opportunity for discussions in Karachi and Delhi of the problems of securing the subcontinent against Chinese ambitions and the central importance of a Kashmir settlement and improved Indo - Pak relations to this end.
By late April the U.K. and the U.S. must be prepared: to discuss both in New Delhi and with numerous high ranking Indian official visitors questions relating to U.K./U.S. military aid for the next phase; to Indian air defense and to defense production requirements; and to use the discussions in this regard to encourage forward movement by the Indians on the Kashmir question. Hearings on aid to India will already be under way before the U.S. Congressional committees, but the floor debate and decisions may not take place until mid-summer.
The Pak consortium meeting (pledging) is scheduled for the end of April; the Indian consortium meetings, both preparatory and pledging, are scheduled for May.
The President of India visits the U.S. and U.K. in June.
Attachment/6/
/6/Secret.
JOINT U.K./U.S. INSTRUCTION FOR FIFTH ROUND KASHMIR TALKS/7/
/7/The text of this joint instruction was sent on April 2 to New Delhi as telegram 3561 and to Karachi as telegram 1495. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK)
Our objective before and during Karachi meeting is to get parties into serious discussion of Vale and of line south of Vale.
We do not believe that present pattern of periodic three-day ministerial meetings with no provision for detailed examination of alternatives in interval is productive method of negotiation. Accordingly, our objective at Karachi should be sufficient ministerial agreement on political elements of solution so that parties, possibly through quiet discussion at technical level, could then proceed either directly to Nehru - Ayub meeting or to a final ministerial meeting followed promptly by Ayub - Nehru meeting.
To achieve these objectives we must take vigorous action to step up badly lagging tempo of talks. Practice of urging parties narrow differences by offering proposals and counterproposals has not been productive. Therefore, we plan stimulate proposals regarding Vale by discussing with parties a number of elements which would indicate general limits of what we believe practicable settlement. (Instructions regarding these elements will be sent separately.)/8/ We would not expect either party explicitly to accept these elements but we would hope that concentration on these elements will assist parties, prior fifth round, to shape realistic proposals to be considered at Karachi.
/8/The text of the elements of a settlement, cited in the joint U.S. - U.K. instruction, was sent on April 2 to New Delhi as telegram 3562 and to Karachi as telegram 1496. (Ibid.)
In your discussions with Indians and Paks leading up to fifth round, you should be guided by appropriate portions of instructions relating to fourth round, including authorization take specified emergency action if necessary to avoid breakdown of talks. In addition, you should take following line:
(1) There must be substantial achievement at Karachi talks. Following preliminary discussions at Rawalpindi, Delhi, and Karachi, and regrettable slow-down at Calcutta, talks have reached decisive stage. Major progress is essential and if there is to be such progress both parties must be prepared to make major compromises. We regard fifth round as key test of seriousness with which both sides seek compromise settlement which so much in interest of both economic and military security of subcontinent.
(2) We believe main business of Karachi talks should be serious discussion of Vale, and you should make this clear to both parties. In order to help them come to grips with problem, we will be discussing with them a number of elements which we believe would apply to any mutually acceptable agreement on Vale.
(3) You should continue to insist that each side must accord other a substantial position in Vale and their proposals must take this central principle into account. Each party must come to Karachi prepared give fair hearing to proposals of other. While we continue believe solution which would lead to least difficulty would be achieved by delineation of an international boundary, we will support any feasible settlement upon which India and Pakistan can agree.
(4) You should tell Indians it would have most unfortunate effect on Karachi talks were they again to raise subject Pak - Chinese border agreement, and it should now be dropped.
Attachment/9/
/9/Secret.
ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT
It is proposed that the following points, which are designed to encourage the parties to concentrate on the immediate questions at issue, should be put to the parties by the Ambassador and by Elmore Jackson, after the latter's arrival on the subcontinent. The British, through their High Commissioners, will concert, as appropriate, in the presentation and the subsequent discussion.
1. Neither India nor Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the Kashmir Valley. Each must have a substantial position in the Vale.
2. India and Pakistan must both have assured access to and through the Vale for the defense of their positions to the north and east. These defense arrangements must be such as not to impede a disengagement of Indian and Pakistan forces.
3. Outside the Valley, the economic and strategic interests of the two countries should be recognized, e.g., India's position in Ladakh and Pakistan's interest in the development of water storage facilities on the Chenab.
4. The position of the two countries in the Valley must be such as to permit:
(a) clearly defined arrangements for sovereignty and for the maintenance of law and order.
(b) political freedom and some measure of local self-rule for the inhabitants.
(c) free movement of the people of the Valley throughout the Vale, and their relatively free movement to other parts of Kashmir and to India and Pakistan.
(d) the rapid development by India and Pakistan of tourism in the Kashmir area--with its important foreign exchange potential for both countries.
(e) the effective use in Kashmir of development funds, available from external sources, for such purposes as improving water and forestry resources, the development of communications and small industries, and improving the health and welfare of the people.
271. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret. Drafted by Elmore Jackson on April 3. The meeting was held at the White House.
Washington, April 1, 1963, 4:30 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Harriman
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. Talbot
Mr. W. Bundy
Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Jackson
The Secretary opened the discussion by indicating the importance which he attaches to the defense of the subcontinent. He emphasized the central role of a Kashmir settlement in the development of that defense system.
Mr. Talbot interpreted the present status of the Kashmir negotiations. The last Indian - Pakistan Ministerial Meeting in Calcutta did not move the two parties forward. It may have gotten them over certain hurdles growing out of the Pak - Chicom border agreement. In talks here in Washington during the last few days with the British, a general line of approach has been developed which includes moves to re-emphasize to India and Pakistan the importance which the US and UK attach to a Kashmir settlement./2/ It also included an agreement (ad referendum) on:
/2/See Document 270.
1. A scenario for the period preceding and immediately following the next Ministerial Meeting in Karachi, scheduled to begin on April 21.
2. A paper setting forth certain "elements of a settlement," and
3. The informal use of a background paper elaborating various alternative approaches to a settlement.
As a means of emphasizing the importance which the UK attaches to a settlement, the British are considering the possibility of the Prime Minister addressing letters to Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub. The United States has already moved in this area by sending Walt Rostow and Bob Komer for talks with senior officials in India and Pakistan.
The President indicated that he understood some of the reasons why, under present circumstances, the Indians might be brought to a willingness to reach a compromise settlement on Kashmir. He asked what incentives there were for President Ayub to compromise. It was pointed out that the next few months might be the last good opportunity for Pakistan to settle. The US and UK might be able at the present time to persuade the Indians to make a substantial compromise. The two countries may not have at hand equal leverage in the future.
The President asked if Duncan Sandys was likely again to become directly involved in the negotiations. Mr. Harriman indicated that he did not share Ambassador Galbraith's feeling about the usefulness of Mr. Sandys' efforts. He felt that the latter had already been of substantial assistance in getting the present negotiations underway.
The President asked if the Indians understood that they must settle the Kashmir question. Mr. Talbot suggested that there had been some slippage in the Indian approach during the period surrounding the Pak - Chicom border agreement but said that Mr. Rostow's trip was designed to re-emphasize to the Indians and the Pakistanis the importance of a Kashmir settlement.
The President asked why, if the US was going to make certain military assistance available to India during the next few months, certain of the arrangements could not be made promptly in a manner which could relate them to a more forthcoming Indian offer on Kashmir. The Secretary and Mr. Talbot suggested the problem was partially one of timing. It was pointed out that the India - Pakistan negotiations had not yet reached the stage where it was possible for the US and UK to get a sufficiently clear reading of what the ultimate compromise should be for us to put our full weight behind a particular Indian offer. In addition, a US - Indian deal would certainly leak. This would lead almost certainly to a Pakistani rejection.
The President asked how soon decisions could be made on a military aid program for India. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that while the US might, at an early stage, reach a decision in regard to air defense questions, and perhaps on the first stage of a defense production program, the Indian government's requirements for the later stages of their defense production program and for their long-term military assistance program, were most unclear. The US, as of now, has no firm indications from the Indians for these latter requirements. It would thus be difficult at this stage to relate most of these military programs to a specific Indian offer on Kashmir. If such relationships were to be considered desirable, they could be established much more effectively in early May.
The Secretary of Defense indicated that the costs of an air defense program and of the first stage of a defense production program would not be difficult to handle.
The Secretary suggested that the aim of the United States should be to secure a Kashmir settlement and not just to stimulate an Indian offer which, if the Pakistanis turned it down, would clear the way for additional military assistance to India. This would lead to an accelerating arms race between India and Pakistan and continued wastage of US and other economic resources on the subcontinent. He emphasized the importance of our looking at the defense of the subcontinent as a whole.
The President suggested that perhaps the proper course would be to indicate to Ambassador Galbraith that we might come to some such proposal as his following the meeting in Karachi.
Mr. Talbot said that he hoped that enough progress could be made in narrowing the gap between the two parties before and during the Karachi meeting and it would be possible after that meeting for the US to be much clearer in stimulating or promoting compromise proposals. In response to a question, Mr. Jackson indicated that he thought it would be premature to attempt to work out a final proposal for settlement, of the kind which Ambassador Galbraith suggested, previous to the Karachi meeting. He felt that, using the elements of a settlement on which the US and UK had agreed (ad referendum), it should be possible to get India and Pakistan at the Karachi meeting into a discussion of the Vale. He believed that, following such a discussion, the US would have a much more definite view of the nature of the ultimate compromise toward which the parties should be encouraged to move.
The President suggested that Ambassador Galbraith be told:
1. That Washington is moving promptly to define our response to Indian military aid requests;
2. That we are lacking adequate information with regard to the Indian need for a long-term military aid program and that we urgently need the Ambassador's assistance in getting more precise estimates, and;
3. That the kind of proposal on Kashmir which he has suggested could better be considered later in April or early in May.
Mr. Talbot asked whether this meant that the President approved the scenario which had been worked out with the British. Mr. Bundy suggested that the President might wish to put the consensus that had been reached at the meeting to Ambassador Galbraith, getting his comment, before making a final decision. The Secretary suggested that the consensus should similarly be sent to Ambassador McConaughy for his comment.
The President assented to this approach.
272. Memorandum From the Department of State Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/12/63 - 4/23/63. Secret.
Washington, April 8, 1963.
SUBJECT
India-Pakistan Conversations, April 1 - 7, 1963:/2/ The Impending Negotiating Crisis
/2/Rostow and Komer visited India April 1 - 3 and Pakistan April 4 - 7. Additional documentation on the visit is in Department of State, Central File POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK.
The message was delivered loud and clear in the two countries; and they [it] may have marginally helped our Ambassadors set the stage for the presentation of Principles and Round Five. In any case, as we left, the two parties and the assorted doves of peace were girding themselves for what they know to be a fateful period.
The reactions to our messages and the emotional and political posture of the various principal actors followed a well-worn script wholly familiar to those in the Kashmir business and even to observers at one remove like myself.
But one reaction emerged, which I had not anticipated. It took different forms with different men; it almost always surfaced as the final thought, the last sentence; it was expressed at high levels and low almost unconsciously, always in a moment of sincerity, by Indians and Pakistani, British and Americans; with fatalism, scepticism, or anxiety; and in the case of a few bitter die-hards, with anticipation.
The reaction was this: no one can yet see by what process the negotiation over Kashmir--any negotiation over Kashmir--can be brought to a politically viable conclusion. Nehru, after agreeing the case for a settlement, asked aloud: "But how can it be done without creating more tension than we now have?" Ayub, after warning that a Kashmir settlement might raise tensions, went through his concept of moving by stages, closing in on the Vale only at the end. Ken Galbraith's last thought was: "Perhaps the lines will never meet, but we've got to try." The Indian High Commissioner in Karachi said: "We'll discuss the Vale all right in the Fifth Round; but we won't settle it; and then what do we do?"
And so it went.
This prevalent, vision of a stone wall ahead arises from a complex of psychological, political, and technical negotiating problems.
First, of course, Indian minds run into a real block in surrendering any substantial part of the Vale; and Pakistani minds run into an even greater block in ceding once and for all any part of the Vale to India. Quite aside from political pressures; the issue is so highly charged and men's minds have run so often over the tracks which rationalize their respective present positions that it is literally difficult and literally painful for them to visualize a change in the way things are (for Indians) or anything short of the fulfillment of their dream and crusade (for Pakistani).
In addition, back in a more rational world, both sets of politicians see trouble as they contemplate any conceivably negotiable Kashmir compromise; and tolerably objective observers concede the possibility of trouble--for example, the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi concedes Nehru's problem, and the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi, Ayub's. At the same time, men perceive that Ayub and Nehru both retain, if they are determined, very large potential influence to alter the political scene. Their problem, as I see it, is that they cannot afford to move off their present political postures until two conditions are satisfied: the terms of the whole deal are known; and each is satisfied that the other will wholeheartedly commit himself before his own people to that deal. By "the whole deal" I mean the terms of economic coexistence and at least implicit military collaboration (as well as disengagement), not merely the Kashmir deal. The dilemma, then, is this: only a radical change in political atmosphere, plus economic and military ameliorations, can justify the inevitable pain of a possible Kashmir settlement; but it is possible that the change in atmosphere cannot be brought about until Ayub and Nehru see the whole package; and our present negotiating sequence, for good and sufficient reasons--notably the Pak desire to get at the Vale before being diverted to other issues--does not permit the other, softening issues to be gripped and the vested interests in both countries connected with them, to be brought effectively into play.
The problem may well be complicated by the emergence of negotiating postures, designed to put the other fellow in the wrong and to impress Washington and world opinion rather than to move forward.
Ayub, for example, is so deeply convinced of Nehru's political unreliability (not without recent reinforcing ammunition) that only very hard commitments by the Indians are likely to lead him to defend reconciliation before his people. Similarly, Desai asked us: "Why should we give anything to the Pakistani if their hostility to us is so deeply rooted and fixed that reconciliation is impossible?"; and after I heard Dehlavi, I was damned if I knew what I could have replied to Desai. Thus, the Indians will require very firm assurances that they will, in fact, get the advantages of a new relation to Pakistan before surrendering any part of what they hold.
It is quite clear that thoughtful men on both sides appreciate the irrationality of the present arrangements and the advantages of sensible coexistence; although the economic advantages are, I suspect, even greater than most political figures now understand. But the Pakistani dare not expound these nor evoke the political forces that are directly interested (e.g., East Pakistan) until something substantial in the Vale is sewed up; and the Indians dare not give up something substantial in the Vale until it is clear that Pakistan is broadly committed to a policy of conciliation and that the military benefits of that policy will be available to India.
The vicious circle will operate, I suspect, even within the narrow orbit of the Kashmir and Vale discussions. The complexities are inherently such that "clean surgery" is either likely to lead to events which will produce the higher tensions Nehru and Ayub fear; or it will require for its success a degree of intensive and sympathetic Indo-Pak cooperation which, in turn, is only possible if the two leaders had already committed themselves before their own peoples to a fundamental change in policy.
I conclude, therefore, that if the principles are accepted or if the Vale gets gripped in negotiation by other means, we are likely to run into a dangerous cul-de-sac. At the moment the notion is, as I understand it, that under such circumstances various high-level Anglo - American chaps might be rushed into the breach to hold appropriate hands and try to bring the lines closer together; or, in the last resort, to trot out an internationalized Vale. If this analysis is correct, any amount of pressure and hand holding about Kashmir will not then do the trick. Two other elements must then be introduced, perhaps in sequence, before a Kashmir settlement could become viable:
a. While the Kashmir discussion proceeds on some sustained basis, the other issues must be brought into negotiation in a separate but equal forum (or forums) with an understanding that a total package will be brought together and no part of the negotiated deal is final until all elements are brought together.
b. At a certain point, when the deal as a whole is clear, but before it is signed and announced, Nehru and Ayub would have to enter into a solemn commitment, verifiable by what they say and do before the sign off, to take the case for reconciliation to their people and to be prepared to deal with violent dissidents on a ruthless basis, if necessary.
The latter provision may appear farfetched; but the mutual suspicions go so deep and the interactions of the two governments' policies are so sensitive, that until the deal is consummated--and perhaps for some time thereafter--it could spiral off into a debacle unless each government performs its part of the bargain with unexampled consistency and rigor.
I would only add this: assistance to Ayub and Nehru in finding their way through this political and psychological maze will be vastly more important than any direct bargaining pressure or exhortation we can mount in getting a solution. Or, put another way, bargaining pressure and exhortation at the right moment may prove useful, but only if there is a workable track that these two highly responsible politicians can perceive. Right now the central fact about Nehru and Ayub is that they do not see such a track, embracing the full complexity of the problem--and neither does anyone else on the subcontinent.
273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG - PAK. Secret. Drafted by Carle, Naas, and Gatch; cleared by Cameron and with GTI and AID; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Tehran and Karachi.
Washington, April 10, 1963, 8:23 p.m.
268. We may have reached point where the two essential elements for solution on transit impasse are in sight, i.e., Pak willingness restore Afghan representation in Peshawar and Afghan action to moderate Pushtunistan campaign. GOP has shown desire normalize relations and willingness not be difficult on question Peshawar consulate (Karachi tel 1935 to Dept/2/ rptd Tehran 119, Kabul 151). At same time Paks have indicated they prepared accept continuation of Pushtunistan campaign but have defined limits of tolerance, i.e., no active incitement by Afghans in tribal areas and some abatement propaganda. On Afghan side, policy of nonincitement of tribes apparently has prevailed for some time and has been given official sanction by Prime Minister Yusuf in initial speech when he underscored peaceful pursuit Pushtunistan aspirations. If initial reports (Kabul tel 447 to Dept/3/ rptd Karachi 185, Tehran 167) that RGA radio propaganda moderating are borne out, then gap between disputants seems narrow.
/2/Dated April 7. (Ibid.)
/3/Dated April 6. (Ibid.)
If this assessment valid, we think some steps should be taken shortly attempt capitalize on developments. We are concerned that propaganda slip or unfortunate statement by leader of either side could reverse current trend. We think US can at this stage supplement Iranian effort. We have no wish take over job from Iranians, but our better communications may assure clarity at critical juncture.
We have in mind direct and confidential approach to GOP and RGA Foreign Ministers by Ambassadors McConaughy and Steeves to determine whether they willing discuss in Tehran settlement within framework set of principles which both governments would agree to in advance of Tehran meeting.
As we see it, such set of principles might include following:
a. Mutual agreement to resume diplomatic relations;
b. GOP agreement to restoration Afghan consulate at Peshawar (and perhaps at Quetta) and Afghan trade agencies in Chaman, Parachinar and Peshawar;
c. RGA agreement, if GOP so desires, re-establishment Pak consulates in Afghanistan;
d. Mutual agreement that officials stationed in each others territory will be received in accordance with established international usage and will function in accordance with established international usage;
e. Mutual agreement that both countries will abjure propaganda which creates hatred and incites to violence against each other. FYI: This is formula in Gentleman's Agreement ending 1955 dispute. End FYI.
f. Any matters of mutual concern between the GOP and RGA in the future will be handled through normal diplomatic channels.
FYI: If either party raises question of RGA agreement to withdrawal of trade agencies if completion rail spurs make their functions unnecessary, US position is that we willing complete Spin - Baldak spur as soon as possible, and will consider economic and engineering feasibility of improving and extending Khyber railway into Afghanistan. We would hope however latter project would not prove necessary. End FYI.
It would be explained to both governments that foregoing proposals are being submitted in identical fashion on US initiative to each country and do not have prior agreement of other party. Nevertheless we believe that they provide equitable and honorable route to normal relations. If both governments indicate substantial agreement on basic principles, we will request their permission to present formula to Aram with suggestion that he invite both governments to send plenipotentiary representatives to Tehran to "continue negotiations initiated in New York between Naim and Mohammed Ali."
If foregoing works out, we would envisage short tripartite meeting in Tehran chaired by Aram from which would be issued a communique embodying agreed principles and containing expression of appreciation from both sides for Iranian efforts.
For Karachi and Kabul
Embassies' comments on foregoing proposal and timing requested soonest./4/
/4/The Embassy in Kabul cabled back concurrence in the substance and timing of the proposals outlined in telegram 268, but questioned whether the text of an agreed set of principles should be released in a concluding communiqu?. (Telegram 455 from Kabul, April 11; ibid.) The Embassy in Karachi also concurred that a U.S. initiative could usefully supplement the continuing good offices effort on the part of Iran. But the Embassy felt that there was little chance of securing the agreement of the Ayub government to the proposed set of principles unless there was evidence of moderation of the Afghan propaganda campaign concerning Pushtunistan, and unless point b. in the set of principles was modified to read: "GOP agreement restoration such Afghan representation, including at Peshwar, as may be agreed appropriate and necessary." (Telegram 1984 from Karachi, April 12; ibid.)
For Tehran
Embassy's comments requested on foregoing proposal, especially as regards avoidance appearance of taking over from Iranians./5/ If all three Embassies consider proposal worth trying, Ambassador might tell Aram frankly what we are considering and reasons therefore.
Ball
/5/Ambassador Holmes cabled from Tehran that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake for the United States to attempt to take over the Iranian mediation role to the extent proposed. (Telegram 876 from Tehran, April 13; ibid.)
274. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 - 4 INDIA. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi for USMSMI, Karachi, and CINCEUR.
London, April 11, 1963, 7 p.m.
3989. Department Pass Defense. Embassy telegram 3984./2/ During two-hour meeting/3/ which Secretary McNamara group had April 10 with British group headed by Sandys and including Mountbatten and General Hull,/4/ there was general agreement on important aspects of US/UK military assistance programs to India which laid the groundwork for subsequent discussions by the Bundy group with the British. Major points of interest in these meetings not covered in agreed record reported reftel were as follows (should be noted this telegram not reviewed by Secretary McNamara or Bundy):
/2/Telegram 3984, April 11, transmitted the agreed record of a series of meetings in London of a U.S. - U.K. working group on military aid to India. The U.S. participants in the working group were headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy. The British contingent was headed by Sir Arthur Snelling, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. (Ibid., DEF 19 US - INDIA)
/3/A memorandum of the conversation which took place during this meeting is ibid., DEF 12 INDIA.
/4/Lord Mountbatten, Chief of the Defense Staff, and General Sir Richard Hull, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
1. Secretary McNamara stated UK and Commonwealth should take the lead in future military assistance to India; US would not wish to spend any funds beyond Nassau ceiling until a firm plan had been agreed between the US and UK. Sandys noted his relief at this statement and indicated he had thought the British would have to restrain the US regarding future military assistance. Secretary McNamara said that assuming political decisions on further aid to India were reached, US would be prepared to support such an agreed plan on same 50 - 50 basis as Nassau agreement.
2. In commenting on implications of US/UK air defense scheme for India, Sandys stressed that it was necessary to consider carefully where introduction of US and UK units might lead us. In particular, he noted that actual engagement of US/UK aircraft with Chicoms might lead to "war with China," with possibility Chicom retaliation against Hong Kong. He also said that an air defense commitment might lead US/UK close to a "defense pact" with India. He suggested these implications lead back to thought that only logical Indian defense arrangement is one covering subcontinent as a whole with US/UK participation. Secretary McNamara responded that the introduction of US/UK units should be only a remote contingency; present priorities should go to strengthening existing units of the Indian Air Force.
3. Following extended discussion, agreement was reached that strong efforts should be made to restrain Indian planning to a level of approximately 16 army divisions, which would include three for Kashmir. Discussion of manpower level for ground forces initially centered on figure of 650,000, but it was agreed this might be low and needed further refinement.
4. In response to Sandys question if US had calculated any financial total for possible future US/UK military assistance, Secretary McNamara said that although no precise calculations had yet been made, his own very rough estimate might be about $150 million, spread over a three-year period, for both nations. Sandys later emphasized that the UK is not now committed to any specific method of sharing costs of further military aid to India beyond Nassau limits.
5. General Taylor stated that priority of effort should now be given to maximizing the effectiveness of existing Indian units, particularly the six mountain divisions. Secretary McNamara repeatedly emphasized the serious logistic and training deficiencies of the Indian Air Force.
6. Both Sandys and Snelling emphasized that any discussions with Indians of force levels and any actions with respect to military assistance should be most carefully related to political developments, particularly Kashmir.
7. In meeting with Bundy, Snelling indicated that while final decision not yet made, Sandys proposes to attend CENTO meeting, primarily for discussion of Kashmir question with Paks, and to proceed to Delhi about same time as Secretary Rusk's visit.
Bruce
275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG - PAK. Secret. Drafted by Carle and Cameron and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to Tehran.
Washington, April 13, 1963, 5:32 p.m.
272. Karachi's 1977/2/ and 1984./3/
/2/Telegram 1977, April 12, reported that a review of radio broadcasts from Kabul to Pakistan during the previous few days provided no evidence of any moderation of Afghan propaganda on the Pushtunistan issue. (Ibid.)
/3/See footnote 3, Document 273.
On basis reports from Kabul and Karachi we judge that atmosphere on Afghan side has not improved sufficiently to justify carrying forward with our suggested initiative on Af - Pak border impasse. We see no advantage in trying this out until Afghanistan has reciprocated conciliatory Pak gestures. Before putting idea aside, however, we believe Ambassador Steeves should make another try at convincing new Afghan leaders that favorable opportunity for improvement Af - Pak relations now exists but will be lost unless Afghan response to conciliatory Pak gestures is forthcoming. April 1 Afghan statement is not enough. There must be perceptible toning down of Pushtunistan broadcasts beamed to Frontier Area. This action is sina qua non to further progress particularly on question restoration Afghan consular offices in frontier area. Without moderation Afghan propaganda, Paks may end their own self-imposed moratorium. While perhaps desirable from RGA viewpoint to maintain fiction that normal relations with Pakistan and Pushtunistan are separate issues, fact remains that events August - September 1961 were direct GOP reaction to intensified Afghan propaganda and increase in Afghan-inspired incidents in tribal area during previous year. We do not wish cloud picture with Pushtunistan issue, but RGA should have no doubts of our view that this issue is heart of problem. Accordingly progress on transit impasse will require some adjustment, though not necessarily abandonment, Pushtunistan campaign.
In carrying forward these discussions with RGA, Ambassador Steeves may find it necessary to remind them again that border remains closed at Afghan insistence and that though it is in over-all Pak interest improve relations with Afghans, there are few if any immediate pressures compelling one-sided Pak generosity.
When and if there is evidence that in fact offensive Afghan propaganda is toning down we will reassess situation and decide if course of action proposed Deptel 268 to Kabul/4/ can be moved forward. In this connection we concur modification point b of formula along lines suggested Karachi tel 1984 to Department. In meanwhile we hope Embassy Karachi will continue urge GOP maintain cease-fire on propaganda pending further developments.
Rusk
/4/Document 273.
276. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 4/63. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi and London. A copy of this telegram was attached to White House telegram CAP 63197, April 16, from Bromley Smith to the President's Naval Aide, Captain Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., for transmission to President Kennedy, who was vacationing in Palm Beach, Florida. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, reads: "President read."
New Delhi, April 15, 1963, 11 p.m.
3985. I had a long (hour and a-half), difficult and by no means encouraging discussion with Nehru this evening, all of it devoted to Kashmir. Once or twice he got very angry, shouted and pounded the table but in the end calmed down. The following emerged:
(1) I put up to him the importance of a prompt move toward a settlement and spelled out view that this could only be accomplished by dividing the Valley with appropriate arrangements. (I avoided words "substantial position" to be sure of a fair split. This may have been a mistake.)
Thanks apparently to my careful preparatory work, he was admirably equipped with all the adverse arguments: the ancient integrity of the community, the small area and (there may be some merit in this) the hostility to the idea in the Valley itself. He noted also that any retreat from the past left the Valley indefensible. I countered these arguments without much difficulty. There are innumerable places--Bengal, Assam, Punjab borders--which are equally indefensible. Partition solved the problems of Bengal and the Punjab. The effect can be softened. I was proposing this only because no better opportunity seemed in evidence. Etc., etc.
(2) He then asked why we were pressing so hard. I replied that it was because we had important tasks ahead and Kashmir stood in the way of completing them. He then said it would have been easier to solve the issue if it hadn't become involved in the problem of arms aid and related decisions. I pointed out that they were inextricably involved by nature. We were serious about defense and had to pay for any misuse./2/
/2/Galbraith elaborated upon this point in a message that he sent to Nehru on April 17. He pointed in particular to the difficulties involved in securing Congressional approval for military assistance to both parties involved in a festering dispute. (A copy of the message was sent from New Delhi to the Department of State in telegram 4011, April 17; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US - INDIA)
(3) He then asked, this involving considerable anger, why we assumed the Pakistanis were right and the Indians wrong. I reverted to impossibility of solution that excluded either from the Valley and added that Indians had in fact alienated world opinion. Their UN representation had won the battles and lost the wars. The American people could never understand any issue that wasn't decided by a vote.
(4) The latter point produced a remarkable turn to the discussion. He said he too would prefer a vote. I said this was most encouraging news and I would promptly report it. We had avoided pressing him on a plebiscite because we didn't think it was acceptable.
(5) I probably moved in too rapidly on this. In any case Nehru backwatered. He said such a course would have to meet the approval of the Kashmir government and his cabinet colleagues who were less favorable. I pointed out that the people of Kashmir could hardly object to voting on their own fate and his cabinet colleagues were, one assumed, subject to persuasion on his part. He then elaborately emphasized the personal nature of his remark and said he would have to consult with his colleagues.
(6) There was a great deal more debate which would be far too dreary to repeat. I returned repeatedly to the question of whether he wanted me to report to Washington that GOI although avowing a desire for settlement had nothing to offer. He kept reiterating that they had offered a great deal and I in turn pointed out ad nauseum that they had not offered anything in the Valley and no Pakistan government could accept any solution that excluded them from the Valley. He also went off at intervals into Pak misbehavior with China, the past sins of the British on communal matters, Kurshid's alleged visits to China and other irrelevantia. I noted that our intelligence on Kurshid's movements was quite good and dismissed this and the allegation that the Chinese were training guerrillas in Kashmir as fabrications.
(7) I kept pressing him if he rejected partition as to what he had to offer of an affirmative sort. While I could understand his reluctance on some solutions I could not accept his reluctance on all. There was, perhaps, a half hour of this. The upshot was a postponement. He finally said he wanted to consult his cabinet colleagues before making a final statement as to what they could accept. We made an engagement to meet the end of the week.
I am naturally disappointed. He was in a very resistant mood and I had the feeling that something may have bitten him in the last day or two.
(8) Tomorrow I will see T.T. Krishnamachari and M.J. Desai and impress upon them the importance of trying to move the old man, though I have to be careful as usual not to seem to be mounting a campaign within his own government. I also need to test the repercussions of tonight's session which, though I kept it cool on my side, repeatedly reached the bare knuckles stage. It was, in fact, the most unadorned conversation I have had with Nehru in two years, although we ended on an even note. I will pass the full story on to the British.
Galbraith
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG - PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Kabul, Tehran, and New Delhi.
Karachi, April 16, 1963, 6 p.m.
2007. In course of call by me on Foreign Minister Bhutto Karachi April 15, he raised Afghan question. He said he now had opportunity to study problem more fully and discuss it with President Ayub.
Ayub had given him green light to move ahead with normalization Afghan relations whenever concrete, tangible, affirmative gesture received from Afghans. Paks are ready to be forthcoming in doing their part to mend the rift, but Bhutto stressed GOP needs substantive sign of change in Afghan attitude not merely assessment that new government and its radio output will some time in future be more moderate.
Specifically Bhutto is prepared to go Tehran to meet with Afghans immediately after May 15 if stage is set for reconciliation by then. Pak - Indo talks, CENTO meeting Karachi and subsequent trip to Nepal with Ayub (May 9 to about May 14) will not permit earlier travel. Additionally, Bhutto in reply observations and queries by me indicated:
1. For present GOP prepared continue restraint and moderation Radio Pak broadcasts to Afghans, recognizing abatement of Afghan propaganda tone changed gradually. In this connection I mentioned recent reports from our Embassy Kabul on steps to moderate Afghan Radio.
2. GOP reconciled to continuation for some time of nominal Pushtunistan position of GOA as long as it played in low key and does not seek inflame tribal elements. Bhutto viewed GOA Pushtunistan campaign as defense mechanism and felt Afghan tribal policy not as enlightened as that of Pakistan. He believes theoretical GOA talk about Pushtunistan does not offer any real threat to GOP national interests, since all countries recognize and accept territorial integrity of Pakistan as now constituted, and no country takes Pushtunistan agitation seriously. GOP can therefore afford to be long suffering with Afghans, in his view. He favors intensification of GOP efforts to integrate tribal areas into normal flow of Pak life. Pushtunistan campaign would create difficulties only if Afghans used it in effort to incite Pak tribal groups.
3. Bhutto also thought GOP could seriously consider in right atmosphere some form of Afghan representation in Peshawar and Quetta. He indicated awareness of "New York formula" in this context./2/
/2/In telegram 1579 to Karachi, April 17, also sent to Kabul and Tehran, the Department indicated that Bhutto's comments to McConaughy "provide guidelines over the next month or so for all concerned in seeking solution of Pak - Afghan transit impasse." (Ibid.)
Additionally, Bhutto expressed some uneasiness over the forthcoming state visit of President of India and entourage to Afghanistan. He seemed convinced that Indians intent on perpetuating rift between Pakistan and Afghanistan and would show their cleverness in stirring up Afghan distrust of Pakistan. When I took issue with this estimate, he argued that India saw merit in dividing her neighbors in South Asia and particularly in preserving an example of Pak inability to get along with a neighboring Muslim country. He thought Education Minister and others who would accompany President were carefully selected for their presumed ability to influence the Afghans.
McConaughy
278. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 4/63. Secret.
Washington, April 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
Kashmir; Military Aid to India; Burma
In your memorandum of April 8 to Mr. Talbot/2/ you asked four questions. The questions and our replies follow:
/2/A copy of this memorandum is ibid.
1. What progress are we making with the British in reconciling our position as set forth in our fifth round of talks with India and Pakistan?
We and the British have agreed on approaches to be made to the Indians and Pakistanis prior to the fifth round of talks on Kashmir.
We have not reached agreement with the British on steps to be taken after the fifth round, whether there is marked progress toward a Kashmir settlement or whether there is not.
a. No decision has been made on U.S./U.K. - Commonwealth air defense assistance. The British position, as presented most recently by Duncan Sandys to Secretary McNamara, is to question seriously whether U.S./U.K. air squadrons should be sent to India to assist in defense against Chinese Communist attackers. Sandys views this with extreme caution, particularly since it would involve the possibility of actual engagement between Western interceptors and Chinese Communist bombers with far reaching consequences. He is worried about increasing the vulnerability of the British position in Hong Kong. We understand that a contrary view is being expressed within the British Government, notably by Lord Mountbatten with Foreign Office encouragement. If we are to be in a position to make a quick offer to India on commitment of air squadrons along the lines of our Air Defense Team's recommendations, you may need to discuss the question directly with Macmillan. First, however, the United States Government's position must be made firm.
b. On defense production, neither the British nor we have yet reached decisions on the recommendations of our respective survey teams nor on the much more elaborate Indian requests. The Bhoothalingam team/3/ currently in Washington will press Indian requests, and Minister T.T. Krishnamachari will come early in May hoping for clearer indications of what the United States will do. We should by then have concerted our position with the British to the extent possible. Quite apart from insistence that any further aid to India be conditioned upon a Kashmir settlement, the British take a somewhat narrower point of view of defense production than we do. Their team addressed itself only to the question of assistance to the Indian munitions industry.
/3/Shri Bhoothalingam, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Economic and Defense Coordination, led a team of Indian defense experts that visited Washington April 17 - 26 to consult with officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council. Documentation on this visit is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/24/63 - 4/27/63, and Department of State, Central File POL 7 INDIA.
c. Neither the British nor we have yet made material progress on possible longer range military assistance to India, in part because of imprecision that verges on unreality in Indian military planning. The British have so far maintained a generally limited and resistant posture. However, both the British and ourselves have agreed to produce certain data leading to agreed positions by the beginning of May on basic elements of Indian defense planning, such as strategic concepts, acceptable force goals, and valid defense production needs. Even in the so-called "immediate" phase agreed to at Nassau, the British are encountering difficulties that may postpone some deliveries until 1965. They have done little yet to increase the efficiency of the Indian Air Force (one of the tasks allotted to them in the Nassau Agreement).
2. If these talks fail, what will our strategy and tactics be?
a. We believe that neither Pakistan nor India is ready to accept the onus for causing a breakdown of the Kashmir talks during the fifth round. Should the talks nevertheless fail, our tactics would depend upon our appraisal of the cause and responsibilities for the failure. Strategically, we would still need to be in a position to give India some assistance against Chinese Communist pressure, tailoring this as best we possibly can to maintain our security interests in Pakistan.
b. If there is no major progress on Kashmir at the fifth round, we anticipate that the British will be strongly resistant to further military assistance to India this summer. Even if there should be substantial progress, there are as yet few if any indications that the British would be prepared to move further with the U.S. on the Nassau 50 - 50 formula or anything approaching that. Reinforcing the desire of some elements of the British Government to be more forthcoming, however, are pressures related to the need to provide production contracts for distressed areas and the desire to avert U.S. pre-emption of traditional British relations with India.
3. Do the proposals of Walt Rostow have relevance?/4/
/4/See Document 272.
a. On the assumption that progress can be made in the fifth round to bring the positions of the two parties closer together, we see a developing need to enlarge the perspective in which further talks can take place. Our object is to assist both parties to create a climate in the two countries in which a Kashmir settlement can be sold.
b. Walt Rostow's talks on the subcontinent have laid the groundwork for developing this wider perspective.
c. We plan to find ways to continue the process of educating both the Indians and the Pakistanis about the strategic problems of the subcontinent, perhaps helping both countries to define military, political, and economic policies to serve their strategic requirements.
[Here follow a question and response concerning Burma.]
DR
279. Letter From Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy
New Delhi, April 21, 1963.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Nehru Correspondence, 4/1/63 - 8/31/63. No classification marking. This letter has not been declassified by the Indian Government. In his biography of Nehru, Gopal summarized the substance of the letter, which was an Indian response to U.S. efforts to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, and quoted a sentence from the letter which summed up Nehru's reaction to those efforts: "Intervention by third powers, if quiet, inobtrusive and objective, might have been helpful; but public and semi-public efforts at pressure had only worsened the situation. `I am convinced that these ill-considered and ill-conceived initiatives, however well-intentioned they may be, have at least for the present made it impossible to reach any settlement on this rather involved and complicated question.'" (Gopal, Jawharlal Nehru, Vol. 3, p. 259)]
280. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, R. Komer Security. Secret.
Washington, April 24, 1963.
In assessing the motives behind Nehru letter/2/ I'd put less weight on Galbraith's hard sell or introduction of US/UK "elements" than on the likelihood that these and other steps simply made Nehru at long last face up to what we wanted on Kashmir. Nehru tends to avoid facing up to unpleasant decisions as long as possible, and we know that he personally is the chief roadblock to a forthcoming Indian position on Kashmir.
/2/Document 279.
Thus Ken's pressure and the "elements" seem more precipitant than cause of Nehru's reaction. Nonetheless we may have pushed him harder and more precisely than was wise, particularly Ken. As he told me when there and indicated in private messages, he was already airing to TTK and others the "package deal" he proposed to Washington in Delhi 3693, 25 March,/3/ of trading assurance of substantial US aid for Indian agreement to a substantial Pak position in the Vale.
/3/Document 269.
Despite the clear warnings from here that such a concrete proposal was premature and the joint US/UK instruction/4/ on building up to the fifth round by seeking Indo - Pak agreement to the "elements" of a settlement (approved by you on 1 April), Ken was already so far down his own track that he apparently decided to go ahead. He felt (1) the only way to pin the elusive Nehru down was with a concrete proposition; (2) to switch back to the "elements" alone was bad; and (3) his proposal was fully consistent with the "elements." In effect, Ken was disgusted with what he regarded as US/UK shilly-shallying, and anxious to settle the affair before he left Delhi. His cables show he was quite aware of the risk that he'd precipitate a Nehru turndown. Of course, fear of just such an impasse was precisely why State proposed stepping up US/UK intervention by means of a vague set of principles (which could apply to partition or internationalization) rather than going Ken's route. The expected occurred; in two rough sessions with Nehru on 15 and 20 April Ken got nowhere, and Nehru's visible irritation was ample omen of the fireworks to come.
/4/See the second attachment to Document 270.
Just at this point Nehru got the "elements" paper, regrettably first given in writing to the Indians via our Embassy in Karachi. Nehru's complaint about them goes less to their substance than to his fear they were a product of US - Pak collusion. There is little doubt that Galbraith's delay in giving them to the Indians was a tactical error. We told them to the Paks on April 11th, and then McConaughy (assuming Ken had also told them to Indians) gave a copy to the Indian HICOM in Karachi on the 18th at the latter's request. Nehru and others must have immediately jumped to the conclusion we had cleared them with the Paks first, so over-read them as meaning more concessions and reacted emotionally. Up to this point they probably felt we were genuinely trying to tone down Pak claims; now they felt we were again peddling Pak wares. True, Ken and then Gore-Booth had mentioned the "elements" to Gundevia, Desai, and even Nehru, but in such low key it apparently didn't register. In fact, Nehru asked Ken on the 20th why he hadn't brought the "elements" into the discussion sooner, and Ken replied that he was more interested in hard specifics.
It is in the above light that one must read Nehru's complaint that he'd understood from Galbraith the US felt only the "northwest corner" of the Vale (down to Wular Lake) need be given to the Paks. This was indeed our original idea, and Ken admits he told Indians (Delhi 4101)./5/ Then we decided to up the ante somewhat by moving our proposed line down toward Srinagar, but the Indians presumably didn't know this and Ken claims he'd already switched to talking about a line "somewhere between Wular Lake and Srinagar." Nonetheless the Indians must have learned about this change, and regarded it as upping the ante on them. Nehru's letter amply indicates that he interpreted the "elements" as being just this.
/5/Telegram 4101, April 22, transmitted Galbraith's assessment of Nehru's April 21 letter. Galbraith concluded that the Indian Government saw in the "elements" paper a welcome opportunity to "get off the hook on specific and concrete concessions in the valley." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK)
The moral of this story is that one can't effectively stage-manage a difficult negotiation when the two parties are getting different signals from us, and when each is prone to assume the worst. Ken's decision to handle things his own way was done with his eyes open. He took a chance in order to move the ball forward, and it backfired.
But as Ken himself agrees, at some point we would probably have hit this stone wall anyway. Nehru in fact turned Ken down twice on partition (on the 15th and 20th) before seizing on the "elements" to cover his intransigence. The reasons for this basic attitude are many, e.g. Nehru is a Kashmiri himself, his concern lest he appear to be yielding to US/UK pressure, his emotional reaction to the badly chosen Pak pressure tactics, less sense of urgency over the Chicom threat.
We should shift tactics now and see if he'll buy something other than partition. But the odds are that between Nehru's emotional reluctance and Ayub's insistence on more than half a loaf we aren't going to get a Kashmir settlement. Hence the issue may soon become one of whether, and how far, we go ahead regardless on aid to India.
R. W. Komer
281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 - 3 US - INDIA. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Naas and Cameron and approved by Cameron. Repeated to New Delhi.
Washington, April 24, 1963, 8:10 p.m.
1635. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.
Pak Ambassador Ahmed had one hour discussion with Secretary April 23 on US arms aid to India. Ahmed stated GOP very perturbed over indications US intends go ahead with long-range military assistance to India in absence Kashmir solution. He then reviewed at length familiar arguments: Indians will reach accommodation with Chinese Communists; Chicoms have no intention resuming attack; already precarious military balance on subcontinent will be greatly upset by doubling of India's arms budget taken together with outside aid; in view past history Indian actions in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Junagadh and Goa, GOP does not trust Indian intentions; India will use its superior military strength against neighbors, etc. GOP believes US has great leverage now with GOI and should use it get settlement Kashmir. If GOI concludes it will receive arms without Kashmir solution, then there will be no chance for solution.
Secretary stated we cognizant Pak concerns and fears and he was looking forward to full discussion all aspects problems with Ayub and Bhutto in Karachi. Said that we had not yet taken decisions on long-range arms aid to India but reports of various study groups were being examined and we were discussing matter with GOI. Perforce we viewed arms aid to India from somewhat different perspective than GOP. Secretary indicated our impression was that initial arms aid may have had something to do with Chicom cease-fire and that any future arms aid might act as deterrent to possible future Chinese aggression directed at subcontinent. Defense of subcontinent is of concern to all of us. In our own national interests we must get a clear signal to the Chinese about the consequences of further aggression. Pakistan could hardly be comfortable if another attack occurred. Defense of subcontinent, as well as whole Free World, is indivisible. Those issues which divide countries in non-Communist world must be solved in order present unified front to Communist pressure.
Next few months may be somber for all of us. Soviet domestic troubles, its relations with Peiping, failures in Iraq, Congo, and elsewhere are causing Soviets reappraise their policies. Possible outcome may be some retreat from policy coexistence to resumption more bellicose policy closer to stance of Chicoms. US trying probe in many ways Soviet intentions but we must be alert possibility we face dangerous period ahead during which Chicoms may push out against points on Free World perimeter. We must, therefore, view arms aid to India and defense subcontinent in context this possible threat. US cannot subject our over-all strategic objectives to settlement Kashmir, or any other single problem.
US, however, as Paks well know, is anxious for Kashmir settlement. Otherwise we would not be in present onerous position in middle between GOP and GOI. Kashmir dispute has cost us dearly. US has no brief for any particular settlement. Any settlement both sides can agree upon is satisfactory to us if it contributes to stability subcontinent and improved Indo - Pak relations.
Ahmed stated GOP interpreted US/UK "principles" as in effect advocating partition of Vale and GOP could never agree partition. Secretary said GOI apparently equally adamantly opposed to partition. At least two parties had agreed on what they could not accept and perhaps this would pave way for consideration other solutions.
In closing, Ahmed commented that US and GOP are in full agreement on gravity of world situation and objectives. Differences arose in tactics. In GOP view arms to India, unless preceded by easing of tensions in subcontinent, will not result in more secure subcontinent.
Rusk
282. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/24/63 - 4/27/63. Secret.
Washington, April 25, 1963.
SUBJECT
Review of Problems Pertaining to the Subcontinent
In preparation for my visits to Karachi and New Delhi, we should discuss several issues which we face in India and Pakistan. It would be premature, however, to seek final decisions on these matters at present. The following represents the views of the Department of State:
1. Kashmir
Our pressure on Kashmir has angered Mr. Nehru; his misunderstanding, for whatever reasons, of our tactics has caused him to think we have been doubledealing. Responsibility for this appears to rest partly on his own officials. The resulting fireworks have clearly revealed the Indian position. In being willing to discuss a political settlement with Pakistan, the Indians have not been willing to go beyond minor border adjustments except apparently to the extent of an offer of the northwestern third of the Vale to Pakistan. They had believed this would satisfy us even if it didn't satisfy the Paks.
Mr. Nehru's letter to you/2/ clearly indicates a hardened position on Kashmir, loss of confidence in our "objectivity" on the issues, and unwillingness to have his need for military aid be used to force him to make large enough concessions on Kashmir to satisfy Pakistan's requirements for a settlement. The combination of the Chinese withdrawal, the Pak exploitation of the Indian difficulties with the Chinese, and our own strategic interests in the subcontinent do in fact limit our leverage with the Indians on the Kashmir issue. At this juncture Nehru is the principal key to the achievement of any movement on Indo - Pak issues. Therefore, the task is to see what can be done to get Nehru back in tune with us, and to reaffirm the considerations which lead us to view a settlement of the Kashmir issue as so important to the security of the subcontinent. The Pakistanis must be led to understand that Chicom aggressiveness against India also constitutes a threat to Pakistan. Once they do, Ayub may be more willing to continue talks with the Indians and to explore the necessary compromises to achieve Indo - Pak accord.
/2/Document 279.
This requires that we now explore in Karachi and New Delhi possible directions in which the talks might proceed in the future./3/ It may be that the Indo - Pak talks should be extended to cover a broader range of problems plaguing Indo - Pak relations. It is clear that we cannot expect the timetable for the talks to fit our schedule for making decision on aid to India, even though there will continue to be a correlation between the two problems. At least for a cooling off period, our pressure should be greatly eased.
/3/The fifth round of talks concerning Kashmir took place in Karachi April 22 - 25. According to a summary of the talks sent to Rusk in Tehran on April 28, the only point on which Bhutto and Singh agreed was that the valley of Kashmir could not be partitioned. The two delegations agreed to continue the talks in New Delhi on May 15, but the Pakistanis spoke of the sixth round as a "last go" at the Kashmir issue. (Tosec 16 to Tehran; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK)
2. Air Defense
The Commonwealth - U.S. Air Defense Mission found that a measure of security from strategic air attack can be provided to the Calcutta and New Delhi areas by 2 - 3 Western fighter squadrons using U.S. - U.K. mobile radars. Such air defense assistance would strengthen the deterrent to a Chicom attack on India, indicate a continuing Western interest in India's defense at little expense, strengthen India at minimum cost to our relations with Pakistan, and buy us time during which we could hold off on other military aid if we desired. There is, of course, some question whether this degree of involvement in India's defense would stimulate a Chinese military reaction against the West in the event of actual hostilities between the Chinese and Western aircraft.
The British, however, are uncertain whether they should go ahead on this. Sandys is worried about the consequences of an engagement between these Western squadrons and the Chinese Air Force. In any case, he believes our defense assistance should be conditioned on a Kashmir settlement. We believe we should make every effort to get the British to provide this assistance jointly with us; perhaps you should write to Macmillan.
Note: In connection with air defense as well as with defense production and long-range military assistance discussed below, I believe there are two very important questions which we may have to face but which ought not to be answered until after my talks in Karachi and New Delhi. These questions are: (1) whether we should provide substantial military assistance to India without U.K./Commonwealth participation and (2) whether we should provide such substantial assistance regardless of the state of Indo - Pak relations.
3. Defense Production
Our Defense Production Team, the Staley group, has mapped out a program, keyed initially to a four-year program to meet the combat needs of the Nassau 6 mountain divisions, which would require foreign exchange support up to a total of $34 million for capital goods and $20 million per year for raw materials. Such assistance would have the advantage of helping to meet India's defense needs, and contributing to the development of its economy. The principal problem it gives us is its possible effect on our relations with Pakistan.
The British, for many reasons, give defense production assistance a very low priority. These reasons include their concern about their relations with Pakistan, their limited aid resources, and their concern about the possible effect on British industry. They believe it should be conditioned on Kashmir progress, as they do regarding all additional military aid.
We are inclined to believe that we should approve the Staley plan for defense production support of the six mountain divisions and do our best to get the British to share costs. The question of timing of notification of the Indians is a separate matter on which we would reach a decision after my visit to Karachi. As a minimum we should go ahead on a piecemeal basis with certain projects (e.g., U.S. surplus ordnance equipment) during the next several months.
4. Long-Range Military Assistance
Although we have done some preliminary planning, our plans on this have not yet taken concrete shape. The Department of State is satisfied, however, that there should be military assistance to India beyond the present phase. The questions relate to extent, types, and timing of military assistance.
There are very good political and military justifications for long-range assistance regardless of the outcome of the Kashmir talks. We have much at stake in India and the Chinese can be expected to threaten the Free World at the periphery of their control for many years. Not only must we maintain a degree of Indian military strength to deal with the chance that fighting may again flare up on the border, but we must also support our efforts to strengthen our political relationship with India in a concrete manner. Additionally, we must give India confidence that it has our support in the growing confrontation with Communist China.
5. Economic Aid to India (Consortium)
Very preliminary indications are that Western contributions this year in support of India's Third Plan may fall short of India's estimate of its requirements. If this is combined with a failure to meet Indian requests in the military field, we can expect an adverse Indian reaction.
A preliminary meeting of the Indian Consortium will be held on April 30 - May 1 to consider the progress of economic development in India and India's aid requirements for the third year (April 1963 to March 1964) of the Third Five-Year Plan. This meeting will be followed by a pledging session several weeks later, probably in Paris.
The Indians have indicated a requirement for the Plan's third year of $1,255 million. AID is requesting $450 million in development loan funds for India for FY 1964. If this becomes available, and if the Export-Import Bank approves another $50 million, the U.S. will be able to provide up to $500 million for the third year of India's Third Five-Year Plan.
How much aid the U.S. would provide will depend primarily upon contributions from other members of the Consortium. We estimate that IDA and IBRD will pledge an aggregate of $200 million. It now appears that the contributions of other countries may be as low as $200 - $300 million. If we followed last year's precedent we would merely match the contributions of these other countries. This would limit India's total foreign aid to somewhere between $600 and $800 million. Once we have a better idea of what these other countries will do, we will have to decide whether to abandon our matching technique in order to enable India to come closer to meeting its over-all requirements of $1,255 million.
6. Economic Aid to Pakistan (Consortium)
There is a substantial gap between Pakistan's wishes for economic aid and what the Consortium thinks Pakistan needs. This is of particular concern to us because of the delicate state of our current relations with Pakistan.
At the Pakistan "pre-Consortium" meeting in Paris on March 28 - 29, a consensus was reached among the donors that the level of aid required for FY 1964 to meet Pakistan's Plan targets is in the range of $350 to $400 million of new money. The U.S. strongly supported the figure of $400 million indicating that it would be prepared to pledge up to about $200 million of the total. Last year the U.S. contributed $250 million, constituting 53% of the total Consortium aid including IDA and IBRD.
The GOP, which had asked for $550 million, reacted strongly to the results of the pre-Consortium meeting. Top officials blamed the U.S. for the rejection of their $550 million request. They also insist that the U.S. not reduce its contribution below that of last year.
There is to be a pledging session of the Consortium in Washington on May 2 - 3. On the basis of information now available, we are by no means sure that the contributions from all other members will come to $200 million.
We are prepared to inform the GOP that while we support the $400 million figure, we stand ready to examine with Pakistan and other Consortium members possible additional needs for FY 1964 should events indicate that the Consortium has underestimated Pakistan's foreign exchange needs.
7. Bokaro
A problem which is not yet ready for decision is Bokaro, the proposed public sector steel mill being considered for possible U.S. assistance. A recent report on this project procured by AID from U.S. Steel raises a number of technical and economic questions requiring further study. We mention it because it may have important political implications in the present state of U.S./Indian relations. The problem is further complicated by the Clay Committee's critical comments on aid to public sector plants.
DR
283. Memorandum for the Record/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 4/63. Secret. Drafted by Komer on April 29. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is from the President's Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to Bundy and Kaysen.
Washington, April 25, 1963, 5:30 - 6:30 p.m.
President's Meeting on India, 25 April 1963
PRESENT
The President
Secretary Rusk
Undersecretary Ball
Mr. James Grant
Ambassador Bowles
Mr. Frank Coffin
Mr. William Gaud
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
Mr. Paul Nitze
Admiral George Anderson, Jr.
Mr. John McCone
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. R. W. Komer
Secretary Rusk described his pending mission to India and Pakistan. Our overriding purpose is some accommodation between Pakistan and India. The question is how to achieve it. If we back India against the Chinese, we may drive the Paks off the deep end; if we abandon the Indians, they might move toward the USSR and China again. On the merits of Kashmir, Rusk felt the shape of the settlement was irrelevant to us. We could buy anything they could agree on. The trouble was that any settlement would be more favorable to Pakistan than the status quo; it was precisely [that] which created the problem with India. He saw two other issues: (1) should we get involved in aiding India without the UK if necessary--we felt we must do so if India were really threatened, but must make every effort to bring the UK along; (2) should we give India substantial military aid regardless of Indo - Pakistan relations. We shouldn't condition aid totally on a Pak/Indian reconciliation, nor should we go ahead ignoring it. We should condition aid partly on the course of Indo - Pak relations.
Secretary McNamara then outlined the military aid problem. It was essentially a small one; as the intelligence community pointed out, the Chicom threat was small over the next 2 - 3 years. Their maximum capability in Tibet/Ladakh amounted to 230,000 men, of whom only 120,000 could be combat forces. They would need 40,000 trucks and 40% of the Chicom 1962 gasoline supply to support such a force. To cope with this threat, we and the British estimate that 12 - 14 Indian divisions are needed or with reserves some 16 divisions and 3 brigades, totalling an army of 650,000. But the Indians want to build up to 1.4 million men, a $1.8 million annual defense budget of their own, and $1.6 billion in MAP over the next three years. All this is quite unrealistic.
The air threat is even smaller than the ground threat; McNamara himself really didn't think there is any. The Indians could meet this air threat by themselves if they were not so inefficient.
So the first problem from a military viewpoint was to develop a realistic program. McNamara personally estimated this at a maximum around $300 million jointly from the US and UK over the next three years (including defense production), and perhaps only half that. It would take 2 - 3 months to work up such a realistic program. However, there was also a serious political problem involved in the Indian military buildup as it bore on Kashmir. The President queried whether $300 million would be enough for the purpose and McGeorge Bundy asked whether the estimated threat included that from Burma; it was essential to look at the problem of defense of the entire subcontinent. Including Burma was essential if one looked at the problem in the framework of a decade. McNamara agreed but felt this didn't bear on the immediate Indian buildup problem. Komer pointed out that our estimate of the threat is based on existing Chicom logistic facilities and does not include what the Chicoms could do over the next three years or so. McCone said one couldn't add Burma to NEFA as an additional route of invasion because we estimated the Chicoms couldn't support both. Moreover, Burma would present the Chicoms with a vastly more complicated political problem if they chose to use this route.
Ambassador Bowles regarded the Indian buildup problem as 70% political. We had hoped for ten years that India would see the Chicom threat as we saw it. Now the Indians did; indeed they were the only major Asian power which took such a realistic view. Japan did not, for example. Indian help is essential for a non-nuclear balance of power in Asia vis-a-vis the Chicoms. Nor should we make the mistake of assuming that the Indians don't have other options; they are perfectly capable of patching up their differences with China and of getting more Soviet help as an alternative to their current desire for US/UK support. Could we let this happen? We should give the Indians an "emotional assurance" as soon as possible that we are with them; this would buy us a little time. Third, we should think of aiming Indian manpower toward SEA, not just of Indian defense against the threat from the north. This would also ease our problem with Pakistan, because the SEA threat would tend to unite the Indians and Paks.
The President again asked whether we could get the Indians to take the same view of the Chinese threat we do with only $300 million in US/UK support. As we saw it, we couldn't get the Indians to "come down from $1.6 billion to $300 million." How could we avoid a real clash and disillusionment? McNamara thought that we could; however, we could go to 800,000 men and could probably agree on a $300 million and 800,000 men program in 2 - 3 months. The President said he was inclined to agree with Bowles that we should go ahead with the Indian program shortly. We had never been able to get the UK to go 50 - 50 on anything else, so while trying to bring them along, we should not limit ourselves to their pace. McNamara and Rusk both pointed out the Congressional problem, if we tried to go much above $300 million and UK didn't participate.
The President said he couldn't see how we could stop Communist China without India. "Let's not be penny wise about India; let's not let them get into a position where they feel that they can't cope with the Chicoms and Paks on top of their other problems." Our policy should be not to let the UK restrain us from going ahead. He agreed we should do our best to bring the UK along, but "India is the important thing; not the UK." We shouldn't settle finally on $300 million just because this is the most we could get on a 50 - 50 basis. McNamara argued we should separate the UK issue from that of realistic planning. He thought the UK wouldn't even go along with half of $300 million. It was generally agreed this was so.
The discussion turned to the air defense commitment. McNamara felt this had great political value; Rusk agreed it was very important. The President said that if the Chicoms bombed India we would of course become involved, so he didn't see too much risk in giving a prior commitment. He asked when we should give the Indians our decisions on aid. Grant argued that we need to convince the Indians we are really going to help them. An air defense commitment shortly would buy us time to hammer out a realistic MAP program. Rusk contended that shooting at Chicom planes in India would lead almost certainly to the Chicoms shooting at us elsewhere. It would immediately broaden the war. At the President's request, McNamara, Nitze and Komer described the proposed air defense package. McNamara indicated that the only cost would be some $15 million for radar, nothing else. Rusk suggested we not commit ourselves on air defense until he and Sandys returned.
The President agreed, but said let's consider air defense shortly. We want the Chicoms to know what we are going to do so they won't attack. We were sending planes to Saudi Arabia so why shouldn't we go ahead with India? He felt that we should engage in intensive talks with the Indians and attempt to bring them down to realistic levels. But we should keep these talks on the DOD level without State Department participation so we didn't appear to tie the talks too much to political conditions such as Kashmir.
As to a Kashmir settlement, the President thought the chances were almost nil. Rusk agreed unless the UK could manage to move the Indians. Maybe Mountbatten could when he was out in India. The President asked what we should do about Ayub. He felt we must make clear to Ayub we were doing our best on Kashmir but couldn't hold off indefinitely on aid to India. Rusk agreed and said we must tell the Paks we couldn't subordinate our larger interests to their quarrel with India over Kashmir. Bundy suggested that Rusk give a careful oral rebuttal in Delhi to Nehru's accusations about the "elements," in lieu of the President's replying to Nehru's letter now (especially since Macmillan had already given a written reply). The President thought we should tell Ayub we've got to go ahead with Nehru, while telling Nehru that military aid to him without a Kashmir settlement will cause us all sorts of trouble with the Paks and our own Congress. He asked whether we were likely to get thrown out of our base in Pakistan if we went ahead with aid to India? Rusk thought it would be rough; we might lose our Pakistani base unless the Chicoms attacked again.
The President asked about the consortium problem with Pakistan. Gaud explained the situation. The Paks want from us at least last year's level of $250 million, and a total of $550 million from the consortium as a whole. We just didn't think they needed this much.
The President returned to the air defense problem, saying Komer and others on the staff felt we should go ahead with air defense soon. However, we would wait for Rusk's judgment. Bowles urged that we go ahead on some gesture of this sort. Rusk suggested staff talks with the Indians at a military level about sending the US/UK air defense squadrons as a means of indicating to the Indians our continued interest in helping them.
McNamara returned to the problem of UK participation. We certainly ought to have the UK in. To get Congressional support of our Indian program, one of three conditions would have to be met: (1) a Kashmir settlement; or (2) a realistic program; or (3) the UK going along. He had discovered on the Hill that Congressional opposition to Indian aid was strong. We had also found the British most reluctant to go along with further aid to India at this point. Rusk pointed out that as always the UK had the vulnerability of Hong Kong very much in mind.
The President thought we ought to go ahead on air defense and work on Congress to this end. Congress would be much madder if India went Communist. Air defense was the least expensive move we could make and the least offensive to the Paks. If the UK wouldn't go along, we should go ahead ourselves. We could put the program under the guise of training. He wondered why we couldn't fly squadrons into India for exercises? McNamara indicated this was part of the proposal. It was agreed that if the Paks wanted similar exercises there wouldn't be much problem, since we already had SEATO and CENTO exercises with the Paks. Rusk asked if it made sense for us to have a carrier in the Indian Ocean on a regular basis? McNamara and Anderson indicated that carrier visits would be no problem but that it would over-extend us if we tried to maintain a carrier there on a regular basis. The UK had a small carrier in the area.
R.W. Komer
284. Note From the Department of State to the British Embassy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 UK - US. Secret. Drafted in G/PM on April 18 by Winston Lord.
Washington, April 25, 1963.
The Government of the United States proposes to the British Government the initiation of discussions by appropriate military and civil representatives of the two Governments looking toward the possible strategic use of certain small islands in the Indian Ocean area./2/
/2/According to an April 25 memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen to U. Alexis Johnson, this note grew out of a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State initiate discussion with the British on the possible long-term development of base facilities in the Indian Ocean area. The Joint Chiefs cited a need for such bases for possible contingency operations. (Ibid.)
The two Governments share a common concern for an adequate long-term allied presence in the area, and it is thus considered important that there be effective coordination of strategic planning on the matter. To this end the United States Government would like to explore with the British Government the military and technical considerations involved in any such joint effort. It is further suggested that if the appropriate authorities conclude that mutually advantageous planning is feasible, the two Governments might then proceed at a higher level to discuss the political aspects of the availability of locations in the area to support military plans.
Accordingly, the Government of the United States proposes that the inital discussions be undertaken between appropriate military authorities of the two Governments either in London or in Washington and, as necessary, in the area under consideration.
285. Memorandum for the Record/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/24/63 - 4/27/63. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy.
Washington, April 26, 1963.
SUBJECT
The President's Views on India as expressed at 25 April Meeting/2/
/2/See Document 283.
1. In general, we should prepare to go ahead on military support for India. Given the declining prospects for a Kashmir settlement, we should not hold off so long on aid, in order to get leverage on Kashmir, that we jeopardize the developing relationship between the US and India. It is hard to see how we can stop the Chinese Communists without India.
2. As to the magnitude of further military aid, we should try to get the Indians down to a realistic program, but should regard $300 million (including defense production aid) over three years from the US and UK as a floor rather than a ceiling. It will be difficult to bridge the political gap between India's exaggerated hopes for $1.6 billion in aid over this period and our preliminary judgment that no more than $300 million is militarily realistic.
3. While we should make every effort to bring the UK along on further aid, we should not limit ourselves to their preferred pace. It is unrealistic to expect that the British will go fifty - fifty even on a $300 million program. Therefore, our policy should be not to let the UK restrain us from moving to the extent we think desirable.
4. We and the British should engage in intensive talks with the Indians at the DOD and military level to bring more realism into their thinking and to counter any impression that we are stalling on aid. The State Department should avoid participating in these talks so they won't appear to be tied to political conditions, i.e. Kashmir.
5. We ought to go ahead shortly on the air defense commitment, but will reserve final judgment until Secretary Rusk's return from the subcontinent. This commitment seems the least expensive way to reassure India of our continued interest in its defense, while being the move least offensive to the Pakistani. We should try hard to get the UK to join us, but be prepared to do most of the job ourselves if necessary.
6. We must make clear to Ayub that we can't hold off indefinitely on aid to India because of Kashmir. Let's tell Ayub that we've got to go ahead soon, while telling Nehru that if we give him major aid without a Kashmir settlement, it will cause all sorts of trouble with Pakistan and the US Congress.
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
286. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; No Other Distribution. Received in the Department of State on May 2 at 8:54 a.m. Relayed to the White House.
Karachi, May 2, 1963, Midnight.
Secto 30. Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary. Following are my first reactions to our talk with Ayub this morning,/2/ full report of which coming separately.
/2/Rusk visited Karachi April 29 - May 2. Additional documentation on the visit is ibid.
1. The atmosphere was entirely relaxed and friendly. Ayub sent warm personal message to the President and Mrs. Kennedy and took repeated opportunities to express appreciation for US assistance and for friendship between our two countries. He also expressed understanding of the heavy burdens carried by the US in the total world situation and said that he understood that we would have to make our own decisions in the light of such responsibilities. At no time did he make threats or express any bitterness insofar as US - Pakistan relations were concerned. Indeed, he told us he had rebuked the editor of "Dawn" for his inflammatory and unrepresentative attitude.
2. It is clear that he has written off any further Kashmir negotiations and expects to rest on the status quo rather than accept deep compromises on Pakistan position. This came out in response to my probing as to how he saw the course of events if negotiations completely broke down. His reference to status quo rather than to some wild initiative may be of some significance. He did say that Pakistan public opinion would blame the US, UK and the Government of Pakistan and would say that the government had played the fool in being drawn into the negotiations in the first place.
3. Entire conversation was marked by his deep fear, distrust, and hatred of India and especially the Brahmin Nehru whom he regards as an evil and dangerous man. He said that this was the first time in Indian history that this particular kind of Indian had exercised power; former Indian rulers were like the chivalrous Rajputs with a high sense of honor and responsibility. He is utterly convinced that India not only wishes to eliminate Pakistan but to absorb other neighboring states such as Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon. I told him that we ourselves did not share this view of Indian objectives and asked him, if this were not an Indian policy, what the Indians could do or say to persuade Ayub. He replied that there is nothing India could do, that Pakistan knows them too well.
4. He analyzed his view of the nature of the Chinese military threat to the subcontinent and said that the Chinese could not support more than seven brigades directed against India across the Himalayas. He added that the Chinese had told them that this was their own estimate both with respect to what India could push at China across the mountains and what China could do in reverse. I gave him a brief statement of our own estimates which were somewhat higher.
5. He spent some time on further arms aid to India though none on recrimination for aid already given. He looks upon this as strengthening India against its smaller neighbors and that Nehru is using the Chinese threat as a cloak to build up for other purposes. Thus he argues that the effect of arms aid to India would be to weaken the situation in the general area because of the stresses and strains it would produce. He said that he was almost alone in Pakistan in holding back the flood of public feeling on this subject. I outlined world-wide responsibilities within which our own decision would have to be made but this will be covered in full report.
6. I did raise "in the most tentative fashion" what his attitude would be if the US and the UK were to establish certain air squadrons to offer some defense to Indian cities against Chinese attack and as an alternative to a comparable build-up of the Indian Air Force. He immediately endorsed this idea saying, among other things, that it would help make the Indians behave.
7. Further, he did say if the Chinese again attacked India that we should provide additional emergency assistance and saw this as a full substitute for any military assistance prior to such an attack. He was not impressed with the deterrent role of strengthened Indian forces since he obviously looks upon Indian strength as aimed primarily at himself.
8. He raised his desire to buy some 70 German F86F's which they are willing to sell for $7 million including a substantial number of spare parts, portion of which interchangeable with F86F's. Having consulted Bundy, I told him that we would raise no policy objection but that I urged him as a military man to look at these with a glassy stare in order to be completely sure that he was getting something he wanted other than "white elephant." I mentioned operational and maintenance problems in his country as compared to highly specialized circumstances central European front. My guess is that he will go ahead with this purchase, but he is in no position whatever to chide us if this proves to be a disappointment. He insisted that he was not intending to augment his air force, except that he wanted some night fighter capability.
9. Regarding Afghanistan, he seems to be in a mood to try to find some agreement on a 50 - 50 or even "40 - 60" basis, but remained skeptical about attitude of new government because he does not believe it possible that it could have taken office without full approval of Daud and Naim. I believe we should ourselves proceed on the optimistic assumption that Iranian initiative can work, but should recognize that we may be a long way from settlement.
10. He also made an earnest appeal on Tarbela and gave me some papers to read on which I will report later.
11. Finally, I do not believe we can obtain major relaxation of Pakistan views on relations with India through further reaffirmation of US commitments to Pakistan in the event of attack. Ayub said that on such matters Pakistan will prefer to "do it themselves" and that he could never be certain that in a given situation Pakistan can persuade other governments, "the Congress, the people" of Pakistan's security needs.
Rusk
287. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 5/63 - 6/63. Secret.
Washington, May 2, 1963.
McGB:
Re President's desire to freeze any AID announcements on Pakistan because of chilly Pak reception for Rusk, consortium due to announce tomorrow agreement on $400 million 1963 - 4 aid to Paks (200 ours).
Bill Gaud says hard to see how we could stop announcement since other countries involved. I've noted Ayub was very nice to Rusk (Karachi Secto 30)/2/ and Paks, who want $550 million won't be elated over announcement so I've ok'd Bill going ahead (I see no other choice).
RWK
/2/Document 286.
288. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State on May 3 at 9:53 p.m. Repeated to Karachi and London.
New Delhi, May 4, 1963, 4 a.m.
Secto 40. 1. Sandys called on Secretary late this afternoon. Ambassador, Bundy, Timmons, Gore-Booth and Pickard present. Sandys inquired as to results Secretary's talk with Nehru this morning./2/ Secretary said he had impression that if mediation proposal/3/ can be worked out it is on as far as Nehru is concerned. Secretary added that he talked with Nehru privately today and asked where the Kashmir talks went next. Nehru knocked down idea of independence for Vale, but Secretary felt Nehru used rather desultory arguments. Same true of condominium. Nehru feared as usual that if ceasefire line relaxed, hordes would pour in from Pakistan-held Kashmir and inundate Indian portion.
/2/Rusk visited New Delhi May 2 - 4.
/3/Rusk learned in a conversation with Sandys on May 2 that the idea of introducing a mediator into the deadlocked negotiations over Kashmir had been raised by Nehru in a conversation between Nehru and Lord Mountbatten before Sandys arrived in New Delhi. Nehru envisioned someone of international stature, unconnected with the ongoing talks, who would study the Kashmir problem and put forward possible lines for a solution. (Secto 32 from New Delhi, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK)
2. Secretary said he had indicated to Nehru that Sandys had recounted to him Sandys own talk with Nehru, in which idea of mediator had emerged. Nehru said that if Indians proposed this, Paks would turn down. Secretary gave Nehru to understand that idea would be explored with Paks and that we would be in touch with Nehru again. Secretary said that at end of conversation Nehru unquestionably knew what he (Secretary) had in mind doing, and that Secretary was acting on assumption that such a proposal was all right with Nehru. Ambassador pointed out Radhakrishnan had mentioned mediation idea this afternoon at tea for Secretary and party, and had specifically referred to Ellsworth Bunker as possible mediator. Secretary noted Nehru had said this morning it important "not let situation break down," and that mediation should be explored in lieu of further rounds. Summing up, Secretary said Nehru clearly seemed agree that U.S. should explore mediation idea with Ayub. Secretary seeing Nehru briefly after PM's dinner tonight and this would afford opportunity take final reading.
3. Discussion then turned to question of tactics with Paks. Ambassador suggested line with Paks should be that having sounded Indians out we think we can get them accept U.S. or Britsh mediator; can we go back to Indians with Pak acceptance? Sandys agreed, noting it could be said to Paks that since Indians clearly not ready move forward on any precise proposals, what about mediation? We think we can get GOI to agree. Also noted however that if reluctance encountered might be necessary put mediation proposal more formally to both sides. Secretary thought two stages might be involved. First would be to attempt bring Paks along. If necessary, in second stage proposal could be put to both. Sandys noted Paks would doubtless fear that mediation proposal simply device for spinning things out. Secretary said could be pointed out to Paks that mediation procedure is not something that can go on forever, and that Paks should test to see whether it mere device. Sandys suggested we take stance that proposal good news for Paks since they have always wanted it. U.S. side noted that while Paks have wanted US/UK governmental intervention in negotiations in expectation that this would operate in Pak favor, they might be less enthusiastic about a mediator acting as a private individual.
4. Sandys asked if Eugene Black available. Ambassador said Indians had indicated that difficult accept Black now, as this would mean reversal of earlier decision (i.e. rejection in 1962 of offer of Black's good offices).
5. Pickard asked if question of terms of reference for mediator had come up. Secretary thought it best if mediator worked out his own as he went along, since this not formal mediation procedure. Sandys said he had in mind purely procedural matters, such as that mediator would talk to both sides, explore possibilities of settlement, propose basis for discussion between two sides or with him. Secretary said maximum flexibility should be preserved; therefore thought process should be started by finding appropriate individual and ask him attempt straighten out Kashmir problem. Secretary also noted that more than Kashmir involved. It generally agreed mediator's task would embrace "other related matters."
6. Discussion also touched on question of time limit. Ambassador said process of modifying attitudes and positions on both sides will take time and Paks must be persuaded of this. While work of mediator moves forward, we must also go ahead with military aid decisions, otherwise political climate here would become intolerable. Sandys agreed no time limit should be fixed, but also noted that since Paks could hardly raise Kashmir in UN while mediation going on, they would not wish give up their freedom of action in this regard indefinitely. This another factor which might impel Paks seek some limit. Secretary noted that in any case the mediator himself would have in mind some general time limit beyond which he would not extend his efforts unless some results in sight.
7. Meeting ended this point in order permit Secretary keep another engagement. Agreed that Secretary and Sandys would have further word after Secretary had seen Nehru tonight.
Rusk
289. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 5:03 a.m. Repeated to Karachi and London.
New Delhi, May 4, 1963, 11 a.m.
4276. Secretary met Nehru for one hour 45 minutes Friday morning May 3. Ambassador, Talbot, M.J. Desai, Gundevia and R.K. Nehru also present first 75 minutes, after which they withdrew to permit Prime Minister and Secretary to have half-hour talk alone. Nehru detached and remote during Secretary's presentation of broader world issues, responsive on subject of China, and fully engaged when discussion turned to Pakistan issues.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Secretary suggested that Chinese may have timed their attack on India last fall with knowledge that Russian build-up was occurring in Cuba. They may have considered that whether the missile plot succeeded or failed, US would be likely to be fully occupied with Cuban crisis and thus unlikely to be able to turn attention to actions in Himalayas. Chinese had had intelligence personnel in Cuba and doubtless knew what was up. Secretary was not nearly so sure that Russians knew about Chinese intentions toward India. Gundevia agreed that later indications, specifically, an accusation by an East German communist leader that the Chinese had mounted an attack on India without consultation with the socialist parties, was further evidence that the timing of the attack had come as a surprise to the European countries.
Turning to Indo - American relations, Secretary assured Nehru that there was not the slightest reason to doubt US sympathy and support to India in its conflict with China.
Pointing out that US not responsible for Kashmir problem, which is result of other peoples' unfinished business, Secretary said in American national interest we must be concerned with security of entire subcontinent. If India and Pakistan should develop close, cordial and cooperative relations, subcontinent would be invulnerable; no nation would dare attack it. If, on other hand, India - Pakistani differences vitiated national efforts it would be difficult to support American efforts to help defend these countries. Thus US has strong and specific interest in settlement of problem just as it does in supporting India against Chinese threat. Emphasized that with a million men in uniform stationed outside the US, every American family is vitally concerned such problems. Nehru referred to Chinese attack on India and to Sino - Soviet relations which he described as not merely ideological, but also reflecting a clash of national interests. He said that "possibly" China would not attack India this summer, but the longer range prospect was more uncertain. He showed that he continues to feel the heavy pressure of further prospective Chinese aggression.
On Indo - Pakistan relations, Nehru embarked on long account of familiar facts of pre-independence Hindu - Muslim relations and of post-independence Indo - Pakistan quarrels. Called Kashmir the result rather than the cause of "anti-Hindu" and "anti-India" policies of Pakistan. Secretary told of concerns he had heard expressed in Pakistan that some Indian leaders do not accept partition, thus not just Kashmir, but the existence of Pakistan itself would seem to be issue between two countries. Nehru accepted that the Indian leaders have been reluctant to accept partition but emphasized in long historical statement that ultimately they had, in fact, done so. Then asked how they can persuade the doubting Pakistanis of this. India, but not Pakistan, has been ruled by popular leaders. Indian leaders had thought the Pakistani hatred of India would die down, and so far as people concerned it has. Nevertheless, it has been kept alive by politicians. Some might say that Kashmir issue keeps it alive. He wanted the Secretary to know that Indians wanted to solve the Kashmir issue, but cannot do so at the cost of other relationships. Trouble is that Pakistanis blame Indians for everything, even their troubles in East Pakistan, though India has nothing to do with that. Nevertheless, Indian leaders are worried because anything that happens in Pakistan affects India. India wants good relations with Pakistan. Secretary suggested that if present hurdles could be got over, new areas of cooperation could be found and maximum frontiers could become less important. He recalled that in western Europe settlement of Saar had made possible almost breath-taking progress in common institutions. Nehru said that Indians had same idea, unless something untoward happens. He assured Secretary that on no account would India upset the partition. Secretary spoke again of our keen interest in relationships with India, looking at the question from perspective of our own burdens and responsibilities. If India is again attacked by the Chinese, the US is and will remain India's friend. No question about that; it has to do with overriding crises of our time. When we see the difference between the safety of the subcontinent if the two countries--India and Pakistan--work together, or if they don't we utter "a cry of anguish" at the present situation.
Nehru said that with regard to Kashmir he believed India might well have come to agreement with Pakistan already but for fact Paks had been encouraged by UK and to some extent by US.
Secretary observed that one point he need not conceal is that our people believe just powers of government derived from consent of governed. With regard to Kashmir or other issues, we can't avoid this at home. He hoped Prime Minister understood that. Nehru said he quite understood then launched into description UNCIP processes culminating with assertion that constituent assembly in Kashmir, elected by people, confirmed Kashmir's accession to India. He said premier Indian [objection?] to plebiscite is that it likely to so arouse Islamic sentiments as to bring trouble to minorities in Kashmir and India generally.
At this stage Prime Minister and Secretary excused other participants for private talk.
Galbraith
290. Notes by Secretary of State Rusk/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US - INDIA. Secret. The notes were not signed or initialed by Rusk, but a notation on the source text indicates that he drafted them. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 4/28/63 - 5/5/63. A May 7 memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy indicates that Rusk prepared the notes for the President. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 3/63 - 5/63)
Washington, May 5, 1963.
Notes on Karachi - New Delhi Visit
1. There is little evidence of a desire in either Pakistan or India to work hard toward a general reconciliation which would involve major concessions on Kashmir. There seems to be somewhat more readiness in Karachi than in New Delhi to make substantial moves away from starting positions, but it is also Karachi which gains from changes in the status quo.
2. It is most unlikely that a Kashmir settlement can be negotiated which would not cause serious difficulties for both governments internally. It would help if such an agreement could be cushioned by far-reaching agreements on other matters in order that the pain of Kashmir could be outweighed by obvious advantages which one or the other might find elsewhere. Nothing less than a Franco-German type of reconciliation is likely to work. India is more ready for this than Pakistan; the latter appears most reluctant to ease pressures on Kashmir by discussing or agreeing on other questions prior to a Kashmir settlement. Further, the absence of such a settlement leaves the two parties in an atmosphere of unreasoning hostility which militates against good results on other issues. This adds up to a difficult, but not insuperable, problem of diplomatic procedure.
3. There is a wide gap between India and Pakistan on the nature of the threat which each faces. Each undoubtedly holds its point of view in good faith, but each also exaggerates for our benefit. India wants large-scale military assistance on the ground that it is being encircled by China: along their common borders, in Nepal and Bhutan, in Burma, in Southeast Asia, and to a degree through the animosity of Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, sees a minimum of threat from China to the subcontinent and thinks that India is determined in the long run to absorb its smaller neighbors: Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and Ceylon. Pakistan adds that this kind of expansionist India would either join the communist bloc or work intimately with it against Western interests.
4. Pakistan pretends to be convinced that India has never accepted partition and seeks the disappearance of Pakistan. This fear is given some support by Nehru's repeated rejection of Jinnah's "two-nation theory," that is, a rejection of a religious base for statehood. This is easily converted in Pakistan into a rejection by India of the fact of two states in the subcontinent. I spoke to Nehru about this confusion and urged him to take further steps to clarify that he accepts partition as a permanent solution.
5. The United States should clarify its own thinking about the purposes of substantial military assistance to India. The following elements have been mentioned but need refinement and realistic appraisal:
a. to deter or meet renewed Chinese offensives along the northern frontiers.
b. to prepare for a military threat from the direction of Burma.
c. to obtain a de facto ally against the Chinese in the event of increased Chinese threats to Southeast Asia or other areas.
d. to consolidate the changes in Indian political attitudes which have been produced by the Chinese attacks of late 1962.
6. The consequences of the types and scale of military assistance to India should be carefully assessed, including the irresponsible courses of action which Pakistan might well adopt. Unfortunately, we cannot rely upon Pakistan to act rationally and in what we might think would be in its own interest.
7. Our military assistance to India might be governed by the following approach:
a. In the event of a renewed Chinese attack, we should provide prompt and substantial emergency assistance. We should consider ways and means of rendering this assistance promptly through possible pre-stocking of key items such as ammunition nearer the scene. Pakistan accepts additional emergency assistance for India in the event of a new Chinese attack.
b. We should proceed promptly to prepare the setting for an introduction of U.S. and Commonwealth fighter squadrons into India. This would mean the installation of radar and communications facilities, any modifications of air fields to be used, arrangements for housing, POL, etc., and joint training, including fly-through visitations by such squadrons from time to time. Pakistan approves such a role for U.S. and Commonwealth squadrons in lieu of a comparable build-up of the Indian Air Force.
c. We should press the British hard to bring British-supplied equipment in Indian hands up to maximum operational effectiveness, especially with regard to spare parts for Indian military aircraft. Pakistan would not like this, but could not object to actions inherent in existing or past arrangements between India and Britain.
d. We should help India on improvements in road, rail and communications facilities required to support forces facing the Chinese--facilities which could yield an economic return if not needed for military purposes. This could make a solid contribution to India's strength and would not be inflammatory to the Pakistanis.
e. The Indian armed forces need modernized training for their senior officers involved in war plans, higher command echelons, the employment of combined air and ground forces, logistics, etc. Present Indian military leadership has had little practical experience beyond the brigade level. We and the British ought to get at this as high priority assistance.
f. If we agree that the Indian armed forces require some strengthening in more sophisticated modern weapons of a sort which would unduly excite the Pakistanis, we should let the Indians use their own foreign exchange to purchase such equipment rather than provide it as military assistance. They have for years made such purchases, indirectly supported by our support for their total requirements through economic assistance. Perhaps defense production should be handled in the same way.
g. We should press to assure ourselves that our present emergency assistance is being properly used and is, in fact, adding to the capability of Indian forces in the field.
8. The views indicated above are related to the period of Mr. Nehru's leadership in India. Despite the fact that he is slowing down somewhat, he still dominates the scene on the more important policy questions. I am not sanguine about a Kashmir settlement while he is Prime Minister. Nor do I believe that a heavy investment in Indian defense would cause him to accept defense responsibilities outside India, with the possible exception of Burma. He will remain "unaligned" in an effort to obtain some help from the Soviet Union against China; if this fails the chances are that he would go to considerable lengths to make peace with China. I could be wrong. Post-Nehru, the situation in India could be quite different, both in respect to Pakistan and in East - West relations.
291. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and New Delhi.
Karachi, May 6, 1963, 2 p.m.
2179. 1. British High Commissioner James, Pickard of UK Commonwealth Relations Office London and I saw President Ayub in Rawalpindi late this afternoon to present Kashmir mediator suggestion. Shahi and Shafqat of GOP Foreign Office present. Results were inconclusive but not wholly discouraging. James presented letter from Sandys urging acceptance of proposal (Delhi's 4290 to Department)./2/ President read Sandys' letter in our presence and said he wished to consider proposal further with his colleagues. He seemed disappointed that Sandys had not pursued in Delhi Ayub's proposal for special status for Vale.
/2/Dated May 5. (Ibid.)
2. President's immediate reaction was that mediator would be ineffectual without authority to make authoritative recommendations to US and UK about military aid to India. He was deeply concerned about recent reports in Delhi on military aid and pressed very hard argument that mediator's efforts would be foredoomed to failure unless US and UK decisions on further military aid to India were made dependent on Indian acceptance his Kashmir settlement recommendations.
3. He argued appointment of one man as mediator would be dangerous and a panel might be needed. He felt that most of mediator's work would need be done in Delhi and that he would not want any GOP action to detract from validity of UNCIP resolutions. He asked whether mediator could not work within framework these resolutions.
4. Ayub deprecated present ministerial negotiations as futile and thought there was no possible utility in scheduled sixth round, which should at least be postponed. He felt sure that no progress would be possible without the exertion of pressure on India.
5. James and I stressed importance of new approach as only promising alternative to sterile current series of ministerial level talks. President admitted situation would be somber if talks collapsed with no new procedure adopted.
6. James quoted from Macmillan's statement in Commons on May 3 and Sandys' statement in Delhi on May 4 in effort to reassure Ayub and I quoted from US official sources as to logic of discussing Kashmir settlement and arms aid to India together. President still seemed to feel deeply that only threat of withholding aid would induce India to negotiate.
7. President said he recognized some good features in our proposal, and he did not refute our observation that Pakistan traditionally has favored interposition of third party into negotiations. He said he of course would not make a final decision on a matter of such moment without reflection and consultation with his advisors. He said he would see Foreign Minister Bhutto in Dacca beginning May 7 and suggested that James and I meet him again in Dacca evening May 8, just before his departure for Kathmandu. He expected to have a reply by that time. In the meanwhile he thought we might wish to talk with Bhutto who is arriving Karachi from Larkana midday May 6.
8. Talbot and I plan to see Bhutto in Karachi shortly after his arrival here. James is seeking separate appointment with Bhutto for Sandys after he arrives from Bombay midday May 6.
9. President's first reaction with us not encouraging; but there seemed to be an element of poker in his attitude toward us and it is possible that after his and our discussions with Bhutto and after further consideration by him our rebuttal of his arguments for putting our military aid program in hands of mediator as a pressure instrument, he may take a more favorable view. The crucial problem remains his concern about military aid to India.
10. In view of Ayub's reluctant attitude which seemed to imply that he would be doing us a favor if he accepted, I said on departure that he should not act on assumption that proposal was advanced primarily in our own interest. Suggestion was put forward because we thought it offered best chance of reaching a settlement by two countries directly concerned. We expected him to consider matter on basis of GOP interest and not US interest.
McConaughy
292. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 - 4 INDIA. Secret. Drafted in SOA on May 4 by Carleton S. Coon and cleared by Grant, Cameron, L, BNA, SOV, FE/EA, NR, and G/PM. An enclosure, a 3-page assessment of the legal implications of the recommendations, prepared by Department of State Legal Adviser Abram Chayes, is not printed.
Washington, May 8, 1963.
SUBJECT
Air Defense for India
In our meeting on April 25,/2/ you suggested a final review of this question after I returned from the subcontinent. I have undertaken such a review and submit the following recommendations.
/2/See Documents 283 and 285.
Recommendations
1. The United States should commit itself, by executive agreement, to consult with the Government of India, in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on India, regarding the possible use of United States military air forces to strengthen India's air defenses. We would expect the United Kingdom - Commonwealth to assume a similar obligation.
2. The United States and the United Kingdom - Commonwealth should be prepared in the event of such a Chinese Communist attack to deploy three squadrons of air defense aircraft for use in the air defense of the Delhi and Calcutta areas.
3. The United States and the United Kingdom should in support of the squadrons proceed promptly with the installation of permanent radar and communications facilities. In the interim, they should station mobile radars and communications and navigational aids as required in the Calcutta and Delhi areas.
4. The United States and the United Kingdom - Commonwealth should be prepared to conduct intermittent peacetime air defense exercises in India using the forces earmarked for deployment there at times when it is most practicable to do so and when these exercises would least conflict with other interests.
Discussion
1. Our Reasons for Proposing this Course of Action.
a. Some action needed now--India considers its military security against China is largely dependent upon Western support. It has, therefore, been receptive to developing close military ties with the West. The absence of further overt Chicom belligerency, Western reluctance to proceed with military assistance on the scale desired by India, and continued pressure for a Kashmir settlement, have caused the Indians to cool off somewhat from their position of last November. This trend will continue unless we exploit the present situation energetically by giving India some concrete indication of our backing. We must not lose sight of the long-term geopolitical significance of India as the only non-communist country in Asia capable of becoming a counterpoise to Communist China. To make all military assistance contingent on Kashmir in coming months is to risk losing out on the main chance.
b. Inexpensive--The proposed arrangement is essentially a holding operation. It should indicate our support to the Indians and develop our ties with the Indian military. But it doesn't provide what the Indians really want, a modern air force of their own. Thus, it is unlikely either to antagonize the Pakistanis or reduce our net leverage on Kashmir. Financially it is far less costly than providing the Indians with a comparable capability of their own.
c. Timely--It will significantly increase India's air defense capability during the critical period immediately ahead, when India's own armed forces are still weak.
d. Strong deterrent--During the same critical period, knowledge of this commitment will provide an even greater deterrent to Chinese Communist aggression than a comparable Indian Air Force buildup; the Chinese will think twice before risking direct engagement with the United States/United Kingdom air squadrons.
e. Flexible--The proposed arrangement permits graduated responses to various levels of Chinese Communist aggression. We shall not be committed to engage in specific military action. Nor will we be precluded from action against targets of our choice from bases outside India. Prior to making this type of response, we would probably have to provide a measure of air defense for India in any event.
f. Immediate strengthening of India's border defenses--The arrangement will make it easier for the Indians to commit their own air force in any second round for tactical support and interdiction.
2. Possible Disadvantages
a. Indians might reject proposal--but even if they did our offer would serve the important purpose of demonstrating our willingness to stand behind them in the event of another attack. Last November and December Nehru twice asked for an arrangement along the lines of our proposal. But since then, the Indians have shifted their emphasis to building up their own air force. They may, therefore, interpret our offer as a device to defer their acquisition of comparable capability of their own. Our willingness to begin the installation of permanent radars will reduce this Indian reaction.
b. Repercussions within India--The key here is Nehru. If he decides that our proposal is necessary for India's defense and can be reconciled with nonalignment, public opinion will follow his lead, except for the extreme left. But if Nehru rejects our offers, the controversy between rightist and leftist elements over India's evolving relationship with the West is likely to intensify. The fact that the proposed arrangement does not involve a firm mutual defense commitment will help.
c. Repercussions in Pakistan--We shall, of course, have to explain to Ayub what we plan to do before we approach the Indians officially on air defense. Ayub and others recognize that this is a major step available to us in strengthening India against Communist China that does not significantly affect the military balance within the subcontinent. They see such an arrangement as being in lieu of a comparable build-up of the Indian Air Force. Nevertheless, some Pakistanis will react emotionally.
d. Repercussions in Asian neutralist states--The Chinese Communists will use the proposed arrangement in their efforts to discredit India in these states by portraying it as a vassal of the United States. These states, however, are likely to be less affected by Chinese Communist rhetoric than by the demonstration inherent in our proposal of Western willingness to commit its power toward the containment of Chinese Communist expansionism.
3. British Reluctance
We expect the British to hold back. They are worried about the consequences of a direct confrontation between the RAF and Chinese Communist bombers over India--including Chinese reprisals against Hong Kong. They are also worried about repercussions of an air defense proposal for India in Pakistan. And, in any event, they think we should hold off pending some progress on Kashmir.
We think we have good arguments to counter these British reservations. If the Chinese attack India again, the consequences are likely to be far-reaching in any event, and the air defense arrangement will probably decrease the likelihood of such an attack. The air defense arrangement is less costly in terms of Pakistani repercussions than almost anything else we might do for India of military significance. And we can argue at length that if we do nothing at all for India in the near future, our capacity to push the Indians into a reasonable posture on Kashmir may actually diminish.
Next Steps
1. United States Approach to the British
We should make every effort to bring the British to a political decision to move ahead with us. We should try to secure their agreement to provide two RAF squadrons while we contribute one from the USAF. We should also try to persuade the British to work out at least token contributions from Canada and Australia, recognizing that the joint air defense team found that neither of these countries had the resources to provide a major contribution.
2. United States/United Kingdom/Commonwealth Approach to the Indians
Once we have persuaded the British, with or without Canada and Australia, to join us, we should make a joint approach to the Government of India. The tone of this approach would be that we are responding to an Indian request after a careful technical review which indicates that the proposed arrangement provides the only feasible method of providing a significant increase in India's air defense capability in a timely enough manner to be effective during the current critical period. We would indicate that we did not consider the proposed arrangement a permanent substitute for an effective Indian force. We would not, however, discuss how long we expected the arrangement to continue in specific terms, nor would we commit ourselves to providing India with supersonic interceptors of its own at some future date.
3. Technical Discussions
Having reached agreement in principle, the governments concerned would work out the necessary details, including status of forces, facilities, and arrangements for the ground environment. The resulting understandings would be formalized, as necessary. Meanwhile, technical representatives of the respective air forces would consult and lay the groundwork for rotational exercises.
4. Rotational Exercises
These would involve intermittent peacetime deployment to India by designated USAF and RAF squadrons for air defense exercises with the Indian Air Force. The United States element of the joint air defense team found such exercises essential to ensure effective deployment for combat operations during a militarily acceptable period after the outbreak of hostilities.
Dean Rusk/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
293. Summary Record of the 514th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1963, Meeting No. 514. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Additional records of this meeting, prepared on May 10 by CIA Director McCone, and on May 11 by Acting Assistant Secretary of State James Grant, are in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 B 01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April - 30 June 1963, and Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 INDIA - PAK, respectively.
Washington, May 9, 1963, 5 p.m.
India
Secretary Rusk presented the recommendation contained in his memorandum to the President of May 8, 1963, regarding arrangements for the air defense of India (copy attached)./2/ He said our problem is that if we give too little we might lose India and that if we give too much we might lose Pakistan.
/2/Document 292.
Secretary McNamara restated the military recommendations, adding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned the military utility of stationing U.S. air squadrons in India. General Taylor summarized the Chiefs' views, emphasizing that in their opinion any commitment to defend India involves a very heavy additional commitment for which no additional forces are provided. The Chiefs are concerned that in deciding on the proposed defense arrangements consideration be given to the broad implications for U.S. strategy in the area. The Chiefs accept the political requirement for air defense arrangements for India but want this problem looked at in the light of defending all Asia against Chinese Communist aggression./3/
/3/On May 7, the Joint Chiefs forwarded to McNamara their assessment of a draft of the memorandum sent by Rusk to Kennedy on May 8. (JCSM - 357 - 63; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, India 381 (25 Apl 63) Jan thru Sep 1963)
Secretary McNamara said the recommended arrangements provided for the deployment to India of two mobile radars which would be left there. These radars, taken from our own forces, would be replaced promptly. He asked that any reference in the recommendation to the installation of permanent radar facilities be removed.
The President asked whether the Indians now want the kind of an air defense commitment we are prepared to give jointly with the British. Secretary Rusk responded by acknowledging that there is greater doubt of Indian acceptance now than there was immediately after the Chinese Communist attack. Nevertheless, he is convinced that the Indians would accept our offer. He suggested that we obtain British agreement to a joint commitment for air defense before we informed the Indians of what we are prepared to do.
The President asked whether the commitment "to consult with the Government of India in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on India regarding the possible use of U.S. military air forces to strengthen India's air defense" means that we are really committed to defend India. Secretary Rusk responded that "consult" actually means a commitment to defend.
Secretary Dillon/4/ noted that the paper did not discuss how the U.S. commitment to defend India would be dealt with domestically. He predicted that Congress would view this commitment as of major importance. He urged that full consultation with Congressional leaders be undertaken in order to forestall criticism of the use of an executive agreement to commit the U.S. Government.
/4/Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.
Secretary Rusk commented that possibly the use of "executive agreement" was not necessary and was perhaps overly formal. In his view the President could decide as a matter of policy to consult with the Indians in the event of a Chinese Communist attack.
The President said that it was obvious we would defend India if attacked. He thought that our offer should cover the defense of India's large cities, not the defense of the frontiers of India on the ground. He said that we could argue out this question with the Congress and believed that we should go ahead now with the U.K. and the Indians and talk about our action to the Congress later. If the Chinese attacked India, he predicted that everyone would be in favor of defending the Indians.
Administrator Bell/5/ pointed out that Congressmen would not oppose our defending India if attacked by Communist China, but they would hammer hard as to whether we should offer such a commitment to India without having forced India to settle the Kashmir question.
/5/AID Administrator David E. Bell.
The President responded by asking when we should start telling Congress that we doubted there would be any settlement now of the Kashmir question. Secretary Rusk responded by saying that he was making a foreign policy report to a Congressional Committee next week and during his presentation could begin the process of educating Congressmen about the declining prospects of an agreement. He pointed out, however, that even if there is no settlement of the Kashmir problem, we cannot walk away from India if the Chi