Documents 1-34
North Africa Region
1. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110. Confidential. Drafted by Root; cleared by Valdes, McBride, and Witman; and approved by Collopy. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for the President's visit to France May 31 - June 2, 1961.
Washington, undated.
MOROCCO AND TUNISIA
In giving Morocco and Tunisia their independence in 1956, France expected to remain in very close association with them. ``Independence within interdependence" was the phrase coined to describe the hoped-for relationship. France, it was thought, would continue to support the two North African nations financially and in return would keep its military bases and obtain special guarantees for its citizens and investments. In recognition of France's paramount role, the U.S. at the time said that any aid we might give Morocco or Tunisia was intended to supplement (not supplant) French efforts.
Events soon belied these hopes. The nationalistic prejudices aroused in Morocco and Tunisia clashed with French short-sightedness (and short temper)--over bases, over French privileges, over disputed territory and over the other sequels of French colonization in North Africa. The Algerian war made it certain that a stable relationship was for the time impossible. Morocco and Tunisia were bound to support the FLN and the French were bound to resent such support. The FLN depended heavily on the sanctuary of Tunisian and Moroccan territory. Border transgressions by both the French Army and the FLN exacerbated the tensions between France and its former protectorates to the point of rupture.
The remarkable fact is that French influence still counts for so much in Morocco and Tunisia. This testifies to the underlying importance of the French-North African interrelationship. Some 200,000 French nationals (of 350 - 400,000 before independence) still live in Morocco and some 50 - 60,000 (of 150 - 200,000 before independence) still live in Tunisia. Morocco continues to rely on some 15,000 French advisers, technicians and teachers and Tunisia, while it is much less dependent on such help than Morocco, still employs several thousand French teachers and other experts. France continues to provide a protected market for Moroccan and Tunisian exports and French investments, particularly in Morocco, still account for most of the modern sector of the North African economies. In both countries French is the second language of all educated persons and the French liberal press and French culture exert a powerful influence.
On the governmental level, nevertheless, France, because of the obduracy of Morocco and Tunisia in post-independence negotiations, suspended virtually all direct financial aid to these two countries. This left a void which we have felt it necessary to fill both for the sake of our own national interests and to preserve some position for the West. In both countries the U.S. has become the principal source of direct foreign economic aid. In Morocco, U.S. aid has reached an annual level of $40 to $50 million, in Tunisia $20 to $25 million--two of our largest aid programs in Africa. We also entered into modest military supply programs when it appeared that Morocco and Tunisia, in desperation, would seek arms from the Soviet bloc. France has not been happy about the expansion of U.S. military and economic aid, but has acquiesced in it while trying to insure that we consult France in advance of any new steps and showing great sensitivity over an indication that we might permanently undermine the French position. As elsewhere in Africa, the French have been especially pained by our English-language teaching programs which they see as a permanent danger to the predominance of French culture.
We have taken great pains to persuade France that we are not seeking a predominant role in North Africa and that we hope France will play a greater role there when the Algerian war is over. We have argued, at the same time, that so long as we have important interests in the area, such as our bases in Morocco, and that so long as the controversies separating France and North Africa endanger the Western position generally in the area, the U.S. does not feel it can abandon Morocco and Tunisia.
One of the most hopeful auguries for the future of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) lies in the interrelationships between the economies of France and that area. France is an important labor market for North African workers and provides outlets for North African grain, wine, phosphates, edible oil and petroleum. The great reservoirs of natural gas developed by French enterprise in Algeria can no doubt provide all of North Africa with a cheap source of power on which to base an expanding industry, and with cheap power it may even become possible to desalinize water profitably and thus to bring vast new desert areas under cultivation.
2. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1480A/8 - 1161. Secret. Drafted by Root and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Bowles, Ball, and Johnson.
Washington, August 11, 1961.
SUBJECT
Regional Conference?Nicosia /2/
/2/ The Regional Operations Conference held at Nicosia, Cyprus, July 31 - August 4, 1961, was chaired by Under Secretary Chester Bowles and attended by the U.S. Chiefs of Mission from Aden, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen.
Although Governor Williams on his return will no doubt wish to report personally on the views of our ambassadors to Northern African countries expressed during the Nicosia conference, I believe that meanwhile you will find of great interest the records of that conference here attached. One is in the form of a signed memorandum from the ambassadors to Governor Williams highlighting the main points which they wished to have emphasized for the Department's benefit. The other is a summary of the discussions during the conference. /3/
/3/ Attached to the source text but not printed.
I would like to call your attention to the following points in particular:
1. The consensus of the conference was that the AFN countries are not irrevocably committed to the Soviet bloc nor are they safely aligned with the Free World.
2. The two major motivations in the area are nationalism and the demand of the people for a better life. When a choice has to be made between what is economically rational and politically expedient, we must expect that nationalism will cause political expediency to win out every time.
3. Although all of the ambassadors applauded the criteria for economic development assistance in the new AID program, it was the general view that in this area as a whole the outlook is bleak for the states concerned to meet the self-help criteria. At the same time, AID remains vital for political reasons, and, where we have military bases, for that reason as well.
4. The maintenance of U.S. military bases in the AFN area is contrary to the tide of nationalism sweeping through those countries. Nevertheless, so far as the existing bases in the area have been given renewed strategic importance, we must presumably face the political and economic disadvantages of holding on to them. This may require our giving further economic and military assistance, or in due course altering our agreements to make them less offensive to the nationalistic sensibilities.
5. The Bizerte crisis /4/ was a major misfortune for our relations with Tunisia and may necessitate a profound revision of our policies in North Africa. The Bizerte crisis has made King Hassan II of Morocco apprehensive of our reaction in the event that Morocco has trouble with Spain.
/4/ See Documents 158 ff.
6. While the countries concerned, many with authoritarian regimes and most with low standards of living, were admittedly highly vulnerable to Communist penetration, the consensus of the ambassadors was that the bloc had not registered significant success. The danger was an increasing one, however. The ambassadors from the countries surrounding the UAR (Sudan, Libya, and Somalia in particular) felt that Egyptian propaganda at the present time was more effective and therefore more dangerous to the West than that from the Communists.
7. There was a unanimous and strong feeling that the ambassadors were asked to make too many demarches to local foreign ministries on behalf of international issues in which the U.S. has an interest for such demarches to be effective. It was suggested that the principal effort should be made in the U.N. (for U.N. issues) rather than in foreign capitals, that fewer approaches would be more effective than the numerous approaches which have hitherto been made, that arguments should be made shorter and simpler, and that more time should be allowed between the approach to the foreign government and the crucial vote.
3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/1 - 2963. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Davies, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, and London and pouched to Algiers and Rabat.
Washington, January 29, 1963, 4:30 p.m.
1680. Dept believes it desirable, as occasions permit, remind President Nasser and other senior UAR officials, of strong U.S. interest in stability and independence North African states, including particularly Libya. Dept aware Nasser's recent statement to U.K. Ambassador to effect he had no designs on Libyan oil fields and had cordial relations present Libyan Government. Nevertheless reports persist of UAR sympathy for elements opposed present regime Libya (as well as Tunisia and Morocco) and UAR should be under no illusions re importance we attach stability this area and particularly to security US installations and present regime Libya.
As suitable opportunities arise, and perhaps, on occasion Governor Williams visit Cairo, hope Embassy may be able reiterate U.S. interest this matter.
Rusk
4. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Tunisian Affairs (Stackhouse) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AF - 1963. Confidential. A handwritten marginal notation on the source text indicates that the paper was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning meeting on July 30.
Washington, July 26, 1963.
SUMMARY OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PAPER ``NORTH AFRICA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL"
I.--Despite many present uncertainties in the North African picture, the West's position now is substantially better than could have been foreseen only a little over a year ago during the final throes of the Algerian War. That war left its scars on the West's relations with the area as the increased Bloc presence there attests. But the War's end has permitted the end of what was for many of North Africa's governing elite a painful estrangement. They have actively sought to resume close ties with Western Europe. France has risen to its opportunities and has actively pursued policies of rapprochement with each of the North African countries (though traces of vindictiveness are discernible in the manner in which they are going about their Bizerte military installation shutdown). The United States and other Western European countries have similarly contributed to a reinforcement of the North African swing toward the West. For the United States the problem has become less one of finding means to build North African-European relationships than to discern ways to encourage and perpetuate ties now in existence, while at the same time defining and carrying out a supplemental role consistent with US interests and objectives.
II.--The Bloc, too, has found a different situation in the area than it probably anticipated a year ago. Morocco and Tunisia are less hospitable to Bloc overtures than they were under the stresses of the Algerian War. Algeria remains a relatively soft target for the Bloc but has not become, as was conceivable a year ago, a beachhead for Bloc domination of North Africa. In all three countries an intense pride in independence has been a barrier to the Bloc. Faced with stickier going than expected, the Bloc has not made a major resource commitment to subvert the area. Its interest remains high, however, and we may expect the Bloc to continue to be attracted by the opportunities this important strategic area offers. At the moment Algeria is particularly vulnerable; the Bloc has not been remiss and recent months have seen a substantially increased Bloc presence there.
III.--In quantitative terms, the American presence in the area tends to decline. The Algerian War's end has sharply reduced the danger of a sudden North African spin into the Bloc orbit. Western Europe, again politically acceptable in the area, is helping to take up the assistance slack in Morocco and Algeria. Our assistance to Tunisia represents a major contribution to a soundly conceived development plan, but Western European aid is increasing. Our strategic presence likewise is declining as our SAC operation is pulled out of Morocco. All of this adumbrates a smaller US material involvement in the area and lessens the possibility that we will face assuming the major share in foreign assistance to North Africa.
There is nothing here, however, to lull the US into a false sense of security. Deep-seated economic and political forces bid fair to keep the area disturbed. Morocco's King seems to be in control but his efforts to set his rule in a democratic, constitutional frame, in which he would remain pre-eminent, are encountering disruptive opposition. The political foundations of newly independent Algeria are still settling as Ben Bella goes about eliminating rivals, consolidating his power and attempting to cope with Algeria's massive economic problems. Tunisia appears relatively serene, but only last December it was shaken by a plot aiming at Bourguiba's assassination, and opposition voices continue to be heard. Bloc interest persists and a flexible US policy, alert to the special and not always predictable demands of the troubled period through which North Africa is passing, is essential to protect US interests in the area.
IV.--Talk of North African unity has been more abundant since the end of the Algerian War, but objective analysis discloses little basis for anticipating such a development in any comprehensive form, embracing spheres of major economic and political interest. Political differences, often tied to personal rivalries among leaders, cut deeply. The parallel nature of North African economies gives little real incentive to broad scale, intimate economic cooperation, though the desirability of offering a common front to the challenge of the Common Market may provide a spur to cooperation in limited areas. North African nations clearly intend to pursue their destinies in the near future through national channels; it behooves the United States to continue to address itself to the nations of the area as individual entities and to appraise any proposed US involvement in regional undertakings first from the standpoint of our relations with the individual nations involved.
V.--The skeptical view we take of chances for comprehensive North African unity should not imply hostility for the concept. We look with favor on North African efforts to promote greater regional cooperation and greater cooperation with Western Europe. Such efforts--under leadership not substantially less well disposed toward the West than that presently in control--will tend strongly to damp intra-regional tensions and strengthen the region in all respects against external threats. We can conceive of instances in which US assistance could be helpful. But, given the lack of forceful momentum behind North African unity at present, we would be badly miscast in a leading role in a halting process whose final issue is so uncertain. North African unity, though desirable, is not the key to the achievement of US aims in the area; we are wise to leave unity initiatives to the North Africans themselves.
5. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Basic National Security Policy 1963. Confidential.
Washington, September 23, 1963.
NORTH AFRICA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL
Preface
This report was prepared in response to the Basic National Security Policy Planning Task No. III (I), ``North Africa in the Mediterranean Littoral". The task as defined in the initial terms of reference was:
``To recommend U.S. policies and courses of action which would tend to bring the states of the North African littoral into constructive association with each other, with Southern Europe, and the Atlantic Community while minimizing ties to nations of the Communist bloc and with Cairo, to the extent that the latter are likely to prove disruptive."
This paper is a revised version of the original draft which was discussed at the Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting on July 30, 1963. /2/ This version takes into account the discussion and views expressed by various officers in the Department of State and outside.
/2/ See Document 4.
The principal conclusion of the paper is that while certain trends, now in progress, point to a growth of some degree of regional unity, they are balanced by other trends which point in exactly the opposite direction. The result of the study indicates, therefore, that significant movement toward unity in Northwest Africa is unlikely irrespective of US or other attempts to foster or delay this process. Similarly, the challenge of the common market will be felt by the different countries in different ways and will probably not be a significant spur to unification. Activities of the Soviet Union, likewise, will be differently felt in the three countries of Northwest Africa. The governments of the three are in actual or potential conflict on territorial and ideological issues, and their leaders are rivals.
Thus, while some degree of regional integration would be beneficial, particularly in areas of economic planning and modernization, and while an important legacy of the French period is an East to West communications infrastructure, significant cooperation is judged to be unlikely.
It is suggested that the present paper be considered as completing the Policy Planning task until such time as significant developments within North Africa make useful a revision.
W.W. Rostow /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
[Here follow Sections I - VI of the paper.]
VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Although there are acknowledged advantages to the United States in a closer form of association among the countries of the North African Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), there appears to be little current basis on which to anticipate such a development. Further, there would appear to be little basis for U.S. policy to promote actively any formal association in the political, military or economic realms, although discreet help toward closer cooperation may be possible in the economic field. U.S. policy must continue to address itself to the individual national entities of the North African littoral, taking full account of the heightened consciousness of national identity which has characterized North African nations since they achieved independence. This does not mean that the U.S. should view the possibilities of association or union negatively. As a matter of policy, we should remain open-minded and alert for opportunities to further Maghreb cooperation and Maghreb ties with Western Europe. U.S. and Western aid programs are particularly important in the latter case.
In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia lip service is paid to the notion of eventual Maghreb unity, but currently and for the foreseeable future, nothing more concrete is likely to be attempted. The possibility of Maghrebian incorporation into a larger Arab union seems even more distant though a loose confederative link between Algeria and the UAR cannot be ruled out. The underlying political differences and frictions, the incompatibility of the royalist and republican regimes, the fact that there is no economic basis for unity (they produce in a parallel rather than complementary pattern) and the fact that each is intensely national in aspect, all militate against organized economic, political or military agreements leading toward unity in any sector. This is not to indicate that advantages would not accrue should a form of unity develop. Advantages of customs union, specialization of industry (one steel mill complex for several nations instead of competing mills), and the resultant economy in labor forces, finance and materials are obvious. But it is difficult to see any basis to hope for it today or to estimate foreseeable times when it could develop into actuality.
In the same less than optimistic view, no political or military or economic pact can be presently anticipated between the North African countries and the countries of Southern Europe other than those which now exist. All of the North African countries are now eager for increased economic assistance from their former colonial lords. France seems prepared to play a major role in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, while Italy appears ready to broaden its relations with Libya. But to cement the relationships with a political pact would clash with the Arab-African ideals of independence and non-alignment.
North African abhorrence of formal political or military pacts with the West does not foreordain deterioration of the Western position in the area. On the contrary, the events of recent months give the West cause for tempered optimism: Maghrebian communist parties have been proscribed; the area's historical and cultural ties with the West have been an important underlying counterforce to Bloc bids in the area; and the intense pride in independence manifested by newly independent Maghrebian countries has been a barrier to Bloc efforts to gain influence. The area nevertheless remains vulnerable to Bloc subversion. All of the countries, but particularly Algeria with its enormous economic problems, offer opportunities to the Bloc. If North Africa does not seem at the moment to be exposed to a major Bloc drive for power (on the order of Soviet efforts in the Middle East in the mid-50's), it is, assuredly, because of its economic weakness and political uncertainties, a continuing target of opportunity for the Bloc.
Apart from aspects of cooperation in the official realms, cooperation within the Maghreb and between the Maghreb and Europe takes place in a number of unofficial and quasi-official fields: labor, education, the professions, and commerce. To the extent these can be encouraged they represent an effective aid to the ultimate objective of closer ties.
The U.S. diplomatic establishment must be alert to any change in the present political, military, or economic scenes in North Africa which would augment North African ties per se or ties with the West, or on the other hand a lessening of Western influence. U.S. objectives are to preserve the North African ties which presently exist with the West, to try to strengthen them when and where they need strengthening and to rebuild them where they have been damaged; to utilize our influence wherever feasible to provide a strong economic base for this cooperation through strengthened North African-EEC ties; to present the image of the U.S.A. as responsively enthusiastic toward helping the new independent nations so that the alternative of turning toward the Soviet Bloc will become less and less attractive. All of this is consistent with the creation of a formal Maghreb association and tangentially should promote it.
6. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, Proposed Ben Bella Visit. Confidential.
Washington, October 14, 1963.
Best reading on the Moroccan-Algerian affair /2/ is that, while both sides are building up strength in the disputed desert area and another minor clash or two may occur, neither Hassan nor Ben Bella really wants a fight just now. Both our embassies feel this way.
/2/ Serious fighting between Algerian and Moroccan forces in the disputed border region broke out on October 8.
There seems to me little security risk in any case, except on the really off-chance that the few planes on each side get involved in deep strikes. But there might be a political reaction in Algiers to what these over-sensitive people may interpret as a pro-Moroccan gesture. They are pretty unhappy with us at the moment anyway, because of what they regard as biased US press treatment.
However, a remedy is to hand, if we could tell Algerians now you're happy to see Ben Bella if he comes (we never got to point of telling them, because he postponed visit again just after you OKed seeing him). He's due in NY the 18th (though another delay is always possible). /3/ As attached /4/ indicates we can arrange minimum protocol--we'll bring him down from NY, chopper to the lawn (one platoon honor guard, no speeches), and then back again same way.
Latest reports also say Castro is not going to Algiers in November.
Bob Komer
/3/ On October 17, Komer sent the President a memorandum stating that Algerian Ambassador Cherif Guellal had just informed U.S. officials that Ben Bella had definitely cancelled his U.N. trip. Guellal had also said that Ben Bella had much appreciated the word he had received indicating that Kennedy wanted to see him and that he wanted them to understand that the cancellation was caused solely by his problems at home. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63 - 9/63)
/4/ The source text indicates a memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 12, was attached. Reference may be to an October 14 memorandum from Read to Bundy attached to Komer's October 14 memorandum to Bundy, which provided an assessment of the Algerian situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG) See footnote 2, Document 87.
7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassyin Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Rabat, Paris, and Tunis.
Washington, October 14, 1963, 7:17 p.m.
601. Department anxious that fighting which has broken out on Moroccan southeastern border be quickly brought to an end.
On October 12 Balafrej in Washington briefly for Moroccan Embassy social function expressed only general uneasiness over Algerian response to what he claimed were Moroccan attempts to settle border disputes by negotiations. His attitude indicated he clearly did not expect fighting on any significant scale. Dept reps expressed belief future solution to border problems would be undermined by pressing question at time when Algerian internal situation unsettled and any effort force settlement could push Algeria further to left.
Addressee posts are requested to make every effort provide full information this situation as viewed locally as well as report initiatives likely to halt fighting.
Rusk
8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper and approved by Williams. Also sent to Rabat and repeated to Paris and Tunis.
Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:52 p.m.
609. French Ambassador advised Secretary today /2/ that GOF does not intend get involved in Moroccan-Algerian dispute. Possible solutions were direct negotiations between two countries possibly with assist from Tunisia, OAU or UN. He stated Moroccans had advanced to points within Algerian territory as last administered by French, while admitting international border in this region had never been defined.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
Secretary indicated USG would also not wish become involved and would certainly refrain from any initiatives this direction. In view boundary history resort to ICJ would not seem be feasible means for resolution of problem. Therefore Algerian-Moroccan negotiations would appear be only course open.
Alphand listed as possible Moroccan aims: (1) seizure of limited number of advanced points in preparation for border negotiations, (2) obtaining control of Tindouf and its mineral deposits and possibly (3) positioning for greater pressures on Mauritania.
Rusk
9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Sisco and Davis, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Addis Ababa, Bern, and USUN.
Washington, October 18, 1963, 7:18 p.m.
1974. With breakdown Algerian-Moroccan negotiations Marrakech yesterday and apparent determination both sides continue fighting apparently on wider front, Department concerned that limited border conflict might be expanded to war in which other powers might become involved to detriment interests US and West in area. We do not want become involved, but now actively considering possible courses action to which we could lend stimulus in effort bring about early cease fire and resumption peaceful efforts reach understanding or moratorium.
Algerians have sought assistance OAU and French Embassy here has informed Department today that Zentar Political Director of Moroccan FonOff has informed French that help from either SYG or OAU would be acceptable to GOM as means getting talks started with GOA again.
Request Embassy Paris seek contact Haile Selassie through Ethiopian Embassy during Emperor's unofficial visit Paris Oct. 20 to 23 for purpose obtaining his views on how OAU might assist in bringing about cease fire and resumption of talks. /2/
/2/ On October 20, the Embassy in Rabat, where Haile Selassie had decided to prolong his stay, was given similar instructions. (Telegram 1032 to Rabat; ibid.)
We think this would be good opportunity help OAU move in direction establishing conciliation machinery envisioned in charter and that Emperor's support of possible initial role for OAU in influencing GOM and GOA to return to conference table would be helpful.
Discussion with Emperor should be purely exploratory this stage and it should be made clear USG not intending become actively involved in any way.
FYI. As will be noted separate tels today, we also exploring possibilities that SYG himself /3/ or Swiss /4/ might serve as catalyst for resumption GOM - GOA talks and cease fire.
/3/ In telegram 1094 to USUN, October 18, the Department of State instructed the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations to make discreet inquiries of the Secretary-General, asking whether he was thinking in terms of any U.N. mediatory role. (Ibid.)
/4/ In telegram 245 to Bern, October 18, the Department of State requested that the Embassy discreetly sound out the Swiss Government and inquire whether it was giving any consideration to the possibility of assisting a cease-fire and resumption of talks between the two sides. (Ibid.)
Possibility of combining all three elements to some extent might be GOM - GOA meeting in Geneva with SYG or his representative assisted by selected number OAU Foreign Ministers. No objection your sounding out Emperor this sort of possibility, if conversation develops in such way as avoid implication we trying arrange it. End FYI.
Any information you able obtain incidentally re Emperor's overall assessment of conflict and his understanding of Moroccan position resulting from talks during his Marrakech visit also of interest.
Rusk
10. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Military Aide (Clifton) for President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: ``President saw."
Washington, October 19, 1963, 2:30 p.m.
On allegations US planes helping Moroccans against Algeria, /2/ we've been raising hell on this all week here and in Algiers. After repeated protests we've gotten BB regime to accept our denials and clamp down on radio and press, insofar as this gimcrack regime can control them. We're pressing now to get them to publish our denial.
/2/ On October 12, the Christian Science Monitor published a story alleging that USAF training pilots had been ferrying Moroccan troops to staging areas near the Algerian border at the request of the Moroccan Government because of the lack of Moroccan pilots. The U.S. Government subsequently denied this allegation in public and private statements in both Washington and Algiers. On October 22, the newspaper published a correction, stating that the information on which the October 12 report was based had been inaccurate. Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR.
Unfortunately our Air Attache Rabat just flew down to Ouarzazate (100 miles or so behind front) to pick up intelligence, and was seen by press. We've already clamped down hard on any more such nonsense.
11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Marvin, and approved by Hooper. Repeated to Algiers, Tunis, Paris, and Madrid.
Washington, October 19, 1963, 7:31 p.m.
1031. Following based on uncleared Memcon and Noforn. Amb. Bengelloun in call on Secretary today /2/ presented GOM case: (1) Moroccan efforts to negotiate border problem long rebuffed, (2) posts unquestionably Moroccan were wrested from it Oct. 8, (3) re-taken by RMA Oct. 14, and (4) Iche attacked by Algerians Oct. 17 thus gravely risking turning frontier war into a generalized ideological military conflict. Dangerous for Algeria's neighbors and since it involves another ``Castro-like experience`` in a sensitive part of world, dangerous for US as well. OAU of limited appeal to GOM since likely to be used by UAR and in any event not yet organized for conciliation work. U Thant's offer to help personally was of interest and GOM UN representative indicated willingness accept with ``certain conditions" but GOA had not yet responded.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
GOM most anxious avoid extension of conflict, attributes Ben Bella's performance to internal stresses. Also transformation from border to ideological conflict highlighted by Boumedienne's recent statement to press that Algerian revolution should not be limited to Algeria.
Secretary, emphasizing U.S. concern, over present situation and prospects urged we be kept fully informed. Secretary advised Bengelloun he did not wish make any formal proclamation now but we wished see fighting stopped. We would follow situation closely and hoped talks could be started again possibly through encouragement of Haile Selassie or SYG.
Rusk
12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, October 21, 1963.
McGB:
JFK might be interested in Algiers 802 attached, /2/ which shows invite to BB served its purpose. Also 680 to Algiers /3/ which is one evidence of drumfire we've kept up on allegations US helping Moroccans.
/2/ Telegram 802 from Algiers, October 18, reported that the President's invitation to Ben Bella had apparently mollified Algerian feelings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR)
/3/ Telegram 680 to Algiers, October 19, asked Ambassador Porter to seek the earliest opportunity at a high level to urge the Algerian Government to issue a statement accepting U.S. denials that the United States had been assisting Moroccan troop movements. (Ibid.)
More important what began as a minor border fracas is now well on the way to becoming a major Algerian effort to overthrow Hassan. We've got to get this damped down before it reaches point where Soviets, Chinese, and UAR are actively backing BB, while Spanish are screaming for us to join them in backing Hassan (French have same problem we do--desire to stay on good terms with both).
Best way to avoid having to choose is to get a cease-fire pronto. But Hassan's price is that BB agree to arbitrate border. Since Hassan is the likely loser if this affair escalates, I'm arguing we ought to urge prudence on him. We can't mediate, however; our best bet is to get UN, OAU, Arab League or some other impartial third party in the act. We're trying.
RWK
13. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer to Bundy in the margin of the source text reads: ``Mac--this is way of informing JFK that we're being solicited, and that we propose to stall."
Washington, October 21, 1963.
As Moroccan/Algerian fracas becomes less a border dispute and more a struggle between BB and Hassan, we've gotten the latter's inevitable request for military aid (Rabat 693 and 694 attached). /2/
/2/ Attached to the source text are telegrams 693 and 694 from Rabat, October 20, which transmitted reports from Ambassador John H. Ferguson on his separate conversations that day with King Hassan and General Oufkir at Marrakech, focusing on Morocco's request for U.S. military assistance. The King and the General had insisted that Morocco needed arms because Algeria was receiving substantial aid from the United Arab Republic and had made an arms deal with the Soviet Union. The King said that Morocco had no aggressive intentions and remained ready to discuss the frontier problem before any international body. Ferguson said he had explained the U.S. difficulty in taking sides in the present dispute, but noted that he must be in a position to make some response within a few days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR)
Hassan alleges Soviet and UAR aid to Algeria, which is true, though it is not clear how much this is mostly new aid or material UAR gave Algerians earlier.
In either case we feel that for us to aid Hassan just now would simply cause BB to lean even farther east. Result would be a new East/West confrontation with UAR and Soviets backing Algeria, while French and ourselves are pressed (especially by Spain) to back Hassan. Our best bet is to stay loose while discreetly backing every effort to find a cease-fire and negotiation formula. Meanwhile we propose to stall on Moroccan arms request. /3/
/3/ On October 22, the Department instructed Ferguson to tell King Hassan that the United States was seriously concerned that provision of extensive additional U.S. military assistance to one side could gravely threaten current efforts to limit and halt the conflict, which were in the best interest of the future of Morocco. It would also provide justification for increased UAR and Soviet involvement on the side of Algeria. (Telegram 1049 to Rabat; ibid.)
R.W. Komer /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Newsom and Hilliker, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Cairo, and Paris.
Washington, October 22, 1963, 7:40 p.m.
709. Ref: Embtel 831. /2/ Dept in agreement courses of action proposed para. 6 reftel. Desire you see Ben Bella at first opportunity and state:
/2/ In telegram 831 from Algiers, October 22, Ambassador Porter proposed that, while waiting for the results of Haile Selassie's efforts to bring about a meeting between Ben Bella and Hassan, he tell Ben Bella that the United States deplored intervention by certain foreign powers that was not aimed at negotiations and a peaceful solution to the conflict. (Ibid.)
1. USG neutral in current conflict. We consider ourselves friends both parties and believe any prolongation current conflict will only result in serious setback for development and progress Maghreb states.
2. While not judging issues involved, we warmly welcome efforts Ethiopian Emperor's and other members OAU and hope solution can be found through African mediation.
3. USG has made clear to GOA fact its forces not involved in helping Moroccans. While we appreciate both sides obtain defense needs from outside we would consider military involvement of outside powers serious threat to efforts resolve question peacefully. Should foreign powers intervene directly or indirectly in manner which seems likely enlarge scale of hostilities, it will be apparent that changed and dangerous situation may result. Similar statement being made Hassan.
4. USG will take occasion visit Yazid stress its continued interest in Algeria. President did same to Tito in response Tito's conveying message from Ben Bella and in extending invitation Ben Bella come to Washington. We would deplore and shall continue to work against any propaganda or circumstances threatening polarization present conflict or placing U.S. on either side.
5. In light these considerations, we are expressing strongly to both sides our hope that both Morocco and Algeria can find way accept such mediation as may be offered by outside powers with minimum conditions and can contribute peaceful effort by refraining from further military moves and limiting propaganda exchanges. /3/
/3/ On October 22, Porter reported that he had carefully gone over the points in telegram 709 with Ben Bella that evening. Ben Bella had told him that he and Haile Selassie agreed that the conflict should be handled by the ``Addis Ababa group." He also had indicated that he was willing to withdraw Algerian troops from the frontier zones if Morocco would do the same. (Telegram 851 from Algiers; ibid.)
Rusk
15. Memorandum for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Bundy, Williams, and Newsom.
Washington, October 23, 1963.
At Ambassador Guellal's request I had luncheon with him and Ben Bella's special emissary Yazid. It was quickly apparent that I was being given a preview of the Algerian case to be presented to Secretary Rusk that afternoon. /2/ After a long wind-up about peace-loving Algeria which simply wanted to develop in its own way on its own socialistic model, he pinned the rose on the Moroccans for trying to upset the Ben Bella regime as well as seize the valuable iron deposits at Tindouf. His case was that Algeria did not want a war with Morocco and had repeatedly offered to negotiate ``without any agenda" but that the Moroccans had consistently rejected this. He said the Algerians were standing on an issue of principle. All the African states at the OAU Conference in Addis Ababa had agreed that the borders established during the colonial period should be accepted and that no borders should be changed by force. He understood that the US favored the OAU and accepted the decisions of the Addis conference. Therefore, where did the US stand on this question of principle? Would we condone a Moroccan attempt to change by force an existing frontier?
/2/ Yazid's conversation with the Secretary on October 23 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR.
I evaded the issue, saying that we were neutral in this dispute and had taken no position on the merits; however, we understood the question to be what was the ``border" between Morocco and Algeria in this area? The Moroccans seemed to claim it was simply an administrative line which had been frequently changed, and that the places in dispute were in fact on their side of the ``border." In any case, I was sure we would not want to get dragged into the middle of a dispute between two friends of ours unless we were forced to do so. Our great concern was that a minor border issue seemed to be blowing up into a major confrontation between Algeria and Morocco, in which each side was claiming that the future of its own regime was at stake. It seemed to us in the best interests of both countries that this trend be reversed before other powers were drawn into the situation and a choosing-up of sides resulted which would make it very difficult for the US to stand aloof. The President had amply demonstrated our friendly interest in Algeria, but we were on good terms with the Moroccans too. They had provided us SAC bases at a time when we needed them, although we were getting out by agreement now. Both Algeria and Morocco were young countries with major internal problems which we were trying to help them surmount. A major fight between them could only interfere with their domestic development; this was worth every effort to avoid. We hoped a situation would not develop in which the UAR and others came so openly to the assist-ance of Algeria as to put great pressure on us, the French, and the Spanish to give countervailing assistance to Morocco and thus convert the issue into an East-West confrontation which would help nobody. Were the issues involved in the border dispute of sufficient seriousness to run this risk? Yazid said he fully understood our position.
Yazid said they did not want to take the issue to the UN precisely because it might prove embarrassing to the US and France. What would we do, however, if the UN became involved? I responded that all one could say at this point was that we would call the shots as we saw them. However, if the issue blew up to the point where UN intervention seemed essential, I was sure we would come down in favor of peacekeeping regardless of whether it made one side or the other sore at us.
At the outset I told Yazid and Guellal that the President had very much wanted to see Ben Bella if he came and regretted it wasn't possible at this point. After expressing appreciation, Yazid said that since he was a special emissary from Ben Bella, they had thought of asking for an appointment but had concluded it would not be proper. However, he hoped to present their case informally to certain key Congressmen; it had been suggested he talk with Senator Kennedy. What did I think about their using a family connection in this way? My own personal view was that it was probably wiser not to try and exploit a family connection.
I stressed to Yazid the importance of not letting rumor, tendentious press stories, and incipient misunderstandings get in the way of US-Algerian relations. There had been too much of this recently. I hit him hard on Algerian press allegations that US pilots were transporting Moroccan troops. He was most apologetic, mentioning that he hoped to help set the record straight at a press conference after his talk with Secretary Rusk. They hoped to exert more effective influence on the press, which he admitted was often quite irresponsible. But the American press had its flaws too. I countered that we hadn't yet nationalized our newspapers but if the antics of their press were any guide, this didn't seem to do much good. Yazid said he expected to tell Ben Bella not to be so sensitive to US press stories, but that we must realize we were dealing with a young and fairly inexperienced regime.
I asked Yazid what had happened to his mission to Marrakech, which at one point seemed to be succeeding. He answered that he had sought a cease-fire and return to positions as of 1 October but the Moroccans insisted on holding Algerian territory. As for negotiations, they insisted that these were possible only if border questions were specifically on the agenda. So it was impossible to reach agreement. When Guellal began talking about Moroccan aggression, I asked about the Hassan - Ferhat Abbas agreement of 1961 just published by the Moroccans, which seemed to indicate that the two parties had agreed to negotiate the border issue. Yazid said that the agreement had been in French but the Moroccans had made their own slanted Arabic translation. As everybody knew, Ferhat Abbas couldn't even read Arabic so he had been ``had."
As we parted I again mentioned our neutrality on the issue in dispute but our strong feeling that this issue should not be permitted to lead to a major to-do which would encourage outside intervention. We understood Algeria's desire to develop in its own distinctively Algerian way; we also recognized its right to accept assistance from any quarter and fully expected that it would seek help from East and West. But we hoped the Algerians would recognize that becoming too beholden to any single outside power or group of powers would compromise their own freedom of action over time.
We ended by my mentioning to Yazid that he and I were the same age but the reason why I had so much more grey hair than he did was because of the frustrations of trying to keep up with such volatile people as Sukarno, Nehru, Nasser, and Ben Bella. He laughingly responded by telling me that he tried to call Ben Bella in Algiers last night and the American operator had asked him ``do you mean Algiers, Morocco?" However, he would not take this as an indication of US policy.
RWK
16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 - 3 US - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Haynes and Newsom, cleared by Heffner (DOD), and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Algiers, and USUN.
Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:18 p.m.
1053. In connection current Algerian-Moroccan problem, we presume Embassy aware substantial amounts U.S. ammunition and equipment are in the pipeline due to arrive in Morocco over the next several weeks. This includes jeeps, two helicopters and assorted ammunition. These shipments represent GOM purchases under the MAP military assistance agreement with the GOM. While we do not believe we should raise issue, we assume GOM will continue to unload these military supplies without any conspicuous display. We understand GOM has followed practice unloading such supplies at night and in cordoned areas.
Rusk
17. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse; cleared by Sisco, Davies, Imhof, Ortiz, Meade, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Sent to Nouakchott, Dakar, Accra, Conakry, Bamako, Niamey, Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, Khartoum, Taiz, and USUN. Repeated to Rabat and Algiers and pouched to Madrid, Paris, and London.
Washington, October 23, 1963, 6:58 p.m.
765. Following may be drawn on with FonOff or other officials who broach subject Moroccan-Algerian conflict:
We keenly regret emergence conflict which threatens disrupt stability and development of Maghreb. Years of struggle leading to independ-ence have left nations in area in desperate need period of tranquility to build better life for its citizens. US, in sympathy aspirations area's peoples, has contributed substantially to its economic development. These contributions significant both in Morocco and in Algeria. In latter our surplus food supplies of crucial importance in countering effects post-independence food shortages.
In view our close and friendly relations with both countries we are and intend to remain impartial in the present conflict. We have no intention of becoming involved in substance of dispute over borders never formally delimited to satisfaction of parties concerned. Instructions have been given to US military personnel present in area to avoid any action tending involve them directly or indirectly in this dispute.
US efforts will be bent toward encouraging early peaceful resolution conflict either through direct negotiations or through good offices other friendly countries. We welcome efforts of Haile Selassie and other African and Arab statesmen to bring an early end to hostilities and hope they will have full support other African states. We are also in consultation UNSYG who having continuing discussions with Moroccan and Algerian representatives. We believe any extension of this conflict or its polarization along lines of East - West struggle would be extremely regrettable and we will exert all our efforts to avoid this. In our view increasingly sharp invective employed by press and radio in each country against the other will hinder an early solution and is to be deplored.
Rusk
18. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, October 24, 1963.
Algeria - Morocco. Both sides have cooled down a bit, but military buildup continues and both stick to their basic positions. This is why none of the many mediation efforts have yet succeeded.
Algerians say they want a cease-fire but on basis of Moroccan withdrawal from two disputed Sahara posts they apparently occupied, were kicked out of, and then retook. Algerians also refuse to negotiate border claims. Moroccans want cease-fire on present positions (they may have lost one post yesterday) and insist Algiers agree to negotiate borders.
As to venue, Ben Bella wants OAU to mediate, since he stands on Addis Conference principle that borders inherited from colonial powers should not be changed. Algerians have an impressive case, and even Rusk was impressed by Yazid's presentation of it yesterday. Nasser has also offered summit meeting, and has stimulated Arab League to propose cease-fire, but Hassan sees both as stacked against him. Hassan prefers mediation by Selassie or Bourguiba.
Meanwhile, we're trying to condition U Thant to intervene personally if other efforts fail. We fear renewed fighting which could spread all along frontier, which would give Soviets, Nasser, and Cubans their chance to make a big pro-Algerian splash and make it hard for us not to back Moroccans.
We seem to have re-established our bona fides with Algiers (see Porter's talk with Ben Bella, Algiers 851 attached). /2/ In fact our problem now is how to field Moroccan pleas for arms, etc. Hassan has gotten himself out on a limb, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. As time passes his position becomes weaker [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
/2/ See footnote 2, Document 14.
Our best bet is still to keep loose, while working behind scenes to get a cease-fire. While Hassan may be unhappy with us (and French), [1 line of source text not declassified].
R.W. Komer /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, October 24, 1963.
McGB:
We have a quite disturbing report from a fairly reliable source that Nasser has decided to go in big with help to BB, including substantial Egyptian troops. His reported reason is that he wants to help BB in order to freeze the Soviets out since the Soviet embrace would be the end of BB. Source says the real reason, however, is that Gallal wants a dramatic ``victory" to enhance his prestige in the eyes of the Syrians and show them how powerful he is.
We also have two ships with arms cargoes reported en route from Cuba.
If Algerians get all this help, it will be hard for us to keep turning down Moroccan arms requests. Also Moroccans may just publicize fact we are continuing to ship ammo, trucks, recoilless rifles, etc. under existing MAP program. This would justify other side's intervention.
So our best bet is maximum effort to get a cease-fire and mediation going. SYG is probably our best recourse here since only he will have prestige and leverage. So I am pressing along these lines. We'll also consider going to Nasser and telling him that if he gives massive aid to BB we will have to counter with the Moroccans. I am not sure this would be a good bet, however, (incidentally, if Nasser does intervene on big scale, Faysal will be encouraged to smack his rear in Yemen).
RWK
20. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, October 25, 1963.
Morocco - Algeria. We're going to do all we can to warn off Nasser, /2/ calm down BB and Hassan, and get a cease-fire before this affair escalates. But once again we find ourselves in the middle [2 lines of source text not declassified]. I've already heard working level worry from State that Castro's and Nasser's potential involvement is tending to convert State's seventh floor to a pro-Moroccan stance which would ill-serve our long-term interests.
/2/ Telegram 1740 to Cairo, October 25, instructed Ambassador John S. Badeau to immediately request an appointment with Nasser and stress the serious consequences of large-scale military involvement on Algeria's side. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR)
To avoid getting in this box we're trying to get the fighting stopped. We're (1) pressing U Thant to issue a cease-fire appeal, but he's reluctant so long as Haile Selassie and other Africans are in the act; (2) warning Algerians that if they get substantial outside help at a time when we've been holding off Moroccans, it may force our hand; (3) conveying same point to UAR, adding that an apparent UAR power play westward at a time when UAR being criticized here on Yemen may critically affect US/UAR relations; (4) trying to get Paris in the act--it has same problem we do of being interested in both sides; (4) urging Rabat to move toward cease-fire in a hurry, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Apparently Hassan and BB agreed to meet with Selassie at Tripoli, but one report says Hassan insists Bourguiba be present.
There's not much we can do about Cuban or UAR arms. Castro may be sending help without even asking Algerians. In any case, we're in a spot about protesting UAR (or even Cuban) response to BB's arms appeal, when we and French are continuing regular arms shipments to Morocco (we have 31 jeep trailers landing now and 22 75-mm recoilless rifles, 143 jeeps, 100,000 rounds carbine ammo and 7000 rounds grenades and other artillery ammo due within the next two weeks). Ouch!
Bob Komer
21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Cairo, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, and USUN, and by pouch to London, Rome, and Tripoli.
Washington, October 25, 1963, 6:37 p.m.
1068. You should inform Balafrej that we take most seriously the threat of outside intervention in Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Evidence is increasing that UAR may be preparing intervene with considerable force in support of Algeria. We now actively engaged diplomatic efforts discourage any such massive UAR intervention. Depending on his intentions and relative impact of these and other efforts on Nasser, UAR intervention may or may not be stalled or limited.
In this situation accomplishment of cease-fire with minimum delay is most urgent in order to check any further intervention or escalation of conflict. You may assure Balafrej that we also using our influence to persuade both disputants, as well as those seeking directly to assist in bringing about resumption of talks, to avoid taking positions with regard to cease-fire which would put either GOM or GOA in politically untenable position. We would strongly urge that GOM in own best interests respond with early acceptance to any genuine cease-fire proposals that UNSYG, OAU, or other conciliators may put forward. Cease-fire, even if temporary, now paramount consideration so long as other claims or concerns can be dealt with peacefully.
Ball
22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 1 MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Getsinger and Tasca, Bundy (White House), and approved by Ball as Acting Secretary of State.
A memorandum from Komer to the President, October 27, warned that King Hassan was very unhappy with U.S. stalling on his appeal for military aid, but noted that U.S. officials were going to urge the Moroccans toward negotiations, lest what they feared--a real contest between regimes--actually came to pass. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63)
Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:40 p.m.
1078. Please deliver following message soonest to King Hassan:
``Your Majesty:
I have watched with deep concern the growing split between Morocco and Algeria. Ambassador Ferguson and Col. Canton have relayed to me Your Majesty's apprehensions over the meaning and direction of this conflict. /2/
/2/ On October 27, the Department received a message from King Hassan through Colonel Canton. The King told Canton that it was now clear that his fears regarding the threat of foreign intervention had been correct and that the present border strife had been created by Ben Bella, aided and guided by Nasser, to serve as an excuse for his real objective, the destruction of the Moroccan monarchy. He repeated his plea for U.S. military aid, saying it could be channeled secretly through Spain, which had offered to help. The King said he desired a peaceful solution to this crisis, but felt that Nasser and Ben Bella would not honor any such solutions. (Telegram P 262315Z from COMNAVACTS Port Lyautey to the Secretary of State; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 71 D 370, Morocco)
The crucial fact is that this conflict has not yet come irrevocably to the point of a contest between competing systems, though this might well eventuate, with all its grave consequences, if present moves toward reconciliation fail. So it seems most important that you forestall the development of such a contest by seeking quickly a solution through negotiation rather than war.
I welcome Your Majesty's decision to attend the meeting at Bamako. /3/ I am expressing to the principals at this meeting my hope that agreement can be reached on an honorable basis for ending the fighting and on some means for resolving the issues involved.
/3/ Through the mediation efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali, President Ben Bella and King Hassan II had agreed to meet at Bamako, Mali.
By doing everything possible toward bringing about a settlement, it seems to me Your Majesty's position before the world will be made clear and the risk of grave threats to your Kingdom will be reduced.
John F. Kennedy" /4/
Ball
/4/ On October 28, Ferguson delivered the President's letter to the King and expressed U.S. satisfaction that the Bamako meeting was being held. At the end of the audience, the King asked him to tell President Kennedy that Morocco was now asking only for economic aid and for U.S. non-interference with military assistance from other Western countries, which was needed to restore equilibrium. (Telegram 747 from Rabat, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR)
23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Tasca, and Getsinger; and approved by Ball.
Washington, October 27, 1963, 7:41 p.m.
821. Please deliver following message soonest to President Ben Bella:
``Mr. President:
I have watched with deep concern the growing split between Morocco and Algeria. I am pleased to learn of your decision to meet with King Hassan in Bamako.
I am expressing to the principals at the meeting my hope that agreement can be reached on an honorable basis for ending the fighting and on some means of resolving the issue involved. I am particularly concerned that what started as a frontier dispute not become on either side a far graver conflict between philosophies or systems. Should this happen, it would be most difficult to prevent outside powers from becoming far more heavily involved on both sides. I cannot believe this could serve either your interests or those of Morocco in the long run.
I would hope, therefore, that you would agree, Mr. President, that, given the grave threats posed by continued fighting to peace in the area, the failure to explore every reasonable means to find a common basis for a solution would be tragic.
John F. Kennedy." /2/
Ball
/2/ On October 28, Porter delivered the President's letter to Ben Bella, who asked him to request President Kennedy not to judge Algeria ``on this or that development," and to express his profound appreciation for the President's interest in the problem. (Telegram 903 from Algiers, October 28; ibid.)
24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, October 28, 1963.
4:30 meeting /2/ will cover Algeria - Morocco crisis and Yemen because of Nasser's interest in both. Attached are some of the more recent cables. /3/
/2/ At the White House meeting on October 28, the President agreed to the following courses of action: 1) the signing of the $10 million Supporting Assistance Loan for Morocco; 2) expediting shipments of small arms ammunition to Morocco already programmed under MAP; and 3) raising with Ambassador Porter the particular concern and interest of the United States in the shipment of Cuban arms to Algeria. (Memorandum from Newsom to Williams, October 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR)
/3/ The source text indicates the following cables as attachments: 1079 to Rabat; 742, 744, 745 from Rabat; 276 from Tunis; 882 from Algiers; 1645 from USUN; 969 from Cairo; 2041 and 2042 from Paris.
Core of Moroccan/Algerian problem is to get a cease-fire and negotiation going before Algerian buildup (with UAR/Cuban/USSR support) leads BB to enlarge the war. Moroccans hold both disputed cases, and one press report has them heading for ultimate objective of Tindouf. Of course the farther they go, the wilder BB will get.
Our hopes are pinned on Bamako meeting Tuesday and mediation of Selassie and Keita.
We seem to be softening up Moroccans a bit; your message to Hassan, plus our stall on his appeals for aid, should carry this further. We must get Hassan to compromise before he gets in over his head.
Meanwhile Badeau did a good job of beating up Ali Sabri and then Nasser, but we're not on too good a wicket here. If we and French are still supplying Moroccans, how can we tell Nasser not to equip Algerians?
We also don't want to get too far out of step with DeGaulle; latest suggests French are switching hands-off policy to extent of sending Hassan ammo and food, plus continuing regular military aid. This may be a reaction to reports about UAR involvement.
We hear Chicom delegation due in Algiers tonight to sign agreement covering 25 billion old franc loan announced earlier. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Potolichev is also arriving to discuss aid. In this light, should we still hold up announcing $10 million Moroccan SA loan, which we've already stalled a week?
[Here follows discussion of Yemen.]
R.W. Komer /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mali /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Newsom, Connett, and Komer; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Fredericks is also indicated as an approving officer. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris.
Washington, October 29, 1963, 8:48 p.m.
58. Following message from President should be delivered earliest to Emperor Haile Selassie:
``Your Majesty:
I welcome the key role you are currently playing in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict and wish every success to the Bamako meeting.
In the spirit of our conversations in Washington and with full appreciation of the desire for an African solution, I have asked Ambassador Handley to present informally to your Foreign Minister some ideas relating to the problems faced at the Bamako Conference. From what we hear a crucial need is for some give on both sides. Their initial declared positions would appear to thwart progress towards an end to the fighting. Our thoughts are of course in confidence. If they should in any way prove useful to your estimation, please advance them as your own, rather than as official views of the United States, adapted to the circumstances as you see fit.
I believe, as I feel certain you do, that the results of the present conference will have an important bearing on the welfare of the peoples of Algeria and Morocco, as well as on the future peace and stability of that key region of Africa.
John F. Kennedy``
For Ambassador Handley
Request you seek earliest opportunity deliver foregoing message to FonMin Yifru for Emperor and simultaneously pass following ideas orally to Yifru, making it clear these have no standing other than private suggestions from a long distance for whatever use they may be to Emperor:
1. Possibility of compromise cease-fire agreement based on full or partial (e.g. from Tindouf region and either Hassi Beida or Tinjoub) withdrawal Moroccan forces in return for firm Algerian commitment discuss both geographic and economic approaches to solution of border problem.
2. Possibility of temporary cease-fire pending arbitration by international commission acceptable both sides. Consideration of stationing neutral observers in disputed areas during arbitration.
3. Possibility joint withdrawal by both sides from disputed areas accompanied by agreed moratorium on all claims and establishment of neutral zone embracing areas agreed by both sides to be parts of Morocco and Algeria. Another feature might be agreement to review prospects joint economic exploitation with advice of economic experts of appropriate international financial organization.
FYI. We realize difficulty of delivering message to Emperor in Bamako and possible problem of misunderstanding by Keita and parties to dispute should U.S. role become known. Strongly hope matter can be handled in way which will minimize risk disclosing U.S. hand. To this end, emphasize to Emperor or his representative this be entirely confidential with him. Knowledge of overt U.S. role could be counterproductive. End FYI.
Ball
26. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 10/63. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem.
Washington, October 30, 1963.
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
The Moroccan-Algerian Cease-Fire
Terms of the Agreement--Under prodding from Mali's President Modibo Keita and Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, Morocco and Algeria reportedly have agreed to: (1) a cease-fire commencing November 2; (2) withdrawal of combatants from a Saharan demilitarized zone to be established by a quadri-partite commission composed of Morocco, Algeria, Mali, and Ethiopia; (3) establishment of Malian and Ethiopian observers inside this zone; and (4) an arbitral commission to be formed as a result of an OAU foreign minister's meeting.
Likely Difficulties in Implementation--While the cease-fire represents a concrete and unexpected achievement, both King Hassan and President Ben Bella are likely to place roadblocks in the way of full settlement. The agreement to establish a demilitarized zone does not solve the critical question--whether or not Hassan will withdraw from Tinjoub and Hassi Beida. It is this issue which has stalled all previous efforts to commence negotiations. The cease-fire thus may be short-lived and the threat of renewed hostilities intensified.
Arms Buildup Likely to Continue--Given the tenuous nature of the Bamako agreement, Hassan and Ben Bella are almost certain to continue efforts to bolster their military forces. We believe that the UAR and Cuba will maintain their flow of arms to Algeria, thus increasing Hassan's apprehensions. As a result, the King is likely to persist in attempts to secure broader Western, particularly US, economic and military aid.
27. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret.
Washington, November 1, 1963.
MAC--
Wayne Fredericks just told me worriedly that Rusk was getting pretty itchy about Algeria; ``if those people take arms from Cuba, we'll just have to back Morocco."
But there are a few fundamentals which should guide our approach toward this affair, and override any tactical considerations:
(1) Our basic interest is in a friendly Maghreb (free of undue Soviet or for that matter Nasserite influence). We do not want a pro-West Morocco at the expense of a pro-East Algeria if it can be avoided.
(2) In the long run, as Algeria goes so goes the Maghreb. Algeria is the largest, best located, and certainly most dynamic of the Maghreb states. We and the French must keep sufficient ``in" with whatever regime holds power to compete effectively with Nasser and Khrushchev, and in a real sense to protect our Tunisian and Moroccan friends.
(3) Hassan's border claims on Algeria, though he has a good case, must be seen in the context of his many other claims, which have practically isolated him in Africa. He claims all of Mauritania and didn't attend Addis Conference on this ground. He naturally also claims all the Spanish enclaves, which will in time create real frictions with Madrid (especially Ceuta and Melilla). We've got to turn him off this nationalistic kick before he gets everybody sore at him.
(4) We and the French have been actively supplying arms to Morocco. This makes it hard to argue against Ben Bella's right to get UAR, Soviet, or even Cuban arms (in fact Hassan got a lot of Soviet arms too). One reason why I favor lying low on US arms to Morocco just now is that, when this becomes public, it will seem to justify Algerian arms requests to others. We're also in a poor position to influence BB against such requests if we're simultaneously continuing to equip Moroccans.
(5) We can always reverse our policy well before it's too late, if it becomes clear that BB with UAR/Soviet/Cuban support is really out to get Hassan. In the meantime, we ought not to get out ahead of the French.
A shrewd calculation of our interests suggests that we have to stay loose in these bloody disputes between third parties--precisely so they won't become East - West issues in which we somehow tend to end up stuck with the weaker side against the stronger. In my part of the world, moreover, things are seldom what they seem at first glance. For example, NYT this morning had Indians, not Paks, starting trouble in Kashmir; Hassan blew up this morning about Algerian capture of Figuig and this afternoon we hear Figuig is still in Moroccan hands; UK tells us it's staying strictly out of Yemen war, yet its own people say that puppet Sharif of Beihan sent 35 camel loads of arms to royalists, and is actively conniving with Faysal; four months ago Hussein was accusing us of being in bed with Nasser--now he's cosying up to Nasser and accusing us of being pro-Baath.
We are presently evacuating Morocco except for a residual commo facility at Kenitra. Yet we're still investing tens of millions a year. The more arms aid we give Morocco now, the more BB will seek elsewhere. So we risk a nice little Maghreb arms race in which our costs go up and BB leans further in the wrong direction to satisfy his suppliers. Where is our interest here?
Ben Bella is a pain and will remain so, but he's more likely to be around for a while than Hassan. He seems to have done a good job so far of out-maneuvering his opposition. I think most specialists would agree that Hassan has even less life expectancy than BB. So we also want to be careful lest we end up backing the losing horse. Ferguson, who seems to his managers back here to be pleading his client's case rather more than ours, doesn't seem to be taking these longer range factors much into account.
In sum, our interest is to avoid being drawn into disputes in a way which will plague us, and cost us a lot more than we reckon at the outset, until we see where more clearly we want to end up.
RWK
28. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Mogadiscio, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Cotonou, Accra, Conakry, Abidjan, Monrovia, Bamako, Usumbura, Yaounde, Bangui, Fort Lamy, Brazzaville, Leopoldville, Libreville, Nouakchott, Niamey, Lagos, Dakar, Freetown, Lome, Ouagadougou, Tananarive, and Kigali. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Rabat, and Algiers.
Washington, November 1, 1963, 7:13 p.m.
826. Whatever may be success Algerian-Moroccan cease-fire Dept remains seriously concerned over possibility continued military build-up both sides. /2/ Request Ambassadors addressee posts therefore seek earliest opportunity elicit views FonOffs on Algerian-Moroccan problem and concept OAU role suggesting where possible they consider sending messages to both Algeria and Morocco urging observance of cease-fire and avoidance any further significant arms build-up from other countries. Suggest point be made strongly that continued outside military aid to either country would seriously threaten nullify agreement reached at Bamako and chances any ultimate solution dispute within African (OAU) framework.
/2/ On November 1, the Department of State instructed Porter to express strong U.S. support for the cease-fire and successful completion of the negotiating course established at Bamako in conversations with Ben Bella and his Foreign Minister. The Ambassador was also asked to express concern over Cuban arms shipments to Algeria and the conviction that any continuation of an extensive arms build-up on either side would thwart the encouraging progress made at Bamako toward a peaceful resolution of the dispute. (Telegram 911 to Algiers; ibid.) Ferguson received similar instructions for his conversations with the King and his Ministers. (Telegram 1100 to Rabat, November 1; ibid.)
During such discussion you may summarize US position as follows:
1. Strictly impartial.
2. Welcome Bamako and favor solution within African framework.
3. Most important obtain and maintain cease-fire along lines Bamako agreement.
4. Against further significant arms build-up either side as most serious threat to success of Bamako agreement. Have so informed both Algeria and Morocco and we refraining from contribution any such build-up.
5. Believe Bamako demonstrated that firm and persistent presentation African concern over detrimental impact on African interests of fruitless conflict and outside intervention can have telling effect on both Algerian and Moroccan governments.
6. Consider it crucial in terms longer range effectiveness of OAU in promoting all principles its charter that OAU discussion and mediation begin soon and emphasize objective solution rather than politically charged point of attempting fix responsibility for outbreak hostilities which probably shared by both parties dispute.
Telegraphic reports conversations requested.
Rusk
29. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 11/63. Secret.
Washington, November 4, 1963.
McGB:
I may be all wet but I see Moroccan/Algerian truce being patched up again. Mali and Ethiop observers should be on scene shortly, and we know Selassie and Keita have been weighing in heavily. Their pressure, plus clarification as to who is shooting most, should operate to damp affair down.
We continue low-key needling of all parties. We're going out to UAR again about Cubans and also cautioning UAR about over-commitment. Other than this, we're inclined to lie low.
Yazid has been told to seek session with JFK. We're stalling till we find out if Moroccan coming; I think latter should get in first, if so.
Hard to sort out who's firing at whom, but Figuig seems still in Moroccan hands. Most fascinating question is whether Boumedienne at the front is taking orders from Algiers.
RWK
30. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus and approved by Tasca.
Washington, November 4, 1963.
SUBJECT
Algerian-Moroccan Dispute: Request of Algerian Special Representative to Call on President
Algerian Special Representative Muhammad Yazid arrived in Washington November 4 and has asked for an appointment with the President in order to deliver a special message from Ben Bella. /2/ The Moroccans had previously informed us of their desire to send Prince Moulay Abdullah to Washington as the special representative of King Hassan with a message for the President. Prince Abdullah has been delayed but may arrive within the next two weeks.
/2/ Yazid met November 8 with the President. For a summary of their conversation, see Document 89.
To help preserve the current delicate cease-fire by all means at our disposal and because Ambassador Porter has been able to see Ben Bella at will even during the recent fighting, the Department recommends that the President receive Yazid. It is also recommended that the Department inform the Moroccans of this and that the President be prepared to receive Moroccan Prince Abdullah if he comes to Washington as planned. /3/
John A. McKesson /4/
/3/ Ferguson warned on November 6 that untold damage had been done by agreeing to Yazid's appointment with the President before indicating U.S. willingness to receive Moulay Abdullah, the King's brother, whom Hassan had chosen as his emissary. He urged that the President send a personal message to the King indicating that he would be pleased to receive the Prince. (Telegram 795 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR) The Department responded that, once Yazid's appointment was set, it had immediately informed the Moroccan Embassy that the Prince would be welcome. (Telegram 1121 to Rabat, November 6; ibid.)
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates McKesson signed the original above Read's typed signature.
31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Buffum and Jones, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, Cairo, Tunis, and USUN.
Washington, November 4, 1963, 6:11 p.m.
113. Ambassador Bengelloun telephoned, having just talked to Rabat, to take sounding on U.S. attitude if, in his words, continued fighting by Algerians at instigation UAR at Figuig or elsewhere should oblige GOM to take matter to UN since, in GOM's opinion, understandings reached at Bamako would then clearly no longer be applicable to new situation, i.e., attempts by ANP with UAR help to capture Moroccan city across a frontier which has never been contested.
He was told question premature; we remain convinced African forum is preferable and consider it should be tried in light of (1) new cease-fire as of 1030 GMT, this time with Malian observers, (2) Haile Selassie presence in UAR now where his views on foreign intervention expressed Belgrade likely be conveyed to Nasser, and (3) Balafrej's recent telegram urging haste in convoking Foreign Ministers on acting OAU President Doudou Thiam.
In reply his complaint Dept fails to deplore UAR intervention publicly, we said we had been strong in our protest to Nasser /2/ but believed strongly any public statement on our part likely create additional polemics and make it more difficult for him to back down. Bengelloun accepted our assertion that too early resort to Security Council would likely result in its referring matter to OAU but with GOM in role of having tried to avoid OAU consideration of conflict.
Rusk
/2/ Reported in telegram 1901 to Cairo, November 4. (Ibid.)
32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and McClintic and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid.
Washington, November 12, 1963, 7:31 p.m.
429. OAU Foreign Ministers' Conference. Following is your guidance re U.S role at OAU Foreign Ministers Conference /2/ on Moroccan-Algerian conflict: (Appropriate background material pouched Nov. 8)
/2/ The Bamako agreement called for a special meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The conference took place in Addis Ababa November 15 - 18.
A. General: U.S. desires continue its unobtrusive but active encouragement settlement in African context. As has been case during development conflict and at Bamako, we desire you keep us currently informed of progress conference and send urgently any recommendations for steps U.S. might appropriately take to facilitate solution. At same time, we are conscious conspicuous U.S. role could be misunderstood by Africans and particularly by one or other of parties to dispute.
To meet this objective, suggest your primary effort follow conference be with IEG officials. You will wish to avoid any early initiatives in seeking out Moroccans and Algerians and be wary, if approached, of their seeking to involve U.S. in the details of their dispute. Such contacts once begun by one side or the other should be to the extent possible balanced. In exchanges of information you should confine yourself chiefly to European missions, particularly French. In order avoid too great attention our role, suggest circulation by U.S. Embassy representatives among other delegations be kept to minimum except at public and social events where contact expected.
B. Presidential Message: To establish basis U.S. interest, you will receive separately message from President to Emperor.
C. Oral Demarche: Suggest prior conference, you set forth U.S. position as set forth Depcirtel 826, /3/ making following additional points:
/3/ Document 28.
1. U.S. concerned, as result its contacts with interested African states, that Morocco and Algeria may each be concentrating on seeking votes for its regime and basic position on frontier rather than for means of settlement. Concentration on choosing sides in present conflict could be serious for African unity as well as frustrating genuine efforts find means of solution. (FYI--We are also concerned by possibility Emperor may himself opt for Algerian position on frontiers with Somali problem in mind. While some similarities exist, many features are different. We trust Emperor can be encouraged exercise maximum influence by not himself choosing sides to determine success conference. End FYI.)
2. From our study of problem, we doubt solution can be found in brief span of meeting. We would hope impartial arbitrators could be appointed and time provided for cooling off of current tempers. During this period, cease-fire must be maintained. We remain concerned that in absence clear withdrawal by both sides more observers, equipped for rapid movement, may be needed.
3. We hope conference can focus, also, on problem limiting outside intervention in conflict through excessive shipments military material and introduction foreign troops and technicians. U.S. recognizes right both countries acquire needed equipment in present crisis, but is apprehensive some outside powers such as UAR, Cuba and USSR may seek occasion build up own positions without reference need for peaceful settlement.
We strongly believe injection large numbers foreign advisers and troops likely to exacerbate situation and should be avoided.
U.S. military program in Morocco was initiated in 1959, is of modest proportions and designed to permit GOM to ensure its internal security only. With exception small number USAF personnel in purely and temporary training function there are no U.S. personnel involved. There is no U.S. intention to increase program in present conflict.
4. Consequences failure reach agreement on means for solution could be resumption conflict with much greater threat escalation, general disappointment in African organization, and introduction problem in United Nations. Neither we nor Africans desire this.
D. (FYI) Relations with Disputants: U.S. has sought follow impartial policy between Morocco and Algeria. King Hassan had hoped for more conspicuous and forthright support from U.S. We have not believed this in his interest or ours. Consequently, Moroccans sensitive over U.S. role. In view key U.S. interests Morocco and close association, it is important Moroccans be given no cause believe U.S. in any way favoring Algeria at conference. At same time we wish avoid any Moroccan efforts identify us with their viewpoint.
Relations with Algeria currently on even keel after Yazid talk with President and general recognition impartial U.S. role. However, this subject rapid change in this disorganized country. (End FYI)
Embs. Algiers and Rabat should provide make up and evaluation delegations sent.
Rusk
33. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Stackhouse, cleared by Dorros and Allen, and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Khartoum, Dakar, Lagos, Abidjan, Bamako, and Dar-es-Salaam.
Washington, November 19, 1963, 6:35 p.m.
911. You may indicate as appropriate Department welcomes accord reached at Addis for settlement Algerian-Moroccan problem in African context and particularly welcomes selection seven countries on commission. /2/
/2/ The OAU Council of Ministers meeting at Addis Ababa created a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration consisting of Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanganyika to inquire into the origins of the conflict and submit concrete proposals for its definitive settlement.
We desire also assure continued full appreciation by host government US interests and attitudes re Algerian-Moroccan dispute. Main lines US posture set forth in Depcirtel 826 /3/ continue valid.
/3/ Document 28.
While we do not wish initiate approaches these subjects, Department also interested any info available on decisions reached and action contemplated by OAU foreign ministers on limiting Algerian-Moroccan arms buildup.
Rusk
34. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Symmes, Long, Ortiz, Hadsel, Adams, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris, London, Madrid, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Tunis, and Algiers.
Washington, December 24, 1963, 5:36 p.m.
1246. Ref. Rabat's 947. /2/ Following are suggested talking points your further discussions with British, French, and Spanish ambassadors Rabat relating King's latest approach. FYI. Department hopes replies governments to King can be as much in accord as possible, but at same time does not wish commit U.S. join others in any line of action which may be counter our broader objectives. End FYI.
/2/ In telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, Ferguson reported that King Hassan was gravely concerned over the danger from Algeria and worried that Moroccan military strength would soon be outmatched by Algeria's. He indicated that he was considering accepting deliveries of Soviet arms. Hassan complained that the Algerian Government had refused to accept the appointed Moroccan Ambassador or return their Ambassador to Rabat until the Bamako frontier commission had completed its work and Morocco normalized its relations with Egypt and Cuba, which Algeria did not wish to offend. (Ibid.)
1. King's approach has two elements: his immediate difficulties with Algerians and his desire for additional arms.
2. We believe conditions which King reports Algerians have attached resumption full diplomatic relations unwarranted. Reports from other sources, however, suggest conditions may be less onerous than those described by King. They would seem center about completion work mixed commission, with which we certainly would not take issue, and normalization treatment Algerians in Morocco, which seems logical request from Algerian point view. If we do determine Algerians have posed conditions as described by King, U.S. willing use such influence as it possesses in Algeria emphasize benefit resumption full relations and seek removal conditions.
3. We are guided primarily by desire preserve present momentum toward African solution. This objective directly conditions our attitude toward additional arms for Morocco.
4. We agree evidence indicates Algerians moving to position of materiel advantage and, with completion current training, may become tactically on par with Moroccans or superior to Moroccans. Due weight should be given, however, to fact UAR has not demonstrated great military prowess elsewhere. King's concern over their role, while understandable, may overemphasize real danger. Direct Soviet role has been limited and Cuban role minor, though symbolic. UAR desires keep Cubans out.
5. Morocco does, in our view, face threat from instability in Algeria and from continued risk break in cease-fire by stray shot or initiative individual commanders for political purposes. We also have evidence Algerians may still have substantial military stocks in Libya which Libyans may be prepared release to them.
6. Before considering alteration our present policy toward aid to Morocco, however, believe we must assure ourselves King is not seeking alternative to acceptance African solution. We know he has been reluctant accept withdrawal arrangements worked out on frontier and agreed to by Algerians. We know his military commanders reluctant accept any solution which may require Morocco give up areas now under their control. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He may feel current circumstances give sufficient weight this picture to persuade us of need for additional aid and commitment to Moroccan side. U.S. continues believe King running major risk in isolating himself from remainder of Africa. This danger would be accentuated by accepting conspicuous new Western aid.
7. Prospect additional Soviet arms Morocco is naturally matter of concern. King can hardly sustain picture his pro-Western stance, however, and accept substantial Soviet aid. Believe we should make every effort dissuade him, but yet not indicate this so alarms us we are prepared go extraordinary lengths prevent it.
8. King's approach further concerns us since it represents continuation his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] efforts acquire arms without any indication careful planning, either from financial or military standpoint. Evidence substantial purchases in Europe points to this.
9. Given these factors, believe our initial response to King should be designed: (a) assure him our continued support for independence Morocco; (b) assure him continued reasonable flow normal Western military assistance; (c) indicate our willingness make representations Algerians with respect diplomatic relations problem, if Algerians have set unreasonable conditions; (d) urge his continued cooperation with African solution including withdrawal agreement; and (e) consideration his raising problem with Haile Selassie and Keita and point out acceptance Soviet arms would weaken his case both with West and with Africans who have tended support Morocco because of arms buildup in Algeria.
10. U.S. would be prepared re-examine situation in light responses these demarches. FYI. Policy set forth in Deptel 1965 to Madrid /3/ remains basis our approach. However, in view serious limitations on foreign aid, U.S. response in military aid terms would probably be minimal in event further aid deemed necessary. End FYI.
/3/ Telegram 1965 to Madrid, December 2, outlined the U.S. position toward the Algerian-Moroccan conflict as presented to Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Munoz Grandes in conversations with Rusk and Williams in Washington November 25 - 26. The United States supported an African solution to the crisis; it agreed with Spain that Morocco should not be permitted to fall under anti-Western influence; if Algeria broke the cease-fire and continued its extraordinary military build-up, the situation would be out of control and would require reassessment. In such an event, the United States hoped Spain and France could provide aid to Morocco, which it would back up with some assistance of its own. (Ibid.)
Algiers' 1307 /4/ just received. Department has no objection your seeking reaction French, British, and Spanish ambassadors suggestion para 4. You may also explore privately with French Ambassador (without reference to Porter) ideas paras 5 and 6. Preparation actual reply to King must await your further discussions your three colleagues and receipt comments other interested posts.
/4/ In telegram 1307 from Algiers, December 24, Porter suggested trying to induce the French, British, and Spanish Ambassadors to emphasize to the Algerian Government that the situation was moving into a dangerous stage because of the continuing arrival of Soviet and UAR arms. Porter also recommended inducing the French Ambassador to take the lead. He reported that he had already discussed with the French Ambassador certain ideas, including expressions of concern over the influx of Soviet and Egyptian arms and the need for demilitarization of the frontier. (Ibid.)
Rusk
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