Documents 35-90
Algeria
35. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/1 - 362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof (WE) and approved in S on January 9. Ambassador Herve Alphand had requested an appointment with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter to discuss the general situation.
Washington, January 3, 1961, 3:15 p.m.
SUBJECT
Call by Ambassador Alphand--January 3, 1961
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. J.V. Imhof, WE
Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy
M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
Algeria. The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Alphand had any recent information as to how the Algerian problem was developing. Ambassador Alphand said that in his talks with Prime Minister Debre and Minister Joxe both had been much more optimistic than on past occasions and had expressed the view that they felt reasonably certain for the first time that the other side really wanted to reach an agreement. He said he understood that in preliminary negotiations agreement had been reached on a number of crucial problems such as the Sahara, the stationing of French troops, the maintenance of bases and of communications with Black Africa and the rights of the European minority although this latter point still presented certain difficulties. He said he considered it likely that formal negotiations would begin within the next few weeks. He warned however that difficulties could appear at the last moment. With Arabs, one could never be certain whether agreements that had been reached would not again become negotiable. Also, the Egyptians and the Soviets were exercising pressure on the GPRA against a negotiated settlement. Lastly, there was the threat from the OAS. In the Metropole, the OAS has been noisy but without any real influence. The vast majority of the people in metropolitan France would welcome a negotiated settlement of the Algerian conflict. In Algeria, however, the OAS was influential and could cause trouble. Ambassador Alphand was confident however that the Government would be able to deal with these troubles.
Ambassador Alphand said that in view of the fact that the outlook was favorable and that a negotiated settlement appeared to be at hand it was important to do nothing that might disturb this situation. He referred to the understanding which he had had for several years that FLN leaders would not be received in the Department. /2/ He said that a meeting with FLN leaders in the Department at this time (he cited as an illustration a meeting between Governor Williams and Chanderli) would have a disturbing influence on the negotiations. He said that General de Gaulle has also expressed concern about this.
/2/ For previous documentation on this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 629 - 630, 651, 691 - 692, and 718 - 719.
The Secretary said that we did not intend to do anything that might upset negotiations. Our vote in the UN on the Algerian issue had been determined by this consideration. /3/ However, it was neither in the interest of France nor of the West that the Soviets would meanwhile strengthen their contacts and their influence with the GPRA. Ambassador Alphand said that the Soviets had not recognized the GPRA. He said he knew that we were concerned about Soviet influence on the GPRA but was convinced that a balancing act on our part would do no good. It would be far better to wait until negotiations had led to the establishment of a Provisional Algerian Government. For the moment it was of the utmost importance not to do anything that might hinder negotiations and premature official contacts between U.S. officials and GPRA leaders could have an unsettling influence. The Secretary said that he would discuss this matter with his colleagues.
/3/ Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1573 (XV), adopted December 19, 1960, with the United States abstaining. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 520 - 521. For a record of the U.N. proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/PV.956.
French-Arab relations. The Secretary said the constructive Algerian settlement would improve French relations with the Arab world. He also remarked on the current happy state of relations between France and Morocco. Ambassador Alphand said that there was a curious seesaw relationship in North Africa: when French-Tunisian relations were bad, French-Moroccan relations improved and vice versa. He agreed that an Algerian settlement would have a salutary effect on French-Arab relations but said that Egypt was an exception. He said the French had disturbing reports from Egypt on the treatment inflicted upon the arrested French officials who had been subjected to all kinds of torture.
[Here follows discussion of another subject.]
36. Editorial Note
On January 13, 1961, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston T. Merchant gave the following report during a Department of State - Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting: ``Mr. Merchant said he would like to report to the Chiefs our assessment of the recent referendum on Algeria. In France itself de Gaulle won over 75% of the vote. Even when the non-voters are considered, 57% of the eligible voters supported de Gaulle. Sixteen million Frenchmen voted yes, five million no and five million abstained. In Algeria 70% of those voting supported de Gaulle. In France the negative vote did not reflect success on the part of the extreme right but was largely the communist electorate. The results of the referendum were not as good as was expected a month before the vote took place but were more favorable than was anticipated on the eve of the referendum. We do not know if the FLN will be willing to negotiate with de Gaulle but the lull occurring after the referendum gives us some feeling of optimism. We have no idea of how de Gaulle plans to play his hand, how he will negotiate. With respect to North Africa in general Mr. Merchant said in the future we will want to get JCS views on certain aspects of Sino-Soviet involvement in the area. He said he was considering the possibility of sending the Chiefs a letter containing certain military questions in this regard. Reverting to the referendum he said we felt the West had jumped over a hurdle, that a majority of Frenchmen have endorsed de Gaulle's program, that the ultras have been isolated and that the French Army will remain loyal to France. The Algerian situation now warrants modified optimism." (Substance of discussion of State - Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, January 13; Department of State, State - JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328)
De Gaulle had offered self-determination to Algeria in a speech on September 16, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pages 1096 - 1099. On November 16, 1960, the French Government announced that President de Gaulle had decided to submit his Algerian policy to a nationwide referendum. The referendum was held January 6 - 8, 1961, in metropolitan France and Algeria.
37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 65 D 182, A20, U.S. Policy Towards Algeria. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare.
Washington, January 30, 1961.
SUBJECT
Forthcoming Algerian Developments and the Role of The United States
Algerian problem enters new phase--How is ``Algerian Algeria" to be created
There is general agreement that the Algerian problem is entering a new phase. There is no longer any question that an ``Algerian Algeria" will be created, but there remains the very considerable problem of how this will be done. The central point at issue is to define the Algerian elements to which political power can be transferred without risking unacceptable danger to French national interests. If Algerians could be found who (a) commanded local support and (b) evidenced a willingness to cooperate with France in the post-independence period the forms of transfer of power would assume reduced importance as appears to be the case in the current negotiations with the entente states. Unfortunately Algerian leaders who might have played such a role have either become compromised by non-participation in the rebellion or by siding with the French or, as in the case of Farhat Abbas, have made common cause with the rebellion.
The critical issue--Transfer of Power
France seems to recognize that the rebellion will come to an end only through political negotiations with the PAG in its capacity as spokesman for the ALN and FLN (the Military and Political arms of the rebellion). It is probable also that the French Government recognizes that negotiations with the PAG will inevitably lead to that group's assuming the principal role in determining the future policies of ``Algerian Algeria". There is no question that the PAG and its followers through their advanced degree of political organization, their cadres trained abroad and perhaps covertly in Algeria itself and their security forces, will inevitably outdistance any Algerian competitors. Their initial margin is likely to grow as the formation of trade union, youth and student groups add to PAG's nationalist image that of primary advocate of internal social and economic reforms which can be expected to have great appeal for the urban masses and landless rural elements. Of course the PAG is not a static body and the longer peace is delayed the more likely it is that its policies will become increasingly revolutionary. On the other hand a relatively quick settlement would maintain the leadership of the new Algeria in comparatively moderate hands.
Thus the problem in essence is for France and the PAG to reach agreement on (1) transitional steps and (2) Franco-Algerian relations in the post-independence period. We may expect that the PAG will wish to make no concessions which would seriously restrict ``Algeria's" future freedom of action. At the same time France would be reluctant to make uncompensated concessions in the pre-independence stage, quite apart from the very real problem of France's inability to make any moves at all towards legitimizing the followers of the PAG unless the French Army's acquiescence were assured.
Under these circumstances it is to be feared that the parties if left to themselves will have great difficulty in reaching a settlement. The PAG is already showing the strains of a long war in that it is increasingly vulnerable to suggestions from its own militants and to outsiders that continued hostilities will bring about a French political collapse permitting a battle-hardened and truly revolutionary Algerian regime eventually to take over the country. The French Government has had some success in over-riding the objections of the Europeans of Algeria to self-determination and has also been able to maintain army acquiescence in the government's Algerian policies. However, the Army's hatred of the rebels probably continues to inhibit de Gaulle from taking any really decisive steps towards an early transfer of significant powers to the supporters of the PAG even if he wishes to do so (which is by no means certain). The balance of probability is that talks will be opened, that they will be exploratory in nature and that they will not reach any very meaningful agreements. At the present stage the primary obstacle will probably be the continuation of hostilities. The PAG will not renounce its principal instrument of pressure on France and undecided Moslems, and de Gaulle will not withdraw the French Army in any appreciable numbers without a prior political understanding between the parties. Should the talks become stalled, we would expect that the next phase of the problem would take place in the resumed General Assembly at which time the Algerians would seek a resolution building on that of December and calling for the UN to assume a direct role in the negotiations. Such a resolution would put the US directly on the spot. Our failure to endorse such a demand would be held against us for a very long time and should such a resolution fail, the influence of the extremist view regarding the Algerian problems might be impossible to overcome. In this case de Gaulle would be caught between pressure in France for a settlement on almost any terms and the French Army with serious consequences for his own authority. The moderate leaders of North and West Africa would also be forced to choose sides instead of working for a reconciliation and would bitterly resent what they would hold to be the failure of the US to exert its influence in favor of a UN assisted settlement.
US Role to Prevent a Breakdown by Establishing Influence with PAG /2/
/2/ On October 23, 1962, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk recommending that the U.S. Government maintain effective and public contact with nationalist leaders in the remaining African dependent territories; see Document 360.
It is our contention that the foregoing course of events might well be averted by expeditious US action. It is not safe for us to assume that de Gaulle has the problem well in hand but that we could always intervene to ``influence" the parties if anything goes wrong. The facts are that de Gaulle's room for maneuver is very limited in the negotiations of such key problems as the future of French military installations in Algeria, the political and economic status of Europeans, the future of French holdings in the Sahara and army toleration of PAG political activity in the pre-independence period. It is also true that self-imposed restrictions in response to French pressures have not only prevented us from established meaningful relations with the PAG but, together with our sales of armament to aid the French military effort, have given the rebels the impression that for all practical purposes we support the French side politically, militarily and economically. Hence there is every likelihood that the PAG, faced with a US appeal following no real concessions on the part of de Gaulle, will feel that it has nothing to lose from maintaining a recalcitrant attitude. On the other hand an indication that the US recognizes that an era in history has ended and that in consequence the PAG is entitled to be dealt with much as we deal with the future rulers of British territories may cause the PAG to see some value in US suggestions. While the PAG is disillusioned with past US behavior, it nevertheless still greatly values the potentialities of our active interest and influence in bringing about a solution based on continuing cooperation between the new Algeria and the West. Indeed, the mere evidence of genuine US sympathy and objectivity would go a long way to give the Algerians the confidence to enter into negotiations with France. Already there are indications that the PAG moderates will be prepared to discuss fully with the French the key issues mentioned above. It should be our task to ensure that this willingness does not evaporate in the face of the rigid French proposals which are predictable at least in the initial stages of the talks. Not to be overlooked, also, is the added weight which such a US position would give to similar representations to the PAG by the African and Asian states. The latter have been handicapped by the obvious lack of any supporting evidence for their pleas to the PAG to place its trust in Western intentions. We may be thankful that it was only in the sixth year of the war that PAG leaders began to consider seriously the possibility that the West had no real interest in their goals and decided to explore vigorously the possibilities of bloc assistance. We should not conclude however that the turning away from the West is irreversible or on the other hand that it will not continue in the absence of positive Western moves.
French reaction to a US initiative
It may be argued that a US initiative to establish Western bona fides with the PAG will cause de Gaulle to draw back from his present policies. We do not agree. We think de Gaulle has adopted self-determination for French reasons as the only policy which can settle the Algerian problem in a way permitting France to emerge from the settlement with prestige and honor permitting it to assert a valid claim to great power status. His policies are also responsive to the fact of rebellion, to the fact that the rebellion is dominated by the PAG, and to the growing demand within France for an end to a most unpopular war. We do not believe he could or would draw back from a settlement on the grounds that the US shared his desire that the PAG should negotiate. Nor do we believe that at this stage expanded but discreet US contacts with the PAG would cause the French Army to do anything which it would not do if faced with the prospect, for example, of numbers of PAG approved Algerians assuming power during the transition period as the result of French contacts with the same persons. If the army will acquiesce in the transfer of power it will hardly revolt against the government of de Gaulle because of a US ambassador's contacts in Rabat or Tunis. If it will not acquiesce, such contacts are all the more important to head off the prospects of a bloc-backed Algeria-in-exile forming in Tunisia or Morocco with serious consequences for Western interests in these and other African states.
It is also suggested that an approach to the PAG will be ineffective unless it is preceded by an approach to de Gaulle. While this may well be true as regards the discussion of specific issues such as the fate of the French naval installations at Mers al Kebir a demarche to de Gaulle is not a prerequisite to the kind of relationship which is in itself also a precondition to advice on specifics. We do not object of course to informing the French that we propose to expand our contacts with the PAG in the interest of facilitating negotiations and preventing a further deterioration in North Africa's relations with the West. To do so would in fact have the advantage of underscoring to the French the importance we and other friendly states attach to successful negotiations. De Gaulle himself has admitted that world opinion has a justifiable interest in a fair settlement; he could hardly object if we sought to assist by doing what we could to establish and maintain a similar point of view in rebel circles.
Finally it is argued that expansion of US contact with the PAG serves no useful purpose at this time since ``we have nothing to say" but should await a moment of difficulty at which we could intervene with a plea for the adoption of a ``constructive" approach. This suggestion lacks merit on two counts. It assumes by implication that we will wish to endorse the French position on whatever issue is at stake. It also overlooks the fact that the PAG will be responsive to our advice only if we have made it worthwhile for them to do so by having reassured them over some time that we wish to treat with them as responsible political leaders not as guerrillas. We do not have to convey the impression that we consider the PAG as the government of Algeria. We do need to make clear that our interest is not to rescue French chestnuts but to deal on dignified terms with those who may be important leaders in a new Algeria.
Support from North Africa's Moderates
Should the US assume a more positive position towards the Algerian question using expansion of contacts with the PAG as a first step, it would also be very desirable to make sure that the North African governments understood and appreciated what we were doing. Our willingness to be more forthcoming on Algeria and to consult closely with the North Africans about developments there would do much to shore up our political and military position in Morocco and Libya and would greatly strengthen Bourguiba's Tunisia. It is quite possible that the favorable reaction we could expect to an indication that the US had finally decided to recognize the trend of events in Algeria would be of assistance to us in gaining greater acceptance for our own positions on other issues. It seems apparent that US ``indifference" to Algeria has had a considerable effect on African ``indifference" if not antagonism to the US position on cold war issues. This is not to say that differences between the US and the North Africans will not continue, especially as regards bases and certain other matters, but these conflicts can be reduced to manageable proportions once the North Africans are persuaded that the US is in fundamental agreement with them on major political issues.
Specifics of our approach to the PAG
It is possible to spell out in some detail the content of initial approaches to the PAG, to the French and to the North African states, /3/ but the essential point to be decided at this time is that the US is now prepared to approach the Algerian problem from the assumption that it is desirable that an orderly transfer of power to the PAG and its supporters take place as rapidly as possible, and that the role of the US over the coming months will be to do what it can to ease this transition at the same time laying the groundwork for fruitful relations between the US and the new Algeria, between Algeria and France, and between Algeria and its African neighbors. While we would expect in our discussions with the PAG to counsel conciliatory attitudes towards such matters as the status of European and French economic holdings, it would be premature for us to adopt specific positions on these subjects at this time or to involve ourselves as guarantors in any way.
/3/ Proposals in this respect are already under study in the Department. [Footnote in the source text. For examples of such proposals, see memoranda from Foy D. Kohler (EUR) to Secretary-Designate Dean Rusk, January 13, 1961 (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations); James K. Penfield (AF) to Raymond G. Hare (G), January 19 (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/1 - 1961); and Satterthwaite (AF) to Hare (G), January 27. (Ibid., 751S.00/1 - 2761)]
If the general premises outlined above are accepted and implemented we have every reason to believe that North Africa's present orientation towards the West can be maintained. If not, the probability is that a settlement will not be reached, that the war will drag on with extremists taking over the rebellion and de Gaulle's authority gravely weakened and that the US will be lumped with France in African eyes as being responsible for the growth of bloc influence in the area in spite of the best efforts of North Africa's moderate leaders.
38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2 - 161. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and Valdes; cleared by Kohler, McBride, Penfield, Hare, and Stoessel; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli and repeated to London and USUN.
Washington, February 1, 1961, 9:30 p.m.
3161. Department has carefully studied posts' recommendations for and against raising level our contacts with PAG. Department shares concerns cited Paris 3016. /2/ However, Department also shares belief (Tunis 881) /3/ FLN will inevitably play large role in Algerian future, and therefore sees merit in modifying present arrangements in manner which will permit us to improve our eventual capability to influence PAG in direction constructive approach to problems which bound to arise in conjunction anticipated negotiations. In any case Department believes present situation inconsistent with our traditional position of being willing see all groups and considers effort should be made bring contacts with PAG more into line our normal practices. At same time Department wishes avoid creating expectations or suspicions on either side which could make direct contact between them more difficult. It is important in particular that neither French nor PAG be given grounds to believe US intends to deal with PAG or its representatives in manner inconsistent with our non-recognition of PAG's claim to government status, or to become actively involved in any way in negotiations.
/2/ In telegram 3016 from Paris, January 30, Cecil Lyon, Minister of the Embassy, warned that any advantage gained by moving to higher level contacts with the PAG would not be ``sufficient to counter-balance inevitable French feeling we were prejudicing negotiations and trying to upstage them at delicate moment." (Ibid., 751S.00/1 - 3061)
/3/ Dated January 27. (Ibid., 751S.00/1 - 2761)
Department accordingly authorizes addressee posts to take such steps as may be appropriate locally to deal discreetly but positively with Algerian overtures for exchanges of views at other than present levels. This should be done unostentatiously and without any advance statement to PAG or others we are prepared do so. In other words we would not envisage sudden campaign to cultivate PAG but only quiet return to more normal practices. Posts should make every reasonable effort to confine higher level contacts to those which would arise spontaneously in course of normal social and ceremonial functions.
Department will welcome posts' suggestions as to best ways of handling French when they complain of higher level US - PAG contacts. /4/
Rusk
/4/ On February 2, Lyon recommended that the French Government be informed of any change in U.S. policy and made a ``final plea for deferring any change in present policy at least until FLN - French negotiations under way." (Telegram 3061 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/2 - 261) The Department of State responded on February 4 that it did not believe it advisable to inform either the French or the FLN in advance of any change in policy ``since this would lend too great significance to matter" and reiterated its position on contacts with the PAG as outlined in telegram 3161, noting that the date when Franco-Algerian talks were to begin remained unclear. (Telegram 3201 to Paris; ibid.)
39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2 - 861. Confidential. Drafted by Root on February 6, cleared by Seip and Goodpaster, and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris.
Washington, February 8, 1961, 6:23 a.m.
801. In extended and extremely cordial farewell call on President Feb 6, /2/ Ambassador Slim reiterated his country's confidence in U.S., identity of views between two nations and Tunisia's earnest hope U.S. Government would take courageous anti-colonial stand despite difficulties this might cause us with certain of our European allies. Ambassador stressed Algerian problem as Tunisia's main preoccupation and said that present opportunity for negotiations must not be lost. He informed President that Bourguiba had been invited visit de Gaulle and that, while Bourguiba appreciated this gesture and was willing to take any step that would help cause of Algerian peace, he first wished to discuss invitation with Algerian friends and to make sure his visit would serve useful purpose and not merely be matter of protocol. In answer to President's question, Ambassador said Bourguiba's relationships with FLN leadership were excellent. Ambassador warned that if de Gaulle missed present opportunity for negotiations Tunisia could not long hold out against transshipment of Communist help to Algerian fighters.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
President recalled long interest he had in North African problems from time he was Senator and said his views had not changed though his responsibilities were of course now different. In difficulties that lay ahead we certainly counted on constructive and stabilizing role of President Bourguiba and Tunisia. It seemed to President that more progress had been made toward solution of Algerian problem in last three months than in last six years. He wondered whether events were not now moving toward kind of solution based on self-determination which he and President Bourguiba favored. Ambassador expressed doubt events were moving at sufficiently rapid pace. President indicated we looked to Tunisia for any suggestions as to how US could play effective part.
Rusk
40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassyin France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2 - 1561. Secret. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by McBride, Mau, and Tasca; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, and London.
Washington, February 15, 1961, 9:52 p.m.
3348. Following report of discussion on Algeria in February 14 Alphand - Secretary meeting based on uncleared memcon: /2/
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 770.00/2 - 1461.
Alphand, who probably not speaking from instructions but from what he conceives to be the French position, said de Gaulle obtained mandate proceed with self-determination. Extreme rightists out, army completely disciplined, and question is to negotiate with FLN, first on cease-fire then on guarantees, though latter negotiation cannot be with FLN alone. Inside FLN there tendency influenced by Bourguiba which wants to negotiate, and other tendency influenced by Nasser and East which does not, finding war serves its purpose. French hope moderates will prevail. Negotiations will be very secret, and Alphand will probably not be informed. French ask our confidence. French do not think we can help. Last Administration had no official relations with rebellion, French hope this will remain case. French hope negotiations will commence soon, but once they do we must realize will be difficult process, and will take some time.
Secretary asked, in view split in FLN if would be helpful to moderates to know friendly relations could be established with West.
Alphand replied they already know if agreement with French reached they will be closely associated with France, hence with West in general. Alphand reiterated there no move US can make now.
Secretary asked if French had any idea re time factor. Alphand could not say, even de Gaulle could not fix time.
Secretary stated we feel we are in period of pregnant opportunity, that is French and Algerians are, and we do not want to interfere in any way that might jeopardize progress. We under pressure to make some statement on Algeria, and have resisted, though this difficult for us.
After Secretary left meeting Alphand asked if could summarize our position as: US will let de Gaulle continue try seek solution, US will not make any statement, and US will continue not have any formal relations with FLN?
Kohler replied this essentially our position. Stressed we always under pressure. We realize French problems, but would appreciate any information re progress. We hope there disposition on both sides to compromise issues, so as avoid repeat of Melun. For example, we hope there inclination to find way around problem of cease-fire. We do not wish change our relations with either side, if this would result in firming up that side's position against compromise. If French would at any time indicate this might be useful, we would be glad do what we could. We all confident de Gaulle seeking solution.
Alphand referred to Bourguiba visit to Paris, saying this would not involve good offices, but could be useful.
Tasca stressed importance Bourguiba returning with his status unimpaired. Trip is risk for him. /3/
Rusk
/3/ De Gaulle and President Bourguiba met in Rambouillet, France, February 27 - 28. Following the meeting, Bourguiba flew to Morocco to confer with PAG leaders. On March 1, Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman reported from Rabat that he had met with Bourguiba who had told him that he was convinced of the genuineness of de Gaulle's intentions and that he was ``risking his future on convincing Algeria leaders to respond to de Gaulle." (Telegram 1637 from Rabat; ibid., 751S.00/3 - 161)
41. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. Also sent to Rostow.
Washington, February 27, 1961.
SUBJECT
Algeria at the Point of Decision--Is There Anything We can Do?
With genuine Franco - FLN talks at last in the offing, /2/ we are at a critical stage which may offer the last real chance of a relatively ``peaceful" Algerian solution. It is arguable whether or not we would help or hinder this by US action at this point. But clearly here is an urgent policy issue which ought to be on our list.
/2/ On February 21, the PAG announced that the two sides had agreed to talks. On March 30, the French Government and the PAG issued communiques announcing their decision to open talks in Evian, France, on April 7.
DeGaulle is obviously seeking to disengage from Algeria, but if the FLN pushes him too hard he may be unable to do so (a tragedy for him as well as us). Hence it is now up to the FLN to meet him halfway, and any influence we may have should be used for this purpose.
At a minimum, shouldn't State explore post-haste whether to use all available means of direct and indirect influence to persuade the FLN to respond constructively when DeGaulle lays his cards on the table? [1 line of source text not declassified] We could point out that now is the time when the FLN leaders must choose between the likelihood of expanded conflict in Algeria, which would inevitably convert it into an East - West issue, and a peaceful transition which in the long run will probably give them all they want.
The big hitch is that such efforts might be counter-productive. DeGaulle might be upset by our meddling, regardless of whether it were in his interest. As for the FLN, they might respond to our overtures by seeking compensatory commitments from Washington which would, in turn, embroil us with the French. But before letting the opportunity pass by inaction, let's at least make it a conscious choice.
Bob Komer
42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 3161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root and Chase; cleared by Brown, Valdes, and Witman; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Rabat, London, and Algiers.
Washington, March 31, 1961, 8:21 p.m.
994. Department is disturbed by Yazid statement reported in press that ``under present conditions PAG will not go to Evian."
Embassy should therefore make immediate contact with PAG at level you consider appropriate to express perplexity over Yazid statement and to ask what explanation you can send to USG. Embassy can draw on following points as appropriate in light PAG reply:
(1) While PAG may have felt compelled to underscore its position in light reported Joxe Oran statements and MNA communique, /2/ fact remains that GOF in communique announcing talks and subsequently, especially in Algeria, has clearly differentiated between ``official" negotiations to take place at Evian and exchanges with MNA and other Algerian elements many of which, as PAG well knows, have little political influence among Algerian masses.
/2/ On March 27, rival Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne leader Messali Hadj announced that the MNA planned to appoint a delegation to begin parallel negotiations with the French. On March 30, Louis Joxe, French Minister of State in Charge of Algerian Affairs, said in Oran that he was prepared to meet with the MNA. On March 31, PAG Minister of Information Mohammed Yazid declared that French negotiations with the ``valets of colonialism" called into question the Evian talks.
(2) It quite clear to us that French govt fully committed to begin formal negotiations with PAG on ``conditions for self-determination of Algerian population as well as problems related thereto," a formula which is clearly responsive to PAG's own wishes and status. US believes, as result its discussions with highest levels of French govt, that French intentions are firm and genuine and that decision has been made (not without some cost, e.g. assassination mayor of Evian) to proceed at Evian to begin creation of Algerian Algeria. PAG does not have to accept our estimate on faith but would seem to have everything to gain by exploring French intentions fully in official talks instead of through communiques.
(3) There will no doubt be many extraneous attempts to block or compromise negotiated settlement but parties must rise above them for main issue is that negotiations must take place, and quickly, if peaceful and equitable solution for Algeria is to be found.
(4) Embassy knows US is urging GOF with equal frankness to take every precaution to avoid inopportune statements or actions which might be misinterpreted. US also avoiding substantive statements at this time.
If PAG reaction to foregoing is negative and intractable, Embassy may in its discretion tell PAG that instructions it has received from Washington make clear that US Government, whose interest in a mutually satisfactory agreement should be apparent, would find it very difficult to understand PAG's failure to seize opportunity which Evian seems to offer. Alternatively, you may report PAG reaction to Embassy inquiry together with your recommendations. In either case you should inform GOT of your conversation with PAG and its results.
Paris may tell GOF in general terms that we are seeking emphasize to PAG vital importance of adhering to April 7 schedule Evian, but Embassy should emphasize to GOF, (presumably Joxe or Couve) importance we attach to GOF's doing nothing which would make more difficult task of bringing PAG negotiators to Evian and assuring that talks themselves will be productive. Embassy should indicate that in our opinion it would be most helpful if GOF were to see that a reaffirmation of special character Evian were speedily made clear. /3/
/3/ On April 1, Ambassador James M. Gavin reported from Paris that the French Government was ``still reasonably optimistic" that FLN maneuvers would not prevent the opening of talks in Evian on April 7. (Telegram 4164 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4 - 161) On April 3, Ambassador Walter N. Walmsley met with PAG Ministers in Tunis and emphasized the danger that a delay in beginning negotiations would entail, to which they responded that Joxe's statement indicated a basic French unwillingness to negotiate sincerely and insisted that the Evian talks could not begin until this statement had been suitably clarified. (Telegram 1144 from Tunis, April 3; ibid., 751S.00/4 - 361) This was the first official meeting between PAG officials and a U.S. Ambassador. French protests were reported in telegram 4209 to Paris, April 7. (Ibid., 751S.00/4 - 761)
Rusk
43. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. No classification marking. Attached to the source text but not printed are three attachments entitled: ``French Army Dispositions," ``Military Air Transport Available," and ``Excerpts as stated."
Washington, April 24, 1961.
SUBJECT
The Situation in France and Algeria /2/
/2/ On April 22, French military officers in Algeria seized Algiers and began an armed revolt against de Gaulle's Algerian policy. The French Cabinet decreed a state of emergency.
Ever since the settlers revolt in Algiers in January 1960, the Agency has received, analyzed and published numerous reports of French military and rightist plotting against De Gaulle's government and his Algerian policies. For example, on 26 January the CIB carried reports and analyses of sagging morale and disaffection in the Army and Air Force--in the latter particularly with reference to General Challe's resignation from his NATO command in protest over De Gaulle's intention to negotiate with the Algerian rebels. It now appears that the military officers involved, who had initially decided to exclude political leaders from their plans, suddenly moved up their timetable when their plot leaked to the Algiers Delegate General's office last week.
In Algeria, insurgent leaders remain in control of most of the territory though it seems clear that large elements of the military there, as in France itself, have not fully declared themselves. There is yet no indication, however, that more loyal or passive elements would challenge the Legion and paratroopers in battle.
In France, the government actions on the night of 23 - 24 April /3/ appear to have reduced the prospects of successful invasion of France by the insurgent leaders--if indeed they actually intended such an invasion. These measures also seem to have stirred up the French popular will to resist--particularly among younger groups. The call up of military reservists continues. Other emergency measures are being relaxed, however--tanks and armored cars are being withdrawn from the city, roadblocks and airport barricades removed and commercial flights resumed at Paris airports.
/3/ On April 23, President de Gaulle announced that he had assumed special emergency powers under Article 16 of the French Constitution, and the French Government undertook intensive emergency preparations to block a possible invasion of metropolitan France by rebel parachute troops.
De Gaulle is unlikely to give any ground to the demands of the revolutionary military junta. Over the next few days he will probably solicit acknowledgements of positive loyalty to him both by the general public and by prominent political leaders in an effort to discourage disaffections by now hesitant military officers. The junta leaders for their part will be probing for support in units of metropolitan France and Germany; in the face of strong backing De Gaulle is likely to receive, we do not believe they will gain many additional adhesions.
If the military leaders in Algeria feel the success of their revolt threatened by isolation and by the blockade imposed by De Gaulle on April 22--which we believe will be effective--they may in the next day or so attempt an invasion of France proper, hoping to spark as yet uncommitted military elements on the continent to their cause. However, as time passes without decisive action in metropolitan France, the insurgent leaders are more likely to turn on the FLN rebel bases in Tunisia in a desperate attempt to commit France to an enlargement of the war.
I attach excerpts from the most significant intelligence reports that have come in during the last 24 hours.
Allen W. Dulles /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4 - 2426. Confidential. Drafted by Valdes; cleared by Collopy, and in substance with S; and approved by Kohler.
Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:19 p.m.
4506. Under instructions Alphand called on Kohler /2/ re French press reports that Algiers radio broadcast statement by NBC Algiers correspondent saying Challe told him he asked President to help his movement, in order block Mediterranean to Communists.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
Kohler replied no such communication received, directly or indirectly. Had there been, our reaction would have been totally negative, and we would have informed GOF. Kohler said he assumed it best not dignify statement by denial, but should French think denial desirable, we would issue immediately.
Alphand referred to Secretary's assurance yesterday there no truth to rumors rebel generals had contacted us for support. Kohler said Secretary made thorough check be sure no truth whatsoever in this. He pointed out whole idea fantastic, since no matter what any American felt about Challe, even if he professed friendship to us and NATO, if he should succeed we would inevitably have to take violently opposite line to his Algerian policy, and by definition we would be opposed to him. Kohler said when President offered support to de Gaulle /3/ he meant it in real sense, and we wondered if French had any ideas of what we might usefully do.
/3/ On April 23, President Kennedy sent de Gaulle a message pledging his ``continuing friendship and support as well as that of the American people." (Telegram 4489 to Paris, April 23; ibid., 751S.00/4 - 2361) For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 315. For text of Kennedy's April 26 message congratulating de Gaulle after the revolt collapsed, see vol. XIII, pp. 653 - 654.
Alphand replied he talked to Paris on this twice yesterday after his conversation with Secretary, and they saw no need for further gesture, thinking exchange of messages would suffice to dispel rumors. This is French affair, and French must settle it themselves as fast as can.
Kohler, in reaffirming our readiness be helpful, referred to NATO article 4. Asked if NATO could usefully take any troop or air force dispositions, or if we could usefully move Sixth Fleet under NATO.
Alphand thought not, on grounds this might be dangerous since involvement foreign military units, even of friendly nations, might give more prestige to Challe.
Kohler said we most apprehensive about possible movement into Tunisia. Alphand agreed would be disastrous. Lebel suggested if UN reaction to such move were too strong, French reaction might be increased sympathy for Challe.
Alphand noted there had been rumors at time of force de frappe debate [that] we contacted rightists and encouraged them by saying we would like to see a government more favorable to NATO cooperation. He thought these might have been people in our services who not responsible but speak too much. Hoped we would be careful about this.
Kohler reiterated assurance we have not encouraged rightists in any way, saying this not in our interest, since if Challe won, we would have more serious trouble with him over Algeria than any difficulties we may have had with de Gaulle.
Embassy should follow above line with Foreign Office and other French officials.
Rusk
45. Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 22 - 2 - 61 Washington, May 23, 1961.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 193. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
46. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8 - 561. Confidential. Sent to the White House under cover of a brief memorandum from Battle (S/S) to Bundy (NSC) indicating that the paper had been written in response to an oral request from the National Security Council. A copy of this memorandum is in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria.
Washington, August 5, 1961.
ALGERIAN PROBLEM
The Lugrin talks between the Algerian rebels (PAG) and the French were broken off, at PAG request, on July 27. /2/ The PAG announced that this was not a rupture but a suspension, that they hoped negotiations would be resumed, and that they were leaving contacts in Switzerland to facilitate resumption. They insist that the suspension resulted entirely from the French refusal to concede Algerian sovereignty over the two Saharan departments. They cannot, they maintain, negotiate a settlement on only one fifth of their territory.
/2/ Talks between French representatives and the PAG were held at Evian-les-Bains May 20 - June 13, and at the Chateau of Lugrin July 20 - 27.
The French also have expressed a desire the talks be resumed. They have maintained that the Sahara was only a pretext on the part of the PAG. They have offered numerous other explanations for the breakoff--inability of the PAG to negotiate with the French during the Bizerte crisis, dissension within the PAG and loss of influence by the moderates, the technical inability of the PAG delegation to negotiate, etc.
We believe that the PAG meant what they said, and that the question of sovereignty over the Sahara did in fact cause the suspension of the talks. They are simply not prepared to negotiate the future of Algeria until the Algeria under discussion is defined. The Bizerte crisis did provide an awkward accompaniment to the talks, but the PAG nevertheless felt itself able to begin the second series of talks in the midst of the fighting at Bizerte. There are clearly various tendencies within the PAG, and this might affect the bargaining position the PAG delegation might take on any given issue, but there is no indication that any group opposing negotiations per se has achieved a position of decisive influence within the PAG. As for the negotiating ability of the PAG delegation, this has not yet been tested, since the negotiations did not progress as far as a discussion of technical details.
With the suspension of the talks, what happens now? De Gaulle has made clear his determination to liquidate the Algerian problem by the end of the year. He has conceived of two ways of doing this--by negotiation with the PAG to arrive at an agreed solution of an independent Algeria associated with France, or by regroupment of the Algerian populations.
There is speculation that de Gaulle will now proceed with regroupment. This, as de Gaulle would seem to envisage, involves bringing all Europeans and those Moslems who wish to remain with France together in enclaves, which have not been delineated but will apparently consist of the areas around Oran and Algiers. The east of Algeria and at least some portions of the center and west would then be abandoned to the PAG. Once the enclaves were established, de Gaulle would propose to organize the emigration, to France, of those who wished, and would then attempt to negotiate some sort of arrangement between the two Algerias.
The French have made clear that this solution would be undertaken only as a last resort. They realize that it would not end the war, in that the PAG would continue fighting until it obtained all of Algeria. They probably also realize that the French negotiating position in attempting to bring the two resulting Algerias together would almost inevitably be worse than their present negotiating position. Most importantly, to attempt regroupment would be extremely risky for de Gaulle. He has considered himself to be limited in the manner in which he could negotiate with the PAG by the danger of an army-led coup. This danger would increase enormously with an attempt at regroupment, for it is difficult to see how the army would view such an attempt as anything but sheer abandonment.
We believe, therefore, that de Gaulle will make further attempts to negotiate an agreement. To be successful, this will involve a French concession on Saharan sovereignty (in return for which the PAG can be expected to make economic concessions concerning the Sahara, and it is here, rather than with sovereignty, that France's interests are really involved). This concession could best be made by indicating a change in position to the PAG through the Swiss intermediaries with whom the PAG is still in contact. This, however, would not correspond to de Gaulle's manner of operation. He would be more apt to make a unilateral concession on the Sahara, possibly as a passing reference in some speech delivered in a provincial town during one of his tours. This procedure has in the past resulted in a number of concessions that went beyond what would otherwise have been necessary, and it has led to a gradual erosion of the French position, but de Gaulle is not apt to change his style of operation.
On August 1 Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe stated in a radio address that, with regard to the Sahara, ``in France's view the problem of sovereignty is not the essential thing." This statement would seem to be a preliminary to a de Gaulle concession of Algerian sovereignty.
47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9 - 261. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Algiers, USUN, and Tunis.
Paris, September 2, 1961, 4 p.m.
1197. First subject raised in my tour d'horizon with De Gaulle this morning was Algerian situation.
I told him that I had followed this situation closely and had discussed it with Joxe Tuesday. I explained that US is aware of France's point of view and sympathetic to her endeavors to deal with this very complex problem and that we are aware of his desire to see Algeria become independent although linked to France.
De Gaulle then began familiar exposition of the necessity for France to rid itself of the heavy burden of Algeria. He added that it is no longer important to France whether the future Algeria is friendly toward her, and that France will let Algeria go regardless of the form and attitude of its Government. As in 1958 France had offered independence and the opportunity for continuing ties to her African colonies, she will now offer Algeria the same choice after forming a ``national" Government and withdrawing the European population into enclaves such centers as Oran. Should chaos follow, that will be a problem for the Algerians with which GOF will not concern itself.
I then asked whether he was not concerned about the Sahara in view of French investment and continued interest in its exploitation, since I could not see how a solution to the Sahara issue satisfactory to the GOF could be reconciled with his projected solution to the Algerian problem. De Gaulle replied that nobody had shown interest in the Sahara until the French developed its possibilities. Now he recognizes that it will in the nature of things ultimately be part of Algeria. He realizes, however, that Morocco and Tunisia want part of it--indeed principal motive of Tunisian precipitation of Bizerte crisis was to stake a claim in the Sahara that will later be expanded. Naturally he does not know the final outcome of the Saharan problem. Perhaps the riparian countries will solve it without fighting. As for France she will continue to hold on to the Sahara until the negative value of this position becomes overriding, that is when the cost of maintaining her position there surpasses the return she realizes from being there. There is an abundance of petroleum in the world, so it is not essential that France stay in the Sahara at great cost.
I should add early in the discussion I said to De Gaulle that in the past we had been approached by representatives of the FLN, that France has always been informed of these contacts, and that they may occur in the future. If this were to happen it might be possible for us to fill a helpful role and I wondered if he had any thought in this matter. He ignored the question, intentionally I believe, and his answer in terms of what was going to happen Algeria was also the answer to what role we might play vis-a-vis the FLN. I don't think he cares particularly, perhaps he does not think that what we can do would be significant and, in any event, he is going to go ahead with his own solution.
Gavin
48. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9 - 961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacDonald on September 8; cleared by Brown, Wallner, Buffum, Tyler, Fredericks, Witman, and Korn; and approved by Ball. Sent to Tunis, Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Tripoli, Benghazi, London, and USUN.
Washington, September 9, 1961, 4:10 p.m.
436. Algeria. In September 5 press conference de Gaulle in our view made major concession on Sahara, /2/ in effect renouncing French claims to sovereignty. Way appears be opened to PAG to resume negotiations.
/2/ De Gaulle had told the press conference that France might be willing to recognize Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara if French interests there were safeguarded.
We have also noted Ben Khedda avoided any possible temptation during Belgrade meeting to take hard line. Despite turnover in PAG, effective power still seems be wielded by Krim and Boussouf and PAG consistently says its objectives obtainable through resumption negotiations.
Both French and PAG seem envisage another round of negotiations; both also making alternate plans should negotiations prove fruitless. De Gaulle has announced plans proceed with creation provisional authority in Algeria to implement self-determination process (referendum and elections). He seems regard this as alternate means reaching agreement with PAG, that is, by secret understanding rather than open negotiations. If agreement with PAG impossible by any means, he then would proceed with plans for regroupment and total abandonment large segments of Algeria. PAG on other hand talks of stepped up diplomatic and military activity and probably expects more active intervention Afro-Asian and Bloc powers, should negotiation process fail.
We believe time running out rapidly and that French share this view. Failure to reach agreement would result in complete cessation French economic assistance to partitioned section of Algeria and installation PAG regime therein under chaotic conditions. In such case we would undoubtedly see new regime turn to Bloc. In short, we believe resumption negotiations essential. Failure to reach agreement would possibly be disastrous to Western interests in North Africa and elsewhere.
With above in mind, we believe moment propitious for approach new PAG team. PAG should be sounded out on intentions re negotiations, including any concessions they willing make to accommodate French interests as stated by de Gaulle. PAG should be assured our full support self-determination, and our conviction Algeria will soon be fully sovereign State. Should particularly stress our hope new Algeria will find it possible cooperate with France in economic and cultural fields, on basis full equality, since France already making tremendous efforts in Algeria which it willing continue after independence provided some accommodation made its own interests. Should assure PAG our willingness assist also in numerous problems new state will face.
PAG should be informed we feel de Gaulle intent on full decolonization, and that concession on Sahara was major step forward which should facilitate agreement. We would hope PAG itself will be as forthcoming. Should stress our fear that failure to reach bilateral settlement could lead to introduction cold war in North Africa in particularly acute form, and could prevent for some time to come assumption by Algeria of important role in African and Arab worlds.
In view previous contacts, Ambassador Tunis should seek early occasion make approach to Krim or Dahlab. /3/ While French authorities would be aware approach to be made, contact should be discreet so as to avoid press attention. We are considering parallel approach to Chanderli in New York.
/3/ On September 13, Walmsley expressed these points to PAG officials, Interior Minister Belkacem Krim, and Foreign Minister Saad Dahlab. (Telegram 438 from Tunis, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9 - 1461) Department of State officers made a parallel approach to the PAG Representative to the United Nations, Abdelkader Chanderli, in Washington on the same day. (Telegram 1514 to Paris, September 14; ibid.)
For Paris: Ambassador or Charge should immediately inform Couve and Joxe our preoccupations and intentions, as outlined above. /4/ We note that de Gaulle has no strong feeling on such an approach to PAG, but we would nevertheless hope any information received would be helpful to French in reaching agreement with FLN.
Rusk
/4/ On September 11, Gavin informed French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville regarding U.S. intentions. (Telegram 1378 from Paris, September 11; 751S.00/9 - 1161)
49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15 - WI/10 - 1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Witman, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli for Williams, and pouched to Rabat. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 751S.00/10 - 1861.
Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:06 p.m.
2224. French Charge Lebel, stating he not acting under direct instructions, lodged strong protest with Dept. October 18 on Governor Williams' conversations with PAG in Tunis. /2/ Said he sure GOF would regard meeting and its attendant publicity as most unfortunate, particularly coming at time when Algerians rioting in France.
/2/ On October 17, Tunisian Foreign Minister Sadok Mokaddem gave a luncheon in Tunis for Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams at which Dahlab and Yazid were guests. Williams was on his third official trip to Africa September 29 - October 26. Documentation on the trip is ibid., 110.15 - WI.
Dept. noted protest and then asked Lebel to put matter into perspective in his report to his govt. Said trip to North Africa had been planned many weeks and that it natural for Asst. Sec. in charge of area to visit countries where he had responsibilities. US had taken no initiative to arrange meeting with PAG members. US had, in fact, resisted attempts by others to give special political significance to Williams' trip to Tunisia insofar as Algerians concerned. Tunisian FonMin had invited Williams to luncheon at which two members PAG present. This had not been ``special meeting" but rather social occasion of Tunisian-hosted luncheon. It would have been counter-productive to refuse luncheon invitation. No statements were made to press about luncheon other than to acknowledge it took place. It was press rather than US which created story and attempted give it political significance. Finally, there is no change in US policy which remains one of strong support for de Gaulle in his efforts solve problem and is US hope that renewed French/Algerian talks will be success.
Lebel suggested Dept. attempt put record straight through medium press statement in view fact reports from Tunis imply US policy under modification. Dept. replied Secretary would be holding press conference later in day and question might well be posed.
Lebel then given summary Williams talk with PAG, omitting sections noted earlier cable. /3/
Rusk
/3/ Williams sent a summary of his conversation with Dahlab and Yazid in telegram 566 from Tunis. (Ibid., 751S.00/10 - 1761) On November 28, Williams submitted a report on his trip to the President. He noted that the two PAG leaders had let him know ``in no uncertain terms of their disappointment that the new United States administration had been unwilling to make any public statement not exclusively tied to support of de Gaulle." They had wanted a U.S. statement expressing respect for the ``respectability" of the Algerian nationalist cause. Williams argued that such a statement, phrased to make it clear that the United States believed that legitimate French interests must be protected, was necessary. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa)
50. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Algeria 000. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Yount on October 19. Attached to a memorandum from Major General Frederic H. Miller, Director, European Region, to Bundy recommending that he sign the letter. A handwritten note indicates Bundy signed the letter on October 20.
Washington, October 20, 1961.
Dear Mr. Ball: You recently asked Deputy Secretary Gilpatric for an evaluation of the strategic value to the West of Mers-el-Khebir and other French military installations in Algeria. /2/
/2/ Ball's September 22 letter commented on the value of the recent Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal of the strategic value of the French naval base at Bizerte and asked that they undertake a similar study of the military installations in Algeria. (Ibid.)
We have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the value of the military installations in Algeria based on their importance to the West, if these facilities remain: a) under French control, b) in neutral hands, or c) in the hands of a government essentially hostile to NATO. The reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to our inquiry is attached. /3/
/3/ Attached to the source text but not printed. The memorandum of October 17 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM - 731 - 6) called French and NATO facilities in Algeria a valuable asset to the West and warned that Western forces would be seriously limited without these facilities and that neutral control would constitute a potentially dangerous opening in the southern flank of NATO, while hostile possession would threaten east-west lines of communication through the Mediterranean to the Middle East and U.S. air bases in Morocco, Spain, and other nearby countries. The memorandum was signed by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George R. Decker and included an attachment providing a synopsis of the military facilities in Algeria.
Obviously, the situation under conditions b) and c) above is potentially a serious menace to the Western defense position in the North African, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas, particularly if it is the political evaluation that the new Algerian State will not be pro-Western in its orientation. In such a situation, we would want to watch developments most carefully and, in the event of a possible communist take-over, be prepared to take such steps as might be necessary. However, we see no need for the development of contingency plans to cope with this potentially dangerous situation at this time.
Sincerely,
William P. Bundy /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.
51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations. Secret; Noforn. On October 27, Komer sent this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum that reads: ``FYI, here is a draft Memorandum to the President which I originally intended to propose you send forward with an NSC Action Memo attached. Since the talk which Arthur, Hal Saunders, and I had with the State people, however, I prefer holding up a few days until we can get a better idea as to what, if anything, State proposes to do. Hence, attached is merely to fill you in on the sense of urgency which we feel about this problem. Admittedly, our leverage with the PAG may be marginal and the costs of offending de Gaulle at this juncture high. But the cost of not doing whatever we can, however little, to forestall a frightful mess and push a negotiated solution might be higher still."
Washington, October 27, 1961.
SUBJECT
Action Program to Spur French-Algerian Negotiations
Can we afford any longer to pursue such a cautious policy on the Algerian question when we may well be heading for a major blowup?
DeGaulle appears to be heading toward a showdown with the OAS, with a final desperate coup attempt possible. The PAG is preparing large-scale Moslem demonstrations in Algeria on 1 November, and European extremists probably hope to provoke fighting. French indignation at Moslem demonstrations in Paris has already made DeGaulle's task even harder. DeGaulle himself seems ready in default of a quick negotiated solution to abandon most of Algeria ``to chaos".
If negotiations fail, DeGaulle seems determined to proceed with a shadow government and then, if the PAG won't join in this indirect solution, with regrouping the European population and cutting off aid to the rest. Such partition could lead to a bloodbath, diverting French attention and resources from Berlin, and driving the two sides even farther apart. The U.S. then would face the intolerable choice of flouting DeGaulle to help the Algerians or leaving a vacuum for the Communists to fill. In short, the next round of talks between the French and Algerians, expected soon, may be the last chance for a decent settlement.
Hence from our viewpoint, a negotiated settlement and transitional Algerian cooperation with France are essential. But is there anything we can do in this situation where our interests are so vitally at stake? To date, we have played the role of ``friendly bystander" largely because we saw no other recourse. There are strong arguments for continuing this role: DeGaulle would undoubtedly be offended by any ``U.S. interference", however motivated; powerful segments of French opinion would also be aroused. Nor do we have much leverage with the PAG because we can't offer recognition.
However, in a situation containing the seeds of disaster, anything we could do, however marginal, is at least worth considering. In the basically new situation created by DeGaulle's desperate search for a settlement, the target of these initiatives must be the PAG. DeGaulle and Joxe have come a long way already, perhaps as far as they can go. But the PAG smells victory and shows little inclination to compromise. They do not appear to understand that DeGaulle's fall would ruin chances for a quick settlement. Nor do they appear to understand that DeGaulle needs a few basic concessions to sell decolonization in France and to the colons.
Our objectives. First, if possible, we want to stave off the 1 November demonstrations in Algeria. Second, we must be willing to talk more specifically with the PAG about post-independence relations, particularly economic assistance. Third, we might seek help of friendly pro-PAG quarters in convincing the PAG to negotiate reasonably.
Specifically, we want to get across the following points to the PAG:
1. Large-scale demonstrations now could destroy chances for a negotiated settlement. The best way for the PAG to win control over the Moslem population is to cooperate with DeGaulle and get in on the ground floor of the transitional government--not by mounting demonstrations that could lead to bloodshed. If negotiations begin by 1 November, the PAG would have reason to call off their demonstrations. The demonstrations in France have already weakened DeGaulle's case for a negotiated settlement and increased anti-Algerian feeling, which strengthens support for the OAS.
2. Failure to negotiate a settlement now could make Algeria one of the worst battlegrounds of the cold war and deprive it of real independence. Partition could cut off French assistance and, frankly, make U.S. aid all but impossible. Algeria's resultant dependence on Bloc aid would deprive it of freedom to pursue a policy of genuine neutrality. Algerian aspiration to control all of Algeria could become a cold war victim with France and the Soviet Union contesting control. On the other hand, the PAG can have everything essential now simply by negotiating reasonably.
3. The PAG must face the fact that DeGaulle's fall would disrupt French efforts at decolonization. They should take advantage of DeGaulle as the one man able to go through with it. They misjudge the situation if they think a rightist successor would not quickly scrap the whole idea.
4. The PAG must understand that DeGaulle, desperately as he wants a quick settlement, needs realistic guarantees for the European minority in order to sell decolonization in France. This is the gut issue. If the PAG will only give guarantees now, no one can stop it later from making gradually whatever reasonable adjustments may be more consistent with the status of the Europeans in the new nation.
5. The U.S. will naturally want to help independent Algeria economically. As mentioned, however, it will be almost impossible to do so if Algeria is partitioned. Moreover, a negotiated settlement will be very important to the U.S. government in selling a substantial aid program to the Congress.
6. If the PAG showed real movement toward an accommodation, we would be willing to begin exploratory planning of post-independence assistance, in order to be ready to move quickly after independence. Perhaps the PAG could prepare some of its UN delegates to begin such talks, which could be followed up regularly in Tunis. Many complex problems will demand solution; the sooner we establish contact, the better.
7. But far more important than any conceivable allocation of US aid would be what PAG might get from the French, if it were sufficiently forthcoming. PAG might even be able to get a French commitment to continue the Constantine Plan program. Moreover, PAG should not underestimate the economic value to them of the European minority. Reasonable guarantees for them would be farsighted and help to preserve them as a significant economic asset.
8. Bloc aid could not conceivably add up to what France, backed by US, could do. Moreover, it is folly for PAG not to look at the other side of the coin. The economic chaos created by partition or the political upheaval created by Algeria's direct embroilment in the cold war would inevitably delay Algeria's assuming its rightful responsible role in Arab and African councils.
How can we get these points across? The first hurdle is to get reluctant French acquiescence if possible for the above approach to the PAG. One possibility would be a Presidential letter to DeGaulle. Or a quiet talk between Porter and Joxe, who appears more receptive than DeGaulle, might accomplish the same thing (in any case, the Porter - Joxe channel would be useful to inform the French of our new initiatives). We would have to decide in advance whether to seek French approval or merely clue them. They might even prefer the latter. Then we should instruct Walmsley to present our eight-point case to Krim or Dahlab in Tunis.
2. AID should draw together what we know about Algerian economic needs and should prepare an appropriate officer to talk knowledgeably with the PAG about U.S. assistance after independence. We should begin planning our economic assistance program and should arrange for working level contacts, to begin here and to continue in Tunis.
3. We should try to create a sense of urgency and reason in as many pro-PAG quarters as possible. If U.S. advice carries little weight with the PAG, let's start talking through other mouths as well. For instance, Bonsal might approach the Moroccans to urge use of such influence as they have with the PAG. (King Hassan's recent expressions of concern about Algeria provide an opening.) Stevenson could ask Lebanese Foreign Minister Takla, now at the UN, to explore the possibility of his pressing our line with the Iraqi (who have given the PAG financial help) and other Arab nations. Let's make our case to President Senghor of Senegal during his visit here on 3 November.
Recommendation: We have already gotten some movement from State by a gentle nudging on Algeria. (Our meeting with State last Tuesday led to Outgoing ____ to Paris, etc. /2/ But State may still be moving too slowly to meet the need. AF is toying with the idea of proposing a Task Force, but EUR will no doubt oppose. Perhaps a Presidential action memo is called for. We'll draft one if we don't see signs of movement in next few days. /3/
Robert W. Komer
Harold H. Saunders /4/
/2/ On October 24, Komer, Schlesinger, and Saunders met with Tyler, Brown, and Imhof of EUR and Fredericks, Herz, and Witman of AF. EUR officials indicated that above all, they were concerned with not offending de Gaulle and argued that current channels were sufficient for all necessary contact with the PAG, while AF insisted that these channels were not adequate and that it was absolutely essential to begin practical preparations for Algerian independence. (Memorandum of conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memos Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) Reference is presumably to telegram 2432 to Paris, Document 52.
/3/ The memorandum was also sent to Arthur Schlesinger with a handwritten note in the margin of the transmittal memorandum from Komer to Bundy asking for Schlesinger's reaction. On October 30, Schlesinger responded that the PAG should not be the exclusive target of the initiative, to which Komer replied on November 1 that he doubted it was feasible to press the French at this point, noting that so far de Gaulle had done all the giving. (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, French-Algerian Negotiations)
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11 - 2861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown, Tyler, and Imhof; cleared by Tasca, Witman, Tyler, and Johnson; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat, and pouched to USUN, Cairo and Geneva.
Washington, October 28, 1961, 3:28 p.m.
2432. As Algerian problem enters into crucial phase, consider it necessary that posts directly concerned with this problem understand fully principles and motivations of US policy in order prevent divergent approaches.
1. Algerian independence is inevitable. We believe (as does de Gaulle) that normalization of relations between France and North Africa possible only if Algerians conduct their own affairs. As far as US concerned, continuation of Algerian war constitutes a major obstacle to conduct effective US policy in North Africa, and also has adverse effects on our relations with France. Perspective of Algerian independence makes it desirable improve relationship with PAG and proceed with planning our relationship with new Algerian state, particularly in view of likelihood that independent Algeria will exercise predominant influence in North Africa and on newly independent states bordering on Sahara.
2. Manner in which Algeria will acquire independence not yet clear. If independence comes about without agreement with France, future of Algeria and future relationship between US and Algeria would be heavily mortgaged from outset. There would be danger of chaotic conditions in France and in Algeria which could render France useless as ally and Algeria highly susceptible to Soviet bloc influence. Even if chaotic conditions do not ensue there is further danger that US support for Algeria (or Algerian rump state after pro-French elements have been regrouped in certain enclaves) could alienate France from alliance. Principal objective of US policy must be to prevent such situation from arising. As long as there exists reasonable chance, negotiated agreement between France and future Algerian leadership is therefore of overriding importance. Any proposed inducements to FLN must therefore continuously be examined in light whether they help or hinder negotiated settlement. This examination can only be made by Department based on reports received from posts abroad.
3. As to tactics, Department considers following principles are in accord with above objectives:
(1) Pure prestige gestures toward FLN are in general undesirable and should be discontinued except on instruction because they do not contribute to negotiated settlement and may actually strengthen elements opposing negotiations in France as well as among FLN. However, if we have something important to say to FLN (or they to us) we will decide to raise level of normal contacts with FLN. In any case, while it logical view PAG as likely future government, we should avoid appearing to have recognized it as such prematurely.
(2) Regular non-publicized contacts with FLN should be maintained and intensified. Department planning at appropriate moment assign medium-level officer to Embassy Tunis with specific mission maintain contact with FLN. This move has been complicated by unfortunate leak on appointment ``emissary" to FLN. Other means improve our intelligence of FLN and our ability make substantive points to it under study. Non-government institutions may, for instance, be helpful.
(3) Meanwhile, in regular contacts with FLN we should bring home to them dangers we see in delaying negotiations on assumption de Gaulle successor regime would be willing or able pursue de Gaulle's policy of broad concessions. We should suggest to PAG in convincing terms that if relations between Algeria and France are normal we will be able to do more for Algeria than if relations are hostile.
(4) In general, believe general character of discussions with FLN should look increasingly toward future of Algeria, Algeria's needs and our desire help meet these needs. We hope by this approach (a) obtain better knowledge of FLN post-independence plans, on which FLN leadership has been silent; (b) discreetly and tactfully make FLN aware of problems involved in running complex state in full process of modernization (problem of which at least part of FLN leadership appears to be unmindful); and (c) convince FLN that negotiated solution is in Algerian self-interest in terms future prospects economic aid and development.
Department would welcome comments from addressee posts. /2/
Rusk
/2/ In telegram 2360 from Paris, October 31, Gavin characterized the guidelines in telegram 2432 as most encouraging and constructive, but recommended that the Department temporarily defer assigning an officer to the Embassy in Tunis with the specific mission of maintaining contact with the PAG, pending efforts to renew negotiations. Gavin strongly supported the path described in numbered paragraph 3 of this telegram, but warned against nurturing FLN illusions about the degree of future U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid., 751S.00/10 - 3161)
53. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12 - 1961. Secret.
Washington, November 6, 1961.
SUBJECT
Algeria
Bob Komer left before your note /2/ arrived. However, I believe my comments reflect his views.
/2/ Not found.
We were pleased with the start made in Deptel 2432 to Paris. /3/ We agree we must do everything we can to influence the PAG to stay with negotiations this time until they reach a settlement. Their outcome, of course, will shape our long range problem.
/3/ Document 52.
The urgent question in our minds is whether we could provide any inducements for PAG reasonableness. We are ``intensifying regular contacts," but do we have anything to offer except advice? Is there any way we can increase the weight of our advice without upsetting the negotiating balance?
We feel it's very important to study possible post-independence aid programs now in order (1) to be prepared for quick movement and (2) to discover areas for helpful pre-independence discussion. Admittedly, we can't make final decisions until the situation clarifies, but we can't afford not to move decisively when it does. More immediately, we might find some way of adding substance to our present contacts with the PAG. If independence emerges from partition, the need for imaginative U.S. action will be even greater than if a settlement is negotiated.
We see two related but separate problems: (1) planning our long range approach to independent Algeria and (2) discovering ways to increase our leverage now for insuring successful negotiations. If you set up a study group, perhaps its work might be divided with these distinct problems in mind. Needless to say, we would welcome the chance to sit in on any such deliberations.
Hal Saunders
54. Editorial Note
On December 14, 1961, Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson sent to the Department of State the text of a draft U.N. resolution on Algeria which had been given to the U.S. Delegation by Tunisian Ambassador to the United Nations Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and had the preliminary approval of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. The draft included an operative paragraph calling on ``the two parties to resume negotiations with a view to implementing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria" and a preambular paragraph expressing regret at the suspension of negotiations between the Government of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. In a separate telegram, Stevenson described the draft as ``moderate," and noted that the only significant objection he saw was the reference to the PGAR. (Telegrams 2141 and 2142 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12 - 1461) On December 15, the Department authorized Stevenson to tell the French, Algerian, and Tunisian representatives that the United States could support the resolution if the reference to the PGAR and the phrase ``and respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria" was eliminated. (Telegram 1594 to USUN; ibid.)
On December 15, 34 Afro-Asian countries submitted the draft resolution to the First (Political and Security) Committee with the text unchanged except for a reversal in the position of two of its paragraphs. On December 18, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Ball informing him that Chanderli had told Stevenson he thought the reference to the PGAR could be eliminated but not the phrase ``and respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria," to which only the U.S. Delegation had objected. After noting that the French did not want the United States to vote for any resolution on Algeria, Williams argued that ``the benefits to be gained from support of the resolution (with reference to PGAR eliminated) will outweigh possible disadvantages in both the short run and long run." (Ibid., 751S.00/12 - 1861)
That afternoon, the Department cabled to USUN that it was ``authorized to make it known publicly (in any way and at any time you deem best) that US prepared to vote for this resolution if those two elements, which would make an already difficult negotiation more difficult, are corrected." The telegram noted that the reference to the ``unity and territorial integrity of Algeria" was a clear attempt to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations on the Sahara. (Telegram 1612 to USUN; ibid., 751S.00/12 - 1461)
Despite U.S. efforts, the text of the resolution as submitted on December 15 remained unchanged. U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost explained the U.S. decision to abstain on the resolution to the First Committee on December 19. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 725 - 726. The Committee subsequently adopted the resolution by a vote of 61 to 0, with 34 abstentions (including the United States). For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.308 and Add.1, 2. On December 20, Resolution 1724 (XVI) as recommended by the First Committee was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly without debate by a vote of 62 to 0, with 38 abstentions. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 726 - 727. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/5070.
55. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/12 - 1561. Secret.
Washington, December 15, 1961.
SUBJECT
Reception of Algerian Representatives in the Department
Discussion:
On October 9th the Secretary approved EUR's memorandum of October 3 /2/ recommending that he call in the French Ambassador to inform him of the decision to receive representatives of the FLN in the Department up to the level of Under Secretary. Action was temporarily deferred, however. On November 21st the Secretary decided that EUR should inform the French Embassy we are now ready to receive Algerian representatives in the Department. According to your memorandum of December 11th to Mr. Tyler, /3/ the Secretary agreed that EUR should defer action on informing the French Embassy until after the Paris meetings and that the reception of PAG representatives in the Department should, if necessary, be correspondingly deferred.
/2/ Not found. On November 13, Tyler sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk reviewing the recommendation to receive PAG representatives in the Department. Rusk initialed his approval. (Ibid., 751S.00/11 - 1361)
/3/ Not found.
This matter is of particular importance now because the Paris meetings will be over at the end of this week and the PAG Minister of Information, Yazid, who is now in New York for the Algerian debate, may well want to be received in the Department. He has already asked to be received by Ambassador Stevenson in New York. I think we should be prepared to receive him here as well, presumably some time early next week.
As for the level at which PAG representatives may be received in the Department, it was the decision of the Acting Secretary on September 15, confirmed by the Secretary on October 9, that they could be received up to the level of Under Secretary. I think we should retain flexibility in this matter. As you know, I myself have already met socially with the PAG Information Minister in Tunis. I am afraid we would defeat our purpose if we tried to downgrade him, for example, should he come to Washington.
Recommendation:
That you authorize receiving the PAG Information Minister at Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level some time next week, with the French Embassy to be informed beforehand by EUR. /4/
/4/ Johnson initialed his approval on December 20, crossed out the words ``Under Secretary," and added the following handwritten note: ``On condition that the PAG takes the initiative in requesting an appointment. We are not to stimulate such a request. Should request for appointment materialize, suggest Asst. Secretaries for both AF and EUR."
On December 22, the Department of State cabled the Embassy in Paris that it had informed the French Embassy in Washington on December 20 of the decision in principle to receive PAG leaders in the Department, noting that it had emphasized that their reception would not in any sense mean departure from a policy of nonrecognition and full support de Gaulle's Algerian policy. (Telegram 3539 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/12 - 2261) On December 28, Couve de Murville suggested personally to Gavin that the Department refrain from seeing PAG officials for at least a week. (Telegram 3250 from Paris; ibid., 751S.00/12 - 2861)
56. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/1 - 662. Secret. Drafted by Hooper and concurred in by WE. Attached to a memorandum from Witman to Williams indicating that the memorandum to the Secretary followed the line that McGhee had instructed Witman to take on January 4. Witman added that he would prefer that they adhere to their decision ``no longer to slam the Department's door in the faces of the PAG." (Ibid.)
Washington, January 6, 1962.
SUBJECT
Reception of Provisional Algerian Government Leaders in the Department
I understand that Ambassador Alphand suggested during his talk with you on Wednesday that we should again postpone our decision to receive PAG leaders in the Department. If Mr. Alphand's request had specified a limited period for postponement justified by urgent considerations explained in some detail, I would not find it quite so objectionable. Mr. Couve de Murville's request to Ambassador Gavin on December 28 (Paris tel 3250 at Tab A) /2/ was far more reasonable from our point of view. The week he asked for as a minimum has now passed.
/2/ Not attached to the source text. See footnote 3, Document 55.
As far as we know the PAG has no knowledge of our decision to lift the restriction on their reception in the Department. It is quite possible that several weeks may go by before they seek talks here. But whether PAG leaders take the initiative next week or next month, it is at this stage, and under these circumstances, much more likely to be for substantive discussion than for show. I am most reluctant to be committed to a position of having to refuse them and thus, of doing damage to the reasonably good rapport we have painstakingly established.
Recommendation
I suggest that we inform the French that we are not prepared to defer indefinitely our readiness to receive PAG leaders at their request. We might suggest that we would consider a French request to extend the period proposed by M. Couve de Murville for a specified brief time if the purpose for doing so seemed clearly to justify it. Again we could reassure the French that we will neither initiate such talks in the immediate future nor treat them any differently than previous conversations with the PAG. /3/
/3/ On January 6, the Department of State cabled the Embassy in Rabat in response to a January 4 Embassy request for permission to initiate contacts with the PAG. The Department instructed the Embassy not to initiate such meetings at this stage, although if a meeting with the Ambassador or Charge seemed advisable as the result of a PAG initiative, ``this should not be ruled out." (Telegram 1114 from Rabat and telegram 928 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/1 - 462)
57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1 - 121 1962. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from W.B. Palmer, Director of Military Assistance (DOD/ISA), to Assistant Secretary of State Williams, noting that Defense concurred with the JCS recommendations as a basis for planning purposes and requested further Department of State participation in developing such plans.
JCSM - 10 - 62 Washington, January 8, 1962.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for Post-Independence Algeria
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 22 December 1961, subject as above, and its inclosure, a draft State Department study, subject: ``Post-Independence Algeria". /2/
/2/ The undated Department of State draft paper provided background information relative to the development of a possible military assistance program for post-independence Algeria. In a covering memorandum of November 22 to the Joint Chiefs, William Bundy noted that the Department of State had indicated the strong likelihood that all or part of Algeria would become separated from France within a few months, and had requested the Department of Defense to provide recommendations regarding possible military assistance for post-independence Algeria. Bundy specifically asked that the Joint Chiefs provide recommendations regarding a military assistance program ``which would be demonstrative of our desire to help meet Algerian requirements and preclude Soviet influence" no later than January 10, 1962. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Algeria 000.1 - 1961)
2. The State Department study discusses objectives and lines of action under two general headings. These are ``Short Term (before Algerian independence)," and ``Medium and Long Term (after Algerian independence)". The latter group is further divided into two subgroups, the first on the assumption that a French - Algerian agreement is reached, the second on the assumption of regroupment and partition. The referenced memorandum asked for recommendations for a military assistance program under each condition.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that precipitous action in furnishing military assistance to Algeria will impair relations with France. An overriding strategic requirement is the maintenance of a strong NATO. France is a cornerstone of NATO.
4. No offer of military assistance should be made to the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) prior to Algerian independence except at the specific request of the French Government (GOF). Any offer directly to the PAG, or any response in reply to a request from the PAG without consultation with the GOF, would endanger our relations with France.
5. In the event that through successful negotiations, ties between France and Algeria are severed completely, the United States should be in a position to offer Algeria a military assistance package without delay. The purpose of such an offer is two-fold. First, it would serve as an opening whereby the United States could assert positive influence designed to orient Algeria toward the West. Second, it may forestall Algerian acceptance of similar overtures from the Soviet Bloc. However, consultations with the GOF should precede an offer of military assistance.
6. If the settlement finds France retaining close ties with Algeria, or responsible for certain Algerian affairs, the United States should again be in a position to respond quickly. However, under these circumstances, the GOF, rather than the United States, should take the initiative for discussion of a military assistance program with Algeria. The possibility exists that the PAG might still approach the United States directly for military assistance. Such a request should be thoroughly discussed with the GOF prior to making a positive or negative determination.
7. Regroupment and partition present most formidable problems in developing a suitable military assistance program adequate to meet the varied and delicate conditions which may prevail under such a settlement. If portions of Algeria remain in French hands, the United States should not offer military assistance to the PAG. No action should be taken which would have a detrimental effect on our relations with France. On the other hand, depending on the situation existing between France and Algeria after partition, the GOF might welcome military assistance to the PAG if it assisted in maintaining order. In any case, no offer of assistance should be made except with the full knowledge and participation of the GOF.
8. The extent of military assistance to be furnished under any of the above conditions is dependent on many factors as yet unknown. These include that type and amount of military assistance the United States may provide to countries neighboring Algeria, the position France will occupy with regard to Algeria, and the assistance the GOF itself is prepared to furnish. In addition, information is almost nonexistent as to Algerian requirements and assets. If the determination is made to offer military assistance to Algeria, the most practical approach would be to send in a survey team immediately after settlement of the crisis to develop a program. However, the need for quick response through an ``impact package" is also recognized and such a ``package" is described in the Appendix hereto. /3/ If for political reasons a ``package" of this type is offered, the United States should simultaneously propose sending a survey team to Algeria for the purpose of ascertaining additional requirements and developing a basic program tailored to the need. Arrangements must also be made for US military representation in Algeria to supervise the issue of the materiel.
/3/ Not printed.
9. The National Army of Liberation (ALN) is known to have small arms and some light artillery. Therefore, the impact package is designed primarily to enhance the mobility of the ALN. However, with few exceptions the same items are in demand by US units and diversion to Algeria would be at the expense of US forces. For this reason, an overriding priority must be directed if equipment is to reach Algeria promptly.
10. The memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) refers to the sensitive political nature of this problem, and representatives of your office have advised against coordination with USCINCEUR at this time. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important that they obtain the views of USCINCEUR prior to their furnishing final recommendations on the policy and nature of military assistance to Algeria. /4/
/4/ At a State - JCS meeting on January 19, Department of State and Defense representatives agreed that ``the French should handle the bulk of any military assistance for an independent Algeria since present MAP demands from other recipients are already far beyond our resources." (Department of State, State - JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer /5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
58. Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 62 - 62 Washington, January 24, 1962.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 215. Secret. Extract--1 page of source text not declassified.]
59. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs (Hooper) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S Policy Guidelines: Lot 67 D 396, Algeria. Secret. A cover sheet indicates that the memorandum was being submitted to an NSC Standing Group meeting on February 9 for purposes of discussion, and had been generally approved in the Department of State but had not yet received final approval from Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.)
Washington, February 8, 1962.
PROPOSED ACTION RE ALGERIA
This paper is an outline of action which it is proposed should be taken during the next few months, given the continuing validity of the indicated assumptions for which current prospects appear favorable. Bracketed sections indicate action already taken or now in process.
Assumptions:
Franco - Algerian agreement will be achieved and announced simultaneously with cease-fire during the next two to four weeks. After a brief concerted insurrection the OAS will be checked. A provisional interim Franco - Algerian regime under continuing French sovereignty will be established by early March to secure internal order, conduct a referendum and prepare transfer of governing authority. The joint administration will face considerable economic stress in the form of shortages of food and basic supplies, and heavy unemployment as the flow of refugees and displaced persons from Morocco, Tunisia and internal detainment camps converges on Algerian villages and cities. Algeria will become independent on relatively amicable terms with France by next September.
Recommended actions:
After announcement of cease-fire and successfully concluded negotiations:
(1) Congratulatory message from President to De Gaulle on successful conclusion of negotiations. [Already drafted and approved.] /2/
/2/ All brackets (except those in paragraph (6)) are in the source text.
(2) Press statement welcoming agreement. [Draft being reviewed.]
(3) Short of official recognition of the PAG, pursue active contact with FLN leadership at all levels in order to prepare the way for future friendly relations and to obtain more precise knowledge of current and projected policies of Algerian leadership. [There has been considerable contact with FLN leaders at Tunis, Rabat, USUN and in Washington outside the Department over the past few months. However, this has not included Ben Khedda, it has excluded reception of PAG representatives in the Department, and interviews have been restrained by the hitherto over-riding policy of avoiding discussion which might be disruptive to delicate Franco - Algerian negotiations.]
(4) In renewed approach to French, referring to our earlier exploratory inquiries, we should seek candid discussion of both short-run and longer range Algerian economic problems. French should be reassured we seek minimum involvement, but in anticipation of problems during transition and in future of nature which Communist Bloc might exploit, we wish to be helpful where we can. Explore with French possible emergency aid requirements (food and basic supplies) and also discuss ways and means of projecting long-term developmental assistance to Algeria with maximum feasible adherence to a multi-lateral Western arrangement in which France should play a major role. [We have suggested to the French, in three separate conversations since last November, the advisability of discussing post-independence Algerian aid problems. On January 26, Labouret informed Lyon that French might be ready to do so in a few weeks.] /3/
/3/ Reported in telegram 3632, January 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/1 - 2762)
(5) Through appropriate Chief of Mission in Tunis or Algiers deliver informally (in such a way as to preclude interpretation that diplomatic recognition is involved) a message from the President to Ben Khedda expressing:
(a) appreciation for FLN statesmanship in concluding negotiated settlement;
(b) looking forward to increasingly meaningful contacts on an informal basis now and to the day when these can be formalized by recognition of an independent Algerian Government; and
(c) expressing willingness to discuss ways and means in which USG might help in solution of economic, educational, administrative and other problems which Algerians foresee in connection with coming independence.
[Draft under consideration in Department. Policy difference to be resolved as to whether it should be written personal message, which Protocol and Legal experts agree can be done without any recognition problem, or oral. Former would have greater impact on Algerians.]
(6) Inaugurate new programs and sharply increase those already under way for training Algerians in the United States in technical, administrative, labor and other skills essential to Algerian self-government. [With eight new arrivals this month there will be 46 Algerian students here under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] private auspices and Department's (CU) exchange program. Latter have Tunisian or Moroccan passports. Plans under way to expand these programs and add AID technical training effort as soon as possible. FLN leaders have indicated strong interest.]
(7) Proceed immediately with implementation of interim administrative plans (already prepared or now in process) to elevate CG Algiers to Embassy--building lease, staff and equipment. [Tentative staffing pattern approved in Department and Algiers. Gradual staff build-up in next few months is required, but present funding problem not yet resolved. FBO projected Embassy building would not be completed before 1964 or 1965. Funds for interim lease of large enough building to house Embassy, Attaches, AID and other agency officials will be required. Problem currently under active review. Plans for early opening two small consulates at Oran and Constantine are ready for implementation as soon as expected French approval received.]
(8) Advance preparation of political and protocol arrangements for recognition, diplomatic relations, delegation to independence, gifts.
(9) Timely selection of U.S. Ambassador.
After OAS subdued and joint provisional administration is established and operating:
(10) As follow-up to earlier conversations with GOF and FLN, consult Franco - Algerian Provisional Executive re USG offer to assist with food-relief, food-work and other emergency programs. An economic team of State and AID officers from Washington, Rabat and Tunis should be selected in advance to pursue this. [Economic paper prepared by study group with refinements now in process will serve as basic paper for short-range aid planning. Separate longer range paper now in process. Contact with PAG economic planners, interested in US AID program and methods, has just been established by Embassy Tunis. Department approved last month a Ford Foundation project to sponsor private economic adviser to PAG. Advance assignment of one or two US AID officers to Algiers is being prepared.]
(11) Earmark an advance provisional amount of $50,000,000 in FY'62 and '63 funds for emergency assistance. [AID has noted and will take necessary action.]
(12) Review with French the longer term internal security situation and suggest minimum US military aid and police training assistance as agreed Western alternative to what otherwise might be semi-reliance on Communist Bloc.
[In response to Department's request JCS has prepared preliminary study of possible US military aid to post-independence Algeria accompanied with suggested ``impact package" of items likely to be of immediate usefulness and subject to rapid delivery with appropriate priority. This included 64 cargo trucks, 2 L - 19A aircraft, 2 C - 47's, 3 picket boats, spare parts and auxiliary equipment at a cost of $1.4 million. Its contents could be adjusted to more immediate Algerian requirements when known and when and if it were decided to make any such offer.]
(13) Notify FLN leadership at appropriate point before independence that USG is prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with new Algerian Government on independence day or as soon thereafter as is mutually convenient.
On and after Independence Day
(14) Ambassador-designate and designated US AID Director should participate as members of USG delegation to ceremonies.
(15) Above two officials should remain in Algeria, and assisted by appropriate economic and military survey teams as needed, should make early appraisal of Algerian economic and security plans and requirements with view to early US assistance as counter to expected immediate Communist Bloc initiatives.
[Other preparations under way to cover the above and less favorable contingencies include:
(1) Labor and manpower requirement studies being prepared in the Department of State and Labor, the latter emphasizing possible expansion of US labor union liaison.
(2) State Department intelligence studies re:
(a) Consequences of a French decision to partition Algeria,
(b) Prospective policies of an independent Algerian state, and
(c) The probable effects on North African (Maghreb) relations of Algerian independence.] /4/
/4/ On February 9, during a briefing session held prior to the NSC Standing Group meeting, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs George McGhee asked that two additional points be added to the Algeria paper. U.S. representatives should stress to the FLN ``the importance of honoring in practice the agreed guarantees to the European community in Algeria," and a few representatives of that community should be included in future expanded U.S. training programs. Later that day, McGhee presented the paper to the NSC Standing Group, which discussed it and approved it ``in general." (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, February 9, 1962)
60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/2 - 2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Witman on February 22; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Fredericks, Rowan, Manfull, Davies, and Smith (White House); and approved by McGhee. Also sent to Paris and Algiers.
Washington, February 23, 1962, 6:04 p.m.
515. Procedure re messages Deptel 4419 to Paris rptd Tunis 507 /2/ superseded by following:
/2/ Not printed. (Ibid., 751S.00/2 - 1562)
1. President has approved following stand-by oral personal message to be delivered by Ambassador Walmsley to Ben Khedda /3/ on occasion of cease-fire:
/3/ Benyoussef Ben Khedda was head of the PAG.
President welcomes conclusion of cease-fire agreement for Algeria as a great and historic accomplishment. He expresses his sincere gratification for the wisdom and statesmanship which you and your colleagues brought to bear in helping to achieve it. He believes the opportunities it provides for a friendly and fruitful relationship between Algeria and France should prove to be of profound benefit to all concerned. He sincerely hopes that it will assure a future for Algeria toward which all residents will contribute constructively.
President feels that Algeria now stands at the threshold of a bright new future. He says that we Americans can from our own heritage appreciate the great tasks and opportunities that lie ahead for the people of Algeria as they prepare to build a new nation and in this we wish them well. He wishes to assure you that we look forward to establishing friendly relations, of benefit to both of our nations and peoples.
2. Delivery of foregoing message should be effected by Ambassador Walmsley (personally if possible) at such place and in such manner as he deems most appropriate, but only upon the receipt of further specific instruction from Dept which will be sent as soon as cease-fire has been officially announced. /4/
/4/ In telegram 555, March 18, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Tunis that it should carry out the instructions in telegram 515 and that the President asked the Ambassador to emphasize to Ben Khedda the friendly personal character of his message. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 1062) On March 19, Walmsley reported that he had delivered the President's message to Ben Khedda, who had asked him to express his deep appreciation for the personal message. Ben Khedda had also said that U.S. support and understanding would be invaluable to the Algerian people and noted that the present Algerian leadership intended to work out cooperative arrangements with the French Government. (Telegram 946 from Tunis; ibid., 751S.00/3 - 1962)
3. Ambassador should make following additional points as USG position separate from President's personal message:
(a) USG looks forward to increasingly meaningful informal contacts now and to the day when these can be formalized by recognition of an independent Algerian government.
(b) Appropriate USG officials will be willing explore with Algerian leaders during course such informal conversations ways and means in which USG might assist in solution economic, education, administrative and other problems which Algerians foresee in connection coming independence.
(c) During transition period USG will of course have to conduct official actions vis-a-vis Algeria in accordance provisions Franco - Algerian agreement.
(d) USG considers it important for all concerned despite possible obstacles that provisions of agreement concerning European minority be put effectively into practice.
4. Upon receipt above-mentioned action instructions and time permitting GOT may be informed just prior delivery that Amb intends deliver congratulatory message, but fact that it is presidential message should not be disclosed.
5. Avoid press attention of meeting to extent feasible. If queried suggest you merely say conversation informal and there is no change your status which solely that of Amb accredited GOT.
6. You should advise Ben Khedda that President's message personal and not intended for publication. You may say that if queried by press we will reply that President asked our Amb in Tunis express President's gratification to Ben Khedda about conclusion of cease-fire agreement. You may suggest to Ben Khedda he may wish handle similarly.
Rusk
61. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/3 - 1362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on March 12.
Washington, March 13, 1962.
SUBJECT
Authority to Receive PAG Representative in the Department after Algerian Cease Fire
Discussion
It has been agreed, as you know, that following the Algerian cease fire, the Department should receive representatives of the PAG informally at an appropriate high level. The occasion of the official announcement of a cease fire agreement would in itself present an opportunity which I believe would be particularly useful for us to exploit in this connection.
I should appreciate an early chance to talk to Mr. Chanderli, the PAG representative in New York, who up to now has been limited in Departmental contacts to occasional informal discussions with officers of AFN and WE outside the Department. Mr. Chanderli has been quite forthcoming in these discussions and informal talks he has had with Ambassador Stevenson and other USUN officers.
On an informal basis I should like to arrange to have a discussion with him as promptly as possible after the cease fire announcement during which I would propose to inform him of the substance of the President's message and the additional points which Ambassador Walmsley will have been authorized to pass to Ben Khedda.
This would serve two useful purposes. First, it would be very gratifying to Chanderli who has been sensitive about not being informed about past initiatives of the Department concerning the PAG. Secondly, it would provide a natural pretext for holding such an interview and changing our policy of banning reception of PAG representatives in the Department under circumstances and at a time which could hardly be seriously objectionable to the French.
Mr. Chanderli is a likely choice for the post of first Algerian representative to the UN and possibly also Ambassador to the United States. Recent conversations he has had with USUN indicate that he is well informed about Algerian plans concerning inter-African cooperation and that he is destined to play a significant part in Algerian representation at future African conferences such as the Conference of Independent African States scheduled to take place at Tunis later this year. I feel that this move to establish a basis for informal discussions in the Department would help us considerably in obtaining a flow of useful information about prospective internal and external policies of the FLN.
Recommended Action:
That AF be authorized to arrange informally through USUN after the cease fire for Mr. Chanderli to visit the Department for purposes of holding discussions along the lines indicated above. /2/
/2/ McGhee initialed his approval on March 14. A cease-fire agreement was concluded at Evian-les-Bains on March 18. On March 26, Chanderli was received at the Department of State by Williams. The visit was preceded by a small informal luncheon outside the Department hosted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Tasca. The conversation was recorded in two memoranda of conversation (ibid., 751S.00/3 - 2662) and reported to the Embassy in Paris on March 26 in telegram 5251, which asked the Embassy not to emphasize the fact that this was the first time any PAG representative had been received in the Department of State. (Ibid.)
62. Memorandum for the Files /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler.
Washington, March 19, 1962.
SUBJECT
Algerian Cease Fire
I was called yesterday evening between 8 and 9 p.m. by Pierre Salinger. He said he had been called by Lebel of the French Embassy, on instructions from Ambassador Alphand, who said the Embassy was concerned at the omission from the statement which the White House had issued /2/ of any specific reference to the role and achievement of General de Gaulle with regard to the cease fire. I told Salinger that this had been deliberately done in order not to appear to be giving credit only to one side.
/2/ For text of the Presidential statement welcoming the Algeria cease-fire agreement on March 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 809.
Salinger called me back sometime later to say he had talked with the President, who had requested that some way be found to convey to the press our admiration for de Gaulle's role. Salinger asked if it would be all right for him to leak to the correspondents the fact that Ambassador Gavin had been instructed to express to de Gaulle the President's feelings of admiration and gratification. /3/ I pointed out that the Ambassador had not been instructed to see de Gaulle personally and that it would therefore be better to confine any background comments to the press to saying that the Ambassador had been instructed to convey to the French Government the appropriate sentiments of the United States Government with regard to de Gaulle's role. Salinger agreed, and said he would do so.
/3/ On February 23, the Embassy in Paris had been instructed to call on de Gaulle as soon as a cease-fire agreement was officially announced in order to convey an oral message expressing the President's deep awareness of the immense difficulties that de Gaulle had overcome to reach the agreement, the painful decisions and sacrifices involved, and his admiration for the great qualities of character and statesmanship that made the agreement possible. (Telegram 4554 to Paris; ibid., 751S.00/2-2362) On March 18, the Ambassador was authorized to carry out these instructions. (Telegram 555 to Tunis, repeated as 4992 to Paris; ibid., 751S.00/3 - 1062)
63. Editorial Note
On March 19, 1962, Ambassador Bonsal informed the Department of State that King Hassan II of Morocco had asked that the United States transport FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella and his associates from Geneva to Morocco as soon as possible in two separate U.S. Government planes. (Telegram 1571 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 1962) Komer transmitted this information to McGeorge Bundy in a note, adding that providing planes ``would help cement relations with Morocco and Algerians, while not unduly upsetting French." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer) In a subsequent telephone discussion about the King's request, Ball expressed concern to McGhee over ``French sensitivity" and the danger of a crisis in France. McGhee said they would tell the French that the United States could not refuse the request because it came from the King of Morocco. McGhee agreed to check the possibility of chartering a commercial plane. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 19, 7:21 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Algeria)
On March 20, the Department instructed the Embassy in Rabat to inform King Hassan that a Pan American Airlines Boeing 707, which was chartered to the U.S. Military Air Transport Service (MATS), could be made available to transport the Algerians from Geneva to Nouasseur in Morocco. The Embassy in Paris was told to explain to the French Government that the United States could not refuse this request because it came from King Hassan. (Telegram 1400 to Rabat, repeated to Paris as 5007; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 1962) On March 21, the Consulate General in Geneva reported that the Algerians had departed at 12:06 a.m., March 21, Geneva time. (Telegram 955 from Geneva; ibid.) On March 22, Moroccan Ambassador Ali Bengelloun called on President Kennedy to convey King Hassan's appreciation. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 751S.00/3 - 2262)
64. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 23 - 62. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Imhof, Tyler, Tasca, Thacher, and Pezzullo; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Belgrade, Benghazi, Cairo, Conakry, Djakarta, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Jidda, Karachi, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Rabat, Stockholm, Tripoli, and Tunis; and pouched to all other African posts.
Washington, March 23, 1962, 8:38 p.m.
1613. During transition period between Algerian cease fire (March 19) and establishment sovereign Algerian Government, addressee posts should be guided by following in relations with Algerian representatives their respective areas.
1. It has been made amply clear on occasion delivery President's personal oral message to Ben Khedda March 18 /2/ and by President in press conference March 21 /3/ that USG does not intend recognize PAG. Question of US recognition will not arise until transfer of sovereignty from France to independent Algeria after transition period of three to six months from date of cease fire. Ben Khedda and other PAG officials appear understand our position and are themselves now more concerned with successful implementation cease fire accords and achievement independence than with recognition of PAG. PAG and FLN leaders are now in effect partners with French in joint effort put agreements in practice.
/2/ See footnote 3, Document 60.
/3/ For text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 258.
2. Within formal limits posed by non-recognition policy during transition period Department desires intensify informal and friendly contacts with Algerian leaders. It intends pursue exploratory discussions re future planning and priorities for possible US assistance to Algeria with French in Paris and Algiers and with Algerian leaders in Algiers, Tunis and/or Rabat. These will be conducted in such manner as avoid weakening French-Algerian co-operation which we consider of prime importance future Algerian development. They will be subject separate instructions to posts concerned and should not be mentioned at other posts.
3. Other posts are requested limit their approach to more general terms friendly US interest Algerian problems, hope for early resolution remaining difficulties and importance future Franco-Algerian co-operation. Department will of course welcome any information developed through Algerian contacts all posts re Algerian plans or views in political, economic, social, cultural and international relations fields. Fullest possible biographic reporting also desired.
4. All addressee posts now authorized at their discretion utilize opportunities develop Algerian contacts at official and other functions at appropriate level, even though these specifically in honor PAG. No objection inviting or receiving PAG representatives informally in Embassy or official residence by Ambassador, DCM or such officer level deemed appropriate locally. Posts should however avoid giving impression of ``rushing" Algerian leaders or representatives, should reiterate where necessary that PAG recognition not involved and should conduct discussions in manner avoiding any implication that we consider PAG now responsible for Algerian foreign relations. /4/
/4/ On March 30, the Department of State instructed the Embassies in Paris, Rabat, Tunis, Algiers, and London to treat the PAG as the leadership of the strongest party of a future Algeria and to consult them informally in that capacity on problems concerning Algeria's future. It suggested dealing primarily with the Provisional Executive when it was necessary to have interim formal dealings with the Algerians. (Telegram 5238 to Paris, repeated as 1486 to Rabat, 582 to Tunis, 341 to Algiers, and pouched to London; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 3062) The Provisional Executive had been established under the Evian accords and was officially installed at Rocher-Noir in Algeria on April 7.
5. Paris requested advise Foreign Office this general approach. Other addressee posts requested keep French locally informed.
Ball
65. Editorial Note
The Organization Armee Secrete (OAS) renewed its campaign of terrorism in Algeria following the signature of the Evian accords. On May 24, 1962, the Department of State expressed the hope that Gavin would find the opportunity to tell de Gaulle that the United States was watching with sympathy the efforts of the French Government to bring the situation in Algeria under control and that it was concerned about the extent to which conditions there might endanger the Evian accords, which had its full support. (Telegram 6320 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/5 - 2462) A temporary truce was agreed upon in Algiers between the OAS and the Algerian authorities on June 1.
On June 4, after the OAS announced that it intended to resume terrorist attacks at midnight on June 5, the Department of State issued a statement supporting the Evian accords as ``the charter of the new Algeria" and condemning the OAS threat of renewed violence. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 810. The Department of State had previously informed the Consulate in Algiers that it felt that the OAS threat required strong and specific denunciation. (Telegram 526 to Algiers, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/6 - 462)
66. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 4/62 - 6/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan.
Washington, June 22, 1962.
McGB:
Aid Planning for Algeria
Rusk's talk with Couve was just the latest in the series of unsuccessful efforts to win French cooperation in planning post-independence aid for Algeria. Tyler raised this subject with Joxe last November. Ever since the French have been stalling. Couve told Rusk (Secto 9) that ``it would be best not to discuss aid for many months." /2/
/2/ Rusk reported this conversation in Secto 9 from Paris, June 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/6 - 2062) The conversation was also recorded in a memorandum of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
So we're caught between this French position and the certainty that the Algerians will want to begin talking aid soon after independence. In fact, Information Minister Yazid has already suggested that we put some statement of willingness to aid Algeria into our Independence Day message.
So far, EUR's position has prevailed in State--we must wait for a French green light (except for relief projects) to avoid offending DeGaulle. On the assumption that substantial planning is impossible without French coordination, AID has done little. Although they've picked a Mission Director, they still do not have a senior desk officer to back him up.
With independence expected July 5, I don't think we can wait any longer for the French lead. The Soviets certainly won't. After trying for seven months to play ball with Paris, we too simply have to put ourselves in a position to respond to the Algerian requests almost certainly in the offing. Admittedly, it is unlikely that we can launch major development projects until the new government settles down, but numerous rehabilitation and public works projects will be urgent in the near future. If we are prepared to move, for instance, we can combine PL - 480 food relief with a Title II program to support such labor intensive projects.
We have made a pretty decent showing so far with a number of relief projects (about $4-1/2 million in FY '62) and the Algerians have been appreciative. Most have been administered through Red Cross or UN High Commissioner for Refugees--financial support for repatriation, food, 10,000 tents for temporary shelter, etc. State also hopes to get a medical team of six University of Chicago surgeons under CARE - MEDICO sponsorship with equipment and drugs to Algeria by 1 July. AID has approved $100,000 to support the Red Crescent, which the PAG says it will rely on after independence for relief projects.
But the problem now is to free our hand to be responsive to much larger Algerian requests in the crucial post-independence months. This will require a policy decision to act without a French go-ahead (although of course notifying the French). To stimulate State to take this step, we could send them an NSAM like the attached. /3/ Alternatively, you could just call George Ball or McGhee.
/3/ Attached to the source text is a draft National Security Action Memorandum that reads as follows:
``Having read the report of your talk with Couve, the President is disturbed at the impasse we seem to have reached in our persistent efforts to coordinate with the French our planning for aid to independent Algeria. At the same time as Couve comments that `it would be best not to discuss aid for many months,' we have indications that the Algerians will want to begin talking aid very soon after independence. While recognizing the sensitivity of this matter, I am concerned lest our policy of waiting for the French lead may cost us too much politically with the Algerians, who will certainly be asking shortly for help. Would you therefore review this policy and let the President know how far you think we can go independently of the French? He would also appreciate a brief summary of the current state of AID's preparations for aid to Algeria."
The NSAM was never issued. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 4/62 - 6/62)
Bob K
67. Editorial Note
On July 1, 1962, the Algerian people voted overwhelmingly for independence in cooperation with France. On July 3, President de Gaulle issued a proclamation formally recognizing Algerian independence. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 812. The White House issued a statement by President Kennedy recognizing ``national independence for the Algerian people" on the same day. (Ibid.) Immediately following de Gaulle's proclamation, Ben Bella, who had been Vice Premier in the Provisional Government headed by Ben Khedda, disassociated himself from the PAG. The United States decided to postpone formal recognition of an Algerian Government or establishment of full diplomatic relations until the relationship between the competing factions was clarified.
On July 6, Porter reported from Algiers on Dahlab's statement that the PAG and the Provisional Executive (PROVEX) had agreed to divide responsibilities by mutual consent, with the PAG running foreign affairs and the PROVEX administering the country. Porter said that he believed that if Dahlab's statement remained uncontested by the PROVEX, the United States should recognize him as Foreign Minister. (Telegram 38 from Algiers; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7 - 662) On July 7, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Algiers that it would authorize Porter to deliver to Dahlab a letter accrediting Porter as Charge d'Affaires in Algiers, once Porter was fully satisfied that PROVEX was in accord. The Department, however, questioned whether it was ``juridically or practicably feasible" to separate such action from recognition of the Provisional Algerian Government under Ben Khedda, and noted that statements to the press should emphasize the provisional nature of the PAG pending the choice of a permanent government by the Algerian people. (Circular telegram 33 to Algiers; ibid., 751S.00/7 - 762)
On July 9, Komer wrote Bundy that he had told the Department of State that the White House would want to clear any accreditation of Porter to the PAG, which would strengthen the hand of the Ben Khedda faction. He added that he had previously agreed with State that this was ``highly desirable though a calculated risk" but that the Embassy in Paris had strongly objected so the matter was being reappraised. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer)
On July 13, Rusk cabled Williams, who was in Bonn, that the PAG and the PROVEX had both notified the U.S. Government that Dahlab was responsible for foreign affairs in Algeria and that an official in Dahlab's ministry had informed Porter that the PAG was satisfied to have U.S. representation continue at the Consulate General level until after the elections on August 12. He added that the split between Ben Bella and the PAG under Ben Khedda continued. (Telegram 126 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7 - 1362)
68. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Algeria. Secret; Noforn; No Dissem Abroad; Limited; Background Use Only.
[document number not declassified] Washington, July 10, 1962.
SUBJECT
1. Comments of Ahmed Ben Bella on U.S. and Moroccan Policy Toward Algeria
2. Comments of Mohamed Laghzaoui on Moroccan Policy Toward Algeria
1. Mohamed Laghzaoui had discussion with Ahmed Ben Bella 9 July 1962. Ben Bella requested that Laghzaoui inform United States Govt representatives with whom he is in touch that Ben Bella is friendly to U.S. and supports Evian Accords. However, Ben Bella said that he expects U.S. to maintain a neutral policy vis-a-vis Provisional Algerian Govt (PAG) and himself, keeping in mind that his differences with PAG are purely internal Algerian matters, revolving around a minority (PAG) attempt to seize power from the majority (Ben Bella) (Army of Liberation).
2. Should U.S. not maintain complete neutrality, Ben Bella can guarantee nothing. Ben Bella expressed himself as particularly wary of an overt United States neutrality which did a behind-the-scenes support for PAG. Ben Bella would regard economic aid to PAG as indicating lack of neutrality, and military aid even more so.
3. Ben Bella said he similarly expects complete neutrality of Moroccan Govt (GOM). He is displeased by early GOM appointment of Mohamed Aouad as Ambassador to PAG.
4. Laghzaoui believes GOM policy vis-a-vis PAG and Ben Bella is, as yet, ill-defined (mal definie). He has advised King Hassan II to follow a neutral course because Morocco may soon find itself with another Congo right at its doors. Laghzaoui thinks King will end up by adopting a neutral policy. Laghzaoui personally thinks Ben Bella will win out in the end.
5. Laghzaoui has invited Ben Bella to lunch 11 July for further talks.
6. Field dissem: Ambassador only. /2/
/2/ On July 10, Bonsal reported to the Department of State that he wished to draw attention to Ben Bella's statements to Laghzaoui, who had been the King's personal representative to Ben Bella during part of his captivity. Bonsal added that he assumed it would be undesirable under current circumstances for the Embassy to have direct contact with Ben Bella. (Telegram 85 from Algiers; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/7 - 1062) On July 17, the Department of State cabled Porter that it favored a ``discreet attempt" by Tron, the Consul at Oran, to establish ``informal contact" with Ben Bella. (Telegram 100 to Algiers; ibid., 611.51S/7 - 1662) On July 18, Porter reported that Tron had called on Ben Bella at Tlemcen and that the visit had gone off ``extremely well." (Telegram 107 from Algiers, ibid., 611.51S/7 - 1862)
69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 7/16/62 - 7/30/62. Secret. A copy was sent to Dungan.
Washington, August 17, 1962.
SUBJECT
Policy Differences on Algeria
We're marking time in Algeria until after the 2 September election--except for some fairly active relief work and Porter's efforts behind the scenes. The Algerians themselves have asked us to refrain from establishing full diplomatic relations until they launch their new government. /2/ A major development aid program will have to wait until we see extent of Franco - Algerian cooperation and what the Algerians want.
/2/ On August 2, the Provisional Algerian Government headed by Ben Khedda had agreed to surrender its powers to the Political Bureau headed by Ben Bella.
We have mounted a good-sized relief program and a budding rehabilitation effort. Shipped or in the pipeline is about $30 million (CCC costs plus ocean freight) in PL 480 wheat and 11,000 large Army surplus tents. This week AID is signing off on a $11.5 million PL 480 Food - for - Work program to be administered by Church World Service and its French affiliate in a combined reforestation and farm rebuilding program around Constantine. A CARE - MEDICO surgical team has been working successfully for a month, and we will have ten mobile health units in Algiers by mid-September as an Independence Day gift. State plans a $5.3 million refugee resettlement program under the Refuge Act to meet the needs of the next few months until we can launch a formal aid program.
But even this relief activity reveals a sharp difference between State and AID approaches. State has generated almost all of it, although AID has cooperated in some of the staffing arrangements and has two of its refugee and PL 480 experts in Algiers. State believes we have to do some aggressive planning even before the Algerians are ready to launch a major development program. Latter don't fully understand the complexities of development economics, and it will be up to us to provide what positive guidance we can. Hutchinson in AID, on the other hand, has taken a go-slow position on grounds that we don't want to get deeply involved in a long range refugee relief effort, we don't want the French to unload Algeria on us, and we can't do any planning at all until the Algerians come to us with requests.
We have to clear the air on this basic policy question--should we be aggressively forthcoming or sit back and wait? We may have to wait until Algerian air clears to act, but we can't afford to wait much longer to get AID and State on the same track. And we can't wait much longer for the French lead. The Soviets won't.
Hal
70. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1 - 121, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Junkermann.
Washington, August 23, 1962.
Dear Bill: I want to thank you for supplying me with a copy of your memorandum concerning the possibility of providing military assistance to Algeria which you sent to Mr. Rostow. /2/ Advance information of this type is extremely helpful. A review of this subject is both timely and important if we are to take the initiative rather than waiting to react to Soviet efforts.
/2/ Polk's memorandum discussed several potential sources of military equipment for Algeria, noting that the most disadvantageous to the United States would be for the Soviet Bloc to provide military equipment and instruction directly to the Algerians, which would have a profoundly dislocating effect on the U.S. strategic position in Africa. On the other hand, potential damage to French-U.S. relations placed direct provision of U.S. military equipment near the bottom of the scale of desired actions. The best arrangement would be to have France supply such equipment, but current French attitudes made this unlikely. Better from the U.S. point of view would be to have a friendly Muslim country or another European country act as a source of supply. (Ibid.)
If it is decided to form an interagency working group on this or similar African policy problems, it would be useful if ISA could be represented. In this particular case, I would designate Colonel Howard C. Junkermann and Colonel Joe Whitfield to represent my office.
I have several comments concerning the memorandum which you may find helpful in your deliberations.
I question the concept of any alternative which envisions the probable use of an Arab country acting as an agent for the Soviet Bloc to furnish aid to Algeria. Further, the furnishing of U.S. equipment through a friendly power such as Pakistan would be such a thin subterfuge as to be practically worthless. For example, we were accused of being a party with the French in the Algerian rebellion because the French used U.S. manufactured equipment. The idea of incorporating other friendly powers such as Sweden, U.K., Italy, Japan, etc., which have an industrial base capable of supporting either partially or in toto the required armaments for training, has considerable merit. However, in such cases, it would be appropriate for the U.S to be disassociated with the effort. Of course, France is the logical choice to furnish such assistance but she may be unwilling to meet the needs in a forthright fashion.
Accordingly, I believe that the time has come, if we are unsuccessful after exploring the problem with friendly industrial nations, for the U.S. to speak firmly and clearly to the French about the matter, indicating we are prepared to offer Algeria military assistance if they do not. In this case it would be better for the U.S. to act directly than through a third party.
Sincerely yours,
Frank K. Sloan /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates that Sloan signed the original.
71. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 9/1/62 - 10/15/62. Secret. A handwritten covering note from Komer to Bundy reads: ``This is long, but State briefing book is lousy so I summed up their 30pp. in my three. I also wanted to clue JFK on State/AID hassle over aid to Algeria. Only he can decide it, in last analysis, and now is best time to educate him." Department of State briefing material for Ben Bella's visit in October 1962 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2176.
Washington, October 13, 1962.
While the chief purpose in receiving Ben Bella /2/ is to get acquainted and to offset any misapprehensions he may have about ``neo-colonialist" U.S. policies, we also have a chance to: (1) lay the groundwork for U.S. influence on him; (2) underline the importance of close cooperation with France.
/2/ The National Assembly of Algeria, which was elected on September 20, designated Ben Bella as Prime Minister of Algeria on September 26. On September 29, the Assembly approved his list of cabinet officers and the United States formally recognized the ``newly established Government of the Republic of Algeria." For texts of the statement issued by the Department of State and messages from the Secretary and President to Ben Bella and Foreign Minister Khemisti, see Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1962, p. 560. The Embassy in Algiers was established on September 29 with Porter as Charge d'Affaires ad interim. On October 4, the President formally invited the new Prime Minister to visit the White House when he came to the United States for the admission of Algeria to the United States. (Letter from Kennedy to Ben Bella, October 4; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Algeria)
This 46 year old comes with great personal respect for you, dating from your 1957 Senate speech (you could give him a copy of Strategy for Peace). He still clings to a lot of naive ideas and thinks in terms of a melange of revolutionary cliches from Marx, Mao, Nasser and Che Guevara. Basically, however, he's much more pragmatic than doctrinaire.
Therefore, it should be possible to impress him with our general support of self-determination and social change, our respect for honest non-alignment, and even of our legitimate concern over the Communist threat to new nations (Sekou Toure's experience is relevant here). He understands why we couldn't back his rebellion; indeed your 1957 speech gives you credentials to argue that you didn't oppose it.
The best tactic, however, might be to handle him in low key, asking him questions and responding to his sallies. You might want to query him first about his own plans for Algeria. This could lead naturally to an airing of the outlook for the Evian Accords. We emphatically want France to shoulder the main burden in Algeria (the bill will be immense, and we don't have the money--at least this year). But too direct an affirmation of the need for close French - Algerian ties might arouse suspicion. Instead you might ask him what he thinks he can get from the French, how many technicians and teachers he thinks he can woo back, whether he can get Paris to continue the Constantine Plan, etc.
Ben Bella recognizes the need for extensive French help, and that Algeria's natural economic links are with Europe. But as a neutralist he's going to tap other counterbalancing sources, both east and west. While State believes he has no shopping list in his pocket, he undoubtedly wonders how generally forthcoming we're likely to be.
We've given a lot of relief help already--350,000 tons of food since 1956 through voluntary agencies, a medical team and supplies, ten mobile clinics as an independence gift--and have already approved $40 million more in FY 63 food relief (see Tab C). /3/
/3/ None of the tabs is attached to the source text.
Beyond this, however, we have no real aid program for Algeria. In fact State and AID differ sharply on this issue. AID believes we should leave Algeria to France. They fear that aggressively seeking ways to help Ben Bella over his economic hump would make us frontrunner, whereas we want to leave France in the driver's seat. They plan to continue emergency feeding and food-for-work projects through the winter. But they are reluctant to volunteer other aid--even in principle--for fear of arousing Algerian hopes of extensive technical assistance or development lending. They claim they can't round up enough French and Arabic speaking technicians for such a program and don't have loan money.
State agrees that France must shoulder the chief load, but argues for a U.S. program to support Ben Bella indirectly against an army takeover and to influence development planning as it matures. They feel that the Evian Accords might break down, or at least be greatly modified, and that the Bloc will be all too willing to jump in. They would prefer Ben Bella to turn to us for help if he looks anywhere but in Europe. As for AID's argument about shortage of funds, they argue that a country as important as Algeria should be near the top of the list for what funds we do have.
While recognizing how we're strapped, I think State is right. Here we have a chance (albeit a potentially costly one) to buy in on the ground floor in one of the few really important new nations in Africa. Given a $180 million three-year commitment to Tunisia and $40 million yearly to Morocco (plus $12 million MAP for FY 63), it doesn't make sense for AID to program only $2 million (plus food) for Algeria in FY 63. Agreed that we don't want the French to unload Algeria on us. But we need some kind of an independent presence, if only on preclusive grounds. Unless AID settles down to imaginative planning, we'll be in no position to respond quickly to Algerian needs, to identify those sectors where concentrating our resources will best further our interests, or to face the contingency of a breakdown in Franco-Algerian cooperation.
I don't know whether either you or Ben Bella will want to bring up Cuba (he still seems to be going there). /4/ But he's now heard from many sources how sensitive we are on this issue. His entourage in New York says he is going to Cuba to satisfy the leftists at home, perhaps with some vague notion of healing the U.S. - Cuban rift. He professes to believe that Castro is a ``madman." He excluded Communists from the National Assembly, and even Colonel Boumedienne recently said that the ``Communists never sincerely aided the Algerian rebellion."
/4/ On October 6, following instructions from Washington, Porter told Khemisti that the U.S. Government was deeply disturbed by press reports that Ben Bella planned to visit Cuba immediately after being received by President Kennedy in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10 - 662)
On the other hand, many Algerians still seem to look at Castro through rose-colored glasses. So Cuba may provide a good text to get across the risk of Communist capture of indigenous national revolutions (I've attached a CIA summary).
Finally, you might want to congratulate Ben Bella on his formation of a government and dedication to the principles of parliamentary democracy. He's allowed an opposition in the new Assembly; almost a third of it has opposed him on one issue or another. Whether or not Ben Bella reverts to one-party government, he's a better bet than the army (Major Slimane, whom you'll see at luncheon is along as the Army's man). Although our ability to influence the outcome of Ben Bella's struggle to retain power is negligible, we lose nothing by encouraging him along his current moderate course.
We propose an innocuous joint communique after our talk, in order to limit Ben Bella's opportunities to free-wheel with the press (Draft at Tab III-B). You should also skim Scope and Talking Papers and Tab III-D rounding up recent Ben Bella statements on his attitude toward the US, the Evian Accords, socialism, etc. It gives a good feel for the man.
R.W. Komer /5/
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
72. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10 - 2362. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper on October 22, cleared by Little and Bromley Smith, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris.
Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:03 p.m.
659. Following based uncleared memcons: /2/ Summary foreign policy discussions during Ben Bella visit Washington. /3/
/2/ Four separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., 033.51S11/10 - 1562, 637.51S/10 - 1562, 751S.00/10 - 1562, and S/S Files: Lot 66 D 149, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation.
/3/ The President met with Ben Bella for discussion and lunch at the White House on October 15.
President asked Ben Bella explain Algerian non-alignment policy. Prime Minister said Algeria did not believe grouping of non-aligned states useful as it would become only another bloc. Algeria deeply committed certain principles however. It against imperialism, colonialism, racial discrimination, nuclear tests, armaments races and spheres of influence. Algerians attributed own suffering during war to attitudes represented by such actions and policies.
President said there seemed be impression in Algeria that world divided into two blocs and that one led by US favored nuclear tests, colonialism, and imperialism. Since PM was going to Cuba, /4/ it would be useful talk about US policy. US had pursued neutralist and isolationist policy which geography permitted for greater part our history. Since 1945, against their nature, American people compelled become actively interested world affairs in response threat international communism. US wanted world of independent nations each with govt corresponding needs its own people. Communists wanted uniformity tied together and directed by Moscow and Peking. This was danger which forced US assume burden of world defense.
/4/ Ben Bella visited Cuba on October 18.
Re US policy in Western Hemisphere, President cited examples of Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Colombia. All were under liberal leadership and had fought for freedom and progress against regressive factions as well as against communists. All were under attack by Castro regime. If these free liberal govts failed, cause of independence and sovereignty of nations might be defeated in Latin America. US could not accept this. Fact that limited minority in Cuba striving bring it about explains US policy towards Cuba. Problems of illiteracy, poverty, and disease as serious in LA as problems of Algeria. Solution must be found within independence.
As further evidence US opposition to colonialism Pres cited US dispute with Portugal over self-determination for Angola, and US stand for Congo unity, despite difficulties this entailed with friends in Europe. World struggle not between two great power blocs but between those who wish stable world of independent nations and those seeking establish universal empire.
Pres explained that many in US supported Castro at outset because they believed he led national revolution. US Govt cut out military aid to Batista. But Castro betrayed Cuban revolution. Cuban people never had chance express their will but were delivered to communists and appended to Soviet bloc.
Ben Bella said experience of Algeria had to be that of radical and general revolution. International communism, however, was not valid for Algeria. Algerians wanted prevent possible danger of communist takeover. Algeria's ideology and religion contrary to it. It against Marxism and communism but for reduction of international tensions. In going to Cuba, BB said he not wish poison already grave situation, but hoped through positive approach help relax tension. BB said he did not differ with Pres on substance of problems but had some reservations re choice of policy or lines of conduct. He thought there must be adequate measures other than attempting destroy Cuban regime.
Pres replied Cuba had become world problem only since July when Soviets started shipping in arms. Eighty five shiploads of arms delivered since then, and missile bases established. US had no intention of invading Cuba. If it wanted, would have done so years ago. Our concern was over military reinforcements which Soviets have accumulated in Cuba for purpose of harassment.
Ben Bella compared Egyptian experience. Egyptian move to accept Czech arms had been serious mistake. However he felt Nasser forced little by little into intolerable situation in part by unwise moves of US Administration then in power. Now Cuban Govt had taken measures which bad, but it best avoid nailing Castro to communist camp by failing give him any other choice.
Pres said Dorticos had not extended very green olive branch in UN. PM agreed but said fact that Dorticos asking for official promise of non-invasion might indicate area for negotiation. BB said he now understood US position very well and was happy to not [note] no hostile intention.
Pres said if US did not favor invasion of Cuba, it not because of Soviet military build-up. Real reason was we did not want another Budapest. Sole danger was introduction of Soviet missiles. If those missiles included at any time types capable of striking at US territory, situation would change to such extent that US would be forced reconsider its position. The stronger the military build-up, the more the danger. Cuba's best protection was its own people's support. US does not want war against small country.
In talks with Secretary Ben Bella said Algeria had paid high price for entry on international scene and was determined to be constructive. It might make mistakes because it was young and many issues new to it. Because of their practice in international affairs, US and Algeria could face their future relationship with confidence. They might not always agree entirely but could esteem one another.
Rusk
73. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51S/10 - 2562. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.
Washington, October 25, 1962.
SUBJECT
Aid to Algeria
Despite some speculative press reports, there has not been any offer of any large or long-term aid package to Algeria nor did we receive requests for such during the Ben Bella visit or the brief additional meeting with the Algerian representatives in Washington on Tuesday. (The telegram reporting the conversation with Ben Bella and his advisers is attached.) /2/
/2/ Telegram 649 to Algiers reported that during Ben Bella's visit to Washington, the Algerians had taken the occasion to outline economic problems and had stressed the urgency of such problems as relief, housing, jobs, and land for peasants, but that it had been evident that they were not ready yet to go beyond discussion of economic problems and a general exploration of ways the United States could help. The telegram noted that, despite press reports to the contrary, no U.S. commitments had been made nor figures discussed. (Ibid., 611.51S/10 - 1662)
This is to confirm with you our understanding of the ``Stop Order" on Aid to Algeria issued by Mr. Springsteen of your office. We understand from him that this is not intended at this time to apply to emergency PL 480 programs of wheat being distributed in Algeria through American voluntary agencies, nor to the Care - Medico program of assistance to the Ben Massous Hospital in Algiers, nor to similar emergency relief projects. These currently comprise the only aid in effect or contemplated for Algeria.
We believe it would react in a seriously adverse manner on our efforts to secure support for our policy on Cuba, not only in Algeria, but elsewhere in the Afro - Asian world, if it appeared that we were cutting off relief supplies to the Algerian people, presently in desperate straits, because of the stand taken by the Political Bureau and certain Algerian newspapers on Cuba. /3/
Copies of this memorandum have been given to AID, and AID is awaiting your confirmation of this interpretation.
/3/ On October 26, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Algiers that press reports that economic discussions with the Algerians had been broken off indefinitely were not correct and that relief shipments were continuing. The Embassy was authorized to privately inform the Algerian Government that if it wished additional aid, the U.S. Government was prepared to listen subject to the normal requirements relating to the provision of aid. (Telegram 683 to Algiers; ibid., 611.51S/10 - 2562)
74. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 215. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: ``The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 7 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NIE 62 - 2 - 62 Washington, November 7, 1962.
THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN ALGERIA
Summary and Conclusions
A. Seven years of rebellion and terror have left the Algerians weary, uncertain, and divided. Moreover, the established bases of the society and the economy have been altered; two-thirds of the Europeans have left the country, and 50 percent or more of the labor force is jobless. To a great extent the modern sector of the economy is in a state of collapse. Many enterprises have been abandoned by their owners, and the arteries of commerce and communication have broken down at many critical points. (Paras. 1, 4, 18 - 19)
B. The current period is one of relative political calm. Ben Bella has seized control, and for the moment at least has the support of the largest and best disciplined military force in the country. He is trying, during the present respite in political activities, to consolidate his political position, to improve his popular image, to impose his authority over the Armed Forces, and to revive the economy. (Paras 8 - 9, 15 - 16)
C. Ben Bella, who calls himself both an "Arab Socialist" and a Marxist, appears at the present time to be much closer to Nasser in policy and doctrine than to the Communists. This judgment, however, is based upon his words and actions to date on both national and international matters; there is as yet not enough hard evidence on the new regime to permit us to assess with any degree of finality Ben Bella's basic philosophic leanings; he may indeed prove to be far more radical than he now appears. At the present time Ben Bella does not appear to be vindictive toward France, and he does not now plan major economic changes likely to affront major French interests. The Ben Kheddists, who oppose him, and Colonel Boumedienne, who now supports him, appear to be more radical than Ben Bella. (Paras. 9, 12 - 13)
D. Little has yet been accomplished in economic revival, and the chances are poor that much will be accomplished in the next few months. Thus, the population in the cities, now dependent upon foreign charity, may become increasingly frustrated, and living standards in the rural areas, already barely sufficient to sustain life, may be further driven down. (Paras. 18 - 23)
E. While Ben Bella's immediate prospects for holding power are fairly good, we believe that within a year he will be confronted with severe political challenges. The intractible nature of Algeria's economic problems, the somewhat chaotic conditions which will persist, and latent hostility to his rule in important sectors of the society, all will tend to undermine Ben Bella's position. Any one of a number of oppositionist leaders might seek to exploit the dissatisfactions of the jobless, and there is always danger of unrest in the countryside. B en Bella must also somehow establish his authority over the radical Defense Minister, Colonel Boumedienne, and a showdown between the two seems likley to occur sooner or later. If Boumedienne became tired of political infighting, if there were growing insecurity in the cities and subversion in the countryside, or if there were irresolution and confusion in the government, Boumedienne might simply step in and establish a military dictatorship. (Paras. 24 - 28)
F. We do not believe Algeria's announced policy of nonalignment will be followed with purity and consistency. Already the Algerians have sided with Cuba against the US. But at the same time they are bound to France by a host of cultural and economic ties. The present leaders will probably not deliberately move toward the Soviet Bloc, but they probably will, more often than the US or France would like, support Communist initiatives on a variey of international issues. They will almost certainly accept military and economic assistance from the Bloc. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility that Ben Bella himself may adopt a more radical international stance in response to internal pressues or external blandishments. If a more radical leader--such as Boumedienne--succeeded Ben Bella, Communist influence and ideology in both domestic and foreign policy would probably significantly increase. (Paras 29, 31, 34 - 36)
[Here follows the Discussion section.]
75. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Witman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11 - 762. Confidential. Drafted by Gonzalez.
Washington, November 7, 1962.
SUBJECT
Your Appointment with Ambassador Achilles and Mr. Kraft
Attached are two memoranda on Algeria prepared by Ambassador Achilles, who headed the U.S. Delegation to the Algerian Independence Day ceremonies, and by Mr. Joseph Kraft, a member of the Delegation. /2/
/2/ Attached to the source text but not printed. The Algerian independence celebration was held October 31 - November 1. A note dated November 17 to McGhee from a member of his staff indicated that S/S wanted to remind the Under Secretary of the interest the White House had exhibited in downplaying U.S. representation in Algeria and noted that the choice of Ambassador Achilles as the head of the delegation to the Algerian Independence Day ceremonies had reflected the President's annoyance with Ben Bella's statements about Cuba. The note was attached to a memorandum from Williams to Secretary Rusk, which discussed the possibility of a visit by Williams to Algeria as part of a trip to Europe and North Africa later that month. (Ibid., 110.15 - WI/11 - 1662) The proposed visit to Algeria did not take place.
Ambassador Achilles notes that the political and economic situation in Algeria is bad and will likely deteriorate. He recommends, among other things, that we should show patience and understanding of Algerian aberrations, e.g. Cuba, and not stop our current relief efforts. He further states that the U.S. should encourage France and Algeria to come together since French capital and skills offer the only hope for economic salvation.
Mr. Kraft, on the other hand, remarks that the important political fact in Algeria is the existence of an opposition which because of its maturity and experience would likely adopt more reasonable foreign and domestic programs, if it came to power. Kraft characterizes the Ben Bella regime as being made up of persons who either spent most of the war in prison or were largely symbolic figure heads. They are following chauvinistic policies and playing East against West. Like Achilles, Kraft sees a key role for France and recommends that if France decides to continue support of Ben Bella, we should undertake modest food for work programs on a government-to-government basis. However, if France discontinues its aid, we should follow suit for we cannot alone avert the crisis and we may be weakening the opposition.
76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12 - 662. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers.
Paris, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m.
2386. From Williams. Lengthy review of Algerian situation with Porter indicates that while generally unstable political and economic conditions likely persist for some time, bright spots are appearing, particularly in the political orientation of the government. This probably means that while Algerians likely to remain attached to socialist concepts it does seem that they are now deciding that these ideas must be adjusted to the realities of their economic position. They have learned that the world is not what they thought it to be during years of imprisonment and isolation from Western thought and principle.
At moment, Algerian Government seems be engaged in serious effort define financial, cultural and administrative arrangements with French. /2/ Recognizing that such course undoubtedly unpopular with highly vocal groups such as communists, they are taking action against such groups to minimize criticism and consolidate government position internally. This undoubtedly hampers bloc efforts to take advantage of current confusion to plant apparatus in country.
/2/ Telegram 2387 from Paris, December 6, reported that the Algerians had asked France for 360 billion old francs in aid but had been assured of only a fraction of that amount, probably 60 billion old francs to carry them to the end of the year. The implication had been that further funds would be forthcoming after the French saw how the new Algerian Government carried out certain commitments with respect to French properties in Algeria, especially those of the 600 French farmers still on their land. (Ibid., 651.51S/12 - 662)
Algerian Government attitude toward United States immediately after Ben Bella visit Cuba was mixture of resentment and bewilderment. This was followed by appreciation of fact that population as whole was very disinterested in Cuba and Castro, and unable comprehend government interest in that situation with so many problems at home. Fact that first question addressed to government in foreign affairs debate indicated concern at possible damage to American - Algerian relations had its own special import, and evoked further conciliatory declarations from government and Ben Bella himself. Porter believes this trend will continue for time being at least, and longer it does more difficult it will be to reverse. Certainly, Algerians will be extremely careful about getting caught in gears of international politics again.
In general, I would say that US posture appears well adapted to present situation. We should continue our food shipments to assist Algerians get through hard winter ahead, support for medical program and further student grants. As picture of French-Algerian relations becomes clear, we can examine sympathetically how best to develop supplementary role which will probably be required. We are not past all shoals in Algeria by any means as Algerian-French relationships mentioned are now in process evolution. If reasonable success crowns current efforts in latter sense, we can assume Algerian sentiment, which at its best is strongly nationalist, will prove to be substantial barrier to communist designs. With regard to effect of Algerians on Africa we may expect that they will be so preoccupied with their own problems for foreseeable future that their influence and effort, beneficial or otherwise, will be rather limited. I am assured Embassy Algiers will remain alert to any need to adapt our posture and programs to new developments in this still highly fluid situation.
Bohlen
77. National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Washington, December 14, 1962.
MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Director, Peace Corps
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward Algeria
In view of the Algerian Government's renewed interest in discussing US aid, the President hopes that we are mapping our next steps in this important country. He recognizes that we may want to let the Algerians come to us, and that we clearly want the French to carry the major aid responsibility, with us in a supplementary role.
Unless we do some forward planning now, however, we may not be in a position to respond with sufficient dispatch to serve our political interests. We also want to maintain the momentum of our successful emergency program, and to do what we reasonably can to encourage a good Algerian relationship with the West.
Therefore, the President requests that the Department of State, in cooperation with other interested agencies, draw up a tentative strategy and plan of action for the period of transition from our present emergency relief program toward what we hope will be primary Algerian focus on sensible development. It should include further steps to insure that our program complements French aid wherever possible, together with a review of what diplomatic, civic action, information, Peace Corps, MAP, covert action, and other measures might be desirable. He desires a report before the end of January.
McGeorge Bundy
78. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 10/16/62 - 12/31/62. Secret.
Washington, December 28, 1962.
Here is the interim report on Algeria you requested. Your NSAM has already helped to clear the air. The town now understands that you don't want to rely exclusively on French leadership, that you want more than a token US ``presence", and that you haven't blackballed Ben Bella for his naivete about Castro. Williams launched a working group last week with strong words about Algeria's importance and your interest in it. /2/
/2/ On December 20, an interagency meeting with representatives from the White House; the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Labor; the Bureau of the Budget; the CIA; AID; USIA; and the Peace Corps met at the Department of State to consider NSAM No. 211. A summary record of the meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1 - 121, 1962.
Our emergency food program now totals about $65 million and will hit $80 million by April. About 35% of the population depend completely on it over the winter, but we will cut back sharply when the spring harvest matures. More will go into food-for-work projects. One reforestation job is supplying intermittent employment for 15,000 workers for 20 months, plus food for their families; Ben Bella wants ten more such projects. AID will support through June a $550,000 CARE - Medico staffing of a hospital near Algiers. We've also sent surplus tents and 10 mobile health units ($181,000), contributed $100,000 to the Algerian Red Crescent, begun US training for several administrators, and brought 53 students to US universities.
The Algerians are now acting more soberly as they face up to recovery problems. Ben Bella is trying to get on a better footing with the French, seeking loans from Arab oil producers, and asking us to begin aid talks. While all agree that we must leave the major aid burden in Paris, specific US proposals may spur the French to move faster. Porter also feels that a few specific offers will forestall wild requests. So we're considering four pilot rural rehabilitation projects to employ 60,000 workers (supplying the subsistence for an added 300,000 dependents) at a cost of about $15 million, $11 millon of it in food.
We're also looking cautiously at some military aid, largely to give us leverage with the army. Although the French consider this their province, Algeria is reportedly sensitive about seeking substantial military help in Paris. Ben Bella's made some noises about civic action to put demobilized soldiers to work.
Ben Bella is looking to Nasser for military training, as well as economic help. As for Bloc aid, it has been limited to a few spot gifts and some Bulgarian doctors. So far, Ben Bella seems to have convinced his colleagues to look west. We will have a tentative action program shortly.
R.W. Komer
79. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963. Secret.
JCSM - 6 - 63 Washington, January 3, 1963.
SUBJECT
US Policy Toward Algeria
1. Reference is made to:
a. A memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I - 22413/62, dated 22 December 1962, subject as above. /2/
/2/ The December 22 memorandum from Bundy informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Presidential directive in NSAM No. 211, and asked that the Joint Chiefs review their recommendations of January 8, 1962 (Document 57), regarding possible U.S. military assistance to Algeria in light of the current situation and desired future U.S. relations with Algeria. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963)
b. National Security Action Memorandum, Number 211, subject as above.
c. JCSM - 10 - 62, dated 8 January 1962, subject: ``Military Assistance for Post-Independence Algeria."
2. The development of a specific military assistance program, supporting reference 1 b above, is contingent upon French intentions in Algeria with respect to continued economic assistance, French willingness for the United States to play a supplementary role, and upon Algerian desires and needs for a US program. Any US military assistance program for Algeria must be designed so as to satisfy not only the Algerian Government but, at the same time, not impair our relations with France.
3. Concurrently, any US military aid program for Algeria must be examined for its effect on our relations with Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. In the latter two countries, the continued use of our military bases remains important. Libya, Tunisia, and, in particular, Morocco would view a significant rise in Algeria's military capabilities as a threat to their border claims in the Sahara as well as an effort on the part of Algerian leaders to gain a dominant role in the North African area. Any actions by the United States to strengthen the offensive power of the Algerian armed forces with prestige items such as tanks and jet aircraft would adversely affect relations with these countries and thus indirectly jeopardize our bases. While a US military assistance program for Algeria could serve to lessen Bloc influence to some extent, it can be expected that the Algerian Government will seek military assistance from the Bloc, and the Bloc will be responsive to these requests.
4. Even though the lack of information and the political realities in North Africa are limiting factors in the development of Algerian programs, the US military may still be able to play an important role in assisting Algeria in reconstruction and economic development. This can be done by developing and organizing the Armed Forces primarily along the lines of an internal security force as opposed to a force whose offensive strength could serve as a threat to Algeria's neighbors. The present Armed Forces of Algeria (about 100,000) are beyond the needs of Algeria and aggravate the situation by imposing a financial burden. The present Government has indicated that it plans an Armed Force of 25,000 - 35,000; however, precise information regarding the make-up of this force is not known. One of the principal problems facing the Algerian Government is to find a way to reduce the size of the armed forces without losing their support. A program to ensure jobs for the released military personnel would serve to lessen the impact on the already staggering unemployment problem. Properly employed, the Algerian Armed Forces could become an effective, constructive force to assist in rebuilding Algeria, in developing the Algerian economy, and in providing an important stabilizing influence.
5. In the light of the above, the following are some potential courses of action which DOD, in conjunction with other US agencies, could pursue in converting the Algerian Armed Forces to a more constructive role and adapting it to the legitimate needs of Algeria.
a. Provide vocational training for those military men who are to be released from duty. The training should be in skills which can be utilized in the economy after release and should be conducted, where possible, in concert with civic action programs designed for reconstruction and economic development.
b. Assist in programs which will reduce the armed forces and streamline them for an internal security mission only. This would require, primarily, assistance in reorganizations for the mission and attendant training.
c. Assist in the development of civic action programs in support of economic development designed to win the support of the people.
6. In order to develop plans for assisting the Algerians, it is recommended that:
a. The Department of State advise France that the United States is willing to cooperate with France in providing limited economic and military assistance to Algeria as a supplement to French efforts.
b. Subsequent to the Department of State action above, USCINCEUR be invited to participate in any US negotiations with the French to determine the status of the French programs for Algeria, particularly in regard to military assistance and French desires for US support.
c. Following the above two steps, and if still appropriate, the Algerian Government should be informed that the United States is willing to assist and is prepared to send a survey team to determine the nature and scope of the assistance which the United States could provide.
7. After the above courses of action have been taken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be in a position to make further recommendations.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, February 1, 1963.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM 221. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
81. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM - 21. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 14-page ``Discussion of the Strategy and Action Plan for Algeria."
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Plan of Action for Algeria
Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 of December 14, 1962, the Department of State has coordinated the efforts of the recipients of NSAM No. 211, as well as several other agencies having interest in programs for Algeria, and now submits a Plan of Action for Algeria. Our Ambassador to Algeria, William J. Porter, also participated in the final deliberations. The Action Plan has been concurred in by all of the participating agencies.
Actions projected for the next seventeen months are predicated on the assumption that France and Algeria will by and large be successful in working out their new relationship as independent nations, and that France will continue to carry the major aid responsibility. U.S. strategy is to continue to encourage this trend through advance coordination with the French of planned U.S. actions in Algeria and encouragement of the Algerian Government to take a moderate course in balancing nationalist goals against the immediate necessity of constructive Franco-Algerian cooperation.
Basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to prevent significant communist bloc influence, (2) to promote U.S. influence, and Free World influence consonant with U.S. interests, and (3) to contribute to Algerian political stability, economic recovery, and progress toward sound development.
In order more effectively to pursue these objectives and to maintain and improve the reasonably good U.S. - Algerian relationship that has developed over the past year, it is recommended that the United States take the following actions in FY 63 and FY 64:
First, proceed with diplomatic efforts, which have already made considerable headway, to explain our foreign policies to the Algerian Government and to extend and strengthen contacts with influential elements in and out of Government;
Second, continue the emergency feeding program until the Algerian summer harvest and phase it out as soon as possible thereafter;
Third, proceed with U.S. - Algerian planning and implementation of a rural rehabilitation program which will require PL 480 food as partial wages, between $2 and $4 million for tools, equipment, and other commodities, and some U.S. technical assistance including planning experts and operational or middle-level manpower;
Fourth, explore with the Algerian Government other means of converting food-relief to food-work programs including extension of the reforestation program to other areas;
Fifth, continue AID support for the highly successful CARE - Medico teams of U.S. doctors and nurses at Algiers until ways and means can be found to convert this program to one supported by private U.S. resources without loss of impact;
Sixth, explore various possibilities for an AID-sponsored impact program in the field of public health designed to help alleviate emergency-type health problems and to train Algerians in the use of mobile health clinics;
Seventh, provide selected Algerians with training in the United States in technical and industrial skills through an accelerated AID participants program and encouragement of leading U.S. industries to provide some on-the-job training;
Eighth, at a time to be recommended by the U.S. Ambassador at Algiers, send AID development loan experts to Algeria to review a series of development loan projects which the Algerian Government has proposed, with the purpose of being prepared to act upon a selected number as soon as possible in FY 64 within the framework of U.S. appropriations and, of a limited U.S. role in the Algerian development effort;
Ninth, Embassy Algiers is to consider and make recommendations concerning other fields where U.S. technical assistance is needed and would be effective;
Tenth, take appropriate action to promote U.S. private investment in Algerian development as soon as current negotiations to clarify Algerian policy in this field have been concluded;
Eleventh, continue all successful Algerian students currently enrolled in U.S. colleges under U.S. Government-sponsored scholarships, award new exchange scholarships in FY 64 in a number at least equivalent to those granted this year, and continue to encourage activity of private foundations and organizations in this field;
Twelfth, proceed with planned build-up of USIA programs and activities in Algiers, Constantine, Oran, and the countryside, endowing them wherever possible with a public service cast related to Algerian aspirations for economic and social development;
Thirteenth, promote U.S. - Algerian trade and general relations through planned future participation in Algerian international fairs, through a USIA - Commerce sponsored U.S. National Exhibition, and through various Department of Commerce media and meetings;
Fourteenth, limit action on military assistance to such planning primarily oriented toward civic action, reduction of armed forces, and internal security as may be necessary to meet the contingencies of (1) a GOA request for aid unavailable to them elsewhere in the West or (2) indications that the GOA may seek significant new assistance from the Communist bloc under circumstances which may make desirable US initiative in offering a MAP program;
Fifteenth, seek further information on the probable nature of French aid and Algerian economic planning, undertake a longer-term assessment of the Algerian economy as soon as possible, and take appropriate steps to encourage other Free World nations and international organizations to assist Algerian recovery and development.
Apart from the inter-agency Action Plan, it is recommended that further consideration be given here in Washington to the possibility of a positive and timely response to Prime Minister Ben Bella's recent request for Peace Corps assistance. It is felt that a Peace Corps contribution to Algeria in the near future would be very valuable.
The trend in policies and actions of the Ben Bella Government has been pragmatic and promising in terms of basic U.S. objectives. We must, however, remain alert to such contingencies as a rupture in the politico-military alliance which underpins current Algerian stability, or serious disagreement between Algeria and France leading to sharp reduction or retardation of French aid. In any event, constant re-assessment of the adequacy of U.S. actions projected in this plan will be required because of the transitional and quickly changing stage which Algeria will be going through in the period which this Action Plan embraces.
Dean Rusk /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
82. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Secret.
Washington, February 4, 1963.
Here is the Algeria action program /2/ you asked for in NSAM 211. I suggest you discuss it with Ambassador Porter when he sees you 12:15 Tuesday.
/2/ Document 81.
Things seem to be breaking our way in Algeria. Ben Bella has settled down, patched up his relations with the French and begun focusing on his acute domestic problems. He's been pressing us for more aid, and I think your intervention has produced a reasonably good response.
This year we'll (1) launch four pilot rural rehabilitation projects; (2) expand the food-for-work reforestation program; (3) mount an immunization and public health training effort; (4) continue college scholarships, participant training and CARE - Medico teams; and (5) go ahead until the mid-summer harvest with the sizable emergency feeding program begun last summer. Cost will be about $2 million in FY 63 for equipment and technicians, plus at least $80 million in food.
In FY 1964 we'll continue with perhaps $75 million in PL - 480 and up to $15 million in DL and TA funds. Rusk bought Bell's recommendation that France should handle anything above that level; Bell is also concerned about shortage of funds.
I suggest that we may end up wanting to go higher than $15 million for political reasons. While the French apparently do intend to carry Algeria (for at least $200 million annually), we want enough of a presence to reflect the fact that Algeria is the key to the Maghreb and one of the top new nations in Africa. Moreover, Ben Bella et al have already asked about several projects worth $10 - 15 million each that tie into our emphasis on rural rehabilitation. But we needn't decide this issue yet.
Peace Corps hesitations create another issue. Ben Bella specifically asked Porter for PC help, and State thinks such a program ``very valuable." But the PC is overextended in Africa, and is sensitive on the general question of relating Peace Corps to other AID - State planning.
I suggest you put out attached NSAM, /3/ which generally accepts the State program, but leaves the door open for going a bit higher on aid if it seems desirable and gives the Peace Corps a gentle nudge.
/3/ Document 83.
R.W. Komer
83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 221 /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM - 21. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Washington, February 20, 1963.
MEMORANDUM TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Peace Corps
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward Algeria
I generally approve the Plan of Action for Algeria in the Secretary of State's memorandum to me of 2 February 1963, responding to NSAM 211. /2/
/2/ Document 81.
All concerned should bear in mind the need for a program commensurate with our policy interests in this key North African country. While we want France to shoulder the lion's share of the burden, we also want to increase our own influence. For example, I should like to be advised if it should appear highly desirable to exceed somewhat the $15 million FY 1964 AID level currently projected.
Since Prime Minister Ben Bella has requested assistance from the Peace Corps and the Algerians need just the sort of help the Peace Corps is peculiarly suited to give, I hope it will be able to respond if other commitments permit.
John F. Kennedy
84. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63 - 9/63. Confidential. A marginal handwritten notation reads: ``(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 7/19/63--Tab 6)".
Washington, July 15, 1963.
We had little chance to stave off Guevara's Algerian visit; we learned of it only two days before he arrived. We don't even know whether Guevara invited himself or whether the Algerians asked for higher-ranking delegations from Cuba and the UAR than from other countries. /2/ The press gave him prominent but not excessive treatment and is playing his current trip around Algeria in moderate to low key. Porter says Algerians paid more attention to UAR Vice President Amer.
/2/ Che Guevara had been the Cuban delegate to the Independence Day celebrations in Algiers. On July 15, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Ball noting that members of the U.S. Delegation to that event had expressed concern at the attention paid to Guevara and the lack of attention given to U.S. aid efforts in Algeria. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 - 4 ALG)
Reasons behind Cuba/Algeria tie are baffling, but we think Ben Bella sees it as a sop to extremists who oppose continued close association with France. Recent financial deal with France, while quite successful economically, was not politically spectacular. Ben Bella hasn't pressed Paris further on Saharan nuclear testing. His economic difficulties may have made him more cautious about nationalization. So he may feel playing up to foreign revolutionaries in Cuba and Angola is one of his few appeals to his own left.
In any case, we have no realistic alternative but to live with Cuba/Algeria affair till it peters out, meanwhile helping this along by educating Algerians on how little they gain and how much it might cost. We've been doing so every chance we have, pressing the line both here and in Algiers that things like Guevara visit don't help Algeria win friends in our Congress and public. Salinger and I both chided new Algerian Ambassador on Guevara visit.
Guellal says Ben Bella recognizes that Cuba has become a Soviet satellite, but that he hopes to move Castro away from Khrushchev. Ben Bella claims this is not incompatible with good US relations; we'll have to keep working on him that it is. I'm confident that over time Algerians will increasingly realize Cuban tie is worthless, if we can just sit it out till then.
Bob Komer
85. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Witman and approved by the White House on August 7. The conversation was held at the White House. Earlier on July 24, Komer sent a briefing memorandum to the President suggesting that he take the time for some serious talk with the new Algerian Ambassador, who was one of Ben Bella's closest confidants. Komer proposed that the President focus on the need for Algeria to put its economy, which was in near chaos, in order before anyone else could do much to help, and on U.S. problems with Castro and how Algeria's relations with Cuba raised difficulties for nations that wanted to help Algeria. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 6/63 - 9/63)
Washington, July 24, 1963, 4:15 p.m.
SUBJECT
Presentation of Credentials
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Algerian Ambassador
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. William J. Tonesk, Acting Chief of Protocol
Mr. Robert Komer, White House Staff
Mr. William Witman, II, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs
The First Algerian Ambassador to the United States, Cherif Guellal, presented his credentials to President Kennedy during the course of a thirty minute interview.
After recalling meeting Ambassador Guellal at the time of Prime Minister Ben Bella's visit last year, the President expressed his sympathy for the death of Foreign Minister Khemisti and enquired whether the motive for his assassination had been established. Ambassador Guellal replied that the motive was unclear, but probably personal, the act of a deranged mind.
The Ambassador mentioned the devastation which Algeria had suffered in eight years of war, and the enormous problems created by the lack of trained personnel. In response to the President's question, he said that the Algerian Government sought to encourage the French to stay on to help, especially in the fields of education, administration, finance and communications.
President Kennedy expressed his concern at the dislocation caused by the departure of these skilled personnel. He said we were very interested in Algeria's success in managing her economic problems. We had assisted through food. He hoped that the situation could now be stabilized, the French encouraged to return, and some private capital brought in to get the economy working. If the economy were restored to a vigorous phase, other problems would be less important.
Mr. Guellal agreed that Algeria's problems were basically economic. The President said he thought it was important to provide a stimulus for French assistance. The Ambassador insisted that Algeria encouraged foreign investments, and especially hoped to enlist the interest of American companies. After enquiring about the Algerian investment code, the President remarked that while we were not seeking to place American capital investments abroad because of our balance of payments problem, it was very important for us that Algeria succeed, and we would do what we could to help. The French, he thought, had the primary obligation. But we were concerned for Algeria's economy--if that broke down, everything dissolved.
The President then referred to the recent Independence ceremonies at Algiers, and observed that Senator Mansfield had been impressed with the welcome given to the Cuban delegate, Che Guevara. He recalled that he had discussed Cuba with Ben Bella and understood the Algerian feeling that Cuba had supported Algeria during the months and years of the war. However, Algeria should understand sour American feelings at the extent of the welcome to Guevara, beyond that accorded anybody else.
Ambassador Guellal replied that he understood American feelings. It was very difficult, he said, to explain the overall situation, a very emotional adjustment. But the Algerian Government was gaining a greater realization of the situation in Cuba now that it had a Charge there.
The President said he appreciated Algerian identification with the successful Cuban guerrilla activities, but remarked that the action against Batista was not a serious war, with perhaps 100 killed. It was a political effort, while the Algerian was a bloody affair. Cuba was a pretty hard boiled Communist state, in a satellite relationship to the USSR, being used to communize Latin America.
Mr. Guellal responded that they had stressed these points with the Cubans, they realized the Cubans were completely aligned, and suggested that their own relationship with France might serve as a possible formula for US - Cuban relations. He repeated that his Government knew how far Cuba was aligned with the Soviets, and now understood better the issues for the United States. As for US - Algerian relations, Mr. Guellal assured the President that there could be no doubt of Algeria's friendship. Algeria needed America's help in restoring her economy and greatly appreciated the food which had been sent.
At this point, the formal letters were exchanged. The President remarked on reading the Algerian message that he greatly appreciated the reference to his Senate speech. He asked the Ambassador to present his best regards to President Ben Bella.
Ambassador Guellal conveyed in return his President's personal regards to President Kennedy. He added that if Ben Bella should come to the UN in September, he hoped there might be an opportunity to call on the President. The President replied that he would look forward to seeing President Ben Bella if he came. Ambassador Guellal hastened to add that of course Ben Bella would not go to Cuba this time.
In conclusion Mr. Guellal observed that Algeria had passed through a year of difficulties but was now on the way to recovery. The President expressed his pleasure at having an Algerian Ambassador in Washington.
86. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Porter and approved by the White House on September 23. The conversation was held at the White House.
Washington, September 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m.
SUBJECT
Algerian Developments
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary
Ambassador William J. Porter
Mr. Robert Komer, White House Staff
The President asked about the significance of Ben Bella's cabinet reshuffle. Mr. Porter said it appeared that the Algerian President is gathering around him people whom he considers to be completely loyal to him personally.
The President then inquired concerning Ben Bella's personal philosophy.
Ambassador Porter said Ben Bella considers himself to be a foremost African revolutionary figure, and that much of what he says in public is said with that in mind. He added that Mr. Ben Bella is a zealot who makes every move with great vigor. His take-over of 12,000 French farms last spring without giving much thought as to whether markets in France could be preserved or what kind of administrative system would replace the French farmers, was a case in point. Mr. Ben Bella feels convinced of the need to do such things swiftly rather than negotiate about them. He states that swift action is necessary in the interest of his people. The Ambassador expressed the belief that there would be more drastic moves of an economic nature, and the principal question now is whether the French will find the fortitude to live with the difficulties Ben Bella will create for them in this and other fields.
The President then inquired concerning current French aid to Algeria and Governor Williams and Ambassador Porter outlined the importance of the French to Ben Bella both in terms of aid and trade as well. Governor Williams asked the Ambassador to comment on the significance of the recent Russian credit of $100 million. Mr. Porter said that the details of this credit have apparently not yet been negotiated, adding that the figure seemed to have been published, as in previous cases, for its propaganda impact. In any case Mr Porter said, if the total sum were available to the Algerian Government today it would hardly meet the Algerian administrative budget deficit over a period of four months.
The President then inquired concerning Ambassador Guellal; whether he enjoys a close relation with Ben Bella. Governor Williams and Mr. Porter expressed the belief that this is the case. The President asked Governor Williams if Guellal is getting the proper attention in Washington. Mr. Komer and Governor Williams assured him that the Ambassador received considerable attention here. Mr. Porter said that he had the impression from talking to Ambassador Guellal that the latter is worried about acts and attitudes of his government, and that when Mr. Porter expressed the fact that reports indicate Castro may be in Algiers about November 1, Ambassador Guellal did not deny this.
The President said we should do what we can to prevent Castro from visiting other countries and he inquired what could be done to hamper such a visit. Ambassador Porter said if French and Arab (especially Egyptian) cooperation could be obtained that something could be done to diminish the propaganda impact of such a visit. The President inquired whether cutting off aid should be considered in this connection. Mr. Porter and Mr. Komer expressed the belief that this would not produce desired results.
Mr. Komer recalled that the President had indicated a willingness to see Ben Bella if the latter comes to the United States. The President said that he does not think this would be a good idea if a week later Castro showed up in Algiers. Something might be arranged if Ben Bella came to the United States some time after such a visit by Castro to Algiers. Governor Williams suggested that the difficulties for us in this connection should be made clear to Ambassador Guellal. /2/
/2/ On September 23, during a luncheon meeting with Guellal, Williams emphasized that the prospect of another encounter between Ben Bella and Castro would have an adverse effect on the timing of a meeting between President Kennedy and Ben Bella. The Ambassador said that he had already stressed the sensitive nature of this matter to Ben Bella, who had assured him that he had no desire to embarrass the President. Guellal added that he would make these points to Ben Bella if he came to the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL ALG - CUBA)
87. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria. Secret. The source text indicates two attachments: A memorandum from Read to Bundy, October 14, which discussed the revolt in the Kabylia region of Algeria, which had begun on September 29, and the Algerian - Moroccan border conflict, which had escalated since the first serious armed clash on October 8 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 ALG); and telegram 734 from Algiers, which advised against sending a high-level U.S. delegation to the Algerian ceremonies planned for November 1, the anniversary of the outbreak of Algeria's revolution in 1954, which Communist governments intended to attend at the ministerial level (Ibid., POL 17 - 4 ALG).
Washington, October 14, 1963.
McGB:
Trouble ahead with Algeria. We are now seeing a major Soviet and Chicom effort to woo Ben Bella regime. First step was Soviet $100 billion [million?] three-year credit. Now we have reports USSR may give Algeria 12 MTBs, 3 sub-chasers, and some MIGs; this may be a result of Boumedienne's recent Moscow visit. 450 Algerians are getting military training in the Bloc. Chicoms have entered the competition with $50 million credit at no interest.
At this very time, our relations with Ben Bella have been cooling noticeably. BB's nationalizations (especially of three papers) led to a spate of press criticism here (Newsweek was worst--BB another Castro). Algerians reacted violently; they even protested that campaign seemed inspired. Then US press overplaying of Kabylia ``revolt" led to expulsion of several newsmen. This will give BB an even worse press here, just when Moscow and Peiping are moving in.
If Ben Bella were in real trouble [1 line of source text not declassified] I'd be less worried. But we and French both think BB is in the saddle for quite a while. So holding off in hopes of some new faces leaves me cold. /2/
/2/ A handwritten note in the margin by Komer at this point reads: ``State reached same conclusion. See attached. RWK."
Another complication is that the French, who have been carrying the chief aid burden in Algeria ($200 million this year), might draw back if BB reacts violently to their next A-test or puts squeeze on their oil. If so, BB will no doubt lean even further east.
Thus I see a potentially quite adverse trend in our Algerian affairs, especially painful since we gained quite some capital by our responsive attitude during formative stages of Ben Bella regime. I have no panaceas to suggest; I question whether we could or should enter a major competition with the East. But I don't see our present effort as enough either, however. We gave $77 million in food FY'63 and are planning about the same this year (plus $2 million or so for students and Four Areas food-for-work deal). Perhaps $20 million is available for project loans but nobody is pushing this.
If Algeria were Chad or Dahomey, I'd worry less, but it's the key to the Maghreb on the one really important coast of Africa. It's worth a larger investment than at present (compared to over $300 million on Congo or $50 - 55 million on Guinea through FY 64).
More important than aid, however, is to be reasonably sympathetic during BB's Sturm und Drang period, no matter how outrageously he may behave. Like Nasser, he may take what he wants from the Soviets without leaning too far East, if we keep a Western door open too. Here again, the problem is how to stay on good terms with a young, doctrinaire and dubious regime, braving the necessary criticism (from Morocco and Tunisia as well as domestically) while keeping our eyes on the long pull. I'm sure the President feels this way, yet unless he gives a clear signal (e.g. by such gestures as receiving BB, or sending suitable delegation to 1 November celebration), the bureaucracy is going to stay timid. /3/
/3/ On October 17, Komer sent the President a memorandum stating that Guellal had just informed U.S. officials that Ben Bella had definitely cancelled his U.N. trip. Guellal had also said that Ben Bella had ``much appreciated" the word he had received indicating that Kennedy wanted to see him and that he wanted them to understand that the cancellation was caused solely by his problems at home. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria)
R.W. Komer /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
88. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Morocco Security, 1960 - 1963. Secret.
Washington, November 7, 1963.
Yazid is coming in at Ben Bella's personal request to (1) tell you BB is sorry he couldn't come himself, but appreciates our impartiality in Moroccan hassle; (2) complain delicately about US press campaign against Algeria, which they've hinted is officially inspired; (3) express concern lest US business interests in Morocco have influenced our policy.
I know Yazid and think you can be quite direct with him. Indeed a show of some umbrage on last two points would be useful. Algeria has been getting a bad press because of its own actions, including the manner in which it has gone out of its way to befriend Castro. As for very modest US business interests in Morocco influencing our policy, this is nonsense. Nor do US firms have any stake in Tindouf mineral deposits.
The basic message we want to get to Ben Bella is that we want to be on good terms with Algeria. In fact, we've leaned a lot farther in their direction than they have in ours. We also intend to stay strictly out of inter-regional disputes unless they get out of hand and threaten to become East - West issues. So if Algeria gets too heavily in hock to USSR/Cuba/UAR and then moves to overthrow Morocco, this would put us on the spot and almost force us to react. On the other hand we aren't going to back Hassan against Ben Bella, unless BB is egged on by outside powers and massive aid to go after Hassan. And a big competitive arms race between Morocco and Algeria would be a pitiful waste of scarce resources both sides badly need at home.
Don't hesitate to mention our special problem with Cuba (or you'll make me a liar). That Castro is a threat to our security is 100% obvious from the way he let Soviet missiles in. As a practical fact, Algerian partiality toward Cuba is simply going to cool US - Algerian relations. As to Cuba as a model of Socialist development, only a staggering Soviet subsidy keeps the place from falling apart. Castro can't even grow sugar cane (which we're certainly not stopping him from doing).
All in all, as Bill Porter's cable /2/ suggested, you can trade a few salutary punches with Yazid; a shrewd operator and basically pro-US, he'll use them to good effect on Ben Bella.
Bob Komer /3/
/2/ In telegram 982, November 6, Porter advised that if Yazid visited the President alone, the conversation could be extremely frank. He suggested that the President raise the constant hostility toward the United States displayed by Algeria's official press, radio, and television. Porter complained that the United States had fed almost half of Algeria's population during the first hard winter following independence, but that they had had to ``wring" acknowledgement of U.S. aid from Ben Bella, who in his speech on November 1 had mentioned only aid from Communist countries. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ALG)
/3/ Komer's handwritten note at the bottom of the source text reads: ``We've just heard from Paris that Algerian emissary to de Gaulle invited him to visit Algeria. You may get the same. Suggest you also tell Yazid to be cautious with press about your talk." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Morocco Security, 1960 - 1963)
89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Baldwin and Komer, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, Addis Ababa, USUN, and Moscow.
Washington, November 8, 1963, 8:59 p.m.
1009. Following summary of Yazid conversation with President today is uncleared summary, FYI only, Noforn and subject to revision on review of memcon. /2/
/2/ Six separate memoranda of this conversation are ibid., POL ALG - US and POL 32 - 1 ALG - MOR; and ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
1. Yazid message from Ben Bella was expression GOA appreciation for US position Algerian - Moroccan conflict including both neutrality and indication that US favored solution in African framework.
2. In response Yazid statement that anti-Algerian tenor US press had caused concern in early stages, President countered strongly with point that anyone with real knowledge US press could never have drawn conclusion that it reflected official opinion this administration. Our official position had been made clear to GOA and this was what counted. He expressed annoyance over fact that our efforts correct false Christian Science Monitor story were never followed up by commensurate efforts Algeria and Algerian press to set record straight.
3. President then turned vigorously to subject of Cuba. He said he really disturbed by persistent Algerian attacks on United States over Cuba in such statements as those to Le Monde by Ben Bella (Algiers 994) /3/ which he read to Yazid and in treating his friend Senator Mansfield lightly last July while Che Guevara singled out for all honors. He saw no reason for this continued Algerian excitement over Cuba. We would not attack Cuba and less concerned what system it adopted internally. But Cuba had become part of international communist network threatening weaker Latin American states, and with Soviet missiles had presented direct threat to US security. In these respects Castro was our enemy not just a fetish of some Americans. Until gravity of this fully understood, Cuba would continue present real problem US - Algerian understanding. Castro's early revolutionary exploits were impressive and it understandable they had certain appeal to Algerian revolutionaries. But Cuba had lost national identity and integrity and now using dictatorial controls and propaganda to keep up front. President returned repeatedly to Cuban theme and cited quotes from Algiers 994 several times.
/3/ Telegram 994 from Algiers, November 8, reported Ben Bella's statement to Le Monde that it would be a ``cause for despair if Cuban revolution were crushed or smothered because this would signify there is no place in world for justice or liberty." (Ibid., Central Files, POL ALG - US)
4. Yazid said he understood US concern and that Ben Bella and GOA had sought make clear that Algeria neither Marxist nor Communist and believed Cuba wrong in this regard. GOA had sought avoid resorting to arms procurement from Cuba and had done so only because of urgent need more equipment than UAR could readily supply and desire avoid alternative of having to import many Soviet technicians and maintenance crews. Ben Bella determined keep Communism out of Algeria and Africa. He was devout Moslem with political power based on peasantry. Despite difficulties Algeria determined follow own national course and own socialist goals. In relations with Cuba it had sought convince Castro become non-aligned.
5. President said he wished talk frankly on these points for benefit good US - Algerian relations. Our interests North Africa only see progress of countries and maintenance their independence. On this basis good relations possible. But while we sought no praise, we felt greater recognition deserved for fact US had clearly demonstrated its friendship for Algeria. Reciprocal basis for conducting relations and expression of official views one another was most important. Frank talks with Algerian Ambassador always welcome and Ben Bella should not hesitate use him rather than other channels like Tito whenever doubt exists about our policy.
6. Yazid said OAU FonMins meeting should serve to ``freeze situation" and prevent further fighting while solution to basic dispute being sought. GOA still hoped latter could be found in system of joint economic exploitation Tindouf and other border areas. King Hassan probably reluctant be too closely associated Algerian socialist experiment out of anxieties over his own internal problem. Yazid believed ways still could be found establish basis cooperation nonetheless, and convinced both countries better off trying achieve it without big power intervention.
7. President urged importance avoiding continuing arms build-up in Algeria. Morocco would move to match it and regrettable arms race might ensue wasting resources both countries. Expressed interest in knowing just what plans GOA had for military build-up over next twelve months.
8. Yazid said he not military expert, but felt certain Algerian build-up was reasonable effort make up basic deficiencies such equipment as tanks, planes, artillery and transport. Admitted that in addition to UAR as source, some equipment coming from USSR and Cuba as result Algerian military mission visits to both Havana and Moscow. Recognized significance of military build-up problem with regard both economic considerations, which still paramount Algeria, and considerations of involvement other powers. Promised he would stress President's views to Ben Bella and inform Ambassador Porter in greater detail about extent Algerian intentions military build-up.
Rusk
90. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, Box 242. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 27 except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NIE 62 - 63 Washington, November 27, 1963
ALGERIA
Conclusions
A. The sum of the political and economic difficulties facing Algeria make the achievement of real political stability an uncertain prospect for some time to come. For the present, however, Ben Bella clearly remains the political personality with the widest popular appeal and he appears to have a fairly firm grip on such governmental institutions as exist in Algeria. His recent negotiations with the Kayble dissidents and other opponents seem likely to contain further threats of armed revolt for the time being. Over time, the greatest danger to him would arise from an erosion of his popular support as a consequence of continued economic misery or of military reverses on the Moroccan border conflict. (Paras 29 - 36)
B. No early improvement in the country's serious economic condition is likely. European colonization gave independent Algeria an impressive physical plant in terms of industries and transportation links, but the exodus left it with only a tiny fragment of trained people necessary to run it. At best, Algeria will probably make only modest progress in putting idle industrial capacity to work, with the result that massive unemployment will continue for some time to plague the three million Algerians in the cities. We think it likley that the nationalized agricultural properties will experience considerable trouble in maintaining a minimum level of subsistence in rural areas. However, Algeria will need to import food for many years to come. (Paras. 2 - 4, 24 - 28)
C. For a number of years foreign aid will play a critical role in keeping Algeria from financial collapse and in feeding the country. France will almost certainly continue to provide a substantial level of developmental and budgetary assistance for at least the next two years or so. Nevertheless, the Franco-Algerian relationship will be delicate and there will almost certainly be strains, perhaps arising from the use of the Saharan test sites or disagreements over oil revenues, which could threaten the flow of French aid. (Paras. 21, 46 - 48)
D. In the absence of a Franco-Algerian rupture, the Soviet Union is unlikely to play a major role in Algeria. If relations with France deteriorate, Algiers would probably try to obtain more aid from both the US and the Soviet Bloc. Under present circumstances, the Soviets seem to realize that they cannot compete with France and are content to establish a presence, get into the military field where possible, and take advantage of any opportunities which may occur. (Paras. 44 - 45, 49)
E. Algeria's general foreign policy will continue to be governed by the desire of its leaders to align themselves broadly with the neutralist bloc and to oppose ``imperialism". This general attitude will from time to time bring frictions not only with France but with the US and other Western Powers as well. One major source of such frictions will be Algeria's effort to play a prominent role in encouraging revolutionary independ-ence movements in Africa, a policy to which the regime seems fairly well committed. Links to the eastern Arab world are unlikely to be of major importance to Algeria's policy, but Ben Bella will probably con- tinue to look to Cairo for assistance and will cooperate with Nasser on an ad hoc basis. (Paras. 37, 42 - 43, 49)
F. Prospects for a final settlement of the Moroccan border conflict are not promising. Incidents in the disputed border areas are likely to be endemic and could lead to outbreaks of larger scale fighting. If this occurs or if an arms buildup continues because no political settlement can be reached, there may be increasing pressure on the great powers to declare themselves and to give material support. On the whole, however, we believe that if the US preserves a generally neutral stance the USSR will be disposed to limit its intervention. The effort of the other African states to find a solution through the Organization for African Unity (OAU) will also help to insulate the struggle from the wider issues of the cold war. (Paras. 40 - 41)
[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
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