• Multimedia
• Blog
• Subscribe
• What's New
• Contact Us
• Archive

• Topic
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • J
  • K
  • L

  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • Q
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • U
  • V
  • W
  • XYZ

  
  Select the list of topics to display.
• Country
  • A-B
  • C-E
  • F-K
  • L-O
  • P-S
  • T-Z
  • Regions

  Please choose a country or other area, or a Region.
• Publication Type
• Speaker
  • A-C
  • D-K
  • L-R
  • S-Z
• Date
  • • Most Recent
    • Past 7 days
    • Past 90 days

Libya

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya /1/

Washington, April 26, 1961, 7:45 p.m.

827. Embtel 847. /2/ With collapse of insurrection in Algiers immediate danger of insurgent attack on Libya has presumably dissolved. In reply to Prime Minister, however, you may cite Department's statement to press yesterday (Circular Tel. 1673) /3/ as evidence US did not intend stand idly by in event such attack. US would view with great concern threat to independence of Libya. Embassy should emphasize that we consider failure of insurrection due to strong, courageous and decisive action by General de Gaulle and support he clearly enjoys not only from bulk French population but within armed forces.

/2/ In telegram 847 from Tripoli, April 24, Ambassador John Wesley Jones reported that Libyan Prime Minister Mohammed Othman Al - Said had asked him what the reaction of the U.S. Government would be in the event of a French military attack against Libya from Algeria. (Ibid., 751S.00/4 - 2461)

/3/ Circular telegram 1673, April 25, quoted the Department press officer's April 25 statement that the United States would ``become directly concerned should the insurrection spread beyond the borders of Algeria and threaten the peace of the area." (Ibid., 751S.00/4 - 2561)

Bowles

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.56311/8 - 2561. Secret. Drafted by Post (AF) and Junkermann (DOD); cleared by MacKnight, Newman, and Kilduff; and approved by Witman. Also sent to Benghazi.

Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:09 p.m.

67. In view possibility present Bizerte debate might stimulate adverse public comment re Wheelus Air Base we feel Ambassador might find it useful have available for use at his discretion statement for public release setting forth mission of Wheelus, giving convincing justification for its use by USAF and underlining fact that US tenure has agreement of GOL (unlike French tenure of Bizerte base). We hope statement would counter criticisms that Wheelus might be used for military action against Libya and would draw Soviet fire on Libya in event of war. Following is suggested draft text on which your comments requested:

``As is well known, the USAF uses Wheelus Air Base and certain other agreed areas in Libya under the terms of an agreement concluded between the Libyan and U.S. Governments in 1954. /2/ This agreement was based upon the conviction of the two sovereign governments that the cooperation envisaged in the agreement would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. The agreement was freely entered into by both parties and has since been carried out in close cooperation and consultation. Satisfaction with the arrangements made was reaffirmed by the two governments during discussions held in 1960. /3/

/2/ For text of the 1954 base rights agreement, see 5 UST (Pt. 3) 2449. For documentation on the base negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1952 - 1954, vol. XI, pp. 575 - 597.

/3/ For documentation on the U.S. - Libyan discussions during 1960, see ibid., 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 735 - 755.

``The activities of the Base are fully consistent with the sovereignty and security of the Libyan people and government. The mission of Wheelus is to provide training facilities for U.S. Air Force personnel: Wheelus enjoys climatic and physical advantages which greatly facilitate the task of providing USAF personnel stationed nearby with the training necessary to maintain efficient performance. The Base also provides servicing and refueling facilities for U.S. aircraft in transit through the area. In this regard, Wheelus has played an important role over the past year in supporting UN flights to the Congo."

Rusk

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, to the Department of State /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15 - WI/10 - 2261. Confidential.

Benghazi, October 22, 1961, 3 p.m.

73. From Williams. In audience with me October 20, Prime Minister raised question of economic aid. /2/ He reviewed background starting with 1954 agreement, described creation and eventual dissolution (``because of dissatisfaction of people") of Libyan - American reconstruction cooperation and joint services and eventual creation of development council.

/2/ On September 14, Libyan Ambassador Mohieddine Fekini told President Kennedy that Libya could look forward to becoming economically self-sufficient in another 4 - 5 years and that he hoped the United States would be able during this period to give Libya's economic and financial needs special consideration. President Kennedy said that he would look into the matter once the foreign aid legislation currently before Congress was enacted. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 773.5 - MSP/9 - 1461)

Although rental of Wheelus had proceeded successfully, American economic assistance to Libya in past, regulated by annual appropriations, had been difficult for planning purposes but this year had virtually ceased. Popular pressures against foreign military bases in Libya continued to build up. It was important that US economic aid continue so that Libyan Government could show people mutually beneficial aspects of US - Libyan agreements. Prime Minister had instructed Foreign Minister to set the foregoing down in memorandum which would soon be presented to US.

Prime Minister concluded with assurances continued cooperation, etc.

I made polite non-committal reply, saying would examine problem on receipt of memorandum. /3/

/3/ On October 24, Williams sent the Department a preliminary report on his 3-day visit to Libya. He noted that 10 years of U.S. economic aid had not had the economic and social impact that the United States might have hoped for. Williams, therefore, proposed a careful review of U.S. objectives, policy, and operations in Libya. (Telegram 303 from Khartoum; ibid., 110.15 - WI/10 - 2461)

Dorman

94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/6 - 1562. Confidential. Drafted by Post (AF/AFN) on June 12 and approved by the White House on June 22.

Washington, June 15, 1962.

SUBJECT

Proposed Visit of Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya

I recommend that Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya, be invited to visit the United States officially in November 1962, or, if more convenient, in the Spring of 1963. Despite our considerable strategic interests in Libya, represented particularly by Wheelus Air Base, and our growing economic interests there in consequence of the recent discovery and development by American companies of extensive petroleum reserves, we have not had a visit by the Libyan Chief of State, 72-year-old King Idris I, who has an aversion to travel outside his kingdom. The Crown Prince's visit would serve as a substitute for a State Visit by the King and would reinforce the favorable disposition towards the United States of the young man who is scheduled to be Libya's next Chief of State. It would also, by enhancing the Crown Prince's prestige among the Libyan people, improve the chances for an orderly succession on the death or abdication of King Idris; we feel that a continuation of the Libyan constitutional monarchy under Hasan al-Rida represents the best available means for ensuring the continued unity, independence, and stability of Libya under circumstances most favorable to United States interests there. Finally, the visit would serve as a dramatic demonstration to the Libyan people of the close ties between the two countries and as a reminder, at a time when Libya is on the verge of financial independence from oil revenues, of the value Libya has received in the form of aid in the past and may expect to derive in other forms in the future from close cooperation with the United States.

I would expect that your participation in the visit, which will consist of two days in Washington and several days outside the capital, would be limited to hosting a State luncheon, followed by a meeting, attending a return reception at Blair House and receiving the Crown Prince again at the White House prior to his departure from Washington. We do not anticipate any substantive talks.

I request your approval of the visit and your authorization to extend the invitation. /2/

Dean Rusk /3/

/2/ On July 3, the Department of State notified the Embassy in Benghazi that the White House had approved a ``modified official visit" for the Crown Prince to commence November 13, and transmitted a letter of invitation from the President to the Crown Prince to be formally delivered once his agreement on the date had been obtained. (Telegram 1 to Benghazi; ibid., 773.11/7 - 362) After Embassy discussions with the Crown Prince, the date of his arrival in the United States was changed to October 16. (Telegram 14 to Benghazi, August 1; ibid., 773.11/8 - 162)

/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

95. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Libyan Minister of Defense (Belkhair) /1/

/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1 - 121, 1962. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The text of this letter was sent to McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Nitze indicating that the letter had been prepared in response to McNamara's instructions. McNamara personally delivered the letter to Belkhair on June 25.

Washington, June 25, 1962.

Excellency: I wish to express my appreciation for having had the opportunity last Thursday /2/ to receive you at my office and to discuss Libyan military problems in the full and frank manner appropriate between representatives of two such friendly nations as ours.

/2/ Secretary McNamara met with Belkhair, who was on an unofficial visit to Washington en route to Libya from Taiwan, on June 21. The conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the record. (Ibid.)

Let me say at the outset that I, like you, consider the principle of close collaboration between our two countries in the strengthening of the Libyan forces to be a matter beyond question. I know you will agree that the U.S. through past assistance has already demonstrated the sincerity of its dedication to this principle. Together with the United Kingdom and in full consultation with your government, we undertook to provide assistance in developing a Libyan army of 5,000 men and my Government has considered this program, which was based on a detailed military survey, as appropriate to meet Libya's minimum internal security requirements. Your Excellency has recognized that the U.S. Government has responsibilities extending around the world.

In light of your exposition of the need to further strengthen and modernize the Libyan army, however, I am prepared to review the situation for the purpose of determining the extent to which further U.S. military assistance may be justified. Some additional equipment is no doubt desirable. Meanwhile, to reflect my Government's intent to be responsive, I have issued instructions that the delivery of certain items of already-programmed equipment be expedited in order to be on hand for your December 24 ceremonies this year.

As regards your desire to develop a Libyan Air Force, let me assure you that the U.S. Government views this matter with sympathy. To provide the nucleus for this force, we have already undertaken to train two pilots, and I take this opportunity to inform you that we plan to deliver two T-33 jet aircraft in 1963 when your pilots will have completed their training. In addition, we plan to provide training for Libyan technical personnel to maintain these aircraft. Finally, we are prepared to send to Libya a team of selected personnel from the Department of Defense to assist you in planning for the future development of the Libyan Air Force.

I am, however, obliged to state frankly that your request for more equipment for the Libyan Army appears to me, in a number of respects, to be excessive to your present military needs and capabilities, particularly in view of the 5,000-man ceiling, including both combat and support troops, which you stated to me that you have placed on the size of your army. Past experience makes clear, for example, that the U.S. Congress would be unlikely to provide funds for far more vehicles per soldier in the Libyan army than we supply to our own forces.

Accordingly, I feel that such portion of your request as might be provided by the U.S. Government on a grant basis must be determined on the basis of a detailed re-examination of your requirements at the military level in Libya by the MAAG in consultation with Libyan military officials.

As I stated to you, the Department of Defense is prepared to send additional qualified personnel to Libya to assist in this re-examination. Furthermore, in view of the role of Great Britain in the training of the Libyan army, I feel that this study should be coordinated not only between representatives of our two governments but also with appropriate British officials. I can assure you that I will give my closest personal attention to the recommendations which result from this reassessment. Should your government feel that additional materiel is still required beyond that which the U.S. agrees to provide as a grant following this study, the Department of Defense would be willing to help the Libyan Government to arrange the purchase of such additional equipment.

I trust, Excellency, that this plan of procedure meets with your approval, as I believe it provides the best means of ensuring that the continued cooperation we both desire will proceed on a mutually satisfactory basis. /3/

Sincerely,

Robert S. McNamara /4/

/3/ Belkhair thanked the Secretary for his attention to and appreciation of Libya's military problems and called the letter ``encouraging and a source of great satisfaction." (Telegram 209 to Benghazi, June 25; Department of State, Central Files, 773.56/6 - 2362)

/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

96. Editorial Note

[Text not declassified.]

97. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya, 9/62 - 12/62. Top Secret. Briefing papers cited in this memorandum are ibid., Crown Prince Hasan Briefing Book, 10/6/62 - 10/24/62.

Washington, October 15, 1962.

Crown Prince Hasan of Libya is here as part of our effort to build him up as an effective successor to 72-year-old King Idris. /2/ The UAR is very active in Libya; there are also a number of contending domestic factions. We fear that Idris' death may lead either to chaos or a coup endangering our hold on Wheelus Base and our growing oil interests.

/2/ Crown Prince Hasan visited the United States October 16 - 24, 1962. A collection of briefing papers is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, Visit of Libyan Crown Prince.

[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Backing Hasan is a gamble. We [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have been pleasantly surprised by the way he has handled himself as Regent in the King's few absences. But we want to prod him toward further initiatives on his own behalf--developing a progressive program to carry out when he becomes king and building his own political base.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

As to your formal meeting, I suggest you press three points (the Prince is normally a bit recessive, so you'll have to steer the talk for him):

1. We support the Crown Prince's succession. Although a republican government might be more compatible with our interests in North Africa, the Crown Prince's broad political support from the Sanusi sect makes him a better bet to hold Libya together than even any of the better potential republican leaders. You can put this diplomatically in terms of our continued support for the Libyan constitution and for the arrangements the Libyans themselves have worked out for an orderly transfer of power. It won't do any harm for Libyan officials with the Crown Prince to hear this so the word can get around among potential opposition leaders.

2. Libya should move faster in planning effective use of its new oil revenues. The King finally sacked his incompetent development chief and created a new Ministry of Development Affairs in June. The new crew looks pretty good, but the country's finances are a mess. Unless order is brought out of chaos, increasing oil revenues ($40 million expected this year and $200 million within five years) will become an invitation to waste and corruption which could destroy public confidence in the government. AID has offered to help staff the Development Ministry, but we can't go any faster than the Libyans. The Crown Prince can convey our concern to Idris, and this is a problem he should get involved in himself. His reputation for scrupulous honesty is a major asset.

3. We want to hold on to Wheelus. The Libyans really just want to be left alone to enjoy their oil money, and their government has habitually justified Wheelus to opponents solely in terms of economic benefits derived. But oil revenues will soon deprive us of our economic leverage. So we want to convince the Prince at least that there are other reasons for staying ``neutral with the West." We can't ram down his throat that his own future lies with us, but in addition to our other reassurances we can point out that Wheelus contributes to Free World defense on which Libya's security depends.

We can also get some mileage out of a bit more MAP. We'll have to rely on it more heavily as our ``rent" for Wheelus because increasing Libyan oil revenues will make economic aid unjustifiable. The trouble is that the Libyans presented some wildly inflated requests to McNamara last spring. Since then USAF and Army survey teams have drawn up more modest plans (Tab III. C) costing around $13 million over five years. JCS is still reviewing this package, but you could say we plan some aid for expansion of the Libyan army and will help develop the nucleus of an air force with both fighter and transport capability. Ambassador Jones will discuss details of these two programs shortly in Libya.

As a token of our past aid you can present a new topographic map of Libya--the first of its kind--which the US Geological Survey has just finished. /3/

R.W. Komer

/3/ Komer sent a follow-up memorandum to the President on October 15 saying that the Department of State was now urging the President to take the Crown Prince aside for a few minutes and give him the few words of encouragement as proposed. He added that this would do more than anything else to make the visit a success. (Ibid.) On October 16, Komer sent another memorandum to Kennedy, noting that, although the President had taken the Crown Prince aside for a few moments, there had not been any opportunity to tell the Crown Prince privately that the United States was interested in facilitating his succession against possible threats to it after King Idris died. Komer said that the Prince would be grateful for such words. (Ibid.)

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10 - 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Carr, Jones, Steele, and Junkermann (DOD), Gookin, and Slater; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and pouched to London, Paris for the Embassy and USCINCEUR.

Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:11 p.m.

78. Following based in part on uncleared memcons. /2/ Crown Prince visit to Washington proceeded smoothly and successfully. Met at airport by Vice President, Crown Prince acquitted himself well at this and other public appearances, with remarks appropriate to occasions, generally but not always read from prepared texts. Well prepared for his hour-long meeting with President, Crown Prince presented Libyan requests for financial aid during three to four year period of continuing financial need, and for military aid, dwelling particularly on Air Force needs. He also expressed Libyan apprehension at US decision sell Hawk missiles to Israel, urging President that decision not be put into effect. He further urged President take action relieve plight of Palestine refugees.

/2/ The conversation between President Kennedy and Crown Prince Hasan on October 16 is recorded in four memoranda of conversation; ibid., 773.56/10 - 1662, and ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

Foreign Minister in meeting with Secretary October 17 laid further stress on GOL financial straits, emphasizing GOL need to implement planned projects for benefit of people who otherwise will become susceptible to harmful influences from outside. Foreign Minister also noted GOL desire on return Libya that success achieved by Crown Prince be made known to Libyan people. Secretary explained our policy not tying aid announcements to visits. Further details of talks will follow separately.

Crown Prince has cancelled Detroit portion trip, will now proceed directly from San Francisco to New York October 21 with October 22 set aside for rest. Following lunch with U Thant and address to General Assembly, Prince and party now scheduled depart from New York at 1800 hours October 23.

Rusk

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/10 - 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Post on October 18; cleared by Jones, Junkermann (DOD), Wolf, and Mossler; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR.

Washington, October 19, 1962, 7:01 p.m.

79. Following based on uncleared memcons. In October 16 talk with President on military aid, Crown Prince and Defense Minister expressed hope US would assist Libya to establish nucleus of Libyan Air Force, MOD listing following as basic requirements: two fighters, two transports, and one helicopter. President promised speak to Secretary McNamara to see what could be done.

Subsequent to this discussion, pertinent USG agencies agreed inform Libyans of following as basis for US assistance to nucleus Libyan Air Force:

1. In addition equipment already programmed (two T - 33 jet trainers), US to supply one C - 47 in 1963 and, in period 1964 to 1968, two additional T - 33 trainers and five additional C - 47 transports. Aircraft to be accompanied by qualified flight instructors, maintenance and supply personnel.

2. Personnel to be provided to advise and assist in establishing Libyan Air Force and in working out long-range plans.

3. Facilities and training assistance to be made available at Wheelus.

4. Discussions to be initiated leading to joint US - Libyan utilization of Wheelus as envisioned in Base Agreement.

Summary of first point was conveyed by the President to both Crown Prince and Defense Minister at lunch October 17. President indicated further details would be forthcoming through Ambassador Jones. Libyans seemed pleased and satisfied this aspect of talks.

Rusk

100. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/

/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 123.7 - 686, 1962. Secret. An appendix containing specific JCS and OSD comments on a July 1962 draft of the U.S. Army Survey Team Report on Libya is attached but not printed.

JCSM - 857 - 62 Washington, October 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

Army and Air Force Survey Team Reports, Libya

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 6 October 1962, subject as above.

2. The US military interest in Libya centers primarily on the continued use of Wheelus Air Base. From a military point of view there is no requirement for assistance to Libya beyond that necessary to assure the unrestricted use of this air base by the United States and to preclude increased Communist influence in Libya. Conditions necessary for such assurance include a friendly Libyan Government, internal stability, and internal security. There is a need to establish conditions in Libya which will favor an orderly transfer of power to a Western-oriented group upon the death of King Idris. However, there is no present external threat to Libya. Further, Libya's treaty with the United Kingdom guarantees that the UK will come to the assistance of Libya in the event of an attack. For these reasons, and especially in view of the prospects of continually decreasing military assistance funds, the United States should carefully scrutinize any proposal for assistance to Libya with a view toward providing the very minimum necessary to realize the US objectives. The Survey Team Reports have been examined with this principle in mind.

3. The Report on the Development of Libyan Air Force, dated 12 September 1962, provides for establishment of a Libyan Air Force of four T - 33 jet trainer aircraft, six C - 47 transport aircraft, two E - 4 helicopters, and ancillary equipment at a cost of approximately $3 million over a six-year period. It is understood that the program outlined in this Report has been approved by you, except for the light helicopters, and that the President has informed the Libyan Crown Prince of the intention to provide this assistance. In order that the Government of Libya may have access to remote areas, conduct border surveillance, and perform rescue operations and civic actions, it is believed the two light helicopters should be retained in the plan as recommended by the USAF Survey Team. Maintenance capability will be available at Wheelus Air Base.

4. The US Army Survey Team Report, dated 24 September 1962, /2/ provides for forces necessitating a Military Assistance Program (MAP) of $9.8 million over the period CY 1962 - 66. In light of the fact that the Libyan Army need not be manned and equipped for countering an external threat, the program recommended in the Report appears excessive. Also, it is believed that such a program is larger than can be afforded under present and anticipated availability of funds. Accordingly, certain reductions should be made in the proposed Army Program. Since USCINCEUR must incorporate Libyan MAPs within his over-all MAP dollar ceiling, he should be given an opportunity to recommend revisions to the US Army Survey Team Report toward the objective of reducing the cost of the program set forth in the Report. In revising the Report, two primary objectives should be kept in mind:

/2/ Not printed. (Ibid., Libya 091.3 - 1 - 20233162, 1962)

a. The over-all cost of the program must be reduced. In revising the program downward, USCINCEUR will need some target as a guide. To this end, $6 million is believed reasonable, taking into consideration the size of the army, the type of equipment needed for the internal security mission, and the possibility of negotiating a cost-sharing formula.

b. In establishing the size and organization of the proposed Libyan Army, primary emphasis should be placed on the mission of internal security. In this regard, cognizance must be taken of the 5,000 man army ceiling previously agreed upon between you and the Libyan Minister of Defense in the context of developing Libyan materiel requirements.

5. Consideration should also be given to a cost-sharing formula with Libya. It is noted that the FY 64 - 68 Military Assistance Plan for support of the Libyan Air Force has been prepared on a 50 - 50 cost-sharing basis. However, two factors are of especial importance with regard to Libya. First, assistance to Libya is actually payment for the use of facilities in Libya and a cost-shared program has far less bargaining power than an outright grant program, especially to a poor country. Second, increasing oil revenues are expected to materially improve Libya's economic position over the next several years. These two factors might be satisfied through negotiations with Libya toward a cost-sharing formula whereby the United States would pay the entire cost of military assistance furnished Libya for the first two years with the US proportion of costs thereafter being reduced each year. Perhaps a US ratio of 75% the third year, 50% the fourth year, and 25% the fifth year would be acceptable to both countries.

6. Finally, the Army Report recommends that materiel valued at nearly $1 million be delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962, Libya's National Independence Day. Shipment of such a large quantity of materiel in the short time remaining before 24 December is impractical and could be accomplished only by establishing an overriding priority for Libyan requirements. However, it is considered desirable that a token shipment be made prior to that date. Ten M - 113 armored personnel carriers could be diverted from other claimants, if such action was directed, and would give visible evidence of US intentions to further assist Libya in establishing an effective army.

7. Implementation of the Air Force Program will necessitate a manpower increase for the Air Force Section of the MAAG from one officer and two enlisted to two officers and three enlisted. Additionally, it is contemplated that a MAP training mission consisting of four officers and 13 enlisted will be activated as part of the 7272d Air Base Wing. Approval of the Army Program will necessitate a small increase in the manpower authorization for the Army Section of the MAAG.

8. It is recommended that:

a. The two helicopters be approved for inclusion in the Air Force Program for Libya.

b. The US Army Survey Team Report be returned to USCINCEUR for downward revision. A proposed message for this purpose is attached as the Appendix hereto.

c. A cost-sharing formula be negotiated with Libyan authorities toward gradual assumption of all costs of the Libyan Air Force and Army by Libya.

d. Ten M - 113 armored personnel carriers be diverted from other claimants and delivered in Libya prior to 24 December 1962. /3/

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John A. Heintges /4/

Major General, USADeputy Director, Joint Staff

/3/ On November 7, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitting the Department of Defense's approval of their October 31 recommendations, except for the proposed cost-sharing arrangement. (Ibid.)

/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Heintges signed the original.

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, Visit of Libyan Crown Prince, Oct. 16 - 24, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Carr and McClanahan on November 19; cleared by Mossler, Kent, and Hinman; and approved by Hutchinson.

Washington, November 23, 1962, 3:25 p.m.

Aidto 223. Subject--Economic Aid to Libya. Joint State/AID message. Libyan expectancy of receiving more aid result of Crown Prince visit stated in MacPhail report of Sikta and Mrusa conversations before leaving Washington. This impression further borne out by Libyan press reports of Prince's ``successful" trip hinting US officials promised something tangible forthcoming.

Although record of Washington talks politely non-committal on financial assistance, President did undertake to look into matter personally.

President and SecState chose occasion of Crown Prince's visit to outline US offer of military assistance for Air Force and indicated in their remarks this was area in which US Government could at this time be more forthcoming.

Understanding here at conclusion visit and subsequent conversations Sikta - Mrusa was that Sikta - Mrusa and Embassy would separately convey to Prime Minister US Government's general view that Libya in basically strong economic position with virtually unlimited credit on basis prospective oil revenues beginning next April and increasing rapidly thereafter. In terms AID criteria substantial grants or soft loans simply cannot be justified.

Embassy and USAID are urged to make US view on financial economic assistance clear in tactful way while simultaneously seeking focus GOL attention on measures US might be prepared to take in concert with GOL for alleviating immediate fiscal problems. These include as discussed Ambassador and MacPhail ``package" containing a) possible advance payment of about $4 million in Deutschemarks against CY 64 cash base rental; b) two year Title IV agreement; c) Libyan request for IMF team to improve fiscal institutions and practices and d) establishment trust fund by GOL for local costs of program support.

GOL appears not to have publicized current money crisis and might be reluctant publicize base rental advance even if such transaction acceptable. Believe public announcement advantageous from US point of view as indication US responsiveness Libya's need to get development plans under way before oil revenues peak. This US preference should be intimated to Libyans, and if they unable approve public announcement, US side should nevertheless leave itself room to make our action known in indirect but clear manner.

Rusk

102. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/

/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Libya 000.1 - 121, 1962. Secret. Attached is a transmittal note from Bundy to McNamara that reads: ``The attached seeks your approval by Monday noon in order to meet a political deadline which has just arisen. Subsequent to writing this, I have seen JCS comments which would accept the lower of the alternatives considered. However, I would myself still accept the State judgment that we cannot keep matters sweet in Libya at that figure. The issue is essentially political."

I - 21780/62 Washington, December 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Libya

This memorandum seeks your approval of additional amounts for the Libyan Army, affecting both the FY 1963 amount and the FY 1963 - 1967 MAP totals. State considers decision on this matter urgent, as the Libyan Parliament is meeting next week so that notice of this proposed program would give them a firm basis as well as cementing US - Libyan relations at a time when there have been recurrent threats of Libya turning to the UAR or the Soviets for help.

Following the visit of the Libyan MOD last summer, we agreed to send Air Force and Army Survey teams to Libya. The Air Force team recommended a total of $2.6 million in equipment, and on 17 October you approved this with the exception of two helicopters, totalling $120,000. We have since learned that the Libyans considered the two helicopters included in the package as stated in general terms by the President, and for this reason as well as to meet what appears a legitimate requirement for command communications, we now recommend that you approve their re-insertion.

The Army problem is more serious. The Army Survey team recommended a program of $9.8 million for an 8500 man force over a five-year period, as being required to enhance its internal security capability and insure its superiority over that of the provincial police forces. This plan called for us to fill initial shortages in the proposed modernization and standardization of the Libyan Army with heavy equipment required, including communications and vehicles but with the Libyan Government being responsible for the cost (about $1 million) of small items and maintenance of British equipment which we have furnished in the past.

When you approved the bulk of the Air Force team recommendations, you directed that the total program be held to a level of $1.5 million per year. Your discussions with the Libyan MOD had also indicated that he personally accepted maintenance of the present Army force level of 5000 men. Accordingly, USCINCEUR was asked to review the Army Survey Report under these guidelines, and specifically to eliminate M - 48 tanks and 155mm howitzers, which the JCS had questioned on purely military grounds as not being necessary to the internal security mission.

The revised report just received from CINCEUR proposes a program in accordance with the revised guidelines calling for $4.7 million in new equipment plus maintenance amounting to $1.2 million and reinserting the $1 million to maintain previously supplied British equipment, for a total of $6.9 million over the FY 63 - 67 period. This plan would support only the 5000 man force level and would not provide for replacement of key old British items (hence the recommendation that we include maintenance of this equipment in toto).

The Ambassador had supported the original Survey Report as being the minimum required to maintain our status at Wheelus and prevent Libya turning elsewhere. In addition, both State and USCINCEUR do not believe the revised program level adequate to meet the need, State purely on the Ambassador's grounds, USCINCEUR on the military basis that this reduced program would not provide clear superiority of the Army over the Provincial Police (also about 5000 strong in Tripolitania alone), a political objective stated as essential by the Ambassador and State to prevent a sundering of Libya when Idris dies. Both the Ambassador /2/ and USCINCEUR now believe we must support a greater force level than 5000, and the Ambassador reports that despite the MOD's assurances to you the Libyan Government is in fact determined to move to at least 7500 and even has its sights set at 13,000 by 1964 (which we do not think they can achieve in any case).

/2/ On November 9, Ambassador Jones wrote that he regretted the Defense decision to re-examine the U.S. Army Survey Team report with the view of reducing the proposed strength of the Libyan Army and the recommended program of U.S. military aid. He noted that if the United States was not sufficiently forthcoming in response to Libyan requests for assistance, it could expect questions regarding the present level of rent for Wheelus. Jones reminded Washington that the Libyan Army might well be the deciding influence in a possible crisis over succession to the throne after the death of the King. Finally, he emphasized the relationship of the overall U.S. military aid program to the success of the recent visit of the Crown Prince. (Telegram 98 from Benghazi; Department of State, Central Files, 773.5/11 - 962)

Hence, we have drawn up and recommend your approval of a program between the original and revised, which would:

a. Cost $8 million over the FY 1963 - 67 period.

b. Eliminate the M - 48 tanks and 155mm howitzers.

c. Support a force level of 7500 men.

d. Throw onto the Libyan Government the maintenance of old British equipment (much of which would be replaced).

The effect of this on the total program levels is as follows:

For FY 1963, the presently approved figure is $1.473, which includes some Army items now subsumed in the total program. Thus, we would add a little over $500,000 to this. This would come from the Contingency Fund.

Essentially, this is an issue of judgment. Wheelus matters to us, the flighty Libyans could turn elsewhere, and there is some case for an internal security force clearly capable of dominating the scene. The Libyans do expect a measure of aid for Wheelus, and over time, with their oil coming in the US will not have much to offer through economic aid. All in all, though I hate these rug merchant deals (and these particular rug merchants) as much as you do, I would endorse State's judgment that the rug cannot be had for less. It may at least stay bought if we can lay out the whole program to the Libyans next week.

Tab A shows the program items of the alternatives. /3/ Recommend your approval of the $8 million program. /4/

William P. Bundy /5/

/3/ Not attached to the source text.

/4/ McNamara's stamped signature apparently indicates he approved the recommendation on December 1.

/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA - US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Tasca, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli.

Washington, June 29, 1963, 2:22 p.m.

262. Tripoli's 351. /2/ Believe you should at this time leave to Prime Minister Fekini's initiative any discussion changed Libyan attitude toward Wheelus. Endorse your feeling that in such discussion you should not exhibit alarm nor frame your remarks as being on instructions Washington. Subject to your views, Dept inclined believe that matter as basic and important in US - Libyan relations as GOL attitude to Wheelus if it is to be broached from US side by Ambassador should preferably be in conversation with King sometime after his return from his relaxing and therapeutic visit to Greece. Likely in present context Fekini will assume extreme concern if matter is raised probingly at this time because it is so early in your tour in Libya and particular issues of Parliamentary questions do not seem yet to have come to such head as to be upsetting equanimity of Libyan Cabinet.

/2/ In telegram 351, June 28, Lightner indicated that he intended to sound Fekini out concerning his government's attitude toward Wheelus. (Ibid.)

Dept endorses Embassy officer's statements to Foreign Office in Benghazi's 279 /3/ and believes Abdiyyah's vigorous denial change Libyan policy and subsequent expression of welcome for idea of visit by Vice President or Secretary of State to Libya may indicate that official Libyans are concerned lest GOL's unusually close working relations with US are not sufficiently recognized and appreciated on US side.

/3/ Not printed. (Ibid.)

We have been giving much thought to importance building up in near future confidential, trusting relationship with King and to extent possible similar personal rapport and comfortable working relationship with Fekini and other key members of Cabinet. If Libyan policy is gradually being drawn into greater alignment with prevailing breezes of change in North Africa, these personal relationships plus concrete proofs of friendship such as expanded military assistance program seem likely to prove firmest anchors which we can hold against any drift contrary to our strategic and other interests in Libya. Would welcome your suggestions re best tactics accomplish foregoing. /4/

Ball

/4/ In telegram 6 from Benghazi, July 3, Lightner reported that he had met with Fekini, who had brought up the recent Addis Abba conference resolution on the elimination of military bases, to which the Ambassador had replied that he thought it was possible to defend the concept that bases contributed to the defense of a country that was not yet ready to defend itself. Lightner added that he had not pressed the issue, but he did not have the impression Libya was about to demand that the United States give up Wheelus. He indicated that he would comment soon on the tactical problems of combating ``Libyan policy drift," but that he was sure the Department would agree that any formal approach to the King on the base problem should be kept in reserve until the situation became much clearer. (Ibid., POL 15 - 1 LIBYA)

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by McClanahan, cleared by Walker, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tripoli.

Washington, July 26, 1963, 3:40 p.m.

23. Re Baida's 11 and 13. /2/ Dept concerned by report harmfully inaccurate public statement by Libyan Minister Abaidi concerning amount and form of US aid to Libya since 1960. Believe you should raise matter with Prime Minister Fekini at next opportunity, stressing effect in this country, as Fekini should be well aware, of foreign high level official statements which misrepresent US assistance. You should reiterate (Baida's 13) that in considering aid requests US must recognize fact Libya's increased oil revenues.

/2/ Telegram 11 from Baida, July 24, reported that Minister of Development and Planning Abaidi had told the Libyan Senate on July 21 that the United States had given Libya no material assistance in cash or in kind since the dissolution of joint services late in 1960, although leftover funds had been handed over to the Libyan Government for completion of joint services projects, and the United States had provided assistance through experts attached to various government ministries. (Ibid.) In telegram 13 from Baida, July 24, Lightner wrote that he had talked to the Prime Minister about Abaidi's statement and Libya's probable requests for further U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid.)

Dept recalls Fekini's aid discussions with ambassador were couched in broad terms (Fredericks - Fekini memcon Jan. 15, 1963). You might remind Fekini that total US aid to Libya during his ambassadorship 1958 - 63 was over $110 million.

Rusk

105. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15, LIBYA - US. Secret. Drafted by Stookey on September 5. Attached to the source text is telegram 262 to Benghazi, Document 103.

Washington, September 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

Libyan Policy toward Wheelus Air Base

Information Memorandum

Our attention has recently been focused on the future of Wheelus Air Base by 1) the resolutions at the Addis Ababa conference; 2) the organization of a Libyan Air Force; and 3) Libyan requests for additional aid.

Criticism in the Libyan press and on the floor of the Libyan Parliament of the presence of a foreign base on Libyan soil, while not new, has recently become more pointed as a result of the resolution, adopted by the African summit conference at Addis Ababa in June, that African states should negotiate the elimination of military bases from their territory.

The relatively new and more ``nationalist" government of Prime Minister Fekini has shown itself sensitive on this subject, and has avoided denying forthrightly and publicly that it contemplates measures to eliminate the Wheelus Air Base. During discussion of a possible joint statement on the recently-expanded U.S. military assistance program, including the allocation of a part of Wheelus Base for the use of the new Libyan Air Force, Fekini attempted to introduce language suggesting that this action was preparatory to the take-over of the entire base by the Libyans. As demonstrated by the good-will trip he has just concluded to the Maghreb states, and by his recent public remarks on Palestine, the Prime Minister desires to associate Libya more closely with the mainstream of African and Arab unity movements.

We see no indication, however, that the basic Libyan policy of respecting the Wheelus Air Base Agreement (which expires in December, 1970) has been altered; indeed, a high Foreign Ministry official has assured our Embassy that such is not the case. However, under arrangements made with the Libyans in 1960, the $10,000,000 annual "rent" payment for the base is reduced to $1,000,000 at the end of CY 1964. We interpret recent, unfocused, requests for U.S. economic aid by Fekini and certain of his ministers as an effort to establish a favorable bargaining position for discussions on the future quid pro quo for the Base in anticipation of this reduction. As Libyan oil revenues grow, the economic justification declines, but the political pressures for such payment will remain.

The assignment to the Royal Libyan Air Force of facilities at Wheelus gives Libya a stake in the Base which we anticipate will be a moderating factor in Libyan attitudes toward the future presence of Wheelus.

King Idris retains ultimate control over Libyan policy, and the cabinet could take no fundamental action affecting the Wheelus Base without the King's approval. We have instructed our Ambassador in Libya to endeavor to establish such relations with King Idris as will ensure the preservation of our strategic and other interests in Libya. (Attached.) We anticipate ultimately extended negotiations on the future of Wheelus, but do not feel the time for such discussions has yet come.

The Wheelus Base is used primarily as a very important all weather training facility for U.S. Air Force, Europe. Insofar as we have ascertained the views of the Armed Forces, we understand that the Base will be required at least during the life of the present agreement, i.e., through CY 1970.

106. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Libya 1963. Secret.

Washington, September 28, 1963.

Monday morning session with new Libyan PM Fekini is so you can gently talk him out of asking for a whole new aid program.

This country of only 1,250,000 has lived on US largesse for years ($206 million through FY 1963). Now it's swimming in oil--$64 million royalties this year, over $100 million next year, and up to $300 million annually later. So it is another Kuwait, which doesn't need any more US aid.

But Fekini is using Wheelus base as a lever to pry more aid out of us. Under our 1960 agreement the ``rent" for Wheelus will drop from $10 million annually 1960 - 64 to $1 million per annum 1965 - 71. He alleges growing local anti-base pressures, and says the best way to offset this is a big contribution to Libyan development.

Our best counter is to tell him frankly that Wheelus (and the UK bases in Cyrenaica) are oil-rich Libya's best guarantee against takeover by Nasser next door. Our presence is Libya's real security. We don't see why we should have to pay for the privilege of giving protection (and he should get this across to his critics). Besides, it is mostly US investment which provides Libya's oil wealth. So you could explain why Congress won't favor yet more aid to a country which is doing so well (we don't give aid to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait either--yet protect both).

We want to make clear that what Libya needs is not money but technical help in learning to use wisely all the money it's already getting (and squandering). We're prepared to continue providing such help, and also some more MAP.

Fekini may also make some anti-Israeli noises; if so, you might set him straight that we don't intend to let Arabs attack Israel or vice versa.

You impressed Fekini greatly last time he saw you (he was ambassador here) by airing some general policy views. He'll be quite responsive if you do so again. /2/

/2/ On September 30, Komer sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, explaining that in 1960 the United States had ``upped the ante (1) to keep Wheelus, (2) to take credit for help we were giving anyway to ease the Libyan government over the hump until oil revenues put it on its feet, but (3) to leave the door open to stop grant aid when oil revenues began pouring in." He noted that those revenues had mounted faster than anyone expected ``so while we have to come through with the promised $10 million next year, we want to hold the line after that." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer)

R.W. Komer /3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIBYA. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Walker, McKesson, Junkermann (DOD), Komer, and Warren; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Benghazi.

Washington, October 7, 1963, 3:26 p.m.

133. Tripoli's 108. /2/ Prime Minister Fekini met with President Kennedy September 30. /3/ Following highlights from uncleared memcon are subject to review and should not be discussed with foreign governments:

/2/ In telegram 108 from Tripoli, October 3, Lightner reported that he planned to talk to Fekini ``within the next few days at which time it would be helpful have some indication of substance of Washington talks." (Ibid.)

/3/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., POL LIBYA - US.3

President welcomed Fekini, who replied he brought friendly greeting from King and Crown Prince. After brief mention Fekini's recent trip Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, President inquired about situation in Libya. Fekini said public opinion had favored more unified organization of government and so his government had amended constitution to bring this about. His government had also worked out new 5-year plan and hoped US would help in realizing this plan. Plan was key to stability in Libya, and Libya was counting on US.

President described heavy aid cuts being made by Congress and great difficulties this created for US. We were nonetheless trying to do what we could. But with all its oil resources Libya's position should be extremely good on its own.

Fekini replied that oil revenue would be main support of Plan, but real problem would be in first 2 or 3 years before most oil revenues came in. Fekini said US had special relationship with Libya, for example, one of our most important military bases is there, and Libya had problem with such bases.

President said had noted press attacks on base, but base was important to stability of area and kind of guarantee of Libya's continued independence and stability. Thus it was best to try damp down press attacks and not make Wheelus great dominant political issue.

Fekini acknowledged Wheelus not at present big political issue, but remarked US effort to help Libya substantially would serve to remove base issue from domestic political arena.

President emphasized burden our global commitments many of which were of indirect benefit to Libya. Libya, like Saudi Arabia, will be target for other countries because of its oil wealth. US would do its best but couldn't do all Libya wanted. President urged Fekini use his influence explain to Libyan people Wheelus helpful to Libyan stability and an asset to Libya. Then when Libya wanted us to leave we would. But if we're told we must either contribute to development plan or lose base, we'd leave.

Fekini later said he had spoken frankly because it not easy task to defend base. Only one million dollars rent did not look very great even though there was other aid.

President replied Libya had only 1.25 million people yet GOL receiving over $60 million from oil revenues this year, probably $100 million next and perhaps as much as $300 million within few years. We appreciated Libya's situation and its needs, but such oil revenues obviously a major asset.

Fekini mentioned that US allowing Libya use small part of base to train Libyan Air Force, which US was supporting. Sharing of base was good, and if we could go further toward joint use it would help. President agreed this would be useful.

Conversation concluded with comments by Fekini and President concerning need for caution in viewing prospects for detente in relations with Soviets.

After their conversation President invited Fekini to attend swearing in of new Postmaster General, and Fekini there met several members of Cabinet. Later President accompanied Fekini to President's outer office and shook hands with officers of Libyan Embassy. President sent greetings through Fekini to King and Crown Prince and suggested Fekini write to him directly if he wished on matters of mutual interest.

President had sent presidential Air Force aircraft bring Fekini from New York and return him there. Governor Harriman met Fekini at Washington airport. Governor Williams present at meeting with President and accompanied Fekini to Washington airport. Fekini brought from New York private secretary Ali Abu Suwayl and Police Major Tahir Rahuma. Ben Gileil, counselor of Embassy, only Libyan with Fekini during meeting with President.

Only press notice observed here was New York Times October 1 reference in record of President's September 30 activities. Agence France Presse (AFP) ticker datelined Washington September 30 reported Fekini had meeting of about an hour with President Kennedy and ``two statesmen reviewed international situation and discussed problems of mutual interest." AFP quotes Fekini as terming conversation ``very interesting" and adding ``I hope that it will contribute to consolidating friendly relations which I am happy to say already exist between our two countries."

Rusk