Documents 108-157
Morocco
108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5/2 - 1761. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Root. A handwritten notation on the source text states that the proposal contained in the memorandum was approved by the White House on February 17. The source text is attached to a memorandum from James K. Penfield (AF) to Secretary Rusk recommending that he send the memorandum to the President along with an accompanying draft letter from President Kennedy to King Mohammed V.
Washington, February 17, 1961.
SUBJECT
Soviet Military Assistance to Morocco
The Departments of State and Defense are concerned over the arrival in Morocco of twelve Soviet MIG - 17 jet fighters and two MIG - 15 trainers for the Moroccan Air Force. There are indications that twenty to thirty Bloc technicians may also have arrived, although this is not yet fully confirmed. The Department of Defense is particularly concerned about the significant threat to the security and potential usefulness of our military bases in Morocco, including the SAC complex, that would be represented by the presence in Morocco of Soviet military equipment and personnel. Last November when Moroccan acceptance of the Soviet offer of jet planes was announced our Ambassador obtained oral assurances from the King and the Crown Prince that they would do nothing in this connection to affect Morocco's commitment (reached between the King and President Eisenhower in December 1959) to permit us to remain at our bases until the end of 1963. Those assurances included an undertaking not to admit any Soviet bloc technicians into Morocco. There is thus some question whether or not this undertaking has been breached.
With my approval, and the consent of Governor Stevenson, we have arranged to send Ambassador Yost back to Rabat this weekend, ostensibly to take his official farewell of the Moroccan Government. We are in fact anxious that Ambassador Yost explore with the King personally the significance of the arrival of Soviet jets and perhaps technicians. Last December we provided the Ambassador with a standby authority to offer U.S. jet planes to the Moroccan Government if he felt this was necessary to insure that the Moroccan Government would not make use of the Soviet planes, or as a minimum would refuse to accept any Soviet Bloc technicians. /2/ In view of the assurances mentioned above, the Ambassador did not feel it necessary to use this standby offer at the time. However it is still valid and it is our intention that the Ambassador would be prepared to make the offer explicit to the King if the trend of their conversation indicated this as the best course.
/2/ For documentation on the U.S. offer, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 812 - 816.
Ambassador Yost feels, and both the African Bureau and I concur, that it would be particularly valuable to him in his delicate mission to be able to present to the King a message from you. The letter would have a dual purpose, to reaffirm our good will and desire to continue our cooperation with Morocco and at the same time to emphasize the gravity with which we view the latest developments. The enclosed text will show what we have in mind and would enable Ambassador Yost to enter into a detailed discussion of the problem with the King. (I might add that the occasion could also provide an unusual opportunity to ascertain current Moroccan intentions with regard to the Congo and Algeria.)
Ambassador Yost is leaving for Morocco today, February 17, 1961, and expects to see the King the first part of next week. If you approve the enclosed message we will transmit it to our Embassy in Rabat for Ambassador Yost. /3/
Dean Rusk /4/
/3/ Attached to the source text but not printed. On February 17, the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Rabat to hold for Ambassador Yost. (Telegram 1202; Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/2 - 1761) The letter explained to King Mohammed that Ambassador Yost was being transferred to another post at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, reminded the King of the 1959 U.S. - Moroccan air base agreement, expressed concern over Morocco's recent military transaction with the Soviet Union, and said that Yost would be discussing with the King U.S. concern over Soviet technicians in Morocco.
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1 - 1861. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Root; cleared by Grantham (DOD), Bell, Penfield, and Veliotes; and approved by Hare.
Washington, February 18, 1961, 6:49 p.m.
1209. Hold for Ambassador Yost. Following will serve as guidance for your conversation with King on the problems posed by Moroccan acceptance of Soviet jet aircraft:
1. Our objective still remains as stated in Deptel 771, /2/ (1) persuade Morocco to store Soviet aircraft and (2) in any case prevent Soviet instructors and technicians from entering Morocco (or remaining if already there).
/2/ Telegram 771 to Rabat, December 7, 1960, provided the Ambassador with standby authority under certain conditions to offer a squadron of jet aircraft to the Moroccan Government. (Ibid., 771.5622/11 - 2960) For additional information on the Presidential Determination of December 6, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1968 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 812 - 814, footnote 1.
2. Arguments you use with King must be left largely your discretion and will presumably depend on trend actual conversation.
3. You should certainly emphasize extreme seriousness with which we view presence of Soviet bloc technicians and attempt explain, in whatever detail appropriate, jeopardy not only to United States but to Moroccan interests.
4. If King reiterates earlier assurances regarding Soviet Bloc technicians, you should express our appreciation but point out that, apart from problem of instructors, mere presence planes with technical and maintenance difficulties ensuing in time will sooner or later oblige Morocco obtain outside technical help. It would be useful if you could elicit Morocco's intentions this regard.
5. Regarding Bloc technicians already in Morocco, you should express your frank surprise in view assurances given you earlier. If King says they are merely assembly crew and will soon depart you should attempt to pin down exactly when. Throughout conversation you should attempt to elicit all possible information about Soviet planes, other military equipment, intended use thereof and nature and number accompanying personnel.
6. We suggest your tone at outset should be sympathetic but firm. If in course of conversation King adopts unhelpful attitude, and if in particular it appears to you GOM has in fact breached assurances given you, you may emphasize gravity with which US Government will view such development.
7. We naturally hope however conversation will take more encouraging direction. If this proves to be case and you feel King is looking for way out of his dilemma, you may point out, as you had indicated to him some months ago, that USG stands ready see how it can further help Morocco under present military assistance program. Specifically, you may if necessary draw on authority Deptel 771 to offer jet aircraft squadron, training aircraft and necessary training personnel. As you are fully aware, however, any aircraft offer must be contingent on achievement objectives para (1) above.
8. If King not satisfied with offer under Deptel 771 and shows desire either for jets of later model than F - 86's or for military transport aircraft (either in lieu of jets or in addition thereto), you may say you will personally recommend that USG give prompt and sympathetic consideration to King's wishes. Such assistance would of course likewise be to subject to conditions specified para (1). FYI. Regarding possibilities discussed Hare meeting Feb. 18 for improving US offer over that contemplated Deptel 771, additional assistance would of course require further formal action here, including Presidential determination. If King prefers military air transport to combat aircraft Defense thinks C - 54's could be made available. If he wants such transport aircraft in addition to F - 86's, this possibility too could be examined. If what he wants is improved type jet, there is possibility obtaining F - 100D's. If delivery any foregoing urgently required, planes could probably be taken from US operational units and delivered to Morocco in 15 to 30 days. Action to implement any part of foregoing would first require your recommendation based on conversation with King and then formal clearance and authorization as above, which we would undertake to obtain as rapidly as possible. Obviously we do not wish to go any further into aircraft aid than situation requires and of course would not wish contemplate such aid at all unless it achieves objectives para (1). But foregoing intended indicate to you lengths to which we are willing to try to go to achieve these objectives. End FYI.
9. Tactics in discussing aircraft assistance must again be left to you. You can perhaps say to King he will understand US assistance this nature could hardly be justified to American Congress or public if USSR, through introduction equipment and personnel, were in slightest position to threaten US air bases. You might then ask whether His Majesty would consider conveying his renewed assurances this regard in reply to President.
10. In connection foregoing, and particularly in regard to Embtel 1502 of February 14, /3/ you may also wish to remind King of his written assurances to President Eisenhower that GOM would not permit utilization of US bases relinquished to Morocco in any way inimical to US security. /4/
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/2 - 1461)
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 806 - 807.
11. You can say that you would like to report urgently to Washington King's responses and (if you have discussed possibility obtaining US aircraft) you are confident US can move rapidly to provide any equipment and training on which agreement reached.
12. Depending on King's reaction in your audience, you would presumably wish to take any appropriate steps that would be necessary to insure that Crown Prince does not feel we are circumventing him and to enlist support friendly members of cabinet. You may even think it desirable that Prince should be present in audience with King.
FYI. If conversation does not go as well as we hope, and particularly if GOM seems determined make use Soviet aircraft and technicians, question arises as to means and desirability demonstrating harder US line. On this we wish to be guided largely by your recommendations and assessment of effect any retaliatory measures on overall US interests. US economic aid suggests itself as one area where US could make its displeasure felt. While pressures this regard, particularly those likely to be felt by or revealed to Moroccan public, run risk at some point of dangerous counter-effects, it might be possible take certain meaningful steps in our dealings with GOM officials. For example, while $40 million aid figure has been announced to GOM, most of FY'61 program pending. Although GOM does not appear to be in pressing need this aid, we might, for example, stall on commodity import schedule or tighten up on terms $20 million loan (requiring written Battle Act assurances, etc.). In last analysis, however, this or any other form of reprisal would raise grave considerations requiring most careful study. End FYI.
Rusk
110. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61 - 10/61. Secret.
Washington, February 24, 1961.
SUBJECT
Soviet Military Assistance to Morocco
Ambassador Yost presented your letter to the King of Morocco in an audience on February 21 /2/ and is pursuing the problem posed by Morocco's acceptance of Soviet jet fighters in further conversations this week with the King, the Crown Prince and other key Moroccan officials. Characteristically, the King reserved comment on your letter until a later audience, but did repeat his assurances that nothing would be done to affect the U.S. bases. The Ambassador is planning to offer U.S. jets on condition that Soviet technicians be excluded from Morocco.
/2/ Ambassador Yost's report was sent to the Department of State in telegram 1571 from Rabat, February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/2 - 1261)
In this connection, I think you should know that, in addition to the squadron of F - 86's which the Ambassador is authorized to offer the King, the Ambassador is also authorized to say he will report sympathetically any interest the King expresses in a later model of U.S. jet fighter or in military air transport. The offer of any U.S. aircraft, however, is contingent on satisfactory assurances from the King that Morocco will store the Soviet jets and in any case will not permit Soviet technicians to remain in the country. As my memorandum of February 17 in connection with the message to the King pointed out, /3/ the Department of Defense feels very strongly about the threat which Soviet planes and technicians would pose for our military bases in Morocco, a threat which Defense feels, moreover, extends to our Spanish bases, the Sixth Fleet and NATO's southern flank in general. Defense feels so strongly about this matter that it is willing to go a long way to satisfy Moroccan military air requirements despite the political disadvantages in so doing, including the tinge of blackmail that would color such a move to block the Soviet military presence.
/3/ Document 108.
A Presidential determination to cover as much as $6.8 million for F - 86's was granted on December 6, 1960, but Ambassador Yost did not then feel it necessary to draw on the standby authority given him. If it is now necessary to go beyond this earlier proposition, either by furnishing a later type of jet or by providing military transport aircraft, the cost might rise appreciably and would require a further Presidential determination. I understand Defense estimates that a squadron of F - 100 - Ds might cost as much as $20 million, not including the expenses for spares and maintenance. I do not know that it will be necessary to go to these lengths. Much depends on Ambassador Yost's success in getting the Moroccans to reaffirm their earlier assurances that Soviet technicians would not be permitted in Morocco. We have strong indications that Soviet personnel are already there, but they may be an assembly crew which will soon depart. In any case, I thought you should know where this matter now stands. The Moroccan Government under the initiative of the Crown Prince, does appear to be opening itself dangerously to Soviet assistance. It is not difficult to understand why the Pentagon is apprehensive about this development, given the importance of our bases in Morocco and in Spain as well as Morocco's strategic position on the Straits of Gibraltar.
Dean Rusk /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
111. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Stoessel) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770V.00/2 - 2761. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic and Root on February 24 and cleared by Ferguson, Root, Penfield, and Hartley and in substance with Lindquist. The source text is attached to a transmittal note from Stoessel to Dungan noting that the Acting Secretary had seen and concurred in the enclosed memorandum on Mauretania.
Washington, February 27, 1961.
SUBJECT
U.S. - Morocco Differences over Mauretania
The differences between the United States and Morocco over Mauretania are simply stated. Morocco maintains that the government of Mauretania is a puppet regime, fabricated and supported by France to prevent the return to Morocco of territory rightfully hers. Morocco was of course anxious for the support of the United States, as a great power. We have in effect refused this by recognizing the independence of Mauretania and by showing our willingness to vote for Mauretania's admission to the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has, for ulterior reasons, favored Morocco in this dispute.
Morocco's political claims are not based on conclusive evidence, but there are cultural, ethnic and religious links between the two countries. Roughly two thirds of Mauretania's mainly nomadic population of about 600,000 are Moorish. Only along the Senegal river in the south is the population predominantly negroid. So far as we can judge, most of the Mauretanian tribal and religious chiefs who presently dominate local politics acknowledge the authority of the government of Mauretania's Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah, but there is some internal opposition and Morocco makes much of several prominent Mauretanians who have gone into voluntary exile in Morocco and hold important government posts there.
Morocco bases its claims on historical links (however tenuous) going back to the early days of Islam in North Africa, on the traditional fealty alleged to have been paid the Sultans of Morocco and, of course, on the ``true wishes" of the Mauretanian population. To back the latter assertion Morocco has proposed the holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices.
France, on the other hand, alleges that national sovereignty in the present day legal sense did not exist in this remote and desolate land until the French arrived toward the latter part of the last century. The authority of independent Mauretania's present government is held to derive from the French right of conquest and from the elections which led to self-government.
What has made the US position particularly uncomfortable is the open and determined espousal of the Moroccan claim by King Mohammed himself. Furthermore, the claim has at least the overt backing of all political tendencies in Morocco and it would now be virtually impossible for the King or anyone else in Morocco to back off from it. /2/ At the very least, a face-saving device of some sort would have to be provided.
/2/ While the above was written prior to King Mohammed's death the new King can be expected to pursue this claim with equal, if not even greater, vigor. [Footnote in the source text. King Mohammed V died on February 26. (Telegram 1604 from Rabat, February 26; ibid., 771.11/2 - 2661)]
We had hoped that there would be sufficient opposition to Morocco on this issue from other African countries to deflect Moroccan ire from us. This indeed appeared to be the situation at the time we recognized Mauretania's independence but the situation since then has become a good deal more equivocal. While many nations have recognized Mauretania's independence and, therefore, would presumably vote for its entry into the United Nations, Morocco by skillful horse trading with other nations with policies in need of support, has succeeded in lining up behind itself a group of assertive, radical Afro-Asian states. All of the 10-member Arab League, except Tunisia, and there is recent indication that Tunisia is falling back to a more guarded position, support the Moroccan position and do not recognize Mauretania. The three radical West African states--Ghana, Guinea, and Mali--recognized Mauretania but nevertheless approved a resolution at the recent Casablanca Conference which tacitly supports Morocco's claims. Indonesia, also, has publicly come out in favor of Morocco's claim, seeing therein a parallel to its claim to West New Guinea.
The Soviet Union has backed the Moroccan position by vetoing Mauretania's application for U.N. membership, seeing in this dispute a chance to exacerbate U.S. Moroccan relations and put pressure on our bases. The Soviets did not take an unequivocal stand on the merits of the Morocco - Mauretania dispute but sought merely to link Mauretania's admission to that of Outer Mongolia. However, the Moroccan Government and press have overlooked this subtlety and give the Soviets full credit for blocking Mauretania's admission to the U.N.
The United States recognizes Mauretania, voted for its admission to the U.N., and sent a Presidential delegation to the independence celebrations in Nouakchott. Our Ambassador in Dakar is also accredited to Mauretania. Most Western European and Latin American countries, a majority of the non-Arab Asian countries, and all tropical African states have extended recognition to Mauretania. France and a number of Western-oriented French-speaking African states have vigorously championed Mauretania's cause.
What had been a territorial dispute of murky antecedents, is now, as a result of Moroccan tenacity, being presented as an issue of colonialism versus independence, a test of those who support puppets and those that do not. While the other states probably are supporting Morocco for tactical reasons, there is no evidence that Morocco can be dissuaded from pursuing her claim.
In Rabat's telegram 1589 of February 23, /3/ Ambassador Yost puts the problem vividly from the Moroccan point of view. In Dakar's 379 of December 1, /4/ however, Ambassador Villard cogently defended the Mauretanian position. Ambassador Yost thinks we should proceed with ``extreme caution" and not aid or support Mauretania ``any more than is absolutely unavoidable." Ambassador Villard's recommendation was that we make a statement when the question of Mauretania's membership in the U.N. comes up urging Morocco and Mauretania promptly to consult on means of overcoming their differences and of developing close and mutually valuable collaboration.
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., 771.022/2 - 2361)
/4/ Not printed. (Ibid., 303/12 - 160)
The US thus faces a dilemma in which it cannot entirely avoid antagonizing one side or the other. It is possible, however, that we can limit the damage to ourselves in strategically-located Morocco, where we have a particularly heavy military investment, by avoiding any initiative on this primarily African question. Where we are obliged to express a view, we should try to stress the interest which both parties have in an amical relationship.
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. /5/
/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Stoessel signed the original.
112. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/3 - 2861. Secret. Drafted by Root on March 22 and cleared by Williams and McGhee.
Washington, March 28, 1961.
SUBJECT
Moroccan Bases
In response to your letter, I have prepared the attached, rather comprehensive memorandum on Moroccan bases. /2/ The Moroccans are now anxious that we accelerate our evacuation and that we assist Morocco to make good use of the bases for civil aviation training and other purposes. In a recent call on me the Moroccan Ambassador urged that we send a special emissary to Rabat to discuss the utilization question with the Moroccan authorities. /3/
/2/ An undated memorandum, ``Status and Problems of U.S. Bases in Morocco," from Assistant Secretary Williams to Under Secretary Bowles, is attached to the source text but is not printed.
/3/ The March 22 conversation was recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is in Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/3 - 2261.
There seems to me to be an opportunity here--to help in Morocco's technical and economic development, to insure that Communist bloc powers do not come on the bases when we leave and to preserve for as long as possible our essential military interests in the remaining facilities. Although we have an agreement permitting us to retain our bases until the end of 1963, the internal Moroccan political situation is not promising and we would do well to meet constructively and not negatively Moroccan pressures on us.
Chester Bowles /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original.
113. National Security Action Memorandum No. 34 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret.
Washington, April 5, 1961.
TO
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Memorandum on Moroccan Bases, dated March 28, 1961, from Acting Secretary Bowles /2/
/2/ Document 112.
I am returning herewith the subject memorandum and attachment.
The memorandum of March 23, 1961 (attached to reference memorandum) on ``Status and Problems of U.S. Bases in Morocco," appears a suitable basis for exploring a new policy towards the Moroccan bases. I suggest, therefore, that the Department of State take the leadership in seeking the views of Defense, CIA and ICA as the memorandum suggests. After these soundings, a definite recommendation should be made to me by the Department of State, with dissenting comment from other agencies if they desire. In particular, these appear to be the critical questions.
1. Should an early beginning be made in the transfer of the Nouasseur base?
2. Should U.S. assistance--possibly through American airlines--be granted in converting that base to civilian use?
3. Should withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from Kenitra be contemplated?
4. Should we seek a Moroccan commitment to the long-term maintenance of U.S. Navy Communications at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel?
5. Should we associate ourselves with the goal of a denuclearized Africa?
6. Should we seek a firm Moroccan commitment to keep Soviet forces out of the surrendered bases?
7. Should we seek to negotiate the notion of a U.S. return to the surrendered bases at a time of crisis?
John F. Kennedy
114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5 - MSP/3 - 2861. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Junkermann, (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, and CINCEUR.
Washington, April 14, 1961, 9 p.m.
1529. Generally speaking, we are in full accord with Embassy's advice that we must be sufficiently responsive to King's desires to maintain good relations with him but must at same time avoid damaging our relations with his opponents.
Dept has carefully weighed proposal contained Embtel 1896 /2/ but considers dangers U.S. over-involvement with new King do not warrant pressing forward in supply of military items at this critical time, particularly in absence any indication from King he anxious U.S. should proceed.
/2/ Telegram 1896 from Rabat, March 28, had asked whether the Departments of State and Defense saw any objection to the Army Attache proceeding with discussion of the Royal Moroccan Army's requirements for U.S. military assistance, without revealing the projected FY 1961 U.S. aid figures. (Ibid., 771.5 - MSP/3 - 2861)
His utilization Soviet technicians with MIGs despite his assurances to contrary, opposition criticism of him for acceptance this Soviet equipment, total absence of past cooperation with U.S. in field training assistance to make U.S. furnished equipment useful and still unresolved question of unloading charges all argue against probable success U.S. overtures of this sort now. Reasons for which GOM has in past withheld publicity U.S. aid still obtain.
U.S. programs of support for Morocco in existence prior to King's death are continuing and are of sufficient magnitude to refute any allegations U.S. now withholding support from Morocco. King himself has Amb. Yost's assurances our continuing willingness to be helpful. Furthermore, dramatic evidence this fact will come in next few days with signing FY 61 aid agreement and inauguration sizable famine and work relief programs.
On other hand, we agree (Embtel 1816) /3/ it preferable not give opposition grounds for believing we have sided with Monarch against it. Embassy has reported many friendly counsels U.S. avoid open support of King himself, as arms program would exemplify, as opposed to program for people of Morocco, i.e. economic aid and famine relief.
/3/ Dated March 17. (Ibid., 611.71/3 - 1761)
For foregoing reasons Dept considers it advisable next moves regarding U.S. arms program come from King. Arrival of new Ambassador will give King natural opportunity to do so if he so wishes. Fact of approaching end of our fiscal year does not justify moving forward with program if it is not really wanted by King and if under present circumstances it would result in strong opposition resentment. If, as he well may, King should indicate suddenly he desires U.S. proceed post haste with second slice arms program we would respond to best our ability.
Rusk
115. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Operations for Politico - Military Affairs (Newman) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. Cleared (in substance) by Williams, Johnson, Gullion, Bell, and Bohlen. The Director of Operations administered a special component for politico-military affairs that served under Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. This memorandum was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Ralph Dungan at the White House which noted that NSAM No. 34 had directed the Department to explore recommendations for a new policy on the Moroccan bases and to seek the views of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the ICA. Following preliminary discussions with Paul Nitze of Defense, the Department believed that further examination of the military considerations involved was needed before balanced recommendations taking into account political, military, and intelligence requirements could be made to the President. In the meantime, it was forwarding this interim memorandum on the subject, which had been cleared by Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) Further documentation on the follow-up to NSAM No. 34 is ibid.
Washington, May 2, 1961.
SUBJECT
Moroccan Bases
Since receipt of National Security Action Memorandum No. 34, April 5, 1961, the Department of State has been reviewing our present policy on Moroccan bases, particularly with a view towards developing answers to the questions posed in the aforementioned memorandum. It is evident that the complexities of the problems involved will require considerable consultation with the other agencies involved and makes possible only the submission of an interim report at this time. The Department of State is moving forward rapidly on the necessary consultations.
The Department of State's memorandum of March 28, 1961, /2/ on Moroccan bases dealt primarily with the political problems that have arisen in our relations with Morocco as a result of the presence of our bases. While the memorandum points out the real political advantages which would accrue to the United States if certain actions were taken, it is evident that these actions could have serious military implications. These military considerations, revolving essentially around the relationship of the Moroccan bases to the totality of our national security posture, particularly the credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our strike capability, require discussion with Defense. The Department of State feels that it is essential that our recommendation to you reflect the proper balance of political and military considerations to the end that the actions proposed represent a net advantage to US national security.
/2/ Document 112.
With regard to the specific questions posed, it is possible at this time to provide some tentative answers which will be coordinated with other agencies during our consultations. On the timing of our withdrawal from Nouasseur and Kenitra and the retention of our communication facilities at Sidi Yahia, Bouknadel and Sidi Slimane, these are actively being discussed with the Pentagon to determine their general relationship and importance to over-all United States military posture. In connection with this appraisal, we will also wish to consider the relationship of US bases to our developing disarmament policy. This consideration might well affect the timing of withdrawal for we may wish to seek to gain something for such action through disarmament negotiations.
With respect to the role of United States assistance in converting those bases we proposed to relinquish to civilian use, we believe there is a real opportunity through this means to demonstrate our interest in Morocco. The possibilities involved in this line of action are actively being examined by the Department with Defense and ICA.
The question of associating ourselves with the goal of a denuclearized Africa is an extremely important but difficult problem which affects our policies in other areas. The pressures for a UN resolution establishing a denuclearized Africa require careful handling because Morocco is one of the sponsoring countries. Fortunately, the resolution for a denuclearized Africa has been carried over to the next session so that it is not necessary to come to an immediate decision on how we are to handle the matter. If military considerations relating to the utility of our installations in Morocco at the present time so dictate, these pressures should not be encouraged, though we should not adopt a public stance against this goal. There is the additional consideration that the adoption of the concept of a denuclearized zone would establish a precedent for the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, communist powers, as well as other nations, would seize upon this precedent to argue for the extension of this principle to other parts of the world which, if successful, could profoundly affect our overall military posture.
With regard to securing a commitment from the Moroccans to keep Soviet forces out of the surrendered bases, we have a commitment from the late King, which King Hassan has confirmed, that the bases will never be used against us. While the present commitment may not be as exact or as precise as we might desire, it is nevertheless adequate. It appears that this matter can be safely deferred until Ambassador Bonsal has had an opportunity to appraise US - Moroccan relationships generally. We can then determine if it is desirable to revive the question of securing a more definitive commitment from the King.
On the question of whether the surrendered bases should be made available to United States forces at a time of crisis, we believe that any negotiations to gain us this specific right would unduly complicate our relationships with Morocco. The reality of the situation is such that, if the Moroccans were with us in a time of crisis, they would probably permit the return of United States forces. In the event they were not sympathetic with our policies and objectives at that time, it is highly unlikely they would agree to the return of our forces. This, too, is a matter which we feel should be deferred until we have the advantage of Ambassador Bonsal's appraisal.
The Department of State anticipates very shortly submitting its recommendations and the views of the other agencies concerned. If approved they will serve as the basis for instructions to be given to Ambassador Bonsal prior to his departure for Morocco.
116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5 - 2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McClintic and Root; cleared by Bronez (DOD), Templeton (ICA), Brown, Bohlen, and Newman; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris and Madrid.
Washington, May 26, 1961, 8:06 p.m.
1785. For Ambassador Bonsal: On your arrival Morocco you will face five major problems relating to US bases: (1) evacuation schedule for bases and eventual Moroccan utilization thereof; (2) threat to security of bases from presence of Soviet technicians who arrived with Soviet gift of MIGs; (3) question of post-1963 facilities; (4) US military assistance to Morocco; (5) Moroccan interest in increased use Nouasseur. You aware background these problems and fact there has been little or no forward motion since death King Mohamed V with consequent disruption Moroccan Government. You know that with regard to (1) we have outstanding request from new King to accelerate evacuation and to assist Morocco make appropriate use of base facilities (e.g. for civil aviation); (2) Soviet technicians remain in Morocco despite assurances from both late and present Kings there would be no jeopardy to our bases; (3) King knows we would like to retain communications facilities but has given us no commitment; (4) conditional standby authority to offer jets has not been used and we have not yet negotiated with Morocco second slice of military assistance program for RMA recommended by US Survey Team; (5) USAF authorized the USAF Commander to permit civil use of Nouasseur as weather alternate to Cazes within the limits of Nouasseur's civil facilities but for security reasons have withheld authorization of any use by Soviet bloc civil aircraft.
Lapse of time since these questions last discussed with King and changes taking place in Moroccan internal political life indicate desirability your making fresh appraisal of situation and submitting to us your recommendations before we take further steps. Base agreement and military aid program were negotiated in 1959 with popular and respected King Mohamed V and Prime Minister Ibrahim, /2/ who also enjoyed wide popular support. Regime under Hassan with which we must now deal is much less popular and secure and to maintain itself in power will probably have to rely increasingly on Army and Police. This suggests we must walk narrow line between over identification with monarchy under attack from some of most dynamic segments population and antagonizing King to detriment our objectives as long as he is in power.
/2/ For documentation on the negotiation of these agreements, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 776 - 800.
We hope you can utilize your first interviews with King and ministers to form judgment their intentions and prospects without being drawn into new commitments, but being careful to guard against giving any indication we intend to withdraw from existing ones. We particularly want to obtain your estimate of best way to retain essential facilities to end of 1963 and to lay ground for any possibility there may be of preserving some position after 1963. You should make recommendations regarding any specific gestures which would gain us concrete advantages in foregoing respects, such as training Moroccans in airport management and maintenance and early release of Nouasseur to Morocco with assistance in the development of civil terminal facilities. In same context, we would like your views on (1) when to proceed with second year of military assistance program, and (2) usefulness of providing planes (and whether jets or transports) to Moroccan Air Force.
You will of course have to use your own discretion in determining best approach to King in initial encounters. To strike positive note you can perhaps express interest in King's suggestions for future Moroccan utilization which he promised give us after Ramadan and say we are prepared, if King so wishes, to send experts to examine with GOM means by which bases might be made most beneficial to Morocco. You should emphasize need for careful planning to avoid interference with present military requirements at bases and to resolve many points of conflict that will arise in considering civil use.
Some discussion of King's earlier request for accelerated evacuation is probably unavoidable. You may say this matter being considered at highest levels US Government but raises grave problems. World situation has not improved but worsened since base agreement reached in 1959 and importance of bases has therefore actually increased. While we consider departure 1963 firm obligation and orderly phase-out will require beginning of progressive withdrawal well before then, we are convinced that under present world conditions this arrangement will impair the security arrangements of the free world. We would appreciate learning King's sentiments on this subject. US Government anxious to be as helpful as possible but at same time hopes for sympathetic understanding of its own responsibilities. You should indicate to King that it is our firm conviction, and one that we would hope he shares, that the strength of the free world must be preserved to assure the maintenance of peace. To weaken it not only increases the chances of Soviet moves toward general war but greatly augments the likelihood of Communist expansion by military or covert means leading to the takeover of smaller nations.
You may find occasion at this point to remind King of our interest in post-1963 communications facilities and to probe how far he seems willing to go by way of assurances in this regard.
You should leave King in no doubt about our continued concern over presence Soviet technicians in Morocco. You can refer to assurances which both King and his father gave Ambassador Yost and say you would like to ascertain for your government where this matter now stands. You should reiterate that we consider our bases insecure so long as there are Soviet pilots or instructors anywhere in Morocco.
Present tenuous situation in Morocco would seem to make it inadvisable to press arms or aircraft supply questions at this time. If, however, King shows interest in these questions, you can refer to earlier indications of our willingness to try to be of help and say you will report his suggestions promptly to Washington.
You may of course repeat assurances contained President's letter conveyed by Ambassador Yost and emphasize importance which President attaches to continuing friendly relations which have extended over so many years. At this point, you should state your view that US economic assistance to Morocco over the past few years had been considerable, that you understand and fully expect to support this assistance in the future and look forward to examining ways in which it can be made even more beneficial to Morocco. Unless you think it would arouse excessive expectations you may find it useful to indicate you expect return Washington within few weeks to give your views on how US - Moroccan cooperation can best be enhanced. /3/
Rusk
/3/ On June 12, Battle sent a copy of telegram 1785 to Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum noting that the Department of State had concluded that an on-the-spot appraisal by Ambassador Bonsal was a necessary element of the review of U.S. policy toward Morocco requested by NSAM No. 34. The Department intended to submit its recommendations once it had received Bonsal's views and consulted with other agencies. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/6 - 1261)
117. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Jan. - Aug. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Lang on June 23. Attached to a July 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze to Secretary of Defense McNamara recommending that he sign the attached memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Washington, June 28, 1961.
SUBJECT
Retention of US Communications Facilities in Morocco Beyond CY 1963
In your memorandum of 15 June 1961 (JCSM - 409 - 61), /2/ it was recommended that the President be given a briefing on the need for retaining communications facilities in Morocco after 1963 and that we urge the State Department to pursue with increased vigor its efforts to obtain Moroccan concurrence to our continued use of the facilities.
/2/ Attached but not printed.
I have no objection to a discussion of this matter with the President. He has displayed personal interest in examining the need for retention of our facilities in Morocco, in light of the political liabilities involved. It is suggested, however, that the Joint Chiefs may wish to review for clarity the presentation forwarded with your memorandum of 15 June 1961. Paragraph 7 of the presentation (as well as paragraph 2 of the memorandum itself) indicates that retention of the communications facilities in Morocco is essential. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum states that acceptable alternative means or sites have not yet been found. However, paragraph 5 of the presentation suggests that equivalent substitute facilities could be found through expansion of facilities in Spain and the establishment of new facilities in the Central Mediterranean area.
It would also be most useful to me to have clarification along these lines for any subsequent discussion of this problem with the Secretary of State. I have particularly in mind more precise information concerning the effect upon our Defense Communications System should the Moroccan facilities be lost after 1963 and what possible alternatives there may be, including their cost, the additional land requirements they entail in other countries, the minimum period of time required for their development once political arrangements are completed, and the specific extent, if any, to which they would not constitute equal substitute facilities. This information would be especially pertinent in evaluating what economic, military, political or other quid pro quo the United States should be prepared to offer to retain the Moroccan communications facilities after Ambassador Bonsal submits his appraisal as to what would be necessary to obtain Moroccan consent in this regard.
Since Ambassador Bonsal is expected to return on consultation in the relatively near future, /3/ I would appreciate receiving these clarifying materials as quickly as possible.
/3/ On July 7, the Department of State sent a memorandum to Bundy at the White House noting that since Ambassador Bonsal's arrival in Morocco on May 20 and presentation of his credentials to the King, he had had no opportunity to meet with him for further discussions, despite the Ambassador's indications that he would like to do so. Thus, Bonsal was continuing his assessment, and once the King had made known his requirements for U.S. action regarding the bases, he would report promptly and return to Washington, if the situation warranted. (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34)
Roswell L. Gilpatric /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
118. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 680.1 Morocco. Top Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed are: Appendix A, ``State of Post-1963 Military Requirements for Bases in Morocco"; Appendix B, ``Possible Courses of Action To Achieve Military Objectives in Morocco"; and Appendix C, ``Suggested Bargaining Positions in Possible Negotiations With Morocco."
JCSM - 471 - 61 Washington, July 13, 1961.
SUBJECT
Bases in Morocco
1. The United States has no formal base rights agreement with Morocco. The Joint Communique of 22 December 1959 /2/ by President Eisenhower and the late King Mohammed V commits us to withdraw all our military forces by the end of CY 1963. This commitment necessarily required that the Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco be included in the recent US Air Force submission of overseas base closures to the Secretary of Defense for evaluation within the scope of the Department of Defense, Project 71. Despite the foregoing, significant military requirements still exist for bases in Morocco through 1963 and beyond. A detailed statement of these requirements is attached. The requirement for the retention of US communications and supporting facilities in Morocco, post-1963, has been previously stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM - 317 - 60 and JCSM - 409 - 61. /3/
/2/ For a record of the December 22 conference between President Eisenhower and King Mohammed V, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 796 - 800.
/3/ JCSM - 317 - 60 is not printed. Regarding JCSM - 409 - 61, see Document 117.
2. Military requirements existed in December 1959 for retention of bases in Morocco beyond 1963 but were subordinated to overriding political considerations in arriving at the Joint Communique. These military needs have become more urgent in light of significant changes since December 1959 in the political and military considerations concerning our Moroccan Bases. In his Defense Budget Message to Congress on 28 March 1961, /4/ the President expressed two of these changes: (1) the need for an increased alert posture to deter general war, and (2) the need for a ready capability to wage limited warfare with conventional weapons. Since the Joint Communique on Moroccan bases, these bases have become increasingly important for possible contingency operations in Africa or the Middle East. Too, our military force structure has not changed from manned aircraft to missiles at a sufficient rate to eliminate the need for bases in Morocco and it appears that such a change will not occur at least through 1966.
/4/ For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229 - 240.
3. At the request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), certain State Department officials, including the new US Ambassador to Morocco, were provided information by Air Force and Navy representatives regarding the military factors affecting our bases in Morocco. This meeting afforded State Department representatives a better understanding of military problems in Morocco. Subsequent to this meeting, a State Department instruction /5/ was forwarded to the US Ambassador requesting that he make a fresh appraisal of the situation and recommend courses of action which might fulfill military requirements in Morocco. The Ambassador's recommendations are expected in a few weeks at which time the Department of State is expected to consult further with Defense representatives on this matter.
/5/ Document 116.
4. In anticipation of further action by the Department of Defense on this subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reiterate their view, which was previously expressed in June 1959 to representatives of the Departments of Defense and State /6/ that the bases in Morocco should be retained until the need for them no longer exists and that all feasible means should be taken to achieve this goal. In this connection, there are attached for your information, in addition to a statement of military requirements, suggestions regarding possible courses of action and possible bargaining positions that might be employed to achieve our military objectives in Morocco.
/6/ See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 779 - 785.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer /7/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/7/ Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.
119. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Navy (Fay) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 1/61 - 10/61. Secret. Attached to a transmittal note from Kenneth O'Donnell to Bundy stating: ``The President would like you to read this and give him the benefit of your thinking as rapidly as possible." A handwritten notation says ``done." (Ibid.)
Washington, July 17, 1961.
SUBJ
Retention of Department of Defense Facilities in Morocco
The Eisenhower - King Mohammed V agreement in December 1959 stated in part that the United States would withdraw from its bases in Morocco prior to December 31, 1963 with the possible exception of certain communications facilities in Kenitra. This latter exception was deliberately included to protect and retain if possible, not only the Navy's main radio [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but also the supporting Navy air and sea communications facilities in Kenitra proper. This complex is the Navy's most important in the European - African area.
It is the Navy's position that if certain moves are made, she will be able to keep her very important naval communications installations near Port Lyautey. Our justification for this position is based on the following.
King Hassan II had personally scheduled a departure call on Thursday, 13 July for Captain John L. Counihan, File Number 071627, who was under orders to return to CONUS for duty. /2/ Prior to Captain Counihan's appointment, the King scheduled Ambassador Phillip Bonsal for his initial discussions which, it is understood, included the question of United States bases. /3/
/2/ On July 26, the Department of State sent a report of Counihan's conversation with the King ``Eyes Only" to Ambassador Bonsal in telegram 111 to Rabat. Bonsal was informed that Counihan had met personally with the President following his return to Washington, and that the Navy intended to follow through with its previous decision assigning him to Washington. Noting that the King had said nothing to either Counihan or Bonsal about his conversations with either, Rusk asked the Ambassador to keep these facts in mind in preparing his final recommendations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/7 - 2661)
/3/ Bonsal summarized the portion of his July 13 conversation with the King dealing with bases in telegram 84 from Rabat, July 14. The Ambassador reported that the King had dropped his previous attempt to hasten U.S. evacuation of the bases and was most interested in a careful study of the possibilities of converting those bases to Moroccan purposes. Hassan also said that the Soviet technicians in Morocco had completed their work and would depart soon, and that he believed an arrangement could be reached under which the United States could maintain communications facilities in Morocco. (Ibid., 771.56311/7 - 1461)
During the conference with Captain Counihan, the King expressed his personal and Morocco's regret at the Captain's departure and inquired if the Captain was interested in remaining in Morocco for a longer time. He said that he would like to have the Captain serve as a special technical adviser to his Minister of Interior and Chief of Royal Cabinet, M. Guedira, in matters pertaining to the bases. He indicated he would amplify these instructions upon the return of Captain Counihan to Morocco after his discussions with the proper Washington officials. He then added that he recognized the importance of the U.S. Navy communications facilities in Morocco to the support of U.S. Navy forces in the Mediterranean and he, the King, felt that a suitable arrangement could be made between the Government of Morocco and the United States for their continued use after 1963. As to the main Navy base in Kenitra, he expressed an opinion that after the French withdrawal, the base could be converted to a Moroccan base in which the U.S. Navy would remain as tenants and with an additional role as instructor in maintenance and technical fields for the Moroccan Armed Forces on that base. He thought that the Moroccan Navy (2 PCs) could profit from U.S. Navy's assistance.
He then asked that Captain Counihan personally convey these sentiments in a closely held manner to the responsible authorities in Washington.
This unique arrangement could present some problems. It will take the nicest sense of judgment in the relationship between the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, U.S. Naval Activities to successfully exploit this unusual opportunity to influence Moroccan programs and policies regarding the bases.
There is a possibility that an opportunity might even arise during this period which could result in extension of tenure of certain U.S. Air Force facilities on a joint basis with Morocco.
Captain Counihan has been Commander, Naval Activities, Port Lyautey since 15 December 1957 and has built up an unusually friendly rapport, not only with the King, but with the Moroccans in general in Rabat and Kenitra. He was instrumental in providing extensive aid to the Moroccans during the Agadir earthquake.
It is our belief that without Captain Counihan working in this capacity, we stand to lose not only the SAC bases, but all of our military facilities and therefore feel that if the State Department will agree to letting Captain Counihan accept the King's offer, we will be able to retain the approximately $100,000,000 communications facilities that the Navy uses to serve the Mediterranean area.
Very respectfully,
Paul B. Fay, Jr.
120. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Morocco (Bonsal) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.71/8 - 1461. Attached to a transmittal memorandum from Bonsal to Director of the Office of North African Affairs Witman, dated August 14. On August 24, a copy of Bonsal's recommendations was sent to Robert Komer at the White House. (Ibid., 611.71/8 - 2461)
Rabat, August 14, 1961.
CURRENT UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
Summary of Recommendations
The recommendations contained in this memorandum may be summarized as follows:
1. That we deal with the Moroccan Government as a relatively popular and relatively stable government and that we abandon our concern about overidentification.
2. That the survey group to study post-1963 uses of the bases and to make recommendations thereon be activated and despatched to Morocco without delay (perhaps, however, not until after the Soviet pilots and technicians have departed).
3. That we submit an offer to the King covering a long-term relationship in the field of military aviation training and materiel supply. /2/
/2/ On August 8, the Department of State Executive Secretary, Lucius D. Battle, sent a memorandum to Frederick G. Dutton at the White House concerning the King of Morocco's dissatisfaction with the lack of U.S. aid to the Moroccan Air Force, a subject in which the President had expressed an interest. It noted that Hassan had expressed some bitterness to Ambassador Bonsal on July 28 over the fact that the possibility of Morocco receiving U.S. jets, which he had discussed with General Wade in January, had never materialized. The memorandum pointed out that the removal of Soviet personnel had clearly been a stipulation of any such offer, and that Ambassador Yost had subsequently indicated that Moroccan requests for U.S. aid to the Moroccan Air Force would be sympathetically considered. (Ibid., AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, M - 12 Moroccan Air Force 1961)
4. That we prepare and submit a detailed offer covering the use of the naval communications facilities at Kenitra after 1963 for submittal to the King as soon as possible.
5. That we make a thorough re-examination of the justification from the U.S. point of view of maintaining these communications facilities on Moroccan soil after 1963.
6. A decision is required as to policies to be followed by us in the event promises regarding the departure of the Soviet pilots and technicians are not implemented. (This was mentioned to Balafrej again on August 14--he gave fresh assurances.)
7. That the Embassy and USOM be in a position to initiate negotiations with the Government of Morocco for the FY - 1962 Aid Program as soon as possible after October 1.
8. That similarly we be in a position to initiate negotiations for the third slice of the Military Assistance Program during the fall of this year.
9. That a date be established for Balafrej's visit to Washington and be communicated to him as soon as possible.
121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco 686, 10 Jan 62. Secret. Drafted by Lang. Attached to a memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to Secretary McNamara recommending that he sign the attached response to Secretary Zuckert's memorandum, and noting that if he and Under Secretary Bowles approved, the proposed offer would be conveyed to the President.
Washington, September 23, 1961.
SUBJECT
Moroccan Base Problems
In your memorandum of 20 September 1961, /2/ you recommended that any program of US support for the Moroccan Air Force, involving under present circumstances no guarantee of post-1963 SAC tenure in Morocco, should be carefully designed to avoid prejudicing our relations with Spain and future tenure at our Spanish bases.
/2/ Secretary Zuckert's memorandum had argued that since there was little or no possibility of effective use of U.S. bases in Morocco after 1963, the only significant benefit to hope for was precluding their future use by unfriendly forces. This meant that the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on its Spanish bases and thus any U.S. action in Morocco should not prejudice U.S. relations with Spain. (Ibid.)
In considering whether to recommend to the President that an assistance program be undertaken, we have had this aspect of the matter uppermost in mind. While we would hope that the program might later produce Moroccan cooperation on any continuing SAC post-1963 requirements, we foresee no assurance of this. The purpose of the program would be a calculated effort, albeit without certainty, to preclude further Soviet penetration of the Moroccan Air Force with equipment and technicians. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force have emphasized the threat which such Soviet penetration presents for our operations in Morocco and in Spain.
We agree that the impact of this program on US - Spanish relations is a critical aspect of the problem. ISA has now concurred in the program, because of the considered judgment, at the highest levels of the State Department, that the proposed program would not jeopardize our continued use of the Spanish bases after 1963 (although) we can anticipate increased Spanish demands for military assistance).
The recommendation to the President will be that the program should be kept to a minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support to the Moroccan Air Force. Initially, we would ascertain whether the establishment of flying training facilities and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco's air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, our offer would be limited to F - 86s. Should the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insist on an improved type of jet, a further determination must then be made in Washington weighing all circumstances at the time, whether to proceed with our offer of assistance. It is clearly understood by all concerned that F - 100s are not now available due to the Berlin and other contingency planning.
Ambassador Bonsal has placed heavy emphasis on the need for a highly competent Air Force officer, fluent in French and preferably of general officer rank, to discuss the program with King Hassan and senior officers of the Moroccan Air Force. The success of evolving a program satisfactory to the King, which also falls within limits acceptable to us, could well rest on the influence this officer can bring to bear. Accordingly, it is requested that an officer be carefully selected at the earliest possible time to carry out this task, with the possibility in mind that he may be called to Morocco in the early days of October. It is impossible to predict the length of his stay there. However, we should plan on his being available for this project for at least three months.
As to a JCS opinion, the Chiefs have already given us a military judgment on the desirability of retaining the Moroccan bases, and we are well aware of the importance they attach to the Spanish bases. Since the crucial question is one of political judgment--whether this offer to Morocco will jeopardize the Spanish position--I do not think a further opinion by the Chiefs is required at the present time.
Robert S. McNamara /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
122. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 34. No classification marking.
Washington, September 25, 1961.
SUBJECT
Action Program on Moroccan Base Issue
After long haggling /2/ State and Defense have agreed on a program designed to (a) preclude further Soviet air assistance to Morocco; (b) establish a favorable climate to help ensure the Moroccans live up to the base agreement until the end of 1963 and possibly extend our use in some form beyond; and (c) generally insure a reasonably favorable posture on the part of this highly strategic country.
/2/ Interagency meetings to discuss Bonsal's recommendations were held on August 29 and September 1. These discussions were recorded in memoranda of conversations that are in Department of State, AF/AFN Files: Lot 63 D 250, 1961 - , M - 12, Preparations for Continued Use of Communications Sites, and ibid., Central Files, 771.56311/9 - 161. Final consideration of the resulting policy recommendations took place at a joint State - Defense meeting on September 22. This discussion was recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is ibid., 771.5622/9 - 2261.
The chief means to this end would be to offer aid to the Moroccan air force. As you know, Morocco accepted last year two MIG - 15s and 12 MIG - 17s, along with technicians. The new king has informally suggested to us that US aid for his air force would be preferable to reliance on Moscow. He also has ideas about running a training program for other African countries. Ambassador Bonsal recommends that we agree in principle to provide such aid and send a survey team to see what the Moroccans would settle for. He believes that Morocco should be asked to put up a substantial portion of the cost. Our share cannot be costed for these reasons, but could run to a total of $20 - 50 million over several years.
Why aid to the air force? Giving Morocco advanced US jets will create real problems elsewhere (see below). We are already giving it on the order of $40 - 50 million in economic aid and $4 million in military. Could we increase this instead? The trouble is that we want to preclude a Soviet-supported air arm, and believe the King is otherwise highly likely to continue to accept such Soviet aid. Moreover, a US air mission, etc. in Morocco gives us a leg up on continued access to the bases and facilities after 1963.
What kind of air force? State and the Ambassador believe that the Moroccans may not settle for anything less than a squadron of Century series fighters, i.e. F - 100s. Giving F - 100s to Hassan would at a minimum generate Spanish demands for more advanced types. Spain only has F - 86s, although several squadrons of them. We currently contemplate giving Spain one squadron of 104Gs in 1964 - 1965, but our base rights there too are up for renegotiation by 1963 and will probably generate larger Spanish demands. In any case no F - 100s are currently available because of our Berlin build-up, and Defense would oppose F - 100s because of the implication for many other areas where we are resisting demands for advanced fighters, e.g. Thailand. The compromise recommendation is that we try hard to sell the Moroccans on F - 86s, but if the survey team discovers the price is higher, we'll re-examine our position.
Aid to the Moroccan air force is agreed by all concerned to be a gamble, but State and Defense believe it one we should take. On the plus side are the arguments that Morocco is itself highly important real estate because of our SAC bases, which the JCS say will be needed through 1966. We want to preclude a Soviet military presence so close to our Spanish and Moroccan bases, and at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Navy and SAC communications facilities in Morocco are also highly important, and DOD is anxious to arrange for their continued use, perhaps on a civilianized basis, after 1963. The proposed aid would help create a favorable atmosphere for such negotiations.
On the other hand, there are so many uncertainties in this highly complex and volatile situation that nobody can guarantee that US aid will ensure any hold on these bases after 1963, or even until then. King Hassan has shown more staying power than we thought he would last February when the old King died, and Bonsal thinks that he is a good bet to stay in power, but the Leftist opposition is strong and Hassan may make a false step at any time. Thus any promises made now by his regime may not be worth much later on. Many other developments might take place which could so upset US - Moroccan relations as to render any aid of limited bargaining value. Morocco has designs not only on parts of Algeria and Mauritania but on the remaining Spanish enclaves. Continued friction with Spain is inevitable and fighting may break out. Our position in this event might completely overshadow the positive gain from an accelerated aid program. Moreover, developments in Algeria might also force Morocco to take an anti-Western stand. In the endeavor to rid itself of Spanish enclaves and remaining French bases, Morocco might find it necessary to put pressure on us too.
So offering air force aid to Morocco would create serious problems with Spain and even France. The Ambassador argues that Spain should realize that a US-supported air force would be less of a threat to it than a Soviet-supported one. However, the Spanish doubt that we would buy much with a US air force and have no confidence in Hassan's regime.
Finally, can we be sure that US aid would in fact preclude acceptance of further Soviet military aid? Bonsal believes that we must make this in effect one of the terms of the deal, though we should handle it privately with the King.
I urge that you read State covering memo and pp. 6 - 8 of basic paper. /3/
/3/ On September 23, Acting Secretary Bowles transmitted the paper, ``Recommended U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco," to the President attached to a covering memorandum entitled ``Moroccan Bases and Soviet Penetration of the Moroccan Air Force." (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34) Pages 6 - 7 of the paper contained recommendations that were subsequently approved by the President in NSAM No. 102, printed as Document 123.
Recommendations:
1. That you approve the State/Defense proposals as our best bet; it's frankly a gamble but a good one in view of the military importance of the real estate to us.
2. That, as State recommends, you see Bonsal for a few minutes at New York or Newport. /4/ He's been cooling his heels for a month while State and DOD worked over his program, and must return to Rabat before Mennen Williams gets there on 2 October.
/4/ Ambassador Bonsal discussed these policy recommendations with the President in New York on September 25. Their conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the files is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco.
3. That you give him a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] message for Hassan. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] If you approve in principle an air force program, Bonsal urges the message stress the preclusive angle along the attached lines.
Robert Komer /5/
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
123. National Security Action Memorandum No. 102 /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Sept. - Dec. 1961. Secret. Information copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Washington, October 6, 1961.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Concerning Bases in Morocco
1. The President has approved the following State/Defense recommendations:
(1) While being prepared to fulfill our commitment to withdraw our forces by the end of 1963, we should exploit every feasible opportunity to retain the use of the facilities beyond that date. In the interim we should continue to evaluate the need for these facilities to determine whether it would be in the overall US interest to use extraordinary measures, such as a major political concession at an appropriate time, to retain the use of the bases after 1963.
(2) Given the present trend of developments in the Near East and Africa and the internal political uncertainties in Morocco, we should not base important military plans upon the expectation that we will be able to retain the military use of any facilities in Morocco after 1963. We should realize that the continued use of these facilities in Morocco, a non-aligned country, is subject to many hazards even under present conditions.
(3) There is little evidence that the King is now prepared to grant us, except on presumably unacceptable political conditions, an agreement which would assure the post-1963 tenure of communications sites. Additionally, such an agreement if consummated could become the immediate target of political attacks, and of course there can be no assurances such an agreement would be honored in the political circumstances prevailing at the end of 1963. Nevertheless, the Ambassador should explore the question further with the King on the basis of a detailed Defense proposal as to what would be acceptable after 1963.
(4) With due regard for financial costs, we should assist Morocco in the effective utilization of the bases after 1963 and, in this regard, endeavor to preserve some form of U.S. presence (civilian or military) on the bases after 1963. The objectives should be to:
(a) insure that the bases will not be made available in any way to hostile forces,
(b) insure that Moroccan utilization of the bases would be compatible with possible US use after 1963 and that the bases would be suitably maintained for such use, and
(c) make maximum use of the bases in connection with US programs of economic and technical assistance in Morocco.
(5) We should continue:
(a) to endeavor to improve our intelligence coverage regarding the activities of the Soviet pilots and technicians associated with the Soviet aircraft;
(b) to impress on appropriate Moroccan officials our deep concern regarding the presence of these pilots and technicians and to recall to such officials the King's statement regarding the termination of the Soviets' mission, and
(c) to consider whether we are in a position to take any sort of ``retaliatory" action.
(6) In the light both of the King's demonstrated determination to have a modern Air Force and of his demonstrated willingness to accept Soviet bloc assistance in this field, despite his professed interest in US support, we should be prepared to offer US support in the expansion of the Royal Moroccan Air Force, bearing in mind the effect which such support would have on our relations with Spain and France as well as African countries. Such support should be subject to the following general conditions and limitations:
(a) We would inform the French and Spanish of our intention to offer assistance to the Moroccan Air Force.
(b) If feasible the size of the program should be held down in the initial years to permit us to evaluate the success of the program in achieving US objectives before we become too heavily involved in the support of the Moroccan Air Force.
(c) The character and extent of any US assistance should be kept at the minimum consistent with our aim of precluding further Soviet support of the Moroccan Air Force. We should first endeavor to ascertain whether the establishment of a flying training facility and provision of aircraft to improve Morocco's air transport capability would suffice. If it nevertheless appears necessary to provide jet fighters and training, we should limit our offer to F - 86s. If the King of Morocco, despite our best efforts, insists on an improved type of jet we should at that point weigh carefully whether or not to proceed further with our offer. We should bear in mind, on the one hand, that an offer of Century Series aircraft would provoke demands from our allies and other unaligned nations for comparable assistance. However, we should, on the other hand, bear in mind that our failure, in these circumstances, to make available this type of aircraft would probably hasten Moroccan recourse to the Soviets, setting an example for other unaligned nations. In addition, although the King would probably carry through on the agreement permitting us tenure at our bases until the end of 1963, it can be assumed he would feel less inclined toward willing cooperation if we turned him down on his air force requests.
2. The following courses of action to implement the above policy have also been approved by the President:
(1) That an AID survey group be sent to Morocco in the near future (timing to be decided by the Ambassador after his return to Rabat) to study and make recommendations, with DOD advice and assistance, regarding the ways in which the US could assist the Moroccan Government in the post-1963 utilization of the bases by Morocco. The survey recommendations should point towards the retention of a US presence on the bases after 1963 and terms of utilization which would not preclude post-1963 military use if circumstances later warrant.
(2) That the Ambassador, on the basis of a detailed memorandum from the Department of Defense indicating how we would propose to ``convert" and "civilianize" the communications sites near Kenitra and Sidi Slimane, should seek such arrangements, under mutually acceptable conditions, which would permit the continued use of these facilities after 1963.
(3) That actions in the political field to which the King might attach importance should be continually examined.
(4) That the US, through Ambassador Bonsal, offer in principle to support the expansion of the Moroccan Air Force provided the Moroccan Government makes clear its willingness to bear a reasonable proportion of the costs.
(5) That a French-speaking Air Force senior officer be sent to Morocco with the agreement of the King to examine ways in which US support to the Moroccan Air Force might be furnished, this officer to be fully conversant with the effect such an effort to substitute the US for the USSR in Moroccan reliance on aviation equipment and training would have both on the possibilities for longer retention of our bases and on our relations with our allies and other African countries.
(6) That, based on his recommendations, the US draw up a program of assistance for the Moroccan Air Force to begin in FY '62.
(7) That active steps be taken so that the Embassy and USOM may be in a position to initiate negotiations with the Government of Morocco for the FY 1962 Economic Aid Program as soon as possible after October 1.
(8) That similarly we speed up procedures to permit the initiation of negotiations for the third slice of the current Military Assistance Program during the fall of this year.
3. The program of aid for the Moroccan Air Force will be predicated upon satisfactory private assurances from Morocco that no further Bloc Air Force aid will be accepted. If these assurances are not forthcoming, or if at any future date the Moroccans do accept further Bloc aid of this nature, the US program will be reviewed.
McGeorge Bundy /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.
124. Editorial Note
On October 23, 1961, Ambassador Bonsal met with King Hassan II and Minister of State Ahmed Balafrej. Bonsal conveyed a message from President Kennedy stating that if the King were to come to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly, he would be pleased to meet with him in Washington. The King responded that he did not plan to go to the United Nations this year but expressed interest in the possibility of a State visit to Washington the following year. He added that he planned to send Balafrej as his personal representative to Washington in late November to present a general explanation of Moroccan foreign policy, and hoped he would be received by the President. (Telegram 644 from Rabat, October 24; Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/10 - 2461)
During the conversation, Bonsal outlined the composition of the U.S. survey group that had been set up to study and formulate recommendations on the conversion of U.S. bases in Morocco to peaceful uses, and the King expressed his hope that the team, with which he personally planned to meet for a working session, would proceed to Morocco at an early date. (Telegram 645 from Rabat, October 24; ibid.) The Ambassador conveyed Kennedy's appreciation of Hassan's willingness to find a formula that would permit continued U.S. use of the naval communications facilities at Kenitra after 1963. The King reiterated his hope that this could be worked out, but stipulated that he wanted it done by the two of them on a very confidential basis. (Telegram 646 from Rabat, October 24; ibid.)
Bonsal said that the President had personally and carefully studied the U.S. position on Mauritania in line with the King's expressed desire that this be changed, but had decided, partly in view of previous U.S. commitments, that it could not be. (Telegram 647 from Rabat, October 24; ibid., 611.51T/10 - 2461)
On October 26, Bonsal reported that he and Hassan had not discussed aid to the Moroccan air force, but that he had since learned from Balafrej that the King continued to be interested in this subject and had been surprised that he had not raised it. He had told the Foreign Minister that he would welcome any information regarding Moroccan plans for developing its air force, and stated that he had previously reported his discussion of this subject with Hassan in July to Washington. Bonsal said he then mentioned the problem of Soviet pilots and technicians without eliciting any specific response. He believed that no further U.S. initiative was necessary for the moment, but that the United States should be ready to respond to any Moroccan initiatives. (Telegram 664 from Rabat, October 26; ibid., 771.5/10 - 2661)
125. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1, Sept. - Dec. 1961. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from the Director of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, William E. Lang, to William Witman, stating that the Department of Defense had undertaken to provide a memorandum on its specific post-1963 communications requirements and the ways in which the facilities in Morocco might be converted without jeopardizing the military mission. Noting that the attached memorandum had been cleared in Defense, Lang asked that it be forwarded to Ambassador Bonsal as a basis for discussion with the Moroccans concerning post-1963 communications arrangements.
A copy of the memorandum was transmitted to Bonsal on November 9. (Instruction CW - 4125; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/11 - 961) On December 5, the Ambassador responded that it was clear from the record of all previous conversations with the King that he assumed that continued operation of the communications sites after 1963 would be predicated upon generous U.S. assistance. Thus, the Embassy was convinced that any proposal to Hassan should be in the form of a comprehensive package covering in detail U.S. post-1963 needs and spelling out the advantages to Morocco of U.S. technical and economic aid. (Telegram 933 from Rabat; ibid., 771.56311/12 - 561)
Washington, October 25, 1961.
DEFENSE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUED USE OFCOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN MOROCCO AFTER 1963
There is a need for the continued operation after 1963 of the present U.S. Navy communications facilities at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia. In addition there is a need for continued operation of certain very limited U.S. Air Force communications facilities at and near the Sidi Slimane air base. The latter specifically include the communications center at Sidi Slimane air base, the receiver site about sixteen miles west of the air base and the transmitter site about ten miles east of the air base.
The most effective use of the U.S. Navy communications facilities at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia would require certain support facilities not available at the sites themselves (for example, some administrative, housing, medical, and commissary facilities, and the limited use of air transport facilities). The most practicable solution for these support needs would appear to be some arrangement, satisfactory to both Governments, under which continued use could be made of certain facilities at the Kenitra naval air station which already serve to support the communications sites.
The Air Force facilities at and near Sidi Slimane could be operated after 1963 by approximately thirty-five civilian employees of a U.S. civilian contractor. Operation of the sites at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia would require approximately their current personnel strength, but we would propose to make maximum practicable use of Moroccan personnel in order to reduce the total number of U.S. naval personnel involved. The naval personnel would wear civilian clothing at all times.
As King Hassan was advised during his first visit to Washington as Crown Prince in October 1960, the communications facilities encompassed by the United States proposal are important elements in the world-wide communications system of the United States forces. As such, they are important in the defense of the Western world, including North Africa, against potential Communist aggression. It was also confirmed to the Crown Prince that the function of the facilities would be to provide relay points for the transmission of administrative and operational messages.
126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7111/12 - 561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McClintic on December 1, cleared by Manfull and Smith (White House), and approved by Witman. Also sent to POLAD CINCSAC, Madrid, Paris, and CINCEUR.
Washington, December 5, 1961, 11:07 a.m.
751. During course 3 day visit here Balafrej received by following: President, Secretary, Secretary Defense, McGhee, Rostow, Williams, Kohler, Hamilton. Following based on uncleared memcons: /2/
/2/ Balafrej met with President Kennedy on November 27. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., 611.71/12 - 761. Balafrej met with Secretary Rusk on the morning of November 30. A memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams to Secretary of Defense McNamara summarizing this conversation is ibid., 771.11/11 - 3061. Secretary McNamara met with Balafrej on the afternoon of November 30. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., 771.56/11 - 3061.
In all discussions Balafrej emphasized Morocco's non-alignment, desire strengthen its long standing friendly relations with U.S., Morocco's development possibilities, lack of technicians, gratitude for US aid, preoccupation with need for rapid solution Algeria, pleasure at US understanding new nations' problems.
In addition foregoing more important specific points were as follows:
Balafrej conveyed personal letter to President from King expressing King's wishes for opportunity meet President and consolidation traditional US-Moroccan friendship. President mentioned: King's initiative Ben Bella extremely helpful, our belief de Gaulle moving as far and fast as circumstances permit, that Ghana, Guinea and particularly Mali cause concern and suggested Morocco well placed to steer these countries into more independent non-alignment. President expressed wish meet King sometime soon and said had discussed with Ambassador Bonsal possibility of an early visit of King to US.
Secretary emphasized our concern Morocco may be entering into new association with Soviets in direct and sensitive field of military aviation. Pointed out this would be difficult to explain to US people particularly at time when US and Morocco moving together toward regularizing our special situation in Morocco, i.e, bases. Balafrej countered by saying in view Morocco policy non-alignment a military alliance or accord with Soviets out of question as would be such an alliance with US. Said, however, it unthinkable Moroccan relations with US should be affected by a choice Morocco might make of a source from which to receive arms it needed. Continued with allusions to difficulties which US allies have caused Morocco and other newly independent or emerging countries (Algeria). Dwelt on cooperation US had offered and Morocco's gratitude for it. Contended he unaware of any specific offer from Soviets Morocco now had under consideration.
Secretary McNamara emphasized to Balafrej US willingness to assist Morocco once it became aware Morocco's military plans and needs. Agreed that Embassy Rabat would be channel for exchange info between GOM and USG. Balafrej said would inform King of US willingness on his return.
Comment: While Balafrej was left in no doubt as to seriousness with which US would view further acceptance Soviet aircraft and technicians, he also carried away impression our own willingness examine Moroccans requirements sympathetically.
Dept informed Balafrej gave lengthy interview to UPI, in which he allegedly heavily exaggerates, to benefit of Moroccan Monarchy, most of foregoing. Embassy may comment that this report based on Mr. Balafrej's alleged views of discussions about which Embassy has no full report.
Rusk
127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121. Secret. Attached to the source text is a transmittal note from Komer to Bundy, saying that the President should be informed immediately since an Air Force colonel was ready to leave for Morocco. Komer added: ``I also plan NSAM asking for progress report on Moroccan base question to force State to plan scheme for getting assurances at appropriate point." Another note to Bundy, attached to the source text and signed with the initials ``ab," noted that Komer was very anxious to know the President's reaction and that the Department of Defense was postponing sending the colonel to Rabat until it knew that the President had no objection.
Washington, January 5, 1962.
SUBJECT
Aid to Moroccan Air Force
This memorandum is to inform you of at least a tactical modification which seems required in the policy you approved last September of offering aid to Moroccan air force. This program was to be predicated upon ``satisfactory private assurances" that no further Bloc air aid would be accepted. If these assurances were not forthcoming, the policy was to be reviewed.
Since then Morocco has become more immediately interested in transports than in the jet fighters we were afraid we might have to give. Moreover, the Soviets have made a new aid offer (perhaps including planes) and the Moroccan Defense Minister went to Moscow to discuss it.
State is therefore anxious to move quickly by sending an Air Force colonel to survey Moroccan needs. While Bonsal has not yet been able to get to King (who is obviously stalling), he and State feel that we should take this next step on basis of Foreign Minister Balafrej's statement that Moroccans will make no arrangements involving Soviet technicians in Morocco and that King's interest is mainly in Soviet small arms. French were given similar assurances. State argues that even though Moroccans are obviously blackmailing us, it is tactically unwise now to insist on more formal guarantees. They point out that we could get additional assurances later on before making a final offer.
Defense will go along (it plans to send the colonel to Rabat this weekend), but is worried that in doing so we are in effect taking one more step down the road without yet getting firm preclusive guarantees the policy calls for. LeMay is concerned because the C - 119s Moroccans want will have to come out of our own inventory, and over Spanish objections (French seem to have come around to our view that if we don't help Morocco, Soviets will).
I feel that we should go along with State. Although we do not yet have the words from King we want, our overall interest is preclusion in fact, not in words. All recognize that this exercise is a gamble, and that it is how forthcoming we are on aid which will in fact determine whether King keeps Soviets out. While I too think we need and should try for more ``satisfactory assurances," we should allow State leeway as to how and when these can best be obtained.
R. W. Komer
128. National Security Action Memorandum No. 121 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 121. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director, AID.
Washington, January 10, 1962.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Program to Aid Moroccan Air Force
1. On 6 January the President approved going ahead with the survey of Moroccan air force needs called for under NSAM No. 102, even though the US has not yet received fully ``satisfactory private assurances" from Morocco that no further Bloc air force aid would be accepted. While recognizing that our chief objective is such preclusion itself and that we must be flexible as to when and how satisfactory assurances confirming it can best be obtained, the President nevertheless is anxious that we not lose sight of the desirability of appropriate assurances at some point. /2/
/2/ On January 15, Saunders sent Bundy a memorandum pointing out that recent reports that the King had decided to accept some Soviet tanks and other equipment underscored the importance of NSAM No. 121 asking Rusk to focus his attention on the political aspects of U.S. aid to the Moroccan air force. He recommended reminding Hassan discreetly that a monarch's future with Moscow was dim and that he should show some concern for his increasingly clear image in the United States as a ``blackmailer." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121)
2. Therefore, may I have a progress report by 1 February on: (a) such changes as have occurred since September in the action program for Morocco outlined in NSAM No. 102; (b) your assessment of the assurances received to date that the Moroccans will seek no further Bloc air force aid; and (c) your current views as to the best means of satisfying ourselves that we have the necessary assurances from King Hassan.
McGeorge Bundy
129. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret.
Washington, January 29, 1962.
SUBJECT
New Moroccan - Soviet Arms Deal
This apparent deal with the Sovs for small arms and some heavy equipment including artillery will force question of US policy to fore again. Balafrej said the Moroccans would try to avoid ``as far as possible" presence of Soviet instructors and technicians. He flatly denied Moroccans accepting any air aid. /2/
/2/ On January 27, Bonsal reported that he had discussed with Balafrej the military items being acquired by Morocco from the Soviets and had reiterated U.S. concern over the presence of Soviet pilots and technicians. Balafrej had promised to discuss the matter with King Hassan, but noted that it was well-known Moroccan policy to establish no exclusive relations with East or West, particularly in the matter of arms, and that Morocco reserved the right to acquire arms it needed from any available source. (Telegram 1268 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1 - 2762)
Net effect will probably harden both State and Defense positions, and thus bring to WH the final decision on whether to go ahead with transport aid for the Moroccan air force. State has faithfully passed to Bonsal our desire for assurances from Hassan. But when chips are down, it will probably fall in behind Bonsal in arguing that we'll have to count on US aid, not Moroccan assurances, to minimize Soviet presence. However, DOD will probably contend that the new arms deal proves clearly that nothing but iron-clad assurances will keep Hassan from dealing on both sides of the curtain.
[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
While I believe that Bonsal and State have not pushed Moroccans hard enough (they contend it counterproductive to risk getting Moroccan backs up), in the last analysis we'll probably have to settle for less than absolute guarantees and rely on our aid itself to preclude Moroccans taking too much from Soviets. The fact is that we're competing with the Sovs, and whether it's pleasant or not, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I feel Morocco is important enough to warrant our playing, though I haven't admitted this to State lest they totally relax.
Bob K.
130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/1 - 2762. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Whitfield (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD.
Washington, February 9, 1962, 1:34 p.m.
1152. Dept's reply to NSAM 121 /2/ (copy by pouch) reviewed principal changes in situation RMAF since Sept, noting possible imminent acceptance heavy Soviet equipment and technicians (Embtel 1268). /3/ Concluded by recommending we:
/2/ The reply, a memorandum from Battle to Bundy, February 5, is ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs.
/3/ See footnote 1, Document 129.
(1) hear again from Balafrej, once he has talked to King. Presuming he will reaffirm his previous statements we should
(2) instruct Ambassador Bonsal to insist on an audience with King, explain we consider our assistance to Morocco over past year poorly rewarded by this simultaneous recourse to significant Soviet military aid and request his explanation.
Noted that while such competition (with Soviets) would create many problems we realize importance our other objectives in Morocco make it highly dangerous to abandon this field to Soviets and that continuing military assistance would hopefully exercise limiting effect on amount Soviet aid King might feel he needed to accept.
Rusk
131. Editorial Note
On February 13, 1962, Bonsal reported that he was prepared to carry out the instructions in telegram 1152 and warn King Hassan that the United States considered its previous assistance poorly rewarded by Morocco's recourse to significant Soviet military aid, but warned that this would be poorly received since the King presumably regarded such assistance as having been to a large extent a reward for maintaining important U.S. base facilities on Moroccan territory. Bonsal appreciated the wish to avoid cold war bargaining, but was afraid that so long as the cold war continued, such bargaining would have an irresistible appeal to many other governments. (Telegram 1376 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/2 - 1362)
The Department of State's response noted that the nature as well as the timing of his approach to the King regarding the U.S. reaction to Moroccan acceptance of further Soviet military equipment had been left to the Ambassador's judgment. Although the Department appreciated the complexities of such an approach, it seemed indispensable to further determine the most effective means of achieving essential U.S. aims. (Telegram 1193 to Rabat, February 14; ibid.)
In a discussion of U.S. military and economic assistance with the King on February 21, Bonsal raised the question of Soviet military materiel and described the problems this created for the U.S. Government. Hassan responded that it was his hope to give preference ``so far as possible" to Western sources for such materiel, and indicated that the pending acquisitions from the Soviets consisted of light arms. However, he specifically stated that he did not feel able to give any binding assurances on these matters because he required freedom of action to meet Morocco's needs. (Telegram 1432 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.5622/2 - 2262)
The Ambassador also apologized to the King for the delay in receiving the conclusions of the U.S. base survey team, but noted that he had been increasingly impressed with the complexity of the problem of base conversion with minimum shock to the Moroccan economy. (Telegram 1434 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.56311/2 - 2262)
On March 7, the Head of the Moroccan Base Survey Team, William O. Baxter, submitted the Team's Report regarding the ways in which the United States could assist the Government of Morocco in post-1963 utilization of the U.S. bases to Secretary Rusk. Baxter's transmittal memorandum stated that specific recommendations for action would be formulated in connection with the Report's ``Conclusions" and ``Recommendations" sections, following appropriate staff coordination. (Report of Moroccan Base Survey Team; ibid., 771.56311/3 - 762)
132. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/3 - 1562. Secret. Drafted by McClintic on March 8. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was approved by the President on March 23.
Washington, March 15, 1962.
SUBJECT
State Visit for the King of Morocco
In my opinion the time has come to extend to King Hassan II of Morocco, who has repeatedly and pointedly made clear his desire to meet you, a formal invitation to visit the United States. Ambassador Bonsal is strongly of the opinion that an invitation has become an essential factor in ensuring the King's continued benevolence toward our military requirements. The Ambassador has already felt it necessary to tell the King that a visit here is under active consideration. [1 line of source text not declassified] it will be necessary to offer him a State Visit.
I do not lightly recommend such a visit. The King's [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] rule is challenged with increasing vigor at home and he has pursued [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] policy abroad, keeping a foot in both Eastern and Western camps. He continues to accept Soviet arms (e.g., forty medium tanks may be the latest item involved). [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Nevertheless, I think an invitation is dictated by our military interests and the strategic importance of Morocco's geographic position. Ambassador Bonsal's considered estimate is that the King's rule is secure for at least the next few years, the critical period in our base operations. It is something of a political miracle that our SAC bombers can continue to use Moroccan bases and we would want nothing to interfere with the tenure which has been promised us until the end of 1963. Moreover, the Department of Defense would like if possible to retain certain military facilities after 1963. Even without these considerations, we could not view with equanimity a substantial Soviet foothold in this vulnerable corner of the Mediterranean.
To be of maximum political effectiveness in our current discussions with the King over military aid and base reconversion, the invitation should be extended as soon as possible, even if the visit itself should be scheduled for some months hence. While a long lead-time might well allow the King the opportunity to do things in the interval which could be embarrassing to us, the Ambassador argues that the prospect of a visit to Washington is more likely to have a stabilizing effect on him. On balance, therefore, I recommend extending now an invitation for a State Visit early next year at a time to be mutually agreed upon later, inasmuch as practical problems and commitments prevent a visit in the latter part of this year. /2/
George W. Ball /3/
/2/ On March 16, Komer sent a memorandum to the President urging him to approve the Department of State's recommendation and noting that the United States wanted not only to counter Soviet efforts to establish a foothold in Morocco, but also to show the Algerians that it was greatly interested in North Africa. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco) On April 10, Ambassador Bonsal was instructed to inform the King that the President would be pleased to receive him on a State visit at some future date which would be mutually acceptable. (Telegram 1587 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.11/4 - 1062)
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.
133. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/4 - 262. Secret; Limit Distribution.
Rabat, April 2, 1962, 5 p.m.
1695. Department telegram 1412 (State - Defense Message). /2/ Reference telegram contains basis for exploration with King of circumstances in which GOM might permit US retain use Kenitra area communications facilities after end of 1963.
/2/ Dated March 21. (Ibid., 771.56311/12 - 561)
I wish stress extremely sensitive nature this matter. I will limit messages thereon to this channel leaving to State - Defense distribution to other addressees on need-to-know basis.
I intend discuss our proposals with King at what in my judgment appears most propitious time and context. This will probably be within next two or three weeks. (State - Defense will recall this matter has been delayed principally for lack of specific proposal on our part since fall of 1960 when it was first broached to King then Crown Prince.)
I concur that ``Navy package" need not be offered at initial stage of negotiations. If it is to be injected, we should have prior clearance with French who are currently engaged in small but apparently effective and promising Naval assistance program here.
I have gone over reference telegram with Captain Cox of Kenitra and with DCM. Captain Cox is fully briefed and prepared advise and assist me. His attitude most understanding and helpful.
In airgram of this date /3/ I am conveying to State - Defense some personal views on this subject. These views will not prevent my going ahead with presentation to King as instructed but may be helpful in State - Defense's overall policy formulation.
Bonsal
/3/ Airgram A - 371 from Rabat, April 4. (Ibid., 771.56311/4 - 462)
134. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret.
Washington, April 4, 1962.
SUBJECT
Military Aid Package for Morocco
I recommend you approve State's request for 1550 determinations on the air transport and naval packages for Morocco. /2/ These are the heart of our effort to minimize Soviet military aid to Morocco and to increase our influence with King Hassan.
/2/ NSC Action No. 1550 stipulated that no foreign assistance could be offered without determining whether the aid was in accordance with approved policy, whether Congress had approved or appropriated funds, whether the recipient country could support the programs, and what was the probable duration of the assistance. (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council) Kennedy signed the Presidential Determination on April 6, and Bonsal was instructed on April 9 to tell the King that the decision to provide a U.S. air transport package had been made, with the final details to be worked out by a team from CINCEUR expected in Rabat shortly. (Telegram 1571 to Rabat; ibid., Central Files, 771.5622/4 - 962)
In doing so you will be waiving the requirement in the plan you approved last fall (NSAM 102) /3/ that we review our air aid program if Hassan failed to give ``satisfactory private assurances . . . that no further Bloc Air Force aid will be accepted" or ``if at any future date the Moroccans [did] /4/ accept further Bloc aid of this nature." We have only gotten half a loaf. Hassan has told Bonsal he can't give binding assurances but ``hoped to give preference as far as possible" to Western sources for materiel requiring foreign instructors and technicians. The Foreign Minister went further in telling Bonsal March 23rd that ``he was now in a position to state that there would be no Soviet instructors and technicians" in Morocco. The Moroccans so far have resisted reported new Soviet air aid offers, although they just bought $3 - 4 million in Soviet tanks and artillery to accompany a Soviet gift of lighter equipment for their ground forces.
/3/ Document 123.
/4/ Brackets in the source text.
I join State and Defense in urging that we go ahead on this basis. The Moroccan situation is a highly competitive one. The Soviets have pressed consistently since 1956 to increase their influence. Hassan's early 1961 acceptance of 14 MIGs [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] gave them an opening wedge which they have been trying to widen ever since.
So Hassan will simply turn to the Bloc if he doesn't get what he wants from the West. We can't stop him from accepting some Soviet aid to satisfy his domestic leftist opposition and the African neutrals. He's also determined to build up his armed forces--with or without US help. But by meeting certain reasonable demands we can stimulate his apparent desire to avoid getting in over his head with the Communists. Moreover, we can achieve ``preclusion" in fact if we saturate his fledgling air force's absorptive capacity, which is what proposed transport package tries to do.
R.W. Komer /5/
/5/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
135. Editorial Note
On April 9, 1962, Ambassador Bonsal reported that two Soviet vessels had unloaded shipments of military equipment in Morocco over the weekend. (Telegram 1738 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4 - 962) The Department of State immediately instructed the Ambassador not to make the approach authorized in telegram 1571 (see footnote 1, Document 134) until he had ascertained that the Soviet shipments did not include aircraft. (Telegram 1570, April 9; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4 - 962)
Bonsal reported that when he raised the subject with the Foreign Minister on the morning of April 10, he had denied ``categorically" that either aircraft or helicopters had constituted part of the arrivals of Soviet military equipment. (Telegram 1745 from Rabat, April 10; ibid., 771.56/4 - 1062)
On April 13, Ambassador Bonsal discussed the recent arrival of Soviet arms with King Hassan, who told him that the Soviet shipment had contained helicopters being acquired by the Provisional Algerian Government for publicity uses in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite in Algeria. He added that his government had just been informed of the imminent arrival of three Soviet technicians to assemble the helicopters, and complained that he had been put in an embarrassing position. Bonsal had commented that the King would have a good basis for refusing to receive the technicians, to which Hassan had replied that the matter was under study. The Ambassador also asked if he could be furnished with further information on what was being received. The King said that he did not think this was possible, but stressed that the materiel received belonged in the category of ``light armament" which would require the presence of no Soviet technicians or instructors. Bonsal reported that Hassan, who had been most cordial and had expressed his desire to continue cooperative relations with the United States, had reiterated his preference for U.S. planes, communications equipment, and naval vessels. (Telegram 1786 from Rabat, April 13; ibid., 771.56/4 - 1362)
136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/4 - 1662. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman, Root, and McClintic; cleared by Wolfe, Newman, Valliere, Tasca, and Whitfield (DOD); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD.
Washington, April 18, 1962, 7:22 p.m.
1660. As you are aware, decision to provide major military aviation package for King of Morocco was extremely distasteful one to make, and has always been considered at best as gamble which had to be taken to try to limit to extent possible further Soviet involvement with Moroccan armed forces especially aviation.
While we have now completed all necessary paperwork here to be in position to move rapidly as soon as agreement reached by you with King, it also follows that if for any reason we should conclude either that such action would fail in its purpose of preclusion, or that even without it King might be induced to reduce his dependence on Soviets, we should not hesitate to withdraw or hold back for time our air transport offer.
Arrival of substantial Soviet arms shipments is most unfortunate coincidence, even if King's [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] explanation on helicopters is accepted at face value. This situation will certainly cause adverse public and congressional reaction, and raises certain questions in our mind. We wonder in this respect whether King himself might not have reason be genuinely concerned at our probable reaction, and whether in fact it might not be salutary to encourage such concern on his part. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] do you think that King would really be ready to sever his heretofore fruitful relationships with us and open floodgates to Soviets? Do you think even Soviets would be disposed, against strong Opposition objections and at eventual risk of alienating Algerians, to continue to embrace and fortify ``reactionary" Moroccan monarchy? Do you think that failure at this point to proceed with air transport offer would seriously jeopardize our base tenure through 1963 or possibilities of acquiring post-1963 communications rights?
We are not persuaded that because King has learned we about to make air transport offer we are irretrievably committed to go through with it. Furthermore, is it wise to cut short opposition criticism of King over present Soviet arms shipments by giving public demonstration his tactic of manipulation both sides is highly successful?
Accordingly, we believe that King's uneasiness over our reaction to his moves has made it desirable that you make approach to him along following lines (leaving to your discretion whether more effective cover all points in single audience or in several stages):
(1) We are ready to proceed with our programs of assistance but in view his increasing involvement with Soviets, as well as its effect on our public opinion and on sound military policy, we cannot continue indefinitely to increase our assistance to Moroccan armed services in face of what can only appear to everyone as direct competition with Soviets. Tanks and cannons seem to us go beyond definition of ``light arms" and we understand there will be Soviet technicians to service tanks. We accept in good faith his assurances helicopters not for Moroccan use. You would like to be able inform USG of positive assurance no further Moroccan - Soviet military deals are under consideration.
(2) USG entirely ready implement air transport offer promptly and you are prepared to discuss details forthwith. We could have first group of planes in Morocco by May 14 for fly past, but Washington is seriously disturbed over implications of proceeding in face Soviet arms arrivals and you feel it desirable convey strongest possible assurances from King himself.
(3) In your discretion as conversation develops, and in particular if King should be forthcoming on assurances as we would hope, you may discuss State visit, MAP and increased ammunition allocation and Navy package as you propose (Embtel 1799). /2/ We feel that in proceeding to talk in foregoing manner with King you should know that we would hope you could make of the occasion a real heart-to-heart talk with him to limit of your discretion, bearing in mind even in course of conversation that if you should detect reasons for holding back offer of such magnitude you should do so.
/2/ On April 16, Bonsal requested Department of State authorization to meet with the King and during this meeting to transmit the President's invitation for a State visit, offer the air transport package, and to discuss furnishing increased U.S. ammunition in connection with MAP. (Telegram 1799 from Rabat, April 16; ibid.)
FYI. You should understand that there is no sympathy in Washington for providing a command plane for the King at the present time and your conversation with the King will therefore have to take this into consideration. End FYI.
Rusk
137. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/5 - 462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD.
Rabat, May 4, 1962, 4 p.m.
1909. King received me at 7:30 last night. Foreign Minister Balafrej and Minister of Interior and Agzic Guedira also present. Topics discussed were (1) Soviet arms and helicopters (2) our air transport program and third tranche of ground forces program and (3) President's invitation to King. This telegram deals with first and second topics. The third is dealt with in Embtel 1910 /2/ and my overall comments contained in Embtel 1911. /3/
/2/ Telegram 1910 from Rabat, May 4, reported that Bonsal had raised the question of the King's State visit to the United States and that Hassan asked him to thank the President for the invitation, which he accepted in principle. (Ibid., 771.11/5 - 462)
/3/ Bonsal reported in telegram 1911 from Rabat, May 4, that the King believed his statements should clear any misunderstanding that might have arisen regarding Soviet arms and helicopters, and would not accept the idea that U.S. or French military aid should involve assurances on his part as to conditions under which he would or would not deal with the Soviets. The Ambassador noted that in Morocco the United States was faced with strong and ruthless competition in the arms field. (Ibid., 771.65/5 - 462)
I opened conversation by referring to statement King had made on April 13 which I had conveyed to Washington (Embtel 1786 repeated Paris 457 and Madrid 202). /4/ I asked whether King had any further information which he wished to convey on Soviet arms or on helicopters. He replied in negative. In answer to my questions he said that ``light arms" being received from Soviets (deliveries not yet completed) include tanks and artillery but will not require presence here of Soviet technicians or instructors and will not involve Moroccan training groups in Soviet Union. King is in no doubt our concern regarding these Soviet activities here but he finds difficult understand such concern in view his statements. He reiterated that preference and hence policy of GOM will be to continue obtaining, to extent possible, arms requiring technicians and instructors from West.
/4/ See Document 135.
I then described our air transport program. Starting from point that survey and recommendations now approved by President designed fully meet Moroccan requirements as set forth last December, I described program in terms of (A) two and one half year period, (B) immediate shipment of 3 C - 119's and 3 C - 47's, (C) presence here of about 80 US instructors and technicians for maintenance and instruction and (D) our understanding that King would wish consider as purchase rather than gift and would accept terms similar those involved in ground forces package. I told him total value package about $15 million and that we would expect collect about 10 percent over 5-year period.
King expressed general satisfaction but stressed, as he has done before, his regret that earlier attempts to achieve cooperation between US and Morocco in military aviation field had been frustrated. He referred especially to episode involving General Wade early last year. He agreed with me that details of package could now be negotiated at military level between representatives of two governments.
I told King as emphatically as possible that in making available this package our understanding is that we are meeting complete GOM requirements in this field and would not be confronted with competition from any other sources. Balafrej interjected to say that what was involved was ``amitie exclusive" (exclusive friendship). After some discussion King said that obviously GOM has no intention of seeking assistance in this field from any other source. (He did not raise question of command plane nor did I. This however is weak point our position which will come up in military level discussions and on which I regret we are not in position make constructive suggestion particularly as we wish avoid undesirable source for this requirement.)
I then raised question of third tranche of ground forces package and told King that President has approved ammunition increment requested by Moroccan military and that we are ready to go ahead as soon as necessary formalities at military level can be completed. He expressed appreciation. I raised, in this connection, our willingness accept Moroccan officers in US training schools and recalled that I had mentioned this to King when I saw him in February. He confirmed his interest in this possibility and said that he believed that by next October current reorganization of training concepts in Moroccan army would permit some of his officers to proceed to US (Embtel 1432). /5/
In view of above we are proceeding to approach Moroccan Minister of Defense in order formalize above arrangements. /6/
Bonsal
/5/ Not printed.
/6/ At the conclusion of the conversation, the Ambassador told Hassan that he was ready to discuss with him a proposal under which the Government of Morocco might permit the United States to retain use of the Kenitra communications facilities after the end of 1963. The King replied that he was still full of ``goodwill" on this subject, but would like to have the U.S. proposal submitted first to his Foreign Minister for careful study and examination. (Telegram 1916 from Rabat, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5 - 462)
138. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Morocco, 686, 10 Jan 1962. Top Secret.
JCSM - 595 - 62 Washington, August 3, 1962.
SUBJECT
SAC Bases in Morocco
1. Reference is made to the memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 1 August 1962, subject as above. /2/
/2/ The memorandum asked whether U.S. post-1963 needs could be met through small maintenance elements to keep the bases prepared for re-entry, with Moroccan consent, in time of emergency, and asked for the Joint Chiefs' views on the minimum size of the maintenance elements that would be required and the estimated costs of keeping the facilities prepared for use in varying types of contingencies. (Ibid.)
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed their previously expressed views on the above subject and have concluded that, in the interest of US security, the SAC bases in Morocco are highly important because of their role in the US strategic deterrent posture and their use for contingencies in Africa and the Middle East as well as their denial to third powers. Hence their post-1963 retention in operational configuration remains a valid military requirement. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this requirement cannot be met through small maintenance elements on bases to which we would have only re-entry rights. Therefore, the recommendation contained in JCSM - 544 ? 62 /3/ expresses the course of action believed to be sound from a military standpoint. As expressed in Appendix B to that memorandum, any post-1963 base rights in Morocco which are less than full operational use of Benguerir and Sidi Slimane will not fulfill existing military requirements, as set forth in Appendix A of JCSM - 544 - 62.
/3/ In JCSM 544 - 62, July 24, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed McNamara of their belief that it was in the overall U.S. interest to use extraordinary measures to retain use of the SAC bases in Morocco beyond 1963. (Ibid.)
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that re-entry rights, including small maintenance elements, be considered only after negotiation of the more desirable solutions expressed in JCSM - 544 - 62 have been thoroughly explored with the Government of Morocco and have been denied.
4. Although small maintenance elements will not fully satisfy military operational needs, their value in terms of certain contingency operations and the prevention of base use by third powers is recognized. Costs in connection with small maintenance elements in Morocco would not differ appreciably from known average costs involved in maintaining comparable military units overseas. The Strategic Air Command has been requested to provide preliminary estimates of personnel and costs for such arrangements.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to discuss this matter at the meeting with you on Monday, 6 August 1962.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
139. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 7/62 - 12/62. Secret.
Washington, August 21, 1962.
You will want to use your meeting with Ambassador Ferguson /2/ Wednesday as an occasion for reviewing our Moroccan policy. It's very important that he have a clear sense of how far you are willing to go on bases and aid.
/2/ President Kennedy appointed John H. Ferguson to be Ambassador to Morocco on August 21. Kennedy met with Ferguson at 11:54 a.m. on August 21. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Books) No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
Since you approved our helping Hassan build his air transport force last April, we have delivered the first tranche of equipment and have begun training. The Moroccans appear quite pleased, and we've been successful so far in precluding further Soviet air force activity. However, the Moroccans have bought about 20 Soviet tanks and other army equipment with a few technicians. Some helicopters have arrived too, but the Moroccans claim these are destined for Algeria.
The chief outstanding issues now are the status of the Navy communications facility at Kenitra, our three SAC bases--and the FY '63 aid level. The JCS came up recently with another plea that we try to hold on to the SAC bases past end-1963. McNamara has in fact rejected this, and Ferguson has been clued. All McNamara will go for is an attempt to get caretaker status for the three bases or perhaps a civil airport at Nouasseur, unless we can get more free. However, he is not putting this in writing because he's not anxious to challenge the Chiefs frontally on it, while he still has the B - 70 argument on his hands.
DOD has also approved pressing for arrangements to maintain the Kenitra base, its two outlying transmitter sites, and a USAF communications facility. We have an urgent need for these facilities. In return DOD is willing to train Moroccans in naval operations at Kenitra and to contribute $5 million in naval hardware. Our initial approach to King Hassan on 16 July, however, (which involved keeping there 2200 US personnel, 1300 less than present strength) met with some fudging. Hassan ``accepted in principle" that some formula would be found but said he did not wish to decide or discuss details until his meeting with you next March.
Because the Navy has to decide finally by then whether to build alternate facilities, we'd rather have Ferguson re-open the dialogue now, while recognizing that we probably won't be able to close the deal until Hassan comes here. To arm Ferguson for this effort, we suggest you give him attached letter2 introducing him as your personal spokesman.
Negotiations on the bases will soon get mixed up with the question of the FY 1963 aid level (summary of recent levels attached). /3/ AID is planning $20 million in supporting assistance (down from $30 million last year) plus $5 - 8 million in loans from PL - 480 Title I sales and a $1.6 million development grant for technical assistance. (Title II and III programs are estimated at $30 million total, but the Moroccans don't include this in their definition of the aid level.) Because the Embassy believes the aid level must be at least $40 million for us to keep our base rights, AID is also allowing $12 - 15 million in development loans. The hitch is that we probably won't find enough sound projects to absorb that much development lending, so the pressure will be on to increase supporting assistance. AID wants to hold this line at $20 million this year to press the shift from supporting assistance to development loans, but we will clearly have a major sore point unless we find suitable projects.
/3/ Not attached to the source text.
A minor issue bearing on the base and aid level talks is Hassan's interest in building a shipyard at Tangier. He thinks this would help pull the economy of Northern Morocco out of the doldrums, and his lieutenants hint that the Soviets have offered $30 million for the project. AID says the project would be an economic flop because the world shipbuilding capacity is already excess. We believe we should not respond [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on this one, because so far we don't see the Soviets gaining any significant military advantage from it. However, the Moroccans may inject this into our negotiations.
All in all, we'll have to continue to pay handsomely if we want both to make a stab at keeping certain base rights and to compete effectively with the Bloc. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Morocco (and the whole Maghreb) is certainly the most important piece of real estate in Africa, and one where the end of the Algerian war opens new avenues for US influence, as well as new opportunities for the Bloc.
R.W. Komer /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
140. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Morocco, 400.3295, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Washington, September 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
SAC Bases in Morocco
Mr. McNamara and I have concluded that the political difficulties of negotiating an extension of our present use of the bases in Morocco beyond 1963, when we are committed to withdraw, and the high political or economic price that would be demanded for such an extension make it advisable to negotiate for the retention after 1963 of U.S. maintenance elements only. Our objectives in such negotiations will be to preclude Soviet use or occupancy of the bases and to permit their occasional use for transit and their availability for post-strike recovery operations. Accordingly, I have sent the attached letter to the Department of State. /2/
/2/ The September 28 letter to Acting Secretary of State Ball provided the Department of State with the following information to help the Department respond to Ambassador Ferguson's request for guidance on U.S. post-1963 objectives for the SAC bases in Morocco. The U.S. goal was to ensure the availability of the Moroccan bases for possible re-entry, with Moroccan permission, in times of emergency. To this end, the United States wished to retain maintenance elements at each of the bases after 1963, but their size and nature would depend on the uses to which the Moroccans put the bases and the forms of U.S. assistance. Therefore, it must be determined soon what use would be made of the bases by Morocco after 1963. (Ibid.) Gilpatric also sent a copy of the letter to Carl Kaysen at the White House.
I have seen the discussion paper of August 6, 1962, prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concerning the personnel and cost requirements for the maintenance elements at the bases after 1963. In my judgment, the total number of personnel at the three bases should not exceed 500, and the Air Force should proceed in its planning on this basis.
Roswell L. Gilpatric /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
141. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/12 - 2662. Secret.
Washington, December 26, 1962.
Dear George: In my letter of September 28th, /2/ I outlined our post-1963 objectives for the SAC bases in Morocco. The last paragraph of my letter took into account that AID had conducted a survey, the results of which were given to the Moroccan Government, concerning possible Moroccan use of the bases after 1963.
/2/ See footnote 1, Document 140.
After careful study, the Secretary of the Air Force has concluded that to maintain any military usefulness along the lines proposed in my letter would be inordinately costly in money and personnel, and would have little prospect of success, if integral elements of the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir were converted to Moroccan use. The problems of guarding the equipment against theft and the costs of operating utilities and other support facilities would probably be out of proportion to any potential military benefits.
Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir have little, if any, true economic potential for the Moroccans. We know, however, that they are extremely interested in the development of Nouasseur as a civilian airport servicing Casablanca. Accordingly, I propose that in our discussions with the Moroccans we focus on the conversion of Nouasseur into a civil airport, and our willingness to assist Morocco in this regard, and also seek to work out arrangements under which Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir will be retained by the USAF in a standby or ``mothball" status.
If you agree with this course, I suggest that appropriate guidance be given to Ambassador Ferguson for his use in talks with the Moroccan authorities prior to the visit of King Moulay Hassan with the President. In the interim, I propose that representatives of our respective departments get together at an early date with other interested agencies, such as AID and FAA, and study how best we could assist the Moroccans in developing Nouasseur for civil use within the means available to our Government.
Sincerely,
Ros Gilpatric
142. Memorandum for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333 - 680.1, 1963. Secret. Drafted by Roland A. Paul of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, on January 9. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Sloan.
I - 20180/63 Washington, January 7, 1963.
SUBJECT
The Future of SAC Bases in Morocco
On 7 January 1963 a meeting was held with Mr. Witman and others at State to discuss the import of Mr. Gilpatric's letter to Mr. Ball of 26 December. Major General Wade outlined what the Air Force had in mind when it referred to retaining the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir in a ``mothball or standby" status. General Wade mentioned 5 purposes: (1) preclusion; (2) support for contingency operations (including the prompt pre-strike stationing of SAC bombers); (3) MATS operations; (4) fair weather training for forces stationed in Europe; and (5) post-strike recovery.
Sidi would be manned by 300 AF personnel, and Ben Guerir would be manned by 200 AF personnel, with no more than a total of 1,000 dependents at both bases residing in the guaranteed rental housing which exists at both bases. The bases would be maintained in a status which would permit their use as emergency weather alternates for the Spanish bases, and for MATS landings.
To carry out this proposal for the 2 bases would not require the return of equipment already removed under the existing phaseout plan. Only excess equipment has been removed to date.
Initially the Air Force does not envisage a great use of the facilities, but it would increase this use from time to time to see ``how much the traffic would bear."
Mr. Witman noted that excluding any Moroccan activity at the bases posed two problems: 1) such an arrangement would not provide the economic benefits which the Moroccans were led to expect from the Baxter report; and 2) more importantly, it would be more difficult for Hassan to provide a gimmick to justify domestically a continued US presence at the bases.
He also noted that the Air Force's proposal probably would generate Moroccan expectations for greater economic assistance than we presently envisage. We have just informed the GOM that $20 million in support assistance has been programmed for FY 63. The present projection for FY 64 is $10 million and for FY 65 zero.
While the FAA will soon visit Nouasseur to see what is required to make that a civilian airport, AID and DOD will check in this country to determine what is needed for such an airport, what is available at that base presently, and what will have to be funded by AID. The Moroccans have suggested that Pan Am be allowed to use Nouasseur as early as this coming April. General Wade indicated that this would not interfere with our present function there, and many thought that this would allow the American carrier to obtain an advantage over its foreign competitors and thus assure an adequate American presence there.
In summing up Bill Witman noted that we had three significant projects in Morocco: Voice of America facilities; Naval communications at Kenitra; and the Air Force bases. In view of Hassan's forthcoming visit to the US and the Moroccans' refusal to undertake meaningful discussions on the issue of post-1963 US presence at these facilities until the King's visit, we should endeavor to establish, before then, an order of priority among these three undertakings and to arrive at some estimate of the price, both economic and political, which we are willing to pay for each one.
Roland A. Paul /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333 - 680.1, 1963. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, Hutchinson, and Kitchen, with a copy for Witman.
Washington, January 31, 1963.
SUBJECT
Preparations for King Hassan's Visit
Hassan's visit has more potential for trouble than any recent African visit. The President is naturally not anxious to get involved in any more detailed bargaining over ``base rights" than is absolutely necessary. /2/ I realize you're already hammering out our position, but I thought it worthwhile to highlight some of the points which seem from here to need clarification by, say, the end of February:
/2/ On January 25, President Kennedy sent Ambassador Ferguson a message saying that he hoped to avoid too much personal detailed bargaining on bases and quid pro quos with King Hassan during his visit. He asked Ferguson to tell the King that in order to make his visit more fruitful, Ferguson was to find out from him directly what he wished to discuss. (Telegram 1562 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 1 MOR)
1. Are we fully satisfied that we have our Kenitra needs down to the minimum? Do we still think our naval package is an adequate quid pro quo? Should we have a fallback offer if Hassan ups the ante or says he can't buy our full proposal?
2. Exactly what do we mean by ``standby status" at Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane? Precisely what rights should we ask the King for, what services will we perform that he might consider helpful, and how many people will we need? Can we dispose of these details before the visit?
3. How should we handle Nouasseur conversion to a civil airport? Announcement during visit or simply confirm to King that arrangements are well along?
4. What relative priority do we assign to Kenitra, Ben Guerir, Sidi Slimane, Voice of America station in case these end up competing with each other?
5. Can we make an honest case for increased development lending to supplant decreasing supporting assistance? If we are going to make this line palatable, we need a realistic idea of what projects may be nearly ready to go. Do we see enough realistic DL possibilities to argue, even among ourselves, that DL will help maintain the aid level required to cover our various interests? How far should we lean in helping the Moroccans to put together reasonable loan applications?
R.W. Komer /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original.
144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR - US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Lang (DOD); cleared by Bundy (DOD), Bell (AID), Newman, and Witman; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris for USCINCEUR and London for USNAVEUR.
Washington, March 4, 1963, 6:35 p.m.
1809. Joint State - Defense message. This first of three messages relating forthcoming talks with Moroccans re bases and aid for action as indicated and for information and comment. This outlines base requirements. Others relate aid and negotiating tactics. /2/
/2/ Telegram 1812, March 5, discussed future U.S. economic and military assistance to Morocco and noted the need to discourage any Moroccan expectations of massive U.S. aid based on an exaggerated estimate of the U.S. need for Moroccan facilities. It stated that the U.S. Government had not yet arrived at a final determination on the level of future aid to Morocco, and asked for the Ambassador's comments on the minimum price likely to get Moroccan agreement on U.S. base requirements as outlined in telegram 1809. (Ibid.) A third message to Rabat suggested negotiating tactics for Ferguson to use in his discussions with Moroccan officials. (Telegram 1838, March 8; ibid.)
Requirements generally in line with discussions Embassy has had previously with GOM. We believe, however, it would be helpful for you to discuss them again with Balafrej so King does not come to Washington with inflated idea of what we will want and base his negotiating position accordingly.
SAC Bases. SAC reflex phasing out June 1963. Major US forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1963. US would assist in conversion of Nouasseur to civil use. In view large U.S. investment and prospective assistance in conversion, we would expect to have USG planes use the field on occasion without charge. FYI. If occasional use without charge accorded US aircraft, USAF could take this benefit into account in determining what US property could be left at Nouasseur, within limitations 1949 Federal Property Act, in connection with conversion program. End FYI.
USAF prepared to retain detachments at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (not exceeding total 500 personnel; dependents additional) to maintain these facilities on standby basis pending decision by GOM on future use, provided USAF has right to use facilities for weather alternates, communications, transit, and occasional fair weather training. USAF would be prepared to accommodate similar use by Moroccan Air Force.
FYI: Foregoing must be handled very carefully since USAF does not want to be committed to maintain these bases for an indefinite period and wishes leeway to withdraw maintenance detachments if expense does not warrant benefits gained. Further, USAF is not interested in maintaining facilities unless assured of rights outlined above. Level of maintenance by USAF would be limited to that needed for retaining facilities on standby basis and would not involve major repair or replacement. USAF not prepared to maintain bases if Moroccans want more than limited use parallelling that sought by USAF or if bases are to be turned over to Moroccan command under arrangement where USAF would be responsible to Moroccans for upkeep of bases without control over expenditures or base property. Similarly, USAF not prepared to accept establishment of civil enterprises on bases since this would involve increase of USAF expenditures (through providing utility serv-ices, for example) and increased possibility of theft or pilferage US property. USAF interest in continued presence as outlined based on desirability maintaining facilities working order against narrow, unknown future requirements and precluding unfriendly use. End FYI.
Navy Facilities. Navy wishes retain use of outlying communications sites (1000 personnel) and base at Kenitra. Latter, but not communications could be turned over to nominal Moroccan command and used jointly by USN and Moroccan forces, including RMAF. Navy would absorb costs (up to $4 million annually) of operating and maintaining jointly used facility. This would entail initially retaining 1200 USN personnel at Kenitra, of which 400 would be withdrawn as soon as Moroccans were trained and capable of assuming certain responsibilities for maintenance and operation. USN prepared, but reluctant, to agree have personnel in mufti if Moroccans desire. Personnel figures do not include dependents.
FYI. Communications facilities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are of major importance to US. Facilities at Kenitra [1 line of source text not declassified] also provide logistic support for communications sites. Navy would hope to retain communications and Kenitra facilities for indefinite period. We recognize, however, political obstacles obtaining such indefinite retention and our objective would be to gain at least five-year extension. If this not feasible, we would need two years as minimum period to enable switch to alternate facilities. Minimum of two-year extension would also be helpful in current negotiations with Spain.
You are aware of proposed Naval MAP package, which will be discussed in separate telegram, but do not believe this should be discussed with Moroccans now. We would hope gain full benefit, however, from Navy offer to absorb costs of operating and maintaining jointly used facilities. We expect $4 million would cover costs of operating and maintaining facility even if Moroccans wish to make use of it by stationing Moroccan air transit unit there. Dept has received reports some Moroccans may be thinking in terms certain types flat rental payment. No encouragement should be given such approaches. End FYI.
Rusk
145. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR - US. Secret. Drafted by Warren.
Washington, March 16, 1963.
SUBJECT
Base Requirements in Morocco
In your consideration of the FY 1964 and future year aid levels for Morocco in connection with the King's visit at the end of the month, it might be useful for you to have my views on the importance of the military facilities in Morocco as an element of our foreign policy posture in that part of the world.
The importance of the Sixth Fleet in our diplomatic efforts and our military stance in this area is well recognized. Command and control of the Sixth Fleet is exercised through the facilities at Kenitra which handle a major portion of the Navy's requirements in the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic approaches. Kenitra serves as a vital link in the communications chain from the U.S. through Asmara, Ethiopia [2 lines of source text not declassified]. There are no practical alternative sites for the Navy communications and security facilities. To relocate this complex would require a two year construction program which we understand would cost $25 million. Loss of these facilities would lower significantly the Navy's operational capability in this area.
While the Air Force requirements at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir are somewhat less critical from a military point of view, and we don't anticipate any real difficulty in negotiating the retention of these bases on a standby basis, it is important that these airfields not become available to unfriendly forces. The presence of any hostile force on the southern flank would create serious military problems. There are, of course, added advantages for USAF to retain these two bases for such purposes as training, transport and emergency uses. The phase-out of the B - 47 SAC Reflex operation in 1963 does not completely reduce the value to us of these installations.
I appreciate fully that you must weigh many factors in developing a sound aid program for Morocco.
U. Alexis Johnson /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
146. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret.
Washington, March 25, 1963.
Here are some key questions on which you'll want to be satisfied at your 10:00 a.m. Tuesday briefing session on Hassan's visit:
Is our aid package adequate to get us the residual base rights we want? Ambassador Ferguson argues that it is an absolute minimum, and Governor Williams will have further increases up his sleeve. Dave Bell will strongly oppose.
If Hassan rejects our offer, should we go higher? My own sense is that we can and should hold the presently agreed line. King Hassan needs us as much as we need him, Kenitra is not worth more than we're offering, and we've got to get the Moroccans to use our aid effectively instead of relying on a dole from us. We'd also have a hard time selling Congress on giving more aid than before pulling SAC out. In the last analysis the only reason to raise our offer would be if Defense can make an airtight case that Kenitra is worth it and is willing to pay.
Can the Moroccans come up with enough project loans to fulfill our proposed commitment? Hassan knows his government will have trouble coming up with good projects so will resist our proposal to substitute DL for SA. You'll want to be sure AID will make a major effort to help them. Otherwise we'll be wide open to Moroccan charges of backing out on our agreement, if they don't come through with a few decent loan applications.
Should we give Morocco any new military aid? We have numerous reports that Hassan will be asking for everything from F - 100s to training for a couple of hundred men. We plan on $5 million naval package as partial rent for Kenitra, but aren't enthusiastic about giving any sophisticated hardware. You might probe how far DOD sees sense in going.
We've simply been unable to smoke out the King's ideas in advance, so may have to make some quick fixes during the visit or settle for vague agreements in principle which can be pinned down later. Trouble with the latter is that Hassan may again prove elusive, and if we're going to move Kenitra to Spain we've got to start soon.
R.W. Komer /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
147. Memorandum for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. Drafted by Komer.
Washington, March 26, 1963.
PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING SESSION, 26 MARCH 1963,ON KING HASSAN'S VISIT
PRESENT
The President
G. Mennen Williams
John Ferguson
William Witman
David Bell
Edward Hutchinson
William Bundy
Frank Sloan
R.W. Komer
The President was satisfied in general with the proposed US aid package designed to assure retention of base rights at least at Kenitra, though he was aware that there might be great Moroccan pressure for more than we were prepared to offer.
He also approved the proposed tactics for the visit: (1) during first meeting he would give King Hassan the broad brush treatment on world and African affairs and then discuss our base requirements, mentioning our willingness to give a $5 million navy MAP package in return for Kenitra; (2) Rusk would then make a general aid offer at his meeting the next morning, sticking with the agreed initial position; (3) if the King reacted with shock as expected, the President would then reveal our fallback position in his second meeting with the King Thursday afternoon.
The President asked several questions. He wanted to know why we shouldn't give jet fighters to the Moroccans. Ambassador Ferguson didn't think they'd ask for these, but would ask for considerable training. Bill Bundy thought we could give training, but not in jet fighters. Upon the President's query, Bundy and Williams described the key importance to the navy of the communications installation at Kenitra. The President couldn't see much use in standby rights at two of the SAC bases. It was explained that these were possible transit alternates to the Azores and Wheelus and that we might have some ``emergency" use for them, although this was dubious. It was also brought out that Kenitra in particular, but also the SAC bases, gave us certain leverage in the Spanish base negotiations.
There was considerable discussion of the price we should pay for continued use of bases. Williams and Ferguson pointed out that the King thought he was taking new risks in allowing us to stay longer than specified in the agreement between Eisenhower and Mohammed V; therefore he might want a lot of aid.
In reply to the President's query Bill Bundy indicated that DOD was prepared to pick up the tab on bases in general if it were legally feasible, but that Congress was very reluctant to do so. Senator Saltonstall, for example, had objected to the procedure used in the Libyan case. The President also asked how long we want to stay in Kenitra. We would prefer to stay for five years but could live with two years; it was agreed we would not try to tape down a specific time of stay, but would attempt to keep it open-ended beyond two years. /2/
/2/ In a memorandum to President Kennedy on March 26, Komer indicated that Rusk planned to give King Hassan an aide-memoire on base rights before his first meeting with the President, who would thus be relieved of the need to explain what base rights the United States wanted. Komer also noted that the King was so anxious to have this trip appear to be a success that he would try to put a good face on any reasonable aid offer. (Ibid.) The text of the aide-memoire on military base withdrawal is in the Briefing Book for King Hassan's visit in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2234.
Ambassador Ferguson emphasized that the King would probably press for an increase in FY 63 aid which wasn't specified in our package (Morocco was cut from $30 million SA loans in FY '62 to $20 million in FY '63.) It was agreed that we would try to avoid giving the Moroccans an opportunity to make a counter-proposal to our aid package, because this would inevitably be considerably higher than we could afford.
R.W. Komer /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
148. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR - US. Secret. Drafted by Glenn on March 28 and approved by the White House on April 1. The meeting was held at the White House. Documentation on King Hassan's visit, including memoranda of conversation and substantive correspondence, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235.
Washington, March 27, 1963, 4:30 p.m.
SUBJECT
American Bases in Morocco
PARTICIPANTS
His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco
The President
Mr. Edmund Glenn, Interpreter
The President brought up the subject of the American bases. He mentioned that the U.S. is prepared to withdraw from the three air bases, as this had undoubtedly been communicated to His Majesty by the American Ambassador. We would desire, however, to keep the telecommunications facilities of the Naval base at Kenitra. What are the King's ideas on the subject?
The King asked what were the President's proposals.
The President said that we attached a considerable amount of importance to the telecommunications base at Kenitra, as there are no other facilities easily available in that part of the world, and as the installation had been quite costly. There might be a possibility to remove the facilities to Spain, but this would take time and call for special negotiations.
The King said that when he came to the United States in 1960 as head of the Moroccan Delegation to the United Nations, he spent a full day at the Pentagon where he was thoroughly briefed by representatives of American Naval aviation. He was shown also films about the Kenitra facilities and he fully realizes their importance. At the same time, however, an agreement had been reached between the United States Government and his late Majesty, the King's father, which provided for withdrawal from the bases at the end of 1963. This has a great importance in the eyes of Moroccan public opinion and the King would not wish to appear in any way to have broken an item of his father's will. This is the problem to which a solution needs to be found.
The President stated that our withdrawal from the three air bases would amount to carrying out the agreement mentioned by the King. As for the Naval facility, some arrangements might be found--for example, in the area of command--which would make American presence at that base less conspicuous, but which would allow us to continue using the facilities for a period of time, until they could be phased out.
The King asked for how long would the U.S. wish to keep its facilities.
The President said for as long as the Moroccans would have us.
The King asked what would be the minimum.
The President suggested that five years might be the minimum. The President further said that an arrangement as to the command structure of the bases might be sought in connection with some economic programs and also with some help to the Moroccan Navy which, although not necessarily directly tied to the Kenitra base, would nevertheless be to the advantage of that Navy.
The King said that while he understood the interest of the United States in that question, what is important in fact are the telecommunications facilities, which are needed by the United States to cover the Atlantic and even part of the Pacific. Under those circumstances, it would be useful to seek some sort of arrangement, if this were to prove possible.
The President said that the King would be seeing the Secretary of State the next day. It is possible that details could be discussed between the Moroccan Ministers and the Secretaries and then be brought up again before the King and the President in the afternoon.
The King asked whether he was going to see Mr. McNamara. According to his schedule, he was to receive the call of the Air Force Secretary, Mr. Zuckert.
The President said that Mr. Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was in the next room and that he was the person from Defense who would be discussing those questions with the Moroccans.
The King said that in this case conversations could take place between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Balafrej on the one hand, and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Ahardane on the other. It would be exceedingly important to keep those conversations secret and for that reason the two negotiating delegations must be kept down in numbers to the strict minimum. These conversations could take place the next day. After that, the King might perhaps give up his trip to Annapolis which had been programmed, and instead make another call on the President to conclude the negotiations carried out by the ministers.
The King wanted to make clear the reasons which led him to this proposal. Since the beginning of his reign, it has always been his policy to be clear, explicit and frank in his relations with the Moroccan people. Any decision arrived at in regard to the bases would have to be placed in a communique. It is extremely important that this communique be drafted in such a manner that the decisions in question do not appear to contradict in any way those reached at an earlier moment.
The President said that these questions could be usefully discussed tomorrow as it had been suggested by the King.
The King said that the President, as a person bearing extremely heavy responsibilities, and as a friend of Morocco, certainly understands that the King would not wish in any way to repudiate any part of his father's political will. At the same time, schools, equipment, and hospitals certainly will give more food to the Moroccan people than would the evacuation of some telecommunications facilities. This is a policy of realism. Means have to be found, however, to implement it. For example, civilian mixed US-Moroccan corporations might be established for the reconversion of the three air bases. As for the Kenitra base, the Royal Moroccan Army intended to keep it as its own facility in any case. What might be done is to convert it into a school base, in which Moroccan mid-shipmen would receive training from American instructors. It would be necessary to consider it a Moroccan facility under Moroccan command. There exists an air training facility at Marrakech which is under Moroccan command and which flies exclusively the Moroccan flag. The Moroccan command has, however, French assistants who are highly qualified from the technical point of view and thanks to whom the school in question has remained operational and efficient, instead of becoming a museum piece as it might have been without French assistance. Some such arrangement would enable the King to say with clear conscience to his own people and to friendly countries that there are no more strategic bases on Moroccan territory, since three such bases are converted to civilian use and one is converted into a Moroccan training facility.
This, however, is the maximum of what the King can do.
The President said that such an approach appeared fruitful. The details would have to be discussed between the ministers.
The King said that it is essential that the negotiating parties be kept small and tight. The Soviets are certainly interested in what is being discussed between the Moroccans and the Americans. The French are likewise interested, the more so that they were forced to give up Kenitra. ``My friend" Nasser likewise is ready to say that Hassan II has sold Moroccan soil for American gold, in spite of the fact that Nasser himself has 500 Soviet technicians on his territory. The King can say with clear conscience that he has not sold any part or parcel of Moroccan territory, but he would not wish to see Moroccan public opinion poisoned by an adverse propaganda. Therefore, the communique must be drafted in such a way as to make it clear that the 1959 agreements on base evacuation continue to hold. As for the details on further cooperation, that might be described in an exchange of letters between the ministers of foreign affairs.
The President asked the King whether other members of the negotiating groups could be brought in. The King suggested that Messrs. Balafrej and Ahardane be brought in from the Moroccan side.
The President suggested that Secretaries Rusk and Gilpatric would be called in on the American side.
After the four secretaries had come in, Mr. Balafrej suggested that Prince Moulay Abdallah also be invited.
The President summed up the decisions taken concerning negotiations for the next day.
149. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, Hassan Visit. Secret. A handwritten notation by Komer on the source text reads: ``Mac--I gave this to Pres. but I don't think I'll win."
Washington, March 28, 1963.
Secretaries Rusk and Gilpatric want five minutes with you before 4:00 p.m. meeting with Hassan to describe their talk with him this morning. /2/ They have a draft letter (for later exchange between Rusk and Balafrej) describing base arrangements. /3/ It will probably be the take-off point for this afternoon's discussion. /4/
/2/ Secretary Rusk and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric met with King Hassan and Foreign Minister Balafrej at 10:30 a.m. on March 28. The conversation is recorded in a memorandum of conversation that is in Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR - US.
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235)
/4/ President Kennedy and King Hassan met at 1:15 p.m. on March 28. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files, DEF 15 - 4 MOR - US.
Hassan is willing to let us stay on at Kenitra under cover of running a Navy and commo training program. He wants no standby military presence at USAF bases but would like a civilian contractor to maintain them until Moroccans ready to convert. He also wants an inventory of non-military equipment we can turn over.
You'll also have a chance this afternoon to get Hassan's first reaction to our aid package. This morning Rusk gave Balafrej an aide-memoire /5/ presenting our earlier fallback position as our initial offer. Rusk may recommend a new fallback offer--raising FY 1963 SA from $20 to $30 million and raising DL minimum for FY 1964 and FY 1965.
/5/ Not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2235)
I'd urge that our interests in Morocco, including Kenitra, simply don't justify more aid. AID feels the same way. So urge you resist upping FY 1963 SA and rely for elbow room on line that we'll consider any good project loan applications Moroccans come up with. Why not tell them we can move Kenitra to Spain for $10 million and don't see why we should pay more when we're giving up three SAC bases. My sense is that the Moroccans will buy what we've offered, even if reluctantly. Hassan needs us, and French cushion of $56 million in FY 1963 and again in FY 1964 means he doesn't really need our aid.
Hassan's third meeting with you is Friday afternoon /6/ which will give you a chance to wrap up leftover details and put final stamp of approval on the communique. King continues to press for small meetings, so you may want only Rusk and Gilpatric from our side this afternoon.
/6/ Kennedy and Hassan met at 4 p.m. on March 29. The conversation was recorded in three memoranda of conversation that are ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
R.W. Komer /7/
/7/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR - US. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Ferguson, Fredericks, Witman, Rowe, and Rusk (in draft); and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Paris, Madrid, London for USNAVEUR, CINCEUR, and POLAD CINCSAC.
Washington, March 30, 1963, 3:30 p.m.
1977. Following highlights conversations between President, U.S. officials, and Moroccan King and Ministers for information only; contents should not be discussed with foreign officials. This is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Guidance for other purposes will follow later.
Bases: King throughout conversations stressed obligation vis-a-vis Moroccan people to see his father's agreement on US withdrawal, which he viewed as political testament, faithfully executed. President at opening session expressed US intention carry out agreement withdraw from three air bases on schedule. King repeated oral assurances Mohamed V had given President Eisenhower that, after evacuation, bases would not be used by any other country. He confirmed this publicly by telling National Press Club Morocco wanted no foreign bases on its soil.
Reconversion: Moroccans laid heavy stress throughout conversations on future use air bases and interest in US assistance toward reconversion. Balafrej said Moroccans contemplating possible transfer Marrakech Air School to Ben Guerir and plan convert Sidi Slimane to other civil uses with help joint US - Moroccan private capital enterprise. Nouasseur to be converted to civil airport with US assistance in reconversion in form loan on mutually agreed terms. Problem disposition property of bases upon evacuation discussed at some length. US officials explained restrictions under US law; further expressed willingness consider possibility turning over some material for Moroccan use, possibly under military aid program. King mentioned possibility temporary caretaker detachments Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane pending preparation specific plans reconversion.
Kenitra: Moroccans stated intention use Kenitra base for Moroccan armed forces. US indicated willingness assist in training Moroccan military personnel to develop requisite skills for operation base and in telecommunications; as long as US personnel are employed in this capacity, US shall continue bear cost of operating Kenitra base at about present level of expenditure. King suggested French at Marrakech School as model; invited officer of ``President's household" visit and observe.
Form of Agreement: Balafrej incorporated understanding in agreed letter to Secretary (text by separate telegram) /2/ which Secretary acknowledged as ``reflecting understandings reached."
/2/ The agreed English text of the March 29 letter from Foreign Minister Balafrej to Secretary Rusk was sent to the Embassy in Rabat on March 30. (Telegram 1979; ibid.)
Aid: Secretary presented aide-memoire indicating US readiness continue PL 480 and technical assistance at present levels and, for FY 1964, supporting assistance type commodity loans at $15 million and dollar repayable loans (DL) at minimum level $5 million and, for FY 1965, SA type loans at $10 millon and DL at minimum level $10 million. (Text aide-memoire being pouched Rabat.) King expressed dissatisfaction at figures but did not press subject. At one point, he asked President cost of removing Kenitra facilities to another location; he was told about $10 million. In final meeting with President, King said nature arrangements arrived at during visit changed both nature and intensity relationship. King expressed understanding difficulties in obtaining additional appropriations and expressed full trust in President and Administration to do best possible. President explained Administration subjected severe pressure because of Clay Report (which Moroccans well aware of) and of balance of payments deficit to make severe cuts. President pointed out reduction in US presence after 1963 and, while emphasizing desire help Morocco regardless of question of bases, stressed very large share US aid to Africa which has gone to Morocco. He explained desire change aid pattern to development loans. President added it is intent of US to do as much as possible but he did not want any possible feeling later that he had acted in bad faith in not later increasing indicated aid levels; President said he thought only possibility increase was through Development Loans.
VOA: Balafrej, referring to agreement worked out in Morocco, said for all practical purposes, agreement had been reached and it only remained determine amount of time during which VOA transmitters would be put at disposal GOM.
IBRD - IMF Meeting: Question raised only briefly by Balafrej with Secretary. Slaoui met with IBRD - IMF and turned over dossier on Moroccan preparations for Casablanca meeting. Now apparently up to IBRD - IMF decide on basis dossier.
Military Assistance: Moroccans did not raise, except for training. US mentioned $5 million Naval MAP package in initial aide-memoire given to Balafrej, but there was no further discussion.
Rusk
151. National Security Action Memorandum No. 232 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 232. Secret. A copy was sent to Kermit Gordon.
Washington, April 5, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
Follow-up on King Hassan's Visit
The President was pleased by the careful preparations for King Hassan's visit but wants to be sure we tie up loose ends with equal care. He would like a report by 3 May from the Secretary of State in coordination with the Department of Defense and AID covering the following points:
1. How will we set up the military training program at Kenitra and what is the timetable for negotiating with the Moroccans?
2. How can we help the Moroccans plan suitable projects for the development loans we have promised?
3. How can we best fulfill our commitment to help the Moroccans convert the air bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir and prevent the conversion from dragging on unduly?
4. What is the timetable for converting Nouasseur to a civil airport? What steps remain to be taken?
5. How can we keep disposal of property on the air bases from becoming a serious irritant in US - Moroccan relations?
6. How can we build on the good feeling generated by the visit?
The President is also concerned that we take special pains to safeguard agreements reached on the future of our facilities at Kenitra. Unauthorized revelation to the press could seriously damage our relations with the King and the usefulness of these facilities.
McGeorge Bundy
152. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret.
Washington, May 8, 1963.
SUBJECT
Follow-up on King Hassan's Visit
REFERENCE
NSAM 232
The Departments of Defense and State, including the Agency for International Development, have agreed on actions required to follow up on the visit of King Hassan of Morocco. These actions, in response to the questions raised in NSAM 232 are summarized below with a tentative timetable. The full report is enclosed. /2/
/2/ Attached but not printed.
1. Military Training and Timetable
Brigadier General McHugh of your staff visited, as the King had suggested, the Moroccan Air School at Marrakech, on April 8, accompanied by US Navy and Embassy representatives. Their observations of the austere French presence at Marrakech are being studied by our Embassy, CINCEUR representatives, and the US Naval Commander in Morocco. Washington agencies are preparing an initial negotiating position for Ambassador Ferguson, with the intent that negotiations with the Moroccan Government should begin early in May. The establishment of the training program at Kenitra will be set up under a Moroccan command with US personnel in an advisory capacity. Efforts will be made to reduce both the evidence and size of the US presence.
2. Development Loans
AID is presently screening its Development Loan possibilities to determine those capable of early implementation. Subject to confirmation by the Ambassador that the Moroccans are ready to enter substantive discussions, a loan team will go to Morocco between May 15 and May 25 to speed up consideration of loan projects. The Ambassador will in advance and under instructions acquaint the Foreign Minister generally with our procedures, stressing the need for prompt cooperation. AID can provide consulting services to assist loan application preparation and can consider base conversion projects for loan applications.
3. Conversion of Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir (and Nouasseur in addition to civil airport)
AID is prepared to provide assistance through Development Loans if projects meeting loan criteria can be developed. The initiative lies primarily with the Moroccans, although AID is prepared to advise and assist on specific proposals.
Property disposition procedures are being proposed to the Moroccans to provide methods by which equipment necessary to the constructive use of the base complexes may be made available. Opportunities which might interest private enterprise will be brought to the attention of US companies. On GOM request, maintenance after December 31, 1963, can be provided temporarily (from MAP funds); GOM will be asked to insure against pilferage.
4. Nouasseur Conversion to Civilian Airport
An FAA team in Morocco has reported its preliminary findings in its examination of Nouasseur's possible conversion to civil use, finding a great deal of necessary equipment already available. The FAA will have made a full report by June 15.
5. Property Disposal
An aide-memoire to GOM proposing a joint Moroccan - American team to examine disposition of base property has been agreed to and sent to the Embassy and presented to the GOM. /3/ US law requires reimbursement to the Air Force for non-excess property. Means of providing such reimbursement from US financing are being determined. MAP funds can be used by DOD for financing non-excess property required for conversion of the bases to Moroccan military uses, or, subject to resolution of the legal and other questions involved, through transfer to AID for financing non-excess property required for conversion of the bases for economic development purposes.
/3/ Telegram 2153 to Rabat, April 23. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 - 10 MOR - US)
(Approximately $3 millon of MAP funds in FY 1963 are available for these two purposes.)
6. To Build on Good Feeling Created by Visit
Cognizance has been taken of the need to carry out our commitments as quickly as possible, to seek to meet the King's problems, to make unobtrusive our future requirements, and through follow-up contacts with the Foreign Minister and the King to show an interest in Moroccan views in international problems and to keep them informed, as appropriate, of our policies in Africa and the Middle East.
In conclusion
The need to guard closely our future plans has been reemphasized, but there is always the danger of speculation creating problems. Moroccan dissatisfaction with the FY 1963 Supporting Assistance level has been noted and simplified procedures suggested whereby the available funds, while not increased, can at least be made quickly available.
Some actions are of an interim nature; full development of a response will require several weeks. This, our initial report, will be supplemented as necessary, at the latest by July 30.
The tentative timetable for the next three months envisaged as a result of these actions follows:
MAY
1--SAC units leave Ben Guerir to be relocated at Nouasseur. Begin negotiation between Ambassador and Moroccan Foreign Minister on training program at Kenitra. Establishment of joint US - Moroccan group for identification of major items of movable US property on bases essential to constructive use of base complex.
15 - 25--An AID loan team will proceed to Morocco to examine possible loan projects, subject to confirmation by the Ambassador that the Moroccans are ready to enter substantive discussions.
Approach by Ambassador in advance and under instructions to acquaint the Foreign Minister generally with our loan procedures and stress the need for prompt cooperation.
JUNE
1--Given agreement between Ambassador and Foreign Minister on general principles involved in establishment training program at Kenitra, open negotiations on details between Senior US Naval Officer, Kenitra, and Moroccan military authorities.
15--Report of FAA Team on Reconversion of Nouasseur. Inform Moroccans of recommendations after AID/W review and approval on an urgent basis (possibly one week). Begin action by AID to secure necessary consulting services to assist GOM with feasibility studies and other data required for development loan applications. (Several months will be required.)
30--Determination prior June 30 of property desired by Moroccans which may be made available to the Government of Morocco.
JULY
15--Initial Moroccan application on Development Loan for Nouasseur conversion, expected no earlier than July 15. Subject to delays by Moroccans. After initial application has been fully documented and submitted, three months required for approval loan application.
31--Completion of determination of how selected available equipment on bases can be turned over to Moroccans.
Dean Rusk /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
153. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco. Top Secret.
Washington, August 2, 1963.
Attached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] message from King Hassan /2/ shows he's getting worried about his growing isolation. He clamped down hard on his opposition before last week's local elections and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also probably upset over reports that Ben Bella is training dissident Moroccans. Behind Ben Bella he sees Nasser, so is looking to us for reassurance.
/2/ Not printed. On July 29, the King had asked Lieutenant Colonel Canton to convey a message to President Kennedy through Navy communications channels. Hassan stated that there were new and most dangerous threats to the African continent, particularly the North African nations, from Russian and Chinese Communism. Noting that Nasser's aim was to dominate North Africa, he warned that the United Arab Republic had also become very dangerous and that Ben Bella was aligning himself with Communist ideology. These facts indicated a definite pattern of subversion, infiltration, and an attempt to isolate Morocco and to create a dangerous wedge between black and white Africa. The King said Morocco desired a much stronger attachment with the West, especially the United States, and wanted to join in combating these subversive forces.
We think a prompt [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reply is in order and will have a draft shortly. While we too see some evidence Ben Bella and Nasser would prefer to get rid of Hassan, it's probably best not to enhance his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fears. Instead, this is a good chance to plug the same line we've pushed with the Shah--the best way for a king to survive is to run a progressive government.
R.W. Komer
154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR - US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilliker, Komer, and Hinman (AID); and approved by Fredericks.
Washington, August 7, 1963, 6:39 p.m.
340. Ref: COMNAVACTS PORT LYAUTEY MSG M 301635X. Embtel 177. Charge requested seek private audience with King and convey following oral message in response to King's message sent through Colonel Canton. /2/ FYI, President desires Canton accompany you to indicate we appreciate meaning of private channel through which King's message conveyed. End FYI.
/2/ See footnote 1, Document 153.
1. President pleased continue fruitful exchange begun during Washington talks and appreciates King's analysis recent African developments. He fully agrees we must be on guard against new rash of Communist blandishments triggered by sharpened Sino - Soviet competition in Africa as elsewhere.
2. President also shares King's concern over threat of subversion to nations trying to make economic progress through orderly constitutional means. He has thought a lot about this since taking office and early concluded that, while every government must naturally be alert to its own internal security, equally important that government be so identified with meeting of popular needs as to deprive potential opposition of popular support. He believes well-organized reform, an effectively implemented development program, and government responsive to popular needs are the most effective weapons to this end.
3. President is seriously concerned over possibility raised by King that Morocco becoming increasingly isolated from other African nations. Past performance proves King's ability to take an important role in African councils. US has been impressed with recent African steps toward closer cooperation, and President hopes King will find means resume his role and become an important constructive influence.
4. President aware apprehensions in many states concerning activities and frequently stated aspirations UAR. In dealings with Cairo government, US has always made clear it cannot condone activities directed against other free states Middle East and Africa. US also aware that aftermath Algerian war and resulting adjustments have created potentially serious problems as well as new opportunities in relations between new Algerian state and neighbors. While not agreeing with Algerian leaders on some issues, US has sought encourage by its aid those seeking reconstruct country. US has also welcomed such signs of rapport between Algeria and neighbors as those which followed Rabat Foreign Ministers conference in February. US willing express to Algiers, as it has to Cairo, its opposition to activities directed against other independent states of the area.
5. President is especially pleased to have King's reassurance of desire for close association with West, particularly US, and appreciates King's support for mutually beneficial working relationship at Kenitra. President in turn reaffirms strong US interest in success of King's regime, as conveyed in Washington talks.
6. In this connection, President notes with satisfaction successful financial negotiations with France and King's personal effort to improve relations with Spain. He is pleased, too, that plans are being discussed for the conversion of Nouasseur Air Base to a civil airport and hopes we can conclude satisfactorily on schedule arrangements for turnover of air bases. President assures King US will continue to help Morocco within limits its resources in accordance with their conversations in March, though any aid program depends for its success more on recipient than on donor.
Ball
155. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Morocco, 333 - 680.1, 1963. Secret.
Washington, September 25, 1963.
SUBJECT
Morocco
We have reached a critical point in the Air Force withdrawal from the SAC bases in Morocco. The Air Force is holding at Nouasseur certain property recommended by the FAA as needed for the conversion of this base to a civil airport. The property is non-excess to Air Force needs, however, and arrangements must be made to reimburse the Air Force for its value ($650,000). To this end, AID has included this sum in the Development Loan under negotiation with the Moroccans for the Nouasseur conversion project.
While the Moroccans have stated their willingness to pay for the property with Development Loan financing, this has not yet been reduced to writing. In the absence of a written Moroccan commitment, AID is unwilling to give the Air Force the firm assurances it needs before it can relinquish the property involved. In turn, the Air Force, which has frozen the property since August, states that, unless it receives assurances of reimbursement now, it must begin shipping the property out. To delay further would greatly increase the costs to the Air Force of removing the property, if this could be accomplished at all by the December 31st withdrawal deadline.
Our efforts to gain from AID the assurances that the Air Force needs have been unavailing. AID is unwilling to assume any risk, regardless of how small, that the Development Loan might not go through. If the Air Force starts shipping the property, however, we can expect a strong reaction from the Moroccans, with the real possibility that our objectives at Kenitra would be endangered.
Accordingly, I recommend that you call George Ball to gain his assistance in trying to persuade Dave Bell to give the Air Force the assurances it needs.
Frank K. Sloan /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Sloan signed the original.
156. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 MOR - US. Confidential.
I - 14222/63 Washington, October 31, 1963.
Dear Alex: With respect to your letter of October 11, 1963, /2/ we have taken the steps necessary to assure that those basic utilities at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir that are needed to permit the constructive use of these bases by the Government of Morocco will be left in usable condition. You will note from the enclosed memorandum from the Air Force /3/ that it will require reimbursement in the sum of $202,000 for those utilities that are not excess to Air Force needs.
/2/ The letter from Johnson to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nitze referred to the undertaking, made by the President to King Hassan in March, to turn U.S. SAC bases over to Morocco in operable condition. It asked Nitze for his assist-ance in meeting problems related to leaving the bases at Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir with their basic utilities functioning, including an itemized list of the non-excess material required to meet the U.S. commitment. (Ibid., DEF 15 - 10 MOR - US)
/3/Attached but not printed.
We understand that our government is committed to leave these basic utilities in place without charge to the Moroccan Government. To this end, we will make arrangements to reimburse the Air Force from MAP funds for the non-excess utilities at the two bases if these facilities are to be used by the Moroccan Government for military purposes. However, there are no funds available to the Defense Department to reimburse the Air Force if the Moroccan Government intends to use these bases for economic development purposes, and in these cases we must look to AID to provide the necessary funds. We hope that the Moroccan Government can be urged to make an early decision on the utilization of the two bases.
Sincerely,
Bill
157. Editorial Note
On November 20, 1963, the Department of State conveyed its reservations about highlighting U.S. withdrawal from U.S. bases in Morocco any more than absolutely necessary to Ambassador Ferguson in Rabat. The Department noted that despite U.S. efforts to get Moroccan cooperation on post-withdrawal operation of the bases, the Moroccans had given no indication of their readiness to take over, and Washington agencies (except in the case of Nouasseur) were not prepared to assume long-term responsibility. The Ambassador was instructed to inform the Moroccan Government that the U.S. Air Force intended to relinquish Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane on December 2 and Nouasseur on December 16, and that all U.S. responsibility for the bases would cease on those dates. It was hoped that news of the early withdrawals from Ben Guerir and Sidi Slimane would move the Moroccan Government into taking some action at Nouasseur, where a breakdown of operating capability would be all the more embarrassing in view of the plans for its utilization. The Department stated that civilian technicians still in Morocco could operate the Nouasseur utilities if hired promptly by the Moroccan Government or AID, but not unassisted for any length of time. (Telegram 1159 to Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 - 10 MOR - US)
On December 6, the Embassy in Rabat reported that the last Air Force contingents had left Sidi Slimane and Ben Guerir on the morning of December 2, but that it had received no reaction to its note of November 22 giving the evacuation dates nor any expression of interest in employing technicians after December 16. (Telegram 873 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department asked the Ambassador on December 9 to raise the question of widespread pilferage at the bases formally and at the highest possible level, and to reiterate that the United States accepted no responsibility for the condition of the bases at their transfer since the Moroccan Army had been present on them for months for the specific purpose of maintaining their physical security and equipment intact. (Telegram 1199 to Rabat; ibid.)
On December 11, Ferguson reported that he had told Foreign Minister Guedira that the United States was not planning any base turnover ceremonies at either Nouasseur or Kenitra, and that Guedira had asked whether some of the U.S. officers in Morocco could be present at such ceremonies if they were organized by Moroccans. (Telegram 901 from Rabat; ibid.) The Department responded that the Ambassador was authorized to permit participation in such ceremonies to the extent he thought required. (Telegram 1216 to Rabat, December 12; ibid.)
Before the turnover ceremony on December 16, Ambassador Ferguson met with King Hassan, who expressed his dismay at the condition in which Ben Guerir had been left by the U.S. Air Force. (Telegram 917 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) The King reviewed the agreement reached in Washington concerning United States use of the communications facilities at Kenitra, and told the Ambassador that the turnover ceremony marked a new phase of the U.S. - Moroccan relationship. (Telegram 918 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.) Ferguson reported that a brief ceremony was held before the last U.S. airmen left Nouasseur at noon. He had spoken in general terms of the friendship between the two countries at the Kenitra ceremony later that day, and Guedira's speech had attributed the Kenitra cooperation to the close ties between the King and President Kennedy. (Telegram 923 from Rabat, December 16; ibid.)
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