Documents 158-186
Tunisia
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/1 - 3161. Confidential. Drafted by McBride; cleared by Witman, Easum, and Swank; and approved by McBride. Also sent to Tunis.
Washington, January 31, 1961, 10:13 p.m.
3136. Following based on uncleared memorandum conversation: /2/ Alphand called at his request on Secretary January 31 and raised, among other items, question Tunisian arms. French Ambassador said Paris not satisfied with briefing given heretofore on US arms shipments to Tunisia. Alphand said information had been ``too general." He referred again to fact French not fully briefed on contents Anderson report, though admitted he realized our position vis-a-vis Tunisians delicate. He said French felt Tunisians probably had more arms than they needed, and ``nightmare" persisted that some of these arms might reach FLN. French would of course keep confidential anything we told them.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
Secretary said we were reasonably confident our arms for Tunisia were not going to FLN. He referred also to our understandings with Tunisians. He added he had supposed liaison between French and ourselves on this subject in Tunisia had been sufficient but since this apparently not the case in French view, he would look into matter further.
Rusk
159. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/3 - 1761. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Chase. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy noting that in view of the President's interest in Tunisia's economic problems and in the U.S. assistance program there, Rusk felt that Kennedy would wish to read the enclosed memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams on the subject.
Washington, February 14, 1961.
SUBJECT
Aid to Tunisia
In a letter to President Eisenhower of September 22, 1960, /2/ President Bourguiba solicited additional U.S. help in assisting Tunisia to relieve vast unemployment through a carefully worked out development program based on an intensive use of Tunisian labor. In his reply of October 15, /3/ President Eisenhower confirmed our intention to maintain the level of Special Assistance at the FY 60 level of $20 millon and to consider increasing it following high-level consideration of Tunisia's needs.
/2/ See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIII, pp. 901 - 903.
/3/ See ibid., pp. 903 - 905.
The Country Team had recommended an FY 61 aid level of $30 million. Because of congressional cuts and anticipated DLF expenditures (which have not materialized) the actual level was fixed at $20 million. However after the presidential correspondence mentioned above an additional $5 million was to be set aside in our contingency funds to enable us to meet President Eisenhower's commitments. Recent reports from Tunisia have made clear that this increase is absolutely essential if crippling cuts--perhaps as much as 18%--in Tunisia's economic development program are to be avoided.
Since the exchange of letters, we have carefully reviewed Tunisia's needs and Mr. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the African Bureau, made a special visit to Tunis where he personally examined the Tunisian intensive labor program. He was greatly impressed by Tunisian efforts and feels the example Tunisia is setting is one we should do everything to encourage. AF is convinced therefore that in order not only to honor our commitment without further delay but to consolidate our good relations with Tunisia and promote it as an example for other African nations, we should arrange as soon as possible to inform President Bourguiba that, in response to his request, we are increasing our Special Assistance in FY 61 from $20 million to $25 million.
We have been informed that other liens have already exhausted the contingency funds. It would therefore be necessary to review our resources in order to determine the means of increasing the Tunisian program by $5 million.
160. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/4 - 1861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase and Adams, cleared in substance by Tasca, and approved by Witman.
Washington, April 20, 1961, 7:30 p.m.
1008. Embtel 1224. /2/ As Embassy will note from tel reporting conversations with Hourani we attach great importance fullest possible outlining by Tunisian visitors, beginning with Bourguiba himself, of GOT's three-year plan. We recognize plan may not be complete in all details but it should be possible identify major sectors to be covered, indicate approximate sums to be invested and their anticipated sources; social as well as economic aspects of development should also be provided for.
/2/ Dated April 19. (Ibid.)
Believe Hourani understands importance of making presentation as concrete as possible, it being understood on both sides that specifics would be worked out at a later date when US aid concepts are more firm.
It is most important that Tunisian plan provide analysis present overall economic-social picture in Tunisia, goals to be reached, timing involved, ability to use US aid as stimulant within Tunisian program and present commitments revealing short range plans and how they fit into or support long range goals. Housing as described reftel no doubt can be vital element in such plans, but its position in mosaic of plan itself must be identified and explained. Similarly, needs of university should be presented within over-all plan with specifics to be followed up by Messadi in talks with officials directly concerned.
Bowles
161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/4 - 2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Brown, Collopy, and Fredericks; and approved by Witman.
Washington, April 24, 1961, 9:20 p.m.
1139. We aware Algerian developments will be profoundly disturbing to Bourguiba and GOT, and are actively considering what political and other measures we can usefully take in circumstances.
If you receive a request for US military support in context Eisenhower - Bourguiba talks December 1959, you should reply that you will of course transmit request to Washington. At same time you should say, making clear you speaking personally, that you sure US watching situation carefully and that you confident US will not shrink from taking whatever measures might be appropriate to prevent spread of rebellion beyond Algeria's borders and to assist de Gaulle to ensure its collapse. /2/ You should discourage any request for expedited arms deliveries to Tunisia pointing out that a few additional rifles and mortars unlikely help in controlling situation but could actually be interpreted by Algiers regime as provocation.
/2/ Circular telegram 1673, April 25, quoted the Department press officer's statement that the United States would ``become directly concerned should the insurrection spread beyond the borders of Algeria and threaten the peace of the area." (Ibid., 751S.00/4 - 2561)
In any case Embassy should seek impress on GOT at all available levels importance maintaining calm and demonstrating confidence de Gaulle will speedily bring mutiny under control.
That Bourguiba might desire to remain Tunis during obviously critical period (Embtel 1246) /3/ is entirely understandable and you should inform GOT that we will of course be entirely guided by his wishes.
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., 772.11/4 - 2361)
Rusk
162. Background Paper Prepared in the Office of Northern African Affairs /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1853 - 1854. Confidential. Drafted by Chase and cleared by Williams, Root, and Valdes. This paper was part of the Briefing Book prepared for President Bourguiba's visit to Washington May 3 - 5, 1961.
Washington, April 27, 1961.
UNITED STATES - TUNISIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS
Since independence Tunisia has tended to look to the United States to provide a counter weight to pressures exerted on Tunisia by France and to an increasing extent by the Algerians. Tunisia is too small a country to carry much weight with either of these elements, although its economic, cultural and political future is inextricably tied to them. Consequently, Tunisia feels that it must work with both France and Algeria but to do so safely it must be able to count on support in critical moments from powerful friends. Bourguiba has constantly sought such support from the United States. The United States, he reasons, is in a position to exert pressure on France to be more understanding of North African needs and the United States has the economic resources to fill at least partially the gap in capital investment which has resulted from the cutting off in 1957 of direct French economic assistance to Tunisia.
An active United States interest in North Africa also serves from Bourguiba's point of view to protect the area against Soviet penetration. Bourguiba does not believe in turning his back on the Soviet Bloc altogether. Such a policy would needlessly alienate his younger supporters and play into the hands of his foreign adversaries who constantly portray him as being a tool of the West. Bourguiba also considers that it is too much to expect the United States or even the United States and Western Europe to fill all of Tunisia's needs for foreign capital. He is therefore prepared to consider, although very carefully, any aid offers which the Soviet Bloc might be willing to extend. To date the Tunisians have been unimpressed by the kinds of equipment and techniques which the Russians are prepared to make available to Tunisia. They have found satellite offers considerably more interesting, but to date there has been little concrete Bloc activity in Tunisia.
At the present time, Bourguiba is even more interested in securing a United States commitment to support his regime than in the past. Even assuming a settlement with the Algerians is reached, he foresees a period during which North Africa is likely to go through considerable political and social unrest. He does not wish to isolate himself from these developments but rather to influence them in the direction of the reformist and essentially moderate policies which guide his own country. To do this, he needs the moral backing which can accrue to him through demonstrated United States - Tunisia ties. If such ties could lead also to similar relations between the United States and the Algerians and a more democratic Moroccan regime, Bourguiba would be even more pleased. This is not to say that Bourguiba has abandoned his long search for a Franco - Maghreb community of interest, but he probably believes that, for a variety of reasons, relations between France and the Maghreb will be full of difficulties for many years to come, as legacies from the former colonial relationships are slowly converted into more satisfactory arrangements in an atmosphere of mutuality. He would hope that the United States would influence France as the stronger power to be generous in its treatment of specific issues. However, if this should not happen (and Bourguiba is as aware as any one that de Gaulle feels he must set his own pace), he looks to the United States to protect his regime and to act in ways open to it to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting to its own benefit differences within North Africa and between North Africa and France. Bourguiba was most impressed by our willingness to aid General de Gaulle in crushing the abortive coup of the ex-generals and by the statement of the Department's official spokesman that the United States would become directly involved if the rebellion were to spread beyond Algeria's borders. He considers these statements to be responsive to Tunisia's own expression of concern and will wish to thank the President for reaffirming in this way the importance the United States attaches to the maintenance of Tunisia's sovereignty and independence.
163. Presidential Determination No. 61 ? 26 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/5 - 361. Secret.
Washington, May 5, 1961.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
SUBJECT
Determination under Section 451(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, permitting the use of funds to furnish military equipment and materials to Tunisia
In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of May 3, 1961, /2/ I hereby determine pursuant to Section 451(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter referred to as ``the Act"), that it is more important to the security of the United States that up to $4,100,000 of funds available under the Act for military assistance purposes be used as described in your memorandum to furnish military assistance to Tunisia without regard to the requirements of Sections 141 and 142(a) of the Act that no military assistance shall be furnished to a nation unless it shall have agreed to the undertaking specified by Section 142(a) of the Act, and without regard to the requirements of Section 511(c) of the Act in respect to arrangements for the return to the United States of military equipment or materials furnished to a nation on a grant basis.
/2/ Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Under Secretary Ball to President Kennedy recommending that the President determine that the specified amount of FY 1961 military assistance funds be used to furnish military equipment and materials to Tunisia. A typed notation on Ball's memorandum indicates that the President signed the Determination on May 5.
You are requested on my behalf to give appropriate notice of this determination, pursuant to Section 513 of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
John F. Kennedy
164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.72/5 - 1661. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Brown and Manfull, and approved by Witman. Sent to Paris, Tunis, Rabat, Cairo, Ankara (Niact), and London.
Washington, May 16, 1961, 1:09 p.m.
1805. We consider Bourguiba visit highly successful and have impression Tunisians equally pleased. Two Presidents held cordial talks and found broad identity views on variety subjects. /2/ Tunisian Ministers accompanying Bourguiba likewise engaged in satisfactory discussions throughout U.S. Government.
/2/ The conversations were recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 611.72/5 - 461 and 611.72/5 - 561)
As expected, Algeria was Bourguiba's principal preoccupation. He laid great stress on importance of doing everything possible ensure new Algeria was headed by leaders committed to moderate and constructive policies of intra-Maghreb and Franco - Maghreb cooperation. In Bourguiba's view, French as stronger element should adopt generous line in negotiations with PAG. Such tactics, especially if coupled with release Ben Bella and other moderates having influence with ALN elements, were essential if positive climate to be created. However, Bourguiba cautioned against undue optimism as regards speedy solution since even in best of circumstances transfer of power would involve many difficulties on internal front, e.g. reintegration guerrillas, quite apart from problems inherent in liquidation Franco - Algerian matters such as Sahara and Mers al Kebir.
Second principal topic discussion was Tunisia's economic development planning. Tunisians made impressive presentation in broad terms. U.S. expressed hope that long-term plan on which GOT actually working could form framework for multi-year assistance assuming Congressional acceptance administration's new aid program and concepts.
In general, talks confirmed that U.S. and Tunisia had common approach on main political and economic matters of mutual interest. Hence, visit served primarily to demonstrate reciprocal respect between Tunisia and U.S., our recognition of Tunisia's efforts in foreign and domestic fields and our willingness do what we can to help assure success Tunisia's own measures of self-help.
Bowles
165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7 - 1461. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Valdes, and approved by Witman. Also sent to Tunis and repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and USUN.
Washington, July 19, 1961, 9:37 p.m.
387. Following guidance has been given by Department spokesman:
``It would be particularly regrettable if attempts were made to settle these differences by any means other than negotiation at this particularly important time in the evolution of French and North African affairs." /2/
/2/ On July 17, President Bourguiba announced that the French naval base at Bizerte in Tunisia would be blockaded as of July 19 and that he would send Tunisian forces into the disputed territory. The French sent reinforcements to the base and fighting broke out between French and Tunisian forces on July 19.
For Tunis: You should inform Mokkadem we consider timing of Tunisian moves against Bizerte most unfortunate and destined to be disruptive of progress towards settlement of Algerian question, which to be taken up again at Evian tomorrow. They are also unfortunate in light of world situation generally, i.e., Berlin. Impact of dramatic and contrived Arab pressure against European presence Bizerte can scarcely be reassuring to French who are faced with problem of reassuring French public opinion about security of European minority Algeria.
For Paris: You should seek explanation from Foreign Office about reinforcements destined Bizerte, particularly in light of assurances (Paris Tel 207), /3/ that any such orders could emanate only from Paris.
/3/ Dated July 19. (Ibid., 772.56351/7 - 1461)
You may say we have taken strong line Tunisians this matter, deploring their timing in the light of Algerian situation and world situation generally. You may say, however, that we believe Bourguiba's performance undoubtedly caused in large measure by his very real difficulties with Algerians and that we would hope that nothing would be done by France which would complicate his ability to back down. We would welcome French views as to what moves France might envisage to facilitate this. Would further emphasis on willingness to negotiate once duress removed be helpful?
Rusk
166. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7 - 2061. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic.
Washington, July 20, 1961.
SUBJECT
Tunisian Complaint in Security Council
The Tunisians have decided to take their difficulties with the French to the Security Council tomorrow afternoon, charging the French with aggression in the region of Bizerte. It would be most unfortunate to have two friends of the West disputing this issue in the Security Council and would provide a great many openings for the Soviets and the UAR.
It is our opinion that it would be helpful if you were to call in both the Tunisian Ambassador and French Charge on this matter. /2/
/2/ On July 20, the Secretary called in first the Tunisian Ambassador, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and then the French Charge, M. Claude Lebel. Rusk told Bourguiba that the U.S. Government was agreed on the need for an immediate end to the fighting and he urged negotiations to bring about an immediate cease-fire. Rusk also expressed doubt as to whether U.N. Security Council action would help or hinder a settlement during subsequent negotiations. (Memorandum of conversation, July 20; ibid., 772.56351/7 - 2061) The Secretary then told Lebel that it was ``particularly painful" for the United States to see France and Tunisia, which had been on friendly terms, involved in a situation of this kind and said he thought that negotiation was essential. (Memorandum of conversation, July 20; ibid.)
You might wish to tell the Tunisian Ambassador that we are most disturbed by the timing of these events and are strongly urging both sides to reconcile their differences among themselves. You might add that recourse to the Security Council is bound to bring cold war issues into this question, particularly now at the time of the Berlin crisis, and will certainly affect United States freedom of action. Furthermore these difficulties prejudice gravely France's ability to be forthcoming at the Evian negotiations and the entire matter opens up opportunities to adversaries of both the United States and Tunisia.
You might say that you hope the Tunisian Government will reconsider its decision to bring this matter to the Security Council and say that we are urging the French to take such steps as might facilitate this.
167. Editorial Note
On July 20, 1961, Tunisia appealed to the United Nations to convene an emergency session of the Security Council and charged the French with acts of aggression that infringed on the sovereignty and security of Tunisia in Bizerte. When the Council met on July 21, U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost appealed to both Tunisia and France, calling for an ``immediate cease-fire" and ``a satisfactory settlement of the question directly between the two parties concerned." For text of Yost's statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 736 - 737.
In a July 21 telephone conversation between the Secretary and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home and a meeting between D.A. Greenhill, Counselor at the British Embassy, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland on July 22, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to make joint demarches to France and Tunisia urging a cease-fire and to support a Security Council resolution urging a cease-fire and commencement of negotiations. Both countries agreed that adoption of some sort of U.N. resolution would be necessary despite French objections. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations; Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/7 - 2261)
On July 22, by a vote of 10 to 0, with France abstaining, the Security Council adopted an interim resolution sponsored by Liberia which called for ``an immediate cease-fire and a return of all armed forces to their original positions." For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 737 - 738.
The July 22 Security Council session continued as members attempted to reach agreement on a definitive resolution. A draft resolution sponsored by Liberia and the United Arab Republic, which called upon both parties to enter into immediate negotiations aimed at the speedy evacuation of French forces from all of Tunisia, lost by a vote of 4 to 0 with 7 abstentions (including the United States and France) because it failed to gain the necessary 7 votes for adoption. The draft resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, which urged both parties to promptly negotiate a peaceful settlement of their differences, also failed to receive the requisite number of votes, losing by a vote of 6 to 0 with 5 abstentions.
On July 23, Yost reported that the French were ``on the whole pleased" with the outcome in the Security Council, while the Tunisians were ``deeply unhappy" at the failure of the United States and its friends to support them on the evacuation issue. In light of the strong Tunisian resentment, he advised that they should immediately agree to airlift Tunisian troops from the Congo. In view of strong Tunisian objections to the presence of the base on their territory, Yost urged that the United States exert its full influence with the French so that the issue be promptly settled in a manner that would be at least reasonably satisfactory to Tunisia. (Telegram 177 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7 - 2361)
168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7 - 2561. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits, cleared by Blue and Root, and approved by Cleveland. Passed to CINCEUR and to USUN and Tunis.
Washington, July 25, 1961, 8:26 p.m.
525. Ref urtel 376 /2/ and Deptel 77 to Tunis rptd USUN 150 Paris 524. US position and reasoning on assistance to airlift Tunisian troops described for your information in Deptel 77. /3/
/2/ Telegram 376 from Paris, July 24, reported that Lyon had informed French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville concerning the planned U.S. airlift of Tunisian troops from the Congo. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not like to see the United States failing to support France and would have preferred to see Soviet planes doing this work. He also expressed concern that Bourguiba wanted these troops for a future operation against France. (Ibid., 772.56351/7 - 2461)
/3/ In telegram 77 to Tunis, July 25, the Department noted that the United States was ``cooperating fully" in repatriating Tunisian troops from the Congo, but had decided to use commercial carriers rather than have the U.S. Air Force directly involved in the ``disturbed situation within Tunisia." Ambassador Walter Walmsley was authorized to stress to the Tunisian Government that the United States was ``responding fully and favorably to their request in the most expeditious way possible," noting that the difference between using commercial aircraft and USAF aircraft was ``symbolic rather than real." (Ibid., 323.70G/7 - 2561)
You are authorized inform FonOff that US has carefully considered French objections to our providing airlift support for Tunisian contingent from Congo. In view implications which might be drawn from using US military aircraft to repatriate Tunisian troops at this time, US has decided, contrary to past practice in Congo operations, that US military aircraft will not participate in lift.
In fulfilling its obligation repatriate Tunisians, UN has approached commercial carriers including US and European lines to bid on contract for airlift. Since this airlift represents bona fide UN request, USG will not interpose objections to US airlines participating in airlift. We understand Sabena was first airline to bid on UN contract for lift.
You may wish emphasize that airlift being handled as strictly UN operation, with combination of UN aircraft and chartered commercial aircraft of European and American carriers.
Rusk
169. Editorial Note
On July 27, 1961, Tunisia again requested that the U.N. Security Council be convened on grounds that French military forces had not complied with the interim resolution of July 22. On July 28, the French Government issued a statement declaring its preference for a settlement of the Bizerte problem through direct negotiations with Tunisia. The same day, the French Government informed the Security Council that French troops had not refused to obey the cease-fire, that Tunisia had not accepted French proposals for talks concerning procedures for restoring normal conditions in Bizerte, and that, therefore, France did not consider it necessary to participate in any further debate on this subject in the Security Council.
On July 28, Ambassador Stevenson, who was in Paris, met with President de Gaulle, who told him that France would not participate in U.N. deliberations on Bizerte nor be influenced by any resolutions distasteful to France. De Gaulle indicated, however, that France did not intend to remain in Bizerte forever. The French President also warned Stevenson that the Atlantic Alliance was at stake. (Telegram 509 from Paris, July 28; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7 - 2861) The next day, Stevenson met with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and expressed U.S. concern at the serious division which Bizerte might cause among Western countries and asked if France would consider acknowledging publicly the principle of eventual evacuation. Couve replied that it was not the French intention to remain permanently in Bizerte, but that they could not leave right away and would not leave under pressure even if the base were worthless. (Telegram 521 from Paris, July 29; ibid., 772.56351/7 - 2961)
On July 29, the Security Council considered three new draft resolutions. Two of these were sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic and concentrated on France's failure to comply with the resolution of July 22. Each received 4 affirmative votes (the sponsors joined by the Soviet Union) with 6 abstentions. The third resolution, which was sponsored by Turkey and supported by the United States, expressed concern that the interim resolution had not been fully carried out and called for its immediate and full implementation. A third operative paragraph urged the early opening of negotiations for a peaceful resolution of differences, ``including a definitive settlement of the question of Bizerte, having due regard for Tunisian sovereignty." For text of Ambassador Yost's statement supporting the Turkish draft resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 741 - 742. For text of the draft resolution, see ibid., page 742. During subsequent debate, the third paragraph was dropped. The remainder of the resolution also failed adoption by a vote of 6 to 0, with 4 abstentions. France did not participate in any of the voting and the Security Council concluded its meetings on July 29 without adopting any further resolution.
Immediately following the last Security Council session, Yost saw the Tunisian Representative to the United Nations, Mongi Slim, who expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis and urged that they continue. Similarly, French Representative Berard urged that the United States try to work out with Couve de Murville a formula that would permit implementation of the July 22 resolution. (Telegram 290 from USUN, July 29; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/7 - 2961)
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.00/8 - 361. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by McClintic; cleared by Fredericks, Witman, Cleveland, Grant, and Tyler; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Tunis, Rabat, London, and USUN.
Washington, August 3, 1961, 9:51 p.m.
733. Initial meetings with Secretary morning and President afternoon August 2 confined largely to Ladgham's /2/ emphasizing gravity situation following Bizerte and impact on U.S., West and UN if world sees Tunisia's plight ignored by West.
/2/ Bahi Ladgham, Tunisian Secretary of State for the Presidency and for National Defense, visited Washington as a special emissary of President Bourguiba. He met with Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy on August 2 and again with the Secretary on August 3. (Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149; and ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Converation: Lot 65 D 330)
US expressed concern, awareness larger issues involved, willingness to examine actively ways in which US influence could be made effective.
In luncheon meeting today with Ball, Stevenson, Cleveland and others present, Secretary said we committed to and fully support Tunisian independence and sovereignty and it is US interest that problem be solved with preservation our friendship with Tunisia, with France, and with preservation friendship of Tunisia and France for each other. Despite high emotions both sides we convinced, as a result our soundings, basic motivations both sides are such that agreement can be reached quickly once initial obstacles to negotiations overcome. Problem thus one of method.
Secretary emphasized high-level initial contacts should not be considered vital. Said US supports position that future of Bizerte must be consistent with sovereignty of Tunisia, and is for Tunisia to decide. He assured Ladgham US willing work to make this come about. Said in Paris he would actively examine ways to find solution.
Ladgham promised GOT would provide assurances re civil order and military communications between French installations as soon as French announced intent to effect troop pull-back and departure significant number recent reinforcements.
Secretary strongly emphasized our view that, now that US prestige directly involved, there be no disruption cease-fire. In return for assumption by US of this role, with time and prestige of Secretary directly involved, we entitled to be given full opportunity have our efforts succeed.
Accepting importance this US undertaking, Ladgham agreed to recommend to President Bourguiba, on his return to Tunis 6 p.m. local time tomorrow, that action leading to emergency General Assembly not be pressed forward for time being. Should President Bourguiba object, we will be immediately informed.
Gov. Stevenson said GOT will be kept informed our findings on day-to-day basis.
FYI. French and British Embassies given background of above in general terms only. End FYI.
Rusk
171. Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 561. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Tunis and USUN.
Paris, August 5, 1961, 1 a.m.
Secto 3. Following based on uncleared memo conversation of Secretary's long conversation re Bizerte this afternoon. /2/
/2/ The conversation took place between Secretary Rusk and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. Rusk was in Paris August 4 - 9. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
Secretary explained that while we did not wish meddle, Franco - Tunisian matter one which vitally touched our own interests, particularly its effect on Berlin problem. Secretary regretted fact already some 47 nations which were anxious scold France, US and other western powers would in GA probably use against us words which we might want employ ourselves with respect to Berlin before end of year. Secretary explained saw no reason why question could not be solved since he did not believe either France or Tunisia contemplated future hostilities toward each other; matters probably had gone further and faster than anyone had wanted them to and he thought it would be useful to explore means of easing tensions.
Secretary said he understood that French would be prepared pull their forces back into base if they could receive assurances regarding communications and that law and order would be maintained in area concerned. Secretary also said he understood Tunisians prepared give such assurances. Thus question was how get matter started.
Foreign Minister said he thought he should start beginning and explain how whole matter evolved. After considerable detail of past since 1955, including Bourguiba - De Gaulle talks, Couve said he thought immediate cause of Bourguiba's action last month resulted from latter's failure obtain Moroccan and FLN support for his maghrebian ambitions, his Sahara claim difficulty, and generally finding himself on bad terms with Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, thus Bourguiba felt forced play role on international stage.
Incident with which everyone familiar ensued. Couve explained France's present position very much as set forth Embassy telegram 658: /3/
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 461)
French must maintain base as long as world situation remains tense and must be judge of when it is safe to leave. They do not intend stay in Bizerte ``forever," but not publicly prepared at this juncture make declaration that effect. Quite prepared discuss future of base with Tunisians, but obviously cannot do this while under pressure. Believe that these discussions which must take place between Tunisians and French divide into two stages: (A) reestablishment of peaceful situation in Bizerte or modalities of evacuation, and (B) reestablishment of some sort relations which will permit discussions concerning future of base. They cannot accept Bourguiba's conditions under present situation with some two thousand Tunisian soldiers in Bizerte City, exits of which French control to prevent smuggling in of arms. Foreign Minister explained complicated physical situation of base which is well known. When he referred to contact telephonic and personal between French Consulate General and Tunisian Government Secretary asked why these would not afford opportunity for Consulate General to discuss matter of troop withdrawals, etc.
Foreign Minister indicated that might be possible for Consulate General's conversations to develop more substance than so far but that he thought it would take time for them progress very far. In answer direct question he said he did not foresee much progress within next few days; he mentioned possibly weeks to discuss matter reestablishment normal life, evacuation, etc. Said French must move very cautiously to avoid future incidents.
Foreign Minister touched on matter of ``hostages," or some five hundred French civilians being held in prison, an amount approximately same as some six hundred Tunisians being held by French. He agreed this might lead to exchange of prisoners.
Foreign Minister was not too concerned with regard to possibility special General Assembly. In first place he did not feel at all certain it would take place, since Soviets were opposed to addressing letter directly SYG.
Secretary indicated we were extremely concerned with possibility special GA and President Kennedy himself was most anxious avoid this, particulary in view Berlin. Foreign Minister asked how Secretary saw Tunisian crisis affecting Berlin, saying he believed a crisis must be nourished and once GA over Tunisian matter would normalize itself.
Secretary disagreed, believing there would be calls for volunteers, guerilla activities, reprisals against French, etc. Foreign Minister doubted Bourguiba prepared take on both French and Algerian armies. He also thought Bourguiba would not wish have his Saharan action discussed GA since Bourguiba had endeavored establish his position by force. Bourguiba had never mentioned fact that some two hundred Tunisian casualties involved this operation.
In answer to Secretary's suggestion that France, more powerful nation, might make some gesture toward smaller nation, Couve replied that he had thought two days ago of taking initiative for direct discussions with Tunisians but learned that Tunisians did not want discussions.
In summary, Foreign Minister indicated he saw no difficulty in French Consul General's conversations with Tunisians being broadened and would see what could be done this connection. Couve entirely appreciated Secretary's views that were conversations in progress, GA would be easier handle.
It is recommended that Department alert Ambassador Walmsley to Foreign Minister's views regarding possibility of broadening scope of French Consulate General - Tunisian Governor conversations in order latter may be prepared for any possible initiative on France's part in this connection.
Memo conversation will be pouched later.
Rusk
172. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 861. Secret.
Paris, August 8, 1961, 9 p.m.
Secto 48. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. No progress whatever with de Gaulle on Bizerte. Subject brought up by me at end of hour's conversation /2/ and it was quite clear he considers it a French affair, none of our business, and anything he consented to say was matter of information out of courtesy to a friend. To illustrate this point he said that if we were involved with Cuba or some such problem elsewhere he hoped we would provide him information. He promptly broke off conversation that point by wishing me good journey and expressed warm regard to President. On way out Couve tried to pick up pieces by suggesting he and I talk further before my departure. /3/ Gavin or I will do so just to find out whether anything constructive has been done on French side despite de Gaulle's attitude. Nothing I have learned in Paris leads me to believe we are justified in giving any further encouragement to Tunisians about possibilities useful talks unless they can discover such possibilities through direct contacts with French. Reported here that Admiral Amman expected Paris tomorrow for consultations.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
/3/ On August 7, Secretary Rusk told Couve de Murville that he was under instructions from President Kennedy to see President de Gaulle and emphasize the importance to the Western Alliance that Franco - Tunisian discussions on Bizerte replace U.N. General Assembly action. Rusk had said that an instruction to the French Consul General in Bizerte to begin talks was the minimum contribution that France ought now to make. Couve promised to discuss this matter with de Gaulle. Rusk asked the Department of State to pass his report of this conversation to the President, adding that they should not underestimate the ``precariousness of de Gaulle's position" (Secto 35, August 7; ibid., Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 761)
Will bring complete memcon back with me and will cable anything of interest Couve has to say tomorrow. Sorry mission aborted on this one but Bizerte is the least of our problems with France as we look into the months ahead. /4/
No distribution to field desired.
Rusk
/4/ On August 8, Ball told Stevenson that what had impressed the President the most in the Secretary's report was the reference to the ``precariousness of de Gaulle's position" and that Kennedy was ``very anxious not to be in a position of hurting de Gaulle." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 8, 4:20 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Tunisia)
173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) /1/
/1/ Source: Princeton University Library, Stevenson Papers, Embassy Files, Tunisia. No classification marking.
Washington, August 23, 1961.
I raised the Tunisian question with the President this morning. He said that he saw it as a simple practical matter and hoped that the members of the Delegation would be relatively matter-of-fact and hard-boiled in explaining the reasons for the American position. /2/ He thinks that U.S. representatives should say something along the following lines:
/2/ On August 21, a special session of the U.N. General Assembly convened to consider ``the grave situation in Tunisia obtaining since July 19, 1961."
``Everyone forgets how shaky de Gaulle's position is. A group of generals revolted against him a few weeks back; and the mishandling of the Tunisian affair might well precipitate another and more effective military revolt leading conceivably to his overthrow and to the replacement of his government by a regime of ultras. With all his defects, de Gaulle represents the only hope of gaining a solution in Algeria. Our sympathy continues to be with the nations throwing off the bond of colonialism; but the cause of anti-colonialism will not be helped by the overthrow of de Gaulle; and this seems to us a possible and even likely consequence of too aggressive American support for the Tunisian position."
The President said that he hopes no one will be in the slightest degree apologetic about the American line.
He agrees that what will matter in Paris is not what we say but what we do, and therefore will be happy to have you show as much sympathy as possible for the anti-colonial position within the framework of the abstention policy.
Arthur
174. Editorial Note
France boycotted the U.N. General Assembly special session on Bizerte, which began on August 21, 1961. The general debate, in which 53 delegations participated, continued until August 25. A draft resolution sponsored by 32 members was introduced calling ``the presence of French armed forces in Tunisian territory against the express will of the Tunisian Government and people a violation of Tunisia's sovereignty," recognizing ``the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed forces present on its territory without its consent," and calling upon the Governments of France and Tunisia ``to enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful and agreed measures in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the withdrawal of all French armed forces from Tunisian territory."
Speaking before the General Assembly on August 22, Ambassador Stevenson said that the United States believed that the only solution to the crisis was through negotiations between France and Tunisia and that it did not believe that it would be useful for the General Assembly to adopt ``a resolution which, regardless of its merits, might serve only to prolong the present stalemate." For text of his statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 743 - 746.
On August 25, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 66 to 0, with 30 abstentions (including the United States). For text of the resolution as adopted, 1622 (S - III), see ibid., pages 746 - 747. For a record of the proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/L.351.
175. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56311/8 - 2861. Confidential.
Washington, August 28, 1961.
Dear Dean: In view of the present difficulties which have arisen between the French and Tunisians over Bizerte, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made an appraisal of the military potential of that base to the Western Allies. /2/
/2/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted this appraisal in an August 18 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, JCSM - 553 - 61. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3463, Tunisia 370.02)
The Bizerte base has the following military potential for maritime operations:
a. It contains a Naval air facility capable of providing support for antisubmarine warfare, reconnaissance, mining and seaplane operations.
b. The port of Bizerte is capable of supporting conventional submarines, minesweeping operations, local craft, an amphibious staging area for landing craft, and minor naval units.
c. Geographically, the port is located strategically for both the conduct of submarine operations and the establishment of a defensive barrier line between Tunisia and Sicily. Such operations would assist in the control of sea lines of communication between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean.
While recognizing that the United States faces a political dilemma in how to reconcile its need to support NATO France and still maintain a satisfactory political relationship with the Government of Tunisia, I concur with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if politically feasible, it would be desirable to have the use of the Bizerte facilities available to the Free World after the present difficulties have been resolved.
I recommend that the above comments be considered in the political discussions or negotiations incident to the efforts toward settlement of the problem of the Bizerte base.
Sincerely,
Roswell Gilpatric
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 2861. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Witman; cleared by Tyler, Veliotes, Wallner, Fredericks, Ball, and Schlesinger; and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Paris and USUN.
Washington, August 28, 1961, 8:09 p.m.
173. Ref Embtel 336. /2/ Deptel 174. /3/ Following is text of letter to be delivered to President Bourguiba in accordance instructions transmitted separate telegram (Deptel 174).
/2/ In telegram 336 from Tunis, August 26, Walmsley reported that the Tunisian Foreign Office had suggested he meet with Bourguiba before Bourguiba's departure from Tunisia on August 31. Walmsley recommended that he be given a message from President Kennedy for Bourguiba with ``some soothing words of encouragement and sympathy." Walmsley added that it was extremely important that the United States signify its intention to support both U.N. resolutions and to continue its efforts to bring about negotiations. (Ibid.)
/3/ In telegram 174 to Tunis, August 28, the Department of State conveyed to Walmsley the text of oral remarks to be made to Bourguiba while delivering the letter from President Kennedy printed here. Walmsley was to emphasize U.S. efforts since the start of the crisis to be helpful in bringing the problem to the negotiating table, and would continue to do everything possible to be helpful. (Ibid.)
``Dear Mr. President,
I greatly appreciate your letter of August 12, and want to thank you also for the welcome visits to Washington of Messrs. Ladgham and Hourani.
I am indeed anxious to reestablish with you a communication which seems to have been partially interrupted by the incidents of Bizerte. I am deeply aware of the reasons why your press and public opinion should feel a sense of disappointment or even disillusionment with what must have seemed to be a lessening of the support and friendship of the United States for Tunisia in an hour of need.
But I hope that I do not have to reassure you, Mr. President, of the constancy of our feeling towards Tunisia. You have been kept informed by Ambassador Walmsley as well as by Mr. Ladgham, Mr. Hourani, Ambassador Slim and Ambassador Bourguiba, Jr. of the deep personal interest which Secretary Rusk and I personally have exerted in an effort to seek a solution of this tragic crisis between two nations who have many close ties with each other. Standing as my country does close to a holocaust that could destroy the US as well as Europe and much of the East, I have not found it possible to take a public position on this matter satisfactory to you. I regret this greatly, but I am hopeful that you will recognize our difficulties as well as those of your country in these days.
We have felt deeply this tragedy, not only because of our own intimate association with both parties, but because we know that essentially the differences between you are not irreconcilable. It is for this reason that we felt that careful diplomacy could heal the wounds of pride and prestige which both sides feel they have suffered.
We have tried to be helpful, as a sincere friend of both parties. We intend to continue these efforts, Mr. President, by whatever means appear to be propitious. If there has been a difference of opinion between us, it has been solely on tactics, how best to exert our influence usefully to help bring about a solution which, ultimately, can only result from negotiations between Tunisia and France.
Secretary Rusk has told your representatives that this is a battle which Tunisia, in the exercise of her sovereignty, cannot lose. There remains the problem of working out the details. Knowing as you do my disposition and sentiments, you will I trust not hesitate to communicate to me an indication as to the means by which you may now deem it would be useful for the United States to act to bring about a genuine settlement of the problem of Bizerte.
Sincerely yours, s/John F. Kennedy." /4/
Rusk
/4/ On August 29, Walmsley reported that he delivered the President's message to Bourguiba who had been grateful but who had no constructive suggestion for U.S. diplomatic activity unless the United States was prepared to anger de Gaulle. (Telegram 352, August 29; 772.56351/8 - 2961)
177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/8 - 2661. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Tyler, Manfull, Wallner, Ball, Fredericks, and Smith (White House); and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tunis and USUN.
Washington, September 1, 1961, 7:33 p.m.
1250. We share USUN's concern (550 rptd Paris 104) /2/ at damage which could be caused by renewal Bizerte issue in 16th GA.
/2/ Stevenson reported on August 26 that the U.N. special session had shown that the Bizerte crisis had been ``gravely damaging" to the reputation not only of France, but to the United States and the West as a whole. The United Nations' reputation as the defender of small states against military intervention by large ones had also been tarnished. Stevenson warned of the most serious effects on Afro-Asian attitudes if the situation were allowed to persist during the 16th General Assembly session beginning September 19 and noted that all of these factors warranted a strong appeal by the President to de Gaulle that he make a ``bold and generous initiative" to resolve the Bizerte situation before September 19. (Telegram 550 from USUN; ibid.)
We have considered carefully USUN's suggestion for Presidential letter to de Gaulle and believe such an approach would prove counterproductive at this time.
Believe, however, it essential we make our grave concern patently clear to French. You should, therefore, seek appointment with FonMin, and make following points:
1. You have been instructed by Secretary of State with full approval of President to raise urgently problem of Bizerte.
2. Bizerte has become far more than issue involving only France and Tunisia. Recent debate in Special Session indicates that renewed debate on Bizerte in 16th GA could rapidly turn into generalized political attack by Soviets and Afro - Asians on Western defense policies. Furthermore, continued existence unresolved Bizerte problem affects adversely our interests on such vital questions as Berlin.
3. With Special Session out of way France and Tunisia have short period in which to arrange modus vivendi. This period may expire when General Assembly convenes. Should it pass without forward movement, highly likely UN will directly condemn France for intransigence and may even entertain proposals for sanctions.
4. Tunisians are attending Belgrade conference and it unlikely they will take major actions by themselves before testing atmosphere that conference. We have indications, however, Tunisians ready make some accommodations which could lessen tension now existing. (FYI. August 28 Tunisian note to GOF sent through Swedes. End FYI.)
5. As major power and as country which achieved military victory on ground, a magnanimous gesture by France could have catalytic effect and lead to gestures by Tunisians.
6. As example of definite actions France might take, we believe announcement of withdrawal to base perimeter and willingness negotiate as envisaged in exchange of letters of 1958 /3/ would prove most effective as means reach bilateral accommodation necessary and to prevent further growth anti-French feeling throughout world.
/3 /On June 17, 1958, France and Tunisia reached agreement that all French troops except those at Bizerte would withdraw from Tunisia and that negotiations for a provisional agreement on Bizerte would begin immediately. For text of the French and Tunisian statements announcing the agreement at the June 18 U.N. Security Council meeting, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.826.
7. FonMin. will appreciate fact we worked hard at Special Session prevent condemnation of France and to re-focus Bizerte issue on bilateral plane. Our efforts have not been without heavy cost. We cannot hope be as successful in future.
8. Therefore, we wish FonMin. to convey to President de Gaulle and French Govt. our fervent hopes France will make gesture needed and move this vexatious problem towards resolution so that allies may concentrate on crucial problem now facing us. /4/
/4/ On September 2, Ambassador Gavin reported that he had raised the Bizerte problem during a tour d'horizon with de Gaulle that morning before receiving the instructions in telegram 1250. De Gaulle had said that the situation was ``all Bourguiba's doing" and that Bourguiba ``knew full well that France had no intention of staying in Bizerte forever." He said that France was ``ready to do what must be done to relieve tension" but it was up to Bourguiba to take the first initiative and France would ``not relinquish control of the base while present international tension continues." (Telegram 1198 from Paris, September 2; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/9 - 261) Since the Foreign Minister was absent from Paris, an Embassy officer conveyed the points in telegram 1250 to the chief of the Moroccan - Tunisian section of the French Foreign Ministry that afternoon. (Telegram 1204 from Paris, September 2; ibid.)
For USUN: We are considering further suggestions re approach to Algerians noted your 580. /5/
Rusk
/5/ Telegram 580 from USUN, August 30. (Ibid., 772.56351/8 - 2961)
178. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/9 - 2661. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the source text. Repeated to Paris and Tunis.
New York, September 26, 1961.
Secto 36. Following based on uncleared memcon:
1. Bizerte crisis discussed at length by Secretary with Mokkadem today. /2/ Mokkadem reviewed steps taken by Tunisia to help France pull itself with dignity out of the trough (``orniere") in which it was stuck, emphasizing statesmanship of Bourguiba in seizing on slender openings in de Gaulle statement of September 5. /3/ Mokkadem stressed negotiations on dead center. Despite fact agreement reached on withdrawal of French troops to previous positions and on supervision of withdrawal, no actual movement taking place owing to fact French have been waiting for six days for instructions from Paris. Sec indicated Dept would look into this delay.
/2/ The conversation between Secretary Rusk and Tunisian Foreign Minister Sadok Mokkadem at the United Nations in New York was recorded in a memorandum of conversation; ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
/3/ At a September 5 press conference, de Gaulle asked the Tunisian Government to agree first to a modus vivendi for Bizerte and then to open negotiations on conditions for the use of the base during the dangerous period through which the world is currently passing. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 748. On September 8, Bourguiba announced that he was prepared to allow the French to retain the naval base, subject to its eventual evacuation, and negotiations between the two countries were begun.
2. Mokkadem stressed Tunisian desire achieve friendly statesmanlike resolution of Bizerte negotiations which he described as composed of three phases: (1) withdrawal to previous positions; (2) determination of length ``dangerous period" caused by Berlin crisis and (3) agreement on eventual French departure from Bizerte base.
3. Sec explained that US position on UN resolution may make it possible for US play constructive role in resolving crisis. He made clear he not offering US assume ``good offices" role but that nonetheless he hoped Tunisian Govt would keep him informed of developments as he was prepared do everything possible to end this quarrel among friendly states with whom we on most friendly terms. He pointed out that US should not be assumed have particular influence with General de Gaulle but that he felt there was nonetheless a role which the US should be willing to play.
4. In commenting on US attitude toward Bizerte problem, Sec stressed following fundamentals: (1) Bizerte indisputably Tunisian and subject to Tunisian sovereignty; (2) US security interest in base limited to desire it not fall into unfriendly hands; (3) in commencing negotiations and taking action withdraw troops, French were on path which would eventually end with French return of base to Tunisian Govt.
5. In conclusion Sec informed Mokkadem very confidentially that he tentatively anticipated that within next four to six weeks there would be some clarification of Soviet intentions with regard to Berlin. It was possible and he devoutly hoped there would be a detente. On the other hand, a worsening of the crisis would lead to a situation the end of which no one could foresee but which would assuredly affect scope of considerations bearing on Bizerte issue.
Rusk
179. Telegram From the Embassy in Benghazi, Libya to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15 - WI/10 - 2061. Confidential. Repeated to Tunis, Paris, and Khartoum for Williams.
Benghazi, October 20, 1961, 5 p.m.
72. From Williams. /2/
/2/ Assistant Secretary Williams, who was on his third trip to Africa September 29 - October 26, visited Tunisia October 15 - 18. He was in Khartoum, Sudan, October 21 - 24.
1. During Tunis visit I was struck by warmth shown by both Tunisian Government and people. I could detect few signs US position on Bizerte had seriously harmed US - Tunisian friendship.
2. Outwardly at least I could also see little evidence Tunisian public any longer much aroused by Bizerte issue. This impression no doubt had limited significance however for pullback French forces just being completed /3/ and public not yet aware negative French reply to Bourguiba request for negotiations on evacuation.
/3/ On September 29, a Franco-Tunisian agreement was signed at Bizerte, whereby French forces withdrew October 1 - 3, 1961, to positions held before fighting broke out in Bizerte on July 19.
3. Foregoing notwithstanding, I was made feel aware deep impact of Bizerte episode and President Bourguiba spent most my 75-minute meeting with him dwelling vividly on repercussions which Bizerte has had and will continue to have so long as French refuse negotiate for total evacuation. Come what may, he insisted, Tunisia would push ``decolonization" to end. Decolonization and dignity: West had to realize these were for new nations primary goals to which everything else subordinate. Tunisia had resisted aggression on its own soil and had suffered terrible massacre. Report international jurists attested to atrocities. (Bourguiba indulged in impressive histrionics at this point.)
4. I think he was particularly depressed by French reply he had just received through Swiss. He apparently found no shred of encouragement in it. ``French seem to have understood nothing," he said.
5. Second way in which Bizerte impact could be measured was in serious problems created by departure French teachers, professional people and technicians. I was told Tunisian Jews as well as French and Italians apprehensive and many wanting to get out. Basis confidence on which previous GOT - GOF cooperation depended badly shattered by Bizerte and unlikely be restored in foreseeable future. GOT will certainly look elsewhere to fill gaps and additional problems this will create for us can be readily imagined.
6. Our group was made rather conscious of dogmatic, paternalistic even authoritarian way in which GOT directs Tunisian society, politically and economically. Seen in small way, for example, in obvious organization behind public welcome for foreign visitors. More serious, there is growing malaise and dissatisfaction among important elements Tunisian elite. However, there seem to be considerable difference of opinion and discussion on different points by policy makers.
7. In field economic development we wondered whether GOT really had capacity carry out all its fine plans. There is self-satisfaction here bordering on smugness. I am also apprehensive Tunisian planners giving insufficient consideration to role private enterprise and I took occasion tell Bourguiba so. He assured me there would be much for private enterprise to do. (Ben Salah tends to slight this role but in contrast representative government banking institutions I met with appear consider it very important.)
8. Despite these misgivings, I am still impressed by Tunisia's great possibilities. I think US is presented opportunities with few parallels in Africa. GOT has energy, buoyancy, drive and intelligence. In experience and trained manpower Tunisia is years ahead of countries we have just visited south of Sahara. I think most important consideration of all is influence which Tunisia, small in itself, can have, we hope, in greater Maghreb context. No telling what problems we will face in future Algeria and we will need all restraint, moderation and influence Tunisia, as friend of West, can bring to bear. If Tunisia is not proof, politically and economically, of advantages close cooperation with West, we will certainly have hard time making headway in Algeria. In short, I counsel continued emphasis on Tunisia for itself and especially for Maghreb context.
9. Last but by no means least I wish to report I was deeply heartened by Bourguiba's emphatic and what I took to be quite genuine reassurances about his basic affinity for West and especially US. He said this was matter of conviction which nothing not even Bizerte could change. This because we had same fundamental values, same conception of life and liberty. He felt same way we did about danger in USSR desire extend hegemony over world. In showdown Tunisia, so long as he was its leader, would be at our side.
As I was first high-level Washington official he has had chance to talk with since Bizerte, I took these assurances as special effort impress on us his friendship and goodwill.
Embassy Tunis comments this telegram would be welcome. /4/
/4/ On October 26, Ambassador Walmsley reported that he supported Williams' observations and conclusions. (Telegram 601 from Tunis, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 110.15 - WI/10 - 2661)
Dorman
180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/10 - 2861. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis.
Washington, November 3, 1961, 8:18 p.m.
2566. Tunis tel 608 info Paris 284. /2/ Dept concerned by Emb Tunis reports Bourguiba's growing impatience and frustration with absence indication French readiness negotiate calendar Bizerte evacuation. We recall this was Bourguiba's main preoccupation when Williams saw him Oct 17 (Tunis tel 262). /3/ His concern even then appeared tantamount to obsession; he seemed very depressed. Internal political pressures on Bourguiba could force him on irrational course, damaging to Western interests, to recoup prestige or again draw world attention to Bizerte. GOF should be apprised our concern and effort should be made ascertain what steps, if any, GOF contemplates taking to break present impasse.
/2/ In telegram 608 from Tunis, October 28, Walmsley reported that Bourguiba was ``in great agitation" in reaction to the latest French note which restricted negotiation to the status of the base during the current period of international tensions and was totally silent on a date for evacuation. He noted that Bourguiba could ``no longer, in his own judgment, talk about any interim measures with the French without a prior indication by French of a `date'," adding that he needed this ``to vindicate decisions and tragedy of summer of 1961." (Ibid.)
/3/ Reference is presumably to telegram 563 from Tunis, October 17, in which Walmsley reported that during his meeting with Williams, Bourguiba had expressed his concern that no progress was being made toward negotiation of a calendar for evacuation of Bizerte. (Ibid., 772.56351/10 - 1761)
Embassy Paris should at appropriate level Quai:
(1) Emphasize Bourguiba's concern as revealed to us, explaining he appears to feel essential begin negotiations based on principle eventual evacuation;
(2) We remain keenly interested in evolution of problem and have been gratified at progress made toward normalizing Franco - Tunisian relations in certain spheres. We particularly pleased at foresighted GOF decision resume technical and educational assistance.
(3) In spite these encouraging developments Bizerte problem itself remains unresolved and no major break appears imminent. In our view internal political pressures generated by festering dispute could have serious effects on stability and attitudes Bourguiba regime and ultimately on entire North African region in which West has such deep interest. We would be interested GOF's views on direction it believes evolution Bizerte problem will take.
We would hope at this time when world attention is focused away from Bizerte and when Tunisian political and propaganda pressures for resolution problem their terms are at minimum that GOF could make gesture opening way to rapid liquidation of dispute. /4/
/4/ On November 7, Gavin reported that an Embassy officer discussed Bourguiba's insistence on the importance of fixing an evacuation timetable with an official from the Morocco - Tunisia section of the French Foreign Ministry, who had said that France was not yet ready to fix a calendar for evacuation with Tunisia. He had pointed out that the French Government also had political problems and said that if the Tunisians would show patience and willingness to start discussing matters without threats, ultimately the matter of Bizerte would be settled to their satisfaction. (Telegram 2469 from Paris, November 7; ibid., 772.56351/11 - 761)
For Tunis. You may inform Fon Off, on receipt info Paris has taken action, that we have again expressed our interest to French in seeing early settlement problem.
Bowles
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/1 - 1062. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Imhof, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Tunis.
Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:37 p.m.
3798. French strategy to liquidate Bizerte problem seems now to be nicely complemented by Tunisian desires not to be isolated from main train developments in North Africa.
Dept encouraged by French - Tun agreement to talk at ministerial level, /2/ though we cognizant troublesome central issues remain (Tunis tel 792 rpt Paris 376) /3/ and pace toward definitive solution is perhaps decisively dependent on timing Algerian denouement.
/2/ Franco-Tunisian talks on Bizerte at the ministerial level began in Paris on January 16. On January 20, the Tunisian delegation suspended the negotiations because of what it called French intransigence.
/3/ Telegram 792 from Tunis, January 6, called Bourguiba's decision to negotiate without previous French commitment to a calendar both audacious and realistic, but also noted the potential conflict between the Tunisian condition that the item of eventual demilitarization of Bizerte be included on the agenda and the French goal of negotiating re-entry rights to the base. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/1 - 662)
Emb Tunis and Emb Paris, in conveying to appropriate levels Foreign Ministries our gratification at new fluidity their respective government's positions, should state our conviction that present conjuncture seems propitious for agreement. /4/ Emb Tunis may note to Tunisians our belief French now giving clear signs they ready liquidate problem on basis which could be agreeable to Tuns and our hope Tuns will give full consideration magnitude France's Algerian and domestic difficulties in presentation demands. Emb Paris may say we continue be convinced Tuns will be flexible re timing Bizerte base reconversion but convinced also that Tuns must emerge from ministerial talks with something they can represent as solid progress on what for Tunisians is main issue, eventual evacuation. Failure ministerial talks might irretrievably weaken Bourguiba and could set back solution for months to come.
/4/ Gavin reported on January 12 that an Embassy officer had discussed Bizerte with a French Foreign Ministry official, who was going to be ``heavily involved" in the forthcoming negotiations. The Ambassador emphasized that the French were ``actively interested in emergency re-entry rights" to Bizerte, which was not the minor issue for the French that the last paragraph of telegram 3798 seemed to imply. (Telegram 3436 from Paris, January 12; ibid., 772.56351/1 - 1262)
FYI. Although French desire for access rights expressed by Guiringaud (Paris tel 3312 rptd Tunis 305) /5/ understandable, we hope negotiations will not break down on this issue. /6/
Rusk
/5/ Dated January 4. (Ibid., 772.56351.1 - 462)
/6/ On January 13, Walmsley cabled that French re-entry rights to Bizerte would not, in his judgment, be ``politically defensible" for the Tunisian Government. He pointed out that the ``tragic element" in this situation was that Bourguiba, more than any other North African leader, could be counted upon in time of real emergency, but could not afford to sign up in advance to ``any new servitude which would again expose him to attack as Western puppet." (Telegram 799 from Tunis, January 13; ibid., 772.56351/1 - 362)
182. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, North Africa. Confidential. Copies were sent to Dungan and Amory. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text, presumably by Kaysen, reads: ``Agreed."
Washington, June 26, 1962.
SUBJECT
Tunisian Aid Determination Meeting
I realize tomorrow's meeting on the Tunisian Determination will deal chiefly with the technical problem of whether to commit our aid under Section 202b or NSC 1550. /2/ However, would you put in a word for the mounting political problem our repeated delays are creating in Tunis? From the Tunisian point of view, we look increasingly muddled when we can't yet state publicly what we told them privately four months ago. /3/
/2/ Section 202b of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87 - 195) stipulated that whenever the President determined that it was important to the advancement of U.S. interests, he was authorized to enter into agreements committing funds authorized to be appropriated under this title, subject only to the annual appropriation of such funds. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1270. NSC 1550 stipulated that no foreign assistance could be offered without determining whether such aid was in accordance with approved policy, whether Congress had approved or appropriated funds, whether the recipient country could support the aid programs, and the probable duration of the assistance. (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council)
/3/ The Department of State announced on February 21, 1962, that during AID discussions with Ben Salah in Washington, it had been agreed that the United States would support Tunisia's long-term economic development effort and that formal agreement on the nature and extent of this U.S. assistance would be reached during the coming weeks. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 12, 1962, p. 425.
As you recall, the Patterson Survey Team submitted its appraisal of the Tunisian Plan on 20 December. On 21 February Hutchinson told Plan Secretary Ben Salah informally that AID would recommend a Presidential determination authorizing a $180 million commitment, as soon as Salah furnished certain specific assurances and a copy of the plan. Both were received by 30 March and AID began preparing determination papers. With AID's concurrence, Walmsley told Bourguiba we expected to make our commitment public in time for his National Assembly debate on Plan about 15 May. The Assembly on 30 May finally approved the Plan despite lack of public justification for including a substantial foreign contribution. Finally, on 13 June, State with AID concurrence authorized Walmsley to reassure the Tunisians privately that they could count on $180 million, but to say we still couldn't announce this. On 16 June the Tunisians made their latest plea for an announcement the week of 1 July (Tunis 1268, /4/ 1298 /5/ attached).
/4/ Telegram 1268 from Tunis, June 16, reported that Ladgham had made a strong plea for the United States to make public its economic assistance to Tunisia before July 1 on the grounds that this would greatly strengthen Tunisia's public posture and permit it to be more flexible in its military negotiations with France in July. (Department of State, Central Files, 872.00 - Three Year/6 - 1662)
/5/ Telegram 1298 from Tunis, June 23, reported that Bourguiba's special adviser Hourani had reiterated Ladgham's plea, saying that Bourguiba felt a strong need for such a show of U.S. support for its psychological impact on the Tunisian public. (Ibid., 811.00/6 - 2362)
Serious precedents are admittedly involved here. But three months seems a long time to settle them when AID decided back in February to make this commitment. /6/
Hal
/6/ On July 29, AID announced a U.S. commitment of $180 million in aid in support of Tunisia's $785 million Three-Year Plan, a commitment that included all forms of U.S. aid except that provided under P.L. 480 Titles I and II. (Circular telegram 169, August 1; ibid., 811.0072/8 - 162)
183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.11/10 - 1762. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Ellis (AID), and approved by Witman.
Washington, October 19, 1962, 6:57 p.m.
163. Embtel 263. /2/ Dept appreciates your full report Ambassador's initial meeting with Bourguiba. Although occasion was one which obviously in Bourguiba's interest make good impression, we believe his description Tunisian role vis-a-vis West, Bloc and ``neutral world" is generally accurate in light objective evidence.
/2/ Telegram 263, October 17, reported on Ambassador Francis H. Russell's first meeting with Bourguiba, during which Bourguiba had said that Tunisia had always been on the side of the West even when it was struggling against colonialism. Bourguiba said he thought everything would be settled soon with France. He noted that U.S. aid to Tunisia had to be real aid and complained that currently it was subject to conditions, such as transportation in American bottoms, that greatly reduced its value. He also emphasized the desirability of helping Tunisia develop its army through U.S. gifts of military equipment. (Ibid.)
We find Bourguiba's not unexpected evocation aid problems noteworthy for what appears to be lack appreciation imperatives behind our policies in defense of dollar, and setting forth AID criteria. We hope there will be opportunities bring about fuller understanding by Bourguiba of these policies and of assistance we hope will be forthcoming from our friends, in spirit free cooperation, toward successful implementation these policies.
Would appreciate further Embassy comments re Bourguiba recommendation for grant military assistance. Do you believe Bourguiba's broaching this subject foreshadows formal GOT proposal re past and future programs? No encouragement of course should be given to Tunisian hopes for cancellation obligations on equipment which, it might be well recall if subject raised again at Tunisian initiative, has been provided under pricing and payment arrangements quite favorable to Tunisians. /3/
Rusk
/3/ On October 26, Russell reported that in talks with Tunisian officials he emphasized that the U.S. desire to see Tunisia succeed in its economic development plan was illustrated by the fact that Tunisia was one of only five countries selected for long-term, multi-annual U.S. aid. He had also explained that restrictions such as expenditure of aid in U.S. funds and shipping in American bottoms were necessitated by the need to protect the soundness of the dollar, which was in the interest of the entire free world economy. (Airgram A - 231 from Tunis, October 26; ibid., 772.5/10 - 2662)
184. Report Prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group for President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Report for the President on Liberia and Tunisia. Secret. The source text comprises pp. VII - IX of the Summary. The report was transmitted to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum from Secretary Rusk indicating that the report had been prepared by the Fourth Interdepartmental Survey Group sent to Liberia and Tunisia as part of the Department of State response to NSAM No. 173 of July 18, 1962, which had directed the Secretary of State ``to initiate, in consultation with the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) a program of field visits by senior interdepartmental teams." (Ibid.) A February 4, 1963, letter from Rusk to Ambassador Russell explaining the mission of the survey group coming to Tunisia noted that the President had expressed a keen interest in assuring closer ties between country team planning and operations and the Washington agencies and departments which participated in U.S. programs in developing countries. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US - AFR)
Washington, April 19, 1963.
[Here follows the summary dealing with Liberia.]
TUNISA
United States Policy
Basic United States policy toward Tunisia is clearly defined, provides a satisfactory basis for the conduct of day-to-day relations and the formulation of action programs, and has generally been consistently interpreted by all United States elements both in Washington and Tunisia.
The main objectives of this policy are: 1) the preservation and further evolution of a moderate, pro-western, and politically independent Tunisia, hopefully with increasingly democratic institutions, 2) the development of close and friendly relations between Tunisia and its North African neighbors, 3) the restoration in non-colonial form of Tunisia's former special and mutually beneficial ties with France, 4) the creation of economic relationships that reflect and exploit the economic interdependence of the Maghrebian states and the interest these states have in long-term commercial ties with Western Europe, and 5) the attainment, with the help of such economic relationships, of a self-sustaining, politically acceptable rate of economic and social progress.
United States interests in Tunisia are based mainly on its constructive internal policies and its western orientation which have an important impact on other countries in Africa. 1) Tunisia has supported the West on critical cold-war issues. 2) In Afro - Asian circles it has exercised a responsible and pro-western role. 3) Its development methods provide a good model and the extent of its national self-help is high. 4) It has certain strategic importance. 5) It is a good example of a state with one-party political institutions administered in a manner which gives some encouragement to western concepts of freedom. 6) It is a leader among the nations promoting the decolonization of the southern third of Africa in a manner designed to eliminate or minimize Communist and radical nationalist influences.
Adequacy of Information and Intelligence Base
United States plans, policies and programs appear to be based on sound information and intelligence. Nonetheless, we need to know more about attitudes of the Tunisian military forces, labor, nomadic groups and the stresses and strains inside the ruling Neo-Destour party.
A greater effort should be made to obtain and exploit the knowledge possessed by United States Government employees in Tunisia.
Assessment of Local Situation
Tunisia's goal is to become a modern state responsive to the needs of its people. It is working to achieve this goal by pragmatic means, using private enterprise, cooperatives or government enterprises as circumstances require. At this comparatively early stage in Tunisia's development, there is no alternative to a major use of government enterprise. Tunisian cabinet officers and other key government officials categorically state that government enterprise will give way to private enterprise when the latter is ready and willing to take over.
Tunisia is controlled by one party, the Neo-Destour party, which under Bourguiba's leadership fought for and achieved this country's independence. Its one-party political institutions are administered in a way which gives some encouragement to western concepts of freedom and to the development of a valid popular consensus. The Neo-Destour party is making an effort to broaden its grass roots contacts with the people.
Bourguiba's popularity has been diminished by Bizerte, other less major mistakes, and the inevitable corrosion of original enthusiasm after several years of post-independence reality. Although still strong internally, he is more or less isolated from the revolutionary Arabic leaders of the Near East and Algeria who may conceivably try to stir up trouble inside Tunisia at some later date.
The Tunisian Government is not at present threatened by any organized subversive force, Communist or otherwise. Its police and security forces have good morale, possess adequate modern weapons and are capable of maintaining public order. The recently attempted coup was an unorganized, incoherent gesture on the part of ineffectual malcontents who had no common cause. It did not reflect any deep-rooted or extensive opposition to the regime. However, Tunisia's long and unmarked frontier, especially with Algeria, is vulnerable to foreign-supported insurgency, although any such activity at this time could be dealt with or contained by Tunisian security forces.
Tunisia's Ten-Year Development Plan has been repeatedly reviewed by experts and pronounced reasonable though over-optimistic. Its success, as well as the size of future requirements for American aid, will depend to a large extent on the resumption by France of its natural economic role in Tunisia, and on the working out of mutually satisfactory economic relationships by Tunisia with the Common Market as well as with Morocco and Algeria. It is expected that France will during 1964 resume some financial assistance to Tunisia. Hopefully within three years it will be possible for Tunisia to obtain from Europe the major proportion of the external assistance it then requires.
The Survey Group believes that the United States will continue to have strong foreign policy reasons for playing an important, even though not the most important, role in Tunisia's development for several years after the expiration of our three-year commitment.
[Here follows the summary dealing with the adequacy of U.S. programs and operations and other issues and the body of the Report.]
185. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FR - TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse on July 18 and approved in S on July 25. The source text is the third of five memoranda of conversation of discussions between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Slim on July 15. The other four memoranda of conversation are ibid., POL 10 PORT, POL 7 ETH, DEF 18 - 3 USSR, and AID (US) TUN.
Washington, July 15, 1963.
SUBJECT
Tunisian Relations with France
PARTICIPANTS
American:
The Secretary
Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. H.H. Stackhouse, OIC, Tunisia
Tunisian:
His Excellency Mongi Slim, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Tunisia
Mr. Ismail Khelil, Counselor, Tunisian Embassy
His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Tunisian Ambassador
Mr. Slim said that there had been considerable evolution in recent months in Tunisia's relations with France. Many important outstanding problems had been resolved and the Bizerte problem seemed to be on the way to solution. /2/ But negotiation with the French on remaining issues was difficult and de Gaulle continued to be ``mysterious." The Foreign Minister said that the French continued to try to maintain rights of a colonial character obtained during the Protectorate. Naturally Mr. Slim said, Tunisia opposed this.
/2/ On October 15, France completed a voluntary withdrawal of its forces from Bizerte.
The Secretary expressed understanding, based on U.S. experience, of Tunisia's difficulties in negotiating with General de Gaulle. He said that it was our conviction, however, that de Gaulle has made a basic decision to put France's relations with all Arab states on a solid, friendly basis.
186. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2326. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse and cleared by Brown, Heffner (DOD), Hilliker, and Rives. Prepared for the 18th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
Washington, September 11, 1963.
TALKING PAPER--FOREIGN MINISTER SLIM
Tunisia
1. Progress of U.S. Long-Term Aid Commitment to Tunisia
The first year of Tunisia's Three-year Plan has seen her substantially achieve her investment goals by drawing down heavily on her foreign exchange and restoring [resorting] to extensive internal borrowing. This has generated inflationary pressures which could imperil the Plan's success. The Tunisians say they were forced to rely more heavily on their own resources than expected because of the slow flow of foreign aid, particularly U.S. aid. (Our total commitment in support of the Plan--made in July 1962--is $180 million; allocations thus far are now about $35 million. AID has always regarded the plan as overambitious. Anticipating a stretch-out of the Plan, we made our commitment to the Plan and not for a three-year period.) The Tunisians seem determined to maintain the scheduled pace of investment in spite of the recognized risks of inflation and foreign exchange depletion.
Anticipated Tunisian Position
Mr. Slim may repeat his plea to you last July for additional flexibility of implementation of our aid program. /2/ He may take the tack that the sluggish flow of U.S. aid threatens the success of the Plan.
/2/ The conversation between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Slim on July 15 was recorded in a memorandum of conversation; ibid.; Central Files, AID (US) TUN.
Recommended U.S. Position
Reassure Mr. Slim of our desire to see the Plan successful and our admiration of Tunisian efforts to this end. Since you last saw Mr. Slim we have eased certain aid procedures to expedite the flow of aid. Within the limits set by legal obligations and our balance of payments problem, we will continue to make such efforts. Our hope is that Tunisia will be able to find ways to make effective use of its aid commitments from other foreign sources. If total foreign investment was lower than planned during the Plan's first year, the proportion of U.S. aid to total foreign investment was higher than planned--two-thirds against one-half. We believe this is fair evidence of our attempts to provide aid in good time.
2. Future U.S. Military Aid to Tunisia
Deliveries on our FY 60 - 62 Military Assistance Program to Tunisia are being completed. The success of our MAP has been limited by Tunisian reluctance--for reasons rooted in their past experience with the French military--to take full advantage of training and maintenance assistance available under the MAP. With the termination of this program our military assistance to Tunisia comprises only a small training program. During the past several months the Tunisian Minister of Defense has indicated on several occasions to Ambassador Russell the Tunisian Government's hope that additional U.S. military assistance would be forthcoming. The Tunisians have mentioned military jets especially. Our response essentially has been that large quantities of equipment are now being delivered under our MAP (a $15 million program) and we believe for the present our best contribution would be to assist in training in the use and maintenance of this equipment.
Anticipated Tunisian Position
Alluding to unstable conditions in North Africa and acquisition of arms by Tunisia's neighbors, Mr. Slim may again urge U.S. assistance in supplying Tunisia's future military needs.
Recommended U.S. Position
You may wish to point out first to Mr. Slim that our readiness to supply arms to Tunisia since 1957 attests to our belief that an effective Tunisian military establishment will contribute importantly to stability in North Africa. We continue to hold to this belief, but at this stage we feel that our best contribution will be to assist Tunisia in training for the utilization and maintenance of equipment still being received under our MAP.
Talking Points
1. Mr. Slim, in all likelihood, will be more concerned with African than with bilateral issues, particularly apartheid, the Portuguese territories, and the situation in the Congo.
2. Mr. Slim is always appreciative of hearing our appraisal of the current status of leading cold war issues, and has informed Ambassador Russell he would like to discuss with you the future of East-West relations following the test ban agreement.
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