Documents 187-222
Africa Region
187. National Security Action Memorandum No. 16 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs, NSAM 16. Top Secret.
Washington, February 13, 1961.
TO
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Economic Support for Newly-Independent Areas
The record of action of the NSC meeting of February 9, 1961 /2/ shows in Paragraph 3. b. that the President has approved revision of NSC policies along the lines recommended by the Secretary of State to provide flexibility for the United States to supplement Western European support to newly-independent areas whenever such action is in the United States interest. In my judgment, this action constitutes a revision of the applicable policies, but if new language is desired in all the appropriate documents, we will expect to receive it from the Department of State.
McGeorge Bundy
/2/ A record of the February 9 meeting of the National Security Council is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meeting No. 476. The subject of NSAM No. 16 was covered by NSC Record of Action No. 2404 - b.
188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/2 - 1561. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An attached memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, to Secretary Rusk recommends that the Secretary sign the memorandum to the President setting forth McGhee's understanding of the interpretation agreed upon at the February 9 NSC meeting by Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and President Kennedy.
Washington, February 15, 1961.
SUBJECT
Interpretation of National Security Council Policy on Africa
I am informed that certain portions of the guidance contained in present United States policy toward Africa (NSC 6005/1, Policy Toward West Africa, April 9, 1960; /2/ and NSC 6001, Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa, January 19, 1960) /3/ have in the past been interpreted in such a way as to limit unduly the flexibility and freedom of action required for an effective United States approach to African developments. These limitations have been based particularly on the interpretation of wording of paragraphs having to do with economic assistance. Typical of the language in question is that portion of paragraph 34b of NSC 6005/1 which states that the United States should, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on specified sources other than the U.S.
/2/ For discussion of NSC 6005/1 at the 438th meeting of the National Security Council on March 24, 1960, and its subsequent approval at the 440th meeting on April 7, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIV, pp. 92 - 98 and 106 - 109.
/3/ Text of NSC 6001 is ibid., pp. 78 - 92.
I recognize how important it is that other Free World powers, particularly the former metropoles, continue and where possible expand their efforts to meet the need for external capital of the territories and emerging nations of the area. In our activities and programs we should not take any action that would serve to discourage or supplant these efforts--indeed we should make every effort to urge them to do more. It is my understanding, however, based upon our discussion at the Council meeting of February 9 in which the Secretary of the Treasury participated, that the language of the policy is in the future to be interpreted in such a way as to provide the needed flexibility and freedom of action. Under this interpretation we would not, for example, be called upon for such a strong burden of proof as has been required in the past that the needed assistance was not available from others, before proceeding with assistance deemed to be in the United States interest.
The Department is now reviewing the whole of United States policy toward Africa, and we will be developing new proposals for future guidance.
Dean Rusk /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
189. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning (Rowen) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 000.1 - 091.4, 1961. Confidential.
Washington, April 5, 1961.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for African Nations South of the Sahara
A number of African countries south of the Sahara have approached U.S. representatives for military assistance and it is evident that we can expect similar requests from others.
As you know, NSC policy places preliminary dependence for meeting the military needs of the countries in the area upon the former colonial powers. Strict interpretation of this policy reduces our ability to quickly react to requests for assistance or to achieve maximum political benefit. Too often our assistance has been furnished only after the threat, or actual acceptance, of Soviet military assistance. While it is entirely reasonable that Western military assistance to these African countries should be coordinated, the delay experienced in determining the Metropole's position, the mechanics for coordination with respect to types of equipment and training each country will provide, and the subsequent negotiations with the recipient all tend to retard prompt U.S. response. The ability to react rapidly once a decision has been made to furnish assistance is extremely important to these countries in their current stage of development.
There are other problems that arise with respect to funding of new unbudgeted programs and the establishment of sufficiently high program priority to permit the early delivery of equipment to gain maximum impact of programs which are basically political in nature. At present, our military assistance programs in this area are the result of mounting political pressures and are developed on an ad hoc basis without clear long-term U.S. goals, either from a political or a military point of view.
It would be appreciated if you could undertake to develop a Defense policy position for military assistance to independent nations south of the Sahara which could be utilized by the Joint Staff and this office in evaluating and developing future programs. I would suggest that your analysis treat the Union of South Africa as a separate entity due to its peculiar position.
Haydn Williams
190. Brief of a National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Africa 121 - 350.09, 1961. Secret; Noforn. The source text was transmitted to Secretary of Defense McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF Director for Intelligence, that reads: ``On 11 April 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an Estimate on `Probable Developments in Colonial Africa' (NIE 60/70 - 61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming."
Washington, April 11, 1961.
NIE 60/70 - 61: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COLONIAL AFRICA
This National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 11 April 1961. Significant judgments of this Estimate are as follows:
Over the next three years, virtually all the remaining British dependent territories in Africa, as well as the Belgian trusteeship of Ruanda - Urundi, will almost certainly become independent. The Salazar regime has adamantly refused even to consider self-government for the Portuguese territories, much less eventual independence, despite the growing African agitation. We see no prospect for a change in Portuguese policy which could avoid violence and repression in the colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Nor do we believe that Portugal alone has the military and economic resources to bear the long and bloody struggle that its present policies seem to ensure. While no substantial nationalist sentiment has appeared as yet in the Spanish areas, the Saharan territories will be increasingly threatened by Moroccan adventures.
The areas containing sizable European populations (notably Kenya, the Rhodesias, Angola, and Mozambique) are the principal danger points for racial strife. Outbreaks among Africans are likely in areas in which there are deep tribal antagonisms, such as Ruanda - Urundi and Kenya. While in most areas presently available security forces will probably be able to cope with sporadic, localized disturbances, widespread violence could be controlled only with the aid of metropole or other outside reinforcements. After independence, the quality and capabilities of security forces are likely to deteriorate.
Both before and after independence, most of the territories will labor in varying degrees under the handicaps of strong tribal animosities, rivalries between competing political parties and leaders, weak and underdeveloped economies and shortages of trained personnel. These handicaps will inhibit the growth of effective and stable governments.
Most areas will expect and need outside support and economic aid after independence. They probably hope also to obtain military assist-ance. We believe that they will look first to the West but that most will adopt neutralist policies and be receptive to Bloc assistance.
In the dependent areas the Bloc will be alert to foment and exploit to the disadvantage of the West any dissidence or trouble, even to the extent of clandestine supply of arms. However, we believe that Communist activities in these areas have not yet reached significant levels.
191. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 091 (27 Jan. 61). Top Secret.
JCSM - 280 - 61 Washington, April 28, 1961.
SUBJECT
Arms Control Policy for Africa
1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, dated 27 January 1961, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to provide views on the military implications of the following two proposals:
a. An atom-free African zone.
b. Regional arms control arrangements for Africa.
2. In considering the above two proposals, together with the points cited in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that these notions are inspired largely by a growing feeling that there is a need for action to forestall a possible African ``arms race." There is evidence of some armament activity in Africa. In the main, however, the present rate of acquisition of armed forces by new African nations arises from the need to furnish authority to government, to assure internal security, and acquire the trappings of sovereignty. Where some acceleration can be noted, it is mostly attributable to Sino - Soviet Bloc subversive activity in the military area. This is a symptom of the East - West Cold War in Africa rather than one of African arms competition.
3. The solution to the African ``arms race" is tied up in the political solution to the East - West Cold War. While there is need to forestall any developing arms race, serious political and military disadvantages should not be accepted by the West in an attempt to achieve this end.
4. Africa as an atom-free area, and one in which arms control arrangements would be in effect, still would be open to strong Soviet pressures and influence. While the proposed measures could offer some impediment to Soviet military operations and could reduce Soviet military infiltration of Africa, the Soviets are unlikely to abandon their efforts to dominate the area. Any adoption of atom-free/arms control measures would simply cause the Bloc to intensify its political, economic and cultural efforts in attempting to make further gains on the African continent. Also, they could be expected to seize upon any defects in such arrangements as another avenue through which to debilitate the power of African national governments and to lessen the external protection now furnished them by the West.
5. US military interest requires that US atomic capable forces not be prohibited from deployment to or transit through Africa. Otherwise, the US military posture would lose flexibility and be denied full exploitation of its capabilities in the support of our NATO and CENTO Allies.
6. The Cold War is tending to enlarge US military interests in Africa. Foreseeably, this interest especially in tactical or strategic base rights will grow, if communist penetration of the area increases. The possible loss through some regional arms control arrangement of US and especially European military base rights in Africa could have a most serious impact on the United States and Free World defense posture.
7. From a military standpoint, the United States, in the interest of its own and Free World security, should:
a. Oppose in the United Nations or elsewhere efforts to establish the African continent as an atom-free zone.
b. Support regional arms control for Africa in the lowest possible key and only if it is politically necessary and can be separated from the ``atom-free" notion.
c. Subject to the limitations in b above, support regional arms control measures provided that they are of such a form as to:
(1) Reflect genuine African sponsorship and initiation.
(2) Continue to permit bilateral arrangements for guaranteeing external security.
(3) Preclude jeopardizing the sovereignty and independence of African nations, through denial of aid for internal security purposes or otherwise.
(4) Avoid facilitating Communist subversion of the area.
(5) Permit the United States and the West continuing access to Africa in the maintenance of their defense postures.
(6) Require inspection and verification safeguards which are no less stringent than those currently being developed by the United States for use in East - West arms control proposals.
8. A more detailed discussion of the factors upon which the above conclusions are based are furnished in the Enclosure hereto. /2/
/2/ Attached but not printed.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations
192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4 - 2861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Herz on April 27; cleared by Ferguson, Deming, Weiss, McBride, Spiers, Witman, Burdett, Penfield, and Webb; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Abidjan, Lagos, and Monrovia.
Washington, April 28, 1961, 8:27 p.m.
5093. Dept considering possibility approaches to selected African leaders to encourage them raise subject of arms limitation at forthcoming conference African Heads of State scheduled begin Monrovia May 8. /2/
/2/ Representatives of 20 independent African states attended the Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States at Monrovia, Liberia, May 8 - 12, 1961.
You are requested ascertain FonOff views re desirability such approaches which could take following form:
1. While agenda forthcoming Monrovia Conference is matter which obviously only African participants themselves can decide, we think conference might present excellent opportunity to discuss ways and means for African countries, and especially new countries of West Africa, to avoid dangerous and costly arms competition.
2. We do not wish our interest in this subject to be misconstrued as being due unwillingness help provide necessary military assistance to give new African countries reasonable minimum military establishments for maintenance internal security. We are concerned however that if one country starts exceeding such minimum levels its neighbors would be forced restort similarly to excessive armaments which could gravely unsettle area and detract from resources available for economic and social development.
3. If African countries were willing to agree on reasonable ceilings on their armed forces and limitation on types of armaments requested from foreign suppliers, this would not only constitute constructive development for themselves but would also be inspiring example for other parts of world.
Approaches along above lines might be made by US, UK and France separately to selected list of African leaders, or by agreement each of three allied governments approaching countries on which it would have greatest amount of influence. /3/ We could for instance raise question with Tubman if French would raise it with Houphouet and Tombalbaye and British with Abubakar and perhaps also Nkrumah.
/3/ Telegram 4457 from London, May 3, reported that the British Foreign Office believed that the approach outlined in telegram 5093 was not opportune at that time, and concluded that the reaction of many new African states to the subject of arms limitation would be one of suspicion, especially if they received simultaneous approaches from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. (Ibid., 770.00/5 - 361)
Bowles
193. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92 - Africa, 452, 1961. Secret.
Washington, May 3, 1961.
Dear Ros: I have had the Department make a thorough study of U.S. policy on the supply of arms to Tropical Africa. This study, which I have approved, is set forth in the attachment to this letter. /2/
/2/ Attached but not printed.
As I know you agree, one of our paramount objectives is to avoid the buildup of an arms race with the Soviets in Africa. On the other hand, we must be prepared to supply some arms to the newly emerging states of Tropical Africa if U.S. interests are to be advanced and Communist encroachment frustrated. The newly emerging African states will insist upon exercising what they view to be their sovereign prerogatives of establishing some military forces, and they will turn to Communist sources of supply if assistance from Western sources is not forthcoming. However, I believe that we should be able, through determined and astute dealing, to meet this essentially politically justified requirement by providing for limited programs of an internal security nature. To this end, cooperation between our two Departments is obviously essential so that we can move forward smoothly and purposefully whenever that is indicated.
We must endeavor, to the maximum degree feasible, to avoid large arms buildups in Tropical Africa which drain away resources required for economic development and which could contribute to tension and animosities between neighboring states. We are proceeding to develop our views as to the manner in which U.S. policy can contribute to the encouragement of regional arrangements within Africa designed to limit arms buildup beyond this internal security level. This effort we recognize as a difficult one, requiring a well considered educational program. To the extent that it is successful in achieving its objectives it will be at a more distant point in time. In the meantime we view the positive arms supply policy set forth in the attachment to this letter as an essential interrelated action, indeed to some extent even a precondition to achieving success on arms limitation, which should not be delayed.
Because the objectives of the United States arms supply in Africa are essentially political in nature and involve nations which pose foreign policy problems in many respects quite unique as compared to those which we have encountered elsewhere in the world, I think it highly important for our people, working closely with your staff and ICA, to draw up specific procedures reflecting the policies of the attached paper, for the establishment of programs which accommodate these special circumstances.
I have asked that Jack Bell, as Deputy for Foreign Assistance Coordination, see that effort is promptly undertaken toward this objective. His office will be in touch with the Department of Defense in the near future, and we would appreciate your designating some one to work with us as closely as possible in devising the necessary measures to put the arms supply policy into effect.
With my warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Chet
194. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Secret.
Washington, May 13, 1961.
SUBJECT
De Gaulle, Africa, and Southeast Asia
1. There are two reasons why the major Western powers must concert their policies in Southeast Asia and Africa. First, the Communists are systematically exploiting our differences in policy. They have been a major Communist asset in Africa and Southeast Asia. These differences arise out of the special history of each Western power in each area and from differing short-run interests. The historical differences in outlook must be overcome in the face of present reality. The lesser short-run interests must be resolved so that the larger common interests may come to dominate Western policy in these areas. Second, situations arising in Southeast Asia and, perhaps, in Africa, may draw us close to a test of military strength with the Communists. The possibility of armed conflict affects all of our peoples, notably in an age of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the possibility of a deterring conflict depends substantially on our presenting a united front to the Communists. For these reasons, political and military, the President believes that high level tripartite discussions of a Western strategy in Africa and Asia are urgent. In this matter he finds himself close to the views of General de Gaulle.
2. Africa. The President profoundly respects the deep understanding of the revolutionary forces at work in Africa, which President de Gaulle has revealed. Due to French and British statesmanship the West has some chance of developing over a period of years an Africa which would present us with only modest military and political dangers, and which might, in time, form a constructive part of the Western system.
3. In Africa, Britain and France are still bearing a primary responsibility; but the U.S. is being drawn increasingly into African affairs. In some areas we are working well together; in others we have not yet found a wholly satisfactory basis for common action.
4. In the President's view, what is basically required is a common Western strategy rooted in three objectives. First, where positions of potential political stability and strength exist, we should work with all the wisdom and resources we can muster to create islands of responsibility. For example, this seems possible in Tunisia, Nigeria, and possibly the Ivory Coast. Second, we must work together to fend off Communist efforts to trap areas in Africa where the great revolutionary forces at work have given the Communists opportunity to expand their influence. Mali appears such a case of potential danger, and the Horn of Africa area. Third, we must work together to minimize dangers to the common interest arising from the painful process of disengagement from colonialism. Here Angola is much on our minds. (How much better off we all would be if we had begun three or four years ago to consult seriously together on the Congo and Angola.)
5. Frankly, the U.S. has quite enough commitments in the world, and there is no compulsion in the American Government to extend those commitments where our allies, much strengthened by their remarkable growth in the 1950's can deal with the situation. But we are prepared to sit down and consider together with Britain and France--and with other Western nations where their interests are involved--the broad lines of a common strategy and how the day-to-day tactics and tasks of execution may best be allocated and managed.
6. With respect to North Africa, the President has been impressed by General de Gaulle's vision of the kind of regional development which would be possible after the Algerian settlement is achieved. President Bourguiba is obviously thinking in similar terms. This is a matter in which initiative must arise, evidently, from the Mediterranean powers; but the U.S. is anxious to be helpful in the evolution of a constructive regional solution in the long run. And its emergence as a realistic objective could conceivably contribute to the pacification of the North African area.
7. The President would be interested to hear de Gaulle's views on the appropriate broad strategy which we should all pursue in Africa and believes that these matters should promptly be explored on a communal basis by the Western nations most concerned.
[Here follows discussion of Southeast Asia.]
195. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, President's Visit to France, 5/31 - 6/2/61. II. MEMCONS. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The conversation took place at the Elysee Palace. President Kennedy visited France and met with President Charles de Gaulle May 31 - June 2, 1961. Their discussions were recorded in eight memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.)
US/MC/2 Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.
SUBJECT
Wednesday Afternoon Talks
PARTICIPANTS
United States
President Kennedy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)
France
General de Gaulle
Mr. Lebel (Interpreter)
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
Africa
The President said that he wanted to discuss the African problems both the most direct problems of that continent as well as those of relationships between Western Europe and Africa. The U.S. recognizes French experience and French interest in that area. U.S. interests are only complementary and consist mainly in preventing a Communist ingression to that area and the ingression of the cold war itself into Africa. The problem is one of method. If the President understands correctly, General de Gaulle does not think that the United Nations constitutes the best instrument for dealing with African questions and, in particular, that of the Congo. The only advantage which the President sees in relying on the U.N. (and even that advantage is one that is somewhat decreasing as time goes on) is that action taken at the U.N. may prevent a direct clash between East and West. The U.S. is worrying not only about the Congo but also about Angola and in the latter case not only because our Portuguese friends are concerned in it but because the situation is rapidly deteriorating with Ghana, Guinea and the Communists taking a hand. In addition, the loss of Angola to Portugal would create serious economic difficulties to the latter country.
General de Gaulle said that there are many Africas. There is Black Africa and even Black Africa is very diverse. There is, for example, a country such as Senegal which has a long history of continuous relations with the West and from which many migrants and traders have gone to many countries even to the U.S. There are other countries of Black Africa which have always been poor and which tend therefore to lean towards extreme solutions. France has had a lot of experience in Black Africa having colonized an important part of it, important not so much because of its population (which amounted only to twenty-five million) but because of the land area represented. French colonization was very fraternal and the French have educated many administrators and political men in those countries. Decolonization was also friendly and most of the French possessions want to preserve their ties with France. An exception is Guinea and Guinea is an exception because of Sekou Toure who is a Communist and who not having been able to keep both French aid and a Communist organization preferred to renounce the former. Elsewhere France continues to count friends even if sometimes their action is marked by their pride and by a certain pretentiousness of young countries. Nevertheless, friendship toward the French is a question of fact. Unfortunately, the same type of policy was not followed in other parts of Africa. In the Congo, the Belgians provided little aid and would not leave cadres capable of administering the country. When the blow-up in the Congo occurred, General de Gaulle wrote to President Eisenhower suggesting that an approach through the UN should be avoided, that it would be better to have a tripartite action of the U.S., U.K. and France which should exercise a joint pressure on the Belgians and the Congolese to bring about the implementation on both sides of the Belgian Congo Mutual Assistance Treaty, which would have enabled Belgian aid to continue and which would have kept the East out of the Congo as it was not covered by that treaty. Pressure should have been exercised on both sides including the consent of the Belgians to a general independence of the Congo while continuing their technical aid. President Eisenhower, however, was of a different opinion and Mr. Macmillan followed him in an appeal to the U.N. Now what is the U.N.? The U.N. is men like Hammarskjold and Dayal and also troop contingents from Nasser or Ghana. The result of the U.N. action was not the re-establishment of order but rather more disorder than before.
However, the situation is getting somewhat better at present. There is a slight improvement. It seems that the Congolese want to create a real government under Kasavubu with a Parliament and an Army. They can, however, get little help from the U.N. and it would be better for them to be helped by the three powers mentioned above or even those three powers plus Belgium. The situation is not lost, especially if such a direct contact may be established. There is no evolution toward Communism. Of course, there is Gizenga but the people do not seem to follow in the direction of Communism and will not if they receive help.
The situation in Angola, however, is more serious. The President asked if General de Gaulle would have preferred a tripartite intervention rather than an intervention by the U.N.
General de Gaulle answered that two interventions would not have had the same character and there would have been no question of a military intervention by the three powers but rather a pressure on the Congolese, including Lumumba (who at that time had not yet decided to throw his lot with the Communists). If the Belgians had carried out the agreement between the two countries, means could have been found to obtain a cooperation between them and even for preventing the Belgians from what they had attempted in Katanga and making them generally recognize the independence of the Congo without withdrawing their technicians who are necessary for the life of the country.
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
196. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5 - MSP/8 - 261. Confidential. The source text was transmitted to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 2 memorandum from George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, that reads: ``The attached paper entitled `Selected Aspects of US Economic Aid Policy Toward Africa' was initiated and prepared in S/P. After review in S/P it was circulated to the interested Bureaus and Offices of the Department and ICA for information and comment. An earlier version of this study was discussed at your Thursday policy planing meeting on June 29, presided over by Under Secretary Bowles. The revised version is now sent to you for your consideration."
PPC 61 - 7 Washington, July 24, 1961.
SELECTED ASPECTS OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID POLICY FOR AFRICA
Summary and Conclusions
This paper attempts to develop a general framework to help guide our future African aid efforts in four of its aspects: (1) East-West competition; (2) aid coordination; (3) regional vs. country programs; and (4) economic development planning and multi-year aid commitments.
1. Despite our repeated affirmation that the task of US economic assistance ``is not to negatively fight communism," our present African aid policies appear in practice to have an unnecessarily defensive cast. Although we slowly are beginning to recognize the limitations of bloc aid as an instrument of political influence, we continue to be overly concerned with maneuvers to outbid bloc aid offers or to keep the newly independent African states from accepting bloc aid. As a result, we are in danger of undermining the effectiveness of our aid effort for short-term political considerations, and thereby jeopardizing our longer term goals of promoting African economic development.
Aside from the questionable assumptions underlying preoccupation with precluding or containing bloc aid to Africa, we should recognize that such a policy, even if we were prepared to shoulder the costs involved, will be self-defeating. It seems quite clear that the newly independent African states, with few exceptions, are prepared to accept economic aid regardless of the source, provided no strings are attached. At the same time the bloc seems bound and determined to expand the scale of its economic activities in Africa. We no longer can expect to keep Africa as an almost exclusive Western preserve. Therefore, instead of futilely trying to outbid bloc aid offers, we should concentrate on trying to limit their political impact. This calls for the carrying out of a more vigorous and imaginative aid effort in Africa responsive to the peoples' fundamental needs to demonstrate that ``economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand."
Of equal if not greater importance than economic aid in countering bloc influence in Africa, particularly in the years immediately ahead, is the need to demonstrate to Africans that the United States is truly a disinterested friend and that we genuinely and fully support their aspirations to run their own affairs free from outside interference.
2. We need to intensify our present efforts to develop closer aid coordination with other aid donors in Africa. At the present time more than a dozen Western countries and multilateral aid organizations are providing Africa well over one billion dollars of aid annually. The effectiveness of this substantial aid effort could be increased materially through closer coordination and consultation among these many donors. We should press actively to make the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in OECD a really effective instrument for this purpose.
Among other things, we should seek to develop in the DAC a Western consensus regarding aid objectives and aid criteria for Africa; and to ensure that all bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts are fitted into carefully prepared long-range country or regional economic development plans.
At the same time we should continue our efforts through offers of financial assistance and other means to encourage Africans to take more initiative and assume greater responsibility in planning their economic development. To minimize the risks of being accused of meddling in their internal affairs we should seek to provide whatever assistance African countries may need in formulating and executing their development plans through international organizations or private foundations. In addition, we might encourage the creation of an Inter-African board of experts, such as is now being considered for Latin America, to review these plans and provide assistance in seeking out the necessary external financing. Arrangements also should be made for regular consultation between representatives of the DAC and the Economic Commission for Africa as is the case of the Colombo Plan mechanism for Asia.
3. As a result of extreme political fragmentation, among other things, few African states possess the human and natural resources required to satisfy their leaders' aspirations for economic development. In recognition of this fact most African leaders have spoken out in favor of larger regional economic groupings. We should continue our efforts to encourage such arrangements without, however, making it appear they are merely tools of the West.
Among other things, the West should make known that it is prepared to provide substantial aid funds for investment in basic fields of infrastructure to regional associations large enough to offer the prospect of satisfactory economic growth. Some sort of regional African Economic Development Banks or aid consortia might be useful instruments for this purpose. In addition, we and other Western industrialized countries should investigate the possibilities of providing African regional economic groupings as well as other less developed areas significant one-way trade concessions for their exports. This will help demonstrate that the West is not trying to perpetuate the old colonial system through imperial preferences and like arrangements and at the same time will help keep the newly independent African countries in the Western system.
4. Finally, the US should be cautious about making multi-year aid commitments to African states. Once such commitments are made, it will be difficult to hold back on them because of unsatisfactory performance by the aid recipient without causing serious political friction and ill-will. In addition, we should guard against creating the impression, as a result of our emphasis on planning, desirable as it may be, that if a country comes forward with a well-thought-out economic development plan we are prepared to provide all of the required external financing.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
197. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Africa 400.12 - 680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by McQuade and Junkermann.
Washington, August 17, 1961.
Dear Governor Williams: We have thoroughly reviewed and discussed with your staff the draft paper on ``U.S. Policy on Arms Supply to Tropical Africa" which Mr. Bowles sent to Mr. Gilpatric in his letter of May 3, 1961, /2/ and fully agree with you that our military assistance policy in Africa should contribute toward limiting the armed forces of the independent African countries to legitimate internal security needs, if possible. We have, however, a number of suggestions for changes which we believe will clarify points open to misinterpretation, particularly by people operating in the field. We believe, for example, that a clear statement of assumptions, by showing the rationale behind some of the stated conclusions, helps assure a single coherent interpretation of the intended policies. These proposed changes also reflect fresh insights on military assistance and other African problems gained during my recent trip with Mr. Bowles. I enclose a copy of the State draft marked with our suggested revisions, /3/ and, in addition, a complete redraft setting forth the same basic views in a different format which we believe to state the policy guidance in a manner more useful for operating purposes.
/2/ Document 193.
/3/ Attached but not printed.
Discussions between our respective staffs indicate that we agree on almost all substantive issues, but there are three primary areas where we believe clarification of State language is highly desirable. First is the question of whether the U.S. should ever take the initiative in eliciting requests for military assistance from African governments. Clearly this will sometimes be highly desirable, for example where otherwise the Bloc would supply military assistance or where such assistance will help stabilize an otherwise unstable internal political situation.
Second is the question of whether we should ``discriminate between countries . . . in the matter of arms supply according to their political behavior." The language in paragraph 10 of your draft suggests that we should not, although your staff agrees, citing language elsewhere in the draft, that this implication is not really intended. Presumably neither of us would favor supplying arms to a country which is clearly expecting to use them (perhaps in conjunction with arms from the Bloc) for aggression against its neighbors.
The third question is the meaning of ``maximum civilianization" in your Conclusion No. 4. We interpret it to mean that, consistent with sound internal security objectives, military assistance should also have a capability to contribute to economic and social betterment, and that the public evidences of U.S. military participation in the military assistance program should be minimized.
The State paper makes certain presumptions about U.S. policy for regional arms control (e.g., the opening paragraph, paragraph 8 and Conclusion No. 1) which seem to pre-judge this issue which I understand is presently being examined separately. We are in strong agreement with you that it is desirable to minimize the military capability of the African States to do anything more than maintain internal security. On the other hand, the technique of regional arms control is one which bears examination in depth to assure that the principles and terms of any such arrangement will not have far-reaching and adverse consequences on the U.S. and allied military posture, which, as you know, depends heavily upon certain bases and installations in Africa, as well as its consequences as a precedent elsewhere and upon the U.S. position in East - West disarmament discussions. Therefore, we think that statements on this subject should be deferred until the study now in process has been completed.
I also note that your staff is currently preparing a message which will elicit a comprehensive study of the arms supply problem by African posts. Replies to this message, which will bear directly on the various policy questions at issue, are to be received by 15 September. These replies should be taken into consideration before a final articulation of arms policy for tropical Africa is made.
We have attempted to clarify the State draft statement of policy in the foregoing and certain other respects. However, I should appreciate your sympathetic consideration of our proposed alternative statement of policy. In view of the substantial concurrence of views evidenced in staff consultations between our two Departments, I would hope that we can work out and issue a statement of U.S. policy on arms supply to tropical Africa which will be mutually satisfactory.
Yours sincerely,
Haydn Williams /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Williams signed the original.
198. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret.
NIE 60/70 - 2 - 61 Washington, August 31, 1961.
THE PROBABLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES
The Problem
To estimate the present situation and likely trends in the interrelationships of the independent African states and the effect of outside influences on the regional politics of the area.
Conclusions
1. The newly independent African states have not yet developed consistent patterns of relationships among themselves. The problems of political survival and of the maintenance of law and order have kept African leaders from concentrating on their interrelationships. Pan-Africanism, disagreements between ``radicals" and ``conservative" leaders, and the external influences of the Communist Bloc, the former Metropoles and the US add conflicting and complicating factors to the situation. (Paras. 7 - 10, 12)
2. Pan-Africanism is a mystical concept, glorifying racial kinship and the African personality and culture. Its chief target is ``neo-colonialism," its eventual goal is African unity. No black African leader can afford to reject these concepts and all of them to some degree assert Pan-Africanist ideals. But the more radical leaders, such as Nkrumah and Toure, have found the slogans of Pan-Africanism especially useful in their efforts to extend their influence and build up their followings. (Paras. 14 - 17)
3. ``Conservative" leaders, such as Balewa, Houphouet-Boigny and Youlou, prefer postponing the issue of political integration. In addition, they wish to gain the material benefits which the maintenance of close ties with the former Metropoles have so far assured them. (Paras. 19 - 20)
4. Neither the Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union nor the Conseil de l'Entente is likely to develop into a real federation. Broader groupings such as the Casablanca powers (mainly radical) and the Monrovia group (mainly conservative) have yet to show any basic cohesion. It is possible that the African states may be able to create some functional organs for economic cooperation. It is also possible that some efforts will be initiated to create broad regional machinery to enable African states to settle their own disputes. (Paras. 40 - 44)
5. On the whole, African regional relationships are likely to remain fluid over the next several years. During this period, we believe opportunism is likely to prove more compelling to African leaders than ideology, and that there will almost certainly be frequent shifts and recombination of coalitions as African leaders vie for power and international status. Nevertheless, we anticipate that Pan-Africanism will gain support, at least as a visionary proposition, and that the militant anticolonialism of the Pan-Africanists will induce more moderate leaders to adopt neutralist foreign policies. (Paras. 37 - 39, 45)
6. Western European cultural and economic influence in Africa will probably remain at a relative high level over the next several years, but Africans will increasingly look elsewhere for aid. The US is regarded as an alternate source of foreign assistance, but one which does not fully understand Africa's problems or fully support African aspirations. The Bloc will probably have considerable success in increasing its influence with African states and in promoting neutralist foreign policies, and it will encourage the emergence of additional radical regimes. African leaders will try to play East and West against the other and to extract the maximum amount of aid and assistance from both side. (Paras. 24 - 30)
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
199. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Africa, 1962. Secret.
JCSM - 591 - 61 Washington, September 5, 1961.
SUBJECT
Proposed Regular Scheduled MATS Flights Throughout Africa
1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 April 1961, subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a recommended plan for the establishment of regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa.
2. In establishing a basis for such a plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have fully recognized the comments of the Department of State on this subject contained in their letter, dated 2 March 1961. /2/ In particular, these comments point out that a major obstacle which must be overcome will be the obtaining of permission of the many countries involved for the introduction of US military personnel and equipment. This may prove difficult since the advantages which will accrue to these countries by the inauguration of the MATS service are not readily apparent.
/2/ The letter from Acting Secretary of State for African Affairs James K. Penfield to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy noted that the difficulty with the MATS proposal lay in the fact that the very countries where the United States could use a MATS service to best advantage were also those where it had not yet been able to establish its constructive interest in their stability, welfare, and development. Therefore, the United States needed to go to such countries with a proposal that was clearly to their own advantage as well as to that of the United States. Penfield suggested reconsideration of the question in 6 months, by which time it would be possible to assess developing attitudes, especially in West Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/1 - 3161)
3. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the most feasible premise for the establishment of scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa at this time would be to provide regular air service to the various US Embassies on that continent. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed the attached plan for an African ``Embassy Run" which is designed to provide the specific information requested. /3/ This plan, which would provide MATS service to twelve principal embassies on a weekly basis, is submitted as a realistic initial step toward full-scale MATS operations in Africa. It can be expanded or reduced prior to implementation to meet a specific requirement as may be determined in consultation with the Department of State. A thorough route and site survey would be required, however, before implementation to identify and resolve the many problems inherent to an operation of this type.
/3/ See footnote 1, Document 203.
4. It will be noted that the tariff proposal contained within this plan would charge Special Assignment Aircraft (SAA) hourly rates for aircraft while on the African circuit. Although the SAA method of billing will result in higher cost to the sponsor than the common user tariff rates, it must be utilized initially since specific route requirements are unknown. Once these route requirements have been established, it may be possible to designate the route as channel traffic and revert to normal channel traffic tariff procedures.
5. In response to the comment of the Department of State that any proposal for the extension of MATS routes into Africa should be accompanied by evidence of those advantages which would accrue to the countries involved, it is appropriate to identify, for future discussions with the Department of State, the advantages which an Embassy Run of this type would offer. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strongest advantage is the fact that the proposed MATS routes would provide a readily available transportation means to facilitate the introduction and support of those US programs designed to assist the cultural and economic development of the countries involved and to provide the various forms of medical aid and health education. Similarly, these routes would facilitate the provision of military aid to those countries participating in the Military Assistance Program. Combining the stated desire on the part of the United States to make such varied programs available to these countries with the use of scheduled MATS airlift in these programs should provide a persuasive argument for permitting initiation of such air service to the countries selected. Additionally, it could be pointed out to these countries that MATS service of this type would provide a means for the United States to respond to the expressed needs of the African nations on a timely, yet orderly, basis. Such a capability would be especially desirable in rendering assistance in emergency situations which may develop in those countries.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
200. Report Prepared by Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret. The report was sent under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President's Naval Aide, Captain Shepard, that reads: ``Attached is Soapy Williams' report of his last trip. Sam Belk of our office has put a 4-page summary on top, and I think that is all you need to read." The report of Assistant Secretary Williams on his second trip to Africa August 8 - September 1 is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.5 - WI/9 - 961.
Washington, September 25, 1961.
SUMMARY OF GOVERNOR WILLIAMS' TRIP TO AFRICA
August 8 to September 1, 1961
General Conclusions
1. The personal meetings between the President and African leaders at the White House are a tremendous asset to our good relations.
2. In my personal contacts I was able to correct the views of U.S. African policy and thereby increase the good will toward the U.S., not only in the friendly territories but in the Portuguese territories as well.
3. Southern African countries, except for the Portuguese territories, are looking to the U.S. for needed substantial amounts of aid in fiscal '63 and '64, and U.S. - African relations will suffer if we are unable to provide it.
4. The current attempts at self-rule in Africa, particularly in the problem areas of the Congo, where nationalism has gone wild, and in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where varying views on an adequate rate of progress complicate matters, must be given aid and encouragement toward success, so they can serve as examples for the development of self-government in the surrounding areas.
5. U.S. contribution can best be made in the fields of information, education, technical aid, medical facilities, and development of the economic potentials. In connection with education, one specific field needing sympathetic understanding and guidance, is the education of African women in order to improve their social status and to inculcate a desire for a better standard of living.
6. Two instances of Communist influence--Basutoland and the Malagasy Republic--need to be watched and combatted.
[Here follow country-by-country observations.]
201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5 - MSP/9 - 2961. Official Use Only. Drafted by Troxel and sent through the Executive Secretariat. Copies were sent to Hartman (B) and Toner (AID).
Washington, September 29, 1961.
SUBJECT
Aid to Africa in FY 1962
I am greatly disturbed by two developments in connection with our aid program for Africa for this year. I am calling them to your attention because of the serious political consequences that they may have. Both relate to attitudes that we find widespread in the new task forces and informal groups that are reviewing our FY 1962 programs.
First, there seems to be considerable sentiment for deferring the implementation of many of our projects--a view that we should hold back a substantial portion of the limited funds available to us to permit further program reviews and to allow for the consideration of requirements that may arise later this year. If this view prevails, it may be catastrophic for our relations with Africa. In the best of circumstances, we must expect a great deal of disappointment at the quantity of aid and the speed at which it is made available. The pronouncements of the President, in particular, have raised widespread expectations. But I hope we will be able to live with the disappointment if we move forward promptly with whatever funds we have, demonstrating at least our good will and genuine effort to be of assistance.
I am concerned, too, that in Africa, where our program is largely a new one and where we have relatively little record of accomplishment to which we can point, that further delay (three months of the fiscal year have already passed) will mean facing the Bureau of the Budget, and then the Congress, with almost nothing done. Despite our tremendous needs, we will inevitably be told that we must have had little use for funds in Africa, thus weakening the Administration's position in FY 1963.
Second, I am concerned by what appears to be a disposition to agree to the expenditure of funds in a few countries to the neglect of a great many. I fully support the concentration of the bulk of our funds and argued strongly for this principle before the Congress. But it is a perhaps unfortunate fact of political life that we must have some program--usually a very modest one--in virtually every country in Africa. We simply cannot, at the beginning of the highly publicized Decade of Development, /2/ tell these badly underdeveloped countries that we are not interested in assisting them. Nor can we tell their governments to rely entirely on the former colonial power, unless we wish to weaken seriously whatever moderate leadership exists.
/2/ For President Kennedy's special message to Congress on foreign aid, March 22, which proclaimed a Decade of Development, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 203 - 212.
This is by no means solely a political requirement. Even small sums, expended in carefully selected projects, can often be of great economic value. Many of these countries need help simply to get them to the point where they have the capacity to consider self-help measures of the kind the President has outlined. Assisting them makes sense both for them and for us.
We may already be too late in Africa with too little. Further delay and the lack of a balanced effort could do tremendous damage to our position. It is imperative that we do something to preserve for Africa President Kennedy's Decade of Development and prevent it from becoming a Decade of Disappointment. /3/
/3/ On October 6, Bowles sent a memorandum to Williams thanking him for his September 29 memorandum and expressing shared concern about U.S. aid allocations to Africa for 1962. The Under Secretary indicated his agreement that the United States should have some program in virtually every country, but pointed out that they needed criteria in order to decide how much aid and to whom it should go. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5 - MSP/10 - 661)
202. Letter From the Consultative Group on Arms Limitation in Africa to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5/10 - 2361. Confidential.
Washington, October 23, 1961.
We hereby respectfully submit our views on what we believe the United States can and should do to prevent or moderate wasteful and dangerous military build-ups in Africa.
We are pleased that you are giving this matter serious thought at this time. Our deliberations have led us to the conclusion that the dangers of an excessive arms build-up are very real indeed. African leaders are already showing signs of wishing to possess significant military power, partly as a symbol of their newly won independence. The Communist Bloc has surplus arms and is eager to supply them to Africans as a means of creating chaos and of spreading Communist influence.
Now, while the arms slate in Africa is still fairly clean, is the time to begin making whatever contribution we can to preventing the ills that inevitably arise when nations enter into unbridled arms competition. /2/
/2/ On November 6, Battle sent copies of the Consultative Group's report to McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow under cover of a memorandum indicating that the Department of State intended to use it as a basis for further consultations within the Department and with other interested agencies in order to develop and refine U.S. policies for dealing with this subject. It noted that although the report was not a cheerful document, the Department believed it was an important one and that it merited Bundy's attention. (Ibid., 770.56/11 - 761)
Gerard C. Smith
Joseph M. Jones
Robert E. Matteson
Enclosure /3/
/3/ Confidential.
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON ARMS LIMITATION IN AFRICA
A Report to the Honorable G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
[Here follows the body of the report.]
Conclusions
There is little if any present prospect for success in efforts to impose arms control on Africa from the outside.
We must find ways of stimulating the Africans themselves to take the initiative in working toward effective arrangements for arms limitation.
This requires a discreet but purposeful educational program directed to African leaders and other opinion-formers. This is a long-range program--and a start should be made as soon as possible.
U.S. officials responsible for African problems, both in Washington and in the field, must be made thoroughly aware of the fact that a major U.S. interest is to bring arms build-ups in Africa under some degree of control.
Restraints in military build-ups should be a major aim of U.S. African policy. Such restraints involve a broad spectrum of questions, from U.S. supply of arms to meet legitimate requirements--to the possibility of ``educating" the Africans in the necessity for restraint--to the possibility of some agreed arms limitation arrangements to prevent or moderate arms races in Africa--to the concept of general disarmament.
The U.S. should continue to support its previous initiatives in this field such as the one put forward at the UN in 1960.
Additional major public pronouncements on this subject may, however, be unhelpful. Our principal effort should be to encourage African leaders to become active in this field. One African zealot on arms limitation could be worth ten American and other non-African advocates of that cause.
U.S. arms supply policy can, if properly conceived, contribute to our arms limitation objectives. A responsible U.S. arms supply program that helps to meet legitimate requirements offers worth-while opportunities for exerting a wholesome influence on African political and military leaders.
In general, in the case of the newly independent African countries it would be better to have non-uniformed and non-service technical military experts at our Embassies, rather than military attaches. Where we have attaches, they, too, must be imbued with the arms limitation philosophy.
The U.K. and France have large interests in the matter of African security and should be of great assistance in any educational process to develop restraint.
The U.S. should support, but not initiate, a proposal for an African nuclear-free zone.
Arms control cannot be expected in isolation. It must proceed in train with other developments giving the African nations a sense of security.
203. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/10 - 2661. Secret.
Washington, October 26, 1961.
Dear Alex: We are giving continuous attention to the specific steps to be taken should the national interest require military operations by United States forces in sub-Saharan Africa. A critical aspect of this problem is the timely movement of combat and support elements into the area. We may also need to use recovery bases, other than the strike-staging facilities, subsequent to air operations. Such movements would involve overflight, landing, and operational rights which we do not presently enjoy. I believe it is important, if we are to be in position for effective action if an emergency arises, to set forth now the scope of our needs in this regard.
Military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, as contemplated in current contingency plans, would require the use of combat units from the United States. In an emergency situation, the bulk of such a force would have to be deployed by air. There is attached a description of the routes we expect to use for deployment if the emergency were to arise in the Republic of the Congo, indicating also the new overflight, landing, and operational rights which these routings involve. /2/ As plans for contingency operations elsewhere in Africa are developed, additional overflight rights and terminal operating rights would be needed, although the approach routes to sub-Saharan Africa would remain largely unchanged.
/2/ Attached to the source text but not printed is an appendix entitled ``Planned Routes for Emergency Deployment to the Republic of the Congo."
These deployment plans are based upon technical military considerations. We realize that political circumstances limit our capability for obtaining assurance now that these deployment routes will be fully available. We hope, however, that you will find the attachment a basis for as much advance action as is politically feasible, for advance planning which would save valuable time in an emergency situation, and for comment on political factors which should be taken into account in planning military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. /3/
Sincerely yours,
Haydn
/3/ On December 1, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico - Military Affairs Jeffrey Kitchen responded to Williams' request for comment on political factors that should be taken into account in planning military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. Kitchen's letter emphasized the political difficulties involved in attempting to secure prior overflight, landing, and operational rights from appropriate African nations, which would raise undue alarm concerning U.S. intentions in the area and prejudice continued maintenance of current U.S. base rights in Morocco and Libya. The Department of State therefore recommended that the basic assumptions underlying U.S. unilateral military contingency plans for these areas be revised to reflect these political considerations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5411/10 - 2661)
204. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State - Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, State - JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. No drafting information appears on the source text, which bears a typewritten notation that it is a Department of State draft not cleared with the Department of Defense.
Washington, January 5, 1962, 11:30 a.m.
[Here follow a list of participants at the meeting and agenda item I.]
II. SOVIET PENETRATION OF GUINEA, MALI AND GHANA
General Lemnitzer stated that the JCS were concerned about the trend of political developments in Guinea, Mali and Ghana. Mr. Johnson said that he understood this concern and that he wished to make a few introductory remarks before turning the discussion over to Governor Williams. He pointed out that these countries were very new ones and that they were feeling their way in the world. Under the circumstances it is inevitable that they will swing to and fro like a pendulum in their political leanings. None of them wish to be satellites or vassals of Moscow although they could be unwittingly trapped into such a position. Mr. Johnson said that at the moment Guinea was beginning to swing back to the right from an extreme left position; Mali is swinging to the left while there are signs that Ghana will soon begin a swing back to the right. Governor Williams then made the following comments on the status of developments in the three countries.
Mali--The ruling party organization in Mali controls the actions of the President, and the party is inclined further to the left than is he. We are concerned about a possible drift to the left but are not yet ready to conclude that an irreversible movement in that direction is clearly underway. It is our judgment that leaders in Mali are emotionally and psychologically closer to the Soviet bloc than to the West, but at the same time they intend to balance their commitments and avoid undue dependence on either side. As their maturity develops, we hope that Mali's leaders will come to realize that the U.S., and the West as a whole, are not hostile to their genuine aspirations for the future development of the new African states.
Guinea--President Toure has publicly accused ``Marxist Leninist" groups and their operating centers in Dakar, Paris and Moscow of attempting to overthrow his government. He has expelled the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea, and the Guinean Ambassador to the U.S. has advised the Department confidentially that his government possesses documentary proof that Bloc embassies have been behind the recent difficulties in Guinea. We believe that these recent events will strengthen Guinea's desire to reduce its dependence on the Bloc and thus present us with increased opportunities over the months to come.
Ghana--We feel that our decision to assist in the financing of the Volta dam project will be helpful through insuring U.S. presence in Ghana and as a demonstration of U.S. interest in the future of Ghana. We also consider that Nkrumah's Pan-African ambitions will prevent him from going completely under control of the East or the West. The Peace Corps program in Ghana has been highly successful in its first stages, and the Government of Ghana has requested that additional Peace Corps volunteers be assigned.
General Lemnitzer stated that the political situations in the three countries appeared to be improving. General Smith asked if grant aid provision of transport aircraft to Guinea would help to improve our position there. Governor Williams said that he felt that this would be helpful at an appropriate time. He pointed out that Toure had been advised to let us know at any time if we could be of help to him, and he had replied that he would discuss this offer with us in the near future. Governor Williams also noted that the gift airplanes which the President has provided to various African Heads of State have been very well received. Mr. Nitze remarked that the U.S. Ambassador to Guinea had recommended that U.S. assistance in local road building projects would be helpful. Mr. Ferguson said that we would consider this important project when and if Toure turns to us for aid.
[Here follows agenda item III.]
205. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Africa, Jan. - Mar., 1962. Secret. This memorandum forms the appendix to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 31.
The January 31 covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum printed here was written in response to a January 4 request from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for recommendations on substantive courses of action designed to counter Sino - Soviet penetration of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The memorandum advises that the Joint Chiefs had re-examined measures they had recommended in the past, as well as others being pursued or planned by the Department of State, and were submitting the results of their review in the attached appendix. They recommended that the Secretary of Defense transmit the substance of the appendix to the Department of State and urged that it be considered by a State - Defense Ad Hoc Committee.
On March 9, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy transmitted the memorandum and its appendix to Assistant Secretary Williams under cover of a letter calling it ``a sensible and useful paper." Bundy stated that he was prepared to accept Williams' judgment as to whether an ad hoc committee would be useful, but noted that a continuing watch might have some usefulness. (Ibid.)
JCSM - 78 - 62 Washington, January 31, 1962.
COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GHANA, GUINEA AND MALI
Considerations
1. Communist influence in these three countries does not appear to have reached a stage where the Communist Bloc dictates the policies of these countries. However, if considered in terms of balance of influence
vis-a-vis the West, there seems to be little doubt that the Communist Bloc now has the preponderance of influence in Guinea and Mali. In the case of Ghana, Communist Bloc influence is not so great, but appears to be increasing. Unless this trend is checked, Communist dominance could become a reality soon.
2. In regard to the current situation and Communist Bloc influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, an evaluation of intelligence reports does not indicate a conclusion that significant changes in the current situation in these three countries should be expected. The recent action of President Toure of Guinea in removing the Soviet Ambassador, and the attempted coup with which this action was associated, represent a setback for the Soviet Union, the full ramifications of which are not yet clear. However, the importance which the USSR attaches to Guinea was underscored by the rapidity with which it dispatched Mr. Mikoyan to the scene.
Basic Approach
3. US access to and presence in these suspicious, ``neutralist," Marxist organized countries is limited to what might be considered correct diplomatic representation with some small opportunities in the social, economic, and information areas. US military presence is limited to an Army attache in Accra, and a small mission staffed by the US Army in Mali which has been under pressure to leave. Our military presence in Guinea is nil. All these countries have shown interest of varying degrees in social, economic, and arms assistance from Western sources but have actually accepted little. The most recent significant events offering us an entry into one of these three countries have taken place in Ghana. In addition to the Volta Dam project which the United States has agreed to finance, there are both British and Canadian training missions in Ghana and the Ghanaians have purchased Canadian Caribou aircraft. Recent information from Accra indicates that Ghana has secured the services of a Pakistani general officer to serve as deputy to the Chief of the Ghana Defense Staff and that the Ghanaians have requested Pakistan to make six artillery officers available to serve with the Ghana army. Mali has made some tentative soundings for additional military material. Despite Guinea's growing disenchantment with the Communist Bloc, new concrete opportunities in that country have yet to materialize.
4. Because of limitations on funds, higher priorities elsewhere, and the US policy against fostering an arms race in Africa, US military assist-ance programs to any of the three countries are unlikely to be of such magnitude as would significantly affect the evolution of the political situation in the recipient countries. At best, they can only assist in (a) reflecting the US presence and interest in the country; (b) permitting the observation of Sino - Soviet Bloc activities in the area; (c) providing a tenuous connection with the West for elements out of sympathy with the local government, and (d) serving as a symbol of a possible Western alternative to reliance on Communist Bloc military assistance.
5. The timing and scope of such programs as are instituted with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, will necessarily depend primarily on the assessment by the Department of State of the political advantages to be gained by US military assistance. Because of the need to make certain that US assistance does not simply reinforce a Communist-oriented regime already in power, frequent reviews should be made of all US operations in each country to ascertain the extent to which specific US political objectives have been achieved or are in the process of achievement.
6. In view of the foregoing, it may be readily concluded that prospects for expansion of our influence will be slow. Moreover, it is unlikely to accelerate if our readiness to help remains a one-way street with the United States essentially ``begging" to be allowed to help. Nearby are the friendly, Western oriented countries of Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and the Conseil de l'Entente countries. Accelerated efforts to be responsive to the military aid requirements of these more deserving countries could be the catalyst which might render Ghana, Guinea, and Mali more receptive. Moreover, it is in our interest to foster and strengthen the viability of these countries in any event, as geographically, culturally, and ethnically, they dilute the potential of a Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union and can exert a moderating influence on their radical policies. Therefore, it appears timely and logical to expand our activities in these countries while selectively exploiting such opportunities as may arise to enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.
Recommended Actions
7. The following courses of action, lying primarily outside of the capabilities of the US Military Establishment, would enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, and would contribute to the success of the courses of action listed in paragraph 8 which utilize primarily the resources of the Military Establishment.
a. Expose by all means [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Communist Bloc activities in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, which are inimical to the rights and aspirations of the individual. (This program should be carried on not only by the appropriate US agencies, but by the use of the third party principle.)
b. Discredit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Communist oriented or Communist trained governmental personnel. (The third party principle should be used to the fullest extent.)
c. Assist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pro-Western opposition parties, individuals, or refugee groups in gaining prestige and in building a strong opposition movement to Communism.
d. Assist pro-Western groups in gaining control of news media by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] providing funds and assist-ance.
e. Assist personnel in categories c and d above, in gaining prestige by orientation visits to the United States.
8. The following measures are designed to utilize the resources of the Military Establishment. They could enhance US influence throughout the area of West Africa and take advantage of any apparent swing away from Communist Bloc orientation in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.
a. Initiate US military assistance to the Conseil de l'Entente countries, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and continue such assistance to Liberia.
(1) Every effort should be made to secure early approval and implementation of the recommendations of the US Joint Survey Team to the Conseil de l'Entente countries which was submitted 1 December 1961.
(2) The initial effort in this area should be to create, train, and equip forces for internal security and border and coastal patrol to include appropriate air and naval elements. However, support should be extended to include support of the regional security arrangements currently being organized by France and the Entente countries. The purpose of this support should be to reduce the concern of Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Entente countries about the recent build-up of military forces and equipment in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, by improving the capability of these countries to defend themselves.
(3) Emphasize the development within the above countries of military intelligence assets which can be utilized to counter communist espionage, subversion, and insurgency by assisting them in establishing and maintaining high standards of security against communist penetration, and in the development of indigenous military intelligence assets to meet the requirements of combined or bilateral contingency plans.
(4) Implementation of aid programs to these friendly countries should be carried out with marked dispatch to create a psychological impact that it pays to be friends of the West.
(5) Utilize appropriate specially trained forces to provide counterinsurgency training for friendly forces in West Africa.
(6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medical research.
b. Expand efforts to gain and improve the US entree and influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, in order to create an increased US presence there, offer an alternative to dependence on Communist Bloc support, and increase the flow of information from them.
(1) Take advantage of Toure's current disenchantment with the Communist Bloc to press for the establishment of a US military attache in Conakry.
(2) Take advantage of Mali interest in acquiring US military communications and other material to reopen the question of establishing a US military attache in Bamako.
(3) Follow-up on USEmbassy Accra message of 26 December 1961 (DA IN 188840) by inviting the Ghana Chief of Defense Staff to come to the United States for an orientation tour of US military facilities and schools. Extend similar invitations to the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Guinea and Mali.
(4) Continue to review the desirability of offers of military training to all three countries in terms of the over-all advantage of such training to the United States.
(5) Arrange for the visit of appropriate elements of US armed forces to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.
(6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medicine research.
(7) Offer military Corps of Engineers technical advice especially in the civic area of construction and road building.
(8) Offer military Transportation Corps technical advice to assist in overcoming the problems of communications so important to the economies of these countries, especially Mali.
(9) Endeavor to encourage in these countries the development of Western oriented intelligence agencies capable of coping with the communist threat.
(10) In order to foster Western orientation of the Ghanaian military, consider on its merits the desirability of furnishing financial assistance to Western oriented countries who are otherwise prepared and capable of providing military technical advice, training, or other support to Ghana.
206. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC/Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62 - 5/17/62. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat. A handwritten note in the margin in an unknown hand indicates that copies were sent to Kaysen, Dungan, Klein, and Komer.
Washington, May 9, 1962.
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
Moscow Moves Rapidly on Civil Air Routes in Africa
Four More Countries Approached. Following its mid-April negotiations with the Sudanese, the USSR has now asked Libya, Somalia, Niger, and Chad to sign various types of air agreements necessary for Aeroflot operations in North, East, and West Africa. Czechoslovakia and Senegal signed an air agreement on May 2, and there are reports that Air Guinea and Ghana Airways are going to begin service to Moscow via Tunisia and Switzerland.
Agreements Presently Deferred. The countries approached have de-ferred action on Moscow's requests, perhaps influenced by uncertainty as to whether a Soviet - Sudanese agreement will be signed and US representations on the undesirability of Soviet bloc civil air expansion in Africa. Sudan, Chad, and Niger have expressed surprise at US concern and a Libyan official has implied to Embassy Benghazi that if some African countries admit Soviet air service, others cannot long refuse.
Soviet Officials Exploit Sense of Nationalism. Undoubtedly aware of Western efforts to interdict, the USSR is making quiet, matter-of-fact approaches, taking the line that air agreements with foreign powers are a normal concomitant of sovereignty. Soviet officials incorrectly assured Chad that Niger had already agreed to Aeroflot rights through Niamey. The Sudanese, furthermore, were at first misled into thinking that Soviet air agreements with Nigeria and Liberia had been virtually concluded.
207. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Achilles) to the Under Secretary (McGhee) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962. Secret.
Washington, May 10, 1962.
SUBJECT
Soviet Civil Aviation Penetration in Africa
The Soviet Union's success since January, 1962 in negotiating four civil aviation agreements in North and West Africa (Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Ghana) and in bringing almost to the point of final conclusion a similar agreement with the Sudanese which would lead to further routes in East and Central Africa have caused us to undertake ad hoc measures directed at the Sudanese problem and longer range planning designed to improve our organizational arrangements for policy formulation in this field.
Our efforts to block conclusion of a Soviet - Sudanese aviation agreement were at first based on strong diplomatic representations which stressed the disruptive political effect and the potential security dangers of Soviet aviation penetration for the Sudan and for African stability in general. The technical pitfalls of the proposed agreement were also emphasized (questions of reciprocity, settlements of disputes, rates and standards, soviet non-membership in ICAO and IATA). When the Sudanese indicated that they had committed themselves too deeply to be able to withdraw unless some substantial element ``of principle" were introduced, and renewed their expression of interest in securing two Boeing 720B's, high-level consultations between AID and the Department, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], produced a new proposal to the Sudanese based on two elements: 1) the immediate despatch to Khartoum of the Vice President of Seaboard International Airlines to discuss the possibilities of developing Sudan Airways, including the obtaining on favorable terms of additional equipment best suited to Sudan airlines needs; 2) notification that the US Government was prepared to consider favorably a loan application for financing Khartoum - Port Sudan Road best suited to the Sudan's needs after the recently completed survey had been considered by that Government. We further informed the Sudanese that our willingness to assist the Sudan can be significantly influenced by a decision to proceed with the air agreement which would be viewed by Congress and the American public as assisting USSR penetration of Africa.
As a result of these representations, the Sudanese Government agreed on April 29 to hold off making a final decision for 10 to 14 days, ``or even longer." Discussions with the Seaboard representative are continuing and the relatively favorable Sudanese reaction to his proposal, just received, indicates a further period of postponement while the Seaboard offer is examined.
Even before the accelerated Soviet efforts to expand their air routes in Africa, there had been within various parts of the US Government concern that US policies with respect to civil aviation in developing countries were not being properly coordinated among the various interested agencies of Government and were not taking sufficient account of political and security requirements. A Department of Defense study of September 1, 1961 discussed this problem and made a number of useful proposals for making aviation in the less-developed countries a more responsive instrument of foreign policy. Within the Department of State one principal difficulty seemed to be that civil aviation matters were handled entirely within the Bureau of Economic Affairs by the Office of Transportation and Communications, and as a result political consideration of aviation policies was not achieved on a systematic basis or often at a high enough level. As a partial solution to this problem, efforts are underway to obtain the services of a highly qualified professional in the civil aviation field. The leading candidate for this position is Mr. Joseph Fitzgerald, now President of the Ozark Airlines, St. Louis, and formerly Chief of the International Division of CAB. Mr. Fitzgerald will be coming to Washington for an interview on May 11.
As a first step to arrange closer consultation among those Government agencies chiefly concerned, you wrote on May 1 to Defense, FAA, CIA, AID and CAB proposing an early meeting to discuss arrangements for some form of ad hoc inter-Agency consultation to discuss steps to counteract Soviet Bloc penetration of the developing countries through aviation activities as well as to assure a constructive response to the aviation aspirations of these countries.
As an important element for devising a coherent civil aviation development policy in Africa, the Advisory Group might consider the initiation of thorough surveys of individual countries in order to develop broad guidelines applicable throughout particular regions in Africa. Existing associations such as Air - Afrique and Springbok could be strengthened and the establishment of new regional airlines, for example in the Maghreb, should be explored. One of the elements of difficulty will be in preserving harmonious relationships with the former Metropoles which would, no doubt, resist any massive intrusion of US aviation competition. One proposal suggested by Mr. James Smith is to consider the aviation maintenance and support system separately from the operations of the airlines themselves and to promote, with Exim Bank participation, a series of consortia for building and controlling all national aviation facilities. In this way the basic aviation development of the country could not come under Soviet influence but would be developed as a cooperative economically viable venture with the West.
These and many other interesting proposals, such as those set forth in the FAA - Defense study just sent over by Mr. Halaby, /2/ suggest the range and complexity of this problem. Our opponent has a strategic plan, a single aviation organization whose operations are closely linked with its foreign assistance programs, considerable resources of modern aircraft and technical personnel, no ``colonial" heritage in Africa or Latin America and few problems of coordinating its efforts in the developing countries with other members of the Bloc. The Soviets clearly do not intend to let the momentum already gained to die down: within the last three weeks they have broadened their drive for air routes to four additional countries, Chad, Niger, Somalia, and Libya, although none has yet given any commitment. African States, whether they call themselves neutral or sympathetic to the West, will find the Bloc's offer of new aviation links and quick aviation development on easy terms difficult to resist. The newly formed aviation advisory group has an important and urgent task before it.
/2/ Attachment to a memorandum from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Najeeb E. Halaby, to McGeorge Bundy, May 10. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Standing Group Meetings, 5/1/62 - 5/17/62)
As background information, I am attaching a memorandum by Mr. Wolfe dated May 5 /3/ on this same subject.
/3/ Not printed. Memorandum from Wolfe to Fredericks and Tasca, May 5. (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group Meeting, May 11, 1962)
208. Record of Actions Taken at a Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group, May 11, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to McGhee, Gilpatric, McCone, Bundy (White House), Halaby (FAA), Bell (BOB), Boyd (CAB), and Bromley Smith (NSC).
Washington, May 11, 1962.
Item I--Soviet Penetration of Civil Air Transport in Africa
a. Following discussion of the urgent requirement for a civil air transport program for Africa, agreed that an individual would be appointed on a temporary basis to develop such a program under the policy direction of the steering committee of the International Air Transport Study Group. (IATSG)
b. Agreed on the necessity, as a second priority, of developing U.S. long range civil aviation programs.
Item 2--Status of NSC 5726/1, ``U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino - Soviet Bloc" /2/
/2/ NSC 5726/1, ``U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc." (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5726/1)
a. Agreed to recommend rescission of NSC 5726/1.
b. Asked the Department of State to review the substance of NSC 5726/1 to determine (1) whether a new statement of policy on this subject is required and (2) whether any such statement should become part of the general aviation policy statement being drafted by the International Air Transport Study Group.
209. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.54/7 - 662. Secret.
Washington, July 6, 1962.
Dear Alex: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed concern that, if contingency operations were required in sub-Saharan Africa, we would lack assurance of effective communications for command and control of our deployed forces. We would be dependent upon facilities at Kenitra, San Pablo, Wheelus, and Asmara. The use of these facilities to support contingency operations in Africa might be denied or harassed, for political reasons, by the host Governments involved. Accordingly, we attach importance to making arrangements with the United Kingdom under which we could install and operate communications equipment at Ascension Island, when required during contingency operations, and when use of other facilities is not feasible.
Such equipment would be used for command and control of forces deployed to Africa and for ship-shore communications coverage of the South Atlantic and the African west coast. The equipment would consist of transportable transmitters and receivers to be airlifted into Ascension Island on approximately 36-hours notice when required. We estimate that about 80 to 120 men would be required for the temporary operation of such facilities, depending upon the type of equipment selected and the extent to which support could be provided by other U.S. activities on the island at the time.
There are no current plans for the establishment of permanent communication facilities at Ascension Island, nor for any construction in anticipation of contingency use. Any construction later undertaken in this connection would be the minimum consistent with the circumstances (e.g., the preparatory time available during a contingency, the support available from other U.S. activities at Ascension, and the expected duration of the operations). For the present, the requirement is only to identify and have kept available two suitable sites of 4 to 6 acres each, for receiver and transmitter areas. The former could be co-located with existing Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) receivers; the latter would be located and the frequencies used would be selected and coordinated to avoid interference with existing electronic systems on the island.
It is relevant to point out that we have examined the possibility of using existing AMR communications facilities for these purposes. We have concluded that this arrangement would not be practicable. If we rely upon these facilities to carry both AMR traffic and contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the continental U.S., we would be risking serious and untimely interruptions in one or the other of these important activities. Moreover, the AMR facilities are not suitable for the essential relay of contingency operations traffic between Ascension Island and the deployed forces themselves.
We would appreciate whatever steps you can take to obtain the agreement of the United Kingdom to make sites available on Ascension Island for possible use as described above. As to the form of such an agreement, we have envisaged an exchange of notes authorizing this use of Ascension Island subject to the provisions, insofar as they are applicable, of the Long Range Proving Ground Agreement (Ascension Island), TIAS 3603, of June 25th, 1956. Your views as to the suitability of this approach would also be appreciated.
We would be pleased to arrange for any further information or assistance you might desire in this matter.
Sincerely,
Bill
210. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, INR - NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: ``The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on July 11, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NIE 60 - 62 Washington, July 11, 1962.
GUINEA AND MALI AS EXEMPLARS OF AFRICAN RADICALISM
The Problem
To examine the nature and effect of the radical policies of Guinea and Mali and to assess their wider significance.
Conclusions
A. Guinea and Mali, along with Ghana, are the main centers of African radicalism south of the Sahara. Their attitudes and policies are dominated by strong anticolonialism which tends to make them suspicious of the Western Powers and sympathetic with Communist formulas. In domestic policy their approach is militantly nationalistic and revolutionary. In foreign affairs they seek to establish themselves as leaders of radicalism in Africa and to promote policies of neutralism and nonalignment. These policies have given them notoriety and significance out of proportion to their power and resources. (Paras. 1, 6 - 8, 31)
B. Radical governments are still in a minority in Africa, but the state of mind reflected in radicalism is present throughout the continent. At the same time radicalism itself is changing as a consequence of the clash between its theories and practical realities. The trend is toward a blurring of present distinctions and a converging of the radical and moderate viewpoints, with many of the concepts of African radicalism playing an increasingly important role. (Para. 13)
C. Communist influence in both Guinea and Mali has been extensive. It has greatly influenced government organization, the dominant authoritarian parties, and the mass organizations characteristic of political life in both countries. The Communist countries have supplied Guinea since its break with France with the bulk of its aid from outside sources and have also assisted Mali, though the latter country has continued to receive roughly equal amounts from France. The foreign trade of both countries has been substantially reoriented toward the Bloc, although Mali continues to import heavily from the West. The two countries together have more Bloc advisers and technicians than all other sub-Saharan countries put together. (Paras. 9, 21 - 22, 25, 29 - 30, 35 - 37)
D. Nevertheless, Guinea and Mali have retained their freedom of action under President Sekou Toure and President Modibo Keita. Each heads a group within the dominant Political Bureau of his party which takes a generally flexible and pragmatic point of view, as opposed to the view of doctrinaire pro-Bloc elements. It appears likely that both Presidents will succeed, at least for the next year or two, in maintaining the dominance of their pragmatic approach, which seeks to maintain contacts with the West to balance those with the Bloc. Keita's position, however, is much less strong than Toure's. Over the past few months there has been in Guinea some disillusionment with Bloc assistance and mounting concern about the political wisdom of relying solely on the Bloc. Mali's reliance on the Bloc is likely to be balanced by continuing relations with the West. (Paras. 16, 33, 40 - 41)
E. The most significant thing about Guinea and Mali during the period since their independence is that, while they have offered the Bloc the best opportunities it has had in Africa, and while the Bloc has made a vigorous effort to take advantage of them, the two countries are not Communist and are, in fact, maintaining a more or less independent position. We believe that this experience is germane to African radicalism throughout the continent and may serve in a general way as a guide to its probable long-term attitudes, policies, and orientation. (Para. 42)
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
211. Position Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2160. Confidential. Drafted by Stoffel and cleared by McGhee, Lister, Russell, Wolfe, Ramsey, and FitzGerald. Prepared for Secretary Rusk's delegation attending the 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in September.
Washington, undated.
SOVIET BLOC AIR PENETRATION OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS: AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA
Recommended US Position
The United States hopes that all countries will take precautions against the dangers involved in permitting Soviet Bloc countries to use civil aviation as a means of subverting developing countries. Such penetration is especially dangerous when it takes the form of Soviet Bloc participation in local aviation enterprises (i.e., Ghana, Guinea, Mali), but is also undesirable and potentially dangerous when it consists merely of the operation of secure air routes by Aeroflot, CSA (Czechoslovakia) or other Bloc airlines (i.e., to Cuba, the west coast of Africa, the Sudan et cetera).
Anticipated Foreign Position
1. Developing countries need assistance in operating air services in order to develop the country or the region and the USSR is willing to provide such assistance.
2. Air transport rights are granted to western countries so neutralist countries must grant similar rights to the Bloc countries. Furthermore, Poland and Czechoslovakia (not the USSR) as members of ICAO and adherents to the Air Transit Agreement automatically have transit and non-traffic rights from many other member countries (including the United States) and so they cannot be denied at least non-traffic rights.
Discussion
Present Soviet Bloc Penetration
The Soviets are deeply involved in the air operations of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Ghana, in particular, has reportedly suffered high financial losses as the result of having too many (eight) expensive-to-operate Soviet turboprop aircraft.
The Czech airline has been flying to Egypt and down the west coast of Africa, as well as through Near, South, and Southeast Asia for some time. The Soviets have just concluded a series of air agreements with west Africa countries plus the Sudan. The latter agreement gives Aeroflot routes through eastern Africa to the Malagasy Republic, across central Africa to the west coast and beyond to Latin America.
The Czechs also have been flying to Cuba (by way of the U.K., Ireland, and Canada) for some time. Aeroflot is now beginning service to Cuba by way of Conakry, Guinea.
Future Penetration
The Soviets are likely to be active in many African countries seeking the rights that will allow them to flesh out the routes already obtained. Eventually they will have a permanent network of secure communications. (Had they had such a network two years ago, it might not have been so easy to eliminate them from the Congo.)
The Soviets have also publicized the fact that they want routes into, and through, the heart of South America. (Brazil, Bolivia, et cetera.)
Although we have been unable to keep the Soviets out of Africa, we want to make every effort to keep them out of South America. If the Latin American countries will cooperate, it should be possible to do so.
In the field of technical assistance, a Soviet offer to train Somali pilots has been accepted. Offers of modern Soviet aircraft have been made to Bolivia. Other aid offers will undoubtedly accompany the seeking of landing rights in Latin American countries.
212. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/9 - 2062. Confidential; Priority.
New York, September 20, 1962, 8 p.m.
831. For Secretary from Stevenson.
1. Because of generally negative posture we will be in during GA on Africa, I suspect you might want make special effort in your talks with key African FonMins here to impress on them that while we may have opposed some specific proposals in GA, US objectives in Africa remain unchanged and that we remain as committed as ever to liquidation of colonialism and racism and to early emergence of prosperous and independent African states. Our record re economic and political assistance to independent African states needs no documentation, but Africans know practically nothing about our private efforts to get Portuguese and South Africans and even UK when necessary to be more forthcoming. Perhaps you could usefully describe for some of them our arms control policies vis-a-vis South Africa and Portugal and even allude to other initiatives we have taken with the govts concerned.
2. A second point which you could usefully make would be that American warnings against sanctions reses and extreme language in UN comes not from any desire to protect status quo but from our conviction that such measures will not be successful either in obtaining changes in policy of colonial powers or in hastening the process; indeed they could even harden the attitude of powers involved. We believe political, legal and moral pressure is best course for immediate future. We have influence which can be used within this context; and we are prepared to cooperate with them in so doing.
3. It would also be useful, of course, to get across the point that the USSR has used the Comite of 17 /2/ for cold war purposes and that they and we should be removed next year.
/2/ The Committee of 17, otherwise known as the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was established by the U.N. General Assembly on November 27, 1961.
4. I may have some specific suggestions for your meetings later but thought it might be useful to call your attention to this general problem now.
Stevenson
213. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. No classification marking.
Washington, December 5, 1962.
Senator Ellender's remark that Africans do not have the ability to govern themselves /2/ has now been so widely disseminated by press and radio in Africa that prolonged damage to U.S. prestige is likely to result.
/2/ On December 1, at a press conference in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana said: ``My own government, of course, supports the United Nations efforts to make as many of the countries of Africa independent as desired to be, or happen to operate their own government. Now personally I wouldn't have any quarrel with that if those who are to operate the government were competent to do so and had the capability. But I've yet to come to any of them wherein that capability exists and for that reason I stated that the time for this change to independence is a little early, quite early." (Telegram 222 from Salisbury, December 4; Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12 - 462)
It is only a question of time before Communist Bloc propaganda exploits his comments fully.
In the long run we may well regain all we lose. However much depends upon our day-to-day prestige in the pulling and hauling that surrounds the Congo issue, the attempts by Nkrumah to force us out of Ghana and a number of less identifiable but equally serious situations related to African nationalism which are up for decision in the near future.
The State Department release has helped. The Agency is using all its resources. However more is needed. We suggest that Pierre Salinger give the press--on behalf of the White House--something along the lines of the attached. /3/
/3/ Attached but not printed. For text of the Department of State statement issued on December 4, see Department of State Bulletin, December 24, 1962, p. 961.
Ed Murrow
214. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Assistant Special Counsel (White) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Memoranda and Miscellaneous, 11/62 - 2/63. No classification marking.
Washington, December 17, 1962.
1. You may want to pass to the President the following. The group of Negro leaders he is seeing at 4:30 today are ostensibly coming to talk about Africa. /2/ In fact, according to Soapy Williams, their main purpose will be to talk about Negro representation in the State Department. Soapy will be talking with them at 2:00, and you might call before they come in to see the President.
/2/ President Kennedy met with Theodore E. Brown, Director of the Arden House Conference; James L. Farmer, Executive Director of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE); Dorothy Height, President of the Council of Negro Women; Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; A. Phillip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP; and Whitney M. Young, Executive Director of the National Urban League at 4:55 p.m. on December 17. (Ibid., President's Appointment Books) No memorandum of the conversation has been found.
2. If some facts on Africa are useful, here is a handful.
For this fiscal year we have approximately $1 million available for development loans in Africa and somewhat less than $1 million for development grants.
We have aid programs in 34 African countries. In addition, we will be shipping in about $20 million worth of PL 480 food into South Saharan Africa.
The Peace Corps has about 1500 people assigned or in training for African programs, of whom about 1100 are teachers. In Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Camerouns, the Peace Corps volunteers provide a very substantial proportion of the teaching force. Education is the largest single item in our development grant program as well, and took more than 1/3 of all the funds.
In addition, we have a major political investment in the Congo situation. We will have spent about $40 million in support of the UN operation, accounting for more than 1/3 of its total cost.
Carl Kaysen /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, 091.3 Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Junkermann and Sloan. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams.
Washington, February 15, 1963.
Dear Alex: The problem of U.S. military assistance programs in Africa generally has been giving us considerable concern here in Department of Defense for some time. I recognize that the swiftly emerging and changing character of the African states presents especially difficult problems; but it seems to me that our own internal indecision contributes unnecessarily to the difficulty. After many years of experience with military assistance programs, we should now be able to agree on certain guidelines to apply when these same old questions arise in new African states.
I would further say that we all can agree that experience has taught us at least the following basic facts:
(1) Military assistance programs must be tailored to fit each country and are not manageable by any sort of over-all ``regional" organization.
(2) New programs should not be encouraged except in cases where clear benefits can be foreseen; but once a decision in principle is made to provide assistance, it should be done promptly and vigorously or not at all.
(3) The program should not be attempted if the recipient state finds it politically or practically impossible to meet our criteria for administration, auditing, training and control; including the understanding that a military assistance program is not simply a gift of equipment but must be a program designed to accomplish specific internal security or defense aims, and extending over a period of time.
The U.S. desire to appear forthcoming to the developing states of Africa has apparently led us to make, or imply that we will make, military assistance commitments without a previous decision here that such a program is wise or without making plain our requirements of prospective recipients. It would also appear that no clear-cut policy has fully emerged concerning our attitude with reference to the metropoles of former colonial possessions. We are generally agreed, for example, that we would defer to the metropoles and hope they would carry the military assistance burden; but we have never decided what we should do in event the African state continues to press for assistance but the metropole ``voices objection" to our proceeding with a program.
The failure to profit from what we have learned over the years in other parts of the world, compounded by the failure to agree to a plan of action when we are caught between conflicting demands of metropoles and African states, have enmeshed us in many problems in the implementation of military assistance to Africa. I have attached some examples of such problems and also attached a draft Department of Defense position for implementation and administration of military assistance to Africa, /2/ which is designed to help correct some of the difficulties and deficiencies encountered and to establish a better basis for future programs.
/2/ Attached but not printed.
The primary concern is to satisfy U.S. objectives and administer the military assistance program in a manner which will reflect credit on the U.S. It is not only essential that these programs be conducted under procedures responsive to the intent and continuing surveillance of Congress, but also in the manner which experience has taught us will make them succeed. If new programs are unable to meet these criteria, then they should be rejected; if a program in existence cannot meet this test, it should be terminated as soon as possible and the funds utilized elsewhere. It seems to me that a full understanding and agreement on the part of all of us in the Government as to our objectives and methods could bring about a rapid solution to present African military assistance problems and preclude the same mistakes in the future.
Sincerely,
Paul H. Nitze /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Nitze signed the original.
216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Africa. Confidential.
Washington, February 25, 1963.
SUBJECT
Major Conclusions of Williams African Trip /2/
/2/ Result of visit to Algeria, Nigeria, Congo, Rhodesias and discussions with principal officers there and Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, Angola, RSAF, Mozambique, and Tanganyika. [Footnote in the source text. Williams visited Africa February 1 - 23.]
1. U.S. Congo policy has won us high esteem in all Africa except for European minorities in Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Republic of South Africa.
2. Southern Rhodesia is new African time bomb. If Nationalist aspirations do not get some hope and if Nationalists are not brought into constitutional dialogue instead of belligerent hostility, there will be major flare-up (after period of gestation).
3. Portuguese Africa will be under increasing pressure for self-determination from all independent Africa.
4. Nigerian development will grind to a slowdown if US and other aid does not soon start flowing significantly.
5. American policy must move imaginatively and quickly in these areas or our present prestige will suffer acute and rapid diminution.
6. PAFMECA /3/ promises to become an African association of considerable importance involving all East African countries from Ethiopia to Tanganyika and Congo (L), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. It will concern itself with black self-government in Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, and Southwest and South Africa.
[Here follow country summaries.]
/3/ The Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) held its first conference at Mwanza, Tanganyika, September 17, 1958.
217. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Dungan) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Dungan, Ralph A., 1/63 - 5/63. No classification marking.
Washington, March 6, 1963.
SUBJECT
Aid to Africa
Following your discussion with General Clay on Tuesday, I thought you might be interested in this breakdown of the 1963 AID program for Africa:
Countries receiving less than $1.0 million (obligations/authorizations)
| Mauritania | Malagasy Republic |
| Burundi | Dahomey |
| Rwanda | Chad |
| Congo (Brazzaville) | Togo |
| Central African Republic | Upper Volta |
| Zanzibar | Cameroon |
| Algeria |
Countries receiving between $1.0 million and $10.0 million
| Niger | Kenya |
| Gabon | Uganda |
| Senegal | Ivory Coast |
| Congo (Leopoldville) | Guinea |
| Rhodesia & Nyasaland | Somali Republic |
| Sierra Leone | Ghana |
| Mali |
Countries receiving more than $10.0 million
| Sudan | $10.8 million |
| Tanganyika | 12.3 |
| Libya | 12.9 |
| Ethiopia | 13.8 |
| Liberia | 21.2 |
| Morocco | 23.5 |
| Tunisia | 39.4 |
| Nigeria | 53.8 |
Total |
$187.7 million |
The 1963 total for Africa is $252.2 million. The eight countries receiving more than $10.0 million account for 74.5% of this total. The 26 countries receiving less than $10.0 account for an aggregate of $54.2 million or 21.5%. The remainder--$10.1 million (4%) is for regional programs and expenses.
RAD
218. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 2226, Strategic Importance of Africa. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Colonel Howard C. Junkermann, USAF, to Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Robinson, Defense Intelligence Agency, Commander H.A. Cummings, Department of the Navy, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Tanassy, Department of the Air Force, and J.J. Blake, Department of the Army. Junkermann indicated that the paper was drafted by Fred Greene, and would be used as a basis for discussion at a forthcoming conference to be held at Georgetown University on May 25. No record of the group's discussion has been found.
Washington, undated.
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA
Working Paper for Discussion Group Meeting May 25, 1963
Abstract
From a global perspective Africa is not an area of primary strategic importance to the US, and we therefore have a strong interest in restricting our involvement in Africa. Nonetheless, we have a considerable number of specific interests and commitments there in whose service we might have to undertake serious and extensive burdens.
Our military and technological needs include: (1) bases in support of our readiness posture; (2) transit and supply points for efforts in the Middle East; (3) overflight and landing rights to implement contingency plans in sub-Saharan Africa; (4) facilities in support of space and missile programs; (5) communications and intelligence facilities; (6) essential raw materials. In general, we will require more military and space facilities in Africa over the next decade, but they will be more difficult to obtain.
Our minimum political interests are: (1) to keep Africa free of Communist regimes and to minimize Sino - Soviet influence; (2) to restrain violence in general and preserve the present territorial order as the most feasible alternative to chaos; (3) to prevent violent racial confrontations; and (4) to prevent or control situations of internal chaos similar to the Congo. We have general commitments to act under the UN Charter and specific defense commitments to Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Liberia.
Our interests sometimes conflict with each other. There is a basic conflict between our requirements and our desire to limit commitments, which will presumably be resolved on an ad hoc basis. There are a number of more specific conflicts as well, e.g., between our desire to work with our NATO allies and the difficulty of agreeing with them on fundamental common interests in Africa; and between our desire to draw close to states that show promise of regional leadership and the domestic problems this creates for moderate regimes.
We require a basic point of departure which gives proper balance to political and military considerations in light of our overall African posture and which establishes principles for determining future courses of action in response both to our immediate needs and longer-range interests.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
219. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Sherry, cleared by Hadsel, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bamako, Bangui, Benghazi, Tripoli, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Fort Lamy, Freetown, Kampala, Khartoum, Kigali, Lagos, Leopoldville, Libreville, Lome, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Cape Town, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tunis, Usumbura, Yaounde, and Zanzibar.
Washington, May 28, 1963, 6:41 p.m.
2032. Dept not planning make comprehensive public statement on Addis Conference /2/ this time, although senior Dept officials will probably be called upon comment. Following summarizes Dept's preliminary assessment Conference. You may use this material in conversations with officials and other responsible personalities, but should not give statements to the press.
/2/ The Summit Conference of Independent African States met in Addis Ababa May 22 - 25. For text of President Kennedy's message to the African Heads of State at the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 417. The Presidential message was sent to Emperor Haile Selassie, Chairman of the conference, who read it at the opening session. (Telegram 605 to Addis Ababa, May 17; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH)
Dept regards Conference and its outcome as remarkable achievement in that leaders managed in four days agree on certain basic issues despite personal rivalries and serious differences in approach. They adopted charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU), refusing to accept postponement as recommended by Foreign Ministers. Resolutions they adopted also reflected search for workable compromises, but may create problems for U.S. Dept therefore not prepared give unqualified endorsement to resolutions.
A. OAU Charter: Signed by 30 countries present with Morocco and Togo probably to adhere later; provides for assembly Heads of State meeting annually, Foreign Ministers Council meeting twice a year, permanent Secretariat with limited powers (no SYG yet, probable location Addis), and Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. There is no parliamentary assembly and charter contains no collective security provisions. Based on Ethiopian draft and resembles OAS Charter. It is, in Dept's view, a realistic agreement in terms present African capabilities.
B. Resolutions:
1. Racism--Condemned racial discrimination everywhere, particularly in US, but coupled this with appreciation for efforts US Gov't end discriminatory practices which otherwise likely cause serious deterioration in relations between US and Africa. This probably as good a resolution as could be expected. More moderate than earlier Foreign Ministers draft and significantly includes recognition and understanding role US Gov't.
2. Decolonization--Great powers urged cease aid colonialist governments, particularly Portugal which engaging genocide. Other references to Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa. Committee of 9 established at Dar es Salaam to raise funds and coordinate activities for liberation remaining dependent areas. Member states called upon develop local volunteers to provide assistance to national liberation movements. However, proposed fund of 1% national budgets OAU countries for liberation not adopted. UK Ambassador, Addis, believes UK can live with Southern Rhodesia resolution. Pressure on US increased by declaration that Portuguese allies must choose friendship of Portugal or Africa. Although resolution appears to call for economic boycott South Africa by all governments, effect this resolution still not clear.
3. Disarmament--Africa declared denuclearized zone. Great powers called upon sign disarmament agreement with effective controls and reduce arms. Expressed willingness African countries negotiate end military occupation, bases and nuclear testing in Africa. Moderation these resolutions encouraging in that need for disarmament controls recognized and willingness negotiate on removal bases expressed. Effect on tenure US installations North Africa and Ethiopia remains to be seen.
4. Apartheid--Fund set up for anti-apartheid movement.
5. Non-alignment--Doctrine given general support but need for payment UN obligations affirmed and better representation in UN requested.
6. Role of African Leaders:
a. Haile Selassi (Ethiopia): Prestige high, Nkrumah called him ``Ethiopia the Wise"; good lobbyist; demonstrated high organizational ability.
b. Nkrumah (Ghana): Usual mixture extreme and sensible statements. He failed get his views adopted, although outcome Conference owed much to his dedication African unity.
c. Balewa (Nigeria): Critically important; turned Wachuku from obstructionism to positive work on charter; good influence; respected.
d. Nyerere (Tanganyika): Established himself as African with continental influence.
e. Nasser (UAR): Avoided controversy; tried to be good African.
f. Ben Bella (Algeria): Strong activist on decolonization; won approval sub-Saharans.
g. Keita (Mali) and Toure (Guinea): Reasonable and moderate.
h. Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and Senghor (Senegal): Confirmed their reputations as veteran parliamentarians.
i. Obote (Uganda): Sought to be disciple of Nkrumah.
Some of above subjects may be too controversial or ambiguous for comment in local context. These probably include gamut anti-colonialist activities rooted in new charter, probable South African boycott, and explicit anti-Portuguese resolutions. You should, of course, avoid comment these aspects Conference results and any others which in your judgment inadvisable in our particular situation.
You should also, as opportunity arises, offer congratulations US Gov't on success of Conference to leaders who participated, tailoring approbation leader's particular role both to objective assessment his accomplishments and attitude his gov't to value of Conference.
Comment on economic aspects Conference to follow.
Request you report reaction local government to Conference.
Rusk
220. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Africa, 1963. Secret.
JCSM - 416 - 63 Washington, May 31, 1963.
SUBJECT
Proposed Regular Scheduled Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Flights Throughout Africa
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have held for some time that the United States should develop and maintain the capability of conducting small or large-scale military air transport operations in support of US national security policy objectives in Africa. This will require arrangements for operating rights, servicing and supporting facilities, and aircrew familiarity in the area on a continuing basis.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the establishment of regularly scheduled MATS operations throughout Africa is the most effective method of achieving this capability. Furthermore, they believe that such action is desirable at this time for the following reasons:
a. A series of contingency plans involving 39 African nations has been developed to support US national security objectives, e.g., MATS OPLAN 133/62 supports CINCLANT OPLAN 330/61 and JTF - Four OPLAN 330/61. The establishment of MATS routes will enhance the capability to execute these plans, should the need arise.
b. The very substantial assistance (made possible by US military airlift resources) which the United States has recently rendered African nations, as well as other underdeveloped nations throughout the world, has created a favorable image of the United States, demonstrating the advantages accruing to cooperating nations through the maintenance of a MATS operation in their areas.
c. The Soviet Bloc civil air offensive in Africa, designed primarily to enhance Bloc capabilities for subversion, intelligence collection, and airlift in support of such operations, is a matter of increasing concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
d. US Government activities in Africa are expanding at a rapid rate. In many instances, commercial air service provided by US flag carriers to or near these locations is inadequate or nonexistent. At the same time, sufficient airlift requirements have been generated by the presence of State Department, MAAG, AID, USIA, CIA, and NASA personnel to justify the establishment of a MATS channel traffic route, the operational costs of which might be absorbed by selective adjustments to the Industrial Fund point-to-point tariff rates. It will not be necessary under this funding concept to designate a sponsoring agency.
3. The extension of MATS routes into Africa could, under some circumstances, encounter political problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel, however, that these problems can be overcome by pointing out to African governments the advantages to be gained from the initiation of such air service. Extension of MATS routes into Africa would facilitate the support of US technical, economic, and military assistance programs in the countries concerned. Also, the establishment of MATS service would enable the United States to respond to the contingency needs of African nations and the United Nations on a timely and orderly basis.
4. The most feasible concept for the establishment of scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa at this time appears to be to provide regular air service to various US Embassies on that continent. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed an illustrative plan, attached hereto as the Appendix. /2/
/2/ Not attached to the source text.
5. The initial step in implementing this plan should be the conduct of a thorough route and site survey to identify and resolve the problems inherent in any operation of this type, including determination of the traffic loads and requirements of the user agencies. It is anticipated such a survey can be completed within four months after authorization. In the light of the findings, and to accommodate specific requirements, as may be determined in consultation with the Department of State, the plan can be modified, changed in scope, or made flexible as to itinerary. Definitive requirements for overflight/landing rights and rights for positioning support personnel and equipment will be based on the result of the survey and the needs of interested agencies.
6. Implementation of this plan will not result in the stationing of large numbers of additional US military personnel in Africa. Other than at the initial entry point, such as Wheelus AFB, Libya, or Torrejon, Spain, where US military presence already is established, and the mid-route support base, where a total of not more than ten MATS personnel will be required, the plan calls for the introduction of only two US military personnel per stop. These numbers may be adjusted as contractual arrangements mature. The political disadvantages resulting from an increased US military presence in politically sensitive countries thus will be avoided.
7. Experience indicates that the annual costs of the operation envisaged would be around $1.75 million. Based on estimated airlift requirements, the anticipated traffic revenues are expected to offset initially about 65%, or $1.13 million of these costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that any deficit which may accrue, now estimated at about $620 thousand, might be absorbed by selective adjustments to the Industrial Fund point-to-point tariff rates charged all DOD and other users of MATS airlift. They consider that such adjustments to the Industrial Fund tariff rates, as may be required to support these operations in the initial stages, are justified by the national security policy considerations involved. Neither an increase in total MATS aircraft nor in the total objective flying hour utilization program will result.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve in principle the attached plan for conducting regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa. They also request that you approve the conduct, in the near future, of a route survey which will provide the basis for a fuller examination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the feasibility of the proposed routes and their economic implications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that you raise this matter with the Secretary of State, in the context of the Department of State letter of 2 March 1961, in order to obtain his concurrence and cooperation. /3/
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor /4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/3/ On June 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs proposal to establish regularly scheduled MATS flights throughout Africa was transmitted under cover of a letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Kitchen. Bundy noted that the Department of State had refused a similar request in March 1961 on grounds that not enough advantages would accrue to the countries concerned to justify U.S. requests, but argued that in the ensuing period U.S. Government activities had expanded to a sufficient degree to overcome the previous political objections. He requested Department of State approval for the conduct of a route survey which would provide the basis for further examination of the feasibility and economic implications for MATS operations in Africa. (Ibid.)
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
221. Editorial Note
On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent a Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pages 483 - 496. On the same day, the Department of State sent a series of instructions and information messages to all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, which included messages from President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk as well as a background summary of U.S. civil rights accomplishments. The President's and the Secretary's messages asked U.S. Ambassadors and principal officers to discuss civil rights with foreign governments with candor, but also to affirm U.S. accomplishments and to highlight the positive commitment set by the President toward the goal of equal opportunity for all. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa)
On July 8, Deputy Special Assistant to the President Carl Kaysen transmitted a copy of the Department of State's ``Status Report of African Reactions to Civil Rights in the United States" to Kennedy, noting that the report was a roundup of African reactions to the President's civil rights messages and the related material sent out to the Embassies. The evaluation section of the report stated: ``Responses from African posts indicate that ensuing direct diplomatic approaches at the highest levels produced a greater understanding of United States efforts and that the approaches were appreciated. The nuances of US federal impediments to progress were more greatly appreciated than before, but still not comprehensively so. By contrast, the President's words and the President's actions were clearly understood and appreciated. Several posts report that this sympathetic understanding of the President's actions by African leaders overlays a latent, unexpressed concern by both officials and the public which could become articulate if the situation worsens." (Ibid.)
222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR - US. Confidential. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews.
Washington, November 23, 1963.
SUBJECT
Current Key Issues Affecting Our Relations with Africa
Our actions during the next few months on the following current, key issues affecting Africa will be anxiously awaited and carefully assessed by the Africans as indicators of the direction of United States policy under President Johnson. /2/
/2/ Lyndon B. Johnson became President after President Kennedy's assassination on November 22.
Civil Rights in the United States
Our greatest asset in dealing with the Africans has been their conviction that President Kennedy's Administration was committed to eliminating racial discrimination in this country. The Africans will be looking for early reassurance in both word and deed that the new Administration is equally committed. Passage this year of the civil rights legislation now pending in the Congress would be a major triumph in United States relations with Africa.
Presidential Diplomacy
President Kennedy had established close personal relations with many African leaders including such militant nationalists as Ben Bella of Algeria, Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea. These relations enabled the late President to apply personal influence on a number of African problems. By deciding to utilize his responses to messages of condolences to emphasize the continuity of United States policy, President Johnson will signal to Africa his willingness to assume these personal relations. The President could further evidence his intentions in connection with Kenya's impending independence on December 12 by designating the Attorney General to head the United States Delegation to the independence celebrations and by receiving Prime Minister Ken-yatta when the latter comes to the United States on the occasion of Kenya's admission to the United Nations. The inclusion of African leaders (e.g. President Azikiwe of Nigeria) in the 1964 program of state and official visits would also serve the same purpose.
South Africa
Despite efforts to prevent it, we may be faced in next few days with a critical choice in the United Nations Security Council of (a) abstaining and thereby possibly permitting adoption of an anticipated Afro - Asian resolution of sanctions against South Africa (probably including oil embargo) or (b) casting our first veto in the United Nations on a racial issue. It is of utmost importance that we should not choose the veto which would be interpreted as a major shift of United States policy by the new Administration. We have already lost heavily in United Nations influence by taking the lead in seeking to moderate resolutions aimed at South Africa. The United Kingdom, which has much more at stake in South Africa than the United States, must, if necessary, bear the onus of casting the veto if that is the only way out.
Portuguese Africa
African pressures for progress toward self-determination in Portuguese Africa are becoming stronger and, in terms of votes in the United Nations, more effective. The United States finds it increasingly difficult to play a moderating role between Portugal and the Africans. The latter will shortly place before the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Portuguese Africa which will again bring this problem to the fore. Additionally, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly has invited Henrique Galvao, the hijacker of the Portuguese vessel Santa Maria, to appear before it. Portugal has indicated it will request Galvao's extradition as a criminal. Our posture on the African resolutions and our handling of the Galvao problem will be closely examined by the Africans for clues as to the new Administration's position on African nationalism.
Guinea
Guinea is the only African country which went almost all the way to the Bloc and then broke with the Bloc and is moving steadily toward closer relations with the United States. Its government has planned to send a Ministerial delegation to the United States in December to seek economic assistance following the beginning of a retreat from extreme socialism, so as to enable it to continue the healthy liberal economic trend. Since the prestige of President Toure and the moderates in his Government depends on the results of this visit, it is important that we be as responsive as possible to their requests.
Algeria - Morocco
A fragile cease-fire exists along the border between these two North African states. An African solution worked out in meetings at Bamako and Addis Ababa appears to have a reasonable chance to succeed in maintaining the peace. The United States role has been one of impartial efforts to reduce outside intervention and to encourage a solution in an African context. President Kennedy personally intervened to these ends. Should fighting break out again, the ramifications could be serious and prompt United States action, including Presidential messages, may be necessary.
Horn of Africa
The aim of the Somali Republic to unite Somalis living in Ethiopia and Kenya has created serious tension in this area. It is further complicated by Somali acceptance of an offer of Soviet military assistance--an evidence of the persisting Soviet intention to probe targets of opportunity in Africa. President Kennedy in talks with the Emperor of Ethiopia in October emphasized our interest in stability and peace in this area. Our interests justify pursuing actively efforts to find a modus vivendi between Somalia and its neighbors and to reduce the impact of the obvious Soviet interest in fishing in these troubled waters.
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