Documents 223-253
Ghana
223. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/2 - 1761. Confidential. Drafted by Eisenberg and cleared by Ferguson, Kenney, and Kerr.
Washington, February 17, 1961.
SUBJECT
The Volta River and Related Projects
The Government of Ghana obtained in 1960 tentative assurances from the U.S. Government, the World Bank, and the UK to assist in the financing of the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. /2/ Of the total cost of $168 million, Ghana would finance 50 percent, the World Bank $40 million, DLF and Exim Bank $30 million and the UK $14 million. Foreign financing is dependent on satisfactory arrangements for the financing of the proposed Valco aluminum smelter which is to be the main purchaser of Volta River power.
/2/ See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIV, pp. 657 - 669.
The Government of Ghana is now sending a delegation headed by Minister of Finance Gbedemah to Washington with the objective of working out the details of the contracts under which World Bank and U.S. financing of the hydroelectric project would be made available. They also want to finalize the draft of the tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana which is necessary to permit satisfactory operation of Valco.
Valco (Volta Aluminum Company) is being organized by Kaiser, Alcoa, Reynolds and Olin Mathieson. The total cost of the smelter will be $128 or $178 million according to the size of the smelter to be built. In view of what they believe are unacceptable political risks for private investment in Ghana, given the present pro-Soviet and anti-U.S. policies of the Government of Ghana, these four companies are now asking the U.S. Government for guarantees against all but the commercial risks of the Valco project.
The U.S. Government is also being asked by a group of aluminum companies headed by Aluminum Ltd. of Canada and including Kaiser and Reynolds, to guarantee against all but commercial risks a major part of a $162 million investment in the Boke Bauxite Mine in Guinea. Finally, the U.S. Government has offered last year to update a French made study of a dam on the Konkoure River in Guinea and to participate in the financing of this project. This would involve construction of an aluminum smelter.
There is general agreement among Washington officials who have studied the problem that strong political and economic reasons speak in favor of U.S. Government support of the construction of the Volta Dam and of the aluminum companies engaged in the Valco project and the Boke project. It is recognized that a refusal to aid the Volta Project or a withdrawal of the aluminum companies from the Valco smelter would have very undesirable effect on Western relations with Ghana. In the case of Boke, a withdrawal of the Western aluminum companies project would make it possible for the Soviets to create an extremely efficient aluminum production on the basis of what is considered the richest bauxite mine in the world and of the very cheap water power potential of the Konkoure River.
On the other hand, U.S. guarantees in unprecedented far-reaching terms of the aluminum projects in Ghana and Guinea can only be justified if the terms of investment are such as to give some promise of continued operation. Little permanent benefit can be derived for the U.S. from the Valco and Boke projects unless we make our support of these projects part of a wider program designed to assist the economic growth of West Africa. We also must attempt to create a situation under which it will be more advantageous for the Governments of Ghana and Guinea, politically and economically, to permit these enterprises to continue their operations under Western control rather than to nationalize them. The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs has called for February 21 a meeting of the heads of Exim Bank, ICA, DLF and of the interested Assistant Secretaries in State and Treasury to work out a policy along these lines. /3/
/3/ A handwritten notation on the source text reads: ``W B will give a report on the results."
224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3 - 761. No classification marking. Drafted by Toomey on March 6 and cleared by Penfield, Cleveland, Bell, Kohler, and Nitze. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: ``hand carried to WH by AF/Penfield 3/7/61 per R Perkins."
Washington, March 7, 1961.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting With President Nkrumah of Ghana
You have agreed to meet with President Nkrumah of Ghana on Wednesday, March 8 at 4:45 p.m. Mr. James K. Penfield, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and I will join you for the meeting. /2/
/2/ A line crossed out in the source text at this point reads: ``The Chief of Protocol, Mr. Duke, will introduce President Nkrumah."
Unfortunately, I was unable to talk privately with Ghana's Finance Minister Gbedemah during his visit to Washington last week. Members of his entourage managed to be present at both our meetings. /3/ However, other officers of the Department did discuss general conditions in Ghana with the Minister. Following much the same tack as he did in the conversation with your brother Edward /4/ in Accra on December 12, 1960, Mr. Gbedemah urged the United States to be more aggressive or it would lose out in Africa. He deplored the progress that the Soviets have already made in Ghana and said that he was finding it increasingly difficult to make his voice heard. In a final conversation with Mr. Penfield on the evening of his departure, Mr. Gbedemah pleaded that you seize the opportunity of your meeting with President Nkrumah to review with complete frankness the various points of misunderstanding between us. We agree completely with Mr. Gbedemah and suggest you take the conversational initiative at the outset and raise the various matters discussed in the attached talking papers. Nkrumah should depart with no misconceptions on our firm support of the UN in the Congo, and with the clear understanding that while we are prepared to cooperate in every possible way to assist Ghana in its development we expect equitable treatment in return.
/3/ Ghana's Finance Minister, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, discussed the Volta River Project with Secretary Rusk on February 28 and March 3. The discussions were recorded in two memoranda of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, 845J.26/3 - 361.
/4 /Edward M. Kennedy.
Our conversations with Minister of Finance Gbedemah last week were very successful and have created an aura of good feeling you may well wish to exploit during your conversation with President Nkrumah. Mr. Gbedemah will have reported fully on this matter to Nkrumah in New York. A detailed status report on the Volta Project is attached. /5/
/5/ Not printed.
Our past experience with Nkrumah has been that in private meetings with U.S. officials he adopts a conciliatory and receptive posture; but, all too frequently, he subsequently reverses himself and speaks critically of the West. If Nkrumah can leave Washington with no illusions as to the firmness of our policies and a clear understanding of what we expect of Ghana if our relations are to improve, we will have made a great stride forward. I would suggest an appropriate communique be issued following your meeting, tone and content of course depending on progress made during the discussion.
It should be noted that the attached briefing papers /6/ were prepared prior to President Nkrumah's arrival in New York. Should he make new and significant policy statements during his talk with Ambassador Stevenson on Monday, March 6, or in his speech before the UNGA, we may provide you with supplementary briefing material.
Dean Rusk /7/
/6/ Attached to the source text but not printed. Briefing papers for Nkrumah's visit are ibid. and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana - Nkrumah Visit.
/7/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
225. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/3 - 861. Secret. Drafted by Penfield on March 9 and approved by the White House on March 21. The conversation was held at the White House.
Washington, March 8, 1961.
SUBJECT
Summary Record of Conversation--Visit of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. J. K. Penfield, Acting Asst. Secretary, AF
Ghana
President Kwame Nkrumah
Hon. A.E.A. Ofori-Atta, Min. of Justice
Hon. Tawiah Adamafio, Min. for Establishment
The bulk of the conversation consisted of a monologue on the Congo and related topics by President Nkrumah, punctuated by occasional questions by the President and the Secretary. President Nkrumah seemed to go out of his way to minimize his differences of view with the United States position. For instance, on his proposal to withdraw diplomatic missions from Leopoldville he said, ``why not give it a try? Let them get out for just a month and see if it doesn't make a difference." (At this point Mr. Adamafio made his only contribution to the conversation, murmuring, ``three months.")
Mr. Nkrumah's comments were somewhat rambling and at times repetitious, but he concentrated on two phases of the situation, restoration of law and order, with emphasis on removal of the Belgians, and isolation of the Congo from all outside influences except the UN.
On the first, he expressed the conviction that the indiscipline and terrible excesses of the ``Force Publique" could quickly and easily be controlled if Belgian military and para-military personnel were removed and the UN made ``just a show of force." He illustrated his point by asserting that the Ghanaian troops in the Kasai had stopped the Gizenga forces at Luluabourg and had then persuaded all the forces there to lay down their arms. He at first maintained that even in Katanga removal of the Belgians should not be too difficult but did not contest the President's explanation of the limitations on United States ability to influence our European allies, Belgium, Portugal or the French on Algeria.
On the UN role, President Nkrumah played down his Afro - Asian ideas and emphasized his support of the UN. He expressed approval of the February 21 Security Council resolution /2/ and said he had made it clear he did not want his UN speech of March 7 to be used as a pretext for reopening a Congo debate. He felt that practically all Afro - Asian states supported Hammarskjold and said he had told Mr. Gromyko in New York that the Soviets should give up their campaign to force him out. He agreed with the President's expression of hope that more general support of the Secretary General would be manifested because if the United States was too far out in front in backing him there was a tendency in some quarters to pin a U.S. label on him. President Nkrumah implied that his support of the UN has been consistent. He said, for instance, that he had stood alone at the Casablanca Conference /3/ against withdrawal of troops from the UN force and had finally succeeded in forcing a compromise under which the participants agreed to await developments for a month before making a decision on withdrawing their contingents. He expressed approval of the work of the CAC and disapproval of a Security Council meeting in the Congo until the situation there has considerably improved. He was very relaxed about U.S. activities in the Congo and said he saw no objection to U.S. planes and ships operating there as long as they were under UN command.
/2/ For text of U.N. Resolution S/4722, ``United Nations Security Council Authorization of Measures, Including the Use of Force, If Necessary, In the Last Resort, to Prevent the Occurrence of Civil War in the Congo" adopted on February 21 by a vote of 9 (including the United States) to 0, with 2 abstentions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 782 - 784.
/3/ The Casablanca Conference constituting the Heads of State of Morocco, United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali and representatives of the Provisional Algerian Government, Libya, and Ceylon met in Casablanca January 3 - 7, 1961.
On the internal political situation President Nkrumah said he had little hope for constructive results from the Tananarive Conference /4/ because the Congolese participating could not take any meaningful decisions which would stick. He expressed some contempt for Gizenga's abilities and suitability as a leader but said he is no Communist. He made no comments on other Congolese politicians except a rather casual remark that Kamitatu is a genuine nationalist who might emerge as a real leader. He mentioned elections and the reconvening of Parliament as necessary steps in Congolese political development but appeared very flexible on details, placing his emphasis on the principle that the Congolese themselves should be free to work things out in their own way.
/4/ The Conference of Congolese Authorities met in Tananarive March 8 - 12, 1961.
In summary, the two Presidents found themselves in agreement on three principal points on the Congo, (1) removal of Belgian military and para-military personnel, (2) neutralization of Congolese military forces and insulation of the Congo against outside influences and military supplies, and (3) freedom for the Congolese to work out their own political development. On the last point the Secretary called attention to our own history to illustrate the importance we attach to the principle that government must be based on consent of the governed. In addition to examples from our early history he cited our important role in assisting Indonesian independence and President Roosevelt's heavy pressure on Churchill, even while we were allies in a world war, in regard to India. There should be no doubt, therefore, in any reasonable mind, that the U.S. would always be basically, and in the long run effectively, on the side of anti-colonialism and independence, whether the problem is Portugal and Angola or France and Algeria or any other.
President Nkrumah exhibited no desire to talk about U.S. - Ghana bilateral relations and at one point turned off the Secretary's attempt to bring up the Volta project. President Nkrumah did, however, make the point that the U.S. should broaden its view of Africa and look at the continent as a whole, a subject which he said he had raised when he was here in 1958. /5/ The President took this opportunity to explain the difficulties we face in Africa. He cited the resentment inspired in ``colonialist" circles by Governor Williams' alleged statement on ``Africa for the Africans" in Nairobi /6/ and pointed out that despite this, Governor Williams had been given an unfriendly reception by the press in Lagos. The President also expressed his surprise and puzzlement over receipt of a recent personal message from Sekou Toure accusing him of complicity in Lumumba's murder. President Nkrumah seemed sympathetic but offered no very specific advice or comment.
/5/ For documentation on Nkrumah's visit to Washington, July 23 - 26, 1958, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIV, pp. 645 - 652.
/6/ On February 21, Williams told reporters at the Nairobi airport: ``America's declared policy of Africa for the Africans means that African people should have self-determination at the speed they want. As far as we are concerned, this is true of the Rhodesian Federation and South Africa." The Assistant Secretary subsequently explained that by Africans he meant Africans of all races. (Telegram 36 from Capetown, February 23, and telegram 493 from Nairobi, February 23; both Department of State, Central Files, 110.15 - WI/2 - 2361)
President Nkrumah also made a particular plea to avoid confusing Communism and nationalism in Africa. He said he was told in New York yesterday by an East African who has recently been making speeches in the United States that whenever the speaker mentioned him (Nkrumah) or Sekou Toure favorably, he was accused by his audience of being a Communist. President Nkrumah emphatically insisted that there is not a single organized Communist party in sub-Saharan Africa. He explained that Ghana practices its own form of socialism which is in reality a mixed economy. To illustrate his problems he said the Government has for some years been subsidizing five British gold mines in Ghana. He could not continue this but neither could he permit the mines to close because of the unemployment problems which would be created. In the end, therefore, the Government had bought up the shares.
On the subject of aid, President Nkrumah's only substantive comment was that aid from the East is much more speedy and simple than that from the West. He gave as an example his efforts to get transportation for Ghanaian troops to the Congo last summer. When he had exhausted all other means he appealed to the Soviet Ambassador and in three days Soviet planes were at his disposal in Accra.
226. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Springsteen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/5 - 1661. Confidential. Drafted by Springsteen. Copies were sent to Williams, Linder (Export-Import Bank), and Coffin (DLF).
Washington, May 16, 1961.
SUBJECT
Volta - Valco
On May 15 Mr. Ball discussed with the President the question of proceeding with financing for the subject complex. He indicated that it was our view, in the light of recent political developments in Ghana, /2/ that Mr. Black of the IBRD should be urged to proceed to Accra to consult with and obtain the necessary financial assurances from Nkrumah, as suggested by our Embassy, on this activity.
/2/ Telegram 1288 from Accra, May 4, reported that Nkrumah had increasingly pursued a line of action that had put him into alignment with the Soviet bloc on a series of issues. Ghana's policy in Africa and in the United Nations had been closely aligned with the Soviets. Within the past month, Ghana had secretly received a large shipment of Soviet bloc arms. Nkrumah had also been working steadily toward an authoritarian state with power more tightly in his hands. The Embassy still favored going ahead with Volta, but recommended that the agreements not be finalized until after Nkrumah's forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union in order to see how far he intended to go in agreements and statements with the Soviets. (Ibid., 845J.2614/5 - 461)
The President endorsed this suggestion.
Mr. Ball has requested that you proceed to talk to the IBRD about the Black visitation to Ghana. /3/ Mr. Ball has also agreed that the ExIm Bank should be requested to undertake negotiations with the Valco people on the loan for that project, it being understood that the finalization of these negotiations would be contingent upon satisfactory findings by Mr. Black.
/3/ On June 21, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Eugene Black, met with Under Secretary Ball to discuss the Ghanaian Ambassador's request that the signing of the Volta and Valco agreements be accelerated in order to permit President Nkrumah to make an announcement on July 1, Ghana's Republic Day. Referring to Ball's suggestion in May that he personally go to Ghana and talk with Nkrumah, Black indicated that he was prepared to go, but argued that his visit would be more effective once the agreement had been signed. (Memorandum of conversation, June 21; ibid., 845J.394/6 - 2161)
In light of the above, Mr. Ball does not believe that the Bank should invite the Ghanians to come here to negotiate until after Mr. Black's visit.
227. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/6 - 2961. Confidential.
Washington, June 29, 1961.
Dear Mr. President: I was glad to receive your letter regarding the selection of a Chief Executive for the Volta River Authority. /2/ I think it was an excellent idea to ask Prime Minister Diefenbaker to propose a candidate. We have been in touch with our Canadian friends, and I am advised that the Prime Minister is giving this problem his personal attention and hopes to be able to suggest a suitable candidate soon.
/2/ On June 19, Ambassador Halm delivered a personal message from President Nkrumah to President Kennedy which stated that since basic agreement had been reached about the Volta River Project, it had become urgently necessary to appoint a Chief Executive for the Volta River Authority. Nkrumah noted that he had sent a personal message to the Canadian Prime Minister asking him to propose a candidate, if possible. (Ibid., 845J.2614/ 6 - 1961)
I have asked my advisers to try to develop some alternative suggestions in the event that others do not prove available. At the same time, we have been in touch with Mr. Eugene Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and I know that he is continuing to look over the field for possible candidates.
I am delighted to be able to advise you that all major issues involved in negotiations for the United States Government's share of the financing of the dam and smelter have now been resolved. The United States Government representatives are now working with your representatives here to develop the necessary documentation for signature and final closing.
Of course, as we all appreciate, our signing is contingent upon your bringing your negotiations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to a successful conclusion.
It is a source of satisfaction to me that we have been able to join with your Government in helping to make this great project possible. It is a good omen that this major initial step has been accomplished during the first year of your Republic and it is a satisfaction to me that this was achieved during the first year of my Administration. I send you my congratulations on Republic Day and my sincere hope for the continued progress of your nation.
With kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
JFK /3/
/3/ Kennedy's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Kennedy signed the original.
228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/7 - 2761. Confidential. Drafted by Kenney, cleared by Padberg, and approved by Kerr.
Washington, August 4, 1961, 8:34 p.m.
143. Embtel 141. /2/ World Bank has accepted GOG letter re financial policy. Dept. has not seen text but assumes GOG committed to consult re level debt service and development expenditures without fixing absolute ceilings. Agreement was based on Kaldor's suggested formula that debt service be related to level exports and development expenses to GNP. Kaldor departed prior conclusion of talks leaving Gbedemah in charge.
/2/ Telegram 141 from Accra, July 17, reported that the Ghanaian - IBRD talks in Washington on the Bank's financing for the Volta Project seemed to have been successful, and that the Government of Ghana was planning to present a side letter describing Ghana's level of economic development and rate of debt repayment in terms that would satisfy the Bank. (Ibid.)
World Bank did not insist on set aside GOG's share of financing, but President Black thought GOG would be wise set aside foreign exchange component. Gbedemah agreed and said total would be appropriated and be first charge from Consolidated Fund. Set aside of about G# 10 - 15 million from existing foreign exchange reserves will be drawn only if current earnings insufficient to cover. Bank accepted this. FYI. Bank has not previously required such set-aside from other borrowers, but in this case GOG (Gbedemah) had made offer. Kaldor had indicated to us earlier such arrangement would be acceptable and no reason to believe any differences to be resolved on GOG side. End FYI.
Remaining issues concern current negotiations Valco loan by ExImBank. Target date for comprehensive signing now August 29. /3/
/3/ An investment guaranty contract providing substantial protection for the proposed equity investment in Valco by Kaiser Aluminum and Reynolds Metals was initialed by representatives of the Development Loan Fund and the investors on September 1. The Executive Directors of the World Bank approved the proposed loan of $47 million to the Volta River Authority on September 7.
Ball
229. Editorial Note
On September 12, 1961, Ambassador Russell reported that Nkrumah wanted the signing ceremony for the final Volta agreements to take place in Accra on October 5 and to be attended by high-ranking U.S., U.K., and World Bank officials. (Telegram 393 from Accra; Department of State, Central Files, 611.45J4/9 - 1261)
On September 18, President Kennedy sent NSAM No. 96 to Acting Under Secretary of State Ball. It reads: ``I want to hold up any final decision and announcement of the Volta project for Ghana. Would you please talk to me about this at your convenience?" (Ibid., S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 96)
On September 21, Ball informed the Acting Secretary's staff meeting of the President's memorandum, and indicated that he had gone into the matter thoroughly and had concluded that the United States should proceed. Acting Secretary Bowles suggested that they consider sending Assistant Secretary Williams and Legal Adviser Abram Chayes to Ghana before signing to explain that this was a hard decision for the United States in view of its concern over Ghana's stability and financial meas-ures. (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147)
230. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs, NSAM 89. Secret.
Washington, September 13, 1961.
SUBJECT
Nkrumah's Plans to Send 400 Cadets to the USSR for Training /2/
/2/ On August 28, the Embassy in Accra in telegram 285 confirmed previous Embassy reports that Nkrumah, who was on an extended visit to the Soviet bloc, planned to send 400 Ghanaian Army cadets to the Soviet Union and listed several recent developments that indicated Ghana's increasing orientation toward the Soviet bloc. (Department of State, Central Files, 645J.60/8 - 2861) On September 5, President Kennedy sent NSAM No. 89 to Secretary Rusk. It reads: ``I would like to determine whether Mr. Nkrumah is going ahead with his plan to send 400 of his troops to the Soviet Union for training." (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 89)
This memorandum is in two parts. The first part is the gist of an attached memorandum from the Secretary of State. /3/ The second part contains very recent information, added by your staff, which is not included in the Secretary's memorandum.
/3/ Attached but not printed.
I
President Nkrumah has commanded that arrangements be made for 400 officer cadets to be selected as early as possible for training in Russia for the ``African High Command." General Alexander, the Chief of the Ghana Army Defense Staff, has protested to Nkrumah in an attempt to dissuade him. Leading Ghanaian officers also are opposed and plan to voice their protests to Nkrumah on his return to Ghana. If Nkrumah fails to countermand the order, their opposition might reach the point of revolt or an attempted coup d'etat. Embassy Accra believes Nkrumah will defend his action by saying he is balancing Soviet and Western influence.
In spite of a growing opposition to Nkrumah in Ghana, the opposition has not coalesced and we anticipate its collapse upon his return. /4/ Sending Ghanaian cadets to the USSR for training would go a long way toward providing a wedge for Soviet domination. We have urged the UK to make a firm demarche to Nkrumah to warn him of this danger in the strongest terms. If the British remain reluctant to make a strong protest, we should do so unilaterally, and should not delay too long or it may become impossible for Nkrumah to reverse his decision. We should emphasize that such training would be a clear indication of Ghana's move away from a position of non-alignment, and may result in pressure from the Congress to hold up on U.S. aid.
/4/ Reports from Ambassador Russell in Accra indicated that former Finance Minister Gbedemah, who had been demoted to Minister of Health by Nkrumah in May and was serving on the three-man presidential commission governing Ghana in Nkrumah's absence, was considering an attempt to depose Nkrumah. On September 7, Russell reported that Gbedemah had said, ``I would be sorry to have to do it but country has had enough of Nkrumah's arrogance, whims and madness." (Telegram 362 from Accra; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/9 - 761) In 1973, Russell told an interviewer that Gbedemah had received an official assurance of U.S. support in September 1961. (Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 172)
II
In addition to the foregoing, we now know through the British Embassy that General Alexander has protested to Nkrumah. Nkrumah, who continued to be unyielding, acknowledged that it would be difficult to recruit 400 cadets but insisted that he intended to send ``some" cadets to the USSR for training. Alexander followed up this initial protest by sending an emissary to Nkrumah at Yalta to explain his objections. The emissary reported on his return to Accra that Nkrumah now plans on sending only 20 cadets to the USSR at this time with perhaps more to follow later. General Alexander believes it will be difficult to find even 20 qualified candidates. Meanwhile Embassy Accra has reported that the Ghana Ministry of Defense has only about 180 applicants for cadet overseas training; that the cadets do not realize the training is to be in the USSR; or that the course will involve about two and one-half years without home leave. The Embassy agrees with General Alexander that Nkrumah will be lucky to get 20 candidates of the 180 applications, pointing out that the Ghana Military Academy barely got 150 candidates out of 1200 applications.
In the light of the foregoing, it appears that the situation is not as bad as we suspected. However, as an officer in the British Embassy here has indicated, even 50 or 60 cadets indoctrinated in the USSR for 5 years would create serious problems in the Ghanaian armed forces.
I think we must now wait until Nkrumah returns to Accra where, as you know, he will have to face up to a number of problems in addition to this one. We expect him to arrive in Accra on September 16.
231. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Secret; Noforn. On September 15, Battle forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum that reads: ``Enclosed is a paper prepared in the Department which might be of interest to you."
Washington, September 14, 1961.
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
Internal Dissension in Ghana
Strikes Reflect Growing Discontent. Week-long strikes in the three main towns of Ghana, called initially to protest the government's compulsory savings scheme, reflect widespread public discontent with the Nkrumah government. Government efforts to persuade the strikers to return to work have gone largely unheeded. Nkrumah, who has been abroad since July, has thus far ignored urgent pleas from party leaders to return home to deal with the situation personally.
Moderates May Break With Nkrumah. If the strikes should get out of control, indicating an unexpected groundswell of popular opposition to Nkrumah, some of the more moderate old-guard leaders of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP) may be tempted to try to depose him, either by force or by political intrigue. The moderates, who include several cabinet ministers, have been increasingly critical of the President because of his growing reliance on younger left-leaning radicals within the party. The moderates command sizeable followings among the major Ashanti and Ewe tribes, two traditional centers of dissatisfaction with the government. Nkrumah would probably use totalitarian methods to suppress any open opposition by the moderates, eliminating in the process most of the pro-Western elements in the CPP.
Possibility of a Coup. Aware that an open break with Nkrumah will be met with repressive measures, the moderates may see a coup as the only course open to them. Reports of plottings are filtering out of Ghana. In view of the respect the moderates have for Nkrumah's political astuteness and his ability heretofore to marshal popular support, it is unlikely that they would attempt a coup without army support. (The police are reportedly loyal to Nkrumah.) Ghanaian officers are known to be dissatisfied with the present government, but British officers in command of the Ghana forces will probably caution against the Army's participation in any attempted coup for fear of implicating the UK Government.
232. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Acting Under Secretary of State (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking.
Washington, September 21, 1961, 6:40 p.m.
Ball said he wanted to give him a quick rundown on the Volta River project. The situation is that we have gone very far in committing ourselves to it. Now we have the problem of Nkrumah acting up and also the fact that there is some reason to think final situation may not be stable as it was because there is a strike going on and some trouble out there. What Ball proposes to do is to have Soapy Williams and Abe Chayes and probably Harold Linder go out there the latter part of next week with the statement that since this is such a major project that they want to be satisfied the conditions are such that all the provisions are going to be met before there is any final closing. They will make a complete study of the situation and that will make them come back and in the meantime we will have seen the situation developed there. The Parliament comes back early in October. The President said he supposed we were faced with something a bit like the Aswan Dam situation. Ball said that was what we wanted to avoid. Pres. said that if it is cancelled they will blame everything on us. On the other hand, if we go through with it, everybody will think we are crazy in the Congress and every place else.
Ball said that was right. He thought that this formula was probably about the best . . . The President said we couldn't delay their visit a couple of weeks could we, but announce we are going to do it. He thinks the more time we get, the clearer the situation becomes. Ball said we could do that. We have one technical problem--we may have to close by November 5 in order to get in under the authority of the DLF act which is going out of existence. The President asked how much money are we going to commit of our own. Ball said the total in loans and guarantees would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $240 million. But actually the draw down won't begin for a long time. The draw down on the DLF money won't be until next year and on the bulk of the money (which is what goes into the smelter) won't begin until 1965, so that we are not actually laying out money. There are lots of outs for getting out of this thing--on various breaches of covenance all the way down the line.
The President said he had given up on him. He wouldn't mind giving them a little aid just to keep the contact, but he thinks he's been unnecessarily difficult with us, considering the effort we've really made about him. As bad as he's been in Belgrade, as well as his desire to send 400 soldiers to Russia--ideally would be to give them some aid but not to give them that kind of aid. Ball said he thinks what we have to avoid is being in a situation where it appears to all these underdeveloped countries that because he has said some unpleasant things we are terminating a great project. President said on the other hand, these people would much rather have the dough themselves. Ball agreed. We ought to delay that decision, he would think, and do it on a basis of saying we are sending these people out to make the check before. If it is cancelled they . . .
President said otherwise, of course, then it comes out in the paper that we are giving Ghana, no matter how it is stretched out, $220 million. This would make us look sort of foolish in view of his statement about supporting others.
Ball said Mollenhoff is writing a story tomorrow to the effect that the thing has been put on ice. Ball thinks if this mission is announced in the next few days they are going out for the purpose of making a check to make sure that all the financial commitments etc. are going to be met without tying it specifically--
President said as long as Ball and he are in touch on it so that we don't go beyond the point of [no] return, then we can see how we go in the next month or six weeks. It could really mess up our foreign aid program by giving him that kind of money when we give others almost nothing.
President asked what were we doing on Tanganyika. Ball said we had a consortium which we are about to propose through DAG which has German money, our money, and two or three other kinds of money. President said if we decide not to go with them it seemed that we could say it just doesn't make sense to put that kind of money in. Then immediately commit a good percentage of the money to some other African countries. Then at least we wouldn't look like we had pulled the rug out of Africa--just Ghana. Ball said that was a possibility. This fellow might get overthrown in the next couple of weeks and a really solid government come in. The situation is very fluid. If agreeable to the President, he will send these people. Pres. agreed. Ball said we would delay them and not make any final commitment.
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9 - 2761. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Padberg and Chayes; cleared by Springsteen, Dumont, and Ferguson; and approved by Chayes. Repeated to London.
Washington, September 27, 1961, 8:30 p.m.
425. Dept discussed recent developments Volta with Edgar Kaiser and Calhoun September 27. Kaiser sending following telegram Nkrumah: ``Re U.S. Dept State postponement October fifth date. /2/ Understand top mission from U.S. has requested meeting with you Accra. I believe very important you see mission at early date. Am advised mission could arrive before end October. Believe it would be helpful if Chad and I meet with you in advance mission's arrival. We can plan arrival Accra Pan Am 150 morning October fourth. Believe important we have several hours together to review with you personally. Please advise."
/2/ On September 21, Russell had recommended that the United States postpone signing the Volta agreements until after October 5, which coincided almost exactly with the opening of Parliament and the date when critics planned to launch their attack on Nkrumah. (Telegram 462 from Accra; ibid., 611.45J/9 - 2161) On September 26, the Department of State informed Russell that financial and operational considerations made a final review in Accra of the Volta Project highly desirable before proceeding with a final decision on the agreements, and asked the Embassy to obtain agreement for an informal visit of a team led by Williams sometime in October. It noted that the mission also provided a basis for delaying signing as the Ambassador had recommended. (Telegram 424 to Accra; ibid., 611.45J7/9 - 2561)
Kaiser very concerned about report Russians moving forward with Bui and intends tell Nkrumah they hard to live with this, since opposite ideology. Would seek continuously undermine Western operation.
Kaiser was urged talk in private capacity frankly with Nkrumah including impact Sov-Bloc loans on ability Ghana service Volta and other debts particularly on East-West relationships and fact U.S. public opinion extremely disturbed result his recent statements. Request you provide Kaiser and Calhoun all possible assistance during their visit.
Bowles
234. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project. No classification marking.
Washington, September 29, 1961, 11:30 a.m.
The President said on this business of Ghana, /2/ it looks like it is getting worse and worse from our point of view so that it does not seem right to him. Perhaps we should be thinking about disengaging ourselves.
/2/ On September 22, Nkrumah dismissed General Alexander as his Chief of Staff and relieved all other British officers of command positions in the Ghanaian Army. (Memorandum from Hilsman to Bowles, September 27; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana) Russell reported on September 28 that Nkrumah had asked for the resignations of Gbedemah and several other cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials, and that Gbedemah had urged that any contemplated U.S. assistance be provided as soon as possible. (Telegrams 531 and 535 from Accra, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/9 - 2861)
Ball said we have that in mind. The Mission is not going until the end of October and in the meantime we can see how this thing evolves. Kaiser and Calhoun have gone over and will be coming back with their report. Ball thinks we will have to say this has evolved to the point where it is more clear they are creating a socialist state and it is no place for a private enterprise of this kind.
The President said the question would be whether we would have Kaiser do it, or we do it, or the World Bank.
Ball said actually we have left the thing where the documents have not finally been signed. Ball has deliberately kept it that way so that the private enterprise people could bow out. This would be a more graceful way.
The President said fine.
235. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to Belk.
Washington, October 2, 1961.
SUBJECT
The Volta Project
1. In the attached papers /2/ the State Department has made the case for postponing a decision on the Ghana dam until we see what happens to Nkrumah and his policy over the next ten days or so. I concur. In fact, we should seek, if possible, the thirty-day postponement of decision suggested in Accra's No. 577 of October 2, attached. /3/
/2/ Not attached to the source text. ``The Volta Project and the Current Political Situation in Ghana," memorandum from Battle to Bundy, September 30, is in Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9 - 3061.
/3/ Not printed.
2. The State Department does not, however, lay out the pros and cons of cancellation. Its argument moves towards cancellation, but the issue is not squarely faced.
3. Pro-Cancellation.
--Nkrumah's foreign and domestic policies have taken an ugly lurch to the left since your letter of June 29.
--His domestic economic and political position is less stable than it was five weeks ago.
4. Anti-Cancellation.
--The dam is a long-range project for the people of Ghana and Africa. It should not be handled off-again, on-again in a country that is bound to suffer from various instabilities in the course of its building.
--The long-range prospects for Ghana fetching up an independent African country are reasonably good: it has no Communist border; it has strong nationalist, anti-Communist political elements, which are not yet cowed; its trade is heavily tied to Britain and the West. There is risk; but less risk over coming years than, say, the risk of Nasser's taking Egypt into Communism in 1956.
--If we pull out on what will be interpreted as political grounds, we shall place extremely heavy pressure on Nkrumah to make any terms with Moscow he can get to build his dam; and Africans (who dislike him) will, on this account, be sympathetic. Accra's No. 577 underlines this point. We shall probably have a second Aswan Dam problem on our hands and have given Nkrumah powerful grounds for justifying his Moscow connection.
--The deal itself represents an extremely complex consortium of government, private business, and the International Bank. And, as the memo from the Legal Adviser's office at State indicates, it is extremely hard to find justifiable grounds for breaking it up now. Nkrumah may give us a clean-cut provocation, but his unsatisfactory behavior at Belgrade and Moscow wouldn't hold up in court--or in African and world opinion.
5. Conclusion.
a. We should buy a little time to assess where Nkrumah is going; to bring maximum external and internal pressure on him to settle down; and to see if Gbedemah gets anywhere.
b. The weight of the argument is for going ahead with the project unless things turn radically for the worse in Ghana.
c. If we go ahead, we should do so--and say so--in ways which make clear this is being done for Ghana and Africa--despite Nkrumah, not because of him. Accra's No. 577 has some concrete suggestions as to how this attitude might be effectively communicated.
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2610/10 - 1061. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, cleared by Freund and Herz, and approved by Ferguson.
Washington, October 10, 1961, 8:22 p.m.
50. For Williams from Fredericks. Depcirtel 644 /2/ requested judgments African posts re likely local reaction U.S. decision against Volta River Project. Replies to date as follows: Probable adverse reactions predicted in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Togo and Morocco; varying degrees of approval or uncritical reaction in Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Upper Volta and Madagascar; divided or uncertain opinion in Congo (L).
/2/ Circular telegram 644, October 4, asked the Embassies in Africa for their measured judgment as to what the reactions would be in their countries if the United States decided not to go through with the Volta River Project. (Ibid., 845J.2624/10 - 461)
Adverse reactions predicted on basis charges we apply political strings and indifferent to Africa's development needs. Aswan ``debacle" would be cited and would reinforce adverse reactions to U.S. disapproval Volta project. These charges would be used by radical elements or opposition in some countries whose dominant elements might approve U.S. decision. Embassy Rabat sees possibility King making political capital by supporting Ghana while Lome notes negative U.S. decision would damage U.S. image since would strike at Ewe brethren of Togolese.
Predicted approving or uncritical reactions are based in part on governmental distrust of Ghana's subversive intentions (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger) or on anticipation more aid for good boys and comeuppance for bad boys (especially in Madagascar, Congo (L), Tunisia, Upper Volta). Embassy Monrovia notes negative decision would buttress pro-West elements against cynics who advocate playing both sides of street. Ouagadougou notes strength respected by Voltans and that millions to Ghana coupled with need plead lack of funds for friendly Entente states almost impossible to explain. Tunis anticipates public indifference and private approval. Several replies indicate possible reversal of uncritical reactions and general disappointment with U.S. if negative U.S. decision Volta project did not result in increased aid for other countries (especially, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone).
Bonn states FedRep in quandary, would probably discontinue aid to Ghana except for fear Ghana might recognize GDR, and may well be influenced by U.S. decision.
Ambassador Bruce reports Sandys believes U.S. withdrawal would prejudice Western position throughout black Africa, even in Nigeria. Sandys considers Nkrumah not attracted by Soviet ideology but desires imitate Soviet development methods and will continue play both sides to best advantage.
Rusk
237. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Washington, October 18, 1961.
SUBJECT
Clarence B. Randall and Mission to Ghana
Mr. Randall, who has agreed to head a small mission to Ghana on the Volta problem, has an appointment to see you at 4:30 on Thursday, October 19.
I met with Mr. Randall today and discussed the Volta situation with him. He is familiar with the background of the project as a result of his service with the Eisenhower Administration. He recognizes that a decision to proceed is not an easy one. On the other hand, he believes that failure to go ahead can be even more detrimental to our own longer run interests. He fully understands why he has been chosen for this task and what is expected of him. He does not blanch at the assignment.
He understands that he is to go to Ghana to appraise the situation. At the same time he will apprise President Nkrumah candidly of the problems confronting the United States on this project. He understands that he is to return and report to you early in November, submitting a report which will provide the basis for our proceeding with the project. /2/
/2/ Randall, who had been Special Assistant to President Eisenhower on Foreign Economic Policy, visited Ghana October 25 - 28. Following his return, he recommended a 1-year moratorium on the Volta Project. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between President Kennedy and Ball, October 31, 5:30 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Ghana, Volta Project; Memorandum for the record of the daily staff meeting, November 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, September - December 1961)
Mr. Randall will leave Tuesday for Accra. He is being briefed now by the Department. He will be accompanied by Abram Chayes, the Department's Legal Adviser, and Harry Shooshan, Assistant Deputy Managing Director for Operations of the Development Loan Fund.
I suggest that the White House issue a press release Friday on Mr. Randall's appointment and his mission. A draft of such a release is attached. /3/
/3/ Not printed. For text of the press release, see Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1961, p. 771.
I will accompany Mr. Randall to the meeting with you.
George W. Ball
238. Special National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 189. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: ``The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on November 16, except the Atomic Energy Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
SNIE 64.1 - 61 Washington, November 16, 1961.
PROSPECTS FOR GHANA
The Problem
To estimate Ghana's present situation and the prospects for political stability and foreign policy orientation over the next year or so.
Conclusions
1. Nkrumah remains the pivotal factor in Ghana. Considering himself the messianic deliverer of his country, he has used authoritarian means to reinforce his personal control at home and continues political adventures abroad to promote his claim to be Pan-Africa's leading figure. (Paras. 7 - 8)
2. However, challenges to his political position have recently developed and Ghana faces severe economic problems. As a result of dissension within the ruling Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) Nkrumah has replaced many of the moderate figures in the government. /2/ The more radical elements are now in positions of importance in government and will continue to be so in the immediate future. He has also imprisoned large numbers of critics outside the party. These moves, plus unpopular steps the government has taken to alleviate Ghana's economic troubles, have increased the number but weakened the power of his opposition. (Paras. 13 - 15)
/2/ On October 26, Russell reported that Gbedemah had fled Ghana several days earlier. He noted that there was little doubt that the government had planned to place him under preventive detention and that he had undoubtedly decided to get out while still free. (Telegram 754; Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/10 - 2661)
3. We believe Nkrumah will be successful in suppressing any elements within or without the CPP which might challenge his pre-eminence, at least over the next year or so. But the internal strains will remain and may erupt into sporadic disorders. We believe that he will retain the support of the army and the police during the period of this estimate. If he should be assassinated, an all-out struggle for power would be almost certain. (Paras. 17 - 20)
4. Ghana's economic problems arise principally out of the fall of the price of cocoa, coupled with the continuing use of income and reserves for development projects, extravagances at home and sizable expenditures and adventures in other African countries. Nkrumah is not likely willingly to reduce any of these activities but will probably not be able through his attempted forced savings and austerity measures to mobilize sufficient internal resources to finance them. He will look to foreign aid to fill the gap. (Paras. 21 - 24)
5. We do not believe that President Nkrumah has decided to align himself completely with the Bloc. The Bloc has been assiduous in cultivating Nkrumah, recognizing in him an invaluable instrument for furthering its ambitions in Africa. Assistance in the way of credits, barter agreements, offers of training, etc., has already been supplied. Nkrumah and the extreme radicals among his followers are attracted by the apparent success of the Communists in promoting rapid economic development, and their avowed anticolonialism. He almost certainly believes that he can use the Bloc to further his own objectives without becoming inextricably committed to the Communists. Nevertheless, Nkrumah will probably try to maintain a Western presence in Ghana to offset the Bloc and to improve his prospects for aid from both sides. As a consequence of the interplay of these attitudes, we believe that for the immediate future there will be both the appearance and the fact of a close congruence between Bloc and Ghanaian actions and policies. (Paras. 8 - 11, 29)
6. Nkrumah's leftist policies and positions will probably increase the difficulties of his obtaining private or governmental investment and aid from the West. If this trend is aggravated by the West's refusal to honor what is in his view a commitment to finance the Volta River project, Nkrumah will almost certainly react violently and turn even more to the Bloc. Even should the Volta project be backed by the US, we do not believe that Nkrumah will significantly change the present policies of his regime. We believe that he will continue his attempts to reduce the dominating influence which private Western interests have in many sectors of the Ghanaian economy and will continue to develop close economic and political relations with the Bloc. (Para. 25)
[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
239. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ghana, Vol. I, Volta River Project, 1961. Secret.
Washington, December 1, 1961.
SUBJECT
The Volta Project
Since Clarence Randall returned from Ghana in early November, there have been further developments in Ghana about which you should know. You also have received letters from Prime Minister Macmillan and Senator Gore on the subject, /2/ and, in addition, CIA has prepared a memorandum on the Volta project and a special intelligence estimate on the future prospects for Ghana. /3/ A summary and discussion of these developments immediately follow.
/2/ A copy of the November 16 letter from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Prime Minister Macmillan's Correspondence with President Kennedy--1961. A copy of the November 13 letter from Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee to President Kennedy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Summary of Volta Project Documents.
/3/ The intelligence memorandum, entitled ``Likely Consequences of Various U.S. Courses on Action on the Volta Dam," November 16, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates Files. The SNIE is printed as Document 238.
The Situation in Ghana
The Queen's visit went extremely well. Sir Robert Jackson has told us that Nkrumah is ``greatly inflated" by the success of the visit; counting on your approval of proceeding with the Volta project and Khrushchev's visit (probably after the Berlin problem is less sharp) to restore his momentum. Jackson also reported that, following an hour-long conversation between the Queen and Nkrumah, it had become clear that ``if a decision were made within the next three or four days to proceed with Volta, the situation here would be most receptive." He said that if the U.S. wanted to obtain more detailed assurances from Nkrumah on the genuineness of Ghana's non-alignment in the months ahead, he was likely to be more receptive and forthcoming in the immediate afterglow of the Queen's visit. Jackson told us following the Queen's departure that Nkrumah's present mood was to proceed with the Volta dam regardless of the outcome of negotiations with the U.S. and the World Bank, and that he had just authorized an Italian firm to acquire a third dredge. Jackson said the leftist clique had moved in fast following the Queen's departure to bring greater pressures to bear on Nkrumah--one demand being Jackson's early departure.
Komla Gbedemah, formerly Nkrumah's Minister of Finance and Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, but now Nkrumah's leading opponent, has told a U.S. official in London that, despite all the drawbacks, the U.S. must go through with Volta financing; that to withdraw at this time would only play into the hands of Nkrumah and his intimates who would use the incident to go all out for socialism, for withdrawal from the Commonwealth and for closer ties with the Bloc. However, Gbedemah emphatically insisted the U.S. should condition any agreement to proceed on the project upon the understanding that funds only will be made available in proportion to the extent Ghana is able to meet its commitments to the Volta authority. Such a procedure would, he said, place the blame for any financial failure of the Volta project directly on Nkrumah. With regard to the effect of a possible U.S. withdrawal upon other African countries, he only repeated the widely expressed view that ``another Aswan would result."
The West Germans have informed us that they will follow through on their plans to finance a road from the port of Tema to Accra (a small project) only on the condition that the U.S. will follow through on the Volta project.
A group of British African experts which has just concluded talks with the Department stressed that Nkrumah is ``balancing" between East and West and despite occasional evidence to the contrary they believe Ghana must be placed in a neutral category and will remain there unless pushed in another direction. They felt it would be a mistake to withdraw from the Volta project; that such action would lead to the withdrawal of Ghana from the Commonwealth and heavy damage to the western position not only in Ghana but elsewhere in Africa.
Other miscellaneous items of interest are that Ghana voted with the majority at the UN in the appeal to the USSR against further nuclear tests in contrast to Cuba which voted with the Bloc and Mali which abstained; a large representation of the top Ghanaian leadership appeared at the Soviet Embassy's November 7 reception although their presence at other national receptions is rare; and trade union leader Tettegah, who is on Nkrumah's personal staff, opened the Soviet - Ghanaian Friendship Association in Kumasi with a speech full of praise for the USSR.
Throughout the period persons having moderate or pro-western views have been steadily removed from positions of influence with radical elements gaining increased power. The trend toward a totalitarian state also has continued with Nkrumah's Convention People's Party pressing a campaign to establish branches in business and professional firms, churches and Sunday Schools; accompanied by increasing fear on part of people to criticize the regime.
Intelligence Estimates
The most important conclusion reached in a Special National Intelligence Estimate on ``Prospects for Ghana", dated November 16, is that Nkrumah is counting heavily on U.S. aid for the Volta project. After more than four years of negotiation and several surveys, he firmly believes the U.S. has committed itself to give assistance. Should the U.S. withdraw at this stage, Nkrumah will react violently and turn even more to the Bloc. He might take actions against U.S. operations in Ghana--USIA, the Peace Corps, the modest technical assistance program.
The Estimate also concludes that even if the U.S. should back the Volta project, Nkrumah will not significantly change his present policies. He will continue his attempts to reduce the dominating influence which private western interests have in the Ghanaian economy and will continue to develop close ties with the Bloc.
An intelligence memorandum on the ``Likely Consequences of various U.S. Courses of Action on the Volta Dam" concludes that most African and Asian leaders believe the U.S. is morally committed to proceed with the Volta project. Recent U.S. uncertainty, together with U.S. displeasure with Afro - Asian neutralism, have made the project seem a test of U.S. willingness to give aid without political strings. African moderates, though they would like to see Nkrumah chastised by not getting the assistance, would be fearful that a negative decision might indicate a reluctance to contribute substantially to African developments.
The memorandum examines three contingencies:
1. U.S. implementation
2. U.S. withdrawal
3. A moratorium
If the U.S. implements the project, Nkrumah's political standing would be much enhanced, particularly with the moderate elements. His policies would not change significantly and he would continue to reduce private Western influence and to develop closer Bloc relations. Afro - Asians generally would be pleased at U.S. tolerance of neutralism. Neutrals would still suspect U.S. motives; radicals would conclude that extremist policies do not preclude U.S. aid; and moderates in other African states could be pressured by radical elements to follow Nkrumah's example. Leaders who have cooperated with the U.S. would resent aid given to an uncooperative leader.
If the U.S. withdraws from the project, Nkrumah would denounce the U.S. for its political strings and move even closer to the Bloc. Ghana's current domestic political balance would soon tip in favor of the radicals. Communist influence in all Africa would increase. Although they would exploit U.S. withdrawal as evidence that the U.S. does not intend to help African nations, they would not immediately take over the Volta project but delay until the extent of aid needed to further their aims was determined. Liberia, Nigeria and most of the French-speaking nations would sympathize with U.S. motives but be reluctant to openly support our decision. Most critics would say the U.S. is punishing an African state for not following acceptable policies, remind people of our withdrawal from the Aswan Dam project, and refuse to consider as valid any economic reasons given for the decision.
If the U.S. called for a moratorium, reaction would be similar to that of a withdrawal and be expressed more vehemently. Nkrumah would regard delay as an attempt to blackmail Ghana into complete surrender to American interests, and he would be supported not only by Communists but by many neutrals. The U.S. could not convince Nkrumah or other African leaders of the economics of the problem and our influence would be more disastrously affected by a delay than by a complete withdrawal.
Macmillan and Gore Letters
You will wish to read both of these letters.
The Prime Minister's letter strongly re-states the long-standing view of the British that the U.S. must proceed with the project.
Senator Gore, however, feels that your decision should be to withdraw. In order to clarify some portions of his letter, we have attached a brief comment following the letter. The section of the comment dealing with tax aspects may not be fully accurate and may have to be revised.
McGeorge Bundy /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
240. Notes for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on December 18.
Washington, December 5, 1961.
NSC MEETING ON VOLTA DAM
The meeting began with a very brief intelligence statement by Mr. McCone. In view of the President's tight calendar, he was postponing the briefing on Soviet - Finnish relationships. He confined himself to a comment only that a Soviet space activity was to be expected soon. There did indeed follow an unsuccessful space shot on December 11th.
The Secretary of State opened discussion of the Volta project. The Department had reviewed the matter with care, and believed that we should go ahead. /2/ We made a commitment in the President's letter of June 29, 1961. /3/ The Secretary believed that we should enlist Prime Minister Macmillan in attempting to turn Nkrumah on a reasonable course. He also suggested that we should discuss the matter promptly with Congressional leaders. The President believed that we could not get Congressional support and should make our decision without any further consultations with the leadership. It would be better simply to make our decision and then explain it as persuasively as possible.
/2/ The Department of State submitted a paper for consideration by the National Security Council recommending this. (Ibid., Countries Series, Ghana, Volta River Project, 1961)
/3/ Document 227.
The President then asked how we could justify a decision to help Nkrumah in the light of the leftward and authoritarian course of his domestic politics, and his unhelpful positions on international issues. The essential reply of State Department officers was that we were committed and that a refusal to go forward here would be misunderstood all over Africa.
The Secretary of the Treasury took the other view. To him the essential question was whether Nkrumah was a Castro or a Nasser. On the evidence thus far he was inclined to think him a Castro and on this ground he would withhold approval of the Volta project.
There was discussion of the intelligence estimate of Nkrumah's character and purpose, and the precise language of the most recent intelligence estimates was examined by the President. Director McCone interpreted this language as meaning that Nkrumah still intended to preserve his independence from Soviet domination, although he certainly expected to seek increasing help from the bloc. Mr. McCone added that he had taken soundings of business opinion on the Volta project and had found opinion on the whole not unfavorable.
Secretary McNamara was in favor of proceeding on the simple ground that we had already committed ourselves.
The President then read to the group the entire text of the letter of June 29th, and probably this reading was decisive. The President said dryly that this seemed a fairly warm letter and asked who had drafted it. He was gently reminded by Mr. Ball that it had been made warmer at the President's own direction. The President remarked that as far as he could tell, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General were opposed. The Attorney General had not spoken, the President said, but he could feel the hot breath of his opinion. A little later the Attorney General did speak, arguing that moderate leaders like Houphouet-Boigny would rather that we not go ahead, as he had discovered in his visit to the Ivory Coast. It would be better to take this money and spread it around in all the needy countries of Africa, but if we should go ahead we ought to get something in return.
In concluding the meeting, the President directed that there be a careful study of the precise degree of the American financial liability over the early years of the project. Mr. Chayes indicated that this liability would be on the order of $25 million until 1965. The President found these figures comforting and asked that the legal aspects of this involvement be reviewed by both the State Department and the Department of Justice. This review was subsequently conducted and the President's final approval of the Volta project was given on December 12th.
McGeorge Bundy /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
241. National Security Council Record of Action No. 2444 /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, 1961, No. 494. Secret. Taken at the 494th meeting on December 5; see Document 240.
Washington, December 5, 1961.
Volta River Project
Discussed the recommendation of the Secretary of State that the U.S. proceed with the project as summarized in a paper entitled, ``The Volta River Project," dated December 5, 1961. /2/
/2/ See footnote 1, Document 240.
Noted that the President would defer his decision pending a report to be prepared by the Department of State and the Attorney General on legal aspects of the project.
242. Letter From President Kennedy to President Nkrumah /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, AF/AFW Files: Lot 66 D 53, Volta Project Letters, Miscellaneous. No classification marking.
Washington, December 14, 1961.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have asked Mr. Clarence Randall, together with Ambassador Russell, to deliver this letter to you informing you of my decision to provide United States financial assistance to the Volta River Hydroelectric Project.
When Mr. Randall returned to Washington from his previous trip to Accra, he told me of your cordiality and hospitality and of his frank conversations with you on my behalf. In the same spirit of candor which characterized our talks in March and which has continued in our subsequent communications, I asked Mr. Randall to explain to you the serious concern which the American people and Government have regarding certain political and economic policies of your Government.
In all frankness I must say that these concerns still exist. Nevertheless on the basis of the assurances which you gave me in your letter of October 5 /2/ and your subsequent assurances to Mr. Randall that your policy is truly one of non-alignment and independence and that you share with us the desire to see the dam and smelter through to completion, we are prepared to go ahead with the project on a cooperative basis.
/2/ Nkrumah's October 5 letter to Kennedy declared that it was his intention ``always to be truly neutral and non-aligned" and that he was ``neither pro West nor pro East." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Ghana Security)
The Volta project is an investment in the future generations of the Ghanaians and their African neighbors. This investment promises to pay large dividends, for I am hopeful that these generations will live in a world of increasing freedom in which they will work out a pattern of life to meet their own needs and desires.
The United States Government looks forward to a continued close association with the Government of Ghana and the VALCO consortium in the major forward step in the development of your country.
With sincere regards.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.
243. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson /1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, Vice President's Security File, Memoranda to Vice President from Burris. Confidential.
Washington, January 31, 1962.
RE
Nationalization of Industry--Ghana
In coming to a decision on United States participation in the Volta River Project in Ghana, the President was concerned over the possibility that Ghana would nationalize the project after it was completed. One opinion held that the approval of the Volta River Project would encourage Ghana to permit the establishment of private industry with foreign investment playing a major role in Ghana's industrialization.
Ghana's Cabinet has just made a decision to acquire 100% of foreign investment in certain enterprises. Nkrumah has clearly expressed his preference for government establishment of industry and his view that private investment will not play a major role in Ghana's industrialization.
U.S. policy continues to be the encouragement of private investment and technical assistance in Ghana for its further development and to counter Soviet activities in industry and in the country as a whole. However, the Cabinet's decision at this time, following so soon after approval of the Volta River Project, is a clear indication of Ghana's intentions and perhaps unwillingness to follow Western philosophy and leadership.
244. Paper Prepared in the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.00/2 - 1262. Secret. Drafted by Coote on February 11. The report was transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Bundy that reads: ``Enclosed is a paper on Ghanaian Subversion in Africa in response to the verbal request by Mr. Brom Smith. While it is not an all-inclusive discussion of the subject, it does contain the most significant elements of the problem. A general summarization of the situation is at the beginning of the paper. The paper has not been cleared with the CIA, but a knowledgeable CIA representative contributed his ideas on the subject prior to the drafting of the paper."
On February 7, Battle sent a memorandum to the Executive Secretariat that reads: ``Mr. Brom Smith called me this afternoon to report that the President, in reading the Staff Summary for today, became extremely interested in the item on Africa entitled Ghanaian Subversion in Africa Discussed. The President would like to get on a rush basis full information on this matter including, if it would not delay preparation, anything CIA has on the subject. Can this be prepared urgently and cleared appropriately?" A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: ``AFW--Mr. Coote: S/S would like a B to B report on this within 24 hours." (Ibid., 770.5245J/2 - 762)
Washington, February 12, 1962.
GHANAIAN SUBVERSION IN AFRICA
General
Nkrumah's overpowering desire to export his brand of nationalism has unquestionably made Ghana one of the foremost practitioners of subversion in Africa. Ghana's influence, or interference, is felt in all sections of the continent. Concentrating at first on the dependent areas, of late Ghana has become increasingly interested in the independent African states, particularly Togo and the Congo.
There is some indication of a slow-down in activity in recent months, undoubtedly due in part to the domestic political problems which have beset Nkrumah since he returned from his extended visit to the Bloc last summer, as well as Nkrumah's desire that nothing go wrong with the final Volta negotiations. A possible additional influencing factor could be a growing realization that the policies he has pursued with his neighbors have so far caused more harm than good to Ghana. Finally, the deteriorating financial situation in Ghana, and resultant drain on its reserves, could serve as a deterrent to Nkrumah's more ambitious schemes. There remains the possibility, however, that the USSR will be receptive to furnishing supplemental funds for subversive purposes.
When Clarence Randall met with Nkrumah last December to inform him of the United States decision on the Volta, he candidly told Nkrumah that the American Government and people were most concerned by the reports of interference by Ghana in the internal affairs of other free and independent African nations. He added that it would be of obvious assistance to the United States in justifying this major contribution if the Government of Ghana could make a statement that it would not engage in such activities. While Nkrumah touched upon the subject of subversion in his subsequent radio address to the nation on the Volta project, his remarks were hardly an assurance that Ghana would refrain from such activities in the future. Nevertheless Mr. Randall's frank confrontation with Nkrumah on this subject, and the knowledge that Mr. Randall was speaking as President Kennedy's personal representative, might have some salutary effect on the Ghanaian President.
Also, Nkrumah met secretly with President Maga of Dahomey about three weeks ago at Pusiga in northern Dahomey for the purpose of discussing the deteriorating relations between Nkrumah and President Olympio of Togo. Maga reported to his fellow chiefs of state at the Lagos Conference his belief that in the future his policy might be less aggressive. As a result of Maga's initiative the Foreign Ministers of Ghana, Togo and Dahomey are now meeting in Cotonou. This may or may not lead to an eventual summit meeting between Nkrumah and Olympio.
There is perhaps some reason to be hopeful but certainly not optimistic. Nkrumah has been in this game for some time and with his aggressive energy and egotistical ambition he can normally be counted on to play the game for keeps. The situation will bear close watching and continued pressure should be maintained on Nkrumah to cease and desist.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
245. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Dungan File. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Washington, June 13, 1962.
GHANA: ASSESSMENT SINCE VOLTA
Our relations with Ghana have considerably improved since the fall of 1961. At that time Ghana appeared to be moving swiftly toward an accommodation with the Bloc. Anti-Western feelings were especially evident in statements by Ghanaian leaders and vitriolic press attacks. Ghana voted with the Bloc on Berlin, disarmament and other UN issues; Nkrumah sent military cadets to the USSR; received and stock-piled Bloc arms in Ghana. He dismissed pro-Western ministers, the UK military chief of staff, and down-graded generally the British military posture in Ghana. Following a trip through the Bloc, Nkrumah accelerated the socialization of Ghana.
Especially in the Congo, U.S. - Ghanaian policies clashed head on. Nkrumah had hoped to dominate the Congo as a first step toward achieving his Pan-African goals. Lumumba had assured him that the Congo would join the Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union. This hope was dashed by UN action, supported by the U.S.; as a result, he moved closer and closer to the USSR.
Internal tensions also were heightened during this period by mounting opposition to Nkrumah over his economic and political policies. Nkrumah turned against the British, blaming them for creating unrest, and became increasingly suspicious of his more conservative ministers who he thought might attempt to replace him.
Unquestionably our decision to give assistance on the Volta project changed the atmosphere from one of acrimony into one of guarded cordiality. However, this did not bring about any fundamental change in Nkrumah's foreign or domestic policies. Indeed, Nkrumah has continued over the past 9 months to concentrate increasing authority in his own hands. This has been accompanied by the ousting of Ministers Gbedemah and Botsio, and a long time political associate, Krobo Edusel.
As the situation stands today, there are some hopeful developments in Ghana--stemming in part from the Volta decision--which we should watch with care and encourage when possible:
--For a variety of reasons, Ghana's relations with the USSR have deteriorated since last fall. Soviet technicians have been too high-handed; the IL - 18 aircrafts are expensive to operate; Ghanaian students in USSR are increasingly dissatisfied.
--Nkrumah released 160 detainees and granted amnesty to persons who fled the country for fear of detention.
--He has shown greater cooperation with his more moderate neighbors including possible rapprochement between Casablanca and Monrovia powers. He has normalized his relations with the Congo and has recognized Adoula's Government.
--Nkrumah has indicated that he envisions regional use of Volta power and already has offered to extend the use of Volta to Togo and other neighboring countries.
--The Ghanaian press has become less antagonistic toward the U.S.
--Nkrumah has shown some inclination to appoint moderates to important positions. The most important of these are the 7 Board Members of the Volta River Authority and Ambassador Halm as Governor of the Bank of Ghana.
There are both promising and unpromising aspects in the military situation in Ghana. On the good side, Ghana on May 1 signed a military agreement with the UK under which the British will train Ghanaian armed forces. Canada and Pakistan also will participate, and Nkrumah is sending a small number of junior officers to U.S. Service Schools. However, serious problems could arise in connection with the proposed African High Command, which will be the military arm of the Casablanca Powers, with headquarters in Accra. This may well start an all-out arms race and provide an opportunity for increased Soviet influence through materiel, technicians, etc. The Command might decide to intervene militarily in territories still under Portuguese and Spanish rule.
Nkrumah also is supporting two international meetings, either being held or scheduled to be held, in Accra. One is the ``Freedom Fighters Congress"--strictly anti-colonial--which includes nationalists from all the dependent areas in Africa. The other is the Government-sponsored ``Ban the Bomb" Conference which probably will support a position more in accord with that of the USSR than with the U.S. (In 1961 Nkrumah was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize.)
Nkrumah recently decided to assign the Ghana Trade Unions Congress a more active role in Africa to promote his brand of Pan-Africanism through the labor medium. Its leftist Secretary-General, John K. Tettegah, has been put in charge of the offensive. A major objective will be to drive the ICFTU out of Africa; another the ascendency of Ghanaian influence in the radically-oriented All-African Trade Unions Federation. If launched in earnest, the project could have important implications for Africa, the ICFTU, and the U.S.
In the economic sphere, although Ghana had acquired a considerable sterling balance at independence, the economy has suffered both from imprudent development spending and depressed cocoa prices. Ghana's gold and foreign exchange reserves, which totalled $532 million at the end of 1955 and $382 million at the end of 1960, fell to an estimated $200 million in March 1962. Moreover, most of these reserves already are committed for currency backing and development projects.
In July 1961 the Ghanaian Government instituted fiscal measures which may prove helpful, but preliminary information indicates that revenues were below and expenditures above budget estimates during the first half of FY 1962. Thus the budget deficit may be even larger than anticipated.
Concurrently there has developed a discouraging climate for private foreign investment in Ghana, primarily because of a growing uncertainty resulting from contradictions in the Government's attitude--the Government insists that there is a place for foreign investment, but actions and official statements have discouraged it. For example, Ghana violated the contract it had made with Pillsbury early this year and announced the establishment of a state trading company which would compete against private commercial firms. Pillsbury cancelled its contract forthwith.
Most of the $196 million of Soviet credits (Tab C) /2/ has not been utilized. Ghana is expected to draw more heavily on these credits in the future and unquestionably the Soviet presence in Ghana will concurrently be strengthened. On June 1, Ghana signed a 3-year technical agreement with the USSR under which Soviet credits will be used to establish state farms; the remaining credits probably will be used for similar state-owned enterprises.
/2/ Not attached to the source text.
Our Embassy in Accra has succeeded in maintaining very helpful contacts with various groups in Ghana--especially the more moderate pro-Western ones--which include civil servants, cocoa farmers, small entrepreneurs (including the ``mammy" traders), and the university students.
Our relations with some other groups, however, are less rewarding. These include the Convention People's Party, the Ghana Trade Unions Congress, the Youth Pioneers and the cooperatives.
246. National Intelligence Estimate /1/
1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79 R 01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: ``The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 17, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NIE 64.1 - 62 Washington, October 17, 1962.
THE OUTLOOK FOR GHANA
The Problem
To estimate President Nkrumah's position in Ghana in the aftermath of the recent assassination attempt and terrorist attacks, and, over the short term, the outlook for his continued hold on power and likely developments in the event of his death.
Conclusions
A. Nkrumah is in trouble at home. In the course of establishing himself as messianic leader of an authoritarian state, he has broken or antagonized internal competitors and alienated many moderates. During the past year persons with marked Communist sympathies came to the fore in the regime, but in recent weeks some persons of moderate tendency have become of increased importance. He has deprived dissenters of all effective means of expression except violence. At the same time he is experiencing doubts as to the reliability of some of the forces upon which he has depended. The recent nearly successful attempt on his life and subsequent terror bombings have dramatized to Nkrumah, to the people of Ghana, and to outsiders the existence of extreme opposition. (Paras. 1 - 3, 5)
B. Not knowing who was responsible for the assassination attempt and the bombings, Nkrumah permitted widespread accusations of blame, including the US and UK. This charge is probably for internal consumption and uses the ever-popular theme of anticolonialism. He arrested members of his government whom he probably suspected of personal ambitions and probably suspects tribal elements, labor leaders, military officers and particularly the exiled oppositionists whom he may believe to be supported by the US and UK. (Paras. 6, 8 - 9)
C. Barring assassination, Nkrumah is likely to retain control. The security forces are not likely to attempt an overthrow, his control of the political apparatus is firm and his popularity still widespread. However, pressures against him will increase, particularly if the tight economic situation does not improve or if taxes and forced savings arouse widespread dissatisfaction. We do not believe he will attempt to attract the support of political moderates by altering his policies, domestic or foreign, though in an effort to forestall a financial crisis the government may attempt to improve the climate for private foreign investment. (Paras. 11 - 13)
D. If Nkrumah were assassinated the security forces would probably take steps to maintain order. The Cabinet would try to follow the constitutional procedures of appointing a commission, probably of old-guard Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) leaders, to rule until a new President was chosen. If they were able to move surely and promptly, the security forces would probably support them. We believe that it is by such means that a successor government would establish itself. In the event the party cannot agree on a commission or successor government, disorders would be likely to result, in which case the intervention of the security forces would give the moderates, both domestic and in exile, a better chance of establishing the successor regime. Whatever group comes to power is likely to follow many of the radical policies espoused by Nkrumah. (Paras. 14 - 15, 17)
[Here follows the Discussion section.]
247. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects, Kaysen Letters. Confidential.
Washington, October 29, 1962.
1. You requested a review of our relations with Ghana, and raised the question of whether it might be appropriate at this point to indicate our displeasure with recent Ghanian reactions in the UN and elsewhere in some way. You yourself have just sent a rather sharper letter (Tab 1 attached) /2/ to Nkrumah in response to his complaints about Governor Williams' public statement on Ghana's votes in the UN.
/2/ None of the tabs is attached to the source text.
2. Ghanian reaction to your message on the Cuban situation, both in the UN and elsewhere, has not been particularly gratifying. However, it is fair to say that the reaction was about what we would have expected in terms of past policy. What we know about Ghana's reaction is as follows. The formal response of President Nkrumah to your letter on Cuba was neutral. (See Accra 696 at Tab 2) /3/ Nkrumah's immediate, off-hand response was much less even-handed and more pro-Soviet (Accra 690, Tab 3). /4/ At the same time there were some indications that Nkrumah has decided that the more neutral line of his formal response was the right one, and he is reported to have instructed his press and radio along these lines. This instruction was delivered after a first radio reaction of a pro-Soviet type (see Accra 691 and to USIA 179, Tab 4). /5/ Ghana joined with the UAR in sponsoring a Cuban resolution in the UN Security Council on Thursday, October 25 (from New York 1450, Tab 5); /6/ it had no specific content, and was not acted on.
/3/ Dated October 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10 - 2662)
/4/ Dated October 23. (Ibid., 611.3722/10 - 2362)
/5/ Telegram 691 from Accra, October 24, reported that Nkrumah had telephoned Radio Ghana to express displeasure at an October 23 radio commentary that had sharply criticized the U.S. Government's Cuba policy. (Ibid., 611.3722/10 - 2462)
/6/ Dated October 24. (Ibid., 330/10 - 2462)
3. The most obvious way we could deal more harshly with Ghana is to cut down our aid program. The details of our current aid program are shown in the table at Tab 6. In summary, they are as follows. We obligated nearly $2 million in FY 1962 in development grants for a variety of educational and technical assistance projects. The big item was the Volta Project. In connection with that, we obligated $117 million last year, of which $7 million was charged against development loan funds directly; $55 million were Ex-Im Bank funds transferred to the AID account and obligated through AID; and $55 million was committed by Ex-Im directly. Next year we propose a somewhat reduced program of development grants totaling $1.4 million. This represents a continuation of the on-going programs with lower levels for some, and slightly increased levels for others. In addition, we propose once again to commit $7 million in development loans; $4.5 million for the construction of the basic science building and hospital for a medical school, and $2.5 million as capital for an investment bank. The medical school is a project close to Nkrumah's heart. Planning on this is complete, and the project is ready to go as soon as a decision is made. The investment bank is not yet in the same state; so far the report of the survey team on the bank has not been received. AID believes we could usefully spend another $8 - 9 hundred thousand in development grants on more activity of the present kind, but does not now have the money to do so.
4. Current developments on the economic front in Ghana are encouraging. Ghana has been meeting all its commitments on the Volta Project. So far the Government of Ghana has disbursed $28 million, the U.S. has made no actual disbursements, and the UK has spent a very small amount. Progress on the dam has been good: the work is ahead of schedule, and costs so far are lower than the original estimates.
Another encouraging sign of some importance on the economic front is that the government is moving toward establishing an investment bank whose mission would be to finance private enterprise. As originally conceived, the institution would have the purpose of financing State-owned enterprises. Two banking experts from Czechoslovakia were brought in to advise in setting it up. More recently, Ghana has changed the concept of the bank to emphasize the financing of private business, has asked for American advisers, and has let the Czechs go home. The details are given in the attached memorandum from AID. (Tab 7)
There are still other encouraging signs. A general law regulating foreign capital investment is now being considered by the administration. The latest draft has removed two features which we thought undesirable: (1) 60% of the earnings of any foreign enterprise be reinvested in Ghana; and (2) a long list of industries was reserved for State enterprise. The law is still in its draft stage. It has many technical weaknesses, and we are not yet sure what in fact will come out. The Sunkist Tuna Fish enterprise, which involved a proposal for operating a fishing fleet and a cannery was scared away from Ghana last Spring by the conditions then proposed. They now feel that the situation has changed sufficiently to make it desirable to look again.
Another sign of a turn away from emphasis on exclusively State control of industry are the appointments of W. Halm, former Ambassador to the U.S. as Governor of the Bank of Ghana, and Adomakah, as first head to the proposed investment bank. They are both pro-Western, moderate and technically competent. Still another is the stoppage of work on the Bui Dam project by the Soviets.
Attached at Tab 8 is Chad Calhoun's account of his most recent trip to Ghana, September 18 - 23. Calhoun, a Vice President of Kaiser, is enthusiastic about the progress Valco is making and is in general optimistic about the economic and political outlook in Ghana. He thinks Nkrumah is taking a definite turn away from the Soviets toward the West.
5. Recent political developments point in the same direction. The attempted assassination of Nkrumah on August 1 has resulted in a significant shake-up in the government. This shake-up has displaced some of the more radical advisers around Nkrumah. There are several reports that the next foreign minister will be Alex Quaison-Sackey who is now Ghana's representative at the UN. We consider him a moderate, and an able diplomat.
Bill Mahoney, our Ambassador in Ghana, feels he is making a real impression on the situation. He has established good relations with Nkrumah without in any way being inhibited from speaking plainly to him. He shares the view that the outlook in Ghana is favorable to the West in general and to the U.S. in particular. I spoke to him at some length when he was here ten days ago for consultation. If not for the crisis, you would have seen him.
It still remains the case that there are no feasible alternatives to Nkrumah who promise a more helpful policy from our point of view. This was the general consensus of opinion at the time we authorized our participation in the Volta River Project. It remains substantially the consensus now.
6. You have already expressed your displeasure at Nkrumah's comments on Governor Williams' statements. It would be easy for Ambassador Mahoney to reinforce the effect of this by further comments on the Ghanian response to your actions on Cuba. We could take a major step beyond this to a harder policy by cutting down on aid to Ghana.
There are two arguments that can be made for a harder policy toward Ghana at this moment. First, it would be useful to make an example of one of the left-leaning neutralists, especially in the light of the present situation. Ghana is a country which lends itself well to such treatment from our point of view. Nkrumah has been extreme in his statements. Ghana is not of strategic importance to us in Africa in any direct way. Further, Nkrumah's actions and words have alienated many of his fellow African leaders, especially his neighbors. Accordingly, a strong line by the U.S. might be welcomed by other African countries.
The considerations on the other side, however, appear to me much weightier. We have a substantial U.S. economic interest in Ghana in the shape of Valco. The present outlook for the success of that enterprise is favorable, and those in charge of its operations are optimistic. A hardening in our policy toward Ghana, whether by reduction of aid more than is inevitably required by the aid cuts of the Congress, or by other means, may endanger Valco's prospects.
This alone would not be persuasive if there were strong political reasons for a harsher policy. However, the political reasons appear to me to go in the other direction. There are signs that Nkrumah is turning away from the Bloc and that his neutralism is moving from neutralism against us to neutralism for us. Just because has has been vociferous and virulent in his previous stand, the gains to us of a permanent change in his attitude will be large. If Nkrumah joins Toure among those who are visibly and publicly disillusioned with the results of close political alignment with, and heavy economic dependence on, the Bloc, this will be a significant gain for the U.S., not only in Africa, but more broadly. At this moment, when Nkrumah is making at least some moves in directions favorable to us, his political situation is fluid, and when the ultimate results are in doubt, it would be unwise to apply pressures on him that might well cause him to return to his previous pro-Soviet orientation. Finally, at a moment when we have won a significant victory in the world political struggle we should show a position of generosity in relation to small neutrals, even those who have been more neutral with respect to the Soviet Union than they have with respect to us.
CK
248. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/12 - 1762. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dorros, cleared by Witman and Ross, and approved by Tasca. Sent to Abidjan, Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Lome, Monrovia, Tunis, and Yaounde and repeated to Accra, Bamako, and Conakry.
Washington, December 17, 1962, 6:55 p.m.
1112. For Ambassador. Since attempt on Nkrumah's life last August developments in Ghana have followed trend that appears unfavorable to US and Western interests generally. Situation reflects increasing importance assumed by anti-Western left-wing elements in Nkrumah's entourage and in leading positions Ghanaian information media. There have been violent press attacks against our Ambassador, Peace Corps and press allegations that official and other Americans in Ghana are involved in CIA plot against the regime. Policies of US and those of West have been subject unbridled press criticism and charges of neo-colonialism and imperialism. On other hand Ghanaian press has been lavish in praise Soviet Union and Ghanaian delegation in UN has shown distinct preference for communist bloc positions. UK and US have been criticized by Ghana for responding India's request assistance repel ChiCom aggression and GOG has shown marked inclination favor ChiCom negotiating proposals.
Because of uncertainties outlook Ghana including emotional impact on Nkrumah of use of violence against him Dept would find it helpful have views responsible African leaders. Would appreciate soonest evaluation on basis existing knowledge Embassy present attitude leadership government to which accredited toward Nkrumah and developments set forth above. Ambassador also requested in his discretion avail himself suitable opportunity elicit personal views Chief of State or Prime Minister. Approach should be within framework of general discussion on matters of mutual interest between two countries. View delicate nature this consultation and obvious risks if Nkrumah learns of it and concludes US questioning his future, objective should be create impression local authorities volunteering information on matter of common interest rather than our requesting it. /2/
Rusk
/2/ On December 19, Ambassador Mahoney urged that maximum caution be used when chiefs of state and heads of government were asked to comment on Nkrumah. He pointed out that Ghanaian press and radio had been charging for the past 3 months that the United States was working against Ghanaian interests and plotting Nkrumah's downfall, and warned that if any word of high-level U.S. inquiries on Ghana in other African states got back to Nkrumah, U.S. relations with the Government of Ghana might be seriously prejudiced. (Telegram 774 from Accra, ibid., 745J.11/12 - 1962)
249. Memorandum by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret.
Washington, January 24, 1963.
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
The President met with Mr. Edgar Kaiser, Chad Calhoun and Carl Kaysen on January 23, at 6:30 p.m., to hear a report by Messrs. Kaiser and Calhoun on their visit to Ghana. Mr. Kaiser observed the President had read Mahoney's reporting telegrams and had a fair picture of the substance of his conversations. As a conclusion he offered the proposition that we ought to have a three to six months' period in which we try to make Nkrumah deliver on specific political goals in terms as definite as Valco had got him to deliver on economic goals. The President asked Kaiser to explain Nkrumah's behavior. He could understand his trying to deal with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but he could not understand the lack of subtlety and balance. Why did Nkrumah lean so hard against us if he thought continuing relations was not of any use to him. Kaiser responded in terms of two factors. The influence of Bing and others in Nkrumah's immediate entourage and the desire of Nkrumah to respond favorably to everybody who saw him frequently. Kaiser raised two specific questions. Whether Calhoun should return to Ghana as Nkrumah had requested to work on the investment bill and whether Kaiser should persist in his attempt to get Nkrumah to make a trip to the U.S. Kaiser explained the significance of the investment bill both to Valco and to the country in general. The President agreed that we should make an effort along the lines Kaiser suggested. Essentially, however, he thought that the Nydell case was an immediate test and if there was not a satisfactory resolution of the Nydell case in the sense of a complete back-down by the Ghana Government, he did not see how we could expect anything in other areas. /2/ Assuming a satisfactory resolution of the Nydell case, he agreed that Calhoun should return and that Kaiser should present his invitation to Nkrumah. In addition, the President suggested that we draw up a list of definite results we could expect in the near future in the political sphere, especially in response to the Ghanaian President, as an indicator of our ability to exercise a minimal degree of influence necessary on Nkrumah.
/2/ On January 11, the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to Ambassador Mahoney requesting the unofficial recall of two members of the U.S. Embassy staff in Accra, Dr. Carl C. Nydell, Regional Medical Officer, and William B. Davis, Cultural Affairs Officer. The Deputy Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that he had been instructed not to give any reason for the request. On January 15, Mahoney met with President Nkrumah and told him that such a recall was unjustified since neither man had done anything improper, and stated that the United States did not intend to recall either officer unless the Government of Ghana officially declared him persona non grata. (Memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, January 18; Department of State, Central Files, 611.45J/1 - 1863)
Edgar Kaiser suggested the President write a letter to Nkrumah in response to his own letter in which he, in addition to mentioning Nkrumah's reception of Kaiser and Calhoun, make some statement of his policy views on U.S. - Ghanaian relations, make some mention of Kaiser's invitation to Nkrumah to take a trip to the U.S., and express his regard for and confidence in the Ambassador. Kaiser also raised the question of Mahoney's present instructions and whether it would not be wise to encourage Mahoney to a more intimate contact with Nkrumah. The President said he would consider the letter and Mahoney's instructions.
Note: After the meeting, Kaiser agreed to provide Kaysen with a draft of his idea of the letter, and Kaiser and Calhoun agreed that Calhoun would wait for further word from us before returning to Ghana.
C.K.
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA - US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kaysen and Gebelt, cleared by Kent (S/S), and approved by McGhee.
Washington, February 7, 1963, 8:54 p.m.
753. President's reply Nkrumah's February 1 letter /2/ follows. You should deliver letter as soon as possible and give orally substance of your suggestions your 1015 /3/ as you think appropriate.
/2/ On February 1, Ambassador Mahoney transmitted the text of a lengthy letter from Nkrumah to Kennedy dated January 31. Referring to the short letter he had previously sent to Kennedy through Kaiser and Calhoun, Nkrumah reiterated that he and the Ghanaian people continued to cherish the most friendly feelings toward the President and the American people, expressed his approval of the ongoing U.S. - Soviet test ban negotiations, and suggested that these be followed by negotiations toward an agreement limiting East - West involvement in African affairs. Nkrumah also wrote that if Kennedy felt that the Nydell case was a matter that affected the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, he was willing to accede to an official request to do nothing to press for his recall from Ghana. (Telegram 992 from Accra; ibid.)
/3/ Commenting on the line in Nkrumah's letter stating that he was willing to accede to an ``official request" to do nothing on Nydell, Mahoney, in telegram 1015 from Accra, February 6, pointed out that Nkrumah might want an ``official request," partly to get off the hook with his left-wing advisers but also to have documentary proof that the U.S. Government had pressured him. Mahoney recommended not giving Nkrumah what he wanted, but suggested some sort of document, such as an informal letter, making it clear that the U.S. position remained unchanged. (Ibid., 123 - Nydell, Carl C. Jr.)
Verbatim Text.
February 7, 1963
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your letters of January 21 and 31. As I have said to you before in our correspondence, I believe that a continued frank exchange can be helpful in improving our understanding of each other's viewpoint, and thus contribute to the improvement of relations between Ghana and the United States. I wish, also, to thank you for your kindness and courtesy in receiving Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and listening both to their views, and to the points I raised with them as giving me concern in our relations with Ghana.
In your letter you discuss the Nydell case. I think Ambassador Mahoney has already told you our views on this matter, and I wish to add only one point. We have seen no evidence of improper behavior on Dr. Nydell's part, and I have been informed by my officials, who have made a close review of his actions, that there is no basis, other than coincidence, for the belief that he is in any way involved in improper activities in Ghana.
I appreciate the points you make about the economic problems of Ghana and of other African countries. We are aware of these problems and most sympathetic to the efforts that you are making to deal with them. Our understanding and sympathy lie behind our efforts through aid and other programs to assist in economic and social development in Ghana and other African countries. The question of what particular economic and social arrangements are best suited to development is one on which different governments have differed and will undoubtedly continue to differ. Each country is the best judge of its own institutions. We, for our part, have no desire to impose our own views on these matters on any other government, nor do we believe that what works well in the United States always works equally well elsewhere.
However, as Mr. Kaiser pointed out to you, continued fruitful economic relations between our two countries must rest on a broader degree of sympathy and understanding. For whatever reason, our general relations have been difficult recently, and I certainly would welcome whatever can be done on both sides to improve them.
In this connection, I think it would be helpful to me, and you might find it helpful to you, if you were to continue the full and frank exchanges you have recently had with Ambassador Mahoney. He has my trust and confidence, and continued discussion with him can do much to improve that sense of mutual understanding and mutual forbearance which is necessary for the improved relations between our two countries which we both desire.
Sincerely, John F. Kennedy
End Verbatim Text.
Rusk
251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 - 1 GHANA. Secret. Drafted by Fredericks and Gebelt, cleared by Fredericks and Davis, and approved by Fredericks.
Washington, April 26, 1963, 8:42 p.m.
891. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment on review of MemCon.
Ghanaian Ambassador Ribeiro presented his credentials to the President April 25 after which a frank and pleasant conversation took place in a cordial atmosphere. The Amb conveyed the greetings of President Nkrumah and expressed appreciation for assistance which US is providing to Ghana. The President reciprocated greetings and noted that Nkrumah was one of the first visitors to White House under his administration.
The President told the Ambassador that, although some difficulties had existed in the bilateral relations between our countries, he believed that the situation had improved in recent months. He continued that, nevertheless, the articles that appeared in the Ghanaian press were not helpful. He said that he personally and his Administration were subject to attack in the American press but it was well known that the government did not control the American press. However, when the Ghanaian press attacked the United States he was led to wonder whether this was not in fact a reflection of the policy of the Government of Ghana.
The Ambassador replied that such was certainly not the case and that, although the Government of Ghana supported the press financially, it did not control its output and frequently found itself embarrassed by what had been written and had to straighten things out. The Ambassador said that the Ghana press was a matter to which he would give high priority.
The Ambassador gave an account of current progress on the Volta Dam. He noted that it should be finished in 1965 and expressed the hope that the President would be present in Ghana at the dedication. The President reminded the Ambassador that he had taken the decision to go ahead with the Volta River Project in face of considerable opposition in the Senate and elsewhere, that it was a large commitment, and that he followed personally and closely developments within Ghana. The President said that it was obvious that our two countries would not agree on all matters but remarked that these disagreements should not be allowed to reach point of interfering with cordial bilateral relations. President stated that critics of US decision to undertake heavy commitments in Ghana must be proven wrong.
Rusk
252. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Ghana Subjects. Secret.
Washington, October 30, 1963.
Last year you asked that, before Kaiser's first irrevocable commitment of funds for its Valco aluminum project in Ghana we should take one last look at the Volta Dam - Valco project in light of the political situation in Ghana. That time has now come.
Unless we object, Kaiser will in the next few days commit a first $1.4 million on Valco. In addition to US, UK, and IBRD commitments for the Volta Dam (already disbursed), US Government liabilities (none yet disbursed) for the Valco project involve:
1. $96 million Eximbank loan to Valco.
2. AID investment guarantee of up to $54 million of Kaiser's liabilities. This first $1.4 million, and indeed any Valco spending, is therefore a US Government liability either as a loan or a guaranty.
There have been no political developments in Ghana in the past year that would warrant seriously reconsidering the Valco project. On the contrary the Ghana situation is probably somewhat improved:
1. The Volta Dam is going very well and Nkrumah is very happy about both the Dam and Valco.
2. Kaiser's relations with Nkrumah are excellent and they have a lot of influence on him.
3. Ambassador Mahoney has good relations and some influence with Nkrumah--e.g. Nkrumah threw a reception for the Peace Corps at his request.
4. Nkrumah has made some friendly gestures--such as expressing admiration for your accomplishments on civil rights.
5. Nkrumah is making a major drive, including new favorable legislation, to increase foreign investment.
The adverse factors of course remain--active Communist influence, anti-Western propaganda, and Ghanaian performance on international issues that is usually on the other side from ours (e.g. the Ghanaian attack on the US in the UN this week on South Africa). On balance, however, there has been no serious deterioration, and the Volta - Valco project is serving well its political purpose--to retain a significant Western role and influence in Ghana.
If you agree, I will indicate to Kaiser that we have no objection to their going ahead with their Valco investment schedule.
William H. Brubeck /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
253. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, November 26, and approved by Bundy on November 27.
Washington, November 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
Situation in Ghana
PARTICIPANTS
The President
William P. Mahoney, Jr., American Ambassador to Ghana
I called on President Kennedy this morning to report on the situation in Ghana and answer questions he might have. I first gave him a brief appraisal. I mentioned that we have had a period of comparative calm in Ghana during the past four months, chiefly because of moderation in the press, but that no fundamental changes had occurred in Nkrumah's attitude, and we should be ready for further outbreaks, especially as African issues sharpen. I told him that Nkrumah had good control but that Ghana is probably moving into an era of political unrest as a result of economic pressures from diminishing reserves, continued heavy spending and a rather severe tax program. I told him I thought Nkrumah would survive this difficulty because of his pragmatic approach to domestic politics. I said that although we could expect further trouble and perhaps increased Bloc penetration, Ghana was a good bet in the long haul because of its many Western institutions and traditions.
The President asked me what I thought of Nkrumah's ideas, specifically whether he is a Marxist. I replied that Nkrumah is a badly confused and immature person who is not quite sure of what he wants except that he wants to lead all of Africa. I said he has much Marxism in his makeup but that his performance, as in the development of Ghana's domestic economy, was mixed and that internally there was promise of Ghana's being at least partially Western. I said that in the field of foreign relations Nkrumah frequently serves the purposes of Mao and Khrushchev but that he was too much of an egotist ever willingly to be their pawn. In short, I said, his Marxist bark was worse than his bite and that I felt we must learn to live with him.
The President asked how the Volta Project was going, mentioning that we were now at a point where heavy financial outlays are to be made under the loan program. I replied the project was on schedule and going well. I mentioned that I realized his decision to go ahead with this project was a difficult one. I added that in my opinion he would not regret it and that the Volta Project will prove a lasting boon to Ghana, with or without Nkrumah. I also said that it would be very hazardous to withdraw now and that if we did, the Russians would probably pick up the chips, or at least give the impression of doing so.
The President also inquired about the leftist press. I said it was still a sore point on which we have been able to obtain only temporary relief. I then mentioned Nkrumah's recent speech to the Pan - African journalists in which he characterized the U.S. as a neo-colonialist power and alleged our press was the tool of the big interests.
The President was very warm in his praise of our Mission's efforts. We were together about fifteen minutes.
Summary of Action: None.
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