254. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, April 26, 1961.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2569/4 - 2661. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

255. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Guinea (Attwood) /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 1/61 - 5/61. Secret. Drafted by Attwood during his Washington consultations.

Washington, May 18, 1961.

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO TOURE

As I understood our last conversation, his [Toure's] priorities are industrialization and education. These priorities are quite consistent with the aims of US aid programs in Africa. Therefore, we are prepared to propose to Guinea US aid for a comprehensive, balanced development program /2/ to include:

/2/ Attached to the source text but not printed is a 15-page paper entitled ``A US Aid Program for Guinea."

1. A dam on the Konkoure River capable of providing sufficient power for a network of light industry within two years.

2. Assistance in detailed planning of a diversified industrial center geared to Guinea's three-year plan and powered by the dam.

3. Increased generating capacity at Grande Chutte to meet Conak-ry's immediate needs plus a quick start on essential plants.

4. A training program--including staff and equipment--to prepare skilled Guinean administrative and technical personnel for positions in both industry and government.

5. Assistance in expanding facilities for higher education at the projected University at Delaba.

6. Staffing of an expanded English-teaching program under the Ministry of Education.

7. An offer of food and other commodities in the US which would generate local currency as required to finance above projects.

8. A Peace Corps contingent to be placed at the disposal of the Guinean Government for ancillary projects urgently needed by Guinea--these to be decided upon in consultation with Mr. Shriver.

We count on maximum Guinean participation in all phases of the program. The keynote of US aid is not charity but cooperation.

To speed the programming and implementation of the development program, an ICA mission consisting of ______ will arrive in Guinea on June ____.

To determine the scope and nature of the Peace Corps program, Mr. Sargent Shriver will be in Guinea on June ____ as President Kennedy's personal representative and can discuss the matter with him then.

To facilitate the financing of portions of the program, we will urge a representative of the IBRD to come to Conakry to discuss with him the advantages of joining the IBRD.

(If mention is made of the big Konkoure Dam and/or smelter)

The USG is primarily interested in creating the conditions for sound economic development aimed at raising living standards. We feel that the program we propose is better designed to meet Guinea's immediate problems--such as employment, production and education.

The big dam and smelter are essentially designed to support and expand the existing bauxite industry and will not show results for several years. We doubt if the American people will set aside this much money at this time for an African project that will not directly or promptly benefit people.

Our proposed program does not rule out the eventual construction of a big dam and smelter. Much depends on the trend of the world aluminum market. The private companies involved in the Fria and Boke might well be more disposed to reconsider the financing of this project in the future.

(If he says he is obliged to accept the Russianoffer to build the dam and smelter)

I will have to return to Washington to determine how this would affect our proposal. The problem is not that we object to his accepting Russian aid. The problem is that Russian preemption of Konkoure hydroelectric power for their purposes might make our development program no longer feasible. /3/

/3/ On May 25, Ambassador Attwood met with President Kennedy and outlined the proposed aid program for Guinea, which had been approved at a conference of representatives of the several interested bureaus and ICA. The President commented that if they could find the money, it looked good to him. (Department of State, AF/AFW Files: Lot 64 D 93, Guinea Aid Package 23.4) On May 31, Attwood presented the integrated U.S. aid proposal to President Sekou Toure in Conakry. (Telegram 537 from Conakry, June 1; ibid., Central Files, 770B.5 - MSP/6 - 161)

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5 - MSP/6 - 161. Secret. Drafted by Habib; cleared by Johnson, Williams, Springsteen, Bell, and Fluker and in draft by FitzGerald (ICA), Shriver (Peace Corps), Martin, and Chayes; and approved by Ball.

Washington, June 24, 1961, 5:26 p.m.

728. Re: Embtel 557. /2/ Dept agrees your approach Sekou Toure along lines set forth reftel with modifications and additions indicated below. In reviewing Guinean counter-proposals Dept has been guided by three basic considerations: First, we wish use current favorable climate Guinea - US relations to move into a position in which US has increased role and influence in Guinea. Second, we wish alter previous drift Guinea into Soviet camp and move Guinea to neutral position at this stage and re-integration into African political-economic scene. Third, we wish to provide basis for continued US and other Free World access to Guinea's bauxite reserves. Key element in achieving these objectives is pre-emption by West of Konkoure dam site. Convinced here Russians will, if possible, undertake construct large dam and related smelter. If Soviets succeed takeover Konkoure in addition to present magnitude their role Guinea, overwhelming Soviet presence will make achievement general US objectives more remote if not impossible.

/2/ In telegram 557, June 16, Ambassador Attwood reported that he and U.S. Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver, who was in Guinea as President Kennedy's special representative, had discussed the Government of Guinea's response to the U.S. aid proposal with the Minister of Public Works, Ismael Toure, and Guinea's Ambassador to the United States, Seydou Conte. Attwood summarized Guinea's counterproposals, offered some specific suggestions for a U.S. response, and asked for the Department's comments and instructions as soon as possible. (Ibid., 770B.5 - MSP/6 - 1661)

Dept hopes that within these broad guidelines you will be able to maneuver on basis excellent reception you have received. We therefore view your current negotiations with Toure as a series of proposals and counter-proposals but always with our basic objectives in mind.

At this stage therefore suggest you explore proposals with Toure along following lines:

1. Express pleasure basis for cooperation and understanding has been established, and indicate we welcome seriousness with which GOG considered US proposals. In view of positive nature GOG reply we wish proceed with cooperative aid program to assist Guinea's economic and social development. Guinean counter-proposals have been studied carefully and you now wish convey our reactions.

2. Make frank approach question small Souapiti dam along lines you propose in reftel. If this does not result in Toure accepting original offer inform him that Kinkon project completely new to us and difficult judge feasibility without study. This will take considerable time. Stress fact we willing proceed with Souapiti on belief French studies have established feasibility. Souapiti could be basis early widespread industrialization and electrification Conakry and coastal areas, while Kinkon may be suitable only meet more modest needs Labe region. Moreover, Souapiti remains feasible as first phase larger project.

3. If Toure still insistent our undertaking Kinkon you should then indicate US willingness examine Kinkon project while going ahead with Souapiti. FYI. Should results Kinkon study prove favorable US would still not finance that project (and Souapiti) without help IBRD and maximum GOG contribution. IBRD has informed Dept that expression of interest on part Ambassador Conte would suffice for Bank send mission discuss membership. We are unable see way make any offer major Konkoure project at this time. Your suggestion shift Boke financing not feasible as aluminum companies unwilling proceed Boke without extensive US Govt financing in any case. Nevertheless, Dept believes control Konkoure remains key to Guinea development and retention bauxite for West and we prepared consider Kinkon only if this would enable us pre-empt Souapiti site. End FYI.

4. Do not associate our offer to look into Kinkon with Guinea assurance three year postponement decision on big Konkoure project. We believe postponement would not contribute to our basic objective of pre-empting Souapiti site.

5. FYI. Dept is reviewing its position on support for Boke in light possibility Konkoure project remains open to Soviets. Pending resolution Souapiti problem we are delaying decision assist financing Boke on basis companies new proposal and informing consortium we cannot give definite answer for some time, probably two months. This will allow you time conduct unhurried negotiations with GOG. If Soviets build smelter and dam, this will put entirely different complexion on US consideration aid to Boke. You should therefore avoid mentioning possible US aid to Boke although Dept agrees you should point out uncertainties will arise in minds of aluminum companies if Soviets build Konkoure. If it develops that Boke consortium ceases operations, US should be disassociated from decision. End FYI.

6. Re other points in package while we will try complete industrial plants by end 1963 we prefer avoid firm commitments until projects surveyed. Re-emphasize proposed plants illustrative, dependent upon Souapiti power, and on results surveys as well as GOG desires. Changes may occur but we hope mutual agreement on technical and economic feasibility would be ruling factors.

7. We believe our aid would be more effective through providing aid to school of administration rather than technical school as proposed by GOG. Administration was one of problems Toure cited earlier and aid this field would enable more rapid Guineaization public and private sectors. Without closing door to possibility technical training as proposed by GOG you should seek return their attention to our original proposal. FYI. Our interests would be better served through developing channels influence on administrative personnel. We might be willing to do both but wonder if there any relationship between such assistance and Soviet Technological Institute. End FYI.

8. Nature of US aid to agriculture should be left for final determination USOM survey.

9. Make clear that US proposal to supply imports for generating local currency was related to agricultural commodities available under PL 480 and limited amounts other commodities related directly to aid projects within package. FYI. We are reluctant consider new projects at this time e.g. road construction, nor are we prepared have US equipment used on non-US projects. End FYI.

10. Use Peace Corps Volunteers subject of separate instruction.

Rusk

257. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5 - MSP/7 - 161. Secret. Drafted by Dumont on June 26.

Washington, July 1, 1961.

SUBJECT

Latest Developments with Regard to our Guinea Aid Program

I have read with interest Mr. Shriver's thoughtful memorandum to you of June 20 regarding his recent visit to Guinea. /2/ His conclusions confirm our own conviction that now is the time for us to make a really serious endeavor to help Sekou Toure and his Government in order to reduce Guinea's dependence on the Soviet Bloc and bring that country back somewhere near a line of true neutralism. The submission of Mr. Shriver's memorandum takes place at a propitious moment, for Ambassador Attwood has now received a formal response to his presentation to Toure of our aid package, about which you were informed by the Ambassador during his recent consultation here in Washington.

/2/ Memorandum from Director of the Peace Corps Shriver to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk, June 20. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea)

From the paper Ambassador Attwood showed you at the White House you will recall the essentials of our aid package to Guinea, /3/ so I will not go into detail in enumerating its component parts. Let me simply say that Ambassador Attwood has made his presentation to President Toure, and the latter's reaction was favorable. Now we have received Guinea's specific counter proposals, which, while not entirely to our liking, are nonetheless not discouraging and are of a nature to encourage our going back to Toure with further details and reemphasis on the most important parts of our original package.

/3/ Document 255.

The principal element in the Guinea Government's counter proposal is that Toure apparently wants to keep the Souapiti site on the Konkoure River available for the original large Konkoure project involving an aluminum smelter plant and a dam, hoping that an offer will still be forthcoming (from us or the Russians) to carry out this major undertaking ``from any source at some future date." Instead of accepting our proposal for going to work right away to build a modest dam and power installation at Souapiti (which could later on be expanded to meet Guinea's original desires for a major smelter-dam operation), Guinea suggests that we construct a hydro-electric project (40,000 kw) at Kinkon, located on one of the tributaries of the Konkoure, farther up north in the Fouta Djallon. Sekou Toure's half brother, Ismael Toure, who is Minister of Public Works, informed Ambassador Attwood that the Kinkon project is desired because it would permit the development of industry and the expansion of agriculture in the Labe region, and because it would also serve as a potential source of power for eventual exploitation of the bauxite deposits in Northern Guinea.

Reactions in the Department to undertaking the Kinkon project have been unenthusiastic, first because we have no information whatsoever regarding this proposal (and it would take some time before an adequate study of its merits could be undertaken), but primarily because this would leave the Konkoure open for Soviet pre-emption. On the other hand, we have sufficient information on the Konkoure, since surveys of it were begun by the French almost a decade ago.

The Guinea Government also suggested other counter proposals, including the substitution of a school for engineers, technicians, and electronic technicians for our own proposed school for administration. The Government also iterated some of the reservations it has had on joining the IMF and the IBRD, although they indicated they would be willing to discuss the possibility of membership with the officials of the Bank, and, we hope, of the Fund. We cannot accept the counter-proposal regarding the use of the Peace Corps for roadbuilding instead of education and health because it implies the furnishing of equipment and materials on a scale too costly to fit into the aid package.

We have now considered Guinea's counter-proposals in detail and have just sent Ambassador Attwood a telegram, /4/ a copy of which is enclosed, instructing him to stress to President Toure that it would be to Guinea's advantage to have another long and serious look at our original proposal for a modest dam and power installation at Souapiti. We hope that Ambassador Attwood will manage to see President Toure alone when he makes this second approach. If President Toure stands firm on the request that we build a dam at Kinkon we may have to agree to examine this new project, but in such case we would make it clear that we would still be going ahead with our Souapiti proposal. For, as pointed out in enclosed telegram, unless we thus preclude a USSR takeover of the Konkoure, Soviet presence and influence in Guinea could reach a point where our own objectives become remote and perhaps even unattainable.

/4/ Document 256.

Dean Rusk /5/

/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

258. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5 - MSP/7 - 561. No classification marking.

Washington, July 5, 1961.

With reference to your memorandum of July 1, 1961 concerning the latest developments with regard to our Guinea Aid Program /2/ is there any chance that we could finance the big dam in Guinea if we omitted all the other elements of our aid program? How much would we pay off dollar wise to be able to do this?

/2/ Document 257.

259. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5 - MSP/7 - 561. Secret. Drafted by Logan and Habib on July 11.

Washington, July 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

Guinea Aid Program

In your memorandum of July 5, /2/ you asked whether we could finance the big dam in Guinea if we omitted all other elements of our aid program for that country and what it would cost in dollars to do this.

/2/ Document 258.

The big Konkoure hydro-electric project would cost about $180 - 200 million, but it would serve no purpose unless it were associated with an aluminum smelter to use most of the power generated. Depending upon the size of the installation, a smelter would cost anywhere from $115 million to $160 million. The entire project would, therefore, cost from a minimum of about $295 million to a maximum of about $360 million and would take about five to six years to complete.

The projects in the aid program which Ambassador Attwood proposed to the Guinea Government involve a total cost of about $45 - 50 million over a period of two to three years. This program is composed of $34 - 40 million for a small version of the Konkoure Dam plus about $10 million for other projects such as industrial development, a school for public administration, and English language training.

Therefore, if the United States were to undertake only the dam and related smelter the total cost would be $250 - 310 million more than we presently contemplate undertaking, assuming Sekou Toure accepts our package program.

In addition to the preceding, however, we are also considering financial assistance for the development of the Boke bauxite resources by a private Western consortium. Here the amount of the United States commitment could be as much as $130 million in loans plus a guaranty of equity investment for which we would have to reserve as much as $15 million, or a total of $145 million. The entire complex--Konkoure, smelter, and Boke--could cost us anywhere from about $440 to about $500 million.

If we were to undertake the big Konkoure project, we would, of course, seek participation by the IBRD and third countries. We have as yet no assurances that Guinea would join the Fund and Bank, and the chances are that other non-US Government participation will be limited. If the US were to undertake financing this complex (or even the small dam), we would be obligated to provide the entire sum, reduced only to the extent we could get participation by others.

The sums involved would appear to require a disproportionately large amount of US aid to Guinea relative to other demands on our limited aid resources. More friendly African states would react adversely if the US were heavily involved in the financing of a large dam and other extensive facilities in Guinea especially following announcement of our support of the large Volta project in Ghana. Several of these nations have also requested or indicated they will be seeking US assistance to construct large dams, (i.e., Kouilou, Sotuba, Inga and Niger dams). We have, therefore, concluded that we should not make any offer on the big Konkoure project at this time, but should permit Ambassador Attwood to continue exploring our current proposals with Sekou Toure, and await the results before developing any alternative programs in Guinea.

Dean Rusk /3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/1 - 362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dumont, cleared by Hall (USIS) and O'Sheel, and approved by Ferguson. Repeated to Accra, Dakar, London, Bamako, Paris, and Moscow.

Washington, January 3, 1962, 7:38 p.m.

406. US Govt policy during present Guinean crisis /2/ has been strict hands off and playdown by official US media including VOA. Reasoning: Bloc activity may possibly be reduced, we hope it will be curtailed and come under closer GOG surveillance, but there is no evidence USSR or other Bloc countries will be kicked out of Guinea. Any Western propaganda hailing Guinea events as smashing victory for West could boom-erang if, as likely, it forced Toure to soft-pedal or stop present attacks on Marxist - Leninists. Obvious Toure is caught in serious intra-party quarrel and is not free agent.

/2/ Reference is to the outbreak of violent strikes and demonstrations against the Government of Guinea by teachers and students which began in mid-November 1961. President Toure and other officials accused Communist groups and Soviet bloc embassies of trying to overthrow the government, and asked the Soviet Ambassador to leave the country.

Because Dept has made serious efforts to play down Guinea crisis in official media (with exception South American audiences) believe it in our interest you make known to Toure efforts US Govt to make things as easy as possible for Toure, insofar as its activity and influence make this possible. Assume Toure would be appreciative this forbearance as constituting gesture sympathy towards him in his present trouble and mark of US good-will and friendship.

Rusk

261. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential. Drafted by Abrams on May 23; cleared by Hutchinson (AA/AFR), Dumont (in draft), and Tasca; and approved at the White House on June 15. The conversation took place at the White House.

Washington, May 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with the Guinean Ministerial Delegation

PARTICIPANTS

Guinea

M. Moussa Diakite, Minister-Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea

M. Alassane Diop, Minister of Telecommunications

M. Alpha Abdoulaye Diallo, Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Seydou Conte

M. Mamadou Bah, Director of the National Credit Bank

U.S.

The President

Mr. Edmund C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of African and European Affairs, A.I.D.

Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, State Dept.

Mr. Donald Dumont, Acting Director, Office of West African Affairs, State Dept.

Mr. Eugene Abrams, Acting Director, US A.I.D. Guinea

The President welcomed the Delegation and inquired whether Mr. Diakite had any comments to make.

Mr. Diakite stated that the Guinean Delegation was most pleased with the results of their visit to the U.S., adding that the Delegation was grateful for this generous assistance that the President, through A.I.D., was making available to Guinea. The Minister reviewed Guinea's past relations with the U.S., expressing gratitude for the timely U.S. assistance given at the outset of Guinea's difficult access to independence. He went on to describe Guinea's current economic difficulties, mentioning the failure of certain countries to live up to their promises, and specifically Guinea's balance of payment problems.

The President inquired as to whether the Delegation had discussed this situation with Mr. Per Jacobssen of the IMF.

Mr. Diakite replied that discussions with the IMF were still under way and requested that the President support Guinea's request for membership in the IMF.

The President replied that he would speak to Secretary Dillon regarding the best course of action to take.

Mr. Diakite stated that the IMF was attempting to put Guinea in the same class as Togo; i.e., a small small country, eligible for an $11 million quota, whereas the Guineans felt that based on comparisons of exports and imports Guinea should be more appropriately considered a big small country like Senegal, which had a $25 million quota.

The President then inquired as to the amount of aid, budgetary or otherwise, that Guinea was receiving from the French.

Mr. Diakite replied that Guinea was receiving no assistance whatsoever from the French. In fact, he went on to state, the French owed Guinea a considerable amount of money. He described this debt as taking the form of pensions owed by the French Government to veterans of French Military service which Guinea had been paying since independ-ence at the rate of some $8 million per year, now totaling approximately $30 million.

The President then inquired as to whether the Guineans had attempted to resolve their differences with the French with a view to re-establishing normal relations between the two countries.

Mr. Diakite replied that President Sekou Toure had written to President de Gaulle upon the signature of the Evian agreements, but that this gesture had had no echo.

The President then stated that he was seeing French Ambassador Alphand the next day and would inform him of the visit of the Guinean delegation. He went on to say that he did not want to see most African countries having access to the Common Market with Guinea left out. The President then inquired as to Guinea's reserves in gold.

Mr. Diakite replied that Guinea had no gold reserves, but that her foreign exchange reserves consisted of approximately $30 million. He went on to describe in general terms Guinea's balance of payments difficulties. He described how certain foreign enterprises had made commitments to their foreign lenders and how Guinea respected these commitments. He stated that Guinea's imports matched approximately her exports but that the capital repayment requirements of these foreign enterprises resulted in a deficit of approximately $30 million per year. He went on to state that Guinea wished to settle its accounts with France, but that raising of the question of Guinea's participation in the Common Market prior to normalization of relations on an overall basis would be premature.

Mr. Diakite reiterated the gratitude of his Government for the generous assistance provided by the U.S. He specifically mentioned the Investment Guaranty Agreement which had been signed the day before, as well as the commodity import assistance to which the U.S. had committed itself. He stated parenthetically that Guinea should be considered apart from other African countries because it had no metropole to support its currency system. He suggested that a possible solution to this problem might lie in permitting Guinea to utilize local currencies generated by U.S. import programs for the purchase of U.S. material.

The President explained that local currencies generated by P.L. 480 or other import programs could not be converted to dollars. He again expressed his surprise that no French assistance was being made available to Guinea. The President then pointed out that the U.S. also had its balance of payment problems. He cited the $100 billion that the U.S. had made available to other countries for aid. He pointed to the loss of $11 billion in gold from U.S. reserves, pointing out that if the U.S. ceased its aid operations it would have no balance of payments problem. He explained that in the U.S., a free country, he had requested the Congress for $4.75 billion in foreign aid funds but that he had no assurance that these funds would be forthcoming, pointing to last year's cut of $1 billion in the foreign aid program. He described how, whenever a dam was proposed for a foreign country, certain congressmen said they needed dams in their districts.

The President stated that he did not wish the Delegation to leave thinking that the U.S. was not concerned with the problems of Guinea. He stated that on the contrary he had been impressed by the cordial and sincere welcome given to the various American representatives who had gone to Guinea, mentioning specifically the hearty welcome given to his brother-in-law, Mr. Shriver. The President went on to state that the U.S. desired a truly independent Guinea, free from the East - West struggle. He understood Guinea's position, citing the neutral policy that the U.S. had maintained for 100 years. The President concluded by expressing the hope that the Guinean Delegation would understand why the U.S. could not do all that it wished.

The President, in an aside to Messrs. Hutchinson and Abrams, stated that efforts should be made to make full use of the P.L. 480 program in assisting Guinea in its balance of payments problems.

In a final observation, as the group broke up, the President remarked that the U.S. considered Guinea a big small country.

The group then went out on the veranda off the Cabinet room for pictures, followed by an introduction to Miss Caroline Kennedy, who was playing on the lawn.

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea /1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/9 - 1362. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Logan, cleared by Rogers, and approved by Trimble.

Washington, September 13, 1962, 8:31 p.m.

184. Deptel 180. Following based upon uncleared memo conversation between Secretary and Amb. Conte Sept 12 requested by latter. /2/ Secretary assured Conte that although President's schedule very full he would make every effort see President Toure if this can be arranged. He emphasized that US aid commitment would be most difficult even though USG has genuine interest in Guinean development. He hoped concrete expression this interest would be shown in discussion with President and that public statement could be made following meeting that talks had covered problems of Guinea's economic development in which USG prepared interest itself. Announcement any definite aid commitment would set unfortunate precedent in regard President's meetings with other distinguished foreign visitors and might aggravate Administration's difficulties if made while Congress was still considering FY63 aid appropriation.

/2/ The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, 9/62.

Secretary also stressed importance economic assistance from other Western industrialized nations and suggested proposed talk between two Presidents would provide opening obtain such assistance. Hoped that Conte and Toure would agree that under circumstances main emphasis would be placed on fact that conversations had taken place and other questions treated in subsidiary manner.

Conte thanked Secretary for comments. He stated that although meeting with President most important aspect of trip, possible public announcements should convey impression Toure here to attend UNGA. Among several reasons for this is fact Guinea having difficulties with SovBloc. Guinea had oriented trade and economy toward Bloc. Furthermore, recently Bloc has sought to meddle in Guinean internal affairs. Guinea's economic situation difficult although not ``dramatic." US had been unable respond to first Guinean overtures for aid immediately after independence; now that new difficulties have arisen Guinea again turning to US.

Conte said he appreciated difficulty which precise statement on aid would present for US. He had come to understand philosophy of US assistance and understood President might not have authority make commitment until Congress had acted on aid appropriation. He intended fly Conakry next day to explain US position to Toure. Since relations between US and Guinea have greatly improved and further improvement anticipated, Conte felt particularly important that possibility misunderstanding be avoided.

Secretary said he encouraged by Conte's comments. Present Administration had taken political risks to improve relations with Guinea; these appear have paid off. Asst Sec Williams pointed out Conte had also taken political risks in working improve US - Guinea ties and therefore deserved much credit for present situation. Secretary continued that improved relations would be further justification for direct contact between two Presidents and also provide good explanation for meeting. USG felt meeting should in no way be interpreted as signifying some crisis exists. On contrary, meeting useful step in normal development international relations. Conte agreed. In closing, Secretary asked Conte for early indication Toure's intentions in order permit rearrangement President's schedule for possible meeting Toure. Conte promised furnish information soonest.

Rusk

263. Background Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2173. Confidential. Drafted by Eugene Abrams and cleared by Trimble, Hutchinson (AID), and Tasca. Prepared for President Toure's visit to Washington in October.

Washington, October 4, 1962.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN GUINEA

Summary

The United States is providing the major portion of Western assist-ance to Guinea. To date, total United States aid commitments in all categories amount to just under $20 million, the majority of which has been Food for Peace. The bulk of United States assistance commitments, approximately $16 million, have been made in the past year, starting with the aid offers made by Ambassador Attwood in May 1961. The offers, consisting of projects in the fields of education (vocation), industry, power, public administration, agriculture, and commodity imports, were well received by the Guineans and continue to be the basis for the FY 1962 and 1963 programs. At the time of the visit of the Guinean Ministerial Delegation in May 1962, $2.5 million of balance of payments assist-ance for commodity imports was added to the commitments previously made. Implementation is now well under way with commodity deliveries being made on a regular basis. With improvement of Guinea's relations with the United States, Guinea in August 1962 requested a Peace Corps program.

The objectives of the United States program in Guinea have been to lessen Guinea's dependence on the Soviet Bloc and to stimulate private investment from the West as one of the ways to start the country toward economic development. It has become apparent that a measure of success has been registered in these areas. The trend towards United States sources of supply, using private importers, has been accelerating. An Investment Code, encouraging private investment, has been promulgated by the Guinean Government. Individual Guinean entrepreneurs are planning various industrial enterprises in collaboration with United States investors. An Industrial Growth program, financed by a United States Development Grant, will shortly be activated for the purpose of accelerating private investment.

Discussion

The first assistance given by the United States to Guinea consisted of $1.7 million of Title II PL 480 rice and flour delivered in 1959. This was in response to an urgent request from the country based on widespread rice crop failures. At the time of President Toure's visit to the United States in October 1959 a further United States offer consisting of 150 scholarships and an English language teacher training program was made. This offer was accepted and the program became operational during the summer of 1960. Again in response to Guinean requests for assistance $1 million of Section 402 rice, flour, and milk were made available to Guinea from FY 1960 funds with deliveries made in the spring of 1961. With the scholarship and English language programs costed at a total of $1.1 million, cumulative United States assistance up until the spring of 1961 was $3.8 million over the preceding three years.

In April 1961, with the arrival of Ambassador Attwood in Guinea, a significant United States aid offer was made to President Toure consisting of projects in the fields of education, public administration, industry, power, and agriculture. These activities were estimated to cost $2.5 million. In addition, $1 million of commodity imports for balance of payments assistance was offered. A small dam and a Peace Corps contingent were included in this aid offer but were not accepted by Guinea at that time. Negotiations were also begun for a three-year program to provide Guinea with needed surplus agricultural commodities. These negotiations were completed and agreements were signed in February 1962, providing for $10.2 million worth of rice and flour over a three-year period. An increment of $470,000 was added to this agreement in May 1962, providing for deliveries of edible oil, milk and milk products. Also, at the time of the visit of the Guinean Ministerial Delegation to Washington in May 1962 an additional $2.5 million for commodity imports balance of payments assistance was made, thus bringing the total commodity import assistance for FY 1962 to $3.5 million. As of June 30, 1962, total obligations for that year were $6,106,000.

Based on analysis by the Embassy and USAID, a program has been drawn up for FY 1963 which provides for a total of $18,525,000 composed of $7 million for commodity imports, $2,535,000 in development grants and $9 million of prospective development loans. It is anticipated that in addition to the foregoing the value of the PL 480 Title I will be considerably augmented by new Guinean requests for increased quantities of items already provided for in that program, e.g., rice, flour, and milk as well as the addition of new items such as meat, fruit, vegetables, etc.

The Guinean Government has drawn up a tentative list of import requirements to be financed by the United States. This list, totaling $30 million, was informally transmitted to USAID in Conakry on September 25. A preliminary analysis shows that a great many of the items requested would be ineligible for United States financing because of either the source of supply (France, Italy, West Germany) or the type of item in question (luxury goods). It is possible that further discussions over the coming weeks with the Guineans in Conakry will permit reduction of this list to a hard core of essential commodities totaling $15 - $18 million including Title I sales. Furthermore, the Guineans have included in this import requirements list provision for certain equipment which would be ineligible for financing as commodity imports but would rather be included in project assistance either under development grants or loans.

It is becoming apparent that one of the major United States objectives, that of encouraging participation by both American and Guinean private enterprise in the development of that country's economy, is being accelerated considerably by the A.I.D. program. The signature of the investment guaranty agreement in May 1962 has generated considerable interest on the part of small, medium, and large United States investors (Harvey Aluminum, Olin Mathieson, Pan American Airlines, etc.) and several projects are now under active consideration in the mining and manufacturing areas. Additionally, the United States financed commodity import program has tended to encourage the Guineans to do their importing through normal commercial channels. Activities (such as feasibility surveys, promotion of investment opportunities, training of Guinean entrepreneurs, etc.) of American consulting engineering firms are being launched and should be operational before the end of this calendar year.

264. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62 - 10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson (LS) on October 11. The conversation was held at the White House.

Washington, October 10, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

African Unity and Guinean - American Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Americans

The President

Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

William Attwood, American Ambassador to Guinea

Edmond C. Hutchinson, Assistant Administrator for Africa and Europe, AID

William C. Trimble, Director of the Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs

Foreign

Sekou Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea

Saidou Conte, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea

Louis Lansana Beavogui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea

N'Famara Keita, Minister of Commerce of the Republic of Guinea

Alassane Diop, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications of the Republic of Guinea

Ousmane Balde, Vice Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Guinea

The President opened the conversation by assuring President Toure of United States interest in Africa and its problems, an interest, which he was sure President Toure had already sensed in his talks with Ambassador Attwood and Assistant Secretary Williams. We believe that the interests of the United States are closely linked with those of Africa. Consequently, we believe that increased stability, increased economic development, a more intimate association of African nations and greater security in Africa will lead to greater security in the Free World as a whole. As an example of our interest, the President mentioned our efforts to bring about stability in the Congo and our support of the UN to prevent the secession of Katanga. He also cited our efforts to aid the African countries within the limits of our own resources.

The President continued that he had been very interested in President Toure's speech at the UN on October 9, in particular the point he had made on the drop in raw material prices, a development which was a matter of concern not only to Africa but also to other parts of the world such as Latin America. The decline has been very sharp over the past three years and, unfortunately, gone far to wipe out the benefits of aid the under-developed countries have been receiving from the United States and other nations. In Latin America the drop in the price of certain commodities, such as coffee and bananas, has led to a decrease in the stand-ard of living despite foreign aid. This is a major economic problem for the under-developed countries and therefore should receive greater attention from the industrially advanced nations. The President stated that we are trying to persuade the countries associated in the Common Market and the other nations of Western Europe to open up their wealth for products of the under-developed countries and we are seeking commodity agreements for the stabilization of prices. Furthermore, we are endeavoring to encourage private capital to invest in the under-developed nations and to further the industrialization of those countries so that they will not be dependent on one or two basic commodities. The President said that these are problems which should concern all industrially developed nations as well as countries like Guinea.

The President concluded his opening remarks by asking President Toure's opinion on the possibilities for increased unity among the African countries, pointing out that such unity would permit the African countries to play a greater role in resolving problems of mutual concern such as the Congo.

President Toure did not comment on the President's remarks regarding raw material prices. With respect to African unity, he said that Guinea had taken various steps. Contacts with other African Governments had made clear that they are unanimous in their support for greater unity, and he predicted that this will become increasingly evident in the coming months. A greater cooperation among the African nations will lead to greater confidence and provide greater possibilities for the rapid economic and social development of the Continent. All African countries, President Toure stated, are in agreement that the terms of unity should respect the institutions and traditions of each country and that cooperation among them should be centered in the cultural and economic fields. Guinea, he said, is pleased to see that the United States recognizes the need for and favors greater African unity, for a divided Africa would be detrimental to world peace.

President Toure continued that his present visit to the United States demonstrates the sincere desire of the Guinean Government and the people to cooperate with the United States, and that they are very happy at the understanding that has been established between the two countries. He wished to pay tribute to the Administration for removing various misconceptions which had existed about Guinea and its Government. He also paid tribute to the work of Ambassador Attwood, stating that his efforts are much appreciated by the people of Guinea and have contributed greatly to the present understanding and friendship between Guinea and the United States.

265. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 10/12/62 - 10/31/62. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble and Porson on October 12. The conversation was held at the White House.

Washington, October 10, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

Problems Facing Guinea and Guinean Suggestions with regard to United States Aid

PARTICIPANTS

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 264.]

President Toure said that Guinea is a small underpopulated country, but along with other African nations has many big problems. The countries of Africa now find themselves at a crossroads, with various routes open. Guinea's choice will depend on how rapidly it can move to meet its human needs. First efforts after independence were to consolidate the bases of the new State. The evolution of the nations of Africa has not followed the same pattern as in Europe. In the older countries, economic organization preceded the State. In Africa, the State must create the nation. During the colonial period the countries of Africa were divided in such a way that traditional ethnic groups were separated from one another. The Guinean Government has sought to create a viable State, and for this political action is indispensable in order that all ethnic groups may share the same goals. Certain people have criticized the Guineans or have harbored certain misconceptions about them. This has occasioned difficulties for the Guineans, but thanks to the efforts of men of goodwill, President Toure believed that Guinea's position is now more clearly understood. Today, the bases of the State have been created. Although Guinea, like other African countries, has pressing economic problems, the Guinean people have faith in themselves and are prepared to make every sacrifice in the development of their country.

President Toure asserted his Government must now deal with human needs: the people must have adequate food and adequate housing, the sick must be cared for and the illiterate taught--these are the main preoccupations of his Government. To meet these needs, Guinea must have the cooperation of other countries, and Guinea attaches great importance to the cooperation of the United States. President Toure hoped that this cooperation would develop further: that is his desire and the desire of the Guinean people. Guinea has many latent possibilities. It is a country of great economic diversity, since most of the natural resources found elsewhere in Africa also exist in Guinea. With respect to industrialization, Guinea possesses enough; necessary raw materials, and its power resources only need to be developed.

President Toure said he wished to suggest that the United States aid take various forms. The assistance thus far received has been extremely useful, particularly in 1961 when Guinea was suffering from a severe draught and the United States generously made food available. He hoped that American aid can be broadened and diversified, thus permitting the further development of his country.

After mentioning the reasons why Guinea had initially turned to the East for assistance and summarizing the difficulties which had arisen in dealing with the Bloc (covered in separate memorandum), /2/ President Toure expressed his concern about the execution of the three-year development plan. He was, he said, fearful that it would be unsuccessful despite its modest nature and the full support being given to it by the Guinean people. For example, the plan gives priority to infrastructure projects such as aviation, a printing plant, schools and health facilities. This is all well, but President Toure is worried whether there will be enough food for his people. Agricultural production has declined, and this was also true in the industrial sector. To illustrate the point, he said, that although Guinea produces large quantities of coconuts and palm kernels, serious shortages of soap and edible oils exist. This situation also has a political aspect, for the Guinean people wish the plan to succeed. President Toure therefore would like to see more vegetable oils proc-essed in Guinea in order that his country can meet some, if not all, of its needs for these products. Also, he would like more soap to be produced locally from domestic raw materials, thereby eliminating the depend-ence upon imported soap. He added that these two sectors had been neglected by the Socialist countries in their aid program for Guinea. He did not consider it necessary to give all the reasons why these projects would be of great value to Guinea, but felt strongly, that if carried out, they would show the Guinean people that something is being done for their country.

/2/ The two leaders' discussion of Guinea's experience with bloc aid and Franco-Guinean relations on October 10 was recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid.)

With respect to current and future United States aid, President Toure said he wished to suggest three forms it might take:

1. Assistance in bringing Guinea's foreign trade into balance. AID has helped this year, and continued assistance would be very useful;

2. Assistance to small firms and enterprises which do not require large capital but do need equipment. This type of aid, he suggested, could be carried out through joint cooperation--the United States providing equipment and Guinea the manpower and local costs. Americans could even manage the enterprises until the investment has been amortized. President Toure believed that this kind of assistance would have considerable impact, not only in Guinea but also in other parts of Africa for the latter would see for themselves that Guinea does not permit ``certain nations" to introduce systems it does not wish. Guinea has been able to resist this type of pressure from the Bloc because of the stability of its institutions, but there are other countries which do not possess the same capacity to resist;

3. Large scale economic development projects. In 1960 the United States Government had sent a message to Guinea expressing its interest in the Konkoure dam project. President Toure believed that the completion of the Konkoure dam would lead to the establishment of many small enterprises. Guinea has great potential power resources, but at present many villages lack electricity, and power is very expensive. Guinea therefore attaches major importance to the project. During his visit to the USSR the Soviet Government had told President Toure that it favored the project, and a communique to that effect had been issued. However, his experiences with FRIA had shown him what complications and technical difficulties might develop if the Russians were to take charge of the project, and he therefore had decided not to carry out the agreement with the Soviets. If the United States were willing to help build the dam, its assistance might come from the United States Government direct or from private American firms or from national or international banks.

President Toure then mentioned several other projects of importance in the development of his country. He first alluded to the railroads, stating that they are over 65 years old and no longer capable of transporting the country's products. The highway system must also be improved, and he would like to see 3000 - 4000 km. of roads surfaced in oil or asphalt. As illustration, he said, that despite the fact that there are miles and miles of natural palm plantations, less than a third of the crop ever reaches the market.

President Toure said he realized that the United States Government always wishes to have plans before it is prepared to discuss individual projects. He therefore asked that American technicians be sent to Guinea to draw up the necessary plans with their Guinean counterparts. Some highway plans have already been prepared, but he would like them also to be studied by United States experts before these projects are started.

President Toure reiterated the importance of setting up small firms to make soap and edible oils and to process and crush palm kernels. In reply to the President's question, he indicated that the soap produced would be for domestic consumption.

Another problem is education. President Toure expressed gratitude for the AID projects already started, mentioning the vocational school and the school of administration. He said that 1600 Guineans are presently studying abroad, of whom 130 are in the United States. As he had mentioned in his speech at the UN, the lack of trained manpower is acute in most countries of Africa. After alluding to his reluctance to send young Guineans to the Bloc countries for technical training (covered in separate memorandum) President Toure said he strongly favored the establishment of training schools in Africa. This would permit students to remain in their own environment and thus not lose contact with the people of their country; would not expose them to alien political ideologies; and, finally, would represent a financial saving for the African countries. President Toure therefore hoped that the proposal he had made at the UN for the establishment of African universities would have the support of the United States.

With regard to health and sanitation, President Toure said that Guinea is encountering great difficulties in combating various diseases. He had therefore established a health program which will utilize teachers, doctors and technicians provided by the Peace Corps. The matter is presently being discussed in Conakry with representatives of the Peace Corps, and the latter will soon return to the United States with the Guinean proposals. Peace Corps assistance would, he concluded, be of importance to Guinea.

The President said he could well understand the economic problems facing a country like Guinea which sells raw materials at wholesale prices and must import finished goods at retail prices. This, of course, leads to a balance of payments problem. The United States is also having its own balance of payments difficulties. We bear a heavy international financial burden, and while it does not have serious effects on our domestic economy, it does create a serious balance of payments problem. This limits the amount of funds at our disposal for foreign aid. The Soviet Bloc has an easier time. In Latin America, for example, they concentrate on Cuba alone, while we are trying to help all the other countries of the Hemisphere. As regards the French, the bulk of their assistance is directed toward Africa and, furthermore, it does not create a payments problem because all of their aid is tied to the franc.

The President said he believed the United States should do everything it can to help Guinea, and as evidence of this desire cited our aid during the past 12 months. He stressed, however, that our whole foreign aid program constitutes a very heavy burden. For example, in 1961 we gave $1.6 billion in economic aid. We were happy thus to assist others, but it did put a drain on our dollar reserves. The President continued that these have dropped by about $12 billion during the past four years. We have given over $80 billion in aid in the past 15 years, with most of it going to Europe, and we therefore hope that Europe will now meet its responsibilities in assisting the under-developed countries. Europe also receives a large amount of dollars through United States defense expenditures. For example, we spend about $350 million in France on defense. This means that one third of France's dollar surplus comes from defense expenditures. The President stressed that this situation can not continue indefinitely, and we feel that the other countries must bear their share.

The President said he had wished to explain our financial position because of his interest in Africa and in Guinea's success. He thought that the United States had made a mistake when it did not respond to Guinea's request for aid at the time it became independent. We cannot, however, he concluded, do as much as we would like because of the balance of payments situation he had just outlined.

266. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea, 5/63. Confidential. Drafted by Porson and Trimble. The conversation was held at the White House.

Washington, May 1, 1963, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Call on the President by Dr. Saidou Conte, Special Representative of Guinean President

PARTICIPANTS

The President

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Edmond C. Hutchinson, Deputy Administrator for AID

William C. Trimble, Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs

Mrs. Sophia Porson, Interpreter

Dr. Saidou Conte, Minister of Youth, Education and Culture

Karim Bangoura, Ambassador of Guinea

The President welcomed Minister Conte and asked him how it felt to be back in the United States. The Minister replied that it seemed as though he had never left. In reply to the President's further question, Minister Conte said that he had a great deal of work to do in Guinea since he is responsible for education and youth affairs, but that he found it very exciting.

The President then asked after President Toure. Minister Conte said that his President was very well, that they had left Guinea on the same day, himself to Washington and the President on his way to Nigeria but that he should be back in Guinea by now.

Minister Conte said that he was very happy to be back in Washington and to have a chance to see his many good friends here. He explained that his Government and President Toure had asked him to come to the United States on a mission of friendship, and that he brought with him a message from President Toure to President Kennedy. His visit marks the occasion of the opening of the American Fair in Guinea which the Guineans consider to be a major event and to which they attach great importance. He also wished to take advantage of his trip here to go over economic relations between Guinea and the United States. He added that the Government of Guinea would be happy to receive any representatives to the Fair that the United States Government might care to send. He said that the Government of Guinea was very pleased to learn that Mr. Shriver had been appointed as representative, and was looking forward to having both Mr. and Mrs. Shriver in Conakry. Governor Williams said that he understood that Mrs. Shriver would be unable to go to Guinea as she had previously accepted an engagement to deliver a speech at that time under the auspices of the Mental Health Foundation. The President said he would look into the matter.

The President then asked Minister Conte about Guinea's economy. Minister Conte replied that it is getting off the ground, but that the situation is not brilliant. There are serious economic problems as President Toure had described on his most recent visit to the United States and these difficulties are increasing because Guinea's relations with the USSR and, as a matter of fact, all the Bloc countries are poor and are getting even worse.

The President inquired as to the percentage of Guinea's exports going to the Bloc. Minister Conte said it was difficult to give an exact figure but he estimated it at around 30% to 35% and that it might be as high as 40%. This is Guinea's great problem, because this 40% cannot be sold elsewhere to earn hard currency and, thus, in effect, is blocked. Therefore, a considerable part of Guinea's production is mortgaged for some time ahead since it has long-term credit arrangements with the Bloc based on barter agreements. In reply to a further question Minister Conte said that arrears to the Bloc covering the last three years amount to some $40 million to $48 million; and, of course, these arrears continue to accumulate from year to year.

The President then inquired about Guinea's relations with France. The Minister said that a French mission had visited Guinea and the Government of Guinea had sent one mission to France. The two governments are now examining the points at issue between them, and the Government of Guinea believes that they will soon reach a solution. He pointed out that since 1958 Guinea has received no aid at all from France, and moreover, that Guinea had had to pay out of its own funds military pensions which the French Government should have paid. France owes Guinea some G.Fr. 6 billion, i.e., $24 million, for these pensions.

Reverting to relations with the Bloc, the President asked how Guinea expected to pay off its debt to the USSR. The Minister answered that Guinea cannot mortgage all of its exports, because it must live and thus export elsewhere to earn hard currency. The USSR has been told and the latter must understand that this is a credit which Guinea will pay off within its production capabilities, but that some of the production must be used to earn hard currency.

The President asked how Guinea planned to earn hard currency to improve its balance of payments. Minister Conte said that Guinea hopes to do it in three ways: 1) When their differences with France are settled, the $24 million owed by France will be paid over; 2) By increasing agricultural and mineral production. In this connection the Government of Guinea and FRIA have agreed that FRIA is to increase its output this year, thus increasing Guinea's earnings; 3) Through aid from friendly countries. He mentioned that besides FRIA, Guinea is now negotiating with the Harvey Aluminum Company for the export of bauxite.

The President asked what products Guinea exports to the Bloc. Minister Conte replied that they largely consist of agricultural products such as coffee and bananas.

The President inquired what Guinea received from the Bloc in return. The Minister replied that this was a real problem for Guinea. The Bloc furnishes some food products, but mostly equipment, and the difficulty is that the Bloc equipment is not suited to Guinea's climate. In fact, it is not unusual to see Soviet equipment lying alongside the roads because it does not work. He said that the principal types of equipment supplied were tractors, vehicles and maintenance equipment. The most serious problem is with the vehicles; they do not work at all. The result is that Guinea is losing on two counts: first, because exports don't earn foreign exchange, and secondly because the equipment can't be used. He added that Guinea has made this quite clear to the USSR.

President Kennedy said that we are trying to do what we can to help Guinea solve its economic problems. He said that he takes a great interest in Guinea; he was aware of problems with the USSR and to its still unsettled differences with France, and appreciated both put Guinea at a disadvantage. We are trying to do what we can, although we may not have been able to do as much as we would like. We are trying to obtain enough dollars to be able to meet our responsibilities around the world. We are hopeful that we can do something for Guinea, but we must wait to see what action the Congress will take. He trusted that the negotiations with France will work out as this would be very helpful. For our part, the President repeated we shall do what we can for Guinea.

Minister Conte thanked the President and said that Guinea realizes that the United States has many commitments around the world, and is most grateful for what the United States has done for it. Guinea is asking for more assistance, but it is because Guinea believes that it has given proof of its courage and because Guinea believes that a nation must first help itself. The purpose of foreign assistance is to help a nation to help itself. For this reason, American aid helps Guinea increase its own efforts. He then expressed the Government of Guinea's thanks to the United States Government and AID for their assistance which, he said, has been very effective. He concluded by handing the President a letter from President Toure.

The President thanked Minister Conte for the message and asked him to convey his best regards to President Toure.

267. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guinea. Confidential.

Washington, May 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

Next U.S. Moves Toward Guinea

The meeting in the Governor's office yesterday was for the most part a belaboring of the obvious, with some confusion thrown in. However, we finally formulated a short-range line of action with which I hope you will agree.

By way of background, you probably are aware that Sargent Shriver has done an excellent job of convincing the town that the time had indeed arrived when Guinea will make a clean break with the Bloc. Ambassador Bangoura made calls yesterday on both Williams and Hutchison, taking the same line, saying the break (``de couper") will come soon and that they are depending on the U.S. to step in and fill the gap. Neither Shriver, Attwood nor Bangoura have given any indication as to the actual timing of the ``break," nor how Sekou Toure plans to do it. This of course is something for Toure himself to decide on his own. Assuming that the break does come, we should take great care not to give the impression that we are calling the shots.

If we do decide to move in, we face a dilemma as to how and with what we should do it. We do not know the extent of the Bloc aid programs. The Guineans have always been very secretive about it. When I asked if the Guineans probably would not be more forthcoming now that they plan a break, Williams and the others doubted very seriously that the Guineans knew enough about Bloc assistance themselves to be very helpful. Apparently Toure himself is totally ignorant about foreign assistance to Guinea, whether it be Bloc or non-Bloc--he simply does not and will not understand it.

Most of the discussion centered about a possible letter to Toure from the President. The majority of those present had bought Attwood's suggestion that the President should reiterate existing aid programs and cite a figure (e.g., $31 million). The Governor overruled them on this, strongly supported by me. I said I saw no reason why the President should reiterate in a letter a list of programs which have already been publicly announced, and that there were obvious dangers in citing the $31 million figure which, as the Governor had said, would lend itself to very unfortunate interpretations. If there were to be a letter at all, it should be one that would express the President's sentiments in general terms, but in such a way as to inspire Toure's confidence in our intentions should Guinea face difficulties in the future. (Trimble has just read me the first draft which isn't bad. I will have it shortly.)

Toure leaves for Addis on May 21 (Tuesday) where Attwood thinks he may make a strong pro-Western statement. Any letter we send, therefore, should go out over the weekend. We will have no control over what Toure says at Addis and in the light of his past his statement, if unrestrained, might be damaging to our posture with other African states. This is why the President's letter should be reassuring but not so much so that it will appear that we have, on such short notice, rushed in pell-mell to replace the Bloc.

The important conclusion of the meeting--to which I personally agreed--was that the President should send Toure a letter over the weekend which would be drafted along the general lines set forth above. As you know, Toure has asked for a Presidential letter and knows that Attwood has recommended it. Tasca is calling a meeting to draft such a letter today, which they will then send to the White House for approval. /2/

/2/ The letter from Kennedy to Toure was transmitted in telegram 1039 to Conakry, May 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GUIN - US) On May 20, Ambassador Attwood delivered the letter during his farewell call on President Toure. Attwood told Toure that the total U.S. aid commitment to Guinea during the previous 18 months had totaled $31 million, of which only about $6 million had been expended, but pointed out that public announcement of this figure in the President's letter might have had a negative effect on the economy-minded U.S. Congress. (Telegram 747 from Conakry, May 20; ibid., AID (US) 8 GUIN)

In addition, an instruction is being sent to the Country Team in Conakry to get more specifics on exactly what the U.S. should do if Guinea breaks with the Bloc and, hopefully, some idea as to timing. Everyone at the meeting yesterday agreed it would be foolish to go ahead when we are still uncertain as to exactly what the situation is that we are facing. It was felt that we should go slowly and respond readily to requests for short-term assistance--e.g., Guinea needs rice, and this we can furnish quickly and easily, and we should say so in the letter.

Finally, I have laid on a requirement with CIA to prepare a paper telling us absolutely everything they know about Bloc programs in Guinea. This we should have shortly.

Sam

268. Memorandum of Conversation /1/

/1/ Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan, Dean, and Poole, and approved in the White House on July 22. The conversation was held at the White House.

Washington, July 19, 1963.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

William C. Trimble, Director, Office of West Coast and Malian Affairs

Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

Republic of Guinea

Ambassador Diallo Telli, Guinean Representative at the U.N. and Special Envoy of President Toure

Karim Bangoura, Guinean Ambassador to the U.S.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Diallo Telli, Special Envoy of President Toure with President Kennedy

The conversation opened with an exchange of amenities in which Ambassador Diallo recalled that he had already had the privilege of being presented to the President shortly after his inauguration. He added that he had also had the privilege of attending a meeting between the then Senator Kennedy and President Sekou Toure in Los Angeles in 1959. After these opening remarks, Ambassador Diallo gave the President Sekou Toure's personal message. /2/

/2/ Not found.

After reading the letter, the President expressed his appreciation and added that he was well aware of the problems which exist in South Africa and Portugal. He noted that even though the U.S. is allied with Portugal in NATO, we have actively urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for its colonies. For the past year, we have consistently pursued this policy. Our relations with Portugal have become strained as a result of these efforts. And because our relations with Portugal are now more strained than ever, we probably do not have much influence left which we can bring to bear on this issue. We have supported the policy of self-determination and we believe that sooner or later Portugal must also see the light. It is not only a question of what the U.S. can do, but also of what other European countries will be willing to do. There is an added difficulty in that, if we exert too much influence upon Portugal, she may seek the support of other European countries. If so, she might receive a measure of support from some of them. We are very dependent upon our defense installations in the Azores. However, on the question of the Portuguese possessions in Africa, we have acted in accordance with our principles.

The President then turned to South Africa, which, he said, seems to pose a more difficult problem. While, in the case of Portugal, one could feel that she would adopt a more progressive attitude in the future, this was not the case with respect to South Africa. The President pointed out that he had clarified his position on this subject in his recent press conference. He expressed his concern that neither expulsions from world organizations nor sanctions would change the policy of South Africa. He feared, he said, that such actions would do for the U.N. what Abyssinia had done for the League of Nations. Another effect would be to create demands for similar pressures against Cuba. If sanctions were applied to South Africa, the American public would ask why the same measures could not be applied against Cuba. The President noted that he had discussed this question yesterday with Ambassador Stevenson who would present the U.S. policy on South Africa and the Portuguese territories at the U.N. The President felt that the world organization ought not to proceed according to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter in regard to South Africa because ``the situation there was different." The President noted that he had used the expression ``threat to peace" in his recent press conference in which he discussed South Africa. However, the President said he had reread his own statement on this subject. The United States favors proceeding according to Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter, and he hoped Guinea would be able to support this position. The President assured Diallo that the matter is receiving his very close attention. He had discussed these subjects with President Nyerere of Tanganyika this very week, and he is well aware of the strong feelings the African people have on these issues. Nonetheless, he said, it is difficult for us to preach to others about racial discrimination when we still have so many unresolved problems in our own country. The United States Government is opposed to discrimination, and we will, therefore, continue to act as we have in the past. The President added that Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Diallo would undoubtedly keep in contact on this subject. He again expressed his appreciation for President Sekou Toure's letter, and said that he would send a reply to it.

After thanking the President, Diallo said that Toure had entrusted him with three tasks in addition to delivering his message to President Kennedy. The first was to clarify the Guinean view on a number of points of direct interest to Guinea and the United States. The second task was to give the President any additional information or documents concerning the Addis Ababa Conference that he might require. Finally, if the President had any suggestions or proposals to present to Sekou Toure, the Ambassador would be happy to convey these to Toure.

Ambassador Diallo added that he would like to stress that his mission was an additional proof of the personal confidence which Toure has in the President and that Guinea is grateful for the assistance extended by the U.S. Having himself been Ambassador in Washington for three years, he was greatly impressed by the improvement in U.S. - Guinea relations. However, he noted that, since relations between Guinea and the United States had begun to improve, a press campaign, led by Agence France Presse, had attempted to block this development. At Addis Ababa, immediately after an announcement of U.S. aid to Guinea, AFP had reported that Guinea's representative at the conference had opposed President Kennedy's racial policy. Prior to leaving Conakry Ambassador Diallo had been instructed by President Sekou Toure to enlist the full support of the African Chiefs of State for President Kennedy's policy which Sekou Toure himself fully endorsed. Diallo said that Toure felt this issue was sufficiently important to instruct the Guinea delegation to seek out the U.S. Ambassador at Addis in order to inform him of Toure's position.

Agence France Presse (AFP) also referred to an agreement between the Soviet Union and Guinea for a regular air service. However, relations between Guinea and the U.S. were such that Guinea would never do anything like this without prior consultation with the U.S. The purpose of this AFP campaign is that some elements in France do not look with favor upon the improvement of relations between the U.S. and Guinea. They would like to see Guinea reintegrated into the UAM. This is not possible. Relations with France must be conducted on the basis of full equality and frank cooperation as they are with the U.S.

President Sekou Toure had asked him to say that he had been happy to support the President's racial policy in October 1962 when he came to the U.S. and that he again wishes to congratulate the President and his brother for all they had done in this field.

Finally with respect to Gizenga, Diallo stated that Guinean leadership had been grateful for the interest shown by the President in that matter. Total reconciliation in the Congo is indispensable for progress and President Sekou Toure will do all he can to achieve that end. Because President Kennedy has voiced his concern regarding intervention on this matter, President Sekou Toure wishes to assure him that before taking such action Toure would make absolutely certain that Gizenga is ``recuperable" and that he could perform a constructive role. Toure would appreciate any suggestions the President might care to make.

Diallo Telli said that whenever President Toure traveled in Africa, he noted that the people were very emotionally involved in the problems of the Portuguese colonies and South Africa. Because of President Kennedy's responsibilities and the hopes placed in him by the Africans, the President should do something, otherwise the African governments would be forced by their people to take extreme measures.

The President reiterated the importance of having other African countries exert their influence, specifically the African countries of the French Community. He said that our influence was now very slight. Portugal would not want to become isolated. The President's personal feeling was that Portugal would probably see the light when it would be too late.

The President concluded by indicating that he would write to President Sekou Toure on the various questions discussed at the meeting. In this letter he would also address himself to the problem of civil aviation in Guinea. The President again stressed the importance of having other European countries bring their influence to bear upon Portugal because otherwise it would appear that Portugal was pitted against the U.S. as well as Africa. At the present time, Europe was very sensitive to U.S. influence. President de Gaulle had rallied the forces of European nationalism against U.S. influence in Europe. France and the French Community could do a great deal on the Portuguese issue, even if Guinea could not do very much. The President reassured his visitor that his interest in this issue would remain constant.

269. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/

/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Guinea, Security. Confidential.

Washington, November 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

Guinea Aid Program

Ambassador Loeb reported this morning Toure's unhappiness over the US aid program in Guinea but, in a telegram later today (attached), /2/ indicated that the issue is being resolved. The major problem, as Loeb says, is educating Toure.

/2/ Telegram 495 from Conakry, November 12, not printed. (Ibid.)

Toure's unhappiness reflected primarily his confusing counterpart (local currency generated by dollar financed commodity imports) and PL 480-generated local currency. Contrary to his belief, counterpart (about $5 million per year in Guinea francs) is totally available to the Guinea Government for development purposes and this should satisfy Toure, when explained. The restrictions Toure complained about apply instead to PL 480 local currency. It is US-owned with 51% available to the Government of Guinea in loans that are virtually grants (40 year--3/4%); 25% for private industry loans, and 24% for US Government use (Embassy expenses, etc.). PL 480 to date is about $20 million.

In any event, the main point of Toure's complaint--that local currency should go for development projects and not for technical assist-ance--can and will be satisfied. The key point is simply to make him understand a set of facts which he will find generally agreeable.

More important is the situation behind Toure's complaint. Guinea is in desperate economic shape and, for the first time Toure is concentrating with some realism on his economic problems. He wants the largest amount of visible, ``meat and potatoes" development projects, particularly to stem the political unrest. To this end he is trying to make peace with the French, improve the climate for private investment, and to control spending. He is putting together an ambitious and probably impractical new economic development plan and is tentatively sending a mission over here to talk about increased aid the beginning of December. Our problem is to keep our aid commitment down to sensible limits without Toure getting so disillusioned he turns back to the Bloc.

Ambassador Loeb is coming back this month for consultation and AID and State are working on the problem. I am following this closely and when we reach the point of difficult decision I believe you may want to consider it.

William H. Brubeck /3/

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.