Documents 270-310
Horn of Africa
270. Editorial Note
According to NSC Record of Action No. 2381, taken at the 474th meeting of the National Security Council on January 18, 1961, the National Security Council ``Adopted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6028 [`U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa']." The Record of Action also indicates: ``Note: NSC 6028, as adopted above, subsequently approved by the President for implementation by all Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency." (Department of State, S/S - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action) For text of NSC 6028, December 30, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, volume XIV, pages 197 - 210.
On the recommendation of Secretary of State Rusk, President Kennedy authorized the recission of NSC 6028 on December 17, 1962. (Memorandum for all holders of NSC 6028, December 17, 1962; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa)
271. Special National Intelligence Estimate /1/
/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DCI Files, Job 79 R 1012, Box 190. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: ``The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 24, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
SNIE 76.1 - 61 Washington, January 24, 1961.
ETHIOPIAN PROSPECTS AFTER THE ABORTIVE COUP /2/
/2/ This estimate supplements the discussion of Ethiopia in NIE 76 - 60, ``Probable Trends in the Horn of Africa," dated 21 June 1960. The underlying factors in the Ethiopian situation are more fully analyzed in that estimate. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 76 - 60, see Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XIV, pp. 188 - 190.]
The Problem
To assess the significance of the abortive coup of December 1960 and its likely consequences for Ethiopian internal stability over the next few years.
The Estimate
1. Emperor Haile Selassie has re-established his personal authority in Ethiopia after a bloody three-day coup attempt initiated by the Imperial Body Guard against his regime in December 1960. Nevertheless, the Emperor's position was, if only briefly, seriously challenged, and he is confronted with serious problems involving the rebuilding of his Administration, and over the longer run, the stability of Ethiopia and the perpetuation of the imperial dynasty.
2. The abortive coup appears to have been intramural in character; the active protagonists on both sides came almost exclusively from the small Amhara ruling group and its supporters. Fighting took place between the Imperial Body Guard and the army, the principal military components upon which Haile Selassie had depended for the retention of his power. However, the immediate consequences of the short struggle and its implications for the future suggest that it was more significant than a ``palace revolt." In addition to the blatant and well-publicized challenge to his authority suffered by the Emperor, many of his most trusted ministers and advisers have been assassinated, his Imperial Body Guard and the security services have been proved unreliable, and his doubts concerning the competence and resolution of the Crown Prince have been confirmed. Most importantly, the way in which the revolt unfolded dramatized the existence of social and political discontent at key points in the Empire's social structure.
3. The issue which sparked the coup appears to have been the dissatisfaction of the Imperial Body Guard officers with their low pay and what they felt to be their declining status in the military hierarchy. Nevertheless, there exists a wider range of dissidence in the country, arising from a more complex set of factors. These include dissatisfaction of some middle level government officials with His Imperial Majesty's autocratic rule, and the thwarted aspirations of the growing number of young ``modernists" and western educated intellectuals for more rapid social and economic advance. The Body Guard leaders probably anticipated support from large numbers of civil servants, army, and police officers. However, initial alarm at the audacity of the undertaking, realization that Haile Selassie was not in full eclipse, and most important, the unpopularity of several plot leaders probably prevented the rebels from gaining the support they anticipated. Since the attempted coup was engineered by a small segment of the ruling group, and because the revolt was quickly snuffed out, there was neither inclination nor opportunity for discontent among civilian elements to manifest itself. Moreover, coup leaders approached the important army and air force commanders only after the initiation of the coup, and failed to secure their support. The longstanding prestige of the Emperor almost certainly had its effect in limiting enthusiasm for the attempted revolt. Ultimately, it was the vigorous action of the armed forces in putting down the rebellion that was the decisive factor.
4. Although Haile Selassie has indicated that he intends to deal charitably with opponents who did not directly lead the revolt and who are now willing to make public apology, the experience will almost certainly reinforce his penchant for a constant shuffling of top government officials. He must not only replace those who were murdered by the rebels--a slow and difficult task--but is likely to continue his longstanding practice of assigning potential troublemakers abroad and making frequent shifts of cabinet ministers and other high officers. A number of the Emperor's advisers and aides perished in the coup or are under suspicion, and this will reinforce his customary practice of using a variety of foreign advisers of miscellaneous nationalities. The ineffectual perform-ance of the Crown Prince has almost certainly reinforced the Emperor's grave doubts about him as a successor. However, there are no clearly qualified alternative candidates, and the Emperor will probably be in no hurry to name a substitute.
5. Security measures will almost certainly be tightened, and the Emperor's suspicions of the more progressive of his civil servants will almost certainly persist. Nevertheless, pressures by the latter for major reforms probably will grow. The Emperor faces the dilemma whether he should seek to control these ``modernist" elements by somewhat more concessions to their point of view or should rely on traditionalist supporters and thus risk further alienation of the literate class. On the whole, we do not anticipate any massive internal reprisals or dramatic changes in Haile Selassie's program of painfully gradual economic and social reform. If the Emperor succeeds in the task of re-establishing an effective government apparatus, we do not believe that any important coup attempt by disgruntled military and civilian elements will develop during the next year or so.
6. Haile Selassie, who may have been harboring fears concerning US intentions under precisely such emergency conditions, has probably been reassured by the assistance rendered by the US for the Emperor's cause during the rebellion--[3 lines of source text not declassified]. Moreover, some uncertainty apparently exists in the Emperor's mind concerning possible Bloc or Yugoslav support of the revolt leaders. While we have no evidence of such involvement, Haile Selassie is perfectly capable of becoming obsessed with such a possibility. He will continue to weigh American friendship by its support of his own position at home and in his foreign relations, especially in his difficulties with the neighboring Somali Republic. In any case, Ethiopian demands on the US will probably increase.
7. The abortive coup has served to underscore the personal importance of Haile Selassie as the dominant force in a far from united Empire, and the potentialities for sustained conflict and fragmentation when the Emperor leaves the scene. In addition to the question of the succession, which traditionally has been resolved in conflict among the pretenders and contenders, the ruling group is likely to find itself deeply divided over the direction Ethiopia should take in the modern world. The conservatives, led by the Coptic Church and the traditional aristocracy, are likely to oppose strongly the ambitions of young ``modernists" who wish to end Ethiopian isolation and expose the country to far-reaching social, economic, and political change. If dissension within the ruling and educated groups broke into open conflict, this might release the floodgates of separatism among the other peoples of the Ethiopian Empire.
272. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Penfield) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775A.56311/3 - 761. Secret. Drafted by Allen on March 6.
Washington, March 7, 1961.
DEAR MR. NITZE: In view of the fact that we have recently authorized our Ambassador in Ethiopia to proceed with negotiations for the additional facilities desired by the Department of Defense near Kagnew Station in Eritrea, I believe that I should call to your attention Assistant Secretary Williams' impressions of the political climate in Ethiopia. A copy of telegram 389 from the Embassy at Mogadiscio is enclosed. /2/
/2/ Not printed. In telegram 389, February 21, Williams reported that Ethiopia had been deeply affected by the unsuccessful coup of December 1960 and would never be the same again. He noted that in the minds of many forward looking Ethiopians, U.S. assistance to the Ethiopian army had aided in maintaining what had become an unpopular regime, and that if a revolution should occur in the near future, there was reason for concern that Americans might be among those attacked. (Ibid., 775.00/2 - 2161)
Assistant Secretary Williams' impressions are consistent with our own analysis. It is clear that there is a very real danger that political developments in the Horn of Africa over the next few years may result in limitations on our freedom of action at Kagnew Station or even in demands for its evacuation. Therefore, although we are presently in a relatively good political position in Ethiopia, I believe it would be only prudent for the interested agencies to begin now to study seriously alternative means by which the functions of Kagnew Station could be carried out. I do not mean that we will in any way relax our efforts to preserve the status of this valuable facility--I am simply calling attention to a contingency which it would be shortsighted to overlook.
Sincerely yours,
James K. Penfield /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5 - MSP/5 - 2961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Allen, cleared in draft by Williams and Moffett, and approved by Witman. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, and Paris (by pouch).
Washington, May 29, 1961, 9:34 p.m.
880. Addis for Ambassador. As Embassy aware, we have for some time contemplated approach to IEG in hope latter could be convinced Western arms for Somalis less dangerous to Ethiopia than arms from unfriendly sources. Department feels it now time to make approach and unless you perceive serious objection, you should at earliest convenient occasion have frank conversation with Foreign Minister Imru referring to his call on Satterthwaite (Deptel 429 to Addis, rpt London 3212, Mogadiscio 288, Rome 1638, Paris unn), /2/ as well as to your recent conversation (Addis 1123, rpt London 32, Paris 26, Rome 17, Mogadiscio 64) /3/ and outline U.S. analysis Somali Army situation as provided recent Deptels. After explaining carefully arguments for Western action, you should reiterate U.S. position it has no plans assist directly in training or arming Somali Army but in circumstances feels former metropoles should do so and has so informed UK and GOI. We feel this source supply in best interests IEG as well as West. You should say that if IEG feels U.S. participation with UK and Italy would reassure IEG as to intentions Western powers, USG prepared give serious consideration doing so. Alternatively, if IEG feels smaller (and possibly non-European) power might be more acceptable as source training for Somali Army, then USG would be willing see if one is prepared make offer to GSR. Naturally we have no idea whether GSR likely accept. You should offer discuss matter with Aklilou and HIM if desired.
/2/ Dated December 13, 1960. (Ibid., 877.00/12 - 1360)
/3/ Dated May 27. (Ibid., 777.5 - MSP/5 - 2761)
FYI. One purpose above approach (details of which you may modify in your discretion) is to test validity Embassy belief (which Department shares) that IEG reaction to U.S. support of Somali Army would be so negative as to result in unacceptable damage to U.S. position Ethiopia, including but not restricted to possible loss of Kagnew. We feel possibility IEG would tolerate U.S. aid to Somali Army slight but that suggestion in above terms enables us test this hypothesis with minimal risk.
In our view IEG just might reluctantly accept idea of small power as source training and channel for arms in view fact Deressa once indicated such possibility not out of question (Addis 10, July 1, 1960, rpt London 1, Rome 1, Mogadiscio 40). /4/ We also feel IEG most likely accept ``small power" concept if faced with fact U.S. feels alternative is unfriendly power (in view IEG repeated opposition to U.S., U.K., or Italy) and gravely concerned at this possibility. End FYI.
/4/ Not printed. (Ibid., 777.5/7 - 360)
This message repeated other posts strictly for information and contents should not be passed to third parties at present.
For Rome: If Italy and UK should meanwhile wish to begin tripartite talks, you should be guided in your comments by Deptels 3127 and 3145. /5/
/5/ Neither found.
Rusk
274. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential/Noforn. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy that reads: ``Enclosed is a paper prepared by the Department which may be of interest to you."
Washington, September 8, 1961.
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
Somali Republic May Seek Bloc Military Aid
The Somali Republic may soon seek military aid from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia: there have been new Ethiopian incursions into tacitly neutralized border areas; a recent major Cabinet crisis has weakened the government; and Somali officials have been unhappy with the implementation of Western military and budgetary aid. The Somali Army Commander recently appealed to his government for arms ``regardless of source." Prime Minister Abdirascid discussed the Somali military program with Bloc officials in June, but sought no military aid commitments at that time.
Western Aid Delayed. UK - Italian discussions of a coordinated military supply and training program for the Somalis have dragged on without concrete results. Only small deliveries of Italian military supplies have been made. During Somali President Aden Abdulla Osman's visit to Rome en route to the Belgrade Conference, Italy reaffirmed its intention to supply Somali arms requirements. However, the details remain to be worked out, and the extent of UK participation is uncertain.
The Italian Parliament has adjourned without legislative action on Italy's major share of the tripartite Western (Italy, US, and UK) budgetary aid agreed upon in principle late in 1960. Final action by Italy is not expected until late September. A crisis in financing Somali Government operations may be expected by November.
Deterioration in Western Position. Recent developments suggest that Western prestige is declining steadily as a result of the prolonged delays in providing aid. Radical Somali elements contrast the West's plans for assistance with those of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, which promised unusually large-scale economic aid in June. The acceptance of Bloc offers at that time was a concession to strong, neutralist factions which continue to exert pressure upon the unsteadily based Abdirascid government. Any introduction of Bloc arms into the explosive Somali - Ethiopian border situation would seriously increase instability in the Horn of Africa and aggravate US and Western difficulties in balancing Somali and Ethiopian demands for support.
275. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11 - 2161. Confidential. Drafted by Buckle on December 12.
Washington, November 21, 1961.
SUBJECT
US - UK Talks on Africa: The Horn of Africa
PARTICIPANTS
United Kingdom:
Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Sir Algernon Rumbold, Deputy Under Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Officer
M.K.M. Wilford, Foreign Office
J.D. Hennings, Colonial Attache, UK Embassy
J.D.B. Shaw, First Secretary, UK Embassy
United States:
G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary, African Affairs
William Witman II, Director, AFN
Martin F. Herz, Special Assistant for Planning, AF
John F. Buckle, AFN
Marcus Gordon, AID
Colonel Joseph Whitfield, USAF, DOD/ISA
Sir Roger remarked that if two years ago anyone had asked where trouble was most apt to arise in Africa the answer inevitably would have been ``in the Horn". The absence of that trouble was no cause for self-congratulation, however. The problems are intractable and trouble is standing in the wings. The West had to be particularly careful not to appear to favor one side or the other since the side which felt neglected would inevitably turn toward the East. While other African countries certainly did not regard them as the leaders in any movement, because of their geographical position Communist penetration of either would probably result in the spreading of the infection to all of the adjoining areas in Africa.
The problem is further complicated by the racial difficulties involved in the territorial overlapping of the Somali people. The Governor of Kenya, for example, felt that the most difficult problem facing that new nation was the resolution of the question involving the Somali people in Northern Kenya. The British definitely did not intend to alter territorial boundaries prior to independence. Furthermore, he was happy to say, the Somali Government was not pressing them particularly in this regard. However, the British were advising all important Kenyan political leaders that the Somali section of their country held little but trouble for them in the future. There was little indication so far that any future Kenyan Government would be willing to part with this area. On the other hand, if one should show any such inclination, the problems of the area would be even more aggravated, for the cession of this territory to the Somali Republic would provoke similar claims against Kenya from Ethiopia and would inevitably result in increased pressure by the Somalis on Ethiopia for the Ogaden as well as a stepped-up campaign against the French in Djibouti.
While the French had not informed the British as to their intention regarding French Somaliland, it would seem to be the last vestige of French colonialism in Africa, with obvious consequences. But if the French should pull out, it would create extremely serious problems for the Ethiopians and so the British were inclined to hope that the French would hold fast. Governor Williams agreed it was a problem area and remarked that we also had received little information from the French on their intentions.
Sir Roger then turned to the problem of economic and military assistance. The main principle all of the Western parties involved should follow was one of balancing the assistance given Somalia and Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the British had found it extremely difficult to work with the Ethiopians and had very few projects in that country. However, they were expecting a fairly large private participation by the firm of Michael Cotts in a Gezira-like scheme in the Awash Valley. The United States, of course, was meeting Ethiopian requirements quite successfully as well as providing for the military. On the other hand, the British were giving very significant amounts of assistance to Somalia and were now also undertaking the training of the Somali Army in conjunction with the Italians. The United States should be aware that the UK could not continue to provide assistance to Somalia at the present level. The Treasury had informed the Foreign Office that the most that could be hoped for next year was #1.3 million. Since it was expected that military expenses would increase from #150,000 to #250,000 there obviously would have to be considerable decrease in the amount of money available for developmental activities in the North. Perhaps it might be useful, Sir Roger said, if the United States could obtain a better balance in the assistance it was providing the two countries and thus somewhat compensate for this reduction.
Mr. Witman corrected the misapprehension of the British regarding the theoretically disproportionate amount of assistance being furnished by the United States to Ethiopia. He pointed out that if military aid were excluded--which should be the case since it was primarily a quid pro quo for Kagnew Station--the economic assistance on a per capita basis was very much in Somalia's favor. Furthermore, in FY 1962 Somalia was one of the few countries where we were increasing our assistance. We would actually be providing more economic assistance to Somalia than to Ethiopia this year. Mr. Gordon explained that the total contemplated for Somalia in FY 1962 was approximately $9 million with $5.6 million of this amount going to the Chisimaio Port. When Sir Roger asked how the remaining roughly $4 million was to be spent, Mr. Gordon explained that specific amounts had not yet been decided upon, but the United States planned to concentrate on two or three sectors of the Somali economy--the inter-river area, education and water resources, plus the public safety program--and the various projects in these sectors would probably total $3.2 or $3.4 million.
Sir Roger remarked that this was very interesting information and confirmed his views that tripartite discussions among the British, Italians and United States should be held in the near future. The British had recently talked with the Italians in Rome, where they had found the Italians questioning the United States contributions to developmental aid. The Italians had said that they did not know what the United States had done to fulfill its commitments made during the Rome talks in November 1960 with the exception of Chisimaio Port. In view of this lack of communication it would probably be useful for the three powers to review what they had done and what they contemplated doing in 1963.
Governor Williams said he agreed that such a tripartite meeting would probably be useful. He felt that a balanced approach as proposed by Sir Roger was generally right. However, it should be noted that although the United States seemed to be providing a considerably larger amount to Somalia, this was not a deliberate policy on our part. It resulted from our wanting to provide one large project the Somalis particularly desired. Since this had been Chisimaio, the picture had been thrown somewhat out of focus.
Mr. Witman then said we hoped both the British and Italians would come forward soon with the military items they proposed to provide in the forthcoming year. The Somalis seemed very concerned over that particular subject. Sir Roger said that they had that problem very much in mind and did intend to inform the Somali Government shortly. He gathered from what had been said that the United States would not object to a tripartite meeting which he envisioned primarily as a discussion of what could be done in the developmental field since the United States obviously was not prepared to participate in budgetary support and military assistance. The Italians and British, of course, would use the occasion to inform the United States of their intentions in these areas. Governor Williams said that inasmuch as the British had talked to both the Italians and us about the meeting, he would suggest they consider themselves delegated to coordinate the arrangements for it. When Sir Roger asked if the United States preferred any particular site, the Governor said he thought it would be better to hold it outside of Washington. Sir Roger agreed and said he would probably propose to the Italians that a preliminary discussion take place among our Ambassadors in Mogadiscio which would be followed up in Rome in the Spring in formal tripartite consultations.
Mr. Gordon said he would like to point out that any reduction by the British in their aid level would create quite a problem for us with Congress. It was extremely difficult to make a convincing case of why we had to pick up additional aid requirements when former metropoles reduced their contributions. Sir Roger said he realized this, but, if it would be of any help, it could be pointed out that the British reduction would probably occur entirely in its former protectorate as far as the developmental sector went. If the British in addition had to reduce the amount of budg-etary support they were providing, this would not effect the American aid level since we are not participating in the budgetary sector.
Mr. Witman inquired whether the British were aware of the activity surrounding the new Haile Selassie I University. Specifically, were they going to send a representative to the Founder's Day celebration on December 18, 1961? Sir Roger replied that while they were aware of some new stirring within the University, they had not been invited as far as he knew to send a representative to the convocation and had made no preparation to do so.
276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5 - 1962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe in draft and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and pouched to Paris for the Embassy and CINCEUR.
Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:20 p.m.
544. Embdes 233. /2/ While numerous notes received from FonOff in last six months requesting additional military equipment, believe presentation Ethiopian position given Bowles by Emperor (ref des) most important and inclusive. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should seek audience with Emperor and, in response to referenced memorandum, orally present points outlined below. You should also leave an aide-memoire along same lines.
/2/ Despatch 233, February 26, reported the discussion between Chester Bowles, Presidential Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, and Emperor Haile Selassie of U.S. military assistance programs in Addis Ababa on February 21. (Ibid., 123 - Bowles, Chester) On February 24, he sent a telegram from New Delhi recommending that the Ethiopian request for a second squadron of F - 86s [text not declassified] be rejected tactfully but firmly. He noted that there was no rational military justification for the request and that if the United States increased military aid to Ethiopia, the result would be an arms race with its neighbors. (Telegram 2633 from New Delhi; ibid., 775.56311/2 - 2462)
USG appreciates opportunity given Ambassador Bowles Feb 21, 1962 discuss with His Imperial Majesty problems which Ethiopia and US share. Bowles returned to Washington deeply impressed not only with Emperor's dedication to Ethiopian people and their political and economic development but also with Emperor's views on social development and importance of individual citizen.
U.S. believes, as indicated by Bowles, there broad areas of agreement on almost every point discussed: need for economic planning; for widespread distribution of land so that every peasant family will have share in country's development; for expansion education and medical services; for improved communications and particularly for greater emphasis on rural areas. USG is anxious continue to assist IEG carry out these plans for development and will work with IEG on those projects which meet AID criteria and which both governments agree will contribute to social and economic betterment of Ethiopian people. Only need of additional military equipment seemed require further study by both governments. USG has reviewed memorandum given Bowles after meeting and comments as follows:
Scope and purpose US - IEG military program decided in 1953 agreement as modified 1956 and 1960. Since that time efficient, modern Ethiopian fighting force has been developed capable defeating any potential invader. In fact, nowhere near Ethiopia's borders does there appear to exist a well-armed adversary capable of launching a serious sustained attack on Ethiopia. The possibility of successful aggression against Ethiopia has therefore, if anything, markedly decreased. The military case for expansion Ethiopian forces for defensive purposes is thus difficult to substantiate at this time and justification to numerous interested observers would be necessary not only by Ethiopia but also by U.S. in view Somalia's recent complaint to UN SYG and increasing concern over Ethiopian military might. USG, and presumably IEG, would wish to be especially careful at this point re taking any action which might trigger an arms race in Horn of Africa. While Italy and UK undoubtedly would not provide Somalia with any more military equipment than required for internal security and basic defense, there is little doubt Communist countries would exploit any possibility of causing an armed conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. Furthermore, and important as a separate consideration, support for additional military equipment and forces at this time would place considerable additional strain on Ethiopia's resources and quite probably necessitate postponement of some important economic development measures. Therefore in the interest of peace, and in order to prevent hasty counter-action by Somalia, USG regrets that it is unable to meet IEG request for additional fighter aircraft. With regard to transport aircraft for Ethiopian airforce, USG considers, and assumes IEG would now agree, that planned delivery of 2 C - 54 aircraft in August of this year together with C - 47 aircraft already delivered fulfills IEG requirements.
With reference other military items mentioned in note given Ambassador Bowles Feb 21, 1962, USG has already undertaken to meet most these requests on a continuing basis in regular program. While M - 24 tank has been considered adequate for Ethiopian needs, Ethiopian program nevertheless already calls for change which should meet Ethiopian request this item (13 M - 41 tanks in FY 62 program to be delivered in FY 63; 27 more in proposed FY 63 program for delivery in FY 64). Twelve 155 mm Howitzers are proposed for FY 63 program for delivery in FY 63. While USG always willing consider other IEG requests such as prefabricated housing mentioned in memorandum, it should be noted that 26 quonset huts and 16 prefab buildings were delivered in Oct 1959. Four of these quonsets and 7 prefab buildings are still in original crates at Engineer Depot Addis Ababa. With respect to the quartermaster items requested in IEG note of Sept 6, 1961, a substantial quantity of personal equipment is proposed for FY 63 program with delivery before end that fiscal year. Believe facts enumerated this para strong evidence that USG is in fact planning meet IEG needs on a continuing basis. Of course, firm program for such of above items as proposed for FY 63 program depend-ent upon annual Congressional action which for FY 63 still pending.
In conclusion USG wishes assure IEG it expects to continue fulfill all of its commitments re Ethiopian military establishment and is prepared jointly review Ethiopian needs yearly and meet continuing requirements on basis military, political and economic situation prevailing in two countries at that time. /3/
/3/ On May 24, Ambassador Arthur Richards reported that he had discussed the points in telegram 544 with the Emperor that morning. Haile Selassie expressed gratitude for U.S. aid and said that it was because of the build-up of the military capability of Ethiopia's neighbors, especially Somalia, that the Imperial Ethiopian Government felt it necessary to increase the capabilities of the Ethiopian Air Force. Thus, he was disappointed that the United States had rejected his request for F - 86s. (Telegram 618 from Addis Ababa; ibid., 775.5/5 - 2462)
Rusk
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/5 - 362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Buckle on May 17; cleared in draft by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tasca, and Wolfe and by Hutchinson, Kitchen, and Bowles; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Addis Ababa.
Washington, May 19, 1962, 12:22 p.m.
311. Embtel 420 to Dept, rptd Addis Ababa 89, /2/ Embdes 184. /3/ View certain contentious statements in GSR note Embdes 184, Dept had hoped be able avoid official reply. However, Embtel 420 indicates GSR awaiting response. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should reply along following lines:
/2/ Dated May 3. (Ibid.)
/3/ Despatch 184, April 20, transmitted a translation of a Somali Government note verbale of April 17 stating that the Somali people were deeply convinced that the massacres perpetrated by the Ethiopian armed forces against thousands of innocent Somalis had been carried out with arms furnished to Ethiopia by the U.S. Government, and expressing the hope that the United States, having realized the gravity of the situation currently existing between Somalia and Ethiopia, would stop furnishing arms to Ethiopia. (Ibid., 775.5/4 - 2062)
USG previously unaware that thousands of Somalis had been massacred in their villages by Ethiopian troops using arms furnished by the USG as stated in GSR's note of April 7, 1962. USG would of course wish to review carefully any evidence GSR has to substantiate this accusation. Use of military equipment furnished IEG by USG is restricted to internal security and defensive measures or in support UN operations. As far as we have been aware, this is all that arms we have furnished have been used for and USG would certainly take appropriate measures if investigation proved otherwise.
USG policy in Horn of Africa is to help both Ethiopia and Somalia help themselves in battle against underdevelopment. This is only battle which USG supports. We profoundly hope all disputes between Somalia and her neighbors can be settled by peaceful means and have used our good offices in past in pursuit this objective. USG more than willing attempt do so again if tensions should once more rise. Moreover, GSR does not have to be reminded of special interest of UN in welfare of Somali Republic, which acquired its independence under UN supervision. Somali Republic has won respect of world in promising that pursuit of national interests will conform to principles UN charter. In return, Somali Republic's best hope of security lies in protection offered by UN charter.
USG has been extremely careful to avoid any action which would seem to be a contribution to an arms race anywhere in Africa. In line with this objective USG has refrained from assisting GSR in military field particularly since it is understood that governments of Italy and UK have agreed satisfy her defense requirements. Similarly USG has not responded favorably to Ethiopian requests for military equipment over and above quantities reasonably needed for internal security and defense.
Should be noted that equipment USG currently providing IEG is in fulfillment of commitments made in 1953 as amended 1956 and 1960. No expansion of force goals set at those dates is currently contemplated. USG, of course, cannot refuse to honor its limited commitments, however, and various replacement items will be provided from time to time.
USG is well aware Somali concern over possible border difficulties and would of course endeavor use its influence to discourage aggression should it threaten. USG believes its continued role in Ethiopian military program actually one of great usefulness to Somalia as well as IEG. As long as USG satisfying IEG's minimum materiel and training requirements, peace has much greater chance remaining in Horn than if USG withdrew and left a vacuum.
Rusk
278. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia, 1/62 - 10/62. Official Use Only. Drafted by Tasca.
Washington, July 13, 1962.
SUBJECT
Presentation of Credentials to the President by the New Ambassador of the Somali Republic
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Omar Mohallim Mohamed, Somali Ambassador
Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
After the usual opening pleasantries, the President referred to United States interest in Somalia and limitations on United States aid arising from the balance of payments position. He stressed the large and continuing drain which had resulted from our aid program over the years. The President underlined the importance of continued aid from Italy and Great Britain.
The Somali Ambassador expressed his gratitude for United States aid to date and requested the President to urge the Italians to continue their aid and to pay the amounts promised for budgetary support. In reply the President promised we would urge the Italians to take appropriate action. He remarked that Italy's gold and balance of payments position made this quite feasible, particularly, since Italy was doing nothing elsewhere of this kind in the field of direct aid. It was noted that the United States was not in a position to provide budgetary support.
In this connection, the Ambassador referred to the Soviet offer to finance certain items which are included in the United States plans for the second phase of Chisimaio. He said that the Somali Government would turn down the Soviet offer. However, they would wish the second phase to be financed by United States grants, not loans. The President stated it was unwise to mix Soviet assistance with ours. The Congress does not like this.
The Ambassador then raised the question of United States military aid to Ethiopia. In reply the President noted (a) our aid was for internal security purposes; (b) it began in 1952, long before Somalia's independ-ence; (c) we counted on the Italians and British to provide aid in this field to Somalia.
In closing the meeting the President said that the United States would address itself again to Italy requesting it to provide aid to Somalia.
279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/8 - 962. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Adams on August 10; cleared by Witman, Troxel, Hamilton (AID) in draft, Snowden, Fitzgerald, and Hunt; and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, and Rome.
Washington, August 11, 1962, 1:05 p.m.
40. Embtel 52 to Dept, rptd London 13, Rome separately by Dept; Embtel 53 to Dept, rptd London 14, Rome 23. /2/ You should inform Prime Minister in response your tels 52 and 53 that although USG desires help Somalia and has shown unfailing good faith in this respect, our ability to continue to do so has been increasingly handicapped by repeated instances of his Govt's simultaneously dickering with both US and USSR in same or related fields. Sometimes we have learned of prior commitments to Soviets only after negotiations with US well advanced. While we have endeavored where possible to provide Somalia with Western alternatives, in notable recent instances our efforts have been rewarded by Somali decision to accept Soviet offers.
/2/ Both dated August 9. (Ibid.)
Reftel 53 indicates Minister of Interior and Soviet Economic Counselor already discussing Soviet aid for Somali national airline. USG can not deliver DC - 3 aircraft and provide training for 8 pilots previously offered, to be incorporated in Soviet-managed airline. Therefore, in context above paragraph, you are requested inform Somali Govt as follows: USG will offer following package to GSR on clear understanding latter not accept Soviet offer re aviation training (civil or military) and airline management or assistance: USG will provide three DC - 3s as formerly discussed with GSR plus training 15 civilian pilots and 20 mechanics if Italian Govt does not meet its portion previous proposal, together with management assistance for purpose establishing internal airline system. Rejection of any one of these three parts (aircraft, training, or management) by GSR will be considered rejection total package. In presentation to Somali Gov't officials you should make clear this does not mean open end provision of funds by USG for all expenses required to operate an airline.
FYI. Dept still considering whether or not recommend invitation Prime Minister for Presidential visit. Outcome likely depend upon negotiations aviation problem Mogadiscio. End FYI. /3/
/3/ Telegram 58 from Mogadiscio, August 14, reported that General Abscir said that although it was the firm policy of the Somali Government not to accept military assistance from the Bloc, the ``Defense Establishment" had persuaded the Prime Minister that accept-ance of training did not violate this policy. (Ibid., 775.5/8 - 1462) On August 15, the Department instructed the Embassy in Mogadiscio to make the package offer as directed. (Telegram 44 to Mogadiscio; ibid., 777.5/8 - 1562) Telegram 66 from Mogadiscio, August 17, reported that after learning that the three DC - 3s previously offered would be withdrawn if Somalia sent pilots and mechanics to the Soviet Union for training, the Prime Minister rejected the U.S. package. (Ibid., 777.5/8 - 1762)
Rusk
280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/11 - 762. Secret. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Junkermann (OSD/ISA) in substance, Stout, and Bergesen; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Addis Ababa.
Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:02 p.m.
2505. London's 1793 /2/ (not repeated to other posts) and Deptel 216 to Addis. /3/ Dept plans inform UK and Italian representatives Washington that, as result discussions in Addis and with General Merid in Washington, US has agreed accelerate shipment limited number tanks and personnel carriers to Ethiopia in context basic US commitment to strengthen Ethiopian armed forces and in light cooperative Ethiopian attitude with respect Korea and Congo. US has not agreed provide additional jet fighters beyond replacement for two F - 86s lost in accidents. US has agreed provide additional propeller-driven training aircraft and 5 additional jet trainers.
/2/ Dated November 7. (Ibid.)
/3/ Dated November 5. (Ibid., 775.5/11 - 562)
U.S. continues be guided in assessing Ethiopian requests by its desire, within context US commitments and interests in Ethiopia, avoid increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia and stimulating arms race Horn of Africa.
Deptel 124 to Mogadiscio requesting latest information status UK and Italian arms aid Somalia is indication continuing US interest in assuring Somalia on its part can meet its defense needs from friendly sources. Dept aware this subject likely be discussed during Abdirascid visit November 27.
London and Rome may similarly inform foreign offices.
Rusk
281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 675.77/11 - 1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared in draft by Cole, Tank (AID), and Harrison (AID) and by Witman, by Godley and Whitfield (OSD/ISA) in substance; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Leopoldville, and Asmara and by pouch to USUN, London, and Rome.
Washington, November 17, 1962, 6:16 p.m.
232. Addis Ababa's 281 /2/ and 283. /3/ For Ambassador. You should on urgent basis seek earliest possible audience with Emperor or failing this appointment with Prime Minister Aklilou to discuss following:
/2/ Dated November 16. (Ibid.)
/3/ Dated November 16. (Ibid., 975.40/11 - 1662)
1. Congo: Only three Saabs and one Canberra combat equipped and operational in Congo. In view Emperor's continued indications firm support UN operation in Congo, Department hopeful IEG will dispatch four F - 86s with pilots soonest.
2. At your discretion, convey our desire move ahead rapidly to complete arrangements for Kagnew extension in implementation of Emperor's 1960 agreement in principle.
3. At your discretion, advise that RCA has informed Department and is informing IEG that after full consideration problem, they are unable continue with present contract. You should also advise that USG urgently examining alternatives.
4. You should present military assistance for Somalia in following manner (to Emperor only):
(a) USG has consistently demonstrated its sincere interest in security Ethiopia through variety means including support for Ethiopian military and police. US opposition to any activities threatening Ethiopia's territorial integrity was publicly announced shortly after Ambassador Richards' presentation credentials in 1960. USG continues adhere firmly to this position.
(b) USG is aware of Ethiopia's concern that Somalia might again become avenue for threat to Ethiopian territorial integrity. It clear to us that Somalis not likely ever have sufficient military establishment to encourage them attempt unaided promote their aim of Greater Somalia by force. We are concerned however at penetration of Somali military through medium military assistance from nations whose intentions towards Ethiopia suspect. This raises possibility Somalis might lend themselves to adventure against Ethiopia supported by forces from outside.
(c) Military assistance to Somalia which UK and Italy willing provide leaves gaps in Somali military requirements which being filled in part by UAR. Soviet Union has recently made beginning in filling one such gap by initiating program of training for 20 Somali military pilots and 30 mechanics. Soviet plans with regard Somali military clearly do not stop there. Undoubtedly training will be followed by offers military hardware.
(d) USG has already made major effort influence Somalis against allowing entrance into such sensitive field of nations whose intentions towards Ethiopia dubious. Principal inhibiting factor in US ability exert influence on Somali Government has been our refusal, based on our knowledge Ethiopian sensitivities, to provide military assistance to Somalia.
(e) We feel time has now come when both USG and IEG must take under urgent reconsideration problem of military assistance to Somalia. There is now no longer any question of whether Somalis are going to continue build their military establishment, but by how much and from whom. We feel interests of both USG and IEG require that sources of military aid for Somalia be nations who can be counted upon keep Somali military development within reasonable bounds and whose friendship for Ethiopia and dedication to Ethiopia's territorial integrity are amply demonstrated and not open to question.
(f) USG accordingly is coming to conclusion that some form of limited US military assistance to Somalia may be necessary to supplement efforts of UK and Italy in order preclude Soviet Union from this field and to reduce and if possible eliminate UAR as well. We are coming to Emperor before making any final decisions on this matter in hope he will appreciate urgency of need to ensure that major outside influences on Somalis in this sensitive area so important to Ethiopia's security will be exercised by nations sincerely desirous retaining Ethiopia's friendship and to promoting peace and security in Horn of Africa.
FYI. In your discussion if you think it would be useful, you might wish draw also on following: Somali Prime Minister arriving Washington November 27 and has already indicated this topic will be one of foremost subjects for his discussions with President and Secretary. His visit here will be part of tour of Western countries from whom Somalia now receiving aid. Degree of responsiveness he meets on tour could have significant effect on where Somalia will place its future reliance for aid of all types. You might also wish explain that any US military aid to Somalia would be closely coordinated with UK and Italy and would consist of minimum supplement to Italo - UK aid required for preclusion. End FYI. /4/
Rusk
/4/ On November 24, Ambassador Richards reported that when he had discussed Ethiopian-Somali relations with the Emperor during his farewell audience, Haile Selassie had told him he was convinced that U.S. military aid to Somalia would neither enhance U.S. influence nor prevent Somalia from accepting military aid from unfriendly quarters. (Telegram 299 from Addis Ababa; ibid., 777.5/11 - 2462) The Ambassador also reported that the Emperor had told him that if the United States was interested [text not declassified] he would agree in order to ``give pleasure." (Telegram 296 from Addis Ababa, November 24; ibid., 775.56311/11 - 2462)
282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 775.00/11 - 1962. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Newsom on November 20; cleared by Sisco, Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Witman, Harrison (AID), Tank, Hackler, Bergesen, and Stone; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Mogadiscio, Rome, Asmara, and USUN.
Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:33 a.m.
237. Addis Ababa's 287 to Dept, rptd Asmara 44; Addis Ababa's 288 to Dept, rptd Mogadiscio 42, Asmara 45. /2/ In audience with Emperor Thursday, Dept suggests further points for discussion in addition those outlined Deptel 232: /3/
/2/ Both dated November 19. (Ibid.)
/3/ Document 281.
(1) Re Eritrean Unification: In frank and friendly manner which has characterized our relations with Emperor, we wish state we have noted step and appreciate that there are factors relating nation's security which bear on Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea. Step has, however, placed US in difficult position. While USG wishes give full support measures designed increase security of Ethiopia, Eritrean federation was action supported by US in UN, action which, at time, was considered favorable to Ethiopia.
(2) If it appears appropriate pursue subject, or if Emperor raises question message you may inform HIM that, while US does not feel it appropriate commend Ethiopia on dissolution of federation or participate in formal observances of event, in view history federation and general interest international community, US has noted with favor Emperor's intention maintain rights and freedom Eritrean constitution and hopes unification may strengthen IEG's hand in moving forward with plans for reform and modernization (Embtel 287).
(3) If it would be of assistance in presentation that portion Deptel 232 relating arms for Somalia, you may indicate that, while our program by no means certain, and will in part depend on how other programs develop, our initial thinking solely in direction training and minimum supplement to equipment provided by UK and Italy.
(4) You may state, if occasion arises, US remains interested, as Ambassador Bowles stated, in viewing Five Year Plan (Embtel 249). /4/
(5) We hope have further telegrams re visit to you prior Thursday audience. /5/
Rusk
/4/ Telegram 249 from Addis Ababa, October 19, reported Ambassador Bowles' conversation with Emperor Haile Selassie on October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 675.77/10 - 1962)
/5/ Telegram 304 from Addis Ababa, November 27, reported that during his farewell audience with the Emperor on November 23, the Ambassador stressed that the U.S. Government was gratified at the Emperor's public pledge to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms in Eritrea. (Ibid., 775.00/11 - 2762)
283. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Somali Republic. Secret.
Washington, November 24, 1962.
Somali Prime Minister Abdirascid's visit may prove a delicate one. He's after more US aid and our support against Ethiopia; on neither account are we in a position to satisfy him fully, though we're trying to be as forthcoming as we can.
Somalia's whole outlook is dominated by its fear of Ethiopia (it has an undemarcated border with Ethiopia's Somali-populated Ogaden province), and its ambitions for a greater Somalia--including Ogaden, part of Kenya and French Somaliland.
Though Somalia's inclinations are pro-Western, it regards the US as so committed to Ethiopia that it has tended to reinsure with the UAR and the Bloc (this in turn feeds Ethiopian fears). The Soviets have been quite responsive, to the tune of $57 million in credits. Both the UAR and USSR are training Somali military and technicians.
Because of our Ethiopian ties, we've tried to get the UK and Italy, as the former landlords, to shoulder the main burden of supporting this desperately impoverished little country (see Tab V - B). /2/ But we've also invested quite a bit, especially in the Chisimaio port.
/2/ Not attached to the source text.
Abdirascid will no doubt complain about our military aid to Ethiopia (primarily as rent for the Kagnew communications facility we've given about $10 million MAP annually to build up the largest--and most useless--force in East Africa). Here again we've relied on the UK and Italy to help Somalia, but their aid, always small, is declining. If we don't start a small MAP program ourselves Somalia will turn increasingly to the all too willing Soviets and UAR.
A few hundred thousand a year in preclusive MAP for Somalia (we already support the police) will be much cheaper than the Ethiopian bill if Somalia goes to the Bloc and UAR. So if Abdirascid presses, we urge you tell him we'll examine his needs. Haile Selassie will holler, but we propose to make the same points to him.
Even more important, I hope you'll impress on Abdirascid the dangers Somalia is running if it pursues an irredentist course. It faces two broad choices, either to compose its quarrel with Ethiopia and take the road of internal development or to engage in an arms race in which we'll inevitably be on the other side. We don't see how Somalia can win out over Ethiopia; on the other hand, it could well use the UN route to mediate its boundary dispute (we don't want to mediate this one because the prospects for success are poor).
Abdirascid also wants more economic aid. We've already given more than to most comparable African states (average of $2.5 million FY 1957 - 61, $14.2 million in FY 1962 and $8.8 scheduled for FY 1963). The biggest item has been $7.3 in development grants for the Chisimaio port; we're committed to a $3 million second phase but there's an argument over whether it should be loan or grant. AID rightly insists that all other such African capital projects are going on a loan basis and that our DL terms are hardly onerous (3/4%, ten years grace, 40 years to pay). But Abdirascid contends that we promised a grant. The history is sufficiently fuzzy that you may want to concede if he presses the issue.
We've been more than forthcoming enough with Somalia to justify lecturing our visitor gently about the dangers of walking both sides of the street. Guinea's experience alone suggests that the Bloc eventually demands payment for its aid in one form or another.
The visit will be a success if we can send this fellow away thinking that (1) we'll help defend him against Ethiopia if he'll only stop tweaking Selassie's nose; and (2) the West will be reasonably helpful on aid if he doesn't play too much to the Bloc.
R. W. Komer
284. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret.
Washington, November 26, 1962.
Following last minute developments are worth noting before your talk with Abdirascid:
1. We have a report that Somalia, backed by Arab states, may bring Ethiopia's recent formal annexation of Eritrea before the UN (Eritrea was ``federated" with Ethiopia as part of the Italian colonies settlement). Though we hardly applaud Haile Selassie's action, we ought to tell Abdirascid that for Somalia to complain to the UN about it would not only be futile but further exacerbate Somali - Ethiopian relations. If they refrain instead, we could tell Selassie the Somalis did so as a contribution to better relations.
2. In his final audience with Selassie, Richards asked his reaction to possible US military aid to Somalia (see Addis 299 attached). /2/ Selassie doubted this would either enhance US influence or preclude Communist aid, but said he would not object if we decided to go ahead. So the field is clear. Selassie has also accepted your invitation for a visit in 1963.
/2/ Not attached to the source text. Telegram 299 from Addis Ababa, November 24, reported Ambassador Richards' discussion of Ethiopian-Somali relations with the Emperor during his farewell audience on November 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11 - 2462)
3. Before Abdirascid's departure, State tried to remove one recent irritant in US - Somali relations by promising three DC - 3's for an internal Somali airline on condition that the Somalis arrange for effective management and agree not to accept Soviet aid for the line. We had promised these planes a year ago but withdrew the offer when we thought erroneously that the Somalis were negotiating for Soviet management. Abdirascid was annoyed by the withdrawal and is not fully satisfied with our conditions for renewing the offer. If he raises this, you may want to soft-pedal the conditions by describing them as simply a normal effort to insure effective use of our aid and to assure Congress that it will not be mixed with Soviet aid.
4. Abdirascid also let his hair down on the US aid program. He feels our procedures are too slow, conditions too restrictive, and that we often fail to consult the Somalis. AID rejoins that the chief difficulties are poor Somali planning and lack of coordination within the Somali government. If Abdirascid brings up this issue, why not agree that improved US - Somali cooperation is essential but deliver a little lecture on the need for sound planning and self-help. Our projects take time because we, unlike the Soviets, are more interested in making a well-planned economic contribution than a political splash.
5. The Somalis have made a pitch for Abdirascid to see you alone. State doesn't know what he wants to say. Since his English is only fair, State will have an Italian-speaking interpreter (our visitor's Italian is fluent). We have no good Somali speaker available, so will have to depend on their interpreter if they choose Somali.
6. A supplementary State memo is attached. /3/
/3/ Attached to the source text but not printed is a paper entitled ``Visit of the Somali Prime Minister, November 27 - December 2, 1962: Contingency Talking Paper for the President."
R. W. Komer
285. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Witman. The conversation was held at the White House. A memorandum of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Abdirascid's discussion of U.S. economic assistance to Somalia on November 27 is ibid.
Washington, November 27, 1962, noon.
SUBJECT
United States - Somali Relations
PARTICIPANTS
Somali
Prime Minister Abdirascid Ali Scermarche
Foreign Minister Abdullahi Issa Mohamud
Ambassador to the U.S. Omar Mohallim Mohamed
Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdulrahim Abbey Farah
Deputy in the National Assembly Michael Mariano
Deputy in the National Assembly Abdinur Mohamed Hussein
United States
The President
Deputy Administrator, AID, Frank M. Coffin
Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams
Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry J. Tasca
Chief of Protocol, Angier Biddle Duke
Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, William Witman II
The President welcomed the Prime Minister and asked his judgment on events in East Africa, as well as how he felt relations between Somalia and the United States could be improved.
Prime Minister Abdirascid thanked the President for the opportunity of expressing views on problems of interest to both countries, which he would do with the President's indulgence in a frank and direct manner. He asked that it first be established, however, that the Somalis were grateful for American interest and support both before and after independence.
The Prime Minister went on to say that Somalia could not solve its problems by itself; it needed the help of the developed countries, especially the United States as a world leader. Somalia's problems were political, economic and social. Political independence was not enough if the country did not advance with economic development, especially for such a backward country as Somalia.
Abdirascid then gave an historical account of the ``artificial and unjust" division of Somali lands during the last century into five parts by Italy, Great Britain (2 parts), France and Ethiopia. The greatest hope of the Somali people was for reunification, but the Somali Constitution condemns all manifestations of violence. He felt there was a necessity for good offices or mediation by friendly states, and hoped the U.S. could be helpful. Ethiopia toward the end of the last century had incorporated a large part of Somali territory, and was using troops against the Somali population. These troops were equipped with arms furnished by the United States. He said he had told the U.S. Embassy the U.S. should stop the moral and material aid it was providing Ethiopia against the defenseless Somali people. The Government knew what the U.S. explanation was, but it was very difficult to explain to the man-in-the-street that the U.S. was furnishing arms to Ethiopia. The Prime Minister appealed to the President as the highest authority in the United States to stop furnishing arms to Ethiopia. He added that Ethiopia was also encouraging the Kenyans not to come to terms with Somalia over the Northern Frontier District. In the interest of avoiding a new Congo situation, he hoped the U.S. would intervene with Kenya before independence to transfer the Somali-inhabited area to Somalia.
President Kennedy replied that the problem of arms for Ethiopia was a difficult one. We had had similar situations elsewhere as in the Pakistan-India dispute over Kashmir. We would attempt to prevent the use of our equipment against the other. We recognized that as long as Ethiopia possessed the important territory Somalia claimed, relations between the two countries would be complicated. Our assistance to Ethiopia was begun long before Somalia became independent, and was not related to Somalia in any way. We would like to see relations with Ethiopia improved but were not sure what the U.S. could do. The Kashmir dispute had gone on for 14 years, but we were not able to influence it. Nor the Pak - Afghan, Thai - Cambodian, Ecuador - Peru, even Cuba - U.S. disputes. There was tremendous popular feeling, and we were not able to settle them as we would have liked to see them settled. Perhaps the UN could help. But it was beyond the resources of a single country like the U.S. to solve all problems, especially those going back in time. We could only try to minimize differences, and try to keep a balance. The President noted that we were providing relatively large economic assistance for Somalia in addition to the obligations of the Italians and British which they should fulfill. We were anxious to see the problems between Somalia and Ethiopia settled, and would do anything we could.
Prime Minister Abdirascid remarked that he understood U.S. difficulties over good offices. Somalia was anxiously awaiting arms, but was not asking for arms just because Ethiopia was getting arms.
The President responded he would like to talk to the Prime Minister about how we might assist Somalia in this area. (Abdirascid did not take the President up on this point.) The President then went on to cite the use by the Portuguese in Angola and the French in Algeria of NATO arms, and said he understood Somali irritation, but assured the Prime Minister we would attempt to prevent the wrong use of the arms we were giving Ethiopia. He reiterated that we would be glad to talk to see if we could be of any assistance to Somalia. (Again Abdirascid seemed not to grasp the meaning of the President's remark.) The President added that the Ethiopians alleged Somalia was getting arms from the UAR and the Soviets. The Prime Minister vigorously asserted that Somalia was getting absolutely no arms from the Soviets.
President Kennedy summarized this part of the discussion as follows:
a. We would be glad to talk about any assistance we might give, and
b. We would look again at the use of American equipment against the Somali people.
An Italian interpreter was used.
286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret.
Washington, November 28, 1962.
I understand Rusk and Coffin took care of most remaining specifics this morning, so your second talk with Abdirascid can be short. However, one problem area deserves a reprise.
Nothing you can say will be of more benefit to US policy than urging Abdirascid to lay off Somali - Ethiopian disputes. Unless the trend is reversed, things are heading toward an eventual clash in which we will end up backing Ethiopia and the UAR/USSR the Somalis.
There is no point in debating the specifics. We understand Somali's ethnic claims. But the overriding fact is that Ethiopia is so much bigger than Somali that Somalis can't win. You could drive this home by warning Abdirascid that if the issue is pressed to a confrontation, we may be forced to take the Ethiop side, something we don't want to do.
On the other hand we oppose any Ethiopian pressures on Somali. In fact we will consider limited military aid along with UK and Italy (this point apparently didn't sink in at last session) in addition to our support of Somali police. But we think it folly for so desperately poor a country as Somali to burden itself with a big military machine. This is a mistake made by all too many underdeveloped states.
Also worth saying is that we can protect the Somalis even more by controlling the flow of MAP to the Ethiops than by giving compensatory aid to Somalis. But we cannot resist Ethiopian pleas if the Somalis get a lot of equipment from Moscow and Cairo. Therefore, we're happy to hear that Somalis aren't seeking arms from the Soviets.
Why not tell Abdi that you've looked into his complaints about handling of US aid projects. We can and will improve, but Somalis need to jack up their planning and improve coordination within their own house. We're serious about self-help.
R. W. Komer /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.7711/11 - 3062. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Coffin (AID), Whitfield (OSD), Little, Tasca, and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Witman. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Rome, Bonn, and London.
Washington, November 30, 1962, 12:22 p.m.
161. Following is summary discussions with Somali Prime Minister and party in Washington November 27 - 28 based on uncleared memcons. Prime Minister and party met with President November 27 and 28 /2/ and with Secretary November 28. /3/ AID Acting Administrator Coffin present at all meetings.
/2/ These discussions were recorded in four memoranda of conversation. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia) See also Document 285.
/3/ These discussions were recorded in four memoranda of conversation. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
Abdirascid expressed gratitude for US interest and support and expressed need for help. Then followed exposition Somali desire for reunification and expression concern over difficulties with Ethiopia and US military assistance to Ethiopia.
President explained problem US arms for Ethiopia was difficult one similar to those faced by US in certain other areas in which we endeavor prevent use of US equipment by one nation against another. Recognizing complications in Ethiopian - Somali relations and long history US assist-ance to Ethiopia unrelated to Somalia, US could only try minimize differences and keep balance. President noted large US economic assistance to Somalia in addition to Italian and UK obligations and expressed desire see problems between Somalia and Ethiopia settled. US would do what it could.
Prime Minister mentioned Somali need for arms. President said he would be prepared see how US could be of assistance. Secretary separately enunciated further US agreement in principle study Somalia's genuine security needs and to consider supplementing efforts other Western powers. Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with changed US position and expressed hope for vehicles and equipment and training for both Army and police. He agreed with suggestion security forces could play useful role in economic development as well as security field. He stressed Somalia's needs were strictly for internal security and defense and promised any assistance provided would not be used for offensive purposes. Prime Minister also stressed fact Somali Government committed by Constitution to pursue its national goals only by strictly legal and peaceful means.
President presented case for long-term low interest loan on second phase Chisimaio with ten-year grace period. Somalis did not press for grant. Prime Minister outlined points dissatisfaction with aid program including slowness execution projects and high administrative costs. Details various aid problems were later reviewed in separate meeting Coffin and Muller of AID and Abdinur and Ali Sheikh.
US opposition to commingling was stressed. Prime Minister said Somalia constitutionally neutral but fundamentally pro-Western and would not go to Soviet Union for essential needs if they could be obtained in West.
Prime Minister asked US put in good word for Somalia with IBRD. Noted 5-year plan would be ready in next few months and indicated Somali intention seek support for plan from EEC, US, and international agencies. He stated IBRD had approved November 27 proposal to send IBRD survey team to study projects.
President concluded that visit useful in focussing attention on Somali needs. Somalis must recognize difficulties US has in meeting Somali needs, but assured Prime Minister US anxious do best it can and is very sympathetic to Somalia's difficulties.
Rusk
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11 - 3062. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on November 29; cleared by Kyle (AID), Junkermann (OSD/ISA), Stout, and Burke; and approved by Witman. Also sent to London and repeated to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Bonn.
Washington, November 30, 1962, 4:18 p.m.
1035. Department November 29 handed representatives UK and Italian Embs following memorandum re military aid for Somalia:
``During the visit of Prime Minister Abdirascid Ali Scermarche of Somalia to Washington November 27 and 28, he raised with United States officials the question of military assistance to the Somali Republic.
The United States stated its readiness to talk with the Somalis regarding a coordinated program supplementing assistance being received from Italy and the United Kingdom. Presumably such discussions will take place in Somalia at some appropriate time after the Prime Minister's return.
In advance of any such discussions, the United States would welcome the views of the Governments of Italy and the United Kingdom on the matter and the details of their current program which would be helpful to the United States in assessing supplemental requests from Somalia.
The United States decision represents a further expression of the importance with which we regard the maintenance of a Western position in this area and a further indication of our desire to support, to the fullest extent possible, the assistance being rendered Somalia by Italy and the United Kingdom."
In presenting memoranda to UK and Italian representatives Dept added orally U.S. had raised question military assistance Somalia with Emperor of Ethiopia who did not like idea but said he would not oppose. Dept also stressed hope expressed to Somalis that arms program could serve dual purpose of military needs and civic action. Finally, Dept expressed earnest desire that U.S. willingness contribute to program would not cause cessation or diminution military aid from UK and Italy. Re discussion with Somalis, Department noted new U.S. Ambassador Somalia expected arrive Mogadiscio January or early February.
Rome and London may give memo and background to Foreign Offices. /2/
/2/ On December 12, the Embassy in Rome reported that the Italian Government intended to maintain economic assistance to Somalia at the current level. (Telegram 1181 from Rome; ibid., 877.0000/12 - 1262)
Rusk
289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/11 - 2462. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared in substance by Whitfield (OSD/ISA), Tank (AID), and Kent (AID); and approved by Witman.
Washington, January 7, 1963, 6:19 p.m.
320. Addis Ababa's 299 to Dept, rptd Mogadiscio 45, Nov 24, 1962. /2/ If Embassy should be queried by IEG concerning military aid results Somali Prime Minister's visit to U.S. you may advise IEG that:
/2/ See footnote 1, Document 284.
(1) In response his request for military aid, Somali Prime Minister was informed USG willing in principle consider supplementing military aid supplied Somalia by other Western powers and that matter would be discussed further after arrival Mogadiscio new U.S. Ambassador (ETA end January).
(2) Somali Prime Minister gave assurances Somali military forces would be used solely for purposes internal security and defense and would be designed as dual purpose forces with capability contributing to economic development.
(3) Somali Prime Minister also has assured us Somalia will not accept military aid from Soviets (i.e., arms and equipment) and that if training available in West ``we will send no more to Communist countries."
(4) USG has reason to hope other Western powers will bear main burden arms supplies to Somalia and that therefore relatively small U.S. program will be needed supplement efforts other Western powers to fill gaps through which Soviets might otherwise effect entry. /3/
/3/ On January 17, the Embassy in Addis Ababa reported that Getachew Mekasha, Assistant Minister for African Affairs at the Ethiopian Foreign Office, had been informed of the military aid results of the Somali Prime Minister's visit to Washington. The Minister said that Ethiopia would prefer that Somalia not be given military aid, but added that Western aid to Somalia was perhaps the lesser of two evils because Ethiopia could count on U.S. influence to prevent these arms from being used against it. (Telegram 400 from Addis Ababa; Department of State, Central Files, 777.5/1 - 1763)
Ball
290. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Confidential.
Washington, February 26, 1963.
Military aid to Somalia. When Abdirascid was here last November, you told him we were willing to discuss how we could help Somalia in a limited way. State amplified that we would consider supplementing UK and Italian aid if the Somalis promised not to use it for aggression. Somalis agreed that we might help their military contribute to economic development.
Ambassador Torbert mentioned our offer to Abdirascid early this month. The Somalis last week agreed to our sending a survey team by mid-March. We have in mind very limited civic action and internal security support.
We're still not sure why Sunday's demonstrations in Mogadiscio rubbed off on us. However, Somalia hadn't announced our offer (PM intended to include it in a recent speech then got sick), so most Somalis still think of us as the guys who arm their enemies, the Ethiops. Our embassy stands only a block from Ethiopia's and a small goon squad could easily have diverted the main anti-Ethiopian demonstration. We think we ought to go ahead with the team anyway, as our aim is to forestall Somalis turning to Bloc and UAR for a lot more hardware.
R. W. Komer
291. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: ``(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63--Tab 1)."
Washington, March 18, 1963.
SUBJECT
Current Crisis in the Horn of Africa
Present Situation
The present situation in the Horn of Africa contains elements of serious concern which would be particularly aggravated by a break in British - Somali relations:
1. The USSR and Communist China, which have from time to time shown particular interest in Somalia would be presented with the most favorable opportunity since Somalia's independence to establish a position of influence by encouraging the Somalis to press their claims in various ways including the provision of financial and military support. The Communist countries would have to weigh very carefully the effect on their position in Ethiopia and East Africa of supporting what may well be the miniority side of an intra-African quarrel. Their support of Somalia in this crisis might therefore be so conceived and so purveyed as to minimize damage to their interests elsewhere in the area.
2. The situation poses threats to the peace in three areas:
a. Within Kenya's Northern Frontier District, where Somali tribesmen, possibly with Somali Government support, might clash with British-led African troops.
b. On the Ethiopian - Somali frontier, where Ethiopia might move military forces, enhancing the risk of incidents with Somali military or police units.
c. Within Somalia itself, where a breakdown in internal security could occur, fomented by anti-Western elements and directed indiscriminately against all Western nationals (there are 437 Americans in the country, including 40 Peace Corps Volunteers widely scattered in the interior).
3. The termination of British aid to Somalia would leave gaps of approximately $2 million in budgetary support, $700,000 in development aid and $700,000 in military aid. (The US in the FY63 program is providing $4.6 million in development grants, $4.4 million in loan funds, and $1.7 million in PL-480 aid.)
Steps We Are Taking
To meet these possibilities we have taken the following steps:
1. Urgent consultations carried on with the British continuously over the past few weeks to ascertain what they might be able to do to mollify the Somalis at least temporarily for the purpose of postponing or averting the rupture in relations.
2. Presidential message delivered to the Somali Prime Minister on March 14 strongly urging that channels of communication and negotiation with the UK be kept open.
3. Strong demarches made to both Ethiopia and Somalia on March 16 urging that they avoid such actions as troop movements which might appear provocative to the other side.
4. Temporarily delaying the US military survey team for Somalia, earlier scheduled to depart Washington March 17 to arrive Mogadiscio March 25. /2/
/2/ A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text at this point reads: ``Addis and Nairobi strongly objected to our sending team just now. It would also encourage Somalia to think we'd back them. RWK."
5. Urging the Italians on March 17 (to be repeated March 18) to accede to the British request that Italy assume responsibility for UK interests in Somalia in the event relations are definitely broken (we are willing to assume this burden ourselves but would prefer not to have our maneuverability so circumscribed).
Recommended Steps
Additionally, we are recommending:
1. that Governor Stevenson, after consulting with the UK UN Representative, approach the UN Secretary General to alert him to the situation, acquaint him with our concern, and discuss possible influence he may be able to bring to bear, either through the dispatch of a special emissary or through the UN Resident Representative in Mogadiscio;
2. that we urge the UN SYG to prevail upon the Somalis and the Kenya leaders to accept a formula calling for retention of the status quo for a 90-day period, to be followed by talks between Kenyans and Somalis after the May 18 - 26 elections in Kenya;
3. that we request the UK to urge moderation on Kenya leaders, particularly in public pronouncements concerning the problem;
4. that we instruct our African posts to solicit the views of African leaders and to suggest the possibility of African discussion of the problem in the PAFMECSA context or at the Addis Ababa conference of African heads of state tentatively scheduled for May 23; and
5. that if hard information is received of Ethiopian troop movements into areas where their presence might provoke hostilities, (a) a demarche be made to the Ethiopians reminding them that our military assistance agreement with them prohibits the use of US - supplied arms for aggressive purposes, and (b) a Presidential message be sent to the Emperor expressing our concern over the course of events and asking the Emperor's assistance in reducing tensions.
Additional Factors
1. Another measure we have considered is to slow down the return of two battalions of Ethiopian troops which we are committed to airlift from the Congo. However, this movement will not begin until early April at the earliest, and it is not wholly clear that these two battalions are or would be a crucial factor in the problem described above. In the circumstances, we are not now prepared to recommend that we set aside or compromise the important principle that a country providing troops to a UN force gets them back when it asks for them.
2. The Department is considering the conditions under which we should regard it as useful to bring this matter to the Security Council, or to see it brought there by the Secretary General or one of the parties involved.
Grant G. Hilliker /3/
/3/ Hilliker signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
292. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: ``(Taken from Pres week-end reading dtd 3/23/63--Tab 1)."
Washington, March 21, 1963.
Attached is a fuller rundown on how we're trying to damp down Somali - Kenya - Ethiopia tension. /2/ We've already invested considerable effort, but must be careful because of our larger interests in Ethiopia and Kenya. Also, the Somalis have painted themselves into a corner by breaking relations with the UK, despite our best efforts. This will cost them $3.4 million in UK aid. Kenyan leaders have hardened against ceding any of their Somali-inhabited territory.
/2/ Document 291.
UK ineptness has added to this mess. The British have long encouraged the Somalis to think the UK would give them Somali Kenya before granting Kenyan independence. But Sandys, in negotiating the Kenyan constitution and paving the way for self-government there in May, reversed field and triggered off the Somalis.
We're in the middle. The Somalis will ask us to fill the aid gap, but we're already hard-pressed to justify the $10.7 million we're giving this year. We don't want to oppose Kenya, and most other Africans back Kenyans. But Kenyan refusal to cede Somali region will provoke further Somali agitation and invite Bloc meddling.
Moscow may go slow to avoid alienating Ethiopia and Bantu Africa. However, the Soviets have increased their effort in Somalia in the past year and may be willing to pay the price for a toehold on the Gulf of Aden. As for the Somalis, Abdirascid wants to avoid Bloc aid, but his opposition is pressing for it.
Immediate job is to keep the Somalis from further violence. We'll use our MAP survey team (held up until current flurry ends) to maintain our influence. State recommends we get U Thant to propose 90-day cooling-off period leading to Somali - Kenyan talks.
What happens in Kenya in the next year will be the key to ultimate solution. If Kenyan leaders foresee so much trouble controlling the Somalis that they decide to allow increasing autonomy, there might be a way (cession, purchase, UN plebiscite) to transfer Somali region to the Somali Republic. But this sets a bad precedent in rest of Africa, and Ethiops would violently oppose. So best line may be to dampen Somali irredentist hopes and convince Somalis their best bet is cooperation in some sort of East African federation.
Bob Komer
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US - SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Newsom, Kyle (AID), Muller (AID), Whitfield (DOD), and Oulashin; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome.
Washington, May 23, 1963, 11:19 a.m.
482. Based on findings and recommendations US Military Survey Team, /2/ Department and other agencies are now proceeding with preliminary steps necessary to implement quickly a final decision on US military assistance when it is reached. Because some of team's recommendations, such as the ``impact package," involve obligation of FY 1963 funds prior June 30, there is need for moving quickly.
/2/ Text of ``Recommended Military Assistance Program for Somalia" is ibid.
Without raising subject with Somali officials at this time, Department would like CT evaluation of desirability proceeding through Presidential Determination on waiver of bilateral agreement military assistance, or attempting obtain bilateral agreement and possible problems involved. This would include Somali reaction to provisions US - Ethiopia and US - Libya military assistance agreements, and role of Somali National Assembly. Re latter point, is Department correct in assuming Assembly would have to authorize ratification of bilateral agreement? /3/
/3/ On May 25, Ambassador Torbert recommended proceeding with a Presidential Determination, but avoiding advising the Somalis of this fact in order to have extra leverage for negotiation if necessary. (Telegram 601 from Mogadiscio; ibid.)
Ball
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Post; cleared by O'Mahony, Judd, Whitfield (DOD), Stout, Warren, Witman, and Polansky in substance and Tank (AID); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Bonn, Rome, Mogadiscio, London, Nairobi, and Paris (also for CINCEUR).
Washington, July 3, 1963, 6:38 p.m.
12. Ref: Rome's 2833. /2/ As outlined reftel numbered paragraph one, participants at Rome talks agreed US should undertake initial approach to IEG, in relatively low key, re western military aid to Somalia. Following suggested approach is provided for comment by Embassy Addis Ababa and for subsequent comment Germany, Italy and UK. Embassies Bonn, Rome and London should delay discussion this approach with FonOffs pending further instructions after Addis comments received.
/2/ Dated June 25. (Ibid.)
Department feels approach should be made directly to Emperor in context desire acquaint him with our concern and intentions re current situation Horn of Africa, taking advantage groundwork already laid with other IEG officials. Suggest you make these points:
1. As HIM aware, US long interested in peace and stability Horn of Africa, including particularly territorial integrity and independence states of Horn. As problems have arisen this area and US has made decisions it has always sought keep HIM informed its concern and intentions.
2. We welcomed progress toward closer relations among Africans achieved at Addis conference.
3. We are conscious Emperor's special concern over Somalia. We hope HIM's efforts improve relations will be successful. As HIM knows, we have been ready at all times assist in this matter. We believe close relations important to peace of significant area of Africa.
4. At same time, as HIM knows, we and other western friends of Ethiopia have for some time faced problem posed by Somali determination acquire modern defensive capability. We see problem against background intention Somali Prime Minister visit Peking, significant Soviet economic efforts Somalia, Somalis training in USSR, possible Somali acquisition of Soviet-type aircraft from UAR or USSR, and of possible arms shipments from USSR or China. We believe presence Soviet arms in Somalia, particularly if they are compatible with those held by UAR, would present threat to Ethiopia as well as to stability area and interests other neighboring African states. We are conscious Soviets and Chinese might not necessarily proceed to point giving actual support Somali claims, but we cannot underestimate willingness of communist powers to provide sufficient aid to Somalia to complicate situation in Horn.
5. US and western allies have consulted on problem and feel situation can best be met by continuation limited western arms program of which HIM aware, previously instituted by Italy and UK with supplementary help from Germans and US for modernizing force for defensive purposes at modest level.
6. We are hopeful that programs of three western participants will soon reach stage where Somalis may be presented with both plans and tangible evidence western good faith to convince them their basic and legitimate needs for internal security and limited defensive capability will be met without resort to communists. As Emperor aware, Italy has had continuing program in this field since shortly after Somali independence and hopes delivery in near future of long-planned items will prove timely in context recent renewed overtures to Somalia from communists. While UK has of course withdrawn from this field following break in relations, FRG, as Emperor no doubt aware, has volunteered assist in this joint effort and plans shortly to conclude formal military aid agreement with Somalia. US plans provide supplement to other efforts in form small amount defensive equipment to be delivered later this year and engineering equipment, which will constitute bulk of US contribution over next several years. Latter designed enhance Somali Army's capability to contribute to economic development and civic improvement activities and hence to stimulate them to engage in such activities. Total western program will not provide Somalis with offensive capability and arms will be delivered under most effective guarantees against misuse as can be devised.
7. Development this joint western program has been undertaken in full recognition of and sympathy for Ethiopian security interests. Western nations concerned have entered into this program with reluctance and only after careful assessment, concurred in by all western nations with major interests in Ethiopia and Horn, that program of extremely limited nature, providing Somalia with minimum internal security and defensive requirements, and in which powers friendly to Ethiopia maintain measure control, best serves interests of peace and security in Horn in situation where Somalis determined build defense establishment and where alternative sources supply available and being pressed on Somalis.
In view scheduled visit Somalis to Germany July 11, German problem of protest note from IEG (separate tel), and early Italian shipment, would hope Addis comments and, subsequently, those of allies could be received in time make formal approach prior July 10. /3/
Rusk
/3/ On July 9, Ambassador Korry reported that he had reviewed these points with the Emperor in a very friendly conversation. The Emperor had then pointed out that this was an unusually bad moment to take such action since Somalia had just reaffirmed its territorial claims against Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. Western emphasis on establishing only a modest defense force in Somalia was meaningless if such a force were used for guerrilla warfare. In addition, the Emperor asked how the West could believe that Western aid, if it was in fact so small, would stop Somalia from obtaining more aid from the East. (Telegram 27 from Addis Ababa; ibid.)
295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 - 3 US - SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post on July 3, cleared by Whitfield (DOD) and Kyle (AID) in substance, and approved by Witman. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi and by pouch to Rome, London, Bonn, and Paris (for CINCEUR).
Washington, July 5, 1963, 6:56 p.m.
15. Presidential determination for ``impact package" signed June 29. Package to be delivered in two shipments, first comprising 12 106 mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps with spares and ammo to arrive end September or early October. While recognizing problem presented by introduction new vehicle, modification mounts for use with Land Rovers presents technical problems which would delay shipment. We have accordingly decided proceed with jeeps. Second part of impact package to arrive January/February will comprise following engineering equipment:
1 motorized 10 - ton roller
2 motorized heavy graders
1 scraper
2 16-cu yd concrete mixers
2 angle-dozer cables
2 medium tractors
Spares for above and related maintenance equipment.
Mobile training teams to arrive concurrently with equipment.
Above information to be treated as Noforn. /2/
/2/ The telegram is unsigned.
296. Memorandum for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Komer.
Washington, July 12, 1963.
I saw Mohamed Awale Liban, Chef de Cabinet to Somali President Aden, on 11 July 1963, following his talks with Ken Hansen and Dick Donahue.
I expressed our concern that Somalia is ``isolating" iteself from its neighbors. Though professing our strong friendship and desire to help Somalia, I pointed out that there was very little non-Africans could do to help the Somalis if they persisted in pushing Greater Somalia to the point where they alienated all the surrounding countries. I'm not sure he got the point, but I suggested the Somalis should realize that the cards are stacked against them and that it would be in their interest to come to some peaceful terms with their more powerful neighbors.
Mr. Liban, after blaming the current NFD tension on the British, said he hoped the US could help with some sort of arbitration since we are friendly with the Kenyans, the British, and the Ethiopians. I reiterated that the primary obstacle was one we couldn't do much about--the problems and aspirations of Kenyan leaders. Somali and Kenyan rather than US actions would determine outcome of this issue. It had become an ``African" issue not a colonial one.
Somalis would find same problem if they turned to Soviets, Chicoms or UAR for backing. These powers would probably be no more willing than we and UK, in last analysis, to provide arms or back Somali claims to point of alienating many other bigger and more powerful African states.
After an exchange of pleasantries about our respect for the Somali president, we left it that he understands our difficulty over backing Somalia against our other African friends, and our desire to help within our limitations. Liban is obviously a thoughtful and moderate fellow, but he is naturally a heartfelt spokesman for the Somalis whom he feels history has greatly wronged.
R. W. Komer /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
297. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and Fredericks on July 31 and approved in the White House on August 12. The conversation was held at the White House.
Prior to this meeting on July 25, Komer sent President Kennedy a memorandum recommending that during the meeting Kennedy stress that domestic reform and development were Ethiopia's prime needs, and that the United States was not backing Somali territorial ambitions, but attempting to retain a relationship with Somalia in order to prevent its leaning too heavily on the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Ethiopia Security)
Washington, July 25, 1963, 12:30 - 12:50 p.m.
SUBJECT
Prospects for Ethiopian Development; Ethiopian - Somali Dispute; Portuguese African Territories and South Africa
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol
J. Wayne Fredericks, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief of Protocol
William B. Jones, Acting Chief Northern African Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
Ethiopia
His Highness Assrate Kassa, President of the Senate of Ethiopia
Senator Lij Araya Abebe, Member of Senate of Ethiopia
Honorable Ato Tadele Yigezou, Member of Chamber of Deputies of Ethiopia
Mr. Tesfaye Roba, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Ethiopia
The President expressed his pleasure at the role played by Ethiopia in Africa and particularly of its leading role at the recent Addis conference. The President expressed gratitude for the fine welcome and response to the Peace Corps in Ethiopia.
Prospects for Ethiopian Development
The President asked the impression of His Highness on the prospects for the future of Ethiopia. His Highness replied that Ethiopia has a chance for a grand future, provided it receives help. Ethiopia is tied down by her economic needs and her inability to obtain finance for development. She is less fortunate than some other African countries in that she has not had the benefit of direct assistance during a colonial period. Ethiopia would welcome an increase in the size of the Peace Corps and they wish to explore the possibility of forming their own peace corps type organization. (Note: this point was discussed in some detail earlier when His Highness talked with Mr. Shriver.) They are also engaged in the exploration for minerals.
Ethiopia has a five-year development program, but at least one-half of the program must be based on outside financial aid.
Ethiopian - Somali Dispute
The President introduced the subject of the prospects for settling the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. His Highness remarked that it would be easier for Somalia to answer this question as they initiated the dispute. There is no way to settle the matter until Somalia changes its present inflexible ``Greater Somalia" policy. The demands of Somalia cannot be met by Ethiopia. To accede to the Somali position would set a dangerous precedent in Africa as there are many countries which could have boundary disputes based on ethnic considerations. ``Where would the mapping of Africa end if Somali claims are honored?" Ethiopia views arming Somalia as the arming of an aggressor. Ethiopia has no aggressive intent toward Somalia, there being no economic attraction. Ethiopia has no claims on Somalia and wants to pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence.
The President expressed concern at the direction Somalia might take and inquired where Somalia might go for arms.
His Highness stated that the Somalis are fanatical on the question of ``Greater Somalia". It would not surprise Ethiopia if Somalia turned east for arms and support. There is nothing the Somalis would not do in pursuing their aims. The world can't afford to see a breach of peace which might lead to World War III. Somalia should be firmly told that her aims will not succeed. The idea of a ``Greater Somalia" was originally started by certain foreign countries.
The President inquired if the reference was to the British, and received an affirmative reply. The President stated that the U.S. has no evidence that the British now hold these views. The President noted Somalia's strategic location and expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement of Somalia's disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya will be worked out.
His Highness asserted that there is little hope for settlement unless the Somalis change their view. Ethiopia has gone as far as possible in offering co-existence, including a plan whereby the various nomadic tribes would be free to use Ethiopian territory, but Somalia refused.
Portuguese African Territories and South Africa
In response to a question from the President concerning the situation in the Portuguese areas of Africa and in South Africa, His Highness described as ``painful" Ethiopia's decision to break relations with Portugal. Ethiopia has a long history of friendly relations with Portugal and offered to act as mediator in the present dispute. Her plan would have called for a continued Portuguese presence, but a gradual turning of control to the Africans with eventual independence. This was rejected by Portugal, so a break in relations between Ethiopia and Portugal was necessary. The situation looks very dangerous and it appears that unless Portugal modifies its positions there will be bloodshed.
Concerning South Africa, His Highness felt that there is apparently no hope at all. The South African government appears inflexible and this may lead to disastrous consequences. It is a more difficult situation than with Portugal.
The President wondered if success in South Rhodesia might help the situation in South Africa, to which the response was ``this is dubious."
298. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Somalia. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom on August 24. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: ``Sent to Mr. Bundy for info. Aug. 26. S.B."
Washington, August 26, 1963.
U.S. Policy Toward the Ogaden
1. Peace in the Horn of Africa depends in large measure on the stabilization, if not the ultimate solution, to two problems: the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia.
2. Britain, Somalia, and the new African government of Kenya are currently seeking a modus vivendi on the Somali-inhabited portion of Kenya's Northern Frontier District. The United States, representing British interests in Somalia, is acting as an intermediary in the steps leading to talks between the parties, but has not taken a stand regarding the substance of the issue.
3. The Ogaden is internationally recognized as being within the boundaries of Ethiopia, but is largely inhabited by Somali tribes, closely related to the peoples of the adjacent Somali Republic. It is one of the five parts of Greater Somalia (the other two unredeemed being: French Somaliland and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya) which the Somali Republic aspires, by its constitution, to bring under the sovereignty of the Somali Republic. It is a plateau area, for centuries the grazing place of nomadic tribes. These tribes, of Somali origin, wander across the international frontiers. One area in the north of the Ogaden Province, the Haud, contains water and livestock forage used by tribes on both sides of the line.
4. The problem of the Ogaden has, therefore, three elements: Somali irredentism, Ethiopian insecurity, and the traditional movement of nomadic tribes.
5. Somali irredentism toward the Ogaden has been pursued at various times in the past by press and radio propaganda and by seeking support in international meetings (e.g. Afro - Asian People's Solidarity Conferences) for resolutions in favor of unification of all Somali inhabited areas. The Somalis were undoubtedly given some hope and stimulus immediately following World War II when the British administered all of the five Somali lands except French Somaliland, and proposed a Greater Somaliland Trusteeship under UK administration. The Somalis were led to believe, at a minimum, that Britain might hold the Ogaden for ultimate incorporation in an independent Somalia. The exact degree of Somali Government stimulation of unrest within the Ogaden is frequently difficult to determine because of the inherent sympathy of the Somali tribes for the Somali Republic and their antipathy for Amharas, because of the more or less free traffic back and forth across the frontier, because of the normal tribesman's penchant for carrying a rifle, because of traditional illicit arms traffic through the area, and the fact that sizeable quantities of arms were acquired by tribesmen during World War II, and because of the Ethiopian tendency to assume that all unrest in the Ogaden is ultimately traceable to the Somali Republic. The Somali Republic, while having the reunion of all parts of Greater Somalia as its ultimate aim, has been careful to pursue this objective ``by peaceful and legal means" as the Somali Constitution requires, and its leaders have frequently stressed their intention to adhere to this requirement.
6. Ethiopian insecurity is compounded of the fact that, historically, Somaliland has been an invasion route into Ethiopia, of the inherent Christian Ethiopian fear of being engulfed by Moslem expansion, and of the keen apprehension that the Somali Republic, perhaps with the assist-ance of the United Arab Republic, can, by subversion in the Ogaden, succeed in rendering the Ogaden unmanageable, if not detaching it. Basically, many leading Ethiopians undoubtedly see in the existence of a Somali Republic, as weak as it may be, a latent threat to the security of the Ethiopian Empire. Many Ethiopians undoubtedly see the elimination of an independent Somalia as the ultimate solution of the Ogaden problem.
7. The intractability of the problem cannot be overemphasized. The Ethiopian apprehension is very deep, going back to the sixteenth century when Somali tribes almost destroyed the Empire and, of course, to the Italian invasion in 1935, when an incident in the Ogaden became a casus belli. It is difficult, indeed, to see any real detente between the two peoples. It appears possible, however, to work for some form of modus vivendi which will lessen the continuing possibilities of serious trouble between them.
8. The United States is vitally interested in this problem essentially because of its important interests in Ethiopia. Any United States policy which would clearly alienate the Emperor of Ethiopia would seriously affect these interests. Similarly, any unrest affecting the security of the area or permitting the establishment of greater influence by either the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists would also threaten these interests. It has, therefore, been the conclusion of the United States that, while not alienating the Emperor, we should seek to retain a broader influence in the Horn than our influence in Ethiopia, itself.
9. The United States cannot take any action which would appear to lend support to Somali irredentism. The United States supports the validity of current frontiers in Africa, despite the many claims and counter-claims which surround them and believes changes should come about only with the consent of all parties involved. The United States should continue to make this clear to the Somali Republic.
10. At the same time, it does not seem feasible, in a search for a formula which would stabilize the area, to seek to obtain a formal renunciation of Somali claims on Ethiopia. There is strong emotional and constitutional support in Somalia for these claims and it is doubtful any political leader could successfully make such a renunciation. Alternative formulae must, therefore, be found.
11. Essentially, the Ethiopian position is to leave Somalia weak and to isolate it as much as possible from other African relationships. Ethiopia feels that it can, with its military power, guarantee that unfriendly influences will not establish themselves in Somalia. At least one high-ranking Ethiopian has stated that Ethiopia would prefer to see arms coming into Somalia from the Sino - Soviet Bloc or the UAR because Ethiopia might then get wide support to eliminate the threat and, in the same action, establish Ethiopian suzerainty over Somalia. The Ethiopians feel that, because of Soviet and Chinese desires for influence elsewhere in Africa, they will not undertake support for Somali irredentism to a point that would genuinely threaten Ethiopia.
12. The United States cannot accept fully the Ethiopian position in this matter. The United States supports the integrity of independent nations in Africa except where there are changes in status brought about by peaceful means. We cannot appear to support the Ethiopian reluctance to accept fully the continued independence of Somalia. While it may well be true that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would give support to Somali irredentism, it is also true that they have already shown a willingness and capability to establish positions of influence in Somalia which represent a threat to Western interests in the area, if not to Ethiopia.
13. Ideally, the United States would prefer that the alleviation of tensions in this area could be accomplished by direct talks between the two parties or by the intervention of an international agency. Unfortunately, direct talks appear possible only with the stimulus and diplomacy of a third party. The United Nations had a major role in the creation of Somalia and in some of the readjustments of frontiers after independence. Ethiopia, however, is not enthusiastic about bringing in the United Nations because of its reluctance to ``internationalize" the Ogaden problem. The machinery of the Organization of African States is a possibility, but this machinery is not yet established. No other individual nation appears at the moment to have the influence in both capitals possessed by the United States.
14. Given these circumstances, United States policy should be directed toward establishing a peaceful modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somalia which will set aside conflicting claims and result in a measure of actual accord which might result, in turn, in a reduction of the current emphasis of both on the building of military establishments.
15. To establish this policy, the United States might consider the following measures:
a. Continued efforts to stimulate direct Ethiopian-Somali talks leading, perhaps, to:
(1) some form of frontier control, jointly administered by the two governments.
(2) agreement to the joint development of the Uebi Scebelli River basin.
(3) agreement on the use of watering places and forage in the frontier area.
(4) agreement on periodic meetings at the Ministerial level to discuss common problems.
b. An examination by the United States, perhaps jointly with Britain and Italy or in connection with a UN agency of the arms traffic into the Ogaden.
c. A statement to the UAR (and Israel) of our interest in the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa and our concern over any activities which might disturb that peace.
d. A statement to both that we are interested in the maintenance of peace in the Horn of Africa area, will not condone aggression of one state against another, and will take appropriate measures in the UN or, if necessary, otherwise, in order to prevent aggression.
e. A clear statement to the Somalis that we do not support irredentism, but clearly support their independence.
f. A clear statement to the Ethiopians that we support the independence of Somalia, but do not support Somali irredentism.
299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Judd and O'Neill, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Nairobi, Bonn, Rome, and Addis Ababa (by pouch).
Washington, September 23, 1963, 8:01 p.m.
1935. Ref: Mogadiscio's 242 to Dept (copy pouched London) and previous; Deptel 1821 to London. /2/ Recent Embassy Mogadiscio telegrams, sent info London, have highlighted difficult situation which Somali officials believe confronting their country and resultant pressures building up on GSR to turn to Communist China or Soviet Union for arms assistance. Mogadiscio's 224 to Dept rptd London 80 /3/ gives particularly vivid account Ambassador's encounter with Somali Prime Minister following latter's return from Peking.
/2/ In telegram 242 from Mogadiscio, September 20, Ambassador Torbert described his conversation with Foreign Minister Abdullah Issa on September 19, during which he emphasized the positive aspects of U.S.-Somali relations and asked the Minister to consider whether turning elsewhere for military help, which would weaken Somalia's ties with the West, would actually strengthen Somali security or the reverse. (Ibid.) Telegram 1821 to London is not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 SOMALI)
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., POL 32 - 1 ETH - SOMALI)
Department believes seriousness of situation in Somalia makes it all the more important for US, FRG and Italy to move ahead with western military aid program in interest strengthening and encouraging moderate elements opposed to extension of bloc influence in military field.
As parallel to Department's contacts with UK Embassy officials here, we would appreciate Embassy London discussing situation with Foreign Office. We would be especially interested in:
1. British views on possible Soviet or Chinese Communist arms assistance to Somalia.
2. British assessment of Kenyan reaction to such assistance.
3. British thoughts on possible courses of action to forestall Soviet or Chinese Communist efforts at supplying Somalia with arms aid.
Ball
300. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Cleared by Bell (AID) and Gilpatric (OSD). A copy was sent to the Bureau of the Budget to meet the requirements of Presidential Determination 1550 relating to military assistance. The paper was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read that reads: ``In response to Mr. Brubeck's request there is enclosed a memorandum supplementing the briefing papers previously submitted for the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie." A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: ``Original sent to White House on 9/29/63."
Washington, September 29, 1963.
SUBJECT
Visit of the Emperor of Ethiopia
The briefing memorandum of September 27 /2/ on this subject stated that the U.S. positions with respect to Ethiopian requests for military and economic assistance were still under discussion and that a supplemental memorandum would advise you of the decisions. Decisions have now been reached and will presumably be conveyed to the Ethiopian advance party by Defense and AID prior to the arrival of the Emperor.
/2/ Briefing papers for Emperor Haile Selassie's visit October 1 - 2, 1963, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2330 - 2331.
In reaching these decisions, full consideration has been given to the significance of Ethiopia on the African scene and to our own special interests in the present Kagnew communications stations and future space-probe installations at this site. The positions we have taken represent in dollar commitments only a fraction of the total initial Ethiopian requests. The final Ethiopian military assistance requests, scaled down from an original $60,000,000 represented $20,000,000. Our reply commits us immediately to approximately $2,000,000 over a five to six year period although the prospect of more expensive aircraft looms in the distance (probably 1968 and beyond). Out of economic requests estimated at between $50 and $70 million, no commitments have yet been made and the immediate prospect is only for a commitment of approximately $200,000 in Bailey bridges and experts, with the possibility in the future of a loan for the Finchaasdam, subject to the completion of surveys and availability of funds.
Our replies will undoubtedly be below the Emperor's expectations, although, given the prospect that he will avoid either a discussion of details or bargaining, we may not know his true reaction. He feels we have a commitment to support him in the military field and he places prime importance on aid for Ethiopia's economic development. To be certain of his acceptance of these replies, we must convince him that (a) we have a keen desire to assist Ethiopia; (b) we had a very short time (one week) to examine the requests; (c) the laws governing our aid program require that we have the fullest possible supporting data before committing ourselves to a project; and (d) we are currently experiencing special difficulties with foreign aid appropriations.
A. Military Assistance.
1. The MAAG in Ethiopia will be authorized to commence discussions prior to December 31 with Ethiopian Defense officials on force goals for the Ethiopian Air Force.
2. For an initial planning basis, we would hope to support the present squadron of F86's.
3. We would program two C54 transport aircraft in FY 1965.
4. We will consider future years modernization of the Air Force as recommended by MAAG and subject to Ethiopian ability to absorb, operate and maintain, and subject to our own appropriation.
(In discussions with the IEG between now and December 31, 1963, we will probably have to agree to an eventual ``force goal" of two jet squadrons for the Ethiopian Air Force. The modernization will be phased so as to support the F86's as long as economically possible. Finally, the modernization of the second squadron will not commence until the first is operational, and all of the training requirements set by the MAAG been met by the Ethiopian Air Force.)
B. Economic Assistance.
We would not approve a line of credit or advance commitment, but will consider further the individual projects as follows:
1. Dam for Power and Irrigation on Finchaa River ($15 - 30 million). We are willing to examine this project further. Subject to the results of the Bureau of Reclamation reconnaissance investigation, and studies of engineering feasibility, cost, power demand, land use and an over-all cost/benefit analysis, the USG would be willing to consider a loan.
2. 154 Bailey Bridges--($1.2 million) We have suggested that IEG consider the possibility of carrying this out through its military establishment as a ``civic action" program. If agreeable, AID will provide loan assistance for the bridges and DOD will provide technical assistance through the MAAG.
3. Meat Processing Facilities--($5 to $10 million) On basis of the material at hand, many questions must be answered before we could agree to pursue the project. A man from the U.S. meat packing industry will be hired by AID to make a study.
4. Grain Storage Facilities--($10 million) While the Export - Import Bank is considering this proposal, approval is doubtful and AID is not at this time interested.
5. Mining Projects in Gold and Iron Ore--($8 million) As a matter of policy, AID normally does not finance mining ventures directly. We will attempt through Commerce to interest an American firm in the iron ore proposition; and AID will hire a Bureau of Mines expert to further study the gold (latter to be a State industry).
6. Additional Aid for Malaria Eradication and Other Health Activities--($12.7 million) We are willing to continue assistance in this field at the pace dictated by IEG's ability to support and operate the program.
301. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Secret.
Washington, September 30, 1963.
Attached is a briefing memorandum and background book for the Emperor of Ethiopia's visit beginning Tuesday. /2/ In the briefing paper you should note particularly Ambassador Korry's personal appraisal of the Emperor and the annex on economic and military aid. In the background book the most important papers are those on the Ethiopian - Somali relations (Tab A) [1 line of source text not declassified].
/2/ None of the tabs is attached to the source text. They refer to briefing material prepared by the Department of State for Haile Selassie's visit. Documentation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2330 - 2331.
Key points on this visit:
1. This is primarily a personal exchange between two world statesmen. The Emperor is very vain and will want to discuss world affairs. He will be particularly flattered if you take him aside for private sessions, not only on world affairs generally but soliciting his views as a predominant leader in the Organization for African Unity, on African affairs.
2. His greatest domestic preoccupation is with the border dispute with the Somalis over Ethiopia's Ogaden District, occupied by nomadic Somali tribesmen, where a good deal of fighting is going on. (See Briefing Book, Tab III - A.) Since he is critical of our help to Somalia it is particularly important that you invite his views on this as a problem in which we have a common concern.
3. Most important to the United States, we are in a bargaining situation over the price we will pay, in increased economic and military aid, for highly classified new intelligence facilities (for monitoring Soviet space communications) /3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (Briefing Book, Tab III - D). We are, in principle, agreeing to maintain, and eventually modernize and increase from one to two squadrons Ethiopia's present F - 86 jet force; and to explore several economic projects, the biggest a $15 - 30 million dam on the Blue Nile still some years off.
/3/ On September 3, Ambassador Korry reported that the exchange of notes [text not declassified] had been completed. (Telegram 206 from Addis Ababa; ibid., Central Files, DEF 15 - 4 ETH - US)
Miscellaneous points:
1. The Emperor is very protocol conscious and was unhappy on his 1954 visit because Eisenhower did not meet him at the plane; he thinks he was kept waiting 12 days in a New York hotel for answers to some aid requests; and they didn't take him to TVA because the Dixon - Yates fight was on at the time (by his own choice he is going to Canaveral not TVA this time).
2. He will be arriving by way of Geneva and an over night stay in Philadelphia and his schedule includes: seeing Shriver (419 Peace Corps in Ethiopia, secondary teaching and small public health group); laying a wreath at the Lincoln Memorial with Udall hosting; lunch on the Sequoia hosted by Chief Justice Warren; usual State and Defense meetings; in New York, doing a Meet the Press; addressing the UNGA; lunch with U Thant; and a private lunch with businessmen, reflecting his special interest in private investment for Ethiopia; visiting Canaveral and then going on to Canada.
3. He is a little resentful that the President of the Ethiopian Senate Assrate Kassa, whom you saw on July 25, was treated too well here. Play any mention in low key.
4. The Emperor will speak Amharic with his American-trained Foreign Minister (formerly his private secretary) interpreting for both sides, since we have no Amharic interpreter. Under the circumstances, you might want to take Ambassador Korry when you withdraw for private talks.
WB
302. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's Visit, 10/63. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom and Korry. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled ``I of III." President Kennedy's discussion of African issues and assistance to Ethiopia with Emperor Haile Selassie on October 1 and their discussion of assistance to Ethiopia on October 2 were recorded in three memoranda of conversation that are ibid.
Washington, October 1, 1963, 4:30 p.m.
SUBJECT
Somalia
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Ambassador Edward M. Korry
The Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary, AF
Mr. Edward Hutchinson, AID
Mr. Frank Sloan, OSD/ISA
Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke
Brigadier General John J. Tolson, Military Aide to the Emperor
Mr. William Brubeck, The White House
Mr. David D. Newsom, Director, AFN
Ethiopia
His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia
His Highness Ras Imru Haile-Selassie
His Excellency Tsahafi Tezaz Teferra-Work Kidane-Wolde, Minister of the Imperial Court
His Excellency Yilma Deressa, Minister of FInance
His Excellency Ketema Yifru, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Menassie Haile, Chief of the Political Section of His Imperial Majesty's Private Cabinet
His Excellency Berhanou Dinke, Ambassador of Ethiopia
In a preliminary session with the Emperor (with Ambassador Korry and Dr. Menassie Haile present), the President brought up the question of Somalia with the Emperor and asked for his views. The Emperor, citing that he had said all of this to the Ambassador previously on several occasions, repeated familiar arguments that arms assistance to Somalia encouraged Somali irredentism, had caused bloodshed and unrest within Ethiopia, had been particularly harmful because of its timing, and had not precluded communist assistance. On this last point, he stated that the Somalis had received nine million sterling in assistance from Peking. The Ambassador interjected that there was no military assist-ance. The Emperor rather disdainfully asked what else would it be for.
The President in his reply made these points:
1. The U.S. arms program was very small and provided over three million dollars of assistance over a period of five to six years;
2. It was mostly designed for civic action;
3. The objectives of this policy were exactly the same as Ethiopian objectives, which was to encourage the moderates in Somalia and to keep peace and stability in the Horn of Africa; and
4. If either the Chinese or the Soviets gave military assistance in significant amounts, the U.S. Government would be forced to review its policy of arms to Somalia.
In the course of the discussion, the Emperor said that a modus vivendi was necessary between Somalia and Ethiopia and the U.S. must support this. The President agreed. The Emperor also acknowledged that there was no conflict between U.S. and Ethiopian objectives. The President said that in the United States view, Ethiopia was the key country in that part of the world and that it was with that in mind that we made our policies.
In the full session, the Emperor again expressed concern over United States military assistance to Somalia. The President reiterated the United States reasons for this action, stating that only time will tell whether these reasons are valid. The United States, he said, was aware of the Somali mission to the U.S.S.R. and the possibility that Somalia might receive some assistance from China. Assistance from these quarters could produce more instability. The United States has made no deliveries to Somalia. It will continue to watch the situation closely and will keep in touch with the Emperor on developments.
The Emperor said that he wished to make it plain that he did not feel that the United States should give no assistance to Somalia. He was preoccupied with the kind of arms assistance which would encourage Somalia to provoke Ethiopia. Arms from Somalia have already been used in the eastern part of Ethiopia. The Emperor knows of the United States interest in friendly relations between Ethiopia and Somalia and is prepared to work to that end. If the Somalis are stimulated through military assistance, however, the situation could get out of hand.
The President said that in the United States view by responding with some assistance, it is possible to increase influence and promote stability. The United States has had some harsh experiences when it has rejected requests for assistance in such situations. He reiterated that it was necessary to wait and see what developed.
The Emperor said that another aspect of his fears was that with the Somali election coming up, Somalis were out-doing one another in attacking Ethiopia. The opposition in Somalia has accused the Government in the Ogaden and the Ethiopians have been forced to retaliate against the tribes.
The President said there would be a better view of the situation when information was received on the Somali mission to Moscow. He promised to keep in close touch with the Emperor.
303. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Somalia. Confidential.
Washington, October 11, 1963.
In view of his exchange with Haile Selassie on the subject of military assistance to Somalia the President should know that:
1. Our Ambassador in Somalia has been unofficially informed that the Somalis have accepted a Soviet offer of $30 million in military assist-ance.
2. As soon as this is made public we will announce promptly termination of our own military aid program (no deliveries have yet been made). /2/ The amount is trivial (half a million dollars a year US, $5 - 6 million German and Italian annually which will probably also end). This will make the Ethiopians happy.
/2/ Telegram 221 to Mogadiscio, October 11, instructed the Embassy to call on the President to express the deep regrets and concern of the U.S. Government at the reported decision of the Somali Council of Ministers to accept an offer of large-scale Soviet military aid. (Department of State, Central Files, AID 6 SOMALI)
3. We will stay in Somalia with limited economic aid ($4 million a year) and the Peace Corps.
Bill Brubeck /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
304. Editorial Note
On October 16, 1963, the Somali Government presented an aide-memoire to the U.S. Embassy in Mogadiscio stating that when it had previously complained to the U.S. Government regarding large-scale U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, it had received assurances that the United States would not permit its military aid to Ethiopia to be used for aggressive purposes. It noted that the Somali Government had every reason to believe that these weapons were primarily intended by the Ethiopian Government for use against the Somalis under its domination or against the Somali Republic itself, and declared that experience had shown that Ethiopia had no compunction about using these modern weapons against defenseless men, women, and children, as the massacres committed since 1960 had shown. Thus, the Somali Government was justified in placing responsibility for Ethiopian aggression on the United States, since its military aid had permitted Ethiopia to carry out its policies of repression and aggression; and it asked the U.S. Government to reconsider its policy of providing large-scale military aid to Ethiopia. (Airgram A - 192 from Mogadiscio, October 16; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 - 3 US - ETH)
On October 18, the U.S. Government responded that the program of U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia had begun long before the Somali Republic became an independent country and thus could not be construed as being directed against Somalia. It pointed out that the agreement between the United States and Ethiopia stated that the Ethiopian Government would use this assistance exclusively to maintain internal security and legitimate self-defense, and that it would not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. (Telegram 238 to Mogadiscio; ibid., POL 32 - 1 ETH - SOMALI)
305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Robinson, O'Mahony, and Heffner (DOD); and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Rome, London, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi (by pouch).
Washington, October 16, 1963, 7:19 p.m.
1114. Ref: Rome's 1062 rptd Bonn 128; /2/ Mogadiscio's 305 rptd Bonn 49. /3/ Reftels indicate there may still be room for saving western aid program and precluding Soviet arms to Somalia. Department particularly notes President Aden's appeal to President Segni for support from west, coupled with Aden's remark about confronting two plans of military aid in order allow Somalis balance political and economic as well as military factors. Also significant are Abscir's statements to effect final commitment to USSR has not yet been made by GSR and that President Aden may still be able exert influence against arms deal with Soviets.
/2/ Telegram 1062 from Rome, October 15, reported that the Italian Government was prepared to come up with a definite plan to meet Somalia's defense needs. (Ibid., POL 7 SOMALI)
/3/ Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 19 SOMALI)
Department requests US reps explore with Germans and Italians following lines of action:
1. Presentation in writing western military aid plan, giving approximate size and scope of program and indicating willingness to meet with Daud and other Somali military reps to discuss requirements and programming. At same time inform Somali officials clearly that contemplated western military aid program could not be carried out if GSR accepts arms assistance from Soviet Union or any other bloc source.
2. Note to GSR to be followed by joint meeting at Mogadiscio with reps western embassies on one side and top level GSR officials on the other at which western reps will stress to GSR officials the political and economic difficulties which would be created if GSR accepted Soviet arms offer.
Points listed by western reps could include: (a) observation that western military aid program is largely grant whereas Soviet policy is usually insist on cash or credit terms; (b) disastrous effect of Soviet arms on Somali budgetary and financial situation. Western powers ask how GSR can meet payments to USSR as well as provide substantial support costs needed to implement Soviet program; (c) despite GSR's proclamations of neutrality, acceptance Soviet arms offer will inevitably lead in minds African and western states to strong identification Somalia with Soviet policies and objectives; (d) western powers recognize that on various and frequent occasions, GSR has reiterated its intention pursue national policy goals only by peaceful and legal means. If GSR accepts Soviet arms, however, Ethiopia and Kenya will almost automatically conclude that such arms would be available for use in Ogaden or NFD. On other hand, if GSR receiving military aid only from western sources, Ethiopia and Kenya would retain some degree of confidence that no encouragement being given by aid suppliers to using of arms in irregular actions. Moreover, fact that west is source of supply would reduce temptation engage in preventive action against Somalia.
Rusk
306. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries, Somali Republic. Confidential.
Washington, October 25, 1963.
This is the first time you have seen Horace Torbert, our Ambassador to Somalia. He has been in Mogadiscio, his first Ambassadorial post, since December 1962, is career Foreign Service Officer whose background is mostly Western and Central Europe.
You remember that Haile Selassie complained about our military aid to the Somalis and you promised to reexamine it after we found out what deal the Somalis were making in Moscow.
The Somalis are about to accept a $30 million Soviet military aid package knowing that they will thus lose an $18 million five-year US - German - Italian program. /2/ Although they are Western oriented their primary drive is a military strength (which they can't afford) to back up their quarrel with the Ethiopians and Kenya over borders.
/2/ At a tripartite meeting in Bonn October 17 - 18, U.S., German, and Italian representatives reached agreement on a joint military aid package for Somalia. (Telegram 1413 from Bonn, October 18; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI)
In addition to our small economic aid program the Somalis have received large aid grants from the Chicoms and Russians.
William H. Brubeck /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
307. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) and to the Assistant Administrator for Africa - Europe, Agency for International Development (Hutchinson) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto.
Washington, October 31, 1963.
SUBJECT
Views of the President on the Situation in Somalia
The President received American Ambassador to the Somali Republic, Horace G. Torbert, Jr., on October 25, 1963. /2/ Excerpts of the memorandum of conversation covering the views of the President on the military aid situation with respect to Somalia and the desirability of maintaining our non-military programs are given below for your information.
/2/ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid.
``The President was also given a brief sketch of the territorial claims situation. He asked whether we could stay in the military picture in some way, possibly in the training area, even though the Soviet program went ahead. Ambassador Torbert said that he understood the consensus was that we could not enter a training program at the same time that the Soviet program was starting and indeed the Somalis probably would not want it; however, it seemed advisable that we should maintain careful watch on the situation and be prepared to enter the military training field on short notice if an opportunity presented itself in the medium term future. The President indicated agreement with this idea.
``Ambassador Torbert said he felt the next year or so would be a difficult time because the Somali Government would be seeking to justify its turning to the Soviet Government for aid and might therefore make anti-western statements which might tempt us to an indignant retort or a gesture of cancelling our other programs. It seemed, however, highly desirable, at least for the next year or so, to maintain our non-military programs in Somalia in order to keep all the influence we have in key sectors of the Somali Government and economy. He hoped therefore that any contrary pressures in the United States could be kept under control. The President indicated full understanding of this idea and general agreement with it."
308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Warren, O'Mahony, Stout, Heffner (DOD), and Wolf (AID); and approved by Tasca. Also sent priority to Rome and repeated to Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Paris, and London.
Washington, November 6, 1963, 6:20 p.m.
1377. Ref: Mogadiscio's 354. /2/ Embassies Bonn and Rome requested confer with respective governments and state that, while Somali note clearly ends chance for tripartite arms program, US believes it important record be made straight in non-argumentative fashion in order support friends in Somalia who urged western military support and in event GSR should attempt in future charge west failed respond its defensive needs. US wishes propose, therefore, for consideration FRG and GOI presentation by respective Embassies Mogadiscio of parallel notes along following line:
/2/ Telegram 354, November 3, transmitted a note from the Somali Government rejecting the Western military aid offer. (Ibid.)
``The Government of . . . acknowledges the receipt of the note dated November 3 from the Government of the Somali Republic concerning the program of military assistance presented by the Governments of the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The right and the duty of the GSR to take all measures to safeguard its territorial integrity are fully acknowledged. The Governments of the United States, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, however, note that the decision to accept military aid from the USSR appears to have been taken on the basis of certain assumptions by the GSR regarding the details with respect to units, quantities and quality of the tripartite program as set forth in the annex to the letter of October 23. It is regretted that the GSR has made its decision without taking advantage of the offer, set forth in the aforementioned letter, to hold a meeting with the responsible Somali military authorities to define these technical aspects of the tripartite program.
Paragraph three of the letter of the respective governments was not intended in any way to be inconsistent with the principle of nonalignment adopted by the Government of the Somali Republic, but was based on the practical difficulties of conducting two substantial parallel programs of military assistance in the face of problems of preserving uniformity of equipment and training, providing adequate spare parts, and allocating local financial and manpower resources.
The Government of . . . notes the expression of confidence by the Government of the Somali Republic that friendly relations with the three governments will not be affected and the desire of the Somali Government that these relations be strengthened in the interest of peace, welfare, and stability. The Government of . . . shares this desire for continued friendly relations.
To the extent that the new arrangements of the Somali Republic with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the diversion of resources which may accompany the new substantial military assistance program permit, the Government of . . . fully intends, within this spirit of continued friendship, to continue the close ties and activities of mutual benefit which now exist." /3/
Rusk
/3/ On November 27, Ambassador Torbert delivered a slightly revised version of the tripartite note to the Somali Prime Minister. His report noted that the Italian and German notes had preceded his. (Telegram 391 from Mogadiscio, November 27; ibid.)
309. National Policy Paper /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, AFRICA 1963. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Department of State. A handwritten notation on the cover sheet of the 114-page paper reads: ``Secretary approved 1/6/64" and ``Part I revised by AF 3/5/65."
An introduction to the report, signed by Secretary Rusk on January 4, 1964, indicates, among other points, that Part I of the paper, covering objectives, strategy, and courses of action is ``a comprehensive, authoritative and approved statement of United States Policy toward Ethiopia." It also notes that ``all agencies with major responsibilities affecting our relations with Ethiopia participated in drafting the paper and concur in the Strategy and Courses of Action which it sets forth."
Washington, December 19, 1963.
ETHIOPIA
Part One
I. The Problem
The difficulties of formulating and attaining US policy objectives in Ethiopia derive not only from the complexities of Ethiopia's problems but also from the nature of US governmental operations. Thus far the various US agencies with programs affecting Ethiopia have different and not always mutually consistent missions. Our immediate and short-term goals do not seem at first glance entirely consistent with our longer-term objectives. Some are essentially positive and progressive in character, looking forward to considerable change, while others appear negative, preclusive, or in support of the status quo. The risk is always present that the pursuit of longer-term policies relating to reform could unleash forces which could jeopardize immediate US interests. A balance of objectives is needed, therefore, in the interest of a continuing US influence in Ethiopia.
Our planning is complicated because we are uncertain how soon a change of regime will occur, in what manner, and with what group emerging in control. The Emperor, for example, could live another ten years or pass from the scene tomorrow. We must examine this and other contingencies as they relate to the power struggle and its implications for US policy.
II. Objectives
Principal objectives of the US with respect to Ethiopia are as follows:
Long-Term
1. To establish a relationship with any Ethiopian regime friendly to the US which will permit the continued, unhampered use of Kagnew Station and a continued exercise of effective US influence on Ethiopian policies.
2. To assure a stable, cohesive, and friendly government in Ethiopia, and to assist that government in making measurable economic and social progress, becoming more responsive to the desire of a broadening range of Ethiopians for political participation.
3. To bring about a reconciliation between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic involving, to the extent possible, recognition of borders, with agreement that force will not be employed in settling disputes.
4. To retard any further growth of Communist Bloc influence in Ethiopia.
5. To help preserve Haile Selassie's moderating influence in All - African councils.
Short-Term
1. To maintain the unhampered use of our military communications facilities in Ethiopia (Kagnew Station).
2. To maintain correct and friendly relations with the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie while discreetly encouraging economic and social reforms and more rapid progress toward the development of Ethiopia as a modern state, especially by the introduction of political changes which will give the trained elements more participation in political processes.
3. To obtain the friendship and respect of elements likely to succeed the present regime in Ethiopia either by evolution or by revolution, e.g., young, educated Ethiopians, junior governmental officials, and liberal military officers.
4. To work toward minimizing friction between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic and the lessening of existing hostilities in the border area between the two countries.
5. To avoid or overcome to the extent feasible situations in which we might be obligated to support either Ethiopia or the Somali Republic against the other on a basic issue between them.
6. To maintain Ethiopian support of the UN and of concepts of collective security.
7. To encourage Ethiopia to use moderation in development of her military establishment and, as far as possible, to aid her in re-directing governmental expenditures from military to needs beyond that required for internal security.
8. To support the Emperor's position of leadership in the Organization of African Unity as a means of tempering radical pressure within that body which are inimical to the West.
[Here follow Sections III - IX (pages 3 - 113).]
X. Conclusion
Political power relationships in Ethiopia still operate within a feudal-type framework. Loyalty to person, family, and clan are far more significant than are institutional ties to the State. The vast majority of Ethiopia's people, an aggregate of disparate ethnic groups, of several different faiths, is still treated by the dominant Christian Amhara minority like conquered subjects. In this fragmented society, respect for military power is a major cohesive ingredient.
The present political structure, with the Emperor at its apex, is supported by four main groups. These include two traditional--the aristocracy and the clergy--and two more modern (in both of which the aristocracy is prominent), the armed forces and the government bureaucracy. A discontented younger educated elite is seeking greater power and influence, but within the present system rather than through its abolition.
It appears that this system still has a good deal of resilience, political and economic, and should continue at least for the next few years with no great change if Haile Selassie remains in control. It will probably continue, with certain adjustments primarily within the Amhara oligarchy, if his death occurs within the same short time-span. While there has been incipient plotting against the Government (and there may be new attempts to overthrow the Emperor), thus far these efforts have been disorganized and the dissidents are mindful of the need to retain the present system. Barring the unpredictable ``sergeant's revolt" or assassin's bullet, we do not anticipate a radical and thoroughly revolutionary movement emerging unless the Emperor (1) remains on the throne beyond the next five or six years, (2) makes further reforms which are only window-dressing, and (3) leaves behind him the threat of a prolonged struggle over the succession. The longer this period lasts, however, the more important it will be that the system show valid evidence of constructive development which is uncertain without US pressure.
If this estimate is correct, we have more flexibility than would otherwise be apparent both in US policy formulation and timing. Thus we do not face the bald choices of supporting either those in power or those who will probably succeed them. Since those young modernists desiring change are still seeking it through enlarging and modernizing the present system, we should be able to work for the enhancement of their position without necessarily jeopardizing our relations with the governing authorities or upsetting the system. Furthermore, the crucial period in which we have to operate against a major threat to the internal political structure is not just the next few weeks or months but a range of several years. Within this longer interim we see the possibility of dynamic forces in the military and educated elite coming forward. Under the conditions posited above, they would either take over control or support a system which is more progressive but which still rests basically on the ethnic supremacy of the Amhara minority. Our own progress in this interim period could influence the direction in which these forces move and reinforce the social cement needed to build a stronger Ethiopia.
During this breathing spell, we must make every effort to maintain and improve the climate for Kagnew and to find some means of dampening or extinguishing the unfriendly fires on both sides of the Ethiopian-Somalian border. If we meet these objectives with straightforward and timely action, the strategic influence of the US in the Horn of Africa should be assured for the predictable future.
310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US - SOMALI. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Williams.
Washington, December 30, 1963, 4:53 p.m.
327. Ref: Mogadiscio's 429. /2/ For Ambassador from Governor Williams.
/2/ Dated December 26. (Ibid.)
Conversation with Issa at Nairobi touched on general subject US military aid to other countries, with Somali Foreign Minister observing that there had been examples of concurrent US and Soviet military aid to the same country. I replied that where this had happened there had been other overriding considerations which did not exist at present moment in relation to Somalia. However we did not have closed mind on this subject, and future developments might turn out in such a way as to warrant a re-examination of our attitudes. Nevertheless, for the present, mixed military aid was out in view size Soviet arms program, which was largest granted to any single African country, and because of our apprehensions, repeatedly voiced to Somali leaders, that arms program such magnitude would deflect Somalia's meagre resources from priority needs of Somali people and result progressive weakening of economic situation.
Rusk
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