Documents 311-319
Southern Africa Region
311. Paper Prepared in the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Duggan and Lewis. Sent to George McGhee and U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State; Paul Nitze, William Bundy, Henry Rowen, and Major General T.W. Parker, Department of Defense; Henry Fowler, Department of the Treasury; Richard Helms and Ray S. Cline, CIA; and McGeorge Bundy and Carl Kaysen, the White House, under cover of a memorandum from Henry Owen (S/P) that reads: ``The attached paper, `The White Redoubt' of June 28, 1962, will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting on Tuesday, July 10."
The paper was discussed at the Secretary's Planning Meeting on July 17. A summary of the discussion is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Departmental Organization.
Washington, June 28, 1962.
THE WHITE REDOUBT
I. Introduction and Summary
The seeds of another Algeria have been sown in Southern Africa. Blacks face Whites across a sea of developing hate. With this confrontation and the increasing polarization of racial relations the White supremacists are seeking to strengthen their established positions.
The white peoples of these territories--the Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese African possessions of Angola and Mozambique and the Central African Federation (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland)--are taking up a defensive position along a rampart from which they feel there is no retreat. They appear to be developing bonds of mutual fear in the face of advancing Black African nationalism and their governments are contemplating a mutual defense strategy, if not economic and political union as well. Theirs is, in effect, a last white stronghold against black invasion from the north and racialist-inspired upheavals from within.
From the north pressing against these white communities comes the tide of nationalism. In this area, 26 newly independent states, mainly black, have found their freedom since the end of World War II. More new black nations will add to these pressures this year and next.
The possible collision of these rival forces in a world already full of racial hatreds is highly dangerous. A Black - White confrontation on the southern tip of Africa, particularly in an area where U.S. investments are extensive, and U.S. nationals are numerous, is perilous in terms of U.S. objectives in Africa as a whole.
There are even more cogent reasons than these which must give us concern--notably the likelihood of the Cold War being introduced into Africa on the wings of racial bias; the weakening of our own relationships with Africa which would ensure [ensue?]; the weakening of the UN; and the domestic dilemma with which the U.S. would be confronted in event of such tragedy.
It should be the policy of the United States to mitigate the polarization of the races into two warring factions. Unfortunately, this polarization has already proceeded a long way, and our efforts must now be directed toward preventing it from developing so completely that strife cannot be averted. Unless this aim is accomplished, we may be faced with a major racial war, the consequences of which could even mean that masses of white inhabitants will be driven out of Africa. We have not yet made a full assessment of the military potential of the Redoubt group. South Africa could no doubt supply her own military needs but probably would have difficulty in meeting all the needs of her partners.
It is difficult if not impossible accurately to estimate the pace of events. The problems of Angola are upon us today. The Rhodesian problems (at least those of Southern Rhodesia) are developing so swiftly they may be with us full force within the next year. The problems of South Africa are only slightly more long range. In all areas time is running out.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
312. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 64 D 467, United Nations 17th GA, Pol 1, General Policy, US. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and approved by the White House on August 29 and by the Office of the Secretary of State on August 27.
Washington, August 21, 1962.
SUBJECT
United States Strategy at the 17th General Assembly
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary
Harlan Cleveland--IO
Ambassador Stevenson
Arthur Schlesinger
Joseph J. Sisco--UNP
The following principal points emerged from the discussion with the President on US strategy in the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
5. Colonial Questions
The President agrees we should oppose sanctions as a way for the Assembly to deal with Portuguese colonial policy and the South African questions. He also agrees we should attempt to get the Soviets off the Committee of 17 on the assumption that we would also do the same. The Secretary reported we had made no progress in our negotiations with the Portuguese on the Azores base and that they have linked this question with the United States position in the United Nations on colonial questions. The Secretary said we want to make a strong effort to get the Azores base negotiations completed before the General Assembly gets involved in a number of the Portuguese colonial questions. The President agreed we should see how far we can get with the Portuguese on this matter, although he was not disposed to make concessions on the colonial issues if the Portuguese were not going to make any movement towards moderation and were going to use the base negotiations as a means of exerting pressure on us.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
313. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/12 - 662. Confidential.
London, December 6, 1962, 7 p.m.
2120. African talks with British completed this afternoon. /2/ Congo, Horn and Arab Africa not discussed except that British summarized conversations with Somali Prime Minister which being reported separately. Atmosphere was cordial but British made no startling revelations of policy or fact.
/2/ The U.S. - U.K. talks in London, December 5 - 6, are recorded in six memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 641.70/12 - 1762)
Focus of attention was Southern Africa. British agreed with US assessment of importance of area and of necessity of showing progress there in order not to lose gains of decolonization to the north.
With respect South Africa, it was agreed that US and UK Ambassadors should consult together and make recommendations as to possibilities of persuasion and pressure on SAG to weaken apartheid. Re UNGA apartheid resolution, we commented that UK perhaps less concerned about public posture vis-a-vis the Afro-Asians than the US. Stevens said this not the case but UK was inhibited by problem of High Commission territories.
Re Southwest Africa possibility of joint or parallel approach to SAG making clear that US and UK could not support SAG in event of unfavorable ICJ decision was discussed. Maud strongly favored such approach but Stevens indicated Foreign Office wished to consider further. We expressed view such approach could be useful.
Re High Commission territories British would welcome a greater American interest and specifically designation of FSO to cover these territories.
Re Federation we emphasized key importance in general Southern African context. British agreed and did not dissent when we expressed view that after Southern Rhodesian elections UK would feel free to exercise influence in Federation and particularly Southern Rhodesia. We explained tentative US thinking re provision of training assistance in public administration and related fields to African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and pointed out that this designed inter alia to achieve immediate effect of providing constructive activity for some ZAPU restrictees when released. British reaction was not enthusiastic. They stressed rather the need to improve secondary education facilities with a view to increasing African capabilities over the long run. While not objecting to discussion of US idea with Whitehead, they stressed need for caution. UK agreed that Whitehead had not closed door to possible UN SYG good offices and apparently do not rule out possibility that Whitehead might accept some UN role after elections.
One interesting sidelight on Federation discussion was that UK dis-sented from US view that African governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would wish to be assured of early African government in Southern Rhodesia if there were to be continuation of some form of association. UK held two northern governments would be willing deal with white government in Southern Rhodesia and that issue was really not one of color. The real problem is existence of Federation in present form which stands in way of accommodation among three members.
Re Portuguese territories there was general agreement on estimate of situation. British somewhat pessimistic about prospects rapporteur proposal in UNGA. We asked them to suggest individuals who might serve as rapporteur. British agreed that we both should urge other NATO allies to make known to Portuguese their concern over Portuguese policy in Africa.
[Here follows discussion of East Africa and West Africa.]
Bruce
314. Paper Prepared in the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. Drafted by Foulon, Sanger, and Mathews. Transmitted to Planning Group members on April 17 under cover of a memorandum from Walt Rostow, S/P, that reads: ``The attached paper entitled `Problems of Southern Africa' dated March 25, 1963 will be discussed at the Planning Group meeting, Tuesday, April 23."
Washington, March 25, 1963.
PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
Summary
The southern quarter of the African continent has become the last major area of the world in which white minorities still control territories where they are far outnumbered by colored populations. While there is an outside chance of a peaceful transition from white dominance to multiracial democracy, it is more probable that over the next few years southern Africa will see a great intensification of hostility between whites and blacks.
This probable development will embarrass the West throughout the Afro-Asian world and could compromise the global U.S. strategy of fostering a cooperative community of free nations across the North - South dividing lines of race and wealth. This in turn would enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc opportunities in Africa.
These consequences would be the more certain and the more serious should the white governments of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa pool their political, economic and military assets in a common front against black Africa. To prevent such a coalescence and to ease as far as possible the black - white confrontation, the U.S. should as a general strategy chip away at Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Portuguese territories rather than make a frontal assault on the hard rock of South African apartheid.
In Southern Rhodesia we should cooperate with the UK to bring about resumed progress toward multiracialism. We should continue to press the South Africans to reach an accommodation with the UN with respect to South-West Africa. The avenues most likely to influence a change of Portuguese policy toward its African territories are to reduce the bargaining value the Portuguese place on the Azores base and to exert the combined persuasiveness of important Western powers.
To carry out this strategy the U.S. will have to work closely with the UK which has a huge direct stake in the area and with the West European and old Commonwealth governments which share our interest in peaceful transition to multiracial societies. We must at the same time apprise the African governments of the northern three quarters of the continent of our broad objectives and keep them currently informed of our major tactical moves.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
315. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to Attorney General Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Africa 7/1/63 - 7/9/63. Secret.
Washington, July 1, 1963.
SUBJECT
Our Policy in Africa
We are confronting a major decision in our African policy, and I think this is something you may well wish to get in on. I attach four documents /2/ which will set forth the problem: (A) a memorandum from Mennen Williams to Rusk; (B) a memorandum from Alexis Johnson to Rusk; (C) a memorandum from Rusk commenting on the Williams memorandum; and (D) a letter from Stevenson to the President.
/2/ Tabs A, B, and C are not attached to the source text. Tab D is attached but is not printed.
The basic problem is what position we should take in the meeting of the Security Council late in July when the African states, following the Addis Ababa meeting, plan to force the issue on the Portuguese colonies and on South Africa. Their basic policy is to try to make us choose between Portugal and South Africa, on the one hand, and the rest of Africa, on the other. We wish to evade that choice. We are opposed to sanctions against Portugal and South Africa, to their expulsion from the UN, etc. On the other hand, we recognize that the African states have history on their side and probably justice too; and that, unless we want to abandon Africa altogether, we will have to do something to show our support of the principle of self-determination. The question is how far we can go without risking the Azores base and various tracking stations, etc., made available to us in South Africa--or, even more essentially whether these military facilities are so indispensable to us that they must determine our African policy. The choice may well be between the military risk of losing the Azores and the South African tracking stations and the political risk of losing Africa.
As you will see from the attached documents, the Secretary and Johnson are fearful of pushing Portugal and South Africa too hard, while Williams and Stevenson would like to go at least as far as some form of arms embargo.
It is not an easy question. My own feeling is that DOD should make a much more rigorous examination than it seems yet to have made of the alternatives to the Azores and the tracking stations. We should also know much more than we seem to know at present about the prospects of the Salazar regime; I doubt if even this regime can hold out forever against the winds of change. I think it would be a great mistake to base our African policy on the indispensability of the military facilities and the permanence of the Salazar regime if neither of these things turns out to be so.
In any case, I hope you will be interested.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 6/6/63 - 7/12/63. Secret.
JCSM - 528 - 63 Washington, July 10, 1963.
SUBJECT
US Policy Toward Portugal and Republic of South Africa
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the problems set forth in the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, I - 24800/63, dated 2 July 1963, /2/ subject as above, and express the following views.
/2/ Not printed.
2. The US policy toward Portugal and the Republic of South Africa, when reviewed in relation to the independent countries of Africa, must take into account the relative importance to the over-all US strategy of military requirements in the entire area.
3. The importance of Portugal lies primarily in the importance of US base rights in the Azores, and secondarily in the membership of Portugal in NATO. Loss of the Azores would seriously degrade the responsiveness, reliability, and control of major US forces. With regard to air transportation to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, costs in tonnage and time would be raised appreciably, with a direct effect on limited war or contingency actions. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Loss of support for antisubmarine patrol aircraft would require the addition in wartime of increased Hunter - Killer forces. Defense Communications System radio facilities at Lajes provide an important communications route between the United States and the Europe/North Africa/Middle East areas. Logistic support facilities in the Azores are also important.
4. The divisive effect on NATO of further censure of Portugal cannot be dismissed. At a time when the Alliance is already strained, the withdrawal of Portugal as a result of affronts by her Allies could dangerously weaken our efforts to revitalize NATO.
5. The peacetime contribution of the Republic of South Africa to US security is considerably less important than that of Portugal. There is a missile tracking station there, but the chief interest lies in its strategic location in relation to the rest of the African continent, the ocean approaches to other areas, and its potential value in contingency operations because of its seaports and airfields. Also of importance are its industrial complex, skilled labor, and strategic materials.
6. North Africa, as the southern flank of the Mediterranean, is of great strategic importance to NATO and to access routes to the Middle East. Two of three important US installations remaining in Africa are in North Africa: the Naval Communications facility at Kenitra, Morocco, and Wheelus Air Base in Libya. The third is a major communications site in Ethiopia.
7. Sub-Saharan Africa is of secondary importance to US military strategy. The armed forces of independent nations in that area are scarcely able to maintain internal order. There is, however, a need to deny the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of the natural resources and the flanking geographical position of Africa in relation to Europe, the Middle East, and South America. Consequently, the United States must be prepared for contingency operations alone or within the framework of the United Nations, and efforts to extend US influence should be continued in every feasible manner including economic and technical assist-ance programs, and limited but selected military assistance programs. We should not, however, yield to blackmail.
8. There is concern that the African nations will form a solid front in supporting resolutions in the UN Security Council calling for severe measures against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. If such action occurs, positive US support for Portugal and the Republic of South Africa could threaten continued use of US facilities in Morocco, Libya, and Ethiopia. Development of a solid front on this question would appear unlikely. Despite the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter and the many manifestations concerning African unity, there is a real demarcation between Moslem Arab North Africa and Negro Sub-Saharan Africa. There are indications that the Addis Ababa Conference and the OAU Charter were of greater interest and importance to the Negro Africans than to the Arab North Africans. Thus, any US position which favored Portugal or the Republic of South Africa would undoubtedly have greater impact on Negro Africa than on Arab North Africa.
9. Consideration of any UN resolutions should be consistent with the provisions of the Charter. Thus, measures which advocate (a) elimination of colonial rule by force, (b) support of military or subversive action in any of the territories or countries, or (c) interference in internal affairs of legally established governments, should be resisted as being inconsistent with the principles of the Charter.
10. A detailed evaluation of US base requirements on Portuguese and African territory is attached as Appendix A hereto. /3/ Included are discussions of missions, importance, possible alternatives, and effects of alternatives or loss of the bases. A brief discussion of the potential of the armed forces of Portugal and South Africa is attached as Appendix B. /4/
/3/ Attached to the source text but not printed.
/4/ Not attached to the source text.
11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that:
a. For the foreseeable future, the US requirements in the Azores are of primary strategic importance by comparison with those in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, North Africa is also of major importance because of its geographical position and its relationship to Southern Europe and the Middle East.
b. The need to deny the African continent to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is a basic consideration. Sub-Saharan Africa, while now of secondary importance, may eventually become of increased strategic value because of location and natural resources. Consequently, denial of the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is important, as is true of the rest of Africa.
c. Sweeping generalizations should not be made in dealing with African problems, as conditions and interests vary widely in diverse regions of the continent.
d. If a resolution is directed against Portugal and South Africa jointly, the United States should endeavor to have the issues separated to permit more rational consideration of them. Not only are our strategic interests and military requirements very different in the two countries, but the issues which would be of concern to the United Nations are different.
e. In order to protect vital US strategic military interests in the Azores and avoid further weakening of the NATO Alliance, the United States should resist the institution of strong measures against Portugal. Such a course of action would be justified by the improvement which has taken place in Portuguese policy, and progress made in Angola and Mozambique.
f. Any resolution directed against the Republic of South Africa should be examined upon its merits, and harsh and irresponsible castigations should be avoided, in keeping with the peaceful purposes expressed in the UN Charter.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor /5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/AFRICA. Confidential. Drafted by Brown and Schwebel on July 18; cleared by Tasca, Burdett, Meeker, and Sisco; and approved by Cleveland. Sent to USUN, London, Pretoria, Paris, Oslo, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, Manila, Accra, Rabat, Taipei, Tunis, Monrovia, Tananarive, and Freetown and repeated to Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, Lisbon, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda.
Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:58 p.m.
117. Deptel 168 to USUN /2/ outlines position US will take in SC on Portuguese territories. This message provides broader framework in which both South Africa and Portuguese questions will be treated, including legal aspects. We believe it would be helpful to achievement of our objectives in SC for other Council members to have general preview of our position both on substance of problem and on legal issues posed, since question whether action to be taken falls under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of Charter directly affects character of action to be taken.
/2/ Document 368.
1) Apartheid. (a) US remains basically opposed to apartheid and will support resolution reaffirming UN disapproval of apartheid and recommendation of embargo on arms suitable for enforcement of apartheid. (b) We foresee however that African members likely seek much more drastic and far-reaching action, including mandatory (Chapter VII) sanctions and expulsion. US could not support such far-reaching measures since we do not believe they would help promote peaceful solution of problem and--in case of more extreme sanctions--are unlikely be effectively implemented. (c) We also believe Council should recommend SYG appoint high-level special representative such as past GA President to discuss with South Africans how their racial policies could be brought into conformity with Charter. We believe above course permits us to reaffirm our dedication to eradication of apartheid by peaceful means while avoiding measures against South Africa to which we could not agree in principle.
Secretary has already described to South African Ambassador above position. He emphasized US opposition to expulsion of South Africa and to mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII.
2) Legal. Chapter VI of Charter defines powers of Security Council in ``pacific settlement of disputes" and covers situations as described in Article 33 ``continuance of which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security." Chapter VII concerns ``Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." For example, measures which US prepared support in resolutions on South Africa are of Chapter VI character: disapproval of apartheid, appointment of Special Representative and request for partial arms embargo.
In view USG, present situations in Portuguese Territories and South Africa fall in category described above by Article 33 and do not now constitute threat to or breach of peace or act of aggression in legal sense of Charter. However, some Members of UN, and two-thirds majority of GA, have previously characterized Portuguese and apartheid situations as threats to peace. Such characterizations not binding on SC, though they undoubtedly will influence character of SC's debate.
SC typically has not made explicit decision as to whether it acted under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. In Dept's view, it would not be desirable for SC now to engage in debate or to take formal action designed to establish under what chapter SC acts. Rather, focus of Council's consideration from outset should be on what concrete steps it can take which may advance peaceful solution of Portuguese and apartheid problems.
We have begun discussions with Africans. Secretary informed Mongi Slim (Tunisia) of general elements of US position in both cases. While Slim insisted some form of ``sanction" necessary, he gave definite impression Africans wished SC action to result from negotiated agreement. Resolution of type described above we hope provides basis for SC action which Africans might be prepared acquiesce, although way tactical situation in SC may develop is unpredictable.
USUN has already been requested in Deptel 151 /3/ to inform UK, French and Norwegian dels generally of our position. Other action addressees should draw on above with FonOff as appropriate. Rio, Caracas, Manila and Taipei should make full presentation.
Rusk
/3/ Dated July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/AFRICA)
318. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal. Confidential.
Washington, July 24, 1963.
SUBJECT
ECOSOC Action on Expulsion of Portugal and South Africa
In view of the President's interest in this matter, I suggest you fill him in on the developments recounted below. A full reporting cable is expected from Geneva Thursday morning.
As you know, the Economic and Social Council has had before it resolutions calling for the expulsion of Portugal and South Africa from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Today ECOSOC voted to expel Portugal by a vote of 7 - 0 - 11 (U.S., U.K., France). Final action regarding South Africa has been postponed to sometime early next week.
Expulsion of Portugal
The principal reason why we were not able to prevent Portugal's expulsion is that it refused to accept associate membership in ECA, as have the U.K., France and Spain. We were ready to be helpful in this regard and submit and campaign for a resolution providing associate membership for Portugal as an alternative to expulsion. The Portuguese turned down our suggestion that they accept such status.
We abstained on the expulsion resolution, along with the British and the French and others. We explained this vote in ECOSOC, to the Portuguese, and to the press on grounds that: (a) the decision was really made last year by the ECA that its membership should consist only of African countries; (b) that the U.K., France and Spain have accepted associate membership, which we believe is the appropriate status for Portugal; and (c) that to vote against the ECA recommendation for expelling Portugal would be an anomaly since it would imply we believe Portugal, a European metropole, should be a full member and have a status greater than the U.K., France and Spain which accepted associate membership. In short, since Portugal insisted on full membership, the proposition on which we wanted to vote--for Portugal to become an associate member--was not available to us.
In order to minimize any adverse repercussions we have explained the above several times to the Portuguese, the latest being about noon today. The Portuguese, of course, will remain unconvinced that we could not have prevented its expulsion by voting ``no" on the resolution. Last night they informed us there were seven sure votes against expulsion and asked us to reconsider our abstention. This appears to be part of a deliberate campaign by the Portuguese to misrepresent the voting alignment and how individual delegates would vote, including our own. We nevertheless took the prudent step of once again checking the vote count this morning. Our delegation reported telephonically, after a meeting of the Western caucus, that the vote count was 7 in favor of expulsion, 0 against, and 11 abstentions. This is exactly how the vote came out.
Expulsion of South Africa
The situation regarding possible expulsion of South Africa is much more complicated.
As a device to prevent adoption of an expulsion resolution, South Africa, in contrast to the Portuguese, heeded our advice and informed ECOSOC that it has voluntarily decided not to participate in the ECA. We were therefore in a position to support a resolution which would have the effect of making South Africa a temporary non-participant in ECA in lieu of a resolution calling for its outright expulsion. The non-participation resolution failed of adoption 6 in favor (U.S.), 6 against (Soviet bloc plus Africans) and 6 abstentions (U.K., France, Australia and Latin America). The Communists and some of the Africans voted against because they favor expulsion, whereas some of our close allies abstained because they felt it was too strong. The expulsion resolution has not yet been voted upon. In this confused parliamentary situation, Ambassador Bingham successfully got a postponement of further voting for a few days.
While we wish to make our decision based on a full report from Geneva, we believe our likely next step will be to submit a slightly changed resolution embracing the non-participation formula and to work on the Latins, Australia and the U.K. to support this proposition in order to prevent adoption of the expulsion resolution. We believe there is better than an even chance of succeeding in this tactic.
Grant G. Hilliker /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Hilliker signed the original above Read's typed signature.
319. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63 - 10/29/63. Secret.
Washington, October 29, 1963.
The South African issue will probably be up in the Security Council again in the next couple of weeks and Stevenson will be here this week to prepare with State a recommendation for a US position for the President's approval. The Portuguese - African issue will remain at low temperatures so long as the talks don't break down. Within State several new proposals are being argued involving expanded student programs and covert assistance for South African and Portuguese - African refugees. I think we need some basic reconsideration and clarification of policy at this point.
There are no early or easy solutions in prospect in Portuguese Africa or in South Africa. It will take a long process of political, economic and possibly military attrition before the Portuguese accept the necessity for serious negotiation; South Africa will be even tougher.
The United States has interests on both sides of these issues so substantial that we can't afford to ``choose sides." Nor do we have sufficient leverage to compel the antagonists to come to terms. In the past several years, accordingly, we have sailed an improvised, often erratic course between the antagonists, with a series of minor concessions to the Africans as the pressures mounted, while avoiding an irreparable break with the Portuguese or South Africans.
While this has been the most sensible--indeed the only sensible--course open to us, we are beginning to run out of sailing room. I think we can gain some space for maneuver, and continue to defer the dilemma, if we raise our present tactic to a deliberate, systematic policy.
Here are some things we can do or, in some cases, just do better, to improve our position. They are based on the proposition that since we can't now bet on a winner, we should be hedging our bets and buying time.
1. At the UN: The key fact is that we are reaching a point where no further concessions can be made to the Africans. We are going to have to take positions which will be more pleasing to the Portuguese and South Africans and less so to the Black Africans, as we did on the Portuguese African resolution in the Security Council in August and on the Southern Rhodesian resolutions since then. Plimpton has already proposed as much in recommending that we vote against any resolution for sanctions on the South Africans. Thus our position in New York will become more difficult, and we will have to seek offsetting gains with the Africans outside the UN. However, we can at least limit our damage in New York if, for negotiating with the Africans, our Mission has clearer guidance on our strategy and purposes. Our performance in the UN has been weakened by lack of firm instructions for the Mission itself, which has had conflicting feelings on the African issues.
2. With the Portuguese and South Africans: While our problem with the Portuguese and South Africans will be a little eased if we stop making further concessions to the Black Africans in the UN, we still need improved communications and whatever rapport can be developed through quiet diplomacy. The Ball - Salazar channel should be cultivated assiduously, primarily for friendship and only secondarily for education. Secretary Rusk and Alex Johnson should continue to cultivate their own special relations with the South Africans. With both countries we should take every opportunity for quiet cooperation and avoid unnecessary frictions.
3. With the Black Africans: Leaving aside the nationalists directly involved, in Portuguese Africa and South Africa, there is little we can do with the leaders of Black Africa that we are not now doing. However, I believe the Africans' bark is much worse than their bite on the Portuguese African and South African issues. These are propaganda issues in the internal politics of Africa, but less important by far than their own domestic problems which are becoming more and more immediate and pressing. I believe the cost of resisting the Africans at the UN has been overstated and CIA analysis of African reaction to the August Security Council vote bears this out. In any event, we have one important asset, the President's status and personal relations with the Africans, on which we can draw heavily--for example in personal communications with key African leaders.
4. Portuguese African and South African Nationalists: Most of the above is simply reiteration, perhaps with new emphasis, of things we are already doing. If, in fact, we follow a more restricted policy in the UN, that will itself ease our problem with the Portuguese and the South Africans. In the case of the Africans, I believe we can afford to pay some price; but only if, at the same time, we strengthen our ties to the Portuguese African and South African black nationalists themselves. This is where we should be hedging our bets, and are doing the least, even though the risks are slight and the potential returns large.
At the present time, US programs for South African and Portuguese African students support only sixty students in the Lincoln University program here and a small AID grant for the African American Institute's secondary training school in Tanganyika. We do nothing with the large Angolan refugee population now in the Congo or the large exodus from both areas that will soon be moving through Northern Rhodesia. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Meanwhile bloc programs for wooing refugees are increasing particularly in Dar-es-Salaam. Communism is a really serious force within the South African nationalist movement. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Clearly, we cannot engage in military training or aid. However, we can expand our student program, help develop training and assistance programs for refugees within Africa (Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Congo) and [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
We need clear guidance for all involved as to our purposes and priorities and I think it might be useful to ask for comprehensive recommendations [2 lines of source text not declassified] so that the President himself can pass on the issues.
Bill Brubeck /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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