Documents, 374-426
South Africa
374. Memorandum for the Record /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Union of South Africa 000.1 - 680.1, 1961. Secret. Drafted by William E. Lang, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Copies were sent to Hare, Nitze, and General Yates.
I - 12, 823/61 Washington, February 27, 1961.
SUBJECT
Long Range Proving Ground Facilities in the Union of South Africa
On Friday, February 24th, Mr. Haydn Williams told me of a conversation which he had had with Mr. Hare, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, concerning the proposed agreement with the Union of South Africa for the establishment of a missile and space vehicle tracking station near Pretoria. /2/
/2/ In August 1960, the Department of State agreed to a Department of Defense proposal to enter into negotiations with the Union of South Africa for the establishment of a U.S. missile and satellite tracking station in South Africa. See Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, pp. 755 - 756.
Mr. Williams stated that Mr. Hare indicated that the proposed agreement was under review by the Department of State and the latter wished to know the importance which the Department of Defense attached to the proposed agreement. This morning, I spoke to General Yates who reaffirmed the long-range need for the facilities as essential to the development of long range missiles and space vehicle operations. General Yates also indicated his view that it was important that we proceed to negotiate a permanent agreement with the Union of South Africa as recommended by Ambassador Crowe. Following my conversation with General Yates, I reaffirmed to Mr. Hare the need for the facilities.
I asked Mr. Hare whether he would like a briefing by the Department of Defense or a letter from the Department of Defense explaining its continuing requirement for the facilities. Mr. Hare said that this would not be necessary but suggested that I record the Defense view in a Memorandum for the Record, a copy of which should be sent to him.
William E. Lang /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Lang signed the original
375. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3 - 1561. Confidential. Drafted by Penfield on March 16 and approved in S on March 29.
Washington, March 15, 1961.
SUBJECT
Visit of the South African Ambassador
PARTICIPANTS
Dr. W. C. Naude, Ambassador of the Union of South Africa
Mr. A. G. Dunn, First Secretary, South African Embassy
The Secretary
J. K. Penfield, Acting Asst. Secretary, AF
The Ambassador said that he had endeavored to get in touch with the Secretary even before he assumed office and wanted, in the course of this conversation, to set forth some basic considerations upon which he felt there should be an early exchange of views between his government and the new Administration. He was afraid, he said, that if this kind of heart-to-heart exchange did not take place, public positions might be taken on each side which would greatly damage the chances of continuing harmonious United States - South African relations. The Ambassador then spoke for approximately twenty-five minutes from notes, a copy of which he left with Mr. Penfield and which is attached hereto. /2/ Acting on instructions, he also left an Aide-Memoire (copy attached).1 At the end of his presentation he made a fervent plea for American understanding of the South African position and for recognition of the principle that one cannot dogmatize about Africa. In this connection he referred to the President's statement when commenting on Mr. Williams's trip in Africa, that ``Africa is not simple." He closed on a personal note of relative optimism by saying that when his friends wrote from South Africa asking what he thought of the chances for a better understanding with the United States, he replied that he was very much impressed with the ``intellectual gift" around the President and that he thought this would bring about a fair and reasonable view of South Africa.
/2/ Attached to the source text but not printed.
In an indirect reference to the problem of the black, colored and Asian urban populations, which the Ambassador had not mentioned in his presentation, the Secretary asked whether the objectives of South African policy could be brought about without the full cooperation of everyone involved. The Ambassador replied evasively by referring to the plans for gradual growth toward a commonwealth of independent countries within the present borders of South Africa and the necessity of white South Africans to preserve their Western identity and, at the same time, do justice to others.
Referring to the Ambassador's comment on how much the South African Government is doing to educate its colored populations, the Secretary asked whether this was not educating revolutionaries. In reply, the Ambassador said that when he was participating in the conference to organize FAO, an Asian delegate asked him ``Why are you doing this; you are preparing to feed us all and we will eventually eat you up." The Ambassador said that his reply was that this is perhaps true but there are certain imperatives of civilization and ideals which must be followed through regardless of the consequences.
In conclusion the Secretary reassured the Ambassador that the United States underestimates neither South Africa's contributions to the Western world nor the difficulties of the problems which it faces, and emphasized that our attitude would be based on the most full and careful consideration of all the factors involved.
376. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92 - Africa 452, 1961. Confidential. A copy was sent to Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
Washington, March 16, 1961.
Dear Chet: As you requested, I have looked into the necessity for concluding an agreement with the Union of South Africa for the establishment in the Johannesburg/Pretoria area of a missile and space vehicle tracking station extending the Atlantic Missile Range.
Many months ago it became clear that the full development of our national missile and space vehicle capability would require the geographical extension of our Atlantic Missile Range facilities into the general area of southeastern Africa. Such facilities are required for the testing of missiles at ranges over 5000 miles, and for tracking and telemetric data acquisition in connection with test satellite launchings from Cape Canaveral. These facilities would also be ideally located to support certain test launchings in polar orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
The use of instrumentation vessels in the area has been considered. However, there is no reasonable prospect that such an unstable platform could provide the reliable and accurate tracking capability which these development programs demand. Further, a ship-based station could not possibly satisfy the need for local airfields to support the specially-equipped aircraft whose participation is also essential in the long-range missile tests.
Possible sites for a land-based facility were discussed in great detail with officials of the Department of State last Spring and Summer. A number of alternatives to the Union of South Africa were examined, among them Zanzibar, Mozambique, the Rhodesias, and Bechuanaland. Some of these presented political difficulties quite as formidable as those in the Union, plus serious technical and logistical difficulties which a site in the Union would not involve. The Department of State therefore agreed in July to sound out the South Africans. In August, given the apparent readiness of the South Africans to cooperate on this defense project despite our acknowledged differences over racial policy, the Department of State agreed to go ahead with the station. While awaiting the arrival of our proposals for a long-term agreement, the South Africans have cooperated fully in occasional use of their airfields and ports, and our use of a temporary site for certain portable tracking equipment. The ultimate requirement, however, involves facilities and activities which we could not reasonably expect to handle indefinitely on an ad hoc and informal basis.
We in Defense do not see any effective alternative to a station in the Union of South Africa if we are to handle the development of Transit, Midas, Advent, Ranger, and other programs which will follow from the availability of the Centaur/Atlas and Saturn boosters. A draft agreement satisfactory to both State and Defense has been prepared. We believe that this draft will be generally acceptable to the South Africans, since it follows as closely as circumstances permit the recent U.S. - South African agreement concerning the NASA station at Pretoria. The latter agreement, which in our view presented comparable questions of U.S. policy, was signed on September 13, 1960.
We urge that in view of the foregoing the negotiating instructions which are now being prepared in working level discussions in State and Defense be forwarded to the Embassy in Capetown as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Roswell L. Gilpatric /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
377. National Security Action Memorandum No. 33 /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 33. Secret.
Washington, March 22, 1961.
TO
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Review of U. S. Policy Toward South Africa
The recent action of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in withdrawing his country from the British Commonwealth and the recent action of the UN on Angola have created problems not anticipated in the outstanding national security policy relating to Angola, the Union of South Africa, and the Portuguese possessions in Africa.
The present situation appears to call for a review of the policy and the development of such recommendations for change as you consider appropriate under the new circumstances and in light of the probable future developments. In this connection, it seems to me that we need to have a particular look at the provisions with respect to the encouraging of American private capital to seek investment outlets in South Africa and with respect to the purchase of gold and other raw materials that provide a major source of economic support for the South African economy. /2/
/2/ Documentation in Department of State files indicates that Martin Herz of the Bureau of African Affairs was assigned to draft the response to NSAM No. 33, but then notes that a draft prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs in June was unsatisfactory. (Ibid.) On August 3, Samuel Belk transmitted an 11-page Department of State paper, ``Guidelines for U.S. Policy Toward the Republic of South Africa," prepared by Herz, to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow. Calling it a far-above-average paper, Belk recommended that Rostow read the first six pages. He noted, however, that the paper had not been well-received in S/P and was still in the proc-ess of being cleared. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) A copy of the paper is in the compilation on South Africa in the Supplement.
McGeorge Bundy
378. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92 - Africa 452, 1961. Secret. A copy was sent to George Newman in G.
Washington, May 17, 1961.
Dear Chet: As a result of your letter of April 3, 1961, /2/ I asked the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of the Air Force personally to re-examine the need for a tracking station in the Union of South Africa and possible alternatives to such a station. This study has confirmed that tracking facilities in South Africa or its vicinity will be needed for an extended period in support of Midas, a program of very high national priority. Other important satellite programs which require the support of the facilities are Advent, Ranger, Vela Hotel, and Saint. In addition, the station will provide extended range support for long-range ballistic missile tests of recognized importance to national security.
/2/ Bowles' letter to Gilpatric pointed out that the use of South African territory for the U.S. missile tracking program posed serious difficulties for the U.S. Government because of the racial policies of the Union Government and the recurring controversies between that government and the United Nations over South West Africa and apartheid. Therefore, he argued, it was unwise for the United States to enter into any long-term military agreement with South Africa for a permanent tracking station, and asked the Department of Defense to investigate other means of satisfying its requirements, such as the use of instrumentation vessels. He also suggested waiting for the views of the new U.S. Ambassador to South Africa before taking any action on the proposed agreement. (Ibid.)
The specific conclusions of our re-examination are as follows:
a. The use of shipborne tracking equipment is definitely not feasible because the three years required to provide this equipment would cause completely unacceptable delay in a program of highest national priority. Additional expenses of the order of $75 to $100 million would also result.
b. A station on land is necessary in an area, the center of which would be in the northeastern portion of the Union of South Africa and which would include the southern portions of Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, the eastern portion of Bechuanaland and the enclaves of Swaziland and Basutoland. The limits of this area are dictated by the geometrical relations between satellite trajectories and the ground based instruments which collect tracking and telemetry data. Specifically, tracking and telemetry instrumentation at this location is essential to cover apogee and orbital injection events which occur over this area.
c. Schedules require facilities in the area for tracking Midas shots in May, June and August 1961, January, March, April and May of 1962 and an Advent shot in March 1962. Shots are projected thereafter for various programs through 1964, and the station would be of great importance in development programs to follow. The Midas shots must be supported by tracking facilities in the area designated. Lack of data on more than one of these shots could cause unacceptable delay or damage to the program.
As a result of our review, it appears to us that an early decision must be made--(a) to seek assurances of South African cooperation for continued use and expansion of the present tracking facilities in that country, or (b) to make firm arrangements to move the facilities to one of the other above-mentioned countries in the area.
If the latter alternative were adopted, we would want agreement in principle from the country concerned not later that July 1, 1961. This data is dictated by the lead time involved in site surveys, site preparation, and the installation and calibration of equipment. Even with initial access by July 1, 1961, it would not be possible to track the January 1962 Midas shot. Any later date would be unacceptable because it would prevent the tracking of the March 1962 Midas and Advent shots.
Even if a site outside of the Union of South Africa is selected for the tracking facilities, we must preserve the good will of the Union to assure the availability of its airfields and ports for the aircraft and ships which must operate in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans if long range missile tests are to be conducted effectively. Similarly, denial of commercial (government or privately owned) communication, transportation and other logistic support within the Union would seriously impede the operation of alternate facilities in one of the other countries.
In view of the need for an early decision on this matter, we earnestly hope that Ambassador Satterthwaite's appraisal of the situation will be available soon, and that we can then give expeditious joint attention to the course of action we should take. In the meantime, if you desire to consider the technical details which support the conclusions set forth above, we would be most happy to arrange for their presentation, at your convenience, by the Defense officials concerned.
Sincerely yours,
Roswell L. Gilpatric /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
379. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45A/5 - 2561. Confidential. Repeated to Pretoria.
Cape Town, May 25, 1961, 5 p.m.
140. Prime Minister Verwoerd received me cordially this morning on my first protocol visit and expressed desire establish friendly personal relations. With apologies for being extremely busy before his departure for Pretoria for Republic Day ceremonies /2/ he said he would endeavor arrange one or more long meetings with me soon after his return Capetown for serious discussion our respective policies.
/2/ On May 31, the Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa and severed its ties with the British Commonwealth.
We did however engage in substantive conversation briefly. He expressed belief we did not fully understand his government's position and its importance to defense of African continent against Communist menace. I said President has told me he was not sending me here to point finger at his government but that latter must realize importance to us of our relations with African, Asian and Latin American states who had very strong feelings re South Africa's racial policies. We desired maintain friendly relations with Union which we looked to as an old friend and ally but unless his government could develop some flexibility and give in its racial policy this would be very difficult. I wondered also whether his government realized intensity of feeling on South Africa's racial policy which was developing throughout world. He mentioned that it did. While interview was most cordial throughout and he seemed genuinely desirious of maintaining friendly relations with US which he said he greatly admired, his general attitude and reaction tended confirm prevailing impression that there is little likelihood of change in SAG racial policy as long as he remains Prime Minister.
Satterthwaite
380. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/6 - 261. Personal and Confidential.
New York, June 2, 1961.
Dear Dean: I have recently heard about the proposed agreement with the Union of South Africa for (a) a missile tracking station, and (b) a sale of arms including fighter aircraft.
While I am not fully informed about the necessity for this transaction, I am sufficiently concerned to presume to send you this note of caution. At a time when the feeling about apartheid and the policy of the Union of South Africa is rising everywhere, including pressure for sanctions in the U.N., I would think that the necessity must be very compelling to risk the repercussions from a transaction of this kind if and when it becomes known, as it must inevitably. I hardly need add that relations with the rest of Africa, and especially the new states, are important to our security too.
Sincerely yours,
Adlai
381. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs (Wight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745X.00/6 - 661. Confidential. Also sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Fredericks.
Washington, June 6, 1961.
SUBJECT
Consideration of South West African Item in the 16th General Assembly
Recently you asked for information concerning the position on items involving the Republic of South Africa which may be expected to come up at the 16th Session of the General Assembly. I am attaching for your information an excellent background paper on the subject of South West Africa which discusses in detail the actions taken by the United States up to the present. /2/
/2/ The background paper is attached to the source text, but is not printed. On March 16, the United States voted for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1593 (XV), which appealed to those U.N. members having particularly close and continuous relations with the Government of South Africa to bring all their influence to bear on that government with a view to ensuring that it would live up to its U.N. Charter obligations and give effect to previous U.N. General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa. On April 7, the United States voted for Resolution 1596 (XV) which noted with regret that the South African Government had refused to cooperate with the U.N. Committee on South West Africa and requested that the Committee proceed with its investigation--with or without that government's cooperation.
Between now and the 16th General Assembly I believe we should instruct Ambassador Satterthwaite to approach the Republic Government to urge it to cooperate with the United Nations in carrying out its obligations with respect to South West Africa. At a minimum, we feel that South Africa should resume reporting on the territory in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Mandate Agreement.
Even though the International Court of Justice now has the case of South West Africa, we may be faced with extreme resolutions in the 16th General Assembly calling for diplomatic or economic sanctions, divestiture of the Mandate or expulsion from the United Nations. We believe it would be preferable to oppose such extreme resolutions (which in any event may be illegal or unenforceable) and to await the judgment of the ICJ. Then, if the Republic should fail to abide by the Court's decision, the matter could be taken to the Security Council, under Article 94 of the Charter.
382. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92 - Africa 452, 1961. Confidential.
I - 4945/61 Washington, June 7, 1961.
SUBJECT
Defense Interest in the Union of South Africa
Attached is a memorandum, prepared at your request, concerning the importance of the Union of South Africa to U.S. naval and maritime interests. This memorandum could serve as the basis for such discussion of this matter as you may wish to initiate with Mr. Bowles.
In addition, the Air Force has raised with ISA the desirability of inviting Mr. Bowles and Mr. Williams to visit the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. They have suggested a visit on or about the 14th of June because, if present schedules are maintained, that period offers an excellent opportunity to witness missile launchings. The Air Force would make appropriate arrangements for transportation and accommodations.
We concur that such a visit could be valuable. It might give Mr. Bowles and Mr. Williams a more concrete grasp of the operations and objectives of the Atlantic Missile Range, out of which such problems as the South African tracking station have been generated. If you agree, it is recommended that you extend the invitation. If Mr. Bowles or Mr. Williams is interested, we would undertake through the Air Force to make the necessary detailed arrangements with the State Department staff.
WP Bundy
Enclosure /2/
/2/ Confidential.
SUBJECT
Importance of the Union of South Africa to U.S. naval and maritime interests
The Union of South Africa possesses the most extensive and well-equipped harbors in its part of the world. These ports have a combined capacity to handle approximately 250 vessels, primarily at Capetown and Durban. The facilities include adequate numbers of powerful cranes and excellent floating and graving docks permitting major repair and maintenance work on large ships. For example, the largest graving dock in Capetown would handle the Forrestal class carrier. The nearest adequate facilities are at Bahia Blanca, Argentina, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, but even these are not equal in capacity to the facilities at Capetown alone.
The South African ports are used regularly by our naval and merchant shipping in peacetime. In the event of emergency, their value would be even greater. Closure of the Suez Canal would require extensive use of the route around the Cape of Good Hope. The ports would be then needed not only for services to expanded merchant traffic on that route, but also for support of the antisubmarine forces which might, depending upon the nature of the emergency, be required to keep the route open.
The facilities would be needed also for support of any general naval operations by a U.S. Indian Ocean Fleet, and would be important for the staging of U.S. forces should contingency operations be undertaken in the southern part of the African continent.
In addition, effective U.S. naval operations south of the equator would require additional shore-based communications to supplement our present facilities in Morocco and Ethiopia. In the circumstances, we would have to rely on the use of South African naval radio facilities at Durban and Simonstown.
For all the foregoing purposes, naval visits to the ports of the Union of South Africa are most valuable for familiarization and indoctrination purposes should the need for use of facilities become more urgent.
383. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 000.92 - Africa 452, 1961. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Washington, June 30, 1961.
Dear Ros: I am writing to confirm the understanding which was reached at our meeting at the White House yesterday regarding our future course of action on the missile tracking station in South Africa.
We will instruct our Embassy in the Union of South Africa to negotiate a two-year extension of existing arrangements in order to retain our present missile tracking facilities there for that period of time. The Navy on its part will undertake to develop seaborne missile tracking facilities to take over the necessary functions upon the expiration of the aforesaid arrangements.
Concerning the large aircraft order which the government of the Union of South Africa wishes to place with Lockheed, I understand that we all agreed that it will not be possible under present circumstances for the U.S. Government to authorize it. We will, however, try to avoid giving Lockheed a final decision in this matter until our negotiations with South Africa for an extension of existing arrangements on the missile tracking facilities are complete. /2/
With my warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Chet
/2/ On August 11, Gilpatric sent Bowles a letter noting that he had instructed Defense Department staff to cooperate in preparing appropriate instructions to Ambassador Satterthwaite for negotiating continued use of tracking facilities in South Africa through 1963. He warned that the approach had to be very carefully thought out so as not to create undue resentment or suspicion concerning U.S. motives, and pointed out that South Africans had been given to understand that the United States wanted their cooperation for a much longer period. Gilpatric stated that he had issued instructions concerning the development of shipborne tracking capabilities for use after 1963, but reminded Bowles that it had been previously estimated that it would take 3 years to develop this capability. (Ibid.)
384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/7 - 161. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Wight on August 22; cleared by Packard, Hennes, Winfree, and Bronez (OSD); and approved by Fredericks.
Washington, August 25, 1961, 9:05 p.m.
175. Reurtels 665 and 3. /2/ Department has given careful consideration to points raised by FonMin Louw with Ambassador on June 30 when he requested an indication of attitude of USG regarding future cooperation. Department agrees SAG should have clear and frank statement US policy both in interest of South African Government and to clear air for future cooperation. Department has therefore prepared Aide-Memoire for presentation to FonMin Louw or for Ambassador's background use in conversations with PM and Cabinet officers. Aide-Memoire is in accord with new policy paper now in final stages. Text of Aide-Memoire follows:
/2/ Telegram 665, June 30 (ibid., 110.15 - WI/6 - 3061), and telegram 3, July 1 (ibid., 611.70X/7 - 161), reported Ambassador Satterthwaite's June 30 meeting with Foreign Minister Eric Louw.
Begin Verbatim Text
``Upon instruction from his Government Ambassador Satterthwaite called on FonMin Louw to discuss with him questions that had been raised by Mr. Louw in his conversation with Ambassador on June 30 as recorded in informal memorandum handed to Ambassador on that occasion.
USG has carefully studied Ambassador Satterthwaite's report of this conversation as well as memorandum confirming frank observations made by Mr. Louw. It wishes to respond with equal frankness to those observations because it believes that relations between our two countries should be based, above all, on a clear understanding of respective viewpoints.
The US is mindful of long tradition of collaboration between our two countries as exemplified by our brotherhood in arms during First and Second World Wars, during Berlin blockade, and in UN resistance against Communist aggression in Korea. US is gratified to note that SAG still adheres to convictions which led to these common actions, convictions to which US continues to be devoted in equal measure. US also is mindful of wholehearted cooperation it has received from SAG in connection with US civilian and military space vehicle and missile research programs, and others.
US however would be lacking in honesty and would be untrue to feelings of friendship it holds for peoples of South Africa if it failed to state its profound concern at evidence of increased racial tensions in South Africa and in country's drift toward international isolation. US can only view continuance of South Africa's official policy of apartheid in terms of ultimate disaster to South Africa.
US would agree that there is much misunderstanding and misrepresentation in world concerning South Africa's racial problem, and an unwillingness to give credit for what is being done for benefit of Republic's non-white population. There is no escaping fact however that most nations of world, including many who wish to retain close friendship with South Africa find themselves unable to accept a governmental policy which compels and perpetuates a system which denies fundamental human rights to vast majority of country's population only because of color of their skin.
Position of USG in this respect is well-known to SAG. US had taken view before Mr. Williams assumed his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs that situation in South Africa `is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security' as expressed in resolution of UNSC of April 1, 1960. /3/ US finds itself unable to agree with SAG's contention that Republic's racial policy represents exclusively a domestic matter. In our view this policy not only does violence to human rights provisions of UN Charter but tends to weaken position of West in its efforts to resist Communist influence and penetration in newly emerged Afro-Asian nations, a matter in which SAG itself has expressed deep concern. As a consequence US for its own and for world security must continue its disapproval of a policy which arouses emotions and resentments of such large segments of population of world.
/3/ For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 635 - 636.
US regrets that press reports of statements by Assistant Secretary Williams have given impression in some circles in South Africa that we regard white population as being expendable and that we urge immediate and unqualified granting of political power to vast non-white majority of South African population. This certainly has never been and is not now intention or desire of US. It is because US is thoroughly aware of great complexity of problem and tremendous importance of white population to future well-being of South Africa that it believes in a planned, purposeful and progressive evolution of institutions that would safeguard basic rights of all elements of South Africa's population.
US is deeply concerned over ever-widening chasm between whites and non-whites in South Africa and evidence that non-white moderation is being supplanted by non-white extremism which can only endanger future stability of country. US therefore would warmly welcome the beginnings of any steps which SAG could take to permit non-whites to play a greater role in life of their country and which would be apt to remove some of opprobrium which attaches to South Africa not only in eyes of colored people of world but also in eyes of people of most white nations. Should such steps be taken with view to ultimate full participation US would gladly cooperate to fullest extent possible with South Africa in all fields of endeavor to mutual benefit of both countries and to Free World generally. In absence of such indications of change however US could not be expected to cooperate in matters which it believed would lend support to South Africa's present racial policies.
On other hand USG agrees with Mr. Louw's view which we believe is shared by SAG that there are numerous fields in which our two countries can continue to collaborate closely and fruitfully to our mutual benefit and for good of Free World especially in areas of common defense against threats emanating from Communist Bloc. Mention might also be made of our continued desire to cooperate in fields of missile activity and space exploration, atomic energy and in entire range of scientific, technical and research activities. Furthermore USG believes it desirable to maintain and strengthen mutually desirable cooperation and exchanges which have existed in cultural, educational, health and welfare and other fields. USG is confident now that divergent views of both Governments have been made clear that relations between our two countries will continue to be characterized by frankness, sincerity and mutual trust as in past." End Verbatim Text.
State and Defense have agreed on desirability negotiating with SAG for continued use and planned expansion of AMR tracking facilities, at least through 1963.
Department has received impression that until US policy towards Republic clarified we cannot expect their cooperation on matters of interest to us. Situation may have changed since July 1 however and Ambassador may feel it desirable to advise SAG and SAAF informally of US desire discuss tracking station arrangements even before presentation of aide-memoire, particularly if it appears appointment with FonMin will be delayed. As Embassy is aware USAF would like to let contracts within next few weeks for construction necessary to install Phase 2 equipment which should be operational in January. Department's hope is that SAG's reaction to aide-memoire will be reasonably favorable and that Ambassador can indicate at same time or shortly thereafter US desire discuss tracking arrangements. (FYI: If SAG agrees to discussions Department and Defense would send small joint team to assist Ambassador in negotiations and to explain USAF plans and needs. End FYI) /4/
Rusk
/4/ On September 5, Ambassador Satterthwaite reported that Louw's reaction to the aide-memoire giving the U.S. position on future cooperation with South Africa had been so negative that he had not raised the question of the U.S. tracking station with the Foreign Minister. (Telegram 178, September 5; ibid., 611.70X/9 - 561; telegram 180, September 6; ibid., 611.70X/9 - 661)
385. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Africa, 000.92 - Africa 452, 1961. Secret.
I - 16, 421/61 Washington, September 16, 1961.
SUBJECT
South African Tracking Facilities
Foreign Minister Louw's reaction to the U.S. aide-memoire explaining its policy towards South Africa (Tab A) /2/ was adverse in the extreme (Tab B). /3/ In essence, he interpreted our policy as one in which we would cooperate with the Federation only in matters of benefit to the U.S., such as the missile and satellite tracking facilities. On other matters we would not only not cooperate with South Africa, but would oppose it, until it changes its apartheid policy. In Louw's view, the U.S. appears to want ``to have its cake and eat it too."
/2/ Not attached to the source text. See Document 384.
/3/ Not attached to the source text. See footnote 3, Document 384.
There are two matters of immediate interest to South Africa which, if the U.S. fails to cooperate, would most likely mean the end of South African assistance with respect to our missile and satellite tracking activities there. The first concerns the possibility of South Africa seeking a second drawdown of IMF funds. According to Louw, South Africa hoped not to have to make this second drawing, but would seek it if necessary to strengthen the economy of the country and further to improve the welfare of the Bantu. Louw, however, had heard that the U.S. intends to oppose the second drawdown and indicated that, if this were so, it was a most serious matter in our relationship. The second matter concerns the recent formal request by the South African Embassy here for approval of the sale of seven C - 130 aircraft by Lockheed. It is Ambassador Satter-thwaite's view that refusal of the sale may foreclose any further South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense and make it impossible to negotiate arrangements for the continued use of the tracking facilities.
We understand that the State Department is seeking Secretary Rusk's approval of a reply to the South African Embassy which would deny its request for the sale of the seven C - 130s. I strongly recommend that you call Secretary Rusk personally, asking him to hold up action on this until our two Departments can review thoroughly the South African response to the U.S. aide-memoire and its implications concerning future South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense. In this regard, Foreign Minister Louw will attend the UN General Assembly next week and is scheduled to meet with Secretary Rusk. I further recommend that you arrange a meeting with Mr. Rusk before then to discuss these problems with him.
If Secretary Rusk should indicate that it had previously been agreed between State and Defense that the sale of aircraft to South Africa should not be authorized, you may wish to point out that this was done in the context of South African desires for F - 104s as well as C - 130s and with the anticipation that this could be accomplished without jeopardizing arrangements for the tracking facilities.
Haydn Williams
386. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, Vol. II, General. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Washington, September 21, 1961.
Dear Mac: We are now facing a difficult situation in regard to the Republic of South Africa on which I would appreciate your assistance. As you know, the Republic's apartheid policy has made it a primary target of the Asian and African bloc; indeed, of a large segment of opinion in the United States and Western Europe.
If we were free agents, our voting position in the United Nations on the Republic and our policies in regard to this government would be designed to encourage a change in the basic attitudes, and in the interval to express our strong disapproval.
However, a year ago we agreed with the Pentagon to negotiate for the establishment of the tracking station in South Africa for which an initial agreement runs out on December 31st; as a result we are under direct and indirect pressure to make concessions to this government which are bound to be costly to us in the United Nations and in our relations with the world generally.
At present, I can think of five points which bear upon this problem.
1. Naval maneuvers involving a few American warships with additional vessels from the South African and British navies, and with Portuguese observers, are scheduled for late October and early November. This is a continuation of maneuvers held in 1959 and 1960.
If it were not for the leverage provided to the South African government by the tracking station, I do not think we would consider participating in these maneuvers. Their military importance can be no more than marginal to us. However, for South Africa the advantage is very real in that this can be used to indicate that this Republic is an ``ally" of the United States. The impact in the United Nations when reports of these maneuvers appear in late October should be carefully weighed.
2. South Africa is considering the purchase of $100 million worth of airplanes from a U.S. corporation. Although the transaction would be for dollars, it requires licenses from us.
If it were not for the tracking station, our reaction would certainly be negative in view of the fact that public opinion generally would assume that the primary use of these planes would be to suppress internal disorder.
There is now a fair possibility that South Africa may decide to buy the planes in France so our present position is to stall.
3. South Africa has requested $75 million from the International Monetary Fund. Although we have no veto power over such a transaction, our position as a principal contributor is of great importance. We have agreed to the sum of $37.5 million because to refuse to do so would be to break all kinds of precedents. Once again, however, if it were not for the tracking station we would under no circumstances agree to the additional $37.5 million which in the eyes of the world will be connected with the purchase of the airplanes.
4. The Republic of South Africa is urgently calling on us for support for its membership on the United Nations Outer Space Committee. Although they do not have a chance of being elected even with all the influence we can bring to bear, it would be difficult for us under present circumstances to refuse to make this effort. Yet if we do so we will be taking one more step toward allying ourselves with what is perhaps the most unpopular nation outside the Communist world.
5. When Ambassador Satterthwaite went to Africa, we instructed him to invite black Africans to private and public receptions at his home. We did this knowing that such action would undoubtedly be subjected to criticism by the local government, criticism which we were fully prepared to meet, if necessary leaving our Embassy under the supervision of a Charge.
Ambassador Satterthwaite has had black Africans to his home privately. But because of our desire not to upset the government in view of pending negotiations for the tracking station, he has not invited black Africans to his public receptions.
If we are forced to take these actions, most of which will become known to the public in the midst of a highly explosive United Nations session in which the attitudes of the Asians and Africans will be of decisive importance, we will probably have to pay a heavy political price.
I have great sympathy with the Pentagon's problem and I have no desire to make this situation more difficult. However, when the agreement was reached a year ago in an exchange of letters between State and Defense in August and September of 1960, it was agreed that ``the (tracking) station would be removed if, due to later political developments in the African area, it should become a net disadvantage to United States interests."
The Pentagon now apparently feels that the tracking station is of such great military importance that we have no alternative but to bargain out the situation as best we can.
Because of the basic importance of this question to our political position not only in the Republic of South Africa but in Africa as a whole, I would be grateful if Jerry Wiesner or some other outside authority in the scientific field could examine the possible alternatives and perhaps bring a fresh mind to bear on the problem.
If such a study accepts the view that this tracking station is of primary vital importance to our defense effort and if no other alternative is available, then I suppose we shall have to do the best we can.
I have discussed this matter with Ros Gilpatric, and he has agreed that we should hold up decisions on the question of maneuvers for a few days. He also agrees that it would be a good idea if Jerry Wiesner, or some other competent outside scientific authority, reviewed the entire matter of our tracking stations. /2/
/2/ See Document 389.
This is a difficult situation with foreseeable political consequences, and I hate to see us take the final plunge without making every effort to try to find a way out of the dilemma.
With my warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Chet Bowles
387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/9 - 2561. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wight on September 12; cleared by Martin, Brubeck, and Bowles; and approved by Fredericks.
Washington, September 28, 1961, 10:36 a.m.
249. Urtels 180, 181, 220, 229, 230. /2/ Following guidance is supplied in reply reftels. In view FonMin's emotional reaction to aide-memoire, leave to your judgment whether amplification and further interpretation are useful.
/2/ Telegrams 180 and 181, September 6, are ibid., 611.70X/9 - 661. Telegram 220, September 20, is ibid., 611.70X/9 - 2061. Telegrams 229 and 230, September 25, are ibid., 770X.5622/9 - 2561 and 611.70X/9 - 2561, respectively.
Dept surprised that aide-memoire interpreted to mean that ``USG desired cooperate only in fields useful to it" since we consider certainly of mutual benefit cooperation which has existed in cultural, educational, health, scientific and other fields.
In reply to FonMin's request for further interpretation two sentences mentioned urtel 180 Dept considers first sentence refers to position USG must take bilaterally, as well as in UN and international organizations.
It seems unnecessary to reiterate why we feel SA policy not in accord with human rights provision of UN Charter. It appears obvious that apartheid policy does not recognize ``dignity and worth of human person" when individuals not permitted by law to live where they wish or travel without special permit, as well as hundreds of other regulations, such as job discrimination, based solely on grounds of race.
Correction should be made in Deptel 190 in reply to urtel 161. /3/ In third paragraph Deptel 190 change phrase ``several generations" to ``a number of years."
/3/ Both dated August 29. (Ibid., 611.70X/8 - 2961)
FYI: Re SAG drawing from IMF, on July 5 IMF announced it had entered into standby arrangement under which SAG may draw up to 75 million dollars during next 12 months. Agreement with the IMF provides for review of situation after six months, such review being necessary before SAG could draw second tranche 37-1/2 million dollars. Since the six months have not yet elapsed, no review has been made and the question of a further drawing has not yet arisen. As FonMin pointed out it is quite possible that no further drawing will be necessary. If a second drawing is requested, the Department is not now prepared to consider it favorably. However this is Dept of State position which has not yet been adopted as USG decision. Dept understands that Per Jacobsson of IMF was planning tell SA officials, in connection original IMF action in approving drawing and line of credit, that SAG intention expend large sums foreign exchange for purchase military fighter and transport aircraft does not seem in consonance with SAG's need conserve foreign exchange. End FYI. In view of uncertainties mentioned above and the impossibility of foreseeing what situation may be in January, suggest you should not inform SAG of above. You may note that IMF review has not taken place and that much depends on result of this review and situation which exists at the time; but that the US position on this matter, if it arises, will not be based on political considerations.
Secretary has agreed to see Fon Min Louw in Washington. Appointment with President appears impossible in view large numbers FonMins who may be attending UN session and who might then also request Presidential meeting.
Sale of C - 130 aircraft, participation in CAPEX exercise, and negotiation of tracking agreement all matters receiving high level consideration. Will inform you soonest when decisions reached.
Bowles
388. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.5622/9 - 2961. Confidential; Niact; No Distribution Outside of Department. Drafted by Deming, cleared by Fredericks, and approved by Bowles.
Washington, September 29, 1961, 8:08 p.m.
256. For Satterthwaite. The Department has approved licensing C - 130 transports for sale to Government South Africa but cannot approve licensing and sale of F - 104s. South African Embassy informed of above.
Department is continuing urgent high level review with appropriate agencies need for continuation Tracking Station Agreement after expiration date and wishes arrive at this decision insofar as possible unhampered by other considerations. Department will advise you promptly of results review this important matter and decision as to whether or not negotiations for extension Tracking Station Agreement will be required.
Bowles
389. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Wiesner) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret.
Washington, October 18, 1961.
In response to your request, /2/ I have investigated the matter of the Air Force tracking station in South Africa raised by Chester Bowles' memorandum to you (attached). /3/ I have talked to a number of people in the Air Force, including Assistant Secretary McMillan, and to Ros Gilpatric.
/2/ An attached memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretary Rusk reads: ``Some weeks ago I had a long letter from Chester Bowles reporting disagreement between his office and Ros Gilpatric on the importance of the Air Force tracking station in South Africa. A copy of the letter is attached. He asked that the matter be arbitrated through a review by Jerry Wiesner. Wiesner's review is now at hand, and in essence his view is reported in the third paragraph of the enclosed memorandum from him to me. From the little I know of the matter, it makes sense. I hear you are receiving Foreign Minister Louw tomorrow, and accordingly I think you will want to know of this episode and of Wiesner's technical conclusion in which Secretary Gilpatric concurs."
/3/ Document 386.
The following are the facts: The South African station is used for receiving telemetering data to provide diagnostic information in the event of failure in certain of our satellite tests. At the present time the only programs involved are the Midas Ballistic Missile Warning Satellite and the Advent Communications Satellite. Both of these are research programs of importance, but are not among the highest priority Defense Department space programs. If we were forced out of the Union of South Africa, we would have to operate without this particular diagnostic data until either we get another land-based site (the Air Force is seeking a new site, but we shouldn't count on their finding one), or we are able to prepare a tracking ship to substitute for the land-based station. The Air Force estimates that this could not be done until late fall of 1962 at the earliest.
However, since the test programs could be carried on, albeit some-what less effectively, Secretary Gilpatric has agreed to the position that loss of this site would be painful, but not fatal, and therefore we should advise the State Department to proceed in the following manner: neither be deliberately provocative and thus insure that we will be ordered out, nor permit the need for the site to be the reason for compromise on issues which the State Department regards as fundamental in the conduct of its foreign policy.
Jerry
390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/10 - 1261. Secret. Drafted by Wight, Gathright, and Hennes on October 23; cleared by Kitchen, Brubeck, William P. Bundy in substance, and Fredericks; and approved by Bowles.
Washington, October 24, 1961, 6:55 p.m.
349. Embtel 292. /2/ For Ambassador. You are requested commence negotiations with SAG for extension on open-end basis of present informal agreement for military research tracking installation. You should make clear US would desire now proceed with installation of programmed equipment as already informally discussed with SAG. In pre-senting foregoing, you should point out US space program requirements under continual review and that in this fast changing field both space programs and requirements for supporting them are subject to substantial change from year to year. For this reason US believes most satisfactory arrangement would be continuation of present flexible informal undertakings by new exchange of letters. You should also state USG desires continue use ports and airfields in connection long range missile tests, and would provide periodic schedules as heretofore concerning these tests. In explaining delay to South Africans you may wish point out well known fact new administration undertook very thorough extensive review of national space program, that of Department of Defense as well as NASA. During period this review present arrangements for military tracking station operated very satisfactorily. As indicated above, results this review show desirability of continuing flexible arrangements of present type of South Africa, subject cancellation by either Government within such reasonable period as may be mutually agreeable.
/2/ Dated October 12. (Ibid.)
FYI. White House Science Adviser has reviewed with Defense requirement for military tracking stations South Africa. Conclusion is that loss this station would be ``painful but not fatal." Conclusion also supports Department's attitude on which State - Defense understanding exists that we will not alter our basic national policy toward South Africa including our opposition to apartheid in order to retain station. Alternatives to South African station would require at best six months to two years to make ready. It therefore necessary for US seek extension of present facilities on present site for time being. As you know, Department of Defense is undertaking to prepare shipborne capability with view to having this ready by end of 1963.
Secretary's discussions with Louw on 20th which is subject following telegram /3/ did not include subject of tracking station agreement though Louw referred to stations as tangible evidence SA desire cooperate with US. End FYI. /4/
/3/ Document 391.
/4/ On October 30, Ambassador Satterthwaite called on Foreign Secretary Jooste and left an aide-memoire containing the substance of the U.S. proposal contained in the telegram printed here. (Telegram 347 from Pretoria, October 30; Department of State, Central Files, 770X.56311/10 - 3061) On December 19, Satterthwaite reported that the South African Government had decided to grant a temporary 90-day extension of the exisiting missile tracking agreement. (Telegram 507 from Pretoria; ibid., 611.70X7/12 - 1961)
Rusk
391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X/10 - 2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Durnan and Deming, cleared by Manfull and Swanks, and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to USUN.
Washington, October 25, 1961, 7:57 p.m.
352. Urtel 327. /2/ Fol summary uncleared memorandum conversation Rusk - Louw Oct 20: /3/
/2/ Dated October 24. (Ibid.)
/3/ The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Louw stated South Africa's position international issues clearly on side West, anti-Communist, and SAG support could be depended on any future world conflict. However, South Africa unclear where other Western countries stand in relation South Africa. At UN his delegation not taken into confidence of West and therefore resented being asked how they will vote on UN matters just before vote taken. Ambassador Naude interjected at this point to say day to day contacts with West at UN quite satisfactory but would prefer systematized arrangement. As further example isolation Louw said he not informed US and Western views Berlin issue. Secretary thereupon informed Louw frankly and at length US policy on Berlin, position principal allies, Soviet objectives and our estimate long-range outlook for reunification Germany.
Louw said his government disturbed by US aide-memoire September 5 especially what he regarded as our policy of ``divided cooperation." Indicated not satisfied so far with US explanation this policy which seemingly based on premise US cannot cooperate with South Africa because it denying human rights. Such conception apparently based misapprehension conditions South Africa and reasons for its policy. Wrong describe South Africa's policy ``separate development" as denial human rights since this policy necessary to ensure most fundamental human rights of survival to which South Africa's whites entitled.
Louw said objective observer in South Africa would see Bantu developing own independent political and social system. South African white knows we can't transplant white man's system government on Bantu. Therefore SAG helping them develop their own systems on ethnic basis to preserve own cultural values. He noted Ambassador Satterthwaite in discussion with him had noted ``job reservation" as one example denial human rights. FonMin said this not case, that reserving certain jobs for whites and blacks related to question ``survival" and was also means protecting whites and blacks against Coloreds.
Louw summarized by saying despite our misapprehensions and despite our criticism and opprobrium toward his government on race policy, South Africa has cooperated and continues cooperate with US in providing missile tracking stations and military facilities, her ports and airfields on highly confidential matters often on short notice. Now he wanted know how USG intended cooperate with SAG.
Secretary stated he would like see total US - SA cooperation in this troubled world. However, we cannot as nation and people with our history accept apartheid policy. This a major moral issue which affects our relations with other countries and we have chosen take our stand forthrightly in UN in accordance with our beliefs and conscience. Despite this we have for considerable period attempted to act as moderator in UN on items involving SA and this role quite frankly has been an increasing burden to us. We sincerely hope SA can find ways improve her position in UN these matters and give opportunity for wisdom and time to moderate these issues. Secretary observed that all of us in West presently faced historical problem of coming into some reasonable relationship with non-white world. In this connection he expressed to Louw concern that our Embassy in SA cannot have normal relationship with population that prevails all other countries. Louw responded if Secretary meant that Embassy cannot have Bantu at its receptions that he would always oppose any change in this policy since it would mean for SA accepting social integration and the end of SA Race Pride to which it had a right. Secretary summarized by stating that while US and SA cannot agree on matter race relations he saw no need why this disagreement should infect total range our relations.
Louw complained failure US Delegate support his right free speech in GA debate rather than in statement issued after session adjourned and observed that seemed to him US fearful antagonizing African members UN. Secretary replied principal US delegate unable attend session in question and issued statement as soon as he learned what had taken place. Secretary told Louw he could not accept inference that US positions based on fear other nations rather than on our best judgment what would be in best interests free world. Louw said he wished retract statement.
Call ended on cordial note Louw stating he expected be in attend-ance at UN until end November and Secretary suggesting they might meet again in New York to continue discussion.
Rusk
392. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, South Africa, Republic of. Official Use Only. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Washington, November 13, 1961.
SUBJECT
Presidential Message to Chief Luthuli, Winner of 1960 Nobel Peace Prize
Chief Albert John Luthuli, President of the African National Congress and the best known opponent of the South African Government's racial policies, has been awarded the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize. This is in recognition of Chief Luthuli's consistent efforts over the past thirty years against racial discrimination and his attempts to advance his people, using non-violent methods.
A congratulatory message from the President will be a source of encouragement to him and all opponents of apartheid, and will be beneficial to us in the over-all African context. The Government of South Africa will, of course, be greatly displeased. However, such a message falls clearly within the strong position this Government has taken on apartheid, and there will be important segments of the South African white population and the press who will understand and applaud our move.
In accordance with the White House request /2/ there is enclosed a proposed message from the President to Chief Luthuli to be delivered to him at Oslo in the form of a letter. /3/ The award is to be made on December 10, and Chief Luthuli should be arriving in Oslo sometime early in December.
/2/ A previous Department of State memorandum proposing that the President send a message to Chief Luthuli bears a handwritten notation that reads: ``JFK does not approve--no message." (Memorandum from Battle to Bundy, October 26; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa) On November 3, Assistant Secretary Williams sent Kennedy a personal letter strongly recommending that it was in the interest of the United States that Luthuli's great cause be recognized and celebrated anew by a public message from the President of the United States. He noted that Luthuli, who was an avowed protagonist of building a future based on equality and cooperation among all the races of the Republic, might well play an important role in the future of South Africa. (Ibid.)
/3/ The message attached to the source text reads: ``I have been moved by the award to you of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize and I join with many others from all parts of the world in extending sincere congratulations to you. This high recognition of your past and continuing efforts in the cause of justice and the advancement through peaceful means of the brotherhood of man is applauded by free men everywhere. Please accept my best wishes for your continued health and well-being." (Ibid., President's Office Files, Countries, South Africa, Republic of) On December 14, Chief Luthuli sent Kennedy a letter from Oslo expressing his very sincere thanks for the President's most inspiring message. (Ibid.)
The Department recommends that the President's message be published shortly following delivery to Chief Luthuli.
M L Manfull /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that indicates Manfull signed the original above Battle's typed signature.
393. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11 - 2061. Confidential. Drafted by Cook on December 13.
Washington, November 20, 1961.
SUBJECT
US/UK Talks--Summary Minutes--South Africa
PARTICIPANTS
United Kingdom
Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office
Sir Algernon Rumbold, Deputy Under Secretary, Commonwealth Relations
M. K. M. Wilford, Foreign Office
J. D. Hennings, Colonial Attache, British Embassy
D. A. Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
J. D. B. Shaw, First Secretary, British Embassy
R. W. H. DuBoulay, First Secretary, British Embassy
United States
G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Olcott H. Deming, Director, AFE
Martin F. Herz, Special Assistant for Planning, AF
Philip R. Cook, AFE
Sir Algernon Rumbold opened the discussion and stated that his remarks would be grouped under three main headings: (1) Speculation about the future of the Republic, (2) Negotiations to bring UK - South African relations up-to-date following the latter's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and (3) Pressures for sanctions against the Republic.
Under heading (1) Sir Algernon commented that there would be no change in the South African Government's policies without a change in the government itself and there was no chance of this taking place. The Afrikaners were tough, stubborn, in-bred people and pressure from outside would simply drive them further into ``laager." Internal pressure was ineffective and if the African people tried to overthrow the government by force they would be massacred. Suggestions about an effective African general strike were pointless since the African people could not afford to keep it up long enough to do any good. The doctrine of ``apartheid" was nothing new in South Africa and was deeply ingrained in the backgrounds of all people, black and white, in the Republic. What liberal elements there were came mainly from the English speaking group sprinkled with a few Afrikaner intellectuals.
Sir Algernon continued by stating that the British Government [2 lines of source text not declassified] saw no possibility of multi-racial sharing such as was being tried in the Federation.
The UK's major concerns in this area were: (1) the dependence of the High Commission Territories on the Republic and the ease with which the Republic could squeeze these territories if it chose to do so, (2) the safety of the sea routes, the Simonstown base, flying rights and other Defense arrangements, (3) the #900 million UK investment in the Republic, (4) the fact that 5% of the UK's total exports were bought by the Republic and (5) the importance of gold production to the Sterling area.
Turning to current negotiations with the Republic (heading 2), Sir Algernon explained that the UK's over-all objective was to cease treating the Republic as a member of the Commonwealth but to arrange means to treat it as a friendly country and protect the UK interests just mentioned. He referred to the present ``stand fast" law, which will expire on May 31, 1962, and spoke of the complicated new legislation which was required. The UK, he said, hoped to complete its negotiations with the Republic on this matter before Christmas but the South Africans were very slow. Among the problems which had been or were being discussed were: (1) The Nationality Problem--The UK would not apply the Irish formula. South Africans would be aliens but certain South Africans would have the right to register as British up to 1965. Special provisions would be made for the High Commission territories and free movement between them and the Republic would continue. (2) Customs--The UK wanted the customs agreement between the H.C. territories and the Republic to continue. (3) Extradition Problems. (4) Defense--The Simonstown base would continue, there would be provisions for the defense of the sea routes and for flying rights and, the UK would provide certain types of military equipment and military training (but not anti-riot equipment or training). (5) Sterling Area--The Republic would stay in. (6) Commonwealth Preference--It would continue. (7) Sugar Agreement--It had been completed.
Sir Algernon stated that the UK believed sanctions against the South African Republic would be counter-productive. Therefore, he said, the UK would not apply sanctions, would not support a UN move to do so and certainly would not sever diplomatic relations. The African people, Sir Algernon said, would be the first to suffer from sanctions and the people in the High Commission territories would be adversely affected. Imposing sanctions would create an awkward precedent. Who would be next? The UK did not wish to prejudice her interests in the Republic. Furthermore, sanctions would tend to force the present opposition into alignment with the Nationalist Government since no South African could approve a move designed to harm the economy. Finally, Sir Algernon said he doubted whether sanctions would be effective in view of the basic strength of the South African economy.
Assistant Secretary Williams responded stating that the U.S. did not have such important interests in South Africa as the British. He noted U.S. investment, the tracking station and the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine interests but said that the U.S. was unwilling to compromise its principles to maintain those interests. Therefore, the U.S. was relatively free in South Africa as compared, for example, with Angola.
The Assistant Secretary said that U.S. policy towards the Republic was based on three factors:--(1) South Africa's economy could make great contributions to Africans and to the rest of the African continent. Accordingly, the U.S. hated to see it destroyed. (2) The U.S. and the Republic shared a common western heritage, had been comrades in arms in two world wars and in Korea and were both unquestionably anti-communist. (3) Apartheid, however, was obnoxious. It created a breeding ground for communism and made U.S. relations with the rest of the African continent very difficult. Therefore, U.S. policy was to ``rifle in" on the aspects of South Africa we did not like but support those aspects we did like. We had conveyed this policy in an Aide-Memoire to the Republic but it had been viewed as a serious impediment to the maintenance of friendly relations.
Examples of our policy in action were:--(1) The Aircraft Sale--They wanted fighters and transports but we approved only transports. (2) The IMF Loan--We had scrutinized this closely but had approved the first tranche since first tranche approvals were traditionally granted by the Fund. (3) The Tracking Station--We were going ahead with this but we would not sacrifice our policies or our freedom of action to get it.
Assistant Secretary Williams said the U.S. might /2/ have to pick and choose sanctions which bilaterally would help the U.S. position with the rest of Africa. He commented that the U.S. had opposed sanctions in the UN and might continue to do so. The U.S. wanted to ``zero in" on the real targets but, at the same time, it did not want to force the Republic into ``laager." The U.S. recognized that South Africans were tough and wanted to show them it was just as tough.
/2/ At this point in the source text the word ``would" is crossed out and replaced with a handwritten ``might."
During the course of the discussion which followed Mr. Tasca advanced the view that the West African nations would attack the U.S. and the U.K. for an ``easy" South African policy and would turn to the Soviet Union. Sir Roger Stevens replied that this was a problem but he believed it could be met. He said that the UK did not believe its South African policy would seriously damage the UK's relations with other African nations. He felt that the other nations appreciated that the UK was a large trading partner with the Republic and pointed out that India had opposed sanctions in the UN too. Sir Roger warned that the question of how apartheid was attacked was crucial and stated, ``you must be careful you don't do more harm than good."
Governor Williams reiterated that the U.S. believed it was necessary to do something about apartheid and expressed the belief that the time of the Europeans in South Africa was limited. Sir Roger and Sir Algernon replied that if this were true there were only two possible results. Either a ``bloody revolution," which would be a ``terrible mess," or a gradual ``leavening of the lump" on the race question. The UK believed that the latter was the best hope. Sir Roger added that the U.S. would bear a very grave responsibility if it gave any encouragement to Africans to attempt to overthrow the South African Government.
Governor Williams asked whether sabotage of the Republic's gold mines would not cripple the economy. The British delegation replied that the situation in the mines was quite good and there was no history of disorders in this sector. However, there were undoubted economic weaknesses in apartheid and the Bantustan border development plan was described as ``just talk."
At the close of the meeting Governor Williams stated that the U.S. wanted to be sure that U.S. inter-racial policies were reflected in its operations overseas. Accordingly, Ambassador Satterthwaite had been instructed to hold inter-racial dinners and improve contacts with non-Europeans. Sir Roger commented, ``I presume the U.S. does not want to provoke a break in diplomatic relations with South Africa." Governor Williams replied that the U.S. wanted to maintain diplomatic relations as long as relations were meaningful but it would run the risk of a break if its operations were restricted.
394. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/2 - 1762. Secret. Drafted by Bronez (OSD/ISA) and Durnan on February 19; cleared by Packard, Hunt in substance, Robinson, Deming, Manning, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to Pretoria.
Washington, February 20, 1962, 4:47 p.m.
12. State/Defense message. Embtel 31 repeated Pretoria 40. /2/ In connection negotiation tracking station agreement you are authorized in your discretion: (1) Indicate we agree in principle authorize sidewinder purchase, subject completion certain technical security procedures and with delivery dates subject availability of equipment. Department awaiting reply note to SA Embassy January 31 requesting information concerning SA timing requirements and the control and associated equipment planned for acquisition and for utilization with sidewinder; (2) Indicate we would welcome having SAAF liaison officer at site, FYI keeping in mind we not in position assume SAG personnel costs, end FYI; (3) Reiterate substance Deptel 360 to Pretoria /3/ concerning our willingness compensate SAG for out-of-pocket costs of alternative site. /4/
Rusk
/2/ Telegram 31, February 17, reported the reservations of some senior South African Defense officials regarding the proposed tracking station agreement. (Ibid.)
/3/ Dated October 26, 1961. (Ibid., 770X.56311/10 - 2661)
/4/ On February 27, Ambassador Satterthwaite reported that he had discussed the tracking station agreement with Foreign Minister Jooste as instructed. Jooste had insisted that his government was requesting nothing except essential military items required to protect the country from external military aggression, by which he meant specifically Communist-supported forces from abroad. The Foreign Minister also declared that he was sure South Africa could comply with U.S. security requirements. (Telegram 37 from Cape Town; ibid., 611.70X7/2 - 2762)
395. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/3 - 1762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria.
Cape Town, March 17, 1962, 11 a.m.
59. Department pass Defense. Acting under instructions Department telegram 22 /2/ Clark and I met this morning with Jooste and Botha leaving with them draft aide-memoire containing verbatim text of reference telegram and incorporating expression our appreciation evidence SAG willingness cooperate in extension tracking agreement. /3/ I made clear we prefer convey our intent regarding military equipment procurement in aide-memoire, altering as little as possible form and content draft letter provided Department telegram 460. /4/ I also gave Jooste additional copies draft letter already furnished informally to Peter Phili on December 11.
/2/ Telegram 22, March 15, authorized Satterthwaite to express the U.S. Government's gratification at South Africa's willingness to cooperate in extension of the tracking agreement and to propose a formal exchange of letters. (Ibid., 611.70X7/3 - 1062)
/3/ Telegram 52 from Cape Town, March 9, transmitted the text of a South African aide-memoire that stated the South African Government was prepared to agree to the U.S. proposal regarding an arrangement to be arrived at between the two governments in regard to U.S. tracking operations for an unfixed period subject to termination after due notice by either party. (Ibid., 611.70X7/3 - 962)
/4/ Not found.
Jooste said he would pass our aide-memoire and draft letter immediately to his own people and would take up with Cabinet first thing Monday morning. Until Cabinet had reacted he could make no comment officially although it was evident from his pleased expression that he felt negotiations were ``back on the tracks."
I enquired about further ``negotiable details" which Jooste might have in mind. He said he had opposed an earlier suggestion of three-months termination notice and would prefer six which was more consistent with existing agreements. I replied that six months was exact period we had in mind as he would find when he read our draft letter. One or two other points Jooste said he preferred not to discuss further until Cabinet had seen our proposals. In general however, he agreed with us that we should introduce as few new elements as possible into discussion beyond those which USG already prepared to clear.
Comment: We were encouraged by evident satisfaction with which our reply to SAG aide-memoire of March 9 was received and by Jooste responses, which were free of implications that any new obstacles from their side evident on horizon. /5/
Satterthwaite
/5/ On June 15, Satterthwaite and Jooste exchanged diplomatic notes in Cape Town signifying the conclusion of the Missile Tracking Agreement. The Embassy in Cape Town transmitted the texts of the notes and accompanying aides-memoire to the Department of State in despatch 81 from Cape Town, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70X7/6 - 1862)
396. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.70X11/8 - 3162. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and approved in S on October 4. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Naude's discussion of other subjects on August 31 was recorded in four additional memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
Washington, August 31, 1962.
SUBJECT
Southwest Africa, the United Nations, and Self-Determination
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Dr. Willem C. Naude, South African Ambassador
Mr. Pieter H. J. J. van Vuuren, First Secretary
The Secretary
Mr. Richard H. Sanger
Secretary Rusk then asked Ambassador Naude regarding the size of population of South West Africa and was told it was about one-half million persons. On being asked what the attitude was towards their present associations with South Africa, Ambassador Naude remarked that a plebiscite had been held in 1946 which indicated that the majority wished to continue their association with South Africa. The South African Ambassador then reminded Mr. Rusk that, at Versailles, Smuts had pressed hard for the mandate system for places such as Iraq where eventual independence could be envisioned. However, some places in the world were of such a nature that they had to be regarded as an integral part of the mandating power.
Mr. Rusk confirmed his knowledge of these ``C" mandates, and asked the Ambassador what he felt was the attitude of the inhabitants of South West Africa towards South Africa at the present time.
The Ambassador said he did not feel he could express himself on this topic. He stated that some of the inhabitants of South West Africa are not happy with the present situation, but he felt that the so-called ``representatives of the people of South Africa" did not represent the thinking of the majority of the people of that area when they testified at the UN. One South West African who was at New York three years ago was now completely discredited by his own people, and had gone to live in Scandinavia.
Secretary Rusk then asked the Ambassador why, if his Government really had confidence in the attitude towards it of the people of South West Africa, they did not ``nail down" the fact that those Africans were pleased with their present relationship to South Africa.
397. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2150. Confidential. Drafted by Sanger and cleared by Grant. Repeated to Pretoria and London and by pouch to Tananarive and Salisbury.
New York, October 6, 1962, 9 p.m.
Secto 88. Fol based on uncleared MemCon: During course two hour discussion with Secy on Oct 6, /2/ FonMin Louw made somewhat rambling presentation South African position mostly along lines previously brought out by him, by Amb Naude, or in GSA aide-memoire handed Secy Aug 31. Among chief points touched on were:
/2/ The discussion was recorded in three memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Secretary Rusk was in New York attending the 17th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
1. Most of SA's troubles and those of US as well due to new found strength Afro-Asian-Bloc coalition.
2. GSA believes just solution racial problem is in gradual development of Bantustans, permitting Africans slow but steady move toward self-government.
3. Communist undercurrent in SA growing stronger and GSA forced to take unusual measures to deal with it.
4. GSA seeking closer relations with other African states but recent overtures to Madagascar turned down flatly as was move toward Japan.
5. FonMin expressed discouragement over political future in much of Africa including deteriorating situations in Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Tanganyika and Rhodesias. Said target of Africans not just colonialism but White domination and even removal White man from scene. He quoted series anti-White utterances as proving this point.
6. Louw said SA not Africa but Europe. Much of agitation in SA being encouraged from UN and by US citizens, such as George Hauser of ACA. Critical remarks of Asst Secy Williams unhelpful. Many so-called African petitioners ``not genuine." Real headquarters for African revolutionary movement now moved from Ghana to Cairo.
7. Further discussion of Bantustans followed, including problems with troublesome visitors, fact that Bantu not farmer but cattleman, and growing instances of sabotage.
8. Louw explained his govt firmly on side of West in Korea, Berlin, etc., and cooperating closely with US space program. He wondered why US leaving GSA to fend for itself in face communist gains in Ghana, Mali, Guinea and elsewhere in Africa. White positions ending in Kenya, Nyasaland, Rhodesias and possibly Angola, but GSA has ``appreciation of importance of White bastion." South Africans cannot go to Europe and so must hold where they now are.
In reply, Secy said US appreciated SA role in three wars and in cold war, and wishes for good relations with GSA in spite of disagreements. But FonMin must realize that if expressions US attitude on race problems not well received in SA, US determination to have good relations with SA complicates our dealings with other African states. He reviewed US commitments to basic democratic principles as defined Preamble of UN Charter.
Secy also made point that although we well aware views of GSA on subject, we feel White peoples handing Black races over to communism unless satisfactory relationships between Whites and Blacks can be established. US working against Afro-Asian demands for sanctions against SA at this GA session. /3/ We cannot satisfy everyone's wishes but we can work for moderation. If this US position understood, no reason why US - GSA bilateral relationships cannot improve.
/3/ On November 6, the United States voted against U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII), which requested all Member States to dissuade South Africa from pursuing its policies of apartheid; requested the Security Council to take appropriate measures to secure South Africa's compliance with U.N. resolutions; established a Special Committee to review and report on the racial situation in South Africa; and requested all states to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa, close their ports to South African vessels, boycott South African goods, and prohibit trade with South Africa. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 67 to 16, with 63 abstentions.
FonMin thanked Secy for his explanation US commitment to principle and said South Africans have commitment to right of survival. Because US has relatively few Blacks, ``what is for you a common cold is for us double pneumonia."
Rusk
398. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45X/11 - 2362. Limited Official Use. Drafted by High on December 6. The source text is labeled ``Part I of IV." The discussion with Nujoma of SWAPO objectives and of working conditions in South West Africa was recorded in two memoranda of conversation. (Ibid., 745X.021/11 - 2362, and AF/S Files: Lot 66 D 344, South West Africa - 1962 - 1963, UN)
Washington, November 23, 1962.
SUBJECT
United States Policy on South-West Africa
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Samuel Nujoma, President General of South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO)
Mr. Jacob Kuhangua, National Secretary of SWAPO
Mr. J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Henry J. Tasca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs
Mr. Waldemar Campbell, INR/RAF
Mr. George B. High, AFE
Mr. Nujoma opened the conversation by describing the recent UN resolution on South West Africa /2/ as being very good, but in view of South Africa's defiance of the UN he wondered how it could be implemented. He suggested that the US and the UK could use influence on South Africa and this would lead the territory to independence. This point was made several times during the meeting.
/2/ On November 19, by a vote of 96 (including the United States) to 0 with 1 abstention, the Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories (Fourth) Committee adopted a draft resolution on South West Africa that reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to independence and national sovereignty, condemned the continued refusal of the South African Government to cooperate with previous U.N. resolutions on South West Africa, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Technical Assistance Resident Representative for South West Africa and to take all necessary steps to establish an effective U.N. presence in South West Africa, and urged all member states to refrain from any action likely to hinder the implementation of present and previous U.N. resolutions on South West Africa.
Mr. Tasca asked him what are the South African Government's objectives in South West Africa and whether the Bantustan policy would be applied. Mr. Nujoma responded that the South African Government wants to incorporate the territory into the Republic, and that the Territory's Africans have opposed the Bantustan policy as they have opposed partition. He recalled that the 1958 UN Good Offices Committee suggested partition with South Africa continuing to administer the Northern Territories. This would provide South Africa with a supply of labor, and SWAPO has fought this.
Turning to another point, Mr. Kuhangua said that SWAPO is thankful for what the US has done--support for all the UN resolutions, offers of scholarships, and a commitment to the International Court case. However, more than voting is required; we should seek to implement the resolutions. SWAPO wants the US to help the UN Secretary General in this regard.
Mr. Kuhangua referred to the need for the United States to establish a consulate in Bechuanaland, or if possible in South West Africa, in order to assist South West African students stranded in the High Commission Territories and to serve as a listening post. The recent UN resolution called for the UN Specialized Agencies to operate in the Territory. Mr. Kuhangua asked if it would be possible to send in the Peace Corps. There are many ways the US can act. The Episcopal Bishop of Damaraland, an American, is very sympathetic and US financial assistance could be given to him to expand his educational, health, and other social services.
Later in the conversation Mr. Kuhangua pointed to USG action in Mississippi. He said we have an obligation in South Africa and a great role to play there, for South African policy is an insult to the world. Mr. Mathews replied that it is one thing to persuade and another to be persuaded. The USG position is perfectly clear. How effective this will be is hard to say. Mr. Tasca added that the International Court case will be very important for the South Africans can be very stubborn. Our real hope is in building up public opinion in South Africa.
Mr. Kuhangua commented that some UN members mistakenly feel that political action is proscribed by the court case. That case is a clear attack against apartheid. The South African Government will be reluctant to become involved in a war unless South Africa is attacked. While SWAPO opposes violence, there may be no other alternative solution.
Later, at the end of conversation, Mr. Nujoma reiterated his pleas for US support saying that the situation is explosive. Mr. Fredericks replied that we are trying to use our powers of persuasion at the UN and in talks with South Africa officials. In Mississippi we acted to deal with our own problems. We hope that other countries will see this resolve. While we can take such steps in our own country, we are not free to do so elsewhere. We are agreed on the nature of the problem in South Africa, the question is how to determine steps that will be persuasive enough. Mr. Campbell said a very real effort of persuasion is being made, but he was not sure much has been accomplished. In this regard Mr. Fredericks said he had talked to a great number of visitors. Our approaches were not simply to officialdom. One is never sure of the results of these talks. He did not want to give any idea of optimism, simply that we are trying. /3/
/3/ On December 14, the General Assembly adopted the Fourth Committee resolution by a vote of 98 to 0 with 1 abstention (Portugal). For text of Resolution 1805 (XVII), ``Question of South West Africa," see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 940 - 941.
399. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Repeated to London and Cape Town.
New York, February 19, 1963, noon.
3069. Subj: Southwest Africa.
1. We spoke to UKDel along lines Deptel 2123 /2/ Feb 18. Campbell (UK) said question already raised in London. He understood UK and US Embs in Capetown would be in consultation on what would be best approach to South Africans and gave impression joint or parallel action depended upon this discussion. (UK apparently anxious initial consideration be in Capetown.)
/2/ Telegram 2123, February 11, instructed USUN to undertake, in concert with the United Kingdom, a sustained effort to convince the South African Government that its own interests, as well as those of the Free World, required it to seek a political accommodation with the world community regarding the Mandated Territory of South West Africa--ideally before the International Court of Justice rendered its decision in late 1963 or early 1964. (Ibid.)
2. We told Campbell we also intended raise problem with SYG this week in order to ascertain SYG's plans re establishing UN presence in SWA in accordance with GA Res. Campbell said he would appreciate report from US on this discussion. (Important that whatever steps we take re UN presence be in accord with SYG's plans.) So far we know of nothing other than appointment of technical assistance rep but it may be he has other ideas in mind.
3. Besides general approaches to South Africa re problem they face with ICJ opinion and on UN presence, Campbell expressed desire for further US - UK talks here on UN tactical issues we likely to face (including presumably both apartheid problem in South Africa, on which UKDel has already expressed concern, and SWA issue).
Plimpton
400. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Pretoria and London.
Cape Town, March 1, 1963, 6 p.m.
41. Political. SWA. Deptel 32. /2/ Reference telegram was received yesterday p.m. and I made requested representation to Foreign Minister Louw at 3 p.m. today. Foreign Secretary Jooste was with Louw and Clark accompanied me. I read following statement but did not leave text; Jooste however took careful notes:
/2/ Telegram 32, February 27, instructed Ambassador Satterthwaite to obtain a high-level appointment, preferably with Foreign Minister Louw, to urge South Africa to adopt a positive attitude toward the U.N. Secretary-General's request to establish a U.N. presence and a U.N. Technical Assistance Representative in the Territory of South West Africa. Satterthwaite was to explain that such action would enable the United States to urge moderation when the Committee of 24 took up the question of South West Africa. (Ibid.)
``Minister will recall that US voted in favor UNGA Resolution 1805 of December 14, 1962. /3/ Paragraphs five and six of that resolution request Secretary General:
/3/ See footnote 2, Document 398.
``5. . . . to appoint a United Nations Technical Assistance Resident representative for Southwest Africa . . .
``6. . . . to take all necessary steps to establish an effective United Nations presence in Southwest Africa.
``I recall that Prime Minister last year indicated that SAG would be prepared to explore possibilities of inviting one or two experts working in particular fields with WHO and/or FAO who could be consulted on matters in regard to which they were particularly qualified. We are also aware that Prime Minister has constituted special commission of outstanding men charged with responsibility for advising him on plans for development of territory.
``In light of evident desire of SAG on one hand to work for development of territory and on other in recognizing earnest desire of UN, as expressed in Resolution 1805, to ensure same objective, terms of resolution appear reasonable in eyes of my government.
``My government hopes, therefore, that SA Government will take positive attitude toward Secretary General's requests, especially in regard to acceptance of a UN Technical Assistance Resident representative but also of course in regard to establishment of a UN presence in territory.
``Minister will recall that US representative, Mr. Bingham, explaining our vote in Committee IV, stated:
``We would be profoundly gratified if SAG were to comply with this resolution and earnestly urge it to do so, so as to open way at long last to a bright future for all peoples of Southwest Africa. We are particularly hopeful that the government will seize the opportunities for constructive cooperation which the UN has offered in operative paragraphs six and five."
``It is our firm belief that positive and early action in response to SYG's request for compliance with these operative paragraphs will enable US delegates in corridors and in committee to urge moderation when Committee of 24 takes up issue of SWA. /4/ Above all we hope that SAG will not respond to SYG's request in manner which will freeze into an irrevocably negative position.
/4/ On April 16, the South African Representative to the United Nations refused the invitation of the Committee of 24 (formerly the Committee of 17) to attend its meetings on South West Africa. On May 10, the Committee adopted a resolution that essentially reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution 1805 (XVII), but added a provision recommending that the General Assembly consider any attempt to annex the Territory of South West Africa as an act of aggression. Twenty-three members of the Committee of 24 (including the United States) voted for the resolution as a whole; the United Kingdom abstained.
``My government at the moment is giving careful study to SWA question and its long-range implications for the United States. Department will shortly be forwarding to me instructions to lay before you outlining our views on this crucial subject. Should there be any inclination to reject out of hand SYG's requests, and we assume that such is not intent of SAG, we earnestly hope that no final response will be rendered until our views have been fully set forth."
Following my representation Louw spoke for about half an hour large part of which was past history well known to Department and USUN. We will report this conversation in detail in a following telegram. Following are however essential points:
(A) SAG will not make definite decision re UNTA representative for SWA until its own commission has made its report. While Louw's position was not clear-cut it does appear that possibility exists of reaching agreement with UN on this point.
(B) If paragraph six means opening of a permanent political UN office in Windhoek this can be definitely ruled out.
(C) Louw does not consider that SYG has yet made formal request of SAG re paragraphs five and six of Resolution 1805. He said only that Protitch had made informal low-level approach but he still expected Secretary General to take matter up formally. (I did not tell Louw that I knew of Protitch's conversation. He confirmed that Botha is in SA. Fourie is now Under Secretary for African Affairs and resides in Pretoria.)
(D) Minister's reaction to our representation was reasonable and conversation throughout was friendly in tone.
We have sent British copy of notes from which I read. Clark is seeing Gordon at dinner tonight and will fill him in re SAG reaction.
Satterthwaite
401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret.
Washington, March 16, 1963.
SUBJECT
South African Interest in Purchase of US Submarines
The South African Naval Chief of Staff urgently asked our Naval Attache in Pretoria to ascertain informally whether the US Government would be willing to entertain a request to permit the purchase of two or three modern conventional attack submarines of about 1700 tons, and would provide crew training for key personnel. Our Ambassador notes that our present policy with respect to South Africa, of which they have been advised, permits the sale of military equipment for external defense, and that this request could be given favorable consideration provided submarines were available.
Submarines of this class are understood to cost approximately $40 million each. They would have to come from new construction, and there would be a three-year lead time from acceptance of order to delivery.
There are both benefits and difficulties inherent in this South African request. An affirmative reply to South Africa would aid in maintaining good military relations, this being of evident consequence in the light of the importance to us of various US military facilities and rights in the country, particularly tracking stations for Atlantic Missile Range operations, port facilities, and overflight rights. In the event the Suez Canal is closed to us, the Navy believes South African harbor and dock facilities are virtually irreplaceable. It is doubtful these strategic interests will be materially changed within the period in which the submarines would be delivered to South Africa.
On the other hand, the prospect of growing racial conflict in South Africa and of intensified international condemnation of the South African Government will make significant US arms deliveries to that country increasingly costly to us in political terms. Our efforts to encourage a moderate African approach to the problems of Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa will be made more difficult. Furthermore, if South Africa's international position continues to deteriorate, it is probable that delivery of US submarines in 1966 could have highly unfavorable repercussions abroad and at home.
On balance, however, in terms of our political relations with South Africa and potential benefits to our balance of payments, I believe we should give an affirmative reply to this informal inquiry and be in a position at least to discuss this sale. Military assistance credits should not be made available. It should be noted that the sale may not eventuate, since the UK is also offering similar submarines for mid-1967 delivery, and the UK price may be lower than ours.
I would appreciate your views. /2/
Dean Rusk
/2/ On March 22, Carl Kaysen sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk that reads: ``The President has reviewed the course of action you propose in your memorandum of March 16 with respect to the sale of submarines to the Union of South Africa. He concurs with your judgment that on balance it is desirable to make such a transaction if it can be made on acceptable terms." (Ibid.)
402. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) /1/
/1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, South Africa Rep. 1963, 383.8 - 676. No classification marking.
Washington, April 9, 1963.
Dear George: During the spring and summer of 1961, Chester Bowles and I discussed the requirement for a missile tracking station in the Republic of South Africa. These discussions resulted in our agreement to proceed with negotiations for the use of a station at Grootfontein through the end of 1963. In turn, I agreed that Defense would undertake to develop ship-borne tracking capabilities for use after that time. As you know, an Agreement was subsequently concluded with South Africa which authorizes our use of a tracking station there through 1963, and thereafter subject to six months notice.
It is the purpose of this letter to advise you that we are planning to reorient our efforts to obtain a ship-borne tracking capability for the South African area by up-grading one or more of the ships now used by the Atlantic Missile Range. While it was our original intention to secure a sophisticated tracking ship at an estimated cost in excess of $40 million, the current and foreseeable requirements do not warrant such an expenditure at this time.
The Grootfontein station has contributed greatly to our missile program. It will continue to be of importance after 1963 and I would hope that we could continue to use the station after that time. As I indicated earlier, however, we would be prepared to withdraw from the station should this prove politically necessary.
Sincerely,
Roswell L. Gilpatric /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
403. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall and approved by MacKnight. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN and by pouch to Johannesburg, Salisbury, and Durban.
Washington, April 23, 1963, 7:25 p.m.
70. Urtel 95. /2/ In absence Ambassador Naude Counselor Dunn called into Department for discussion points raised reftel. Department officer told him Louw speech based on two erroneous pieces information. Emphasized 1) our hope Louw doesn't attribute economic interest as motivating factor our policy vis-a-vis new African states which of course untrue and 2) fact Governor Williams did not address conference but simply attended in role of spectator as he might any representative American group discussing Africa. At conclusion of conversation, during which points contained circular telegram 1778 /3/ were summarized, Dunn was asked to report above to his government. He agreed to do so but commented it will probably whet Louw's appetite as he is spoiling for a good fight.
/2/ Telegram 95, April 23, reported a speech by Foreign Minister Louw that spoke of the dramatic increase in power of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, and declared that this bloc was getting some support from Western countries that were more concerned about export markets in new African countries than about the fate of their fellow whites in South Africa. (Ibid.)
/3/ Not printed.
Decision call in Dunn motivated in part by his visit to Department yesterday apparently on SAG instructions to protest remarks attributed to Governor Williams at Maryland University Symposium April 20th. Department officer gave Dunn copy of Maryland speech and noted it contained nothing which had not been said on other occasions by US officials. Fact press item re Williams speech at Maryland not entirely accurate was also cited. After reading text Dunn acknowledged speech not controversial.
Rusk
404. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 - 5 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria and USUN.
Cape Town, May 14, 1963, 2 p.m.
140. Reference: Embassy telegram 115. /2/ I took advantage of Foreign Minister Louw's absence from country to request interview with Prime Minister Verwoerd in his capacity as Acting Foreign Minister. This took place yesterday afternoon and lasted more than an hour. I first told him of my concern re Bantu laws amendment bill. This bill was so long and complicated that our Embassy had made an analysis of it. It would appear clearly from this analysis that all Bantus outside Bantustans of which there must be some six to seven million would in future be deprived of all their present rights to permanent residence in such areas. They would moreover be entirely subject to decisions of Ministry of Bantu Administration and lower officials and these decisions could not be appealed to Courts. I was therefore leaving him a copy of our analysis in hope that he would have it examined and let us know if it is wrong in any material respect. If not I thought he should know that reaction of US and world opinion in learning of harshness of the terms of this law would be alarmingly strong and would more than negate favorable aspects of Bantustan program with which his Government was moving forward in Transkei.
/2/ Telegram 115 from Cape Town, May 2, analyzed the most significant points in the 125-page draft Bantu laws amendment bill. (Ibid.)
Prime Minister said he would not go over our analysis now but would give me some background on subject. He began with consolidation of previous Bantu administration laws made in 1945 and talked at considerable length about his own experience as Minister of Native Affairs (1950 - 1958). He described misunderstanding by outside world of actions he had taken as Minister to bring Missionary Schools under Government control. This was done however because he had found that under previous system more and more money was being spent annually by Government on same number of Bantu students. As result of steps he had taken this situation was corrected although Missionaries disliked it and it was widely misunderstood abroad. In case of present amendment he said that actually these amendments would go a long way in removing certain frictions. Nevertheless he recognized that certain clauses did present ``something new" but did not believe that these clauses went so far as to nullify all favorable aspects of the legislation. At conclusion this discussion he promised to have our analysis examined by appropriate officials and I again emphasized strong reaction such extreme legislation would have on US and world opinion.
Comment: During discussion this subject Prime Minister exercised all his charm and powers of persuasion on me. While I cannot hope that our analysis and my presentation will dissuade him from going ahead with this legislation, they will at least serve to warn him of our strong reactions to this inhumane measure. Analysis handed him is rearranged version of that transmitted Embassy telegram 115 except for deletion of our own comments and slight softening certain wording without however altering meaning.
Satterthwaite
405. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 - 4 US - S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria, London, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth.
Cape Town, June 10, 1963, 4 p.m.
171. Reference: Embassy telegrams 142, 145 and 170. /2/ In view implied threats made by Prime Minister in my conversation with him May 13, aide-memoire handed me June 7 by Foreign Secretary Jooste on subject our multi-racial July 4 receptions is surprisingly moderate. Possibly SAG after considering problem has decided react moderately rather than violently to our proposed receptions. For example Jooste indicated SAG not concerned about possibility our inadvertently inviting subversive guests. Aide-memoire's last paragraph is particularly intriguing.
/2/ Telegram 142, May 14; telegram 145, May 16; and telegram 170, June 8, are all ibid.
Only time will tell whether our diplomatic reception will be completely or partially boycotted by SAG and whether government will in fact take steps prevent multi-racial receptions in future. Prime Minister indicated this might depend on instructions Sir Hugh Stephenson, new British Ambassador, may have received. Latter arrived June 6 and pre-sents credentials today. I will inquire earliest opportunity whether either Prime Minister or Foreign Minister has discussed this question with him.
In view fact AG knows we are carrying out our plans hold multi-racial receptions we do not necessarily have to answer June 7 aide-memoire. I recommend however that as matter of courtesy I hand Jooste aide-memoire along following lines:
``My government has carefully considered views of your government set forth in aide-memoire which you handed me June 7 from which it is clear that our two governments are confronted with a difference of opinion on the subject of multi-racial receptions in celebration of our Independence Day which seems irreconcilable at this time.
As you know, my government has decided, in the light of its convictions and practices on the question of official multi-racial entertaining (which conform with those of practically all other countries of the world) that our ``customs and conventions rather than yours should henceforth be observed by the American Embassy and consulates in South Africa with regard to the celebration of our Independence Day."
In delivering this aide-memoire I would point out orally that our plans to hold a diplomatic reception on the morning of July 4 would seem to relieve the SAG of the difficulty of being ``a party to a deliberate breach of the customs and conventions of this country by the Embassy of the United States" and that it is in fact for this very reason that we are giving such a reception. /3/
Satterthwaite
/3/ On June 11, the Department of State cabled Satterthwaite that his proposed aide-memoire was approved. (Telegram 107 to Cape Town; ibid.) On July 5, the Ambassador reported that multi-racial 4th of July receptions had been held as planned at all posts in South Africa, with no unpleasant incidents, good attendance, and highly favorable reactions in various quarters. He noted, however, that the South African Government had sent no representative to his morning reception in Pretoria. (Telegram 25 from Pretoria; ibid.)
406. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Secret. Also sent to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Johnson, Williams, Tyler, and Rostow.
Washington, June 15, 1963.
Mennen Williams' memorandum to me of June 12 on U.S. policy toward South Africa /2/ raises again some far-reaching issues which ought to be considered within a broader framework of policy than that relating to the attitudes of the independent states of Africa.
/2/ Williams' memorandum stated that it was time to review U.S. arms supply policy toward South Africa and argued that the United States should be thinking in terms of a total arms embargo. He noted that the current partial arms embargo policy was equivocal, was not an effective pressure on the South Africans, and was considered inadequate by the African countries and by many in the United States who were concerned about racial discrimination. Williams pointed out that a total arms embargo would fall far short of the complete sanctions already recommended by the General Assembly, and argued that this was the only way the United States could convince both world and domestic opinion that it meant business in its disapproval of apartheid. (Ibid.)
At the heart of the issue is how we relate ourselves to those countries whose internal arrangements and practices are not only foreign to our own way of thinking but, in many cases, repugnant to us. Let us accept the general notion that the United States should use its influence steadily and persistently in the direction of the principles inscribed in the United Nations Charter as well as in our own basic commitments to constitutional processes, human rights, etc. It is another question, it seems to me, to extend such influence into the field of sanctions and into actions which, if consistently and conscientiously applied, would interrupt our relations with perhaps half of the existing community of states. Also involved is the position in which we would be if other states undertook to apply sanctions against us because of practices of our own to which they take the strongest exception.
It is true that we have the strongest objections to apartheid in the Union of South Africa; we have said so repeatedly and have asserted our view to the point where our relations with the Union of South Africa are in a continuing state of tension. But I believe it is worth reminding ourselves that there are other states where obnoxious practices of one sort or another exist--and in some of them in the most exaggerated form. I have in mind Bulgaria, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, USSR, the UAR, Viet-Nam, and Yugoslavia. I have not listed some of the smaller African states whose internal practices reflect varying degrees of totalitarianism nor all of the Arab states whose attitudes in religious minorities or constitutional principles leave much to be desired. The question, it seems to me, is whether we ourselves precipitate sharp crises in our relations with other states over such issues or whether we try to maintain the structure of international relations in order to be able to work doggedly and persistently toward the decent world community which is our main objective. I will admit that apartheid presents a case of unusual difficulty but I would not put it ahead of the violations of human rights within the communist bloc or in certain countries governed on an authoritarian basis with which we have correct and sometimes even friendly relations.
I would draw a sharp distinction between our deep concern with respect to racial discrimination in the United States and the way in which we crusade on that very issue outside the United States. The United States is our responsibility; our failures are our failures; we live under a constitutional system in which we can do something about it. But no one has elected us to undertake such responsibilities in other countries. The President has reminded us that we are not interested in a Pax Americana. It seems to me, a fortiori, that we are not the self-elected gendarmes for the political and social problems of other states.
It would be hard to find a single state with which we have relations where it is not necessary for us to try to develop good relations despite important differences in points of view or in action. Specifically with regard to the Union of South Africa, I have felt that we cannot compromise our own attitudes toward apartheid, that we must use our influence wherever possible to modify their position on that matter, but that we must then also try to sustain good relations in other respects despite the severity of our differences on that particular issue. It has seemed to me, therefore, logical that we should not assist the Union of South Africa with means of enforcing its apartheid policy but that we should assist them in playing the kind of role which they have already played in two World Wars and which now is a part of a total confrontation affecting the life and death of our own nation.
A proposal for us to embark upon sanctions against the Union of South Africa must, it seems to me, be a part of a package of proposals for sanctions against other states in other situations where different but obnoxious situations obtain. And such proposals should include some concept of priorities--that is, what are the situations which cause us the deepest concern?
I have no objection to the most intensive study of apartheid or other situations causing us concern. But I do think that we must give careful thought to the broader questions of 1) how we relate ourselves to the other 94% of the world's peoples whom we can influence but cannot control, and 2) where the interests of the American people lie with regard to actions designed to require someone else to act as we would like to have them act. /3/
Dean Rusk /4/
/3/ On July 12, Williams sent a follow-up memorandum to Rusk arguing that a complete arms ban was the least that the United States could do to maintain its influence with the Africans and its ability to prevent more radical and violent action on their part. He admitted that an arms ban might jeopardize the use of certain tracking and naval facilities in South Africa, but argued that this would be a calculated risk and relatively small in comparison to what else might be lost. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Williams Records, GMW Chron File)
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
407. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 7/13/63 - 7/31/63. Secret.
Washington, July 13, 1963.
SUBJECT
Missile Tracking Station in South Africa
Finding the official comments on our South African holdings somewhat vague, I made some inquiries and discovered that while nothing we have there is vital, there is a close relation between the South African missile tracking station and our satellite photography. This station is a part of the system of observation of these satellites, and while the program would not be interrupted if we should lose it, prudence would dictate certain additional technical developments to permit effective observation of the satellites, and the total cost of replacement is estimated to be on the order of $50 million.
In the context of the importance of satellite photography as a whole, $50 million is not an enormous amount of money, and undoubtedly some part of this sum will be paid out even if we keep the missile tracking station in South Africa because of a constant desire to refine and improve this vital system of information gathering.
Finally, there is a good deal of reason to doubt that we would lose the missile tracking station automatically even if we take a stiff line on arms shipment.
Still, I thought you would wish to know the order of magnitude of the replacement cost that we might face. I myself remain quite favorable to the Black African position, in spite of this possible dollar cost.
McG. B. /2/
/2/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
408. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, July 16, 1963.
SUBJECT
Next Steps with South Africa re Security Council Meeting
Following is a suggested list of next steps to be taken to carry out the policy recommendations concerning South Africa contained in my July 13 memorandum. /2/ Those recommendations envisage frank discussions with South Africa, with the African leaders and with the United Kingdom and France, looking toward U.S. support for and including, if necessary, co-sponsorship of a Security Council resolution critical of South Africa's racial policies.
/2/ Not printed.
1. The Secretary would call in the South African Ambassador this week and outline our position along the following lines (our Embassy in Pretoria and USUN could make similar demarches to South African officials shortly thereafter):
(a) Reiteration of our basic opposition to apartheid.
(b) Difficulties we foresee in the Security Council (Addis Ababa resolution calling for sanctions and expulsion).
(c) Statement of our intention to oppose expulsion and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII.
(d) Description of the resolution we intend to initiate or support in the Security Council: (1) a reaffirmation of our strong opposition to apartheid; (2) a recommendation that the Secretary-General appoint a high-level special representative (a former Prime Minister, a past President of the General Assembly, or someone of like stature) [to] discuss with the South Africans how their racial policies could be brought into conformity with the U.N. Charter; and (3) a call on member states to refrain from supplying arms which could be used to facilitate the enforcement of apartheid.
(e) Indication that the resolution we have in mind would do no more than have the Security Council ``codify" in a recommendatory (Chapter VI) resolution our present arms policy vis-a-vis South Africa.
(f) A statement that we intend unilaterally to stop further arms supplies to South Africa from the United States, but we are not yet saying so publicly.
(In connection with a possible unilateral declaration by the United States adopting a total arms embargo, we should keep open the timing of any announcement, subject to Ambassador Stevenson's recommendations in light of the tactical negotiating situation in New York.)
(g) Urge South Africa, in order to help us moderate the actions of the Security Council, to indicate publicly its intention to cooperate with any Secretary-General's representative.
2. The United Kingdom and France. We would inform the United Kingdom and France in New York as soon as possible of the President's decision along the lines of (1.) above. The United Kingdom would also be informed in Washington. This would be a sequel to the preliminary discussions in Europe completed recently by Ambassador Stevenson and Assistant Secretary Cleveland.
3. Norway. Special early consultations along the lines of (1.) above are necessary with the Norwegians who are anxious to avoid political and economic sanctions but are ready to support a total arms embargo provision in a Security Council resolution.
4. The Africans. On Wednesday, July 17, after Foreign Minister Slim has briefed the representatives of the other African countries designated to present Africa's case to the Security Council (Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone) we should pursue our discussions with him in New York along the following lines:
(a) We, too, would like to avoid a clash between ourselves and the Africans in the Security Council and we are prepared (as the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Cleveland indicated to Mongi Slim in Washington) to work with him in an effort to develop a resolution that will command general support in the Council.
(b) We are opposed to apartheid but at the same time we cannot support expulsion or mandatory sanctions.
(c) We will be in a better position to take effective measures provided they are non-mandatory and avoid being put into the Chapter VII category. If the Africans agree that the arms embargo paragraph in the Security Council resolution is not total but partial and within Chapter VI of the Charter, we would be willing to announce at an appropriate time a halt in all arms shipments to South Africa.
(d) Depending on the circumstances, USUN might indicate to Foreign Minister Slim the kind of resolution we could support (1(d).
It would also be advisable to have USUN make the above points to the other three African special representatives and the African members of the Security Council (Ghana, Morocco).
5. Ambassador Stevenson and other Members of the Council. As soon as Ambassador Stevenson returns (July 18), we will brief him on the status of the above consultations. At a later stage, he would broaden our consultations to include other members of the Security Council (except the USSR).
George W. Ball
409. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell and approved in S on August 6.
Washington, July 17, 1963, 3 p.m.
SUBJECT
South Africa and the Security Council Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
W.C. Naude, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa
Mr. Pieter H.J.J. van Vuuren, First Secretary, South African Embassy
Mr. Waldemar B. Campbell, AFE
The Secretary began by stating that he was not responding primarily to the letter from Mr. Louw--that would take considerable study--and continued by saying we are greatly concerned about the Security Council meeting, and others have been sounding us out. A rough time was ahead. The basis of our position in the Security Council meeting will be our opposition to apartheid as a political doctrine. We anticipate a very great controversy in the Council. The Soviet Union will make the most of its opportunity to develop divisions within the free world and to be the champion of the colored races--the same old game. Basic to the United States' policy is the intention to oppose expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, and mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7. We will be under enormous pressure but do not intend to give in. The Secretary said he did not know what was going to come out of this situation, but he imagined that there might be a resolution which we could support that would oppose apartheid and suggest the appointment by the Secretary General of a high-level special representative to discuss with the South African Government any prospect of a solution more generally acceptable to peoples throughout the world and more in accord with the UN Charter. The Secretary said he was not debating the merits of this proposal, only indicating the possible direction that a high-level rapporteur might take. Also, there might be a recommendation under Chapter 6 against the export of arms to South Africa which could be used to facilitate the enforcement of apartheid.
Our present expectation is that after 1963 we might have to refrain from sending any arms to South Africa. This is not finally decided, nor when we might make this public. It would not be part of the Security Council resolution.
The Secretary went on to say he did not know the end of the trail, where we are heading, and wished that the Ambassador could help him in that respect.
Ambassador Naude expressed appreciation at this opportunity and said it was ironical that ten years ago we were fighting together on the same side, and now South Africa will not even be supplied with arms to use against a common enemy. He did not know how his people would feel--he was greatly disturbed. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that more than once he had assured the latter of the American anxiety to cooperate with South Africa as much as possible. But the United States point of view must include its strategic interests and the world situation. He expressed the hope that the Ambassador would pass on to his government that the South African problem was a heavy burden to the United States and was creating problems for its strategic interests around the world with respect to facilities, postures, the cooperation of armed forces. This was the direct cause of a situation that was admittedly ironic and also tragic.
Ambassador Naude then said certainly, South Africa would have to face up to the situation that now the United States' strategic interests elsewhere were more important than those in South Africa. The Secretary replied that he had hoped we would not come to this situation, but our Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about our over-all strategic interests, considering the adverse effect of the South African situation.
Ambassador Naude said that the South Africans in the past had stood with the United States when the chips were down. He expressed a desire to make a few comments about American strategic interests with respect to South Africa. He had heard a military expert describe the importance of Indonesia and Cuba to the Communists because they lie in narrow seas connecting larger bodies of water such as the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The same was true of South Africa--it was at a point where two great oceans meet. The South African military effort was aimed at bolstering South Africa's capabilities there. Another important aspect of the strategic situation was the important resources of South Africa. He expressed certainty that the Chiefs of Staff were familiar with South Africa's many strategic minerals, but he also wanted to call the Secretary's attention to the importance of South Africa's gold production, with particular reference to the U.S. Government's action yesterday raising the bank rate. It was of both strategic and economic importance to the United States and its allies that the gold production of South Africa was in the hands of a friendly country.
The Ambassador then referred to Mr. Harlan Cleveland's figure of speech about a light at the end of the tunnel. He said that he felt there was still some degree of misunderstanding in the United States about South Africa's situation. It was one of survival, not prejudice. Apartheid envisaged the eventual disappearance of racial discrimination. This would not come tomorrow, but this did not mean that it would take 100 years either. Discrimination would come to an end, but right now it was in the interests of both sides. The Secretary asked if that concept of the disappearance of discrimination was in Mr. Louw's letter, and the Ambassador assured him that it was. The Ambassador said that South Africa only needed some help in holding the line. It needed time. The United States had a tremendous responsibility, as well as influence, in this situation. The Secretary interjected that our influence in other capitals of the world was about the same as in Pretoria. The Ambassador proceeded to develop the point that the United States was to a large degree responsible for releasing revolutionary forces in the world. He expressed the view that the goal of a great power should be to play down tensions and try to get people to talk together, but the United States without even opening its mouth had released dangerous forces in the world. The Secretary wondered if these forces were not deeply rooted in the nature of man. He wondered if this discourse had not been going on for 2,000 years. Did not man, like most animals, not like to be pushed around too much? The Ambassador indicated that the Secretary had used this same point with him before. The Secretary then said that these troubles were popping up all over the world because of a basic tendency in man's nature. The South African Ambassador still adhered to his argument that the United States had released great forces of a revolutionary nature. He pointed out that Israel was a very basic part of U.S. policy despite its irritation to the Arab world. All South Africa asked, he said, was that it should be treated like Israel; that it was a little nation that needed similar support for survival. The American solution for its own racial problems was not one that could be applied beneficially for South Africa.
The Secretary said that he was not suggesting that a solution practical for the United States should be applied to South Africa. He understood there were about 3-1/2 million whites in South Africa. Did not their survival in a sea of blacks depend on a policy of accommodation with them? The South African Ambassador replied that the accommodation could only be made along the lines of the South African system of apartheid. South Africa was a Western nation which had to be preserved among African nations. South Africa could maintain itself except for the attitude of the outside world. The difficulties had largely come in the last ten years, particularly because of the United Nations. He admitted that the South African Government recently had given itself extreme powers of repression, but he said this was natural considering the extreme threats that were coming from other parts of Africa. The United States should not make these difficulties of South Africa even worse.
The South African Ambassador referred to the new Transkei state as an indication of the aim of South African policy. In the last two or three weeks Prime Minister Verwoerd had stated that the Transkei was just one of several Bantu nations which would emerge, that the Transkei was only the first step. South Africa hoped to make a breakthrough with respect to its relations with other African states by means of this policy of setting up Bantustans, but UN events which the Secretary had foreshadowed would make the implementation of this Bantustan policy even more difficult.
Regarding suggestions that South Africa should make small adjustments of policy, the Ambassador said Foreign Minister Louw maintained that South Africa could not be flexible regarding its basic policy. The Ambassador said that the United States and Russia could not be flexible either about the essentials of their policy. If South Africa made modifications in basic policy, all racial groups would suffer. Flexibility had to be found in other ways such as South Africa's withdrawal from the Economic Commission for Africa. This was something South Africa could do.
United States spokesmen have suggested that South Africa's policies were preparing the way for a Communist takeover in Africa. The South African Ambassador said he had just been reading Chernov's (sp?) book The Soviet View of Africa and found the aims of its policy expressed in this book shocking. Only in the last hour he had found that in South Africa there was an organization financed by the Chinese Communists.
Ambassador Naude said that if a horizontal adjustment of South African society were made (by this he meant the opposite of vertical apartheid, the suppression of racial groups), the whites would be swamped and southern Africa would be in a more chaotic condition than the Congo had been. This would have grave consequences for American strategic interests. The white group in South Africa was only a handful but it was advanced compared with the people around it. It would take a great deal of power to keep the situation under control if horizontal adjustments were made. A South African leading newspaper repeatedly has said recently that 5 million non-Africans in South Africa (whites, Coloureds and Indians) would not accept the rule of a non-Western majority. There would be resistance and bloodshed. It was not pleasant for him, the Ambassador said to point this out, but presumably the United States would have to be the power to enforce order in this chaotic situation.
The Ambassador repeated the intention of ending all discrimination in South Africa. He said that his country realized that in this day and age it was not possible to continue the old practices. He closed with an anecdote about John Adams telling a Livingston that our Puritan forefathers had had to hang their Quakers because they could not afford agitators in their midst while they were threatened by Indians.
The Secretary mentioned that he would have to end the interview because of the President's press conference, but there had been a new note he had not heard before in the Ambassador's remarks, and the Secretary expressed a desire to have a two-hour talk with the Ambassador this week--not the following day because of the pressure of other business, but Friday or Saturday morning. He suggested that the two countries need to discuss the possibility of some breathtaking invention which might salvage the interests of both South Africa and the United States. The Ambassador expressed his readiness to carry on a further discussion. /2/
/2/ See Document 414.
410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, July 17, 1963.
The President has read and approved your memorandum of July 16th /2/ on next steps with South Africa re Security Council meeting, subject to the following comments:
/2/ Document 408.
The President thinks the statement in paragraph 1(f) should be reframed as follows:
It is our current expectation that we will wish to stop further arms shipments to South Africa after the end of 1963, but we have not yet decided when to make this intention public.
Our discussion with the South Africans should be in the context of our conviction that the course we are adopting represents the minimum changes necessary if we are to be able to assist in preventing much less satisfactory results, from South Africa's own point of view. It should be emphasized that we intend to oppose Chapter VII measures and that our own suspension of arms shipments will not be of critical importance to South Africa since we are not a prime source for South Africa in this field at present.
The President wishes it made clear that in our judgment it would be best for both sides to maintain our existing cooperation in other fields.
McGeorge Bundy /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
411. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking.
Washington, August 2, 1963.
1. Guidance for Governor Stevenson on a US position on the South African issue in the Security Council went to New York last night on a provisional basis pending your approval. It includes a recommended position (Tab A) and draft language for Stevenson's speech (Tab B) /2/ scheduled for 11:30 this morning but postponable for an hour or so if necessary.
/2/ Neither Tab A nor Tab B is attached to the source text.
2. It is not proposed that we initiate a resolution but that we propose modification of an African resolution with regard to arms embargo. Our position goes beyond what you have previously approved in this important respect: it supports a recommendatory (not mandatory) total arms embargo but with a qualification--a phrase which explicitly says that the embargo is ``without prejudice to requirements which may arise for maintaining international peace." If the Africans refuse to accept this language we would fall back to accepting unqualified language but in voting would make explicit our reservation on arms for ``maintaining international peace."
3. State believes that Africans have eight votes for such a permissive total arms embargo, that France will abstain on any such resolution, and that the British will probably go along with us.
4. Since the issue will not come to a vote until next week the immediate problem is to clear draft language for Governor Stevenson's speech today i.e., a public announcement that we will end sale of military equipment to South Africa this calendar year reserving the right to interpret this in light of requirements for ``maintenance of international peace and security" if ``the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort." /3/
/3/ On August 2, Ambassador Stevenson told the U.N. Security Council that the U.S. Government expected to end the sale of all military equipment to South Africa by the end of the calendar year, although he noted that there were existing contracts to supply limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines, that must be honored. Stevenson added that the United States reserved the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 683 - 689.
William H. Brubeck /4/
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
412. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63 - 8/12/63. Confidential.
Washington, August 7, 1963.
SUBJECT
South African Resolution at the United Nations
The attached State Department recommendation /2/ goes somewhat beyond your position as of last week but it is probably the best we can do. To organize enough votes to abstain it to death would require your personal intervention with the Venezuelans, Norwegians and possibly the Brazilians. Nothing in the resolution is so bad as to justify this or the even more drastic alternative of casting our first veto.
/2/ Attached to the source text is an August 6 memorandum from Acting Secretary Ball to the President stating that the resolution before the U.N. Security Council was more contentious than the Department believed was useful or effective, but recommending that, with one amendment, the United States should vote yes on it. Ball proposed that the U.S. Delegation be instructed to try hard to eliminate the recommendation for a boycott of all South African goods. If the boycott feature was eliminated, it should vote affirmatively on the resolution as a whole. If it was not eliminated, the United States should abstain. Attached to Ball's memorandum is a note dated August 7 from Brubeck to Bromley Smith that reads: "The President has approved this and State has been notified."
Specifically we would abstain on the whole resolution unless the economic boycott provision is eliminated (which it will almost surely be). We would abstain on some rhetoric in the preamble that is inferentially critical of countries that have previously supplied arms. And we would carefully explain our understanding of the vote--that this is not Chapter 7 (mandatory) action; and that we reserve the right to ship arms for the common defense. /3/
/3/ On August 7, Ambassador Yost asked for a separate vote on the paragraph of the draft resolution calling for a boycott on South African goods. The paragraph failed to receive the necessary 7 votes for adoption, failing by a vote of 5 to 0 with 6 abstentions (including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). The vote on the amended resolution as a whole was 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (the United Kingdom and France). For text of Security Council Resolution 181 (1963), ``The Situation in South Africa Is Seriously Disturbing International Peace and Security," see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 689 - 690.
WB
413. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 8/7/63 - 8/12/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem. No drafting information appears on the source text. A marginal notation reads: ``(Taken from Pres. weekend reading dtd 9/14/63, Tab [illegible])."
On September 12, a copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck calling it an excellent paper worth the President's weekend reading, which showed pretty convincingly that if the United States were to get into any economic reprisal situation with South Africa, the South Africans would have much the best of it. (Ibid., Brubeck Series, South Africa, South African Arms Embargo)
RAF - 30 Washington, August 12, 1963.
SUBJECT
US and South African Economic Leverage on Each Other /2/
/2/ For a description of related studies which include the psychological-political dimension and the impact of multilateral sanctions, see the Appendix to this paper. [Footnote in the source text. The Appendix is not printed.]
The subject of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa is as complex as it is topical. This paper presents one segment of that subject. It examines a range of possible unilateral US economic measures towards South Africa and estimates their immediate economic impact both on South Africa and on the US. It does not attempt to calculate the impact of multilateral sanctions nor the psychological-political repercussions in South Africa of economic deprivations.
Abstract
In general, any feasible US economic sanctions would have little economic impact on South Africa. Among large-scale South African exports, only chrome ore and rock lobstertails depend overwhelmingly on the US market; US purchases of these items account for only about eight percent and one percent of South African exports to the world, respectively. Among South African imports from the US, there appear to be no critical items which South Africa could not do without, although South Africa would suffer temporary inconvenience in shifting to substitute items or alternate sources of supply, especially for spare parts for existing stocks of American machinery and vehicles.
South Africa, on the other hand, has some economic leverage on the US. US assets in South Africa are probably at least five times greater than South African assets in the US. The international standing of the US dollar and, by extension, the stability of the integrated Western monetary system, is to a degree dependent on the orderly marketing of gold. South Africa accounts for about 65 percent of Free World gold production, and it could encourage upward pressure on free market gold by withholding sales. This might induce sudden heavy demands on US gold reserves.
Yet symbolic US economic sanctions might have important political repercussions within South Africa. What these might be--reinforcement of apartheid and go-it-alone policies, encouragement of non-white resistance, or a change in direction towards non-racialism--depend on internal South African dynamics. A Departmental strategic study currently under way will attempt the latest and most systematic analysis of this fundamental aspect of the problem.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 BAS. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on August 27, cleared by MacKnight and Brown, and approved by Hilliker. Repeated to USUN and London.
Washington, August 28, 1963, 3:39 p.m.
248. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. /2/
/2/ The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL S AFR.
Secretary received Amb Naude Aug 26 for continuation Bantustan talks. Amb said he leaving that evening for consultation Pretoria. According Naude his govt envisages establishment of eight to ten states within confines of the Republic. They would be linked through a confederation or federation. Would be fully independent and doubtless members of UN. Some controls over foreign policy and defense would be retained for a time by the SAG.
Secretary inquired as to discourse now going on between SAG and non-white leaders. Naude gave indirect answer saying that efforts to create Transkei native state require a great deal of consultation with Blacks. Asked about disparities between land allocated to Whites and Blacks Naude said much of land occupied by Bantu is far better than that of many Whites but SAG is committed to make more land available to Bantu.
Secretary asked about measures SAG could take for more fruitful discussion pressing problems. Might begin he commented by liberalizing Bantu Education Act and the pass laws. Naude replied such laws and other forms discrimination which Americans dislike will pass away. Some control over freedom movement necessary prevent overcrowding of cities and to save primitive Bantu from being deAfricanized. Discrimination will disappear with creation native states. In response question if there wouldn't still be considerable admixture of people Amb acknowledged urban Bantu present continuing difficulty but Bantustans will offer counter attractions and Black flood into cities will end.
Naude complained that many US officials speak of their desire keep a US - South African dialogue going but dialogues are difficult to maintain when South Africa is whipped publicly. Secretary replied he would be delighted to have something to support. SAG should seek position its friends could defend. We don't expect overnight changes but it is very important SAG find way to demonstrate both to world and Bantu there is something worthwhile to discuss. Secretary suggested starting with SWA. Here much could be done. Naude said Odendaal Report will be released before UNGA meeting. The report will be a starting point.
Secretary felt SAG has view of Territory entirely different from rest of UN. He asked why SAG doesn't take initiative and institute reforms instead of waiting for others to force action. Naude responded that every time he suggests some course of action his govt replied ``Wait for the Odendaal Report." A bold solution in the Territory could be most important the Secretary said and he then spoke of necessity that SAG prepare for coming ICJ decision in SWA case. Amb said he appreciated Secretary's efforts find solution and he would carry Secretary's message on SWA to Pretoria.
Rusk
415. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 - 5 S AFR. Secret. Also sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara.
Washington, September 23, 1963.
The President has approved the Secretary of State's recommendation of August 28 /2/ to continue after the end of this year to license the sale of spare parts of C - 130s sold to the South African Government.
/2/ Acting Secretary Ball's August 28 memorandum recommended that the U.S. Government approve requests received after the end of 1963 to license the sale of spare parts for the C - 130's. He noted that the U.S. Government had approved the contract between Lockheed and the South African Government knowing that it contained the clause providing for the supply of spare parts to maintain the aircraft so long as five were in operation (Ibid.)
With respect to possible sale of submarines to South Africa the President has approved recommendation B of the joint State - Defense memorandum of September 16 /3/ but with these specific limitations:
/3/ On September 16, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommended quietly exploring the sale of submarines to South Africa on preliminary basis. (Ibid.)
(a) It should be made clear to the South Africans that any informal discussions held during the balance of this year are to be strictly confidential and involve no implied commitment to sell, and,
(b) The US can make no decision before the end of this year regarding sales and any eventual decision will be taken in the light of circumstances at the time the question is considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in August.
McGeorge Bundy
416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL - 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on September 26; cleared by Strong, Streeter in draft, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Wallner. Also sent to Pretoria and repeated to London.
Washington, September 27, 1963, 8:03 p.m.
866. South West Africa. Dept believes our objective for forthcoming Committee IV and Plenary discussion SWAfrica should be to continue to avoid any GA action (e.g. revocation of Mandate, sanctions) which would prejudice ICJ case and thereby reduce likelihood of eventual solution based on rule of law. Such unilateral ``political" action would have little or no chance of changing SAG's policies re territory, whereas action based upon ICJ decision would offer some hope. Since African Heads of State Conference as well as Committee of 24 refrained from urging immediate revocation of Mandate (former emphasized importance of ICJ case), Dept has been cautiously optimistic that outcome of 18th GA consideration this item might be adoption of a res along lines May 10, 1963 Committee of 24 resolution (which we supported despite reservation). /2/
/2/ See footnote 3, Document 400.
However, ICJ granting SAG delay until Jan 10, 64 to present its counter-memorial (originally due Sept 30) may heighten African impatience with Court proceeding and increase danger of unilateral action by 18th GA, e.g. revocation Mandate or sanctions. While we encouraged by opinion of Yomekpe (Ghana) as reported USUN's 946, /3/ that Africans committed await ICJ decision before supporting UN action re status of territory, we wonder whether when he made these remarks he knew of delay ICJ case.
/3/ Dated September 24. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 10)
Dept requests Mission's estimate as to how issue likely develop in Committee IV, as well as views on best means prevent undesirable action. We suggest you discuss problem with Gross, since if ICJ case still to be used as means forestall precipitate action he (and his clients) in best position dampen down African impatience. Suggest you also discuss with UKUN.
Views of USUN and Emb Pretoria requested on advisability our disclosing during Committee IV debate our diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis SAG on SWAfrica. Such disclosure would show we have followed up our UN speeches with quiet diplomatic efforts and might take some steam out of calls for severance diplomatic relations. On other hand, it would tend imply US has more influence with SAG this issue than is actually the case, and public disclosure our demarches might reduce SAG's receptivity to future private representations on SWAfrica.
In any case, we would not make such a statement without consulting UK, our chief partner in this diplomatic exercise. In line with Ambassador's March 22 talk with Louw it would also seem necessary, subject to Embassy Pretoria's views, inform SAG our intention make such a statement. We would anticipate such statement would be couched in general terms, without giving text of Ambassador's oral or written presentation, along lines USG undertook strenuous diplomatic campaign in 1963 to seek to induce SAG to (1) take a cooperative attitude toward UN presence and implementation res 1805; and (2) take steps soonest to adjust its administration of Territory to conform with Mandate and SAG's international obligations.
If we decide proceed with such a statement, it likely other countries who, at our urging, joined us in representations to SAG (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, UK and probably Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Venezuela) would disclose in debate the steps they took. /4/
Ball
/4/ On November 13, by a vote of 82 to 6 with 16 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1899 (XVIII), ``The Question of South West Africa." The United States voted against the resolution after unsuccessfully attempting to eliminate language calling South West Africa ``a serious threat to international peace and security" and language calling for an oil embargo. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 705 - 708.
417. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL - 1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved by the White House on October 15. The conversation took place at the White House. The source text is labeled ``4 of 6 parts."
Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m.
SUBJECT
South Africa
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary European Affairs
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA
UK
Lord Home, Foreign Secretary
Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the U.S.
Oliver Wright, Foreign Office
Lord Home said that an idea was being put forward at the UN for ``strategic sanctions" against South Africa. The UK was opposed to the application of sanctions except when there was a threat to peace. The trouble with Security Council resolutions was that they were mandatory. The UK would accordingly have to veto any ``strategic sanctions" resolution as it was unlikely that enough abstentions could be obtained. Ambassador Stevenson had indicated, Lord Home said, that the U.S. might go along with some selective sanctions.
The President replied that we had gone along on the arms embargo. We would not go beyond that and would not support sanctions. The question was how best to stop them. He thought that the British should not be too disturbed at the idea of casting a veto.
418. Memorandum of Conversation /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 9/30/63 - 10/29/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk.
Washington, October 18, 1963.
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk
H.E. G.P. Jooste, Head of UN Delegation and Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa
H.E. Dr. Willem C. Naude, Ambassador of South Africa
Mr. Jooste and Ambassador Naude asked to see me alone for a few minutes after a conversation covered by another memorandum. /2/ Mr. Jooste told me in great confidence that the South African Government is most seriously and urgently considering withdrawal from the United Nations. He said that they had in mind three elements: (a) South Africa's own national interest in the face of repeated and almost unanimous condemnations and repetitions of embarrassments and harassments in the United Nations and its component organs; (b) withdrawal from the United Nations might serve to reduce difficulties for certain countries with whom South Africa has had long and friendly ties and (c) South African withdrawal from the United Nations might indeed be of some assistance to the United Nations itself since it would continue to have an important role to play and might not be damaged by a continuation of the present situation.
/2/ Not printed.
I told Mr. Jooste that this was a matter of such seriousness that I would not wish to comment off the cuff; that I would not wish to give any views of our Government off the cuff, but that I would make the following preliminary comments: (a) that the South African Government might wish to consider carefully the reasons for its withdrawal and examine realistically whether the purposes to be achieved would in fact be achieved by withdrawal. For example, the withdrawal of South Africa would not cause the South African issue to disappear from the United Nations agenda; (b) I could tell him straightaway that the United States would not wish to ask South Africa to withdraw in order to make things easier in the United Nations for the United States. Although it is true that we have had many painful situations confronting us in the United Nations because of the South African problem, we felt that these were problems inherent in the situation itself and that under no circumstances would we suggest their withdrawal to ease our own situation; (c) I added that I was quite sure in my own mind that they should not give weight to their withdrawal as a means of assisting the United Nations. Indeed, although I know of no way in which the question could be posed, it would be my impression that if the question of South African withdrawal were put to the membership of the United Nations, there would be a large majority indicating that they should not do so. I noted that the earlier effort to expel or suspend South Africa had gathered no substantial support and was now in my judgment a thing of the past; (d) on the question of any comment which we might have to make with respect to South Africa's own interests, I felt that that was a matter in which I would not wish to speak without further consideration since no such comments should be made irresponsibly. I told him that if we had anything further to say, we would try to do so in the next very few days.
Dean Rusk /3/
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
419. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa. Confidential. A marginal notation reads: ``(Taken from Pres. week-end reading dtd 10/26/63, Tab 4)."
Washington, October 23, 1963.
There is a good chance that the South African issue and, perhaps, the Portuguese - Africa issue will be up again in the UN Security Council in November. One of the hard-to-measure factors we will face, as we did in August, is how strong African opinion is on these issues and, therefore, how tough a political issue it really is for us with the Africans.
On this score, the attached analysis /2/ of African reaction to our performance in August (based in part on a thoro canvass of our African posts) suggests that the factor of African reaction may be less important than is sometimes claimed. There was very little evidence, in the African press, in statements to our Embassies, or in other forms of any great African concern with the UN performance. In fact our status in Africa probably improved because of our vote on the South African resolution and because the Portuguese agreed to talk to the Africans after the Ball mission to Lisbon. (Note particularly paragraphs 3, 8, 11 and 13 of the attached.)
William H. Brubeck /3/
/2/ Current Intelligence Memorandum attached to the source text, but not printed.
/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
420. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. No classification marking. A handwritten notation reads: ``(Included in Pres. week-end reading dtd 11/2 - 3/63)."
Washington, November 1, 1963.
SUBJECT
Rostow's South Africa Study /2/
/2/ Attached to the source text, but not printed, is an intermediate draft of a paper entitled ``South Africa, Department of State, National Strategy Series" prepared by William R. Duggan of the Policy Planning Council and Waldemar B. Campbell of the Bureau of African Affairs.
This is still a working draft, not a final product, but it is a surprisingly solid and objective study worth selective reading. It is not, however, very relevant to our current problem about how to handle the South African issue in the UN Security Council this month, on which the Secretary of State will be sending over a paper Monday. He will propose, in effect, that we hold the line at our position of the August Security Council, with no significant new concessions to the Africans.
There is a debate going on within State over proposed action to stop US Government loans and credits to South Africa and even warn US private investors against the economic risk of investment in South Africa. These proposals will probably not mature for a while but the economic sections of the attached study take on particular interest apropos of the general question of what further steps we might take, like our August arms embargo, to pressure the South Africans and help the Black Africans.
The heart of the attached study is a ``long range proposal" (210 - 231) which picks up a remark of Prime Minister Verwoerd's and develops from it a scheme for a set of modest reforms by the South African Government in return for which the US and UK would give categorical support to the South African Government politically. While the reforms are modest and gradual, they are basic because the South African Government would have openly to scrap apartheid--a complete admission of defeat for its present policy.
What is particularly interesting about this proposal is that within the US Government support for it ranges from the liberal, pro-Black Africans (such as the authors of this piece) to Ambassador Satterthwaite and the CAS in South Africa. (The latter of whom is as far to the right as any one in the US Government on the subject of South Africa.) The scheme may, therefore, be a starter in two ways--first as a serious proposal to the South Africans and second, if they refuse it, as a public US gambit which would seriously split Verwoerd's near-monolithic present white support. The second point might be important, because the complaint of South African liberal whites now is that, by being so militantly hostile, the Western powers are driving even liberal white South Africans into the Verwoerd camp. In any event, even if it has practical interest, there's serious doubt whether South Africa is yet ripe for such a proposal.
Other items of interest in the paper:
1. A reminder of how dismal is South Africa's basic record as an allegedly staunch ally of the West (200 - 202).
2. An excellent survey of the South African economy (A - 1 to A - 14); of the possible effect of economic sanctions (A - 15 to A - 20); and of US investment (203 - 6). For example, in spite of all the political noise, South African trade with a number of Black African countries is actually increasing--including Ghana! And the Chicoms and Eastern Europeans still do some business with South Africa.
3. A lot of work needs doing with the economic data, in terms of its relevance to sanctions, pressures, economic reprisals, etc. in the future international quarrel over South Africa. However, it is interesting to note how vulnerable the South African economy apparently is--for example, the sharp outflow of private capital and the $1.4 billion decline in stock values after the Sharpeville riot (March 1960) and the withdrawal from the Commonwealth (May 1961). (Pages A - 3 to A - 4) /3/
William H. Brubeck /4/
/3/ On October 29, Rostow sent a copy of the South Africa paper to President Kennedy under cover of a memorandum stating that he believed that the President would want to examine this intermediate draft report on South Africa over the weekend and noting that the imminent debate on South Africa in the United Nations would make the document useful for him to know, since it was certain to play a role in the formulation of U.S. policy in New York. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa)
/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
421. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, November 6, 1963.
SUBJECT
Security Council Meeting on South Africa
Enclosed is a paper /2/ which describes the approach we plan to take in the forthcoming Security Council meeting on the problem of apartheid in South Africa. This policy has been developed in close consultation with Ambassador Stevenson.
/2/ Attached to the source text, but not printed.
We propose to continue opposing mandatory sanctions and to indicate clearly the limits of UN measures which we think appropriate to deal with the problem. At the same time, in order to show our continuing concern about apartheid and to help deflect support from a more radical resolution, we would be prepared to interpret our existing policy on arms restrictions to include an embargo on materials used primarily in the production of arms and ammunition. The Norwegians have developed such a proposition; Governor Stevenson will be working with them and other Council members to obtain a resolution satisfactory to us. In addition, we would be prepared to accept a suitable version of an expert committee to study the South African problem.
Dean Rusk
422. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, November 7, 1963.
I agree with your proposed course of action on South Africa in the Security Council and share strongly your view that, having made a major concession in August, we cannot get in the position of having to make substantial new concessions on this issue every few months. I think it important, therefore, that in announcing our willingness to apply the arms embargo to ``materials for the production of military equipment" we make it very clear that we regard this as merely part of the position we voluntarily took in August and that the August resolution should be given a more reasonable further term to do its work. /2/
/2/ Printed from an unsigned copy that indicates the President signed the original.
423. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, November 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
South African Submarine Sales
You will recall that in September you authorized exploratory technical talks regarding South Africa's interest in a $90 - 130 million purchase of submarines with the clear understanding that the talks would involve no express or implied commitment on the part of the U.S. to sell and that, in any event, no decision would be made before the end of this year. As a result of a first round in South Africa, State and Defense are now considering a South African proposal for another round of exploratory talks here in the near future.
The prospective value of sale, however, is now down to about $38 million due to South Africa's preference for a smaller, cheaper submarine which the Navy got ELCO to design expressly to meet South African needs. South Africa also has indicated interest in some other military purchases, of which the only plausible one seems to be a $ 35 - 40 million air defense system for their Simonstown Naval Base.
You will recall that in the Security Council debate in August we announced termination of all military sales to South Africa by the end of this year but reserved the right of possible future sales where required for ``the common defense." With the South African issue becoming steadily more difficult internationally, we now have two problems:
1. Given its political difficulties and its sharply reduced balance of payments value, should we continue to explore the submarine sale?
2. In order to retrieve some balance of payments value, should we not only continue submarine talks, but also entertain some additional South African requests such as the Simonstown air defense system?
State and Defense now have these questions under review.
WB
424. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File. Confidential.
Washington, November 26, 1963.
SUBJECT
South Africa in the Security Council
1. The UN Security Council will begin debate tomorrow and probably continue through the latter part of next week on the South African issue. In addition to the usual condemnation of apartheid, the debate will come down to a fight over the African proposal for an oil embargo against South Africa (South Africa is totally dependent on imports for POL, $90 - 100 million per year--we are one supplier).
2. President Kennedy had approved a US position opposing any such embargo or other mandatory sanctions. However, in addition to the policy we voluntarily announced during the August Security Council debate (terminating all arms shipments to South Africa at the end of the year but reserving the right to future sales for cold war defense) he approved a further commitment at this time to embargo a specifically enumerated list of items for the manufacture of arms.
3. Four of the five abstentions necessary to kill a sanctions resolution are in hand (US, UK, France and Norway) and the UK is prepared to veto if necessary. We are pressing Brazil and Venezuela to get one of them as a fifth abstainer, and thus avoid the need for veto. However, we are not having much luck.
4. In view of the general African concern over the civil rights significance of President Kennedy's assassination, /2/ and African uncertainty both as to President Johnson's civil rights position and his position on African issues, I think this South African debate is important:
/2/ President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22.
(a) He should if necessary personally communicate with Betancourt to obtain the fifth abstention and thus avoid a veto (even a British one) on apartheid as the first Security Council action during the Johnson Administration.
(b) Either by his own statement if the occasion is available in the next few days (e.g. new conference) or more probably in Stevenson's speech in the Security Council, /3/ President Johnson should be personally and in his own words recorded on the apartheid issue.
/3/ On December 4, Ambassador Stevenson spoke before the Security Council and appealed to South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid. The Ambassador urged the Council to help bring about a peaceful evolution in South Africa toward a free and just society, and to make recommendations to member states which would diminish the chance that international tensions over apartheid might lead to a major explosion. He said that the United States would support the Norwegian draft resolution before the Security Council, which contained valuable proposals along these lines, including its provision that states should cease providing to South Africa equipment and materials for the production and maintenance of arms and munitions. For text of his remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 694 - 698.
(c) Our proposed voluntary ban on shipment of items for manufacture of arms, which President Kennedy had intended to present as simply an implicit part of our August arms embargo, should be presented as an explicit extension of US policy on South Africa by President Johnson, in his own right.
These are actions which will be very effective at the UN and in Africa and which pose no countervailing difficulty for President Johnson to do. /4/
/4/ On December 4, the Norwegian draft resolution, which did not call for an oil embargo against South Africa, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council. For text of Security Council Resolution 182 (1963), see ibid., pp. 698 - 700.
WB
425. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/
/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Africa, Vol. 2. Confidential. A copy was sent to Belk.
Washington, December 5, 1963.
Some weeks ago the African Bureau appointed Ulrich Haynes, a young Negro, as Desk Officer for Southwest Africa and the High Commission Territories. They have now scheduled him for a trip to the Hicom Territories and we are getting into a first-class fight with South Africa over the matter.
The South Africans first objected to any visa, then after several exchanges, have now offered grudgingly minimum physical transit rights through South Africa to the Hicom Territories.
Secretary Rusk has called the South Africans in and taken a very tough line on our claim to normal diplomatic treatment for Negro officers. However, Verwoerd is apparently making the decisions himself and we may reach an impasse.
Specifically we are demanding a visa to permit 3 days consultation with our Embassy in Pretoria and travel by auto to the Hicom Territories. We are awaiting a Verwoerd reply. Meanwhile the South African Foreign Office has informed us that their real objection is to Haynes' assignment to the Southwest Africa desk (which, for their part, reflects their view of Southwest Africa as part of South Africa). /2/
/2/ Attached to the source text is telegram 694 from Pretoria, December 5, reporting Ambassador Satterthwaite's meeting with Under Secretary Sole of the South African Foreign Office. Ambassador Satterthwaite presented the minimum U.S. requirements in the Haynes case, and Sole claimed that the South African Government's real objection was to the fact that Haynes was also the Desk Officer for South West Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AF)
Unless the South Africans back down, given the position the Secretary has taken, we may find ourselves in a minor diplomatic war--bringing home the Ambassador and leaving the First Secretary in charge or similar actions. And, since it seems to me evident that AF really wanted to test this one, it may well become a public issue of some news interest. It is obviously a parallel to the Arab boycott of Jews, and even (with regard to access rights to the High Commission Territories via South Africa) a faint parallel to Berlin--all this and civil rights too.
We are now waiting for the South African Foreign Office to get a reply from Verwoerd on our demand for normal diplomatic treatment. This may come up, therefore, while I am away next week.
WB
426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AF. Confidential. Drafted by Hooper, cleared by Cahn, and approved by Hooper. Also sent to Nairobi for Williams.
Washington, December 10, 1963, 6:14 p.m.
730. Embtel 707. /2/ You may inform Acting Secretary Uys or appropriate FonOff official of following: 1. that the seven day transit visa with multiple entry as set forth reftel meets needs Haynes official trip. 2. Department pleased abandonment attempted restrictions on full rights of our diplomatic agents re entry, free transit and customary privileges and immunities for conduct business with High Commission Territories and offices at Pretoria and Mafeking.
/2/ Telegram 707, December 7, reported that the South African Government was prepared to issue Haynes a transit visa in accordance with international practice and had expressed the hope that the United States would cooperate by using an Embassy plane. (Ibid.)
Request Embassy forward copy of South African laws and regulations on transit and visitors visas with any comments Embassy has on this case as precedent. South African Embassy Counselor here previously informed Department that normal transit visa limited three days.
Please clarify the meaning of sentence in reftel. ``His visa would be amended at Jan Smuts if necessary." Haynes passport is stamped with diplomatic transit visa without any indication of time limit. /3/
/3/ On December 30, Satterthwaite reported that Haynes' visit to the High Commission Territories had concluded successfully and without incident. (Telegram 769; ibid.)
Rusk
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