59. Editorial Note

On April 24, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina represented by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, released an appeal for a cease-fire in Laos. Also released at the same time was a message from the Co-Chairmen, British Foreign Secretary Lord Home and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, to the Government of India calling for the reactivation of the International Control Commission and calling for convocation of an international conference on Laos. (Texts in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 999-1001)

On April 25, the Department of State released a public statement welcoming the Co-Chairmen's proposals, but stating that the "first essential step" was to put the cease-fire into effect before the convening of the conference. The Department of State promised that the United States would "observe the situation on the ground in Laos very closely." Furthermore, it was the U.S. understanding that the role of the International Control Commission would be limited to verifying the cease-fire and that the United States hoped the Commission would be able to proceed to Laos as soon as feasible. (Ibid., page 1001)


60. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/

Vientiane, April 26, 1961, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2661. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:26 p.m. Repeated niact to Bangkok, London, Paris, CINPAC for POLAD, Canberra, and Moscow. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 335A.

1943. Ref: Deptel 1153./2/ Muong Sai has fallen. MAAG representatives report Siho forces north of Nam Lik have bad morale and likely dissolve if struck hard. They have received some artillery fire. Their dissolution would leave clear way open to Vientiane.

/2/In this telegram, April 23, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Vientiane of the Soviet and British call for a 14-nation conference on Laos (see Document 59), authorized aerial reconnaissance flights, and, in the event the cease-fire was delayed or there was evidence of a Pathet Lao push on Vientiane or another major objective, the use of bombs for Lao T-6 aircraft. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2361)

I do not see how we can afford to let enemy continue his forward movement toward key centers of Laos beyond a certain point. See no way to stop him except by use B-26's, probably followed up by U.S. or SEATO troops. Therefore, I request authority with advice Chief MAAG and ARMA to employ B-26's against such enemy movements if 1) enemy moves south of Nam Lik, 20 or in case of (A) Luang Prabang, (B) Thakhek, (C) Paksane, (D) Savannakhet or other major center near Mekong Valley if enemy threatens occupy terrain which commands city.

I realize that such action would blow whole cease-fire negotiation wide open, torpedo conference and most likely involve immediate intervention U.S.-SEATO forces, but see no alternative if enemy presses beyond limits indicated above.

I suggest these facts and gravity situation be brought immediately to attention our SEATO Allies and also that we advise Soviets that while U.S. earnestly desires cease-fire and peaceful solution, it will not stand by awaiting agreement cease-fire while enemy forces continue pressure RLG forces to such degree and should such actions continue steps as necessary will be taken. Roberts reports Pushkin said he also against further troop movements now.

Suggest SEATO now begin preparation respond immediately to appeal from RLG if enemy moves south Nam Lik in any force or if we have to use B-26's elsewhere. Phoumi has not made such request nor will I yet suggest to him, but we should be ready to act on it.

Suggest Bangkok be instructed clear this ASAP with Sarit.

You may wish alert British, Australians and French to possible use B-26's.

Brown


61. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, April 26, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2661. Secret.

SUBJECT
Laos--Deteriorating Situation and Need for Critical Decisions

This is the backdrop for sending Ambassadors Harriman and Young to Laos:

1. The military situation in Laos is becoming intolerable with the fall of Muong Sai and with Communist offensives continuing against key areas. They could result in the capture of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Paksane, effective bisection of the country and control of the Mekong basin areas. This would seriously threaten Thailand and Vietnam.

2. Politically, Souvanna and his Communist backers are calling for political talks to work out a coalition government before the 14-Nation Conference. The Royal Lao Government may be receptive to such a move.

3. If these military and political trends are not reversed, the 14-Nation Conference may be little more than a Communist victory celebration.

4. The Chinese Communists are taking an increasingly hard line, demanding in effect our expulsion from Laos as the price for a cease-fire, let alone a conference.

5. It would appear that the U.S. has a choice between two difficult and unpleasant alternatives:

a. To intervene militarily in Laos under Paragraph 5 to hold the territory now remaining under Royal Lao Government control. It must be recognized, however, that Peking has stated it will "not remain idle"; or

b. To accept a political solution which will lead to a Souvanna government. He has aligned himself with Communist objectives which would turn us out of Laos and in time convert Laos into a Communist puppet.

6. If we choose the first alternative we must make military preparations immediately, take urgent steps to prevent a political sell-out by the RLG, seek the cooperation of our allies, and develop a rationale which would justify our intervention.

7. Should we decide on the second course of action, we should support negotiations with Souvanna to strike the best bargain possible.

8. In any event, the threat to the security of Thailand and Free Vietnam will be great. In order to bolster their position we must be prepared to give them public and binding assurances coupled with additional economic and military assistance to demonstrate our resolve.

9. In either course of action we can enhance our moral and political position by getting the UN Security Council to call for the cease-fire we have been unable to get otherwise. At the most, this would bring world pressure on the Communists as they pursue a military solution in Laos; at the least, such UN action would help justify the SEATO response to the Communist offensive, and broaden support for our military actions there.

Recommendations

a. I recommend that Ambassador Harriman be instructed to give the King and Royal Government of Laos the assurances of support based on 5a above as suggested in the attached letter for your signature./2/

/2/Not found attached.

b. I recommend that Ambassador Harriman give Thailand and Vietnam general assurances along lines of paragraph 8 above.

Chester Bowles/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.


62. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy/1/

Washington, April 26, 1961, 3:30-6 p.m.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/21/61-4/30/61. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

The meeting was called by the President on my recommendation after a conversation with Acting Secretary of State Bowles. Present were: Acting Secretary Bowles, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Steeves, Mr. Cleveland from State Department; Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze, Admiral Burke and General Fontana from the Department of Defense; Messrs. Rostow and Bundy from the White House.

The President read gloomy dispatches from Brown and Boyle/2/ and a memorandum on the situation from Mr. Bowles,/3/ all attached. After discussion, the President called Ambassador Bruce and asked him to communicate with the Prime Minister, to show him Brown's cable, and to express the President's grave concern. It was arranged that the Prime Minister would be asked to call the President back. The President also sent for Viscount Hood, the British Minister, and for Ambassador Alphand, to express his concern to them personally. He later reported that in these conversations he had pointed out the gravity of the situation, the increasingly urgent need for an immediate cease-fire, and the high importance of not letting Vientiane fall. He asked that their governments consider whether further representations should not be made to Moscow, and he hoped for their prompt advice. He left open with them, as with the people at the meeting, the question whether he would later feel it necessary to order U.S. forces into Laos.

/2/For Brown's telegram, see Document 60. Boyle's telegram, ML 1722 from CHMAAG to CINCPAC, April 26, repeated to the JCS and Department of Defense, stated in part: "My estimate of situation is that FAL is on the ropes and that enemy has capability on [of] taking any of the major population centers now held by the FAL. If enemy should decide to exploit this capability, it would take the employment of B-26's and US or SEATO intervention to stop them." (Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, NSC, 1961)

/3/Document 61.

During the discussion in the Cabinet Room the President considered a number of alternative approaches to the situation. He had particularly in mind a statement from Peking that the Chinese Peoples Republic did not believe a cease-fire could come before the withdrawal of American forces and equipment.

In assessing the possible character of a large-scale involvement in Laos, the President was confronted with general agreement among his advisers that such a conflict would be unjustified, even if the loss of Laos must be accepted. As to whether an intervention in Vientiane would provoke strong military response, there was some uncertainty, but on balance it seemed wise to avoid a test if possible./4/ At the same time the possibility of a strong American response is the only card left to be played in pressing for a cease-fire, and accordingly the President explicitly refused to decide against intervention at this time.

/4/In a discussion with Eisenhower on April 22, Kennedy stated that there was no way of saving Laos by unilateral military action and he was looking forward to the upcoming cease-fire. (Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-1969, John F. Kennedy) Published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 124B.

The Department of State undertook to alert Ambassador Stevenson to a possible need for urgent UN action,/5/ and it also drafted a Presidential message to Prime Minister Nehru/6/ and planned other appropriate cables to carry out the general line which the President had indicated. In particular, the Department proposed to send messages of interim encouragement to Brown and to the Royal Laotian Government, urging them to stand firm while renewed and urgent efforts are made to obtain cease-fire./7/

/5/On April 27, Stevenson telephoned Cleveland to report on his discussion with British and French colleagues at the United Nations. The information in the telephone call was written into a memorandum from Bowles to the President, April 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2761)

/6/The text of the letter to Nehru is in telegram 3040 to New Delhi, April 26. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-2661)

/7/In telegram 1172 to Vientiane, April 26, 10:52 p.m., the Department informed Brown of the results of this meeting and denied his request to use B-26 aircraft. The Department also stated that the decision to send Harriman to Laos would be delayed 24 hours to await developments. The Department assured Brown that it understood the gravity of the situation, but reminded him that it was his "difficult task" to impress upon Phoumi the need to maintain as advantageous a military position as possible while still showing himself amenable to compliance with the request for a cease-fire. Phoumi should agree to meet for political talks only on neutral ground and make no hasty concessions. (Ibid.)

It was agreed that in the event that the Laotian position should crumble, it would probably be essential, at a minimum, to place substantial U.S. forces in South Vietnam and Thailand, and Secretary McNamara undertook to begin contingency planning toward this end.

McGeorge Bundy


63. Editorial Note

On April 27 at 10 a.m., the National Security Council held its 479th meeting with President Kennedy presiding. Thirty-three people attended the meeting including Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Bureau of the Budget Director David E. Bell, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arleigh Burke, Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, and U.S. Information Agency Director Edward R. Murrow. U. Alexis Johnson, George Ball, Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick E. Nolting, and Theodore Achilles also attended for the Department of State. From the White House Staff, McGeorge Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, Walt Rostow, and Chester Clifton attended. Roswell Gilpatric and the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.; John B. Connally, Jr.; and Eugene M. Zuckert, respectively, attended for the Department of Defense.

NSC Action No. 2410 summarizes the decision taken on Laos. It reads:

"Discussed the current situation in Laos and noted the President's view that the Congressional leaders should be promptly briefed on the subject. A meeting with the Congressional leaders was arranged for later in the morning." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

The meeting concluded at 12:02 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) For an account of the meeting with the congressional leaders, see Document 65.


64. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, April 27, 1961, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2761. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 1:12 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, New Delhi, Bangkok, and niact to Ankara and Vientiane.

2657. Saw Gromyko 1630 and spoke along lines Deptel 1833./2/ He said he had already received Menshikov's report. Gromyko said he did not understand US position on Laos. Following my talk with Khrushchev and his with President and Secretary/3/ both sides had agreed to support development of neutral Laos and documents had been drawn up for calling conference reconvening ICC and call for cease-fire. On very day this had been agreed, US had appointed military advisors to Laos troops. This was military step and was only understandable if our purpose was to stir up trouble. He characterized facts to which I had drawn attention as routine and said to best his information there were no major military developments taking place in Laos. He also dwelt at length on continued presence Chiang Kai-shek troops in Laos. President had informed him these were being withdrawn but this had not taken place--at least many were still in Laos. We had not been able to inform Soviet Union officially that all ChiNat troops had been withdrawn. If one summarized actions taken on what he called rebel side, Soviet claims (presumably meaning grounds for complaint) were 10 times ours. Soviet position had been expressed clearly and particularly by head of Soviet Govt. He referred not only to continued presence ChiNat troops but also other foreign troops. He said he knew nothing of Peking broadcast to which I referred.

/2/In this telegram, April 27, 12:19 a.m., the Department of State gave the Embassy an account of Bowles' discussion with Soviet Ambassador Menshikov at 9:15 p.m., April 26, Washington time. The Department instructed Thompson to seek an appointment with Gromyko and make a similar representation. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation of the Menshikov-Bowles meeting of April 26 is ibid., 751J.00/4-2661.

/3/For the Thompson-Khrushchev discussion, see Document 46; for the Gromyko-Kennedy discussion, see Document 43; and for the Gromyko-Rusk discussion, see Document 34.

I pointed out we had reports of presence of many Vietminh troops in Laos. I said I knew many Chinese had been evacuated from area but did not know total number. I said speaking personally and frankly I thought there was suspicion in Washington that it was intended to keep on military activities with objective of taking over virtually all Laos. I pointed out that such action would be extremely dangerous. Our actions in support of neutral Laos had doubtless been discouraging to some elements in Laos and this and continued scale of military operations doubtless accounted for our action concerning military advisors. I said that clearly if we both maintained our objective of a neutral Laos important thing was prompt cease-fire.

Gromyko said doubtless our information concerning DRV was one-sided. He pointed out that with respect to cease-fire there had been no meeting of two sides as yet and they had not even agreed on date or place. He pointed out both Souvanna and Souvanna Vong had made statements supporting cease-fire but he did not think statement of our friends was as clear. He concluded that important thing was for two sides to agree on date for cease-fire. I stated I agreed and hoped they would use their influence to see this was done promptly. He said he wished to emphasize as he had previously that it was most important no steps be taken to aggravate situation.

Comment: In view of rapidly deteriorating situation would appear to me important that RLG immediately propose date for cease-fire and meeting place between lines as attempt to obtain agreement on Luang Prabang would only cause further delay.

Thompson


65. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Ankara/1/

Washington, April 27, 1961, 10:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/4-2161. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Johnson and cleared with Bowles. Rusk was in Ankara, Turkey, April 25-29, for the CENTO Conference.

Tosec 23. Eyes Only Secretary from Bowles. Following NSC meeting this morning which briefly discussed Laos,/2/ President called in Congressional leaders./3/ President briefed group on developments and actions taken along lines set forth Tosec 6,/4/ including reading to them all of Brown's telegram 1943 and pertinent portion ChiCom broadcast./5/ Also briefed them on my meeting with Menshikov (Tosec 14)./6/ McNamara briefed them on US military capabilities for intervention in Laos. Admiral Burke briefed them on military situation, strongly and repeatedly throughout meeting expressing view that unless US prepared intervene militarily in Laos, all Southeast Asia will be lost. However, also pointed out extreme difficulty military operations in Laos and, if battle started there, must be prepared for tough, long and hard war which may well involve war with ChiComs. I expressed views set forth Tosec 6./7/ During course of meeting President received your Secto 7, and President briefly summarized your views therein.

/2/See Document 63.

/3/A memorandum of conversation of the President's meeting with the congressional leaders is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Vol. I.

/4/Tosec 6 to Ankara, April 26, 9:03 p.m., provided Rusk with an account of the meeting on Laos with the President; see Document 62. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2661)

/5/ See footnote 2, Document 62. The pertinent part of the Chinese broadcast of April 26 was as follows: "in order to bring about and to secure a ceasefire in Laos it is imperative that the US, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam immediately stop their assistance to rebel clique in Laos and immediately withdraw their military personnel and military equipment from Laos," as quoted in telegram 1172 to Vientiane, April 26, 10:52 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2661)

/6/Tosec 14 was a repeat to Ankara for Rusk of telegram 1833 to Moscow, April 27; see footnote 2, Document 64.

/7/In Secto 7 from Ankara, April 27, received 11:38 a.m. Washington time, Rusk stated that "fundamental decision is whether we should fight before allowing all Laos to be taken over by Communist armed action." The United States needed to find a way to stop the military advance without destroying the possibility of a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement, Rusk maintained. He doubted that the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese had elected to take all of Laos, but he could not assure the President that was the case. Rusk recommended an immediate U.N. Security Council meeting to call for a cease-fire and negotiations between the Lao factions. Simultaneously, Rusk recommended alerting SEATO and beginning implementation of SEATO Plan 5, including movement of SEATO troops into Vientiane and southern Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2761)

While expressing different shades of views, with Mansfield at one end of spectrum and Bridges at other, there was complete unanimity and strong view among all that, even recognizing possible consequences to our position in remainder Southeast Asia, we should not introduce US forces into Laos. In addition to military problem, Congressional group also seemed strongly influenced by general impression among them that Laotians unwilling to fight for selves. However, it appeared there would probably be considerable support for introduction US forces into Thailand and South Viet-Nam.

President made clear no decisions had been reached and suggested possibility another meeting with Congressional leaders on Saturday./8/

/8/April 29.

Bowles


66. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Ankara, April 28, 1961, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2861. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 4:59 a.m.

Secto 11. Eyes Only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference: Tosec 15./2/ Will arrive for 9:30 Department meeting morning April 29. Further comments on Laos:

/2/In Tosec 15, April 27, Bowles informed Rusk that there was to be an NSC meeting on Laos and Vietnam scheduled for 10:30 a.m. and suggested a preparatory meeting at the Department of State at 9:30 a.m. Bowles also told Rusk that the President concurred in Harriman's visit to Vientiane, but the general feeling was that a Lemnitzer visit at this time was not desirable. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-2761)

1. Delicacy our problem is that we may be on verge of (A) cease-fire which could lead to some tolerable peaceful settlement Laotian question safeguarding general security remainder Southeast Asia or (B) military involvements which could escalate into large-scale war in Asia and possibly throughout world. Big question is which. Our intelligence community should thoroughly canvass all information bearing on readiness of Sino-Soviet bloc to press for Communist Laos at whatever cost, most especially movements southward Chinese Army, Air, Naval units.

2. We ourselves have no special national interest in becoming involved in large-scale fighting in Laos. Our national interest is heavy but part of collective interest in security Southeast Asia. On this we must of course play leading role but if collective action not fully backed by our SEATO allies we must think hard about where our responsibilities lie. Asian neutrals in area must also consider how valuable umbrella American power is to them. Time has come for them to decide whether they are to help hold up that umbrella at least through political support on this issue.

3. We must be clear in our action and words that we are not spoiling for a fight but are working to bring about a peaceful settlement. This means to me that we emphasize background efforts present administration to secure genuinely neutral Laos by peaceful processes and convict Sino-Soviet bloc of cynical aggression directly contrary to Khrushchev's protestations about Austrian Laos. Thus any military step should be limited in its general mission and should be accompanied by United Nations and other efforts to keep peaceful processes busily engaged.

4. If we commit US forces on whatever scale military must have clear mission and we must keep out of their way regarding operations. I cannot emphasize too strongly that we must not try to run a fight half way around the world by all sorts of leading strings from State Department. What the military will need from us is full diplomatic support to carry out assigned mission, however limited that mission might in fact be.

5. President must not be allowed to make decision to employ organized US forces without full presentation possible contingencies involved. Immediate possibilities are renewal fighting in Korea, bombing on bases in Okinawa and Japan, air and possibly other forms attack on off-shore islands and Formosa. Possibilities similar action elsewhere must be part of his decision.

6. Much depends upon attitude of non-Communist Laotians, both leaders and people. In Greece and Korea people themselves gave us something to support. If Laos shows no interest, US arms cannot import freedom into indifferent country. King, Phoumi and other leaders must come clean on their commitments to future their country. If their attitude unsatisfactory we might consider consolidating position on Mekong and in southern Laos designed to secure Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam with determination to react violently against any attempts to dislodge us or push advance southward. I hope Laos will do much better than this and believe our efforts should continue to be to strengthen their resolution.

7. Reluctant to suggest from here what our decisions should be on Saturday morning./3/ Believe steps taken past three days have been just right. Since I will be in Department early Saturday morning, please have all intelligence and other materials ready before 9:30 meeting. With such thoughts as above in mind, I do believe that we cannot permit Laos to be overrun militarily by Communists without SEATO resistance and maximum political effort to obtain world support for that resistance.

/3/April 29.

Rusk


67. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 29, 1961, 9:05-9:50 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by G. Edward Reynolds and approved by Johnson, McConaughy, Bohlen, and in Rusk's office on June 6. The time is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 62-66.

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Secretary McNamara
Attorney General Kennedy
The Under Secretary
General Geo. H. Decker
General C.E. Le May
General David M. Shoup
Admiral Arleigh Burke
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Deputy Under Secy Johnson
Assistant Secy McConaughy
Deputy Asst. Secy Steeves
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Daniel V. Anderson
Ambassador Kenneth Young
Mr. G. Edward Reynolds, Lao Desk Officer

The Secretary observed that the principal change on the ground had been that forces had moved from such points as Muong Kassy and Tha Thom. However, there had been no major change that would in itself make the difference between our carrying out Plan 5 today and three weeks ago.

Mr. McNamara said that the real question was whether we could land forces in Vientiane because of the danger of Chinese air retaliation, local sabotage and the action by PL guerrillas who could move into Vientiane at any time. The Secretary observed that the presence of these guerrillas had been noted for weeks.

General Le May observed that there had been a large build-up of supplies on the Pathet Lao side.

Admiral Burke said that we were faced with the "folding" of the FAL, which was not fighting.

The Secretary asked to what extent we were influenced by the movement of Chinese Communist fighter bombers and pointed out that this capability certainly existed three weeks ago.

General Le May said that these aircraft could always be moved in to scare us off.

The Secretary next asked to what extent the Defense Department had been influenced by the danger of escalation. Had this made any considerable difference? Mr. McNamara replied that it would be easy for the PL or Chinese Communists to prevent successful landings at Vientiane or Seno.

Admiral Burke said that the situation had deteriorated quite a bit but he still thought it possible to go in. War is dangerous, he said. If pushed we could retreat across the river, reinforce from Udorn and go back and fight.

When the Secretary asked whether we could send in troops to secure the airfield, Admiral Burke said that would be a first task. Mr. McNamara said it would be easy for the enemy to deny us the airfield as we would need thirty-six sorties a day to get US troops into Vientiane.

Mr. Bundy said that if we took this action we would be doing something which most countries would not appreciate.

The Attorney General asked where would be the best place to stand and fight in Southeast Asia, where to draw the line. Mr. McNamara said he thought we would take a stand in Thailand and South Viet-Nam. The Attorney General asked whether we would save any of Laos, but the major question was whether we would stand up and fight.

Admiral Burke said that we could hold Tourane, and General Le May observed that we could use our air power back as far as necessary, letting the enemy have all of the countryside but that the PL could be stopped by air power.

Mr. McNamara said that we would have to attack the DRV if we gave up Laos.

The Secretary suggested that the part of Laos from the 17th Parallel across to the Mekong might be easier to hold than the entire country.

General Decker thought that there was no good place to fight in Southeast Asia but we must hold as much as we can of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. At this point the Secretary said that we had missed having government troops who were willing to fight.

Mr. Steeves pointed out that we had always argued that we would not give up Laos and that it was on the pleas of our military that we had supported Phoumi; that we had reiterated in the press and to the public what Laos meant to us. If this problem is unsolvable then the problem of Viet-Nam would be unsolvable. If we decided that this was untenable then we were writing the first chapter in the defeat of Southeast Asia. Mr. McNamara said the situation was not as bad five weeks ago as it was now.

Admiral Burke pointed out that each time you give ground it is harder to stand next time. If we give up Laos we would have to put US forces into Viet-Nam and Thailand. We would have to throw enough in to win--perhaps the "works". It would be easier to hold now than later. The thing to do was to land now and hold as much as we can and make clear that we were not going to be pushed out of Southeast Asia. We were fighting for the rest of Asia.

Mr. McNamara wondered whether more Viet Cong would necessarily enter South Viet-Nam if Laos went down the drain. He mentioned that some 12, 000 Viet Cong had entered South Viet-Nam under present conditions and that the Communists held the area south of the 17th Parallel to a depth of twenty-five miles with a supposedly friendly government in South Viet-Nam. (Several of those present questioned the accuracy of the figure of 12,000.)

Turning to the question of the morale of the Southeast Asians, the Secretary recalled that the Thai Foreign Minister had told him during the recent SEATO conference that Thailand was like a "golden bell" which had to be protected from outside. The Secretary said he was not sure the Foreign Minister was wrong. He added that he was less worried about escalation than he was about infectious slackness. He said he would not give a cent for what the Persians would think of us if we did not defend Laos.

General Decker thought that we should have stood last August and wondered what would happen if we got "licked". The Secretary suggested that Thai and US troops might be placed together in Vientiane and, if they could not hold, be removed by helicopter. Even if they were defeated they would be defeated together and this would be better than sitting back and doing nothing. General Decker said we cannot win a conventional war in Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs. He pointed out that all the advantage we have in heavy equipment would be lost in the difficult terrain of Laos where we would be at the mercy of the guerrillas. The Secretary pointed out that this fact was also true at the time of the Bangkok Resolution/2/ but that we had gone ahead with the resolution anyway and had issued statements indicating that we would back up our words with deeds. Mr. McNamara repeated that the situation is now worse than it was five weeks ago. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the same problems existed in South Viet-Nam, but Admiral Burke thought that South Viet-Nam could be more easily controlled.

/2/The resolution passed at the SEATO Council Meeting at Bangkok; see footnote 4, Document 42.

General Decker then suggested that troops be moved into Thailand and South Viet-Nam to see whether such action would not produce a cease-fire. Admiral Burke asked what happens if there is still no cease-fire. General Decker said then we would be ready to go ahead.

Mr. Kennedy said we would look sillier than we do now if we got troops in there and then backed down. He reiterated the question whether we are ready to go the distance.

The Secretary said that we would want to get the United Nations "mixed up" in this.

Mr. Bohlen said he saw no need for a fixation on the possibility of a reaction by the Chinese Communists. He said we had no evidence that they want to face the brink of nuclear war. He said that he was more concerned about the objectives we would seek if we took military action.

There followed a discussion about the possibility of restoring the kingdom of Champassak where Boun Oum relinquished the throne and where he is popular. It was thought that Sihanouk would support a partition of Laos. General Decker thought that if a cease-fire could be effected now, it would be possible to secure southern Laos.

General Le May did not believe that it would be possible to get a cease-fire without military action. He admitted that he did not know what US policy is in Laos. He knew what the President had said but he also pointed out that the military had been unable to back up the President's statements. He then enumerated a number of possibilities: 1) do nothing and lose Laos; 2) use B-26's and slow up the enemy; 3) use more sophisticated bombers and stop supplies and then perhaps Phoumi's forces could be brought up to where they could fight; 4) implement Plan 5, backing up troops with air. General Le May did not think the Chinese would escalate but believed on the contrary that a cease-fire could then be brought about. He added that he believed we should go to work on China itself and let Chiang take Hainan Island. He thought Chiang had a good air force.

General Shoup suggested that B-26's should be used before troops are landed. He felt that it might then be possible to obtain a cease-fire and get the panhandle of Laos. Mr. Kennedy asked if any appreciable dent could be made on the guerrillas with B-26's. General Le May said it would be possible to knock out a big wad of supplies with B-26's and 100's. Mr. Kennedy asked what would be the next step. The Secretary said it would be necessary to get the UN in quickly. Mr. Kennedy asked what the others would do then. General Le May said the worst that could happen would be that the Chinese Communists would come in. Mr. Kennedy asked if it could all be done by air. General Le May said it could. Mr. McNamara said you would have to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Kennedy asked if South Viet-Nam and Thailand could be held if Laos were lost. The Secretary and Admiral Burke agreed that it would take a greater effort to hold them after Laos had been lost and Mr. Johnson pointed out that Thailand had to be defended from the other bank.

Mr. Steeves felt that the prize to be focused on was Southeast Asia. The question to be faced, he thought, was whether we could afford to lose Southeast Asia.

The Secretary thought if a cease-fire is not brought about quickly, then it would be necessary to get the UN to come in with the SEATO forces committed in a Plan 5 action. He thought that a majority could be found in the UN for such action if the cost is not distributed. Mr. McNamara and Admiral Burke thought that more than two weeks would be required for UN action. Admiral Burke said that only the United States could pull its own chestnuts out of the fire. (There followed a general discussion on the extent to which others would support us. It was agreed that the Pakistani could be relied upon if we paid for them and that a few Malays, New Zealanders and others would help.)

Ambassador Young suggested the possibility of training 50 to 60,000 Vietnamese. He pointed to the ready access to ports in the area of the Lao border and to the fact that the terrain in the area is not too bad.

Mr. Bowles said he thought the main question to be faced was the fact that we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway in 2, 3, 5, or 10 years and that it was just a question of where, when and how. He thought that a major war would be difficult to avoid. General Le May said that, in that case, we should fight soon since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years.

Mr. McNamara said that the situation was worsening by the hour and that if we were going to commit ourselves, then we must do so sooner rather than later.

The Secretary then adjourned the meeting saying he would like to consider the matter further.


68. Editorial Note

On April 29, from 10:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., the National Security Council held its 480th meeting to discuss U.S. policy on Laos and Vietnam. The President presided over the meeting which included 32 people, most of whom attended the previous Council meeting; see Document 63. Secretary of State Dean Rusk attended this meeting. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

According to NSC Action No. 2415, the decisions on Laos taken at the meeting were as follows:

"Discussed the situation with respect to Laos, including the considerations involved in various alternative courses of action.

"Agreed to undertake certain military and diplomatic measures before the next meeting of the National Security Council on Monday, May 1, including consultations on the progress of the cease-fire negotiations, on the International Control Commission, and on possible action in the UN and SEATO." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)


69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/

Washington, April 29, 1961, 6:44 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-2961. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Young, cleared in substance with McConaughy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent niact to Bangkok and Saigon and repeated niact to New Delhi.

1191. Eyes Only for Ambassadors Harriman and Brown.

1. You may explain our following views to King Savang, Prime Minister Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan. You may also wish draw upon Depcirtels 1659/2/ and 1674./3/ President has taken unusual step of sending special Ambassador to confer with King. Will appreciate receiving King's suggestions and guidance on our endeavors to help. Ambassador Brown has kept President informed of difficulties which King has faced over recent trying period. President thus knows of King's personal fortitude and determination to maintain Laos as part of Free World against Communist aggression. President supports King in concept of neutral Laos. King's territory and people must not be embroiled in major conflict. FYI Most important you should stop short of assuring King or Phoumi of US or SEATO intervention in their support unless otherwise informed. End FYI.

/2/In this telegram, April 22, the Department informed relevant posts that it no longer favored an enlarged Lao Government including Souvanna Phouma and had decided to "stand four square behind" the Boun Oum government. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-2261)

/3/In this telegram, April 25, the Department presented preliminary thinking on what it hoped to achieve at a conference on Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-2561)

2. Principal objective your visit to Laos is to convey to RLG our support at this juncture when bloc is stalling on cease-fire while maintaining military, psychological and diplomatic pressure. We are watching situation closely. We wish to encourage Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government to maintain a firm position from which to negotiate in an international conference, or, if necessary, to provide a basis for further military action.

3. Specifically if conference is held we want to keep the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government intact until it is clear whether or not a properly safeguarded Laos can emerge from the conference. Meanwhile, we want to prevent the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government from compromising itself by a deal with Souvanna Phouma and/or others less determined to prevent a Communist takeover. In particular, we feel the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government should enter Geneva Conference intact, without any change in present anti-Communist coloration.

4. We want to guard against Communist efforts to draw RLG into discussions of political matters, or even of substantive military matters, during cease-fire talks. In these talks the RLG should confine itself exclusively to technical aspects of the cease-fire.

5. RLG will undoubtedly raise issue resumption political discussions with Souvanna. We believe any such talks should take place only after cease-fire has become effective and should be carefully limited following two purposes: First, to put RLG in posture earnestly seeking reasonable solution; second, to keep door open if at any point Souvanna should be persuaded move away from present close affiliation with Communists. Under no circumstances should discussions be permitted lead to any type coalition government since RLG position at any Conference would be irrevocably weakened thereby.

6. We are supporting negotiations for a genuine cease-fire in hope that international agreement might be reached to assure integrity of Laos. We are also exploring possible action in UN Security Council to bring about cessation of hostilities./4/

/4/ A record of Harriman's and Brown's discussion with Phoumi and Boum Oum in Luang Prabang on April 30 is in a memorandum of conversation of that same date. (Ibid., 751J.00/4-3061)

Rusk


70. Memorandum From the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff (Breitweiser) to the President's Military Aide (Clifton)/1/

Washington, May 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), April-May 1961. Secret.

SUBJECT
Comparative Forces in Laos

1. The following strength figures are supplied in accord with your request of this date to the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

2. Communist over-all military strength in Laos, to include the Pathet Lao, Kong Le forces, and North Vietnamese support and advisory personnel, is estimated to total 16,500 men. Approximately 4,000 of these are under the control of the Lao Army defector Kong Le, 1,200 to 1,500 are North Vietnamese support and advisory personnel, and the remainder are operating under the direct control of the Lao Communist party. All are responsive to a general headquarters located at Xieng Khouang in the Plaine des Jarres.

3. In addition to the numbers quoted in the paragraph above, we have numerous reports from Lao Army sources of the current employment of North Vietnamese units in Laos, for protection of lines of communication, logistic support, and for operation in the Tchepone area of East Central Laos. While we believe these units, estimated to include 2,625 North Vietnamese personnel, are there, we do not have sufficient information to warrant their acceptance at this time.

4. The Boun Oum government military forces total 58,287, divided into a 38,487-man regular force, a 13,800-man volunteer (auto-defense) force, and a 6,000-man Meo force which is organized for guerrilla type operation behind Communist lines. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] There are approximately 350 U.S. personnel in Laos assigned for duty with the Chief, MAAG, Laos.

Robert A. Breitweiser/2/
Major General, USAF

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


71. Editorial Note

Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman made a tour of Southeast Asian nations to obtain an assessment of the situation and to offer support to U.S. allies during the crucial period before implementation of the cease-fire. On April 29, he met with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. An account of their discussion is in telegram 1946 from Bangkok, April 29. (Department of State Central Files, 751J.00/4-2961) Harriman left that evening for Vientiane and proceeded to Luang Prabang, arriving at noon on April 30. There he met with King Savang, Prince Sihanouk (who was using the state funeral in Luang Prabang as an occasion to try to reconcile differences between the Lao factions), Phoumi Nosavan, and Boun Oum. The Department sent Harriman instructions for his discussions with Savang, Phoumi, and Boun Oum in telegram 1191 to Vientiane, April 29. (Ibid.) Harriman's discussions with Phoumi and Boun Oum, with Savang, and with Sihanouk are in memoranda of conversation, April 30, and telegram 1998 from Vientiane, May 2, respectively. (All ibid., 751J.00/4-3061 and 751J.00/5-261) Harriman also summarized his conversations with the anti-Communist Lao for the President and Secretary Rusk in Document 74.

On May 2, Harriman accompanied by Ambassador Durbrow and joined by General Lyman Lemnitzer, who was also in Southeast Asia following the CENTO Council Meeting at Ankara, April 27-28, met with President Diem to discuss both the South Vietnamese and Laos situations. Accounts of these discussions are in telegrams 1659 and 1673 from Saigon, May 3 and 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-361 and 751J.00/5-461)

On May 3, Harriman returned to Phnom Penh and had a 50-minute interview with Sihanouk in the early evening of that day. Harriman's instructions are in telegram 976 to Phnom Penh, May 1, and an account of that meeting is in telegram 1368 from Phnom Penh, May 4. (Both ibid., 751J.00/5-961 and 751J.00/5-461) Harriman had expected to meet with Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh, but Souvanna sent a telegram explaining that he was delayed by a storm in Phong Saly. Since Harriman was scheduled to meet with Thai Prime Minister Thanarat Sarit the next day, he told Sihanouk he could not wait for Souvanna. Harriman's discussion with Sarit is reported in telegram 1979 from Bangkok, May 5. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-561) Harriman left Thailand for India where on May 5 he discussed Laos with Indian Prime Minister Nehru and then he returned to Washington. The Nehru-Harriman discussion is in a memorandum of conversation, May 5. (Ibid.)


72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 1, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/2/61-5/8/61. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson on April 30 and discussed and revised at a White House meeting on the night of April 30. The April 30 draft text is in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-3061.

SUBJECT
Laos

This memorandum deals with two alternative situations in Laos--Track No. 1, the possibilities of an early and effective cease-fire, and Track No. 2, courses of action if a cease-fire is not achieved in the next few days.

Track No. 1