Docs 39-58
March-May 1961:
Consideration of Military Intervention or Negotiated Settlement
39. Editorial Note
On March 23, President Kennedy appeared on nationwide television to read a statement on Laos at the beginning of a news conference. Behind the President were three maps indicating the extent of Pathet Lao domination as of August 1960, December 1960, and March 1961. The President stated that the United States "strongly and unreservedly" supported "the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination." Such a goal was, Kennedy continued, frustrated by "armed attacks by externally supported Communists," which if they did not cease, would force the United States and SEATO allies "to consider their response." The President stated the United States favored "constructive negotiation" and supported the British call for a cease-fire and convocation of an international conference on Laos. For Kennedy's statement and the full text of the news conference, which contained questions and answers relating to Laos, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 212-220. The text of the British aide-memoire to the Soviet Union, March 23, 1961, proposing an immediate cease-fire, verification by the International Control Commission, and an international conference upon that verification, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 994-995.
40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, March 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/7/61-4/10/61. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler.
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
In accordance with arrangements made from Key West, Ambassador Alphand met the President at the airport at Andrews Air Force Base on his arrival at 10:33 p.m. to deliver a reply to the President's letter of March 25./2/ After the President had read the letter in/3/ the car he said that he agreed that the three powers--the United States, the United Kingdom and France--should concert their approaches to the Soviet Union remarking that he thought the recent British approach to Moscow on Laos/4/ represented the agreed views of all three. Referring to his visit tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko he said that, while he realized that there were differences of opinion among us as to what we should do in case we fail to bring the Russians around, he felt it important that no differences appear between us during the SEATO meeting in Bangkok. There we should all evidence a common resolve.
/2/The Department of State sent a telegram to Paris that contained a text of a message from Kennedy to French President Charles de Gaulle. Kennedy noted that the United States had been trying to do all in its power to find a peaceful solution, but if these efforts were unavailing, he was sure that de Gaulle would agree that "the West cannot allow Laos to go Communist." Kennedy asked that France maintain a united front with the United States at the SEATO Council Meeting in Bangkok, March 26-29. Kennedy informed de Gaulle that he was taking advantage of Macmillan's West Indies visit to meet with him at Key West on March 26 and that he was meeting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 27. Kennedy asked for de Gaulle's views at the earliest possible time. (Telegram 3950 to Paris, March 25; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2561)
/3/The unofficial translation of this March 26 letter is in Tosec 27 to Bangkok, March 27. While de Gaulle agreed that Laos should not fall to the Communist camp, he stated, inter alia, that as for "using of SEATO as a possible cover for direct Western intervention in Laos, I must tell you that France, for its part, is not at present prepared to do it." (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2761)
/4/See Document 39.
Ambassador Alphand replied that there was no doubt but that our resolve was the same. He said that there were some differences with respect to the order of the steps to be taken in seeking a solution to the Laos crisis. The United States wanted first a cease-fire, then a meeting of the ICC and then a conference with the 14. The French differed with respect to the order of these events (i.e., apparently would accept ICC before cease-fire). However, even in this respect the French had accepted the President's position that there should not be a conference prior to a cessation of hostilities. The President commented that if the Soviets clearly indicated that an ICC meeting would bring about prompt arrangements for a cease-fire this might be acceptable. However, the President emphasized that he did not see how the Soviets could be persuaded to agree to a cease-fire without the presence of some threat. Ambassador Alphand replied that basically the French thought that there was no military solution that could be found in the Laos situation. There was simply no front that could be established--though he agreed to the President's interjected observation that there was a river line. However, he continued, there was not even a Dien Bien Phu as a strong point, though God forbid that it should ever come to that! Another difference, Ambassador Alphand pointed out, was that the French were not willing to use SEATO.
The President said that even if there were a negative reply from the Russians it should be realized that a SEATO action would not necessarily be imminent. However, it was essential that we consult. Even more important, he was concerned that we should not show differences of opinion at the SEATO meeting with respect to possible future contingencies.
In reply to a question from Alphand the President said that if the Russian reply, perhaps from Gromyko tomorrow, were satisfactory the whole thing would be over. We should agree that, if the reply were not satisfactory, we would not permit Laos to be dominated or taken by the Communists through military means. However, he repeated he wanted to stress that there should be no obvious division among us and he personally hoped that no military action would become necessary. The difficulties would be aggravated if there were no definite Russian reply tomorrow, and the situation were just allowed to drag out.
Ambassador Alphand said he thought the French could simply be silent except as to basic purposes and the firmness of their resolve. In reply to a question from Alphand the President spoke to him briefly of his talks with General Trapnell and of the need to go ahead with the paramilitary measures. Ambassador Alphand commented that the fact that the de Gaulle letter reserves the French position with respect to SEATO and military action did not mean that they would not consider the possibilities under suitable circumstances. The President then asked what France would actually do if the situation collapses. Ambassador Alphand replied that he did not know. He asked in turn what the United States military thought about the possibilities. The President said they thought there were real possibilities of demonstrating strength. Perhaps the possibility of action on our part was a matter of concern to the other side. Maybe they do not want us to come in.
Ambassador Alphand repeated that the French note did not say they would not consider these matters. However, they now considered the Laos question as political and reserved their position as to SEATO and military action. He also pointed out the strong French backing for Souvanna voiced in the note. In reply to a question from the President the Ambassador said that the Pathet Lao was not a large force--there were about 9,000 of them--but they were fighting much better than the FAL even though they were unpaid. Consequently it was clear that the solution must be political. The President repeated that he did not see how negotiations could be successful unless there was some firm military posture on our side to which the Ambassador responded he realized it was a question of "the arrows and the olive branch". The President stressed again that what we want now is that there should be no division at SEATO. Despite the French reserves there should be a firm and united front. All three powers should agree at SEATO that they should not accept a Communist conquest of Laos.
Ambassador Alphand then turned to the subject of the Macmillan talks and in reply to his question the President gave him a brief resume of the essential points as recorded elsewhere. He stressed that the British were in agreement at least that a bridgehead should be held in Laos if the situation deteriorated.
Ambassador Alphand said that he would immediately cable a full report to General de Gaulle regarding the conversation and the President's observations including the President's stress that we should "paper over the cracks" at Bangkok. The President said we would be in touch with the Ambassador further tomorrow afternoon after his conversation with Gromyko.
41. Memorandum of Conversation
Key West, Florida, March 26, 1961.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2661. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]
42. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, March 27, 1961, 2 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2761. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Rusk was in Bangkok for the seventh meeting of the SEATO Council, March 26-29.
Secto 9. Eyes Only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Having talked with Brown, Felt, Trapnell and others here about situation Laos, I don't believe major UN effort such as you suggest is called for at this stage./2/ Sudden shifting of gears could create considerable confusion especially among SEATO allies. Believe our first step should be obtain maximum solidarity SEATO for taking most serious view Laos and agreeing to act jointly if necessary. Eight nations acting together would be in much stronger position in UN. If Soviets refuse British proposal or delay reply and allow offensive to resume, some action on ground would be necessary while UN is deciding what it will do. Your timing also out of step with Deptel 1489 to Bangkok. Strongly urge President not present matter to UN on Thursday/3/ since events may make it appear much ado about nothing.
/2/In Tosec 12 to Bangkok, March 25, Acting Secretary Bowles sent Rusk an outline of his views on strategy. Bowles saw the principal danger as a Chinese Communist takeover in Laos and a general Chinese threat to Southeast Asia. Bowles opposed both U.S. and SEATO military action in Laos because he believed it would be countered by a challenge from North Vietnam, unless the Soviet Union vetoed it. If the North Vietnamese did not react, Bowles believed the Chinese would. Bowles suggested as an interim step before "Millpond" action and then military intervention, the United States should take the Laos problem to the U.N. Security Council, or if the Soviets vetoed it there, to the General Assembly. As a means of encouraging U.N. solution to the Laos problem, Bowles suggested the United States accept a government under Souvanna which would include some Pathet Lao or partition of the two northern provinces. (Ibid., 751J.00/3-2561)
/3/March 30.
After further consultations here will submit Monday our thoughts SEATO resolution/4/ with which we might reaffirm SEATO in direct relation to Laos and prepare way for prompt SEATO action when necessary. Believe everyone but French would go along with agreeable resolution. Whether French will eventually come along rather than be isolated is highly speculative. Couve de Murville was entirely negative any SEATO involvement during our first talk; indeed, entirely negative any French involvement.
/4/For text as approved, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 940-941.
There is a great deal which can be done in Laos without serious risk of drawing Chinese into major effort, even within ground rules already set by actions other side in support Pathet Lao.
Preparatory planning presentation case to UN all to the good but would strongly urge no action this direction for present.
Rusk
43. Telegram From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, at Bangkok/1/
Washington, March 27, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3-2761. Secret. A marginal note by McGeorge Bundy indicates this telegram was approved by the President. It was sent via non-Department of State channels. No time of transmission appears on the source text.
We have your Secto 21./2/ Macmillan paper seems to me a real gain over earlier Macmillan letter,/3/ but it is not an agreed paper. In particular we did not agree on any definite form of military consultation with the British on SEATO matters, although we agreed that closer relations in this field would be helpful. Returning with Caccia there was informal discussion of the danger of bilateral appearances in Far East, and advisability of holding bilateral discussions in Washington if at all. This seemed to us a matter for further discussion next week. Macmillan para. D does not imply that we agreed to a British veto over our action, but is rather a statement of agreed conditions for British active participation.
/2/In Secto 21, March 27, Rusk reported that the SEATO conference was entering a critical phase, but delegations were confused by events happening elsewhere. Rusk asked for information and texts if possible on any Soviet reply to the British note of March 23 (see Document 39); on whether the President agreed to Macmillan's paper; on Gromyko's talk with the President; and on the Department's view on the nature of the SEATO resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/3-2761)
/3/See footnote 2, Document 42.
In meeting with Gromyko this morning, he took initiative in raising Laos and made orally what was obviously an instruction from Khrushchev. Gromyko said that they were studying British proposal but found in it a basis for pacific settlement acceptable to both sides. He emphasized several times the importance of exercise of restraint in order to avoid exacerbation of situation with consequent danger of spreading of conflict. In reply to specific question, Gromyko categorically said that this suggestion of restraint applied to both the Soviet Union and the U. S. He indicated that there would be a Soviet reply before the end of the week. I stressed the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities, and I reiterated that as a power whose interests and prestige were at stake, we could not remain inactive if the threat of a military take-over continues. We will have to await actual reply before judgment, but Gromyko's presentation was a serious one and devoid of the deliberate evasion Bohlen tells me Gromyko used in talking with you.
In my opinion, the SEATO resolution should be strong enough to hold SEATO together but not so strong as to seem to challenge the Soviets immediately after my conversation with Gromyko.
Following is the text which seems from here to meet the circumstances, subject to your judgment on the spot. We are guided in part by the very strong language of your first rough draft reported in Secto 16,/4/ because if others have seen it any sharp departure may give trouble in Bangkok. The first paragraph of rough draft seems satisfactory. Then we would continue: "The SEATO Council declares the firm resolve of member countries of SEATO not to acquiesce in any takeover of Laos by an armed minority supported from outside. The Council notes with approval the present efforts for a cessation of hostilities to be followed by peaceful negotiations, and it believes that this proposal offers a sound basis for progress toward a neutral and independent Laos. But if these efforts fail and there continues to be an active military attempt to conquer Laos, members of SEATO will be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances.
/4/The first paragraph in the draft in Secto 16, March 27, reads: "Consulting together in accordance with the obligation of article IV (2) of the Manila Pact, SEATO Council has noted with grave concern the continued offensive of rebel elements in Laos who are continuing to be supplied and assisted by Communist Powers in flagrant disregard of the Geneva Agreements." (Department of State, Central Files, 379/3-2761)
Article II of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954, reads as follows:
"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." (American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, p. 913)
"Finally the Council of Ministers records its view that the Council Representatives should continue to keep developments in Laos under urgent and constant review in the light of this Resolution so that their Governments may be fully apprised of the requirements of the situation."
I think it important for you to assure the Far Eastern members of SEATO that our efforts here have been directed toward strengthening the resolve of our Atlantic allies in regard to Laos. I think it is most important that they should understand that this country's determination remains clear not only toward Laos but toward Southeast Asia as well. I think it would be most helpful for you to reaffirm to Sarit our clear commitment to support Thailand in particular. You may also wish to indicate to all delegates that in our judgment the serious and businesslike tone of Gromyko's presentation this morning reflects Soviet understanding of our own strong and carefully stated position, although of course we cannot be sure until we have the definite Soviet answer to the British./5/
/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
44. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, March 30, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379.00/3-2961. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Canberra, Wellington, Manila, Karachi, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
Secto 29. Immediately on adjournment of conference, here is my estimate of this session of SEATO./2/
/2/Additional documentation on the SEATO conference is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIII.
Given low ebb of SEATO unity as backdrop on entering this conference, I feel we have achieved results beyond expectations.
In pre-conference discussions with Phils, Thais, Paks and Australia, a feeling of suspicion existed concerning SEATO and its usefulness with particular apprehension with respect to the formula presented in the British note to the Soviets. So far as French and British were concerned, fear of unacceptable SEATO commitments very apparent, with French attitude approaching apathy and irresponsibility. Series of bilateral and trilateral conferences and constructive discussion in the sessions have, from all indications, succeeded in resuscitating SEATO. Seriousness of the problem at hand has provided basis for realistic exchange of views which have been forthrightly expressed, but, happily, void of vituperation or blame.
This conference has been strikingly void of stereotyped presentations and ministers have addressed themselves with considerable conviction to the tasks at hand.
I believe the passage of the resolution/3/ is the focal point of the conference. In retrospect it may well be referred to as "Bangkok Resolution." Significance of this resolution is that it has been vehicle for reconsideration and reiteration of the purposes of SEATO. At this critical juncture, it provided a necessary opportunity for members of this organization to reassess obligations and commit themselves to its solemn purposes. It has had the effect of breathing new life into this Alliance.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 42.
Samplings of opinion throughout the delegation, in addition to the final statements today, are convincing evidence that it has removed much of the uncertainty from the minds of doubting members such as the Phils and Thais. They have expressed great satisfaction with the results of the conference and there is every indication that they now do not feel abandoned. What is more important, they seem to have a new sense of confidence in SEATO as a result of these consultations. It has been an important step in erasing from their minds the fear that their fate in this part of Asia was being settled by agreement between powers far beyond their reach.
A senior Phil Delegate told US Delegate member that he has attended every SEATO conference since the beginning and that this has been the most profitable of them all.
Although the conference has accomplished much at a very critical period in re-establishing unity in SEATO and has given a renewed sense of individual and collective responsibility, it, of course, is only a beginning in the longer and much more difficult processes of keeping SEATO alive, unified and alert to its continued responsibilities.
Rusk
45. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, March 31, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Laos, No. 1. Secret.
SUBJECT
State-JCS Meeting 1130, 31 March
1. The following points were made during the discussion on Laos:
a. Mr. Parsons stated
(1) Mr. Rusk considered the SEATO Conference to have been more successful than was anticipated but that it represented only a beginning in our effort to hold SEATO together.
(2) In an interview with a Polish journalist Prince Sovannovong [Souphanouvong] (The Red Prince) explicitly admitted, for the first time, that he is a Communist.
(3) State Department is studying the proposal by former Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone that the King assume the premiership and form a more broadly based government.
(4) The lack of Soviet response to the British proposal may be due to pressure from Communist China.
b. Admiral Burke inquired as to the U.S. position re the composition of a new government. Mr. Parsons replied that we would oppose a tripartite government or conference based on a Souvanna-Pathet Lao-Phoumi basis because this would be a two out of three basis for the leftists; however, he indicated that we would probably be willing to include one or two Communist members in minor Cabinet posts in a Lao Government.
c. General Lemnitzer pointed out that we must avoid an International Control Commission like the one in Viet Nam which will not even look into the Russian airlift, and that we must not cease our support to the RLG because the Laos border with North Viet Nam probably cannot be effectively policed. Mr. Bowles agreed that we must be tough on this. General Lemnitzer indicated his belief that the Communists would press their attacks between now and the convening of a conference.
d. Mr. Rostow asked if the use of the B-26's would be our best reply to Communist pressure. General Lemnitzer answered affirmatively and said eight were ready now and that 16 would be ready by 6 April.
e. General Lemnitzer asked if we were doing all we could for Major Bailey./2/ Mr. Parsons replied that efforts were being made through the British, the French and the International Red Cross. He said he was willing to receive any suggestions for additional actions.
/2/On March 23, a U.S. Air Attache plane overflying the Plaine des Jarres en route from Vientiane to Saigon was shot down by anti-aircraft fire of Pathet Lao troops. The plane crashed and burst into flames. Two men were seen to have parachuted from the aircraft, one of whom, Major L.B. Bailey, Assistant U.S. Army Attache, Laos, was taken alive by the Pathet Lao. Bailey held a diplomatic passport and was accredited to the Royal Lao Government. According to a memorandum to McNamara from Lemnitzer, March 25 (CM-156-61), the plane was engaged in a reconnaissance mission with the permission of the Royal Lao Government, a procedure which appeared to be fully "legal" under international law. Lemnitzer recommended a protest to Moscow, and perhaps also Hanoi and Beijing. (Ibid., OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, 381 Laos (Sensitive), Jan.-Mar 61)
f. It was agreed that there were no strings on the use of the helicopters at Udorn.
2. The following points were covered during the discussion of Iran:
[Here follows an account of State-JCS discussion on Iran.]
Haydn Williams/3/
/3/Signed for Williams by Colonel W.S. McCrea.
46. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, April 1, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-161. Confidential; Priority.
2354. Eyes Only Secretary. Khrushchev called me in at 11 a.m. and gave me copy of aide-memoire on Laos which they had given British this morning./2/ Kuznetsov and Dobrynin were present and I said my government would of course wish study it carefully but it seemed to me that though there were some statements in it with which we could not agree it seemed in general a positive reply. I said I thought it important everything be done to remove suspicion of both sides that negotiations might be used as cover for trying improve position on ground. I inquired if he did not think it would be useful for Souvanna return home promptly. Khrushchev said he agreed and in his opinion Souvanna should never have left. When his country on fire, scarcely time travel around world. He said he did not know when Souvanna planned come Moscow. I said I had heard he expected leave France about 12th. Khrushchev said he understood Souvanna was going visit Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He said he thought it might be awkward for him give Souvanna advice as he might question why this being done, but he fully agreed he should return promptly.
/2/Text of the Soviet Union's aide-memoire is printed in full in Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, pp. 545-546, and in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 998-999.
He said that for personal reasons as well he wanted get away from Moscow and was now awaiting visit Afghan PM and did not wish be obliged await Souvanna's visit.
He thought if we were both honest and sincere in wanting neutral and independent Laos we could overcome difficulties and arrive at solution.
I am meeting British Ambassador at 6 p.m. to compare notes./3/ Balance of conversation, which lasted one and a half hours, and text aide-memoire in septels./4/
/3/In telegram 2366 from Moscow, April 1, Thompson briefly reported his and British Ambassador Roberts' impressions of their conversations with Khrushchev. Both Ambassadors believed that the Soviet Union did not want the conference indefinitely postponed. Except for an assurance that the cease-fire should precede the conference, they recommended not to "quibble over the fine points." (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-161)
/4/The text of the aide-memoire is also in telegram 2358 from Moscow, April 1, and the report of the additional conversation with Khrushchev, which did not relate to Laos, is in telegram 2362 from Laos, April 1; neither printed. (Ibid.)
Thompson
47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/2/61-4/20/61. Secret. Sent under cover of a handwritten memorandum by Bundy which reads as follows: "Although dated in one or two places by Soviet answer [see footnote 2, Document 46], this look at the next steps in Laos may be useful to you. It comes from Sam Belk in my office, with revisions by Walt [Rostow] and me. It may ask for more than we can get--but not for more than we need--which of course is exactly the trouble with Laos."
SUBJECT
Forward Thinking on Laos
This memorandum sets aside the question of whether, when, and how we react to the reported resumption of the enemy offensive and to the Soviet reply to the British. It isolates some of the key issues in the probable diplomacy beyond, which may arise in the Macmillan discussions./2/
/2/During Macmillan's visit to Washington, April 4-9.
1. The nature of the Lao Government.
The United States and SEATO nations in Asia favor the continuation of the Boun Oum Government or a government of different personnel and similar anti-Communist point of view. The Soviets continue to regard the Souvanna Phouma Government as the legal government and are generally supported in this preference by such Western powers as the UK and France. Consequently, some formula must be found for broadening the government without creating a government sympathetic to or subject to the USSR. Souvanna Phouma is persistently put forward as the only neutral leader in the situation. However, the Lao King and Thai and Vietnamese officials friendly to the U.S. distrust Souvanna Phouma, believing that at best he is weak and at the worst he may be a tool of the Communists.
The only Lao who might head the government during the period of negotiations is King Svang himself. The King is not a brilliant man but he understands his own people and the leading Lao personalities. The King has the prestige of being father to his people and of having in his possession in his royal palace the palatine of the nation, the solid gold image of Luang Prabang, after whom the capital is named. The King and the Lao people in general credit this sacred image as being the principal defender of the nation and of being responsible for the mysterious withdrawal of Viet Minh troops in 1957 from the Plain of Jarres.
The King, as prime minister as well as monarch, would presumably be objected to by Moscow because that situation would end their claim to be supporting a legal government, but, if done as a fait accompli, they might find it hard to make it a sticking point. However, the King would need to have as representative a cabinet as possible. Presumably Souvanna Phouma should be included in the cabinet, without portfolio, to satisfy the Communists. We should try to include Phoui Sananikone. General Phoumi and the other members of the present cabinet should be continued in their present positions, with the exception of Boun Oum who might be made Deputy Prime Minister without portfolio, or otherwise dealt with. This would dispose of him without denigrating him. If the Communists insisted on some other representation beyond Souvanna Phouma, then Captain Kong Le, and possibly Souvanna Phouma's half-brother, the Communist, Souphanouvong might be included as members of the cabinet without portfolio.
2. What should be the role of the International Control Commission?
The ICC consists of the representatives of three nations--India, Poland and Canada--who were commissioned by the Geneva Conference powers in 1954 to supervise the implementation of the Geneva agreements. The principal role of the ICC would be to observe the effectiveness of the cease-fire and to determine what infringements, if any, occurred during and presumably after the period of negotiation. The Indians can be expected to play a stronger role than they have played in the past because of India's growing realization of the threat to India of hostilities in Southeast Asia between the Communist and Free Worlds. A crucial point--on which we shall have to stick--is an enlargement in the surveillance powers of the ICC. The control of the Viet-minh border will be difficult enough; but impossible unless the ICC is permitted to get out of the headquarters towns.
3. The ICC can be effective only with respect to overt action. Although helicopters could improve the effectiveness of the ICC in covering all parts of the country, it should not be expected to be able to retard the continued infiltration and indoctrination of Communist elements in Lao villages throughout Laos. Consequently, while the ICC may report that no overt action of an aggressive nature is taking place, the Communists might be consolidating their control over all of Laos.
4. There is little likelihood that the ICC could be expanded to include representation from other nations unless the Geneva Conference were reconvened. On the other hand, the Indians, Poles and Canadians might be persuaded to increase their representation numerically to provide the maximum observation possible in outlying areas. The Indians particularly might be able to provide personnel who would be able to live at the village level and to observe any continuing Communist efforts to obtain control of Lao communities by infiltration and subversion.
5. How neutral could a neutral Laos become?
Effective neutrality in Laos must consist in a policy of positively avoiding involvement with either side. Neutrality in the sense of permitting both sides to infiltrate and jockey for external influence would yield a situation as unstable as Czechoslovakia in 1946-47 not an Austrian neutrality. The emphasis, therefore, should be on an actively "unaligned" Laos. If this is impossible, then the Asian members of SEATO, including Cambodia, would probably prefer a divided Laos with the southern half definitely non-Communist.
6. How much of Laos should we attempt to salvage by negotiation?
The ambiguity about neutrality vs. non-alignment may lead to a hard decision as to whether, in the end, we should consider negotiating a fall-back position of a divided Laos. In a divided Laos the Communists would presumably be regrouped in the northern part and the non-Communists in the southern.
7. An essential consideration here is the point of view of the Lao people and of the King. In all probability the King will refuse to leave Luang Prabang and the sacred palatine, the Prabang image. It is inconceivable that the King would be willing to remove himself and the sacred image to the south. The image has left Laos only once in its modern history when it was captured by General Chapri [Chakira] in 1778 who became the first monarch in the present Chapri Dynasty in 1781. The Prabang brought such bad luck to the Thai that a later Chapri monarch sent the image back to Laos in care of a Lao prince. We should, therefore, attempt to exclude from the negotiations any idea of a divided Laos, beyond the two northeastern provinces which have been under Communist control since 1954 and are somewhat like the loss of a limb.
8. When should an election be held?
Under present conditions an election would put the Communists in substantial political control of the government because they have effective control in many villages. Consequently, all steps should be taken to avoid an early election. We should insist that an election must follow pacification, a solid diplomatic agreement, and the creation of a situation where political choices can be offered the people within an international framework guaranteeing neutrality and independence.
9. What should we do if the Communists continue to improve their position?
The monsoon rains began prematurely in March and unless there is an unforeseeable cessation and a dry spell, the terrain in Laos will become so saturated by the third week in April that further movements of substantial equipment will become extremely difficult. It is probable, therefore, that any stalling by the Communists will not be carried beyond the middle of April and certainly not later than the end of April. They will have accomplished all they can by major military action.
10. The Communists will probably use the monsoon season to consolidate their positions politically in the villages. This will give them until late October or November to achieve virtual political control of Laos in the villages under their influence. Although monsoon travel is difficult it is not impossible for small teams engaged in minor guerrilla operations or subversion. Lao personnel who are anti-Communist should be trained to counter such small-scale Communist operations during the monsoon period. Our PEO [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activities should continue full tilt.
11. In view of French reluctance to support a strong SEATO resolution and to provide military support to a SEATO operation, French participation should be limited to the negotiations unless there is a marked change of heart. Including France in the negotiations and consulting President de Gaulle fully with respect to the negotiations will probably improve our relations with France and satisfy President de Gaulle.
Additional Comments:
1. Under existing circumstances it is inconceivable that the USSR will refuse to negotiate or at least to talk with the U.S., or at the UN, about the Lao situation. The Soviets could possibly use the device of continuing negotiations throughout the rainy season in order to obtain their objectives, blaming the U.S. "imperialists" for any continuing disturbances in Laos.
2. The Soviet Union in agreeing to negotiation believes that it can secure eventually what it is taking rapidly by military action. Consequently, we should consider immediately what encouragement and hard assistance might be given to Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam to strengthen their position with respect to a "neutral" Laos which will provide a bridge to their borders for Communist subversion and guerrilla operations. A "neutral" Laos may prove to be fatal very soon for South Vietnam which is already in serious trouble.
3. The Soviet Union might agree to negotiate while disclaiming any control over "Lao patriots" engaged in military action. This would face the SEATO nations with a dilemma especially if the "Lao patriots" held their guerrilla or military action at a low enough key to continue to take Laos while not being provocative enough to warrant intervention by SEATO or the U.S.
4. We should not consider taking any UN action unless the recent scale of military action is continued or enlarged and we and the SEATO nations concert in undertaking counter action. However, it would be useful to have in being various kinds of draft resolutions for use in the UN Security Council or General Assembly if we should find it necessary to act suddenly. Any UN action of this sort should follow and not precede SEATO action in order to avoid Soviet efforts to prevent SEATO action.
5. The impact of what happens in Laos over coming months on the rest of Southeast Asia depends--above all--on the success or failure of the counter-insurgency effort in Viet-nam. If we succeed in Viet-nam the erosion in Laos might, in time, be sealed off; if we fail in Viet-nam, our arrangements in Laos will surely collapse as well as our position in Thailand and the rest of southeast Asia.
48. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 6, 1961, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833, Macmillan Visit, April 4-9, 1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting took place aboard the Honey-Fitz.
SUBJECT
East-West Issues: Laos
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Mr. John M. Steeves
Mr. William C. Burdett
United Kingdom
The Prime Minister
Lord Home
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
Ambassador Caccia
The Honorable P. E. Ramsbotham
Mr. John Russell
Mr. Philip de Zulueta
The President asked whether we could assume that we would receive a Russian response on Laos within a week which would be reasonably satisfactory./2/ Lord Home replied he hoped so but the press reported that Khrushchev had now gone off again. He added that perhaps it would be desirable to get our Ambassadors in Vientiane stoking up to form a national government.
/2/The President was referring to a response from Moscow to a British demarche to the Soviet Union's aide-memoire of April 1. On the evening of April 4, the British Foreign Office instructed Ambassador Roberts to make clear to the Soviets that while the United States and United Kingdom had agreed to go ahead with simultaneous arrangements for a cease-fire, return of the ICC, and the conference, the latter could not be held until the cease-fire was effective. Roberts was also to make representations about venue, level of representation, and date. (Circular telegram 1521, April 5; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/4-561)
The Secretary asked whether the United Kingdom was doing everything it could to get Souvanna Phouma home. Lord Home replied the United Kingdom was trying. The Secretary pointed out that if Souvanna continues to act as he has been doing and visits Moscow and Peking, then it would be difficult for the President to go along with him. Souvanna must establish his claim to being a neutral. Lord Home thought that Souvanna was afraid that if he went home he would be entangled in talks. He wanted to wait for the King to take the initiative. The Prime Minister asked if the King summoned Souvanna home would he go.
Mr. Steeves expressed the view that unless Souvanna went home under some sort of curb by the King he was likely to go home and choose a completely Communist group to form a government. Thus it was necessary not only to get him home but to get him home under enough wraps. The President inquired whether Souvanna as Prime Minister would have the right to pick his government or would this be done by Parliament. Mr. Steeves replied that Souvanna would have wide rights. The President said he assumed the King would not ask Souvanna to form a government unless he had a prior understanding with him. Mr. Steeves thought that Souvanna did not want to go back until he had acquired such prestige that he could do as he liked. If Souvanna formed a Communist-dominated government our position at the conference table would be utterly undercut.
Lord Home reported Souvanna had told him he envisaged a government with two or three Pathet Lao, three or four followers of Phoumi and in the middle a lot of people who would dominate the government. Mr. Steeves cautioned against giving Souvanna's ideas weight when he spoke of neutrality. He urged that the United States and the United Kingdom agree to bring some pressure on the King to act in getting a really neutral government with Souvanna in it.
The Secretary suggested a message to the King urging him to get Souvanna back. The Prime Minister cautioned that the King should not be placed in the position of bringing Souvanna back as Prime Minister. Perhaps the King could say to Souvanna, come back and consult with me.
The President inquired why it was important to have Souvanna back now. Mr. Steeves pointed to the advantages of having a Lao government which could sit at the international conference. The Prime Minister observed that if we could not get a decent government it was better to have none. Lord Home thought it would be possible to have a conference with Lao observers.
Mr. Steeves suggested the King might issue a general call to all men of good will. The President wondered whether there was any chance that Souvanna would go back if he were not offered the Prime Ministership. He knew the British and French were sympathetic to him and he could certainly count on Communist support. Mr. Steeves advocated letting Souvanna prove himself at the polls. Lord Home maintained that Souvanna was the only person who could command a sizeable majority in the country. We must not kid ourselves. We would get a messy government at best. However, a messy government plus an international mechanism to stop the imports of arms might get us by for a few years. Mr. Steeves observed Lord Home might be overestimating Souvanna's strength outside Vientiane.
Lord Home said the United Kingdom would certainly join with the United States in trying to get Souvanna back. The President asked if Lord Home was convinced of Souvanna's desire to keep the Pathet Lao from becoming dominant. Lord Home replied that Souvanna claims he wants to peel the other Lao away from the hard core Communist. He personally could not tell about Souvanna's sincerity. People who knew him said he was sincere.
The President inquired whether we had asked Souvanna to come here. Lord Home said he had sent a message putting to Souvanna the idea that if he wanted to come to Washington as a private citizen he (Lord Home) believed Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him. All Souvanna replied was that he wanted to complete his tour.
The President asked whether we should indicate opposition to Souvanna if he came to power in a way rather indifferent to our efforts, that is, if he went to Moscow and Peking. If we did so, we would not be in a good position to use our influence with him. We should not look like we are eager to see him. Lord Home said he would send another telegram pointing out that Laos depended largely on United States assist-ance, thus it would be very foolish for Souvanna not to come to America. The President suggested Lord Home might say that, based on his conversations here, he found the new administration friendly to Souvanna but shocked at his indifference. Lord Home could describe this as his private reaction. Lord Home said he would see what he could do, but he was not sure of the response. Souvanna was terribly hurt at the United States.
49. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 6, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-661. Secret. Drafted by James W. Swihart of EUR/BNA and approved in U on April 19 and S on April 22. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
U.K.
Lord Home Ambassador Caccia
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
Lord Hood
A.C.I. Samuel
Honorable Peter Ramsbotham
Mr. Charles Wiggin
Mr. John Thomson
U.S.
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGhee
Mr. Kohler
Mr. White
Mr. Burdett
Mr. Swihart
The Under Secretary
The Secretary expressed concern about the shape a new government might assume. We do not wish it to get around that having a lot of Communists in a government can just be taken for granted. If this were to happen we can say goodbye to neutrality and for that matter U.S. aid. We could agree to one or two in the government but not a gang of them. We have heard that the Secretary General of the Communist party (Nouhak) amongst others is being seriously considered. We have to avoid getting too far down the line on this one. Lord Home commented that so far the U.K. has done nothing on this problem. Souvanna Phouma did indicate that he planned to include one or two Communists. The Secretary said that the numbers were not the only issue but the particular job held by any Communist in the government had also to be looked at. Lord Home wondered how we could control the King. The Secretary responded that the latter had some reluctance to assume an active role and it was going to take a good deal of dickering with the King remaining behind scenes. Lord Home thought if the King could indicate which of the two or three Communists would be acceptable at the outset this might do the trick. The Secretary reverted to the importance of which position they might hold. Vongvichit for example would be very bad as Minister of Defense. Mr. Steeves observed that if the messages we are now receiving mean anything we would have to rule out the King. He takes the position he cannot constitutionally assume the Prime Ministership. Lord Home thought this still did not rule out knocking heads together. Mr. Steeves countered this was an absent quality. When the current government resigns normally the King would ask for a new government and refer it to the assembly which then acts. The King then rubber-stamps their action. In our view Phoui Sananikone would be the most neutral. Souvanna Phouma seems to have no appreciation of the Communist problem. Lord Home understood that it was Phouma's idea to have about three Communists, some middle-of-the-road people and some of Phoumi's. Mr. Steeves said the more we hear he is not prepared to take any of the latter. Lord Home inquired whether the King might not call for a "national ticket". Mr. Steeves thought the only possibility of anything along this line would be by elections. The Secretary inquired whether Souvanna Phouma was now planning to continue his leisurely trip in view of his intention not to come to the U.S. Lord Home thought possibly he is afraid of getting tangled up in the situation in Laos. Mr. Steeves took his hat off to him. By his travels he was increasing his stature. The Secretary asked whether Souvanna Phouma "snarled at us" when he was asked to come here. Lord Home replied Phouma said he found difficulty dropping his planned tour in order to come here although he very much admired President Kennedy's Administration and was touched by Mr. Rusk's message./2/ The Secretary observed that he may have been touched but he was not moved. He wondered whether Ambassadors Brown and Addis might talk to the King and ask him to bring together the four leaders (Souvanna Phouma, Phoumi, Souphanouvong, and Phoui) to negotiate the composition of a new government. Lord Home agreed we should do this and in the meantime if Phouma would be willing to go back it would be helpful. The Secretary suggested that Steeves and Warner draft separate messages./3/ Lord Home said he was not clear about the state of military planning. The Secretary pointed out that the British were in close consultation with the Pentagon and that no decisions had been made. The general approach is to step up on a planning basis. The Department of State did not want to escalate military action beyond the possibility of a successful political result. Para-military forces would be used and they would stay within the ground rules of the enemy's action. Lord Home inquired whether there are any para-military forces there now. The Secretary said there were none and would only be contemplated if the enemy keeps it up. If a cease-fire occurs then their activities would stop. Lord Home expressed general agreement with our planning and reported the British military believe Plan 5/4/ is the minimum that could be done. He commented there seems to be a suggestion that Admiral Felt wants to alert the troops. Unfortunately this alert would go to Pakistan and in view of its bad security get to Nehru. The Secretary expressed doubt that Admiral Felt would alert Pakistan and Mr. Steeves added this would take place only if Plan 5 were put into effect. The Secretary added before it could go into effect it would have to be approved by Governments. Lord Home reiterated he understood Admiral Felt has intentions to issue such alert. The Secretary thereupon asked Mr. Steeves to check into this matter. (Subsequently the Secretary reported that Mr. Steeves has been informed Admiral Felt had been in some communication about planning for Plan 5 if and when governments approve.) The Secretary reported that we have not ground up any military plans about which the U.K. are not fully informed. We have stepped up supplies by helicopter, etc. We do not want to do anything to interrupt the possibility of a cease-fire or break it up if one occurs. There are a number of steps possible without getting into M5. Lord Home expressed satisfaction and hoped we would keep an eye on any possible "alerts".
/2/Apparent reference to Document 32.
/3/Steeves' message was telegram 1547 to Vientiane, April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-861; see Supplement)
/4/See Document 41.
50. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-232-61
Washington, April 11, 1961.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 63 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, April-May. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Laos (U)
1.On 28 March 1961, Lieutenant General T.J.H. Trapnell/2/ submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report together with nine recommendations on the situation in Laos./3/ These recommendations are:
/2/On March 14, Lemnitzer instructed Trapnell to visit Southeast Asia to appraise the U.S. plan for the recapture of the Plaine des Jarres, examine the extent to which Phoumi had put his best officers in forward combat areas, and to appraise relationships among Ambassador Brown, Admiral Felt, General Boyle, and Phoumi and determine if Brown's influence was positive or negative. Trapnell was ordered to return on about March 25. (Memorandum from Lemnitzer to Trapnell (CM-133-61), March 14; ibid., Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Laos No. 1)
/3/A copy of the Trapnell Report, March 28, is an enclosure to a memorandum from Lemnitzer to McNamara (JCSM-206-61), March 31. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Laos 1961, January to March)
a. Bomb Plaine des Jarres.
b. Provision and use of reserve.
c. Convert PEO to MAAG.
d. Put US advisors down to FAL battalion level and integrate additional Thai and Philippine personnel into advisory group.
e. Provide armed helicopters.
f. Place PEO advisors with key staff counterpart in FAL GHQ, particularly in logistics positions.
g. Provide PEO an organic intelligence production and counter-intelligence capability.
h. Authorize support for nine additional FAL battalions.
i. Establish JUWTF for unconventional warfare and psychological warfare campaign.
2. On 31 March 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 a and c above, and by memorandum requested the Secretary of Defense to take action deemed appropriate. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 b and f above, were referred to CINCPAC for appropriate action, with advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of action taken and of requirements for further assistance in such action. The recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 d, e, g, h and i above, were referred to CINCPAC for comment and recommendation.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received and considered the comments of CINCPAC on the recommendations referred to him for comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the Trapnell recommendations subject to the following considerations:
a. Put US advisors down to FAL battalion level and integrate additional Thai and Philippine personnel into advisory group. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Chief, Programs Evaluation Office, Laos, is placing US advisory personnel at battalion level and that the Minister of Defense, Royal Laos Government, has agreed. However, Royal Laos Army (FAL) commanders in the field resist US advisors because of reluctance to have US advisors observe their shortcomings.
b. Provide armed helicopters.
(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the present maximum potential to be gained from the helicopters now in Laos is their use as utility aircraft and that the development of armed helicopters in an armed reconnaissance and suppressive fires role is still in an experimental stage. For this reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the current limited capabilities in this field should not be used indiscriminately but only by trained personnel using sound tactics. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the provision of armed helicopters to the FAL would provide a basis for further evaluation of the entire concept by its employment in an operational environment.
(2) Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense authorize the utilization of up to six US Army armed helicopters, crews to be furnished in the same manner as the B-26 crews, if requested by CINCPAC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will furnish you CINCPAC's views on this subject.
c. Provide PEO an organic intelligence production and counter-intelligence capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit appropriate and timely recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in line with the developing situation.
d. Authorize support for nine additional FAL battalions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that on 30 March 1961, the RLG Minister for National Security requested an increase in the FAL troop ceiling for six special battalions, one parachute battalion, replacements undergoing training, and service troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also note that, for the most part, these forces are now in being. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense authorize additional MAP support for an increase in FAL personnel of 5936, broken down as follows:
6 infantry battalions (2520)
1 parachute battalion (800)
Replacements undergoing training (1654)
Service troops (982)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also request that Defense Support funds be provided in the amount of $652,000 for the pay of these forces for the months of May and June.
c. Establish JUWTF for unconventional warfare and psychological warfare campaign. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that this recommendation has long-range aspects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit appropriate and timely recommendations on this subject separately.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that CINCPAC has taken appropriate action to implement the recommendations listed in subparagraphs 1 b and f above. However, with respect to subparagraph 1 b, General Trapnell envisions that two Thai regiments be provided as a reserve for Royal Lao Government forces to be employed promptly should the military situation in Laos deteriorate drastically and suddenly. CINCPAC considers that establishment of such a reserve, which might have to be committed prior to implementation of the SEATO Plan for Laos and the arrival of US forces, requires further political consultation with the Royal Lao Government. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to obtain the approval of the Royal Thai Government to establish such an immediately ready reserve of two Thai regiments for the contingency postulated.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer/4/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1261. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Steeves and Kohler, and signed by Rusk.
Washington, April 12, 1961, 10:55 a.m.
1722. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. We are becoming increasingly concerned at the effect in Laos of the delay in definitive Soviet reply to the British proposals in regard to Laos and with particular regard to the proposed call for a cessation of hostilities./2/ You should, therefore, seek an appointment with Gromyko in view of Khrushchev's absence and point out to him our concern in this matter. You should remind him of his talks in Washington with the Secretary and particularly the one on March twenty-seventh with the President./3/ You should recall to him the statement which he made repeatedly to the President of the importance of avoiding actions which could complicate or exacerbate the situation in Laos, and remind him of the President's statement that while we seriously and wholeheartedly supported the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, free from any foreign alignment or domination, the United States as a great power could not stand by if forces hostile to the United States sought to take over the country by military means.
/2/On April 5, British Ambassador Roberts gave Soviet Deputy Minister for Southeast Asia, Georgi M. Pushkin, draft texts of an appeal for a cease-fire in Laos, a report to Nehru concerning the ICC, and an announcement of the conference. Roberts left no doubt that the cease-fire must be verified before the conference could begin. (Circular telegram 1533, April 7; ibid., 751J.00/4-761)
/3/See Document 43.
You should draw Gromyko's attention to the fact that during this period of diplomatic discussion with a view to a negotiated settlement of the problem the Soviet airlift which in our view has no basis in legality has not only continued but has sharply increased and has included the use of Soviet planes, piloted by Soviet military personnel, for parachute drops in active combat. You should point out in this connection that US has exercised great restraint and has held back from a series of possible actions in Laos while discussions for political solution were under way. Should Gromyko raise question of US flow of supplies and use of helicopters you should state that this is in conformity with longstanding agreement with legal Laos Government.
You should also state that the United States Government is unable to perceive any valid reason for delay in setting in motion the mechanism for peaceful solution of this problem set forth in the British proposal which would involve three simultaneous actions by the British and Soviet Governments, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference:
1. Call for cessation of hostilities.
2. The reactivation of the ICC through a meeting at Delhi as soon as possible, and
3. The issuance of invitations for a 14-Power conference, specifying a definite date and place.
You should likewise remind Gromyko that the President made it clear to him that he hoped very much that the procedures for a pacific settlement and that restraint on the spot by both the Soviet Union and the United States would render unnecessary even the contemplation of decisions of a graver sort. The mechanism proposed by the British and agreed to in principle by the Soviet Union in their aide-memoire of April first, a copy of which was given to you by Khrushchev personally, seemed to provide the basis for such a settlement.
You should endeavor to elicit from Gromyko the causes of the present delay and when a definitive reply to the latest British proposals might be expected. You might mention in this connection that the British proposals were very much along the line of the earlier Soviet ones but at that time there had not been any US-Soviet understanding as to the goal of a neutral and independent Laos which now seems to exist. You should try to get over to Gromyko the thought that if the procedures envisaged by the British proposals for pacific settlement cannot be agreed speedily developments in Laos itself might render such procedures inadequate to deal with the situation.
Therefore, FYI you should avoid in this presentation any tone of ultimatum or threat but you should make clear to Gromyko we are quite unable to understand why this delay in putting into effect a program in conformity with what seemed to be the joint purpose of the United States and Soviet Union. But we will leave to your discretion the manner in which it is done./4/
/4/In telegram 2493 from Moscow, April 13, Thompson reported on his meeting with Gromyko at 4:45 p.m. on April 13. Gromyko responded to Thompson's presentation by stating that the Soviet response would come in the very near future. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1361)
President has approved this message. End FYI.
Rusk
52. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 13, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/2/61-4/20/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Task Force Meeting on Laos, April 13, 1961/2/
/2/The more detailed summary report of the Task Force meeting of April 13, prepared by Sullivan, is ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/11/61-4/16/61.
1. It is the general appreciation that the Communist tactic in Laos is to delay on the cease-fire while the situation crumbles politically and militarily. The political crumbling may be now under way as Phoumi seeks to retrieve a political situation for himself in a neutral Laos. The military crumbling consists in the positioning of Communist troops in areas which will permit them quickly to collapse FAL forces, protecting Paksane and Takhek. The collapse of these two towns would cut Laos in half, isolating Vientiane and Luang Prabang from the south.
2. The assessment is that the Russians understand the need to avoid a major overt move until it is too late for us to move in and their present objective is a collapse of the morale of the FAL forces and of the present government. It was the consensus of the meeting that you, Mr. Rusk, and Mr. McNamara should urgently consider a SEATO operation of a Lebanon type; that is, the movement of forces into Laos as envisaged under Plan 5/61./3/ This was judged preferable to the four actions on pages 4-5 of the attached memorandum. It was felt the first of these actions--the use of B-26s--would constitute an act of escalation without clear overt occasion; that the other three suggested acts would be inadequate to stabilize the military and political situation and provide us with the necessary bargaining strength during a conference.
/3/See Document 41.
3. If this position is accepted, the following actions are required urgently:
a. Consultation with the British;
b. The generation of a request for such an action from the Laotian King;
c. The contingent alerting of our own forces to the possibility of such action.
4. In addition, we should consider now whether, if the British answer is negative or if there is further delay, we should execute such an action with the Thai and Philippine components.
[Attachment]/4/
Paper Prepared by Thomas J. Corcoran
Washington, April 13, 1961.
/4/ Top Secret. Marginal notes, "48 hrs" and "targets," and doodles that are apparently in the President's hand, are on the source text.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN LAOS
Watch Committee conclusion of April 13, 1961 summarizes the critical political and military situations developing in Laos. It observes that the apparent collapse of the Government's Muong Kassy offensive will further depress FAL and Vientiane morale and will permit the communists to resume attacks in the Luang Probang and Vang Vieng areas. It notes indications in the Paksane area that the communists are making preparations for military pressure against Government forces which have withdrawn from Tha Thom. It finds increasing indications that communist forces in Central Laos have been strengthened in recent weeks, and that the pattern of military clashes suggests that the communists are preparing to make a relatively strong military effort in the direction of Thakhek. It predicts that in view of the Government's weakened military posture in this area and its general lack of trained reserves, the communists can probably make further extensive military gains. It concludes that the bloc position that the contending elements in Laos should discuss the terms of a cease-fire is probably intended to stall the termination of active hostilities. It observes that if the position which the Asian communists have advanced--that a cease-fire should be effected simultaneously with a conference--becomes the official bloc position, it will be further evidence of bloc interest in maximizing, without precipitating SEATO intervention, the communist military and political position in Laos prior to any conference.
Thus, while the Russians maintain their airlift and delay their reply to the British note on a cease-fire in Laos, both the political and military situations in Laos continue to deteriorate. We now face the distinct possibility of entering a fourteen-power conference under the pressure of successful communist military activity. We also face the strong possibility that the Royal Lao Government will be drawn into premature negotiation of substantive political questions in the course of long drawn-out cease-fire talks with the Pathet Lao in a manner to prejudice its prospects at the conference.
If we are to head off either of these equally disastrous possibilities we must arrest and, if possible, reverse the current adverse trend reflected in yesterday's watch report. Action to this end should be designed markedly to improve the circumstances under which a fourteen-power conference would begin. It should also be designed to exert pressure on the communist bloc by demonstrating in a deliberate and limited manner our readiness to take whatever measures may be appropriate to create for ourselves at least a reasonably strong negotiating position.
The first step in so demonstrating our readiness would be to inform our SEATO allies, individually or collectively, of our concern at the dangerous nature of current bloc actions. The Russian failure to respond on the cease-fire question, the continuation of the Russian airlift and evidence of Pathet Lao military preparations against Paksane and Thakhek are significant in this regard. This ominous combination of circumstances would be described as casting doubt on Russian intentions to proceed with the conference in a meaningful manner. We would inform our SEATO allies that we were planning in concert with the Thai, whose security is immediately threatened, certain emergency measures which would support the RLG against bloc pressure and incidentally put some pressure on the Russians to respond on the cease-fire question. These measures would follow logically in the absence of a satisfactory Russian reply to our demarche in Moscow of April _, 1961.
We would tell our SEATO allies that the limited measures we proposed might well fail to bolster the Lao Government or to induce the Russians to move towards a cease-fire. That is, the Pathet Lao attempt to take over Laos by force of arms and with formidable bloc assistance might be continued or even intensified. In this event we should at least have obtained confirmation of bloc intentions and should know that SEATO ought promptly to take appropriate action such as implementing Plan 5/61.
The emergency measures we would plan to take in the absence of a constructive Russian reply on the cease-fire question by April 15 would include removal of certain restraints we have heretofore placed on the Royal Lao Government and tangible demonstration of friendly support for the Royal Lao Government in its present difficult predicament. Specifically, we should:
a) Authorize the operational employment of certain aircraft, which the Royal Lao Government now has available and for which it has obtained qualified pilots, against appropriate military targets in Laos. Some 15 B-26 aircraft are involved and they would use machine guns, rockets, high explosive munitions or combinations of some or all of these weapons as determined by the characteristics of available targets.
b) Send into Laos a small token force of uniformed Americans and Thai (and perhaps Filipino and Pakistani) military specialists and technicians. The American personnel would be produced by ordering LTAG personnel into uniform; that is, by ordering them to add USARMY insignia to their present costumes. PEO personnel would retain their present "civilian" status at least for the time being.
c) Authorize and provide logistics, pay and support for seven additional Lao Army battalions and their supporting service troops. (Six of these are already in being, but not receiving US support.)
d) Authorize and obtain the approval of the Royal Thai Government for the immediate commitment to Laos of two Thai 105 mm. artillery batteries with personnel and equipment.
These recommendations are made in the full knowledge that they may have adverse effect on plans for an international conference. However, the communists' stalling tactics, their continued military buildup, and their political maneuvering (especially their successful buildup of Souvanna Phouma) appear to be conditioning the approach to the conference in a way unacceptable to us. Furthermore, we think it equally likely that the steps recommended above might well bring about a cease-fire and a conference sooner rather than later, and enable us to enter the conference on an acceptable basis.
These steps should be taken on the assumption that we may face stepped-up communist retaliation in the area. Under these conditions SEATO elements, in part or in whole, must be ready to act, and immediate precautionary measures must be taken to supply air defense of friendly forces in the area.
53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, April 14, 1961, 12:51 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1461. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Steeves, cleared in draft by Fontana and in substance by the President, and approved by Rusk. Sent also niact to Bangkok as 1587, to London as 4844, to Paris as 4316, and to CINCPAC POLAD unnumbered.
This cable was the result of a meeting at the White House attended by Rusk, Bowles, the President, and Department of Defense officials including almost certainly McNamara. There is no reference to the meeting in the President's Appointment Book, Kennedy Library, merely an indication that the President returned to his office from 6:45 to 7:45 p.m. In Rusk's Appointment Book for 1961 at the Johnson Library, there is an entry indicating that there was a White House meeting on Laos attended by Rusk and Bowles from 6:45 p.m. which the President joined at 7 p.m. A subsequent memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy, April 18, indicates that the April 13 meeting included Departments of State and Defense participants. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61-4/21/61)
1100. Eyes Only Ambassador Brown, Gavin, Bruce, Charge Unger, Creel. Soviets disturbing delay in executing call cease-fire faces us with obvious dangers: 1) buildup of enemy supplies and base for operations continues with no indication of abatement; even gradual increase in evidence. 2) Over-all military situation deteriorates and Communists in position to exploit weakening situation of FAL at will which could place RLG in untenable position while waiting for cease-fire to be accomplished. 3) Aura of pre-ceasefire atmosphere and current political speculation associated with Souvanna Phouma's travels could tempt King and Phoumi to contemplate concessions inimical to our interests.
In view fact this continuing decay could result in sudden collapse military situation and place us at extreme disadvantage at conference table President has authorized the carrying-out of the following action in order bolster military position FAL and restore morale RLG to appreciable degree:
JCS by separate orders tonight authorizing CINCPAC order PEO personnel Laos and LTAG personnel to 1) lift all restrictions with respect their participation combat operations; 2) use of rank; 3) wearing of uniforms. This will enable US military personnel to provide essential leadership and guidance so essential for conduct of operations. They will operate in all essentials comparable to MAAG. Phoumi must understand that in order for LTAG teams to be effective with FAL units there must be no restriction to their participating fully with combat elements at all levels.
We are informing French Ambassador of this action tomorrow morning; also UK Ambassador. French may indeed protest but action will be carried out over such protest if necessary.
In informing British and French of this action we are taking to stiffen FAL posture, we are requesting their approval and cooperation and advising them that should overt action of this type within scope operation indulged in by Communists themselves be used as pretext for Communist retaliation, our next step will be to consider appropriate SEATO action in which we would expect their support.
For Brown: Request you return to Vientiane at once to inform Prime Minister and Phoumi and if possible King of this decision. In order provide necessary authority for this action you should ask RLG to place appropriate request our hands so that military assistance will be covered by agreement with RLG.
In your discussion this whole situation with Phoumi should be made clear US taking this additional step to ensure integrity of Laos and we urge him in all seriousness to put forth every effort achieve tactical advantage on ground as rapidly as possible. In discussion with Phoumi emphasize President's view he must give us something to support./2/
/2/Brown's discussion with Phoumi is reported in telegram 1871 from Vientiane, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1561)
Military channels informing Boyle of his authority to call for airlift and supplies without restriction. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Suggest you stimulate USOM give maximum civilian help throughout as much of countryside as possible as vital supplement to military operations and morale of people.
While it is hoped that Soviet response may be forthcoming with respect to appeal for cease-fire the above authorized action will be indication that US not willing allow situation to deteriorate interminably while awaiting their pleasure.
During this waiting period it is not only military situation which is deteriorating. Political atmosphere surrounding RLG and King during this uncertain waiting period not wholesome nor productive of strength to withstand Communist threats or blandishments. It especially important to show determination in view serious talks upcoming with Souvanna Phouma here next week. We will leave him under no illusion that US is willing fall in line with position he building up by consultations with Communist leaders. He must understand US cooperation only available on basis he willing cooperate achieve genuine neutral Laos but not one ordered by Communist dictation.
For Bangkok: You should inform Sarit immediately what steps we are taking. You should additionally request Sarit to make the two 105 batteries previously requested available immediately, informing him that replacements are on the way arriving early May. You should further inform Sarit that we believe this action will give necessary assurance and lift to RLG morale increasing effectiveness FAL. He may consider advisable parallel our approach to Phoumi urging him to make supreme effort in consonance with this assistance to redress military situation in order improve RLG prestige and bargaining position should international conference ensue.
Further inform Sarit US is committing its personnel in uniform parallel to commitment his artillery and thereby engages US in commitment to him communicated by Secretary of State./3/
/3/Unger's discussion with Sarit is reported in telegram 1861 from Bangkok, April 15. (Ibid.)
For Paris and London: You should inform GOF and HMG of action being taken re American military personnel in Laos urging sympathetic cooperation this step.
Fully aware above action in technical violation Geneva Accords. This only in small measure redresses imbalance caused by massive violation of actual communist signatories and one of co-chairmen over extended period. It remains open to us to insist that all parties return to such accords with complete compliance; obviously we cannot accept unilateral contempt these accords by Communists alongside of obligation on our side requiring meticulous compliance.
UK reps will recall above action in line with paramilitary steps preceding formal SEATO action already discussed principal SEATO allies.
Rusk
54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, April 15, 1961, 5:59 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1561. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Steeves.
4874. Eyes Only for Ambassador. The following letter was handed by the Secretary to Sir Harold Caccia this morning for transmission to Lord Home:
"I very much appreciate your prompt reactions on Laos which Harold Caccia has just let me have./2/
/2/Reference is to a letter from Home to Rusk, a draft of which is contained in telegram 4189 from London, April 14. In the letter, Home stated that he was worried that the military action described in Document 53 would encourage world opinion to believe that the United States had "torpedoed the chances of a settlement just when they looked promising." Home stated that British information indicated that there was very little fighting going on in Laos and the Pathet Lao seemed to be as inactive as the Royal Lao Army. Home wondered if the cease-fire was not already on its way to be realized. Home acknowledged the legitimacy of U.S. paramilitary action, but asked for a delay in implementing the decision for a few more days. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1461)
I think there is some difference in our assessment of the present situation on the ground in Laos. I am thinking both of the precarious military situation in which we find ourselves and the equally disturbing political decay which is taking place.
On the military side, our Laotian friends are not among the stoutest of heart, at best. The long delay which has ensued with much talk of cease-fire is making them even less effective militarily than usual. Rather than ensuring no deterioration before a possible cease-fire, they are completely relaxed and appear ready to accept whatever disadvantages are built up by the other side.
Politically, the decay is even more serious. Our constant reminders of our need to rearrange their government, of course, carry the obvious meaning that we are not as happy as we might be with the RLG itself. They sense that change is in the air and it does not give them the united determination which should characterize their position in the face of national danger.
What they need on both of these fronts is something which will lift their morale to encourage their will to resist. We feel very strongly that the rather minor steps we are taking will provide them with at least some stiffening.
As to the immediate military situation itself, our Watch Committee report of yesterday was most disturbing. It is true that there are no major battles being waged, but in at least three rather critical areas the Communist buildup continues and we could be faced overnight with a virtual collapse. The Pathet Lao have deployed a force of 1,000 troops supported by 105 howitzers and mortars approximately five miles northeast of Nhommarath, to the rear of Thakhek. They are in a position to do real damage there. In a message received today, Phoumi characterized the situation as 'serious.'/3/ On the Tha Thom Paksane road the situation continues to be ominous, and a breakthrough there could sever Laos at the narrow waist. Further to the north, there is the very unsatisfactory situation around Muong Kassy. The abortive attempt of the paratroopers there did not help the situation any. What concerns us the most here is that we could rapidly find ourselves in a position where Luang Prabang is seriously threatened or, indeed, overrun. We do not find evidence of disengagement by the Pathet Lao or the return of Viet Minh to their own country.
/3/The statement as reported in telegram 1864 from Vientiane, April 14, reads "Phoumi acknowledged situation 'serious' but believed he had it under control." (Ibid.)
There is the matter of the Russian airlift. Although the President and I have been careful to discount publicly the increase in supply, it is a fact that in the recent few days a significant increase has been observed. While we did not want to show public alarm by emphasizing this fact, it would of course cast a very serious cloud over the entire scene if the present trends are sustained.
With respect to the Russian response, we find little encouragement leading us to believe that they have an intention of giving an early satisfactory reply. While delaying their answer, they make off-hand remarks about the cease-fire being held off until the conference convenes. They also comment that the conference must of course be at the foreign minister level from beginning to end. This to me is clear evidence that they are being evasive. It should be remembered that, when we agreed to the formula of the cease-fire and conference to begin with, we placed great emphasis on an immediate cease-fire. Weeks have gone by since we put forward this minimum requirement, and it has been largely ignored while they pursue their activities in Laos.
Perhaps it would be helpful for me to be a little more precise about the actual steps we are discussing. The Americans are those who are already there, and known to be there by the other side. To put them into uniform means, actually, little more than pinning on their insignia. What we want them to do is to get down to battalion level with the troops in the field where we think they can stiffen units which are now inclined simply to melt away when the enemy fires a few rounds. We would not think this would 'torpedo' the conference, if there is the slightest interest in a neutral Laos. We do not believe that this step can be provocative since it is wholly within the methods of operation on the other side. Russian air personnel are in northern Laos as are considerable numbers of Viet Minh personnel. If this action on our side is taken as provocative, it will merely be because they wish to make it so.
Another reason for putting our own personnel in uniform is to make it possible to move a very limited number of small Thai units (we now have in mind two artillery batteries) before there might have to be any formal SEATO intervention. Sarit quite naturally does not wish to find himself alone and his attitude could be met by Americans officially present in uniform and in airlift operations. We of course will not take this action until we have the appropriate request from RLG in hand.
The transfer of Americans into 'uniform' is probably not a technical compliance with the Geneva accords, but the other side has been treating these accords with the utmost contempt. It remains open for all sides to return to the Geneva accords, although I am under no illusions that the Communists are willing to do so.
By the time this reaches you, of course, we may have had a reply from Moscow. I can well appreciate your concern, for it coincides with our own. We are not spoiling for a fight, as I am sure you know, but we do believe that the security of Southeast Asia requires that Laos not be overrun by the other side and that we must take minimum steps against the sudden collapse of our position. It will probably take two days or so to discuss the matter with the RLG and to ensure Phoumi's cooperation. If, meanwhile, we have a satisfactory Russian reply, we would be very pleased."
For Paris: The substance of the above letter was reviewed for the French ambassador and the letter is therefore repeated for your information.
Rusk
55. Editorial Note
On April 16 in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed British Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts an aide-memoire, a draft message from the 1954 Geneva Co-Chairmen (the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) calling for a cease-fire in Laos, the text of a proposed message from the Co-Chairmen to the Government of India on convening an International Commission for supervision and control in Laos, and a text of a proposed message to participants to the prospective 1961 Conference on Geneva. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1661) This package constituted the Soviet reply to the British demarche of April 4; see footnote 2, Document 48.
On April 17 in London, British Foreign Office and Embassy working-level officials discussed the Soviet reply and cited two major shortcomings: while the Soviets stated there would be a cease-fire prior to the conference they did not explicitly accept it as a precondition and the Soviet formula for convening the International Control Commission in New Delhi did not meet the Western requirement for an immediate ICC presence in Laos to verify the cease-fire. Two minor shortcomings were also noted: Soviet insistence that the conference should be at the Foreign Minister-level with the Ministers remaining at the conference until its end and Soviet introduction of a new element by stating that the conference should proceed on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. (Telegram 4199, April 17; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1761)
On April 18, Lord Home with the concurrence of the United States sent a message to Roberts for his use in discussion with Gromyko. Roberts was to stress again that the cease-fire should be effective by the time the conference met and to suggest April 20 as the date for issuing the appeal from the two Geneva Co-Chairmen. Roberts was to suggest revisions in the Soviet drafts to emphasize this fact. Roberts also was to point out that the original British proposals had the ICC verifying the cease-fire before the conference. While there was no mention of the ICC performing this role in the Soviet proposals, the Soviets had referred to the Co-Chairmen sending a commission to Laos. Roberts was instructed to stress to Gromyko that the commission should be sent to Laos immediately. Roberts was also to inform Gromyko that the United Kingdom had no objection to the conference being called a Foreign Ministers conference, but the Soviets must realize that individual foreign secretaries must decide how their time and other duties would allow them to be present at the conference. (Circular telegram 1614, April 19; ibid., 751J.00/4-1861)
56. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, April 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/2/61-4/20/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos Task Force Meeting, Monday, April 17, 1961/2/
/2/The summary report of the Task Force meeting was submitted to the White House on April 18. (Memorandum from Battle to Dungan, April 18; ibid, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61-4/21/61)
As of this afternoon the situation, as seen by the Task Force, was as follows:
1. The Pathet Lao approach to Takhek continues. It is not ruled out that Takhek will be taken and the Communist penetration to the Mekong completed in a very few days.
2. The FAL Lao troops in Takhek are trainees; and their commander is of well proven incapacity.
3. General Boyle's efforts to persuade Phoumi to put better troops and a better commander in Takhek are proceeding, but without any clear result.
4. The SEATO permanent organization (local ambassadors) will meet shortly in an atmosphere of alarm that the Pathet Lao will soon be on the Thai border.
5. The British are either ignorant of the movement towards the Mekong or regard it with complacency. We are attempting to clarify with them why we are so uneasy.
6. The B-26s, while capable of shooting up the supplies in the Plaine des Jarres, are unlikely to be able to stop the investiture of Takhek if the Pathet Lao proceed to that point.
7. I have talked with Chip/3/ about this; and he will put a more precise reference to the Mekong and the split of Laos into the draft message to Khrushchev.
/3/"Chip" Bohlen.
8. In the light of all this, we may be up against a rather fine-grained decision. If we do not wish to enter the conference with Laos split, some outside force may have to move into the river towns in the very near future. Given the British attitude, it may be hard to get SEATO as a whole to undertake this action. The Thais seem unwilling to move across the river unless we are there [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It may come down to a decision as to whether we move bilaterally with the Thais.
9. The situation may be different tomorrow morning; but I thought you might want this interim picture of the situation.
57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, April 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61-4/21/61. Confidential.
Mr. Steeves wanted you to have the following message:
1. The British reluctantly agree that we should proceed to put our men into uniform and create a MAAG.
2. The British have grave reservations about the movement into Laos of a Thai battery. They enquired whether we had already talked to the Thais. Mr. Steeves said: yes.
Mr. Steeves and I discussed the difference military appreciation concerning the position around Takhek. He is taking steps this morning to insure that the British understand why we regard this position as dangerous and its correction urgent.
W.W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
58. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, April 19, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61-4/21/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Dungan, April 21.
Summary Report of Meeting of the Task Force on Laos, April 19, 1961
The meeting was called to discuss a preliminary report of the talks between the British Ambassador at Moscow and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 19 and a British recommendation, received just prior to the meeting, that they accept the Soviet proposal as "explained" by Gromyko./2/
/2/In circular telegram 1631, April 19, the Department included an account of Roberts' talk with Gromyko on April 19; a copy of an instruction from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Washington recommending acceptance of the Soviet proposals; and a message from Rusk to Home in which Rusk agreed to accept the proposals, but asked that the British realize that the United States would feel free to act vigorously until the cease-fire was effective, would want immediate consultations if it was violated, and would not accept verification of the cease-fire by the Co-Chairmen themselves should for some reason the ICC fail to verify the cease-fire. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-1961)
In the British view Gromyko would be heavily committed to produce if the British agreed to accept his explanation of the Soviet position. They, therefore, proposed that as a test of the Soviet Union's intentions we agree to their accepting the proposal with the understanding that it would not be binding on the United States and that the West would not attend a conference unless there were a cease-fire by May 5.
Mr. Steeves suggested we tell the British that this would be acceptable to us as a test of Soviet sincerity on the condition that we were left free to take any action we deemed necessary if the situation deteriorated. After considerable discussion it was agreed that we should emphasize to the British again and perhaps consider making public that an effective cease-fire must precede the conference and that it was the function of the ICC to verify the cease-fire.
The group also agreed we should inform the British that we acceded to their proposal with the understanding that we would be outsiders, not bound by the agreement but observing its results. If the cease-fire were not effective, we would reserve the right to take appropriate military action and would expect the British to join us. We would regard any significant forward movement by the Pathet Lao as a violation of the cease-fire. We would also suggest to the British the possibility that after the Co-Chairmen's appeal had become public, we might make public a statement of our position.
Mr. Steeves concluded the meeting by suggesting that the group leave for later consideration the specifics of the type of military action we might take and the kind of action on the part of the Pathet Lao which would require us to act.
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