Docs 81-102
May-June 1961:
The Opening Sessions of the Geneva Conference on Laos and the Vienna Summit
81. Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Laos at Geneva
FNL 0-1/1
Washington, May 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1873. Secret. Drafted by Young and Corcoran; cleared by Steeves, Usher, Anderson (in substance), John P. White of H, and Czyzak; and approved by Rusk. A copy of this paper was attached to an undated memorandum from Rusk which was sent to the President; see footnote 2, Document 84.
SCOPE PAPER
Introduction
This paper outlines the scope of our approach to a 14-Nation Conference on Laos. It suggests the actions needed before the Conference, during the Conference, and after the Conference.
Our strategy for a Conference aims at developing actions, themes, and proposals which will form a strong and hard-hitting position of maximum impact by mobilizing all potential resources to extract the maximum advantage out of this Conference for the free nations of SEA and the US. Our objectives at this Conference are the following:
a) To convince our allies and the neutrals that Communism is not the "wave of the future" and that the US is determined to preserve the independence of Southeast Asia;
b) To obtain a united, independent, and non-provocative Laos built on a new internal and regional structure reflecting the historical realities of Laos and the needs of Southeast Asia;
c) To create a sense of unity and purpose with the Asian allies and neutrals and seek their active identification and involvement with our strategy and objectives;
d) To prevent the Communists from gaining psychological, political, or military advantages at the expense of Laos, Free Viet-Nam, the United States, or the Free World generally.
To achieve these objectives we need: a) dramatic presentations at the Conference; b) military, political, economic, and psychological reinforcement in Laos, Thailand, and Viet-Nam before and during the Conference; and c) mobilization of Congressional support and public opinion to strengthen the hand of the American negotiators.
Background of Conference
The Free World position as we approach a 14-Nation Conference is neither strong nor unified. Militarily, the Royal Lao Government is in almost disastrous straits. This situation is unlikely to improve without increased direct intervention from outside Laos.
On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that we do still have certain important assets in Laos which we must use to the best possible advantage and which we certainly must not dissipate.
The Royal Lao Government still holds much of the area of Laos, including all of the main population centers. We still have a government in Laos which is prepared to cooperate closely with the US. We have the King, who, despite his hesitancy to take strong action, is devoted to preserving his country from Communist control. We still have a National Assembly which is rather timid but which wants to save the country from Communism. We still have a Lao Army of some 30,000 men. We have in place in Laos a carefully selected and experienced body of American personnel. We also have on either side of Laos determined US-Asian Allies who would follow our leadership in military action to defend Laos from further Communist encroachments.
Neutrals and several of our close allies view developments in Laos as the result of inept and narrow-minded US policies. They believe almost any solution in Laos is preferable to the risk of war. Most are agreed that the only feasible settlement is probably a neutral Laos requiring significant concessions to the Communist instrument, the NLHX. In return for such concessions many of our friends would hope that control machinery could be established to guarantee Lao neutrality.
Given such a climate of desperation and despair, the US will have great difficulty in achieving its basic objective even with an all-out effort.
Key Role of Neutrals
We should seek to make this Conference a turning point for Asian neutralists. In this Conference the three participating Asian neutralists will be faced with the choice of joining a diplomatic effort to hold the line against the Communist threat to Southeast Asia or of resigning themselves to ineffectual appeasement of a relentless Communist advance. We must try to impress upon these three Asian neutralists that if they will support realistic provisions for a neutral and adequately safeguarded Laos, then it may just be possible to achieve that objective through this international conference.
The choice which the neutral Asians will make will be significantly affected by the stance of the United States. The neutrals will be vocally interested in assuring themselves that basic US positions in the Conference itself are reasonable proposals and are not provocative; but the neutrals will watch with a quiet intensity what is to them of much greater importance--the evidence of US resolve in terms of military strength in the area and the degree of our willingness to use it when necessary.
Pre-Conference Tactics
A. Military
The weak military position of the Royal Lao Government is perhaps the most serious handicap which we will take to the Conference. It is therefore essential that every means be exploited to rectify this disadvantage before the Conference convenes.
We must now take military steps, if possible in conjunction with SEATO as a whole but at the very least in close coordination with Thailand and South Viet-Nam, so that we will be prepared on very short notice with our own and allied forces to:
a) secure the Mekong Valley Basin in Laos from the Sino-Burmese to the Cambodian border, thus assuring Thailand's frontier;
b) interdict Communist attempts to cut Laos in half and establish positions opposite Thailand on the Mekong River;
c) seal off the north-south Communist access through Laos to free Viet-Nam.
B. Political
Despite its weaknesses, the present Royal Lao Government is the most sympathetic to our point of view which can be obtained. It represents a strong commitment to resist Communism, and would be willing to seek external intervention if we should decide upon such a course of action. This asset will be essential until such time we are convinced that a favorable political solution can be found or until events preclude the possibility of further effective military actions. Despite its drawbacks, the present RLG is broadly representative of major geographic, ethnic, and family elements, and in better times would probably elicit wide support.
C. Psychological
Continued US actions and propaganda output should emphasize US determination to prevent a Communist take-over in Laos while at the same time stressing our willingness to cooperate in the evolution of a truly neutral Laos with appropriate safeguards to guarantee such status.
Within Laos, our position of support for the present government should be unequivocal and every assistance should be given to solicit popular support for it and its military efforts. Intensified effort must be made to identify the US with the survival, welfare, and development of Laos.
D. Economic and Social
Current unsettled conditions make it impossible to execute a conventional full-scale assistance program which is likely to have any relationship to the realities of the future. However, every effort should be made to utilize and expand our existing assistance programs to bolster civilian, administrative, and military morale throughout the country but especially in areas threatened by enemy pressures.
Detailed planning must now be urgently undertaken to determine the type, scope, and new organization of economic and social assistance we would be prepared to move immediately into Laos.
E. Coordination of Positions
Pre-Conference consultations should be conducted at the highest levels in an attempt to reach agreement on Conference strategy. Approaches should be made by our Ambassadors at highest levels to the British, French, Vietnamese, Lao, Thai, and Canadians. Because of their direct involvement detailed and closest consultations should be held with the Thais and Vietnamese at the earliest opportunity.
Similar but tailored approaches also should be made to neutrals: Cambodia, India, and Burma.
Conference Strategy
A. Preventing Resumption of Hostilities
The first order of business should be to ensure that there would be no resumption of hostilities during the Conference. This will require revised terms of reference for a successor commission to the ICC and adequate facilities for it to accomplish its mission. The Conference could well founder on Communist unwillingness to accept the safeguards we should insist be provided.
B. Package Proposal
If agreement can be reached on a satisfactory cease-fire, the leader of the US delegation should present a US-sponsored package proposal at the earliest opportunity. Hopefully, through prior consultation, we may have the support of our allies and some neutrals. In summary our opening proposals would include:
1) a declaration of support for neutrality of a free and independent unified Laos if appropriate machinery can be developed to assure this end.
2) US willingness to contribute manpower, facilities, mat[riel, and funds to assist in the social and economic development of Laos.
3) a proposal to disarm and eliminate all military forces in Laos and to limit internal and police security forces ultimately to about 20,000 men.
4) an outline for a Peace Preservation Commission to be established to monitor Lao neutrality for the 14-Nation Conference. The Commission will be composed of a member from outside the area representing the Communist powers, one from the Free World but outside the area, and a technical neutral, perhaps Sweden or Switzerland. The terms of reference of this Commission should be broad and members must have free access to the entire country. Individual members must be free to make investigations and submit reports.
5) a proposal for an Assistance Development Authority composed of India, Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya to assist in the planning, procurement, and utilization of foreign economic and technical assistance. The primary purpose of the group would be to prevent perversion of economic and technical assistance; additionally this group will evaluate the various aid programs and assure that they are consistent with Lao neutrality and independence.
6) at an appropriate time during the Conference a possible appeal to the King to call for the establishment of a provisional government which will represent the widest possible interests in Laos. This provisional government should be responsible for the re-establishment of law and order and re-integration of all Lao into the national community as well as to prepare for elections to be held at such time as conditions permit.
7) a proposal that the responsibilities of the 14-Nation Conference and the control and supervision mechanics established thereunder shall cease five years hence unless the co-chairman and the Lao Government at that time shall decide that another international conference is required to re-examine the situation to provide further guarantees for Lao integrity and independence. It would seem that the RLG should also reserve the right to ask the various control mechanisms to disband once it were satisfied of its own security and viability and its capacity to survive without the presence of foreign groups which are in themselves incompatible with national independence.
8) a clear indication that the US will not discuss subjects other than Laos at the Conference. Attempts may be made by the Communists to raise extraneous topics such as the conflict between North and South Viet-Nam, Viet-Nam and Cambodia, SEATO, and perhaps even US relations with Communist China.
C. Negotiating Positions
The Communists obviously will not accept our package proposal in toto and may be expected to attempt to pervert our proposals and counter with their own. Major difficulties may be expected over Communist attempts to 1) assure PL continued control over areas they now hold militarily; 2) insist on the formation of a provisional government with strong PL influence--or even urge recognition of the Souvanna Government; 3) removal of all US presence; and 4) introduce extraneous topics, e.g. SEATO, KMT troops, recognition of Communist China, and the conflict in Viet-Nam.
During this hard negotiating period the US may have to adopt the following basic positions:
1) no recognition of the Souvanna Government and no agreement to any interim coalition government which would be dominated or significantly influenced by Communists.
2) no agreement to elections within one year.
3) PL and Kong Le forces must be disarmed and only a minimum integrated into RLG forces and in such a fashion as to nullify their potential for organized military revolt.
4) control machinery for policing internal security must have access to the whole country and not be hamstrung by unanimity rule.
5) US must retain opening for maximum freedom of action and influence in both security and economic fields.
Should we see our position at the Conference eroding to a point where acceptance of the agreements which could be reached with the bloc would amount to virtual surrender of all of Laos to the Communists (i.e., vetoable ICC, weak central government with substantial NLHX representation, continued de facto PL control over areas it now occupies, integration of sizeable numbers of PL into Laotian armed forces in large units), through the RLG, the Thais and the South Vietnamese, and directly, we should (1) make it clear that we will not agree to the creation of a non-viable and Communist-dominated "neutral Laos," (2) attempt to show that we but not the bloc are prepared to create a truly independent, neutral, and viable Laos, and (3) argue that the Conference at the very least should give some semi-permanent status to the cease-fire line of demarcation so that pending new negotiations on creation of a truly neutral Laos the country might be spared further hostilities. If we were successful in getting the Conference to give some status to the demarcation line we would envisage close cooperation between the Thais, the South Vietnamese, the RLG, and ourselves in the military defense and economic development of the Mekong Valley and of southern Laos. If the Communists refused to permit the Conference to give any status to the demarcation line, we should attempt to show that this refusal was clear proof of the Communists intention further to use military force for aggressive purposes in Laos and together with the Thais and the South Vietnamese (and if possible with SEATO blessing) we should intervene with our own forces to secure the Mekong Valley and southern Laos.
We should attempt to avoid a situation at any stage developing where the other Conference participants become committed to accept a package that we (probably together with the Thais and the South Vietnamese) could not accept and from which we would then be forced to disassociate ourselves.
Post Conference Strategy
The Conference may result in several possible situations:
1) ideally, the Communists will accept our proposals for a "peace sanctuary" with military disarmament, a provisional government, and control procedures.
2) more likely, the Communists will not buy such a package but rather will insist upon conditions more certain to assure not only their control of presently held territory but also strong influence over a result-ant government with the corollary implication of elimination of real or potential US influence in Laos.
3) a third possibility would be for the Conference to end in failure to agree to any solution.
4) a further probability, well borne out by past experience, is that the Communists would not honor their commitments to the Conference solution.
It would appear that the US should prepare now to meet these contingencies.
Military
We must sustain a military build-up in Thailand and Free Viet-Nam and be prepared to take direct military action in Laos if the Conference fails and the Communists resume their military operations.
We must also be prepared to give Thailand and Free Viet-Nam firm bilateral assurances that the US will give them full protection against Communist attacks and encroachments.
SEATO, if it is to survive as a meaningful organization, must be prepared to take military action in Laos in the event of a failure to reach a negotiated settlement or in the event of Communist disregard for a political settlement. Planning should be done now to determine whether SEATO in its present form can be expected to provide the military support which may become necessary. If it is believed SEATO cannot perform these duties, steps should be taken to modify the organization or replace it with something which will.
Political
Preparations should be made to assist friendly political groups in their efforts to establish political organizations throughout the country and to win elections.
The National Assembly must be kept in being until Communists' intentions have become better known. It is possible that the Assembly could provide the means for assuring the continuation of a friendly government and if necessary provide the legality for a partitioning of the country.
Economic
In the immediate post-Conference period, we should be prepared to move ahead rapidly with an imaginative crash economic and technical assistance program which can be used to preclude the Communists in important assistance sectors. We should also gear our crash program in such a way to assist friendly political leaders in their attempt to build a political organization and to win popular support.
Conclusion
Through the Conference and thereafter, assuming that the United States achieves an acceptable Conference solution, we should hammer away at the following themes: Recognition of Laos as a Peaceful Sanctuary, Support for a United Kingdom of Laos--Muong Lao, Preservation of Lao Social and Religious Institutions, Conversion of Cannon to Tools for Peace with Security, Reconstruction of Laos by International Assistance.
82. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles/1/
Washington, May 6, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-661. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson.
SUBJECT
Lao Paper
There is attached a copy of a draft memorandum for the President on Laos,/2/ drawn up by Mr. Bundy of Defense and myself, in accordance with a commitment made by the Secretary at the NSC meeting of May 2./3/ Copies have been given to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, to Paul Nitze, Admiral Burke and the Attorney General. A previous draft was seen by the Secretary and broadly concurred in by him.
/2/The memorandum, entitled Second Revised Draft, State-Defense, 6:30 p.m. May 4, 1961, WBundy/UAJohnson, was not attached, but a copy of it and an undated annex, entitled "Pros and Cons of Military Intervention in Laos," are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/2/61-5/8/61.
/3/See Document 77.
While in view of developments in Laos this paper is now largely contingent, it can quickly be updated and adapted to the situation if there is a breakdown in the cease-fire. There are two principal issues in the paper, one the timing of SEATO action with UN action, alternatives on which are set forth in numbered paragraph 3., on page 2, and reaction to movement of Viet Minh forces into Laos, as set forth in numbered paragraph G.3., on page 5. The recommendation on page 8 for simultaneous SEATO and UN action is purely that of the group who drafted the paper. The estimate of North Vietnam and Communist China's capabilities as set forth in paragraph H., on page 6, is being revised by Defense and the JCS so as to make it clear exactly what forces could be brought to bear against the proposed SEATO operation.
83. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Olso, May 7, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-761. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Rusk was in Oslo for the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, May 8-10.
Secto 7. Have reviewed papers prepared by Conference Task Force including those written night prior departure./2/ After opportunity consult and reflect during flight here I offer following as over-all concept on approach to Geneva Conference for your guidance and comment:
/2/A complete set of briefing papers for the Geneva Conference is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1873. See also Document 81.
(1) We take stand for completely demilitarized Laos; gradually shorn of all weapons of war except minimum appropriate for internal constabulary. We emphasize such status best suited in view of geographic position, religious and cultural institutions and temperament of a pacific people.
(2) We strike positive note of bold new program for Laos; avoid recriminations and discussions of past but set as conference goal acceptance of a new Laos unmolested and neutral but assisted in her nation-building processes by multilateral aid administered initially through safe international body.
(3) The conference should direct its efforts after accepting this broad concept to establishing a control commission or commissions to begin complex tasks of control, inspection, demilitarization and administration of internal development. Would prefer neutral nations-type organization with UN blessing to undertake this mission.
(4) If successful in accomplishing foregoing would then recommend conference adjourn giving pacification machinery opportunity to work and to report to a reconvened conference in six months. Terms of reference and tasks to be performed would be clearly set forth.
Realize above skeleton leaves many unanswered questions and details but establishes concept only. My hope would be such a plan would result in a new charter for Laos based for future referenced on 1961 agreements of 14 nations rather than fitting it into the limiting framework and otherwise unsatisfactory aspects of the 1954 Accords.
Rusk
84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Oslo/1/
Washington, May 9, 1961, 10:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared in substance with Bowles. Repeated priority to Vientiane for Ambassador Brown and priority to Bangkok for Charge Unger.
Tosec 34. Following is text of instructions for Geneva Conference on Laos approved today by the President:/2/
/2/Kennedy approved these instructions in the form of a memorandum from Rusk, undated. (Kennedy Library, President's Office File, Countries, Laos Security, 5/2/61-6/30/61)
"1. That the Secretary proceed to Geneva and attend the Conference as the head of the US Delegation on the assumption that a cease-fire, verified by the ICC or other conditions satisfactory to us, will prevail by May 12. In the absence of such conditions, that the Secretary be authorized at his discretion to stay away from the opening meeting or to attend and request a suspension pending clarification of the situation in Laos. In the meantime the Secretary would have an opportunity to concert our policies with other friendly delegations.
2. That we continue to support the present government of Laos and press for its representation at the Conference. If this is impossible, that we accept an arrangement whereby the present government, the Souvanna group, and if necessary the Pathet Lao would participate as observers. If a coalition government with a dangerously large or influential Pathet Lao component seeks admission, as the RLG, the delegation will request new instructions.
3. That as an opening position the United States should propose a constructive package to assure a neutral, independent, peaceful, sovereign and socially and economically viable Laos. Such a program would avoid recriminations and discussion of the past while pointing to the future, not only for Laos but for Southeast Asia. It would include the following three points:
A. A neutral, politically independent Laos with a firm international guarantee against external aggression.
B. The establishment of Laos as a peace sanctuary with internal military forces reduced to that necessary for maintenance of internal security. This condition would be supervised and maintained by a Peace Preservation Commission of Neutrals, preferably with UN blessing, whose mission would be first, to insure the phased withdrawal of foreign military personnel and prevent the entry of new military personnel or equipment except the minimum required to train and equip an internal constabulary and, second, to prevent infiltration and subversion within Laos. The Commission would have terms of reference, personnel, equipment, and access to the country appropriate to its mission.
C. The United States would invite the USSR and other interested missions to join it in underwriting the cost of an extensive technical and economic aid program for a neutral and independent Laos to be administered by a commission of neutral nations from the area.
4. If the Communists reject these proposals, as they probably will, the United States Delegation can consider four contingencies for which instructions would be requested:
A. It can continue presenting our proposals at infrequent sessions for several months providing an acceptable cease-fire is maintained;
B. It can seek to suspend the Conference on the basis of a de facto cease-fire while the principal political elements in Laos turn to the formation of a coalition government;
C. It can seek to negotiate a compromise based on a federated or partitioned Laos;
D. It can take the matter to the United Nations either before or after the Conference has adjourned; or
E. It can leave the Conference on a clear issue of principle, or seek to have it brought to an end.
These are not mutually exclusive. The combination of them will depend on circumstances. Our position on the ground in Laos is weak. We cannot enforce what we would like. The Communists will insist on getting a Communist-dominated coalition government. Therefore, it is recommended that we keep under constant advisement what military and political actions we should take in Laos, Thailand, and Free Viet-Nam to strengthen our hand or anticipate a break-up of the Conference.
5. It is recommended that we be prepared to have the Conference fail and be adjourned if we cannot reach some satisfactory agreement.
With that possibility in mind, we should now consider plans by which, if necessary, the political and military position of the present government may be consolidated in southern Laos. It is possible that the Communists might accept such a de facto division.
However, if the Communist forces, following the break-up of the Conference, should renew their offensive, we will face the ultimate decision: whether or not to introduce U.S. forces into this area through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate. Our military plans and preparations should be kept in a high state of readiness against this eventuality. To support this eventuality the MAAG in Laos should utilize the existing period of cease-fire to intensify its training and reorganization of the FAL.
6. It would not be in our interest to have elections held within Laos for at least a year. The crucial question that we will be faced with early in the Conference is who would head up a new Lao government and what would be the composition of a coalition government.
We should in the first instance have as our objective a government consisting of all of the principal political elements within Laos except those of the extreme right and extreme left with Souvanna Phouma as a member but not as the Prime Minister. If this does not prove feasible, as is likely, we may be confronted with the acceptance of a government headed by Souvanna Phouma and including at least two Pathet Lao ministers. After appropriate consultations have been held by the United States Delegation in the early stages of the Conference, the Delegation would be in a better position to make recommendations on this crucial point and to ask for instructions."
Bowles
85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 11, 1961, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1161. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received at 9:23 p.m., May 10.
Secto 59. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary. Instructions for the Geneva Conference (Tosec 34)/2/ were most welcome and are entirely clear as to our opening conduct at the conference. I shall keep you closely informed on all developments because it will be essential for us to represent your views in detail as well as in general in such a delicate and crucial negotiation.
/2/Document 84.
I do wish to comment on all important paragraph five. The effectiveness and strength of our position in Geneva will be critically determined by whether we are prepared, should negotiations break down, to act in Laos by military means, at least in the south, or whether we are in a position of trying to save what can be saved without SEATO action in Laos itself. I do not suggest that we should threaten or promise such action at Geneva but our underlying attitude must inevitably affect the tone of our statements and our private discussions with other delegations. We hope of course to reach a satisfactory result by negotiation which would avoid military action. But we must be clear in our own minds at some stage as whether we must accept an unsatisfactory result because we have no other acceptable choice.
Lord Home and I will be having private talks with Gromyko about a Laotian settlement which would reflect Khrushchev's agreement to an "Austrian Laos". I believe we can make real headway if Gromyko believes that we still are as determined as President and I said we were when we saw him in Washington. If he concludes that we have "abandoned Laos" he will chase us around the barn in negotiations. If we are serious, beyond a gesture such as leaving the conference, I believe there is a real chance that we can find a US-UK-USSR agreement which could reassure our SEATO Allies and avoid the atmosphere of defeat in Laos. But we are approaching the final stages where we cannot bluff because the bluff might be called.
At SEATO, CENTO and NATO I have been deeply impressed by the extent of the reliance of the free world upon the attitude of the United States. These nations have great respect for the combination of firmness and peaceful purpose which the President has shown. The olive branch and the arrows are both essential, and firmness without bluster will be supported both by our Allies and by many of the so-called uncommitted countries.
Regarding Laos, we have a fair chance of getting strong neutral support, partly because of the extraordinary patience we have shown in trying to find a peaceful settlement and partly because of their own anxiety about a Communist Laos. But even neutrals, for reasons which we might not admire, may abandon their own neutrality if they believe that we will shy away from confronting Sino-Soviet power when the chips are down. I recognize both the irritating and the agonizing issues involved but the United States cannot avoid the consequences of the role imposed upon it by the present historical situation.
It is my personal impression that the unfortunate Cuban episode had far more effect upon us in Washington than upon anyone else in the world. Our present task seems to me to be to shake off that affair and get on with our great central tasks. Among these is collective support for our solemn commitments in conjunction with more than forty Allies who represent the essential strength of the free world and are the indispensable associates we shall need to support vital American interests. The credibility of these great commitments seems to me to be crucial to the prevention of a general war.
We shall not negotiate seriously about Laos until a cease-fire has been reasonably frozen. But if such a cease-fire is blatantly violated by the other side I hope that we will be prepared to support UN and SEATO action by an appropriate military demonstration in Laos.
No one would regret more than I the involvement of American forces in such a place, at such a time and under such circumstances. But I do believe that a demonstration can be made without its getting out of hand and without escalation into a general war. This should be checked with best intelligence and analysis available in Washington. But it seems to me that the Sino-Soviet bloc would be very reluctant to let Laos get out of control under conditions which would impose upon them maximum responsibility for pressing a military rather than a peaceful solution. My own judgment is that they are playing for far larger stakes throughout the world and that they would accept continued negotiations or some sort of UN action before major escalation.
Reading Tosec 34, I would conclude that the possibility of action of SEATO or some group of SEATO members is considered to be a very real one and that it is not expected that we negotiate at Geneva on a basis of weakness but rather with the purpose of obtaining the independent and neutral Laos which we have publicly affirmed as our central object.
I regret the length of this message but wish to be sure that assumptions on which I interpret our instructions are known.
Rusk
86. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva/1/
Washington, May 11, 1961, 6:44 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1161. Top Secret; Niact. Although the cable indicates that it was drafted and approved by the President, a copy sent from the White House to the Department of State for transmission to Geneva, which was signed by McGeorge Bundy, indicates only that the President approved this message. (Ibid.)
Tosec 54. Eyes Only from the President to the Secretary. Fully understand force of your argument in Secto 59/2/ and specifically agree that if a cease-fire is blatantly violated by the other side, we must face the prospect of UN and SEATO action and an appropriate military demonstration in Laos. For this, continued close understanding with the British is essential, and you should hold Home to the standards agreed at Key West and Bangkok. We have been going the last mile with them on the road of negotiation and cease-fire, and we will continue as long as reasonable men can agree that this road offers hope for a genuinely neutral Laos. But if there should be a serious change on the ground by military action of the other side, we should have clear British support for appropriate action. You should press this point with Home, with a view to clear understanding of common purpose. We should also aim at closest possible understanding with French, because three-power solidarity against Soviet pressure may be vital in even more important places this year. Our patience is being fully demonstrated; we must also maintain, with British support and French understanding, a readiness to act. This is the necessary condition for a productive conference.
/2/Document 85.
It remains essential that any action be in conditions which will in fact impose maximum responsibility upon the other side, and accordingly the olive branch and the arrows must never be separated.
Bowles
87. Editorial Note
The International Conference on Laos was scheduled to open at Geneva on May 12, but the heads of the British and Soviet Delegations, Foreign Minister Lord Home and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, met at noon and failed to agree on seating the Lao factions. Gromyko insisted that since there were three Lao parties discussing the cease-fire at Ban Namone in Laos, there should be three Lao parties seated at the conference: the Phoumi/Boun Oum group (the Royal Lao Government to the West); the political arm of the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Hak Xat; and the Souvanna Phouma neutralists (the legal government of Laos to the Eastern bloc). Speaking for the West, Home suggested a compromise whereby there was one empty seat at the conference table with the Lao groups in a separate position coming to the empty seat when called upon to speak. All that Gromyko would concede is that if the three Lao groups were seated, it would be wholly without commitment as to what would happen at the conference.
In a tripartite meeting at Geneva on May 12, at 3:30 p.m., Secretary of State Rusk and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville heard Home's account of his discussion with Gromyko and agreed that Home should inform Gromyko that the opening session should be postponed until May 16 so that all governments invited could be present. The interval would allow further thought to the Lao seating question. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/2, May 12; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1868)
The U.S. master records of the International Conference on Laos during the period in which Secretary Rusk was head of the U.S. Delegation are ibid., CF 1868-1874. CF 1868 contains a complete set of memoranda of conversation by U.S. Delegation members; CF 1869 contains the orders of the day; CF 1870 has the Administrative Series outlining administrative procedures for the conference; CF 1971 contains miscellaneous memoranda, papers, and telegrams relating to administration; CF 1871 contains substantive memoranda, papers, and telegrams; CF 1872 has the minutes of the U.S. Delegation meetings; CF 1873 contains a full set of briefing papers; and CF 1874 has a full verbatim record of the first six plenary sessions.
88. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 13, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Vientiane, and Bangkok.
Secto 94. I made one hour call on Gromyko this morning with Harriman and Pushkin present./2/ I started by asking Gromyko how he envisaged Laotian representation at conference. Gromyko said he saw two possible solutions. First was seating of coalition government if one "acceptable to all sides in Laos" could be formed prior to conference. If this not possible, alternative was seat representatives of "three existing forces" in Laos. These he described as Souvanna government, Pathet Lao and "rebels". Gromyko added if we had any doubts about reality of Pathet Lao movement we had only to look at map.
/2/A memorandum of conversation of this meeting between Rusk and Gromyko is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 and Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1868.
I pointed out our understanding this was to be conference of governments. I observed Pathet Lao was merely military arm of a political party. I said we had no objection political parties themselves being heard if conference so desired. However, I was unaware of any invitation to Pathet Lao. I asked him to clarify this point.
Gromyko said that from outset of talks between co-chairmen he had made his position clear that unless coalition government formed before conference the "three existing forces" must be represented. He said we did not like Pathet Lao because we apparently considered left wing or Communist-oriented. However, "there can be no step forward" so long as we adhere to such ideological considerations. In response to my repeated questioning whether Pathet Lao had been invited to conference and if so by whom, Gromyko asserted there had been "understanding" among co-chairmen that "efforts should be made to ensure that representatives of existing forces be physically available in Geneva." He had assumed each co-chairman would see to this. Soviets for their part had done so in arranging for Souvanna and Pathet Lao representatives to come. Question of neutral and independent Laos to which principle we all subscribed was political one to be resolved on tripartite basis mentioned.
I said we stood firmly for Laotian neutrality and independence but believed conference should not prejudice or instruct Lao on how to form government. We disagreed all Laos divided into three parts. Moreover it was not for us to decide or to intervene at conference in processes of forming government. Gromyko agreed conference should not interfere in internal affairs of Laos but insisted that understanding of Co-chairmen as to measures for providing Laotian representation was not interference. I said proposal for including Pathet Lao representation offered entirely new basis and we were not prepared to start conference on that basis. I reminded Gromyko Pathet Lao had not been seated at Geneva in 1954 but had been represented by Hanoi. Pushkin observed Pathet Lao were included in 1957 Vientiane agreements at which I noted that under those agreements they were supposed to disappear.
At this point Gromyko stated USSR wants to safeguard peace as he supposes does U.S. However, he had impression we were creating artificial difficulties on what Soviets regard as trifling matters since Pathet Lao after all were real Lao force, repeating again "as any glance at map will show". I asked him why he was so insistent if matter was so unimportant and noted again this was first time we had heard of any invitation to Pathet Lao. Gromyko said we were evidently intimidated by Pathet Lao and asked whether we did not want to hear them. I said we had no objection to hearing them but they should not be regarded on same level as governments. I asked Gromyko whether Souvanna himself did not claim to speak for Pathet Lao. Gromyko replied Souvanna and Pathet Lao agree on many things but not on question of speaking for Pathet Lao at conference.
I then asked Gromyko how in absence of agreement on Pathet Lao he thought we might get conference started since we were all eager to begin. He did not see how this could be done without Pathet Lao. As final thought I suggested as possible solution that Laos not be seated but that individual Lao might state their views in any way co-chairmen agreed. For example they could be seated in balconies and be called upon if they wished to speak. Under some such arrangement any formal agreement on Laos seating would be unnecessary and conference could proceed.
However, Gromyko held flatly to position that conference could not begin without Laos representation. He said in absence of coalition government he was prepared open conference today without seating any Lao at table (since Phoumi group absent) on condition tripartite seating be adopted Monday. I said we ready to begin today only under conditions I had outlined. Gromyko refused to envisage anything but tripartite representation, and we closed on this point. I said we would consult further with others.
I communicated foregoing to Lord Home and Couve before lunch. Couve will see Gromyko at three p.m. and sound him out in particular on how he envisages coalition government. Lord Home seeing Chen Yi at five.
Rusk
89. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 14, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1461. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador Brown. Passed to the White House for the President at 7:30 p.m. On another copy of this telegram, there was a note that indicated that the President and Bowles discussed this cable. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/14/61-5/31/61)
Secto 118./2/ Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary.
/2/Dated May 14, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1461)
Secto 116 contains text statement which two co-chairmen propose to make with possible amendment of time for opening meeting. Gromyko has been absolutely adamant in not yielding one jot or tittle in his original demand that all three Laotian groups be seated at the conference table, except to agree that they should be representatives from (not of) Laos. He expressly refused to agree that they should have the status of observers.
Decision before us is whether we attend conference, with some such statement as contained in Secto 117,/3/ refuse to attend, seek postponement or adopt some other position.
/3/In Secto 117, May 14, the Delegation at Geneva suggested issuing a statement indicating that while the United States considered the Royal Lao Government the only legal government, it would be prepared to hear other Lao factions at Geneva so long as it was accepted that the United States could not agree that their presence conferred any status which those Lao might individually claim. (Ibid.)
A. Relevant to our decision are following factors here:
1. We have no support among delegations in Geneva, with exception of RLG, to hold out on what non-Communist delegations consider to be a trivial point of procedure. The fact that point is considered important by Gromyko seems to impress no one. Possibility of influence of seating arrangements here upon relative prestige of parties in political discussions in Laos regarding coalition government is heavily discounted.
2. It is unfortunate that we have not had strong delegations from RLG, Thailand, and South Vietnam who might be helpful on a point of possible symbolic value in Southeast Asia.
3. It seems quite probable that British went considerably further in their talks in Moscow about arrangements for 14-power conference than we were told; I am not suggesting that this was deliberate since seating of Pathet Lao seems to have appeared to them as an inconsequential detail.
4. Canadians, Indians, Burmese have been ready to take Gromyko's formula from beginning. French and British have at least cooperated in trying on a variety of formulae but without success.
5. Gromyko is obviously enjoying himself and considers that he is in the driver's seat at least on this point.
6. Although US and Southeast Asia opinion may be quite different, it seems fairly obvious here that this particular issue is not a good one on which to break up the conference insofar as world opinion is concerned.
B. Other factors which are undoubtedly relevant are:
1. Reaction among countries near Laos, especially Thailand, Vietnam, and Philippines. Timing of this procedural issue in Geneva may make Vice President's mission Bangkok more difficult. Seating Pathet Lao could be decisive regarding Thai willingness send delegation at all.
2. US policy and public opinion which, though divided, might well be negative.
3. Reaction upon Soviets if we concede without slightest move on their part.
4. To be taken into account is importance of gaining time for stabilization cease-fire in Laos making it cumulatively more difficult for other side to renew fighting in absence political agreement to their liking. A conference-in-being is some insurance against resumption of fighting and is good background if such fighting requires reference to UN and SEATO.
5. Repeated reports out of Laos of meetings among "the three sides" which are used as arguments against us, as well possibility that political issues may be settled among Phoumi, Souvanna Phouma and Souvannavong thus making strong stand by us on seating look somewhat ridiculous.
6. My impression is that although we are isolated regarding seating there is considerable strength among Western and neutral group for effective international machinery to supervise and control military aspects of cease-fire and neutral Laos. We won't get all we want but we might get a good deal more by battling out such issues in this conference than by breaking it up.
7. If cease-fire holds, possibility of tolerable solution should be fully explored in conference rather than abandon effort this stage and choose between high risk of fighting and deliberate withdrawal US interest in Laos.
On balance, I recommend that we attend conference with statement contained Secto 117 and take every opportunity to make clear that we consider RLG the only government that country. Other Western delegates have indicated they are prepared to do the same. In other words, insofar as we are concerned, there is only one Laotian representative at the conference; we ignore any "strangers" present but get on with the conference in the interest of international agreement on a neutral independent Laos.
I believe this recommendation, coolly considered, is in our long-range interest although my personal reaction to situation in Geneva could be expressed in more lurid terms.
Since time is of essence, please telephone President's reaction.
If more detailed confidential instructions are to be sent, telephone approximate time we can expect.
Rusk
90. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva/1/
Washington, May 14, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1461. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by the President, Bowles, and U. Alexis Johnson, who also approved it.
Tosec 101. Eyes Only Secretary from Acting Secretary. President has seen text of Sectos 117/2/ and 118/3/ and dictated to me following message for you. I want you to know that President was very complimentary of way you are handling things and is fully satisfied that you are doing everything possible under circumstances. President entirely shares and understands your frustrations with situation with which you have been faced. President's message to you is as follows:
/2/See footnote 3, Document 89.
/3/Document 89.
"May 14, 1961.
I received your cable and think your judgment is right to continue. I am annoyed as I am sure you are at those who are associated with us or neutrals who permit us to carry the heavy load of argument before the press of the world with so little support. I am tired of reading that the Canadians, the British or the Indians are attempting to adjust feuds between the Russians and the militant Americans. I think you should make it clear to the Canadians, British and neutrals who will listen that you feel they are making a serious mistake, that you are prepared to stay at the conference however and then play a less prominent role. Let us see what they are able to do and if it looks as though it would be a disaster let us be prepared to withdraw at the appropriate moment and on an appropriate issue. I think we should let the British, etc. carry more of the burden, stay somewhat in the background, and continue to watch developments with great care."
Re Secto 117 President suggests following changes in proposed statement. Amend penultimate sentence first paragraph to read as follows: "This is considered particularly helpful, for example, when questions affecting cease fire arrangements are involved, even though such other Laotians present do not possess governmental status." Delete all of last sentence first paragraph./4/ Delete last two sentences second paragraph./5/
/4/After indicating that the Delegation thought it appropriate for the conference to hear other Lao with whom the Royal Lao Government was then holding discussions, the penultimate sentence of paragraph 1 of Secto 117 reads: "This is considered to be particularly helpful for example, when questions affecting the cease-fire arrangements are involved." The last sentence of this paragraph read: "If other individuals from Laos are present, the US Delegation cannot agree that their presence confers any status which they might individually claim."
/5/The last two sentences read: "Any arrangements affecting Laos would, of course, have to be acceptable to the duly constituted Government of that country. It is on this basis that the US Delegation expects to attend the conference when convened." For the statement as released on May 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1003.
Bowles
91. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 15, 1961, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1561. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane, Moscow, Warsaw, and London, and to Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Rangoon, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, USUN, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and priority to CINCPAC for POLAD.
Secto 146. Conference on Laos--daily summary number 5, May 15.
Following receipt of instructions from Department,/2/ Secretary informed Lord Home that US could accept formulation to seat representatives from Laos proposed by individual governments participating in conference. In effect, we would thereby agree to disagree regarding seating question and we would propose participation of RLG as legitimate Lao Government, another delegation would propose Souvanna group for participation, and others presumably would propose PL. However, Lord Home also was informed that on basis then existing instructions RLG could not participate in conference and Lao delegates in Geneva were awaiting new instructions, from RLG.
/2/See Document 90.
In late morning we received message from Embassy Vientiane giving UK version of new RLG instructions to effect that RLG would be willing have no Lao representation at opening ceremonial session but could agree all three groups take part in subsequent business meetings./3/ When Home informed of this development he suggested it might be possible eliminate ceremonial opening, reschedule first meeting for Tuesday, 5 p.m. Geneva time with Sihanouk opening first meeting as "business" session. UK later reported that at lunch with Gromyko today latter agreed to this suggestion.
/3/Telegram 2082 from Vientiane, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1561)
Secretary saw Lao delegation this evening and urged them to participate at opening "business" meeting now scheduled Tuesday p.m./4/ Instruction also sent Ambassador Brown to seek broader instructions for RLG delegation permit them decide question participation on spot in consultation US and other friendly delegations./5/
/4/May 16.
/5/In telegram 25 from Geneva to Vientiane, repeated to Washington as Secto 139, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1561)
Meanwhile, latest instructions received by RLG delegation this afternoon continue firm line RLG delegation should not participate under any circumstances in which RLG not recognized as sole legal representative; no objection seating others in qualified observer status.
Secretary has sent personal message to Thanat explaining US concern over conference developments and urging Thai participation and support./6/
/6/In telegram 15 from Geneva to Bangkok, repeated to Washington as Secto 126, May 15. (Ibid.)
US delegation engaged in intensive consultations all day in attempt make our position clear to French, Canadians, Indians, Burmese, Australians, West Germans.
Rusk
92. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, May 16, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1661. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Geneva for Fecon and to Canberra, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2084. For about one hour late evening 15 May Phoumi spoke his mind to Hasey. Following summary of the one way conversation:
Phoumi flatly stated does not understand US policy. US says one thing; does another. For months US took strong position against allowing ICC into Laos; opposed any 14-nation conference; stood firmly against Pathet Lao participation in government; and only two or three days ago publicly stated that Soviet proposal to seat PLG conference table was unacceptable. But Phoumi continued, US actions were very different. Phoumi asked many times, after talking on various subjects, "is US abandoning Laos?"
Phoumi said that King would never leave LP; that King had told him not to have helicopter standing by as he would never shirk tasks left him by his father. King would leave his blood in LP but would never run away.
Several times Phoumi asked what would US do if LP and/or Vientiane were attacked. Phoumi pointed out how possible attack could take place within very few days. Phoumi claims that enemy is already probing his outer Vientiane defenses.
Phoumi claims that enemy is strong because it has "determined friends." Enemy's friends did not make Viet Minh and ChiComs leave Laos when ICC came in like the Americans made the Thais leave.
At one point Hasey stated that Phoumi must have confidence in US and sometimes it is necessary to give a little to gain a lot. Phoumi said that he alone was responsible for running his country and he had to make decisions on facts, not blind confidence. Phoumi also said that when King recently questioned him on his policies he replied to King that he was forced to follow blindly American line and he had no idea where it would go.
Phoumi claims that "everyone" from King on down ask him, "Where are your American friends now?" also, "Is America really abandoning Laos?"
Brown
93. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 17, 1961, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1761. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent niact to Vientiane as telegram 39.
Secto 164. Greatly appreciate Tosec 120/2/ and Vientiane's 36/3/ commenting on my Secto 125. Believe Department and Brown should review whether events are not moving much faster than we now think with respect to a coalition government which we will not like.
/2/In Tosec 120, May 15, the Department suggested to Rusk that if the Geneva Conference were to break down, it should be on an issue that clearly demonstrated the Communist side's unwillingess to accept a truly neutral Laos. The issue of seating the three Lao factions was not such an example. Rather than using a coalition government under the King, which Rusk had suggested in Secto 125 (also sent to Vientiane as telegram 20, May 15) to head off a dangerous coalition under Souvanna Phouma, the Department suggested concentrating at Geneva on effective supervision, multilateral aid, or disarmament which were all issues central to the principle of a neutral Laos. (Both ibid., 751J.00/5-1561)
/3/In telegram 36, from Vientiane to Geneva, repeated to Washington as telegram 2087, May 16, Brown stated that it would be a mistake for King Savang to try to form a coalition government. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-1661)
Believe you should take into account fact that Commies at Geneva are full of confidence and appear to be utterly relaxed about achieving their goals in Laos. Their speeches have been short and moderate, their demeanor friendly and they are purring like cats. I find it difficult to believe that this is because they want a neutral Laos as we see it. They expect a coalition government and a coalition delegation almost momentarily. Of course they could be wrong but so could we. For exactly reasons Commies have in mind, of course, it might be impossible for the King to form a government based upon RLG and Souvanna Phouma group since latter might be wholly unwilling to take the gamble.
My Secto 125 was not intended as an action instruction but to raise the question whether this or some other prompt action could be taken to head off what seemed predictable from Geneva environment. I have supposed that RLG may now be sufficiently intimidated by Pathet Lao or sufficiently discouraged about possibility of SEATO action that their pol position could collapse without warning to US.
Purpose this message is to inform Department and Vientiane that it looks from here as if time is running out fast in Laos, and that what is happening at Geneva is conditioned more by events there than here.
Would appreciate your comments soonest.
Rusk
94. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 17, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1761. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Vientiane, and Bangkok.
Secto 166. Following based uncleared memorandum of conversation: Gromyko called on me at 2:30 at his request./2/ He expressed cautious optimism on prospects for agreement provided both sides want independent and neutral Laos. He considers cease-fire situation now as "almost ideal" and expressed great surprise I had raised question about it at this morning's meeting asking co-chairmen to solicit ICC cooperation in reporting all violations. He had impression we were seeking pretext to stir things up. I explained we had received information of substantial fighting in Padong area which ICC was not reporting and could lead to deteriorating situation directly affecting negotiations here. I expressed our concern with ICC procedures for reporting only when requested by both sides, which I explained is tantamount to no investigation. Unsatisfactory discussion followed. Gromyko insisted we can't change ICC operating rules and if we look at situation with magnifying glass we will raise abnormal suspicions, and I maintained suspicions will arise only to extent violations are concealed and not reported.
/2/The memorandum of conversation of this meeting, US/MC/21, May 17, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1868.
On conference procedures, I asked Gromyko for his views about getting right down to committee work without waiting until end of general debate which will take a few days. He preferred to wait until all proposals ventilated in debate, but saw no objection meanwhile to informal talks perhaps to explore areas of common ground.
We touched on disarmament only briefly and I commented that lack of progress on test ban was not good augury for general disarmament talks. In this connection, I inquired whether "troika" principle was in fact far-reaching Soviet doctrine. He said that in test ban talks principle was well-founded but hoped some headway could nevertheless be made in preliminary talks on general disarmament in Washington in June and Moscow in July.
I took Gromyko to task for holding fast to tripartite approach on question of Lao seating at conference, observing that tripartite discussion among Lao themselves was one thing but not legitimate and proper solution for purposes of international conference. I told Gromyko his adamancy on this point was not calculated to improve Soviet-American relations, since there were after all but two governments--recognized by one side or other--involved. Gromyko got the point but claimed Pathet Lao were central element in picture, disclaimed existence of any Soviet instructions to Pathet Lao, and said Soviets had got nothing out of Pathet Lao seating.
Other noteworthy points mentioned were:
1. Soviet airlift which Gromyko described only as supplying economic aid and equated with our aid to Phoumi. (He also contended our intelligence information on airlift incorrect and there have been ten US flights for each Soviet flight.);
2. Canadian stress in Green's speech today on need for effective control and supervision in any new arrangements for Laos, which Gromyko observed would present delicate problem of possible infringements on Lao sovereignty;
3. Gromyko's reference to still incomplete withdrawal of KMT irregulars from Burma and Laos as matter giving them serious concern. On latter point, I told him Burmese apparently no longer much concerned and suggested if this was particularly sore point with Communist Chinese they might find discussions with Burmese reassuring.
Discussion with Gromyko was somewhat more relaxed and informal than our first talk here/3/ but held little of substance that was very promising.
/3/See Document 88.
Rusk
95. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 19, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-1961. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.
Secto 182. Eyes Only for the President from the Secretary.
I plan depart Geneva early Saturday morning,/2/ after considerable attention Friday to Thai FonMin./3/ Home, De Murville, Green departing Friday.
/2/May 20.
/3/Rusk met with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at 3 p.m., May 19, at Geneva. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
After painful question Laos representation, conference now well into fundamental issues. First is reinforcement cease-fire. On this Western delegations are united and getting some help from neutrals. Bloc will try to hamper such moves and try to keep negotiations Laos and Geneva under threat of resumed fighting. Canadians now being very helpful on cease-fire problems.
Second major issue will be vetoes scattered through any arrangements for long-range supervision and control. Soviets have made it clear in private talks that these are not negotiable, thereby throwing light on seriousness this point in nuclear test talks. Gromyko told me that Soviet Union will not subject interests Soviet Union to decisions made by others. On this issue majority of conference will be united, including some neutrals. Believe, however, Krishna Menon may be startled by extent to which press pictures him in head-on clash with Soviets on this point and may try to compromise.
Third major issue turns more on events in Laos than at Geneva though conference will be fundamentally affected. If a coalition government is formed on basis of thirds for three "forces" now at table, arrangements here about neutrality may be devoid of meaning or even fraudulent.
My own estimate is that an acceptable agreement will not result from this conference. Since it is a classical diplomatic conference without voting procedures issues cannot be resolved by majorities. It seems to me that we should concentrate hard on cease-fire and not feel under pressure to hurry conference to conclusion. Cease-fire plus sitting conference leave way open for RLG to stand against disastrous coalition if King and non-Communists prepared to be stubborn. If cease-fire collapses, situation then also more favorable for reference to UN and possibly SEATO.
Presence delegations Saigon, Bangkok, and Vientiane has helped as has influence Prince Sihanouk. I had not fully appreciated extent to which US had become isolated on Laos by acts previous administration seen both by friends and neutrals as overplaying our hand. Impression that US had "earned" Communist reaction against present RLG has been deep-seated but now being steadily overcome by your efforts in support of neutral Laos and patience in negotiation. Negative reactions Bangkok and Saigon were predictable and understandable and both will need realistic and persistent support by US.
Averell Harriman has situation well in hand to take over here and will do admirable job.
Rusk
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos/1/
Vientiane, May 22, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2261. Confidential. Repeated to the Department of State, London, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and New Delhi. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2129. From numerous sources, both in press and from members RLG Delegation, we understand atmosphere at Ban Namone most oppressive psychologically from RLG viewpoint.
At very outset RLG went to Namone in wake of successive concessions to PL intransigence--first giving up proposal to hold talks at Luang Prabang, then rebuffed on offer hold military talks at Hin Heup, then on suggestion that military talks be held at Namone while political talks proceed at Phonehong, then conceding to holding both military and political talks at Namone, and finally agreeing to discuss political matters first. RLG feeling that lack strong united Western support had helped to bring RLG thus far on road of concession no doubt added to feeling of weakness RLG Delegates on entering talks.
RLG Delegates have confided to Embassy officers that they have been given an "inferiority complex" by PL negotiators. PL and Souvanna group comport themselves like conquerors who have come to dictate terms to the vanquished. Presence of battle-hardened PL troops in Namone village drives home to RLG Delegates weakness their position. Message reinforced by well-staged demonstrations by villagers, peace-slogan placards and by such transparent but effective gestures as having Soviet helicopters flying overhead when RLG Delegates arrive.
RLG Delegates admit they are outclassed as orators and propagandists by other side. Such normally articulate men as Keo Viprakone and Pheng Norindr complain, moreover, that they are handicapped by narrowness their instructions so that they cannot exploit obvious propaganda openings for RLG for fear of exceeding their instructions. Some delegates have also remarked that General Sing and Ou Voravong are easy prey to PL tactic of embarrassing them personally by attacks on illogic of RLG positions. No doubt all RLG team susceptible to jibes and PL aspersions on their personal intelligence. Still further complicating factor, some delegates report, is that Phoumi does not brief delegation as a whole and each delegate is thus apt to understand instructions in a different way. Confusion within delegation was particularly apparent at May 17 meeting when General Sing gave way on placing political item first on agenda against other delegates' urging him to delay until they could consult Phoumi.
Psychological factor, however, is apparently most persuasive and debilitating for RLG Delegation. Keo Viprakone particularly has complained that RLG insistence on talking about cease-fire put its delegation in position of suppliants who have lost all capacity and will to fight. Keo argues that it is a classical necessity in negotiations to talk as if one were ready to break off at any time and resume argument on battlefield. Unfortunately for RLG, Keo points out, it is hard to take this stance with any conviction because RLG feels abandoned by its friends. Only USG can restore spirit of confidence by giving assurance to RLG that it will not be deserted if civil war should resume.
All members RLG Delegation appear agree their strongest card at Namone is constitutional legality Boun Oum government. They feel it is safe to preceed with discussing coalition government so long as RLG insists other side accept constitution, National Assembly, and monarchy as foundation any coalition. Some delegates have stressed that RLG position on seating at Geneva is corollary to using this one trump card of legality and that US should therefore support RLG insistence this point.
One eloquent vignette of scene at Ban Namone has been role of Pheng Phongsavan. Seems to be no doubt that all sides regard Pheng as de facto chairman of meetings if only because he is eldest present and out of respect his being former president National Assembly. At first talks individual RLG Delegates tried wean Pheng away from all-out PL negotiation line; they report that at beginning Pheng seemed impressed but in later sessions PL have seen to it that one or more of their men have moved into any private conversations between Pheng and RLG Delegates. Phongsavan confided to Norindr at one point, "it is not so easy as you may think to keep position of independence when you are surrounded day and night by these fellows." (See also CAS report FOV 4458.)
Consensus RLG negotiators seems to be that Namone meetings could not produce coalition government in any case because such a development could only re [sic] about by "summit" meeting of Phoumi, Souvanna and Souphanouvong.
If Phoumi sticks to policy he has outlined to US for Ban Namone talks, further meetings there might avert more tactical concessions to other side. It is obvious however that delegates in their present state of mind and being preoccupied with loss of face personally at meetings might be led into further forensic and propaganda traps by other side. RLG would be strengthened by adding skilled negotiator like Phoui Sananikone or Sisouk Na Champassak to delegation but we have no indication Phoumi thinking in that direction.
Creel
97. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 24, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2461. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.
Confe 42. For Secretary from Harriman.
MacDonald has just presented US and French at tripartite discussion results of his meeting with Gromyko. British presented draft instructions to ICC as reported our tel Confe 43./2/ Gromyko disagreed contending no instruction necessary. After considerable pressure by MacDonald Gromyko produced prepared alternative draft as follows: "The co-chairmen have received the report of the International Commission for supervision and control in Laos of May 20, 1961 and have carefully examined it. They express the hope that there will be no repetition of the misunderstandings arising in connection with the implementation of the cease-fire arrangements. The co-chairmen proceed from the fact that, whenever the Commission considers it necessary, it will continue to inform them as to the exercise of its functions on the supervision of the cease-fire." Under questioning, Gromyko affirmed that in USSR view, ICC powerless to investigate complaints without express consent of both parties.
/2/In the draft instructions in Confe 43, May 24, the Co-Chairmen ordered the ICC to investigate "substantial infringement of the cease-fire" immediately and on the spot. In addition, the co-chairman called an immediate agreement on a cease-fire by the various parties in Laos. In the meantime, there should be a military standstill. (Ibid.)
British take Soviet refusal to cooperate on this issue as basic and serious. They regard this as issue of substantive importance on which firm stand must be taken. French agree. In fact when MacDonald said that Indians and Canadians had separately suggested confrontation on this issue might be avoided by attempting to work out satisfactory instruction to their members of the ICC, Chauvel objected saying that this is an issue which must be met head on.
Both British and French point out that in Soviet-UK exchanges in preparation for the conference one issue was crystal-clear and fully documentable, that not only was a verifiable cease-fire an absolute prerequisite to the holding of conference but that ICC must be subject in first instance to instructions by co-chairmen and later by conference with respect to their responsibility to control and supervise cease-fire. For Russians to renege at this early stage and to take position noted above as to ICC inspection powers is unacceptable.
Tripartite meeting endorsed the following procedure: MacDonald will see Pushkin tomorrow to inform Soviets that instructions to ICC must go forward. He will point out that ICC asked for instructions, and insist that co-chairmen get on with task of making cease-fire more efficient through ICC.
If Pushkin refuses he will remind him of UK-Soviet pre-conference agreement and tell him that matter will be referred London for instructions. He will further point out to Pushkin that with ICC report now in hand asking for instructions, other delegations will require an explanation from the co-chairmen as to why they have not answered. MacDonald will tell Pushkin that under these circumstances he will have to bring whole matter to the conference for debate not later than Monday.
Meantime UK, French, ourselves will alert friendly delegations to support strong stand on this issue.
If debate (presumably two or three days) fails to induce Russian cooperation, British will suggest suspension of conference sessions until agreement reached on this issue. MacDonald believes if Soviets continue to hold to their position conference should then be adjourned.
Comment: It is clear that battle may be joined on an issue of real substance and principle. It is further most fortunately clear that British can take the lead in this confrontation with strong support from France. While giving strong support we can allow others to move out in front. If conference should break on this issue consequences in Laos may be grave. I therefore request instructions soonest as to position I should take in the showdown. You will of course note relation of timetable sketched above to Paris, Vienna and London meetings. At today's meeting I concurred in British taking firm stand with Pushkin and told them I ask Washington for instructions.
(Gromyko phoned Harriman cancelling luncheon date tomorrow saying he returning to Moscow tonight. He had not informed MacDonald of his planned departure.)/3/
/3/In Confe 44, May 25, Harriman supplemented Confe 42 with the observation that he doubted the British Government would support MacDonald to the point of adjournment of the conference, although London might agree to a suspension for a period to see if an effective cease-fire could be achieved. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-2561)
98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos/1/
Washington, May 25, 1961, 10:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2561. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, and Usher. Repeated priority to Vientiane eyes only for Ambassador Brown and priority to USUN eyes only for Stevenson.
Fecon 22. Ref: Confe 42/2/ and 44./3/ Eyes Only Harriman from Secretary.
/2/Document 97.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 97.
Agree with your analysis and proposed line of action on issue of Co-Chairmen's instructions to ICC. Believe you should stand firmly behind British and French position and assist them to mobilize maximum support from other members of Conference. It is of first importance to get this issue thoroughly clarified in debate at Conference table, particularly if there is substantial agreement outside Sino-Soviet bloc that effective cease fire and effectiveness of future control machinery are indispensable to any possible successful outcome.
Whether Conference should be formally broken off would seem to me to turn upon two factors taken together. The first is the issue covered above. The second is significant military action in Laos indicating intention to continue takeover despite cease fire and existence of Conference. Debate on the issue in Geneva, standing alone, does not provide a convincing base for prompt reference Laotian question to UN and immediate consideration SEATO or other action. But issue joined in Geneva debate plus further aggression on ground do provide such base.
Suggest that issue be vigorously debated when Conference resumes on Monday but that, in absence of military action in Laos, debate not lead to adjournment sine die of Conference prior to Vienna meeting.
So long as Conference is in session, other side would have to accept full responsibility for renewal significant military activity. Meanwhile, Canadians and Indians might be persuaded to get ICC in Laos to exercise fully its authority. This could commit India further and impose some additional restraint on other side in Laos. Longer range implications of issue of effective cease fire fully understood here and intergovernmental discussion will be possible during President's and my visits this coming week.
Rusk
99. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 27, 1961, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2761. Top Secret.
Confe 65. Eyes Only for the Secretary from Harriman.
At meeting this afternoon, including French, MacDonald supplies us with copies of message from Frank Roberts after his talks with Kuznetsov. This was repeated British Embassy Washington and you have undoubtedly been given substance of message reporting Soviet response. It appears that while Kuznetsov said that he agreed that ICC should investigate on the spot, he later largely nullified this by saying that British draft instructions were too complicated, that everyone knew that cease-fire in fact existed, and in short made no commitment to do anything.
This Soviet attitude appears a continuation of stalling tactics which they have effectively used throughout April right up to eve of conference opening. We now find ourselves in the unhappy position two weeks later of being subject to their same maneuvers with cease-fire blatantly violated with same inhibiting tactics being used to deny exercise of control by ICC.
Today's intelligence indicates that Pa Dong is under heavy attack, supplemented by UPI correspondent eye-witness story from Pa Dong on May 26, appearing Paris edition New York Times on 27th. Also A.P. story from Pa Dong of May 27 by Inigaki which reports heavy fighting has made mockery of cease-fire agreement.
Soviet maneuvers have placed us in exact position we earlier declined to accept, namely, attending conference before cease-fire effective. Believe that this issue of cease-fire and ICC instructions should be first order of business when conference reconvenes Monday afternoon. If debate delayed, issue will lose much of its urgency, particularly should Pa Dong fall before we have recorded our position.
I am sure you understand the vital bearing of this issue on our relations with our good friends the Thais and South Vietnamese, as well as its contribution to increasing arrogance of Soviets and other Communists.
I hope you will agree that I should bring pressure on MacDonald to carry out his original proposal for debate Monday.
Am confident of French support.
Request instructions urgently./2/
/2/Telegram 37 to Geneva, May 28, informed Harriman that Document 101 made clear the Department's strong concurrence with his views in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2861)
Martin
100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, May 27, 1961./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2761. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and Moscow for Ambassadors and Geneva Fecon for Harriman. This telegram (apart from Macmillan's letter) was drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McGeorge Bundy.
/2/The time of transmission is illegible except that it was sent in the "p.m."; it was probably sent around 10 p.m.
5553. Following is text of letter to President from Macmillan delivered by British Embassy, Washington, May 26:
"My dear Mr. President,
"As you will have seen the Geneva Conference on Laos has got struck and on a vital issue. The Russians and Chinese are insisting that the International Control Commission now in Laos can only investigate complaints of a breach of the truce or other incidents if both sides agree. What is perhaps even more serious they seem to visualize for the future regime of a neutral Laos an International Control Commission to be itself governed by the unanimity rule.
"If the Russians will not give way during the talks which are being held this weekend we may all feel it necessary to have it out with them in public. On the other hand if the position in Laos remains in fact reasonably stable there is a good deal to be said for postponing a public showdown until after your meeting with Mr. Khrushchev.
"I venture therefore to put this thought to you. Could you early in your talks with him say that unless agreement can be reached quickly about Laos which is certainly not a vital Russian interest then there does not seem much of an outlook for wider agreements. You could tell him with complete truth that the way to a quick and successful conclusion to the Conference is very simple:
(i) The Powers assembled should solemnly declare that they will respect the neutrality of Laos.
(ii) An International Control Commission to supervise the control of arms which would have complete freedom of movement and action and would not be subject in their work to any veto whether internal or external.
"I hope you will not mind my putting this thought to you. I have no doubt that in one way or another we can all manage to keep the Conference alive until after your meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. It is perhaps equally important to gain some time because we shall have to consider pretty carefully what to do if the Conference finally fails."
"Yours sincerely, s/Harold Macmillan"
Immediately following telegram contains reply.
Rusk
101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, May 27, 1961./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2761. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McConaughy, Usher, Rusk, Bundy, and the President in substance. Repeated priority to Bangkok, Vientiane, Moscow, and Geneva Fecon.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 100.
5554. Eyes only Ambassadors and Harriman. Ref 5553./3/ Deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister soonest:
/3/Document 100.
"My dear Mr. Prime Minister:
"Thank you for your letter of May 26 on the issue of the International Control Commission's powers.
"I agree that this issue is vital and I have it very much in mind to raise with Khrushchev in the likely event that it will not have been resolved by the Conference.
"Upon reflection, I think that we cannot avoid debating the issue in the Conference during the coming week. Postponement would have a demoralizing effect on some of our friends, especially the Thai and the Vietnamese, and could lead to a strengthening of the Communist view that they have us on the run in Laos. I would not suppose that a joining of the issue in debate among representatives of the Conference would make any talk with Mr. Khrushchev on the matter more difficult, especially if there is indication of neutral support in Geneva for an effectively controlled cease fire.
"Nevertheless, I agree that we should not ourselves break up the Conference on this issue at this time. You and I can discuss this after my talk with Khrushchev. Our present aims in debate at Geneva might be to clarify the issue, to call to public attention the continuing Communist violations of the cease fire, and to build up neutral support.
"Of course, the other side could terminate the Conference or could press military action on the ground despite a Conference in being. Either event would present us with some very serious decisions. If we decide that some military demonstration is required to reestablish negotiations or to support a United Nations call for a cease fire, we believe that SEATO Plan Five could be speedily adapted to that somewhat more limited objective. Regarding your Embassy's Aide-M[moire of May 25th on contingency planning,/4/ therefore, we would agree that Admiral Felt and General Hull could profitably discuss possible modifications of Plan Five. I am asking Dean Rusk to see Harold Caccia about terms of reference for the military planners.
/4/The aide-memoire was attached to a memorandum of conversation, May 25, between Rusk and British Ambassador Caccia. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
"Meanwhile, our delegation in Geneva will keep in closest touch with yours since it is important that we all try to move together on this matter.
Sincerely yours,"
Copy also delivered British Embassy, Washington, May 27. Inform Department time of delivery.
Rusk
102. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, May 28, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Vientiane.
Confe 68. For the Secretary from Harriman.
Should this conference be able to resolve immediate issue of effective cease-fire and move forward into problems of control and neutrality, future role of French in Laos will assume cardinal importance. Seems increasingly apparent large majority of conference envisages elimination of U.S. military presence and influence in Laos and re-institution of French monopoly in this field as established by 1954 Geneva Accords. Communists have been equivocal on this point but there good chance they will use tactic of offering this "concession" in order to carry conference with them on other points they deem more important. Prospects for conference deciding future training and guidance Lao forces to be made responsibility of Asian or European neutral or neutrals seem very remote at this juncture.
There is, therefore, strong possibility that France may emerge from this conference in the position, internationally recognized, of primary agent of the free world in Laos./2/ I am sure all of us view this with mixed feelings. Performance of French, during period of fourth French Republic, was totally inadequate. French never made full use of military facilities accorded them under 1954 Geneva Accords. Efforts made in training Lao forces fell far short of the mark. Legend arose that French were using Laos as dumping ground for inferior military and civilian officials.
/2/In telegram 5239 from Paris, the Embassy concurred with Harriman's analysis in this telegram and suggested that France probably was now prepared to assume both a training and equipping role for a much reduced in size and lightly armed FAL. The Embassy seconded the idea of the President raising the issue with President de Gaulle during his trip to Paris, May 31-June 2. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-3061)
From what we gather here, French military are far from enthusiastic at prospect of taking on this heavy and very costly responsibility in an area which to the French is now geographically remote.
On other hand we gather that Quai d'Orsay are strongly of belief that if international community indicates desire for re-establishment of substantial French presence in Laos, France must accept this challenge. De Gaulle reportedly supports this view. This of course fits in with his concept of global interests of France which elevate it to status beyond other European countries and into full membership of a tripartite hierarchy of the West.
Problem therefore seems to be one of assuring, from the outset, that French will return to Laos with sufficient resources, initiative, and determination to do their utmost keep Laos truly neutral. Our influence over French in this regard is probably greater now than it will be in future. Once, as a result of international agreement, we are militarily out of Laos and French are in, they will doubtless feel much less inclined to accept our advice.
Assurance we seek from French is a major one and open-ended as to time and magnitude of commitment. It would seem that best way to go about getting it is to engage personal honor of de Gaulle and seek from him personal undertaking that fifth French Republic will not shirk responsibilities it accepts in name of West. De Gaulle might well respond to such a proposition if put to him directly by the President. You may wish to suggest to the President the possibility of him making an approach along these lines to de Gaulle in the course of the Paris visit./3/
/3/In telegram 5253 to Paris for the President, repeated to Vientiane as telegram 1317, May 30, Rusk endorsed the idea of Kennedy asking de Gaulle what France would be prepared to do in Laos and pledging U.S. support for a strengthened French role there. (Ibid.)
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