Docs 103-114
103. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/2
Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. This discussion took place at the Elysee Palace. The master records of the President's State visit to Paris May 31-June 3, are ibid.
PRESIDENT'S VISIT
Paris, May 31-June 2, 1961
SUBJECT
Wednesday Afternoon Talks
PARTICIPANTS
United States
President Kennedy
Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)
France
General de Gaulle
Mr. Lebel (Interpreter)
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
Laos
The President raised the question of Laos. In his opinion, the United States has made mistakes in the past. As a result, it is now in a difficult situation. There exists a commitment on the part of the United States and on the basis of the Geneva Protocols and of SEATO. This commitment must be taken into account. The U.S. Government has been seeking a cease-fire and neutralization of Laos. This, however, may no longer be possible. It would have been possible three years ago, but the situation is different now. The immediate question is what to do at the conference in Geneva.
General de Gaulle said that the situation is "compromised." He does not wish to harp on the past; when it seems the U.S. had the unfortunate illusion that Laos could be made into something strong. In fact. Laos is an unhappy country with no unity, either political or national; it is, in fact, a nonentity which cannot be built up into anything at all. The presence of the U.S. in Laos brings with it Soviet intervention; in any struggle in Laos, the Soviets have the advantage because of their propaganda and because they have devoted efficient agents while we do not. Therefore, the situation is very bad indeed. The question is what to do. The best solution seems to be to encourage the King to form a government which would not be fully and exclusively Communist. It is clear that the Pathet Lao would be in the government as it is too late to prevent them from entering into one, but they might not be in such government alone. Souvanna Phouma should be encouraged. The French know him well. He is not a Communist. He is trying to use the Communists and the Communists are trying to use him but he is not a Communist himself and he has friends. He might be able to establish a government which would make Laos "more or less" neutral. It would be better if the West did not appear to apply any pressure, as by doing so, it would lose the last cards it has to play. Without doing it openly, it would be good to encourage Souvanna Phouma and to encourage the King to take Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. The Government will include Communists but will not be fully Communist. Moreover, the French are authorized by the Geneva Agreements to maintain some influence in Laos. They can have a small military advisory group and also teachers and technicians. No Laotian wants such French advisors to leave, and these can constitute a sort of listening post for the West in Laos.
The President agreed that Souvanna Phouma may be the best available solution even though obviously he is not a very good one. It may, however, be too late to hope that Souvanna Phouma will succeed in maintaining the sort of balance because of the imbalance in the military positions. This may make Souvanna Phouma a prisoner or, if this term is too strong, may place him under a great degree of control on the part of the Communists as a consequence of the military collapse of the Royal Army.
General de Gaulle said that this was indeed possible. He thought that at the beginning Souvanna Phouma might be very close to the Communists but then little by little he might be able to push them farther away--although obviously not very far away.
More generally speaking, Southeast Asia, and that applies to Laos, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and even Thailand, is not a good terrain for the West to fight on. The best thing to do is to encourage neutralism in that area, the more so that the Soviets themselves do not have any strong desire to move in. They will, however, tend to follow every time the West moves in.
The President said that the U.S. is faced with two problems, one of them being the commitment under the SEATO Protocols. Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower entered into such commitments. President Kennedy has reaffirmed them in the hope of arriving at a cease-fire. At the present moment, the prestige of the United States is engaged and if the solution to the Laotian problem is a Communist one, there can be grave repercussions not only in Thailand, in Viet-Nam, and in Malaya, but also in India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey--all the countries along the southern flank of the Soviet Union. It may have been unwise on the part of the United States in the past to have committed itself to this part of the world but the fact is that those commitments exist at the present moment and the question is how to disengage in the best possible way. Secondly, there are commitments also in regard to Thailand and southern Viet-Nam and, there again, it is difficult to avoid the consequences of such commitments. The President agreed that the Soviets may not seek a penetration in south Viet-Nam but the Viet Minh does and it is probable that it would have sought to penetrate into Viet-Nam regardless of whether the U.S. would or would not have been present there. The question is what to do in regard to Viet-Nam and to Thailand. The U.S. is seeking to help those countries, in particular through military training, and the question is not especially in regard to Viet-Nam whether such aid will be successful. It must, nevertheless, be tried as an abandonment of those countries by the U.S. would have repercussions elsewhere in the countries which were mentioned before and also in the Philippines, South Korea, and even Japan.
General de Gaulle said that he understood the difficulties with which the United States is faced. France was deeply engaged in Indo-China and had to leave that country under circumstances which the President undoubtedly remembers. Yet France has kept some influence in those countries, but she can keep that influence only because she does not undertake any military action, or any action in the military field, in either Laos, Cambodia, or Viet-Nam. It seems that to have an influence in those countries and to exercise a military action in them are mutually contradictory. In the minds of the people of that area, any military action is equivalent to a desire to rule them.
[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Of course, it is not easy to change policies. Yet, it is not so difficult either, especially if it can be done in coordination with Nehru and with the Japanese. There exists a genuine Western influence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans but in some areas the best way to further that influence is to seek neutrality even if that neutrality is only more or less genuine. In the countries of Southeast Asia the West can keep its influence only without military commitments, by extending its influence on a cultural plane and also by avoiding to give too much money to those countries. Money makes them corrupt and the governmental corruption makes government unpopular. This is what is happening at the present moment in South Viet-Nam.
The President said that the problem for the U.S. is that it has treaty commitments and has been identified with those commitments. If the United States withdraws, Viet-Nam and possibly Thailand might even collapse. It is true that these countries and especially Viet-Nam might collapse even without the U.S. backing out. We must, however, think of the consequences. The part played by those countries in regard to Asia is perhaps identical with the part played by Berlin with regard to Europe. Already the fact that the U.S. has not intervened in Laos has created great difficulties for us in the Philippines. If now we were to withdraw from Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam were to collapse, that could be taken as a precedent, especially if it were done voluntarily.
General de Gaulle said that he agreed with the President as to the difficulty of the situation. This difficult situation is due to past mistakes in policy. At the time when France withdrew from Indo-China, the ties of the countries concerned with the West were ties with France. After a military withdrawal of the French, those ties were little by little strengthened in the economic and the cultural areas. The U.S. unfortunately felt obligated to more or less replace France in Indo-China. This was not good and now we are suffering the consequences. France does not intend to repeat the mistakes of the past and feels that it will not intervene, at least not militarily and not at present.
The President said that the pressing problem is the Geneva conference. There we should try to obtain for Laos a government as good as possible, in the same sense in which President de Gaulle meant it. It is possible that the French presence in Laos can be helpful and that Souvanna Phouma who is friendly towards France, as he is not to the United States, may be the best choice. Two problems remain, however; first, that of strengthening the Control Commission, not only for the present but for the future. The insistence of the Soviets on the principle of unanimity within this commission renders the situation extremely difficult. Can one hope to see the Polish member vote with the others?
General de Gaulle said that the best thing would be to seek to go back to the 1954 Geneva Agreements. These were signed by everybody including the Chinese. It is moreover something which everyone understands. We should therefore seek to go back to it.
The President said that we would like to have a better functioning Control Commission but the best that we can do is probably to return to the Geneva Convention.
General de Gaulle said that such a course of action would have the added advantage of bringing India into the picture. An Indian is the chairman of the Control Commission, and moreover Mr. Nehru is personally interested in it. By returning to it we would be forcing India to take her responsibilities. This should be done without appearing to interfere.
The President said, however, that a return to the Geneva convention might be prevented by the Soviet insistence on the principle of unanimity within the Commission, where it is to replace the former procedure of a majority vote. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see what the Commission could do to prevent the collapse of the cease fire and the installation of the government dominated by the Pathet Lao. If this takes place, should we interfere in order to defend the Mekong River cities such as Vientiane or Sovannakhet or should we never intervene regardless of the circumstances?
General de Gaulle said that France would not intervene, at least not militarily. France feels that what the West should do is to encourage Sihanouk and also the King who is much more worthwhile to support than is the marshal. In any case France would not interfere militarily. (Note: It is not quite clear whether General de Gaulle meant at this point the King of Siam and Marshal Sarit.)
The President said that the problem was that if our enemies were sure that we would not intervene then there would be no reason for them to seek any agreement acceptable to us.
General de Gaulle said that if the West does not intervene, the Soviets may not want to intervene either, and that the situation would evolve in the direction of neutrality.
The President replied that there is no necessity for the Soviets to intervene as there is no balance in the situation of forces. If there were a military equilibrium, the situation would be different but at the present moment the Pathet Lao can occupy the Mekong River cities any time it wishes. Therefore, there is no need for the Soviets to intervene. The only thing which might be an influence for a better settlement would be the fear of an intervention on the part of the West.
General de Gaulle reiterated that we should not intervene and that France does not intend to intervene, at least not at present and not by military means.
President Kennedy said that we should nevertheless hold the threat of an intervention in order to bring the Chinese and the Soviets to an agreement. Otherwise, what there might be would be a Souvanna Phouma Government which would not last long and would be replaced by a Communist government under his half-brother or under someone else.
General de Gaulle said that he was stating his position on intervention to the President, but did not intend to say anything of the sort to the press and that we should try indeed to keep the opposition guessing. The only card for the West to play is that of Souvanna Phouma, although the General is under no illusions about the worth of the latter who nevertheless represents the only existing possibility. The alternative is military intervention but such a military intervention could lead only to a further deterioration of the situation, mainly for psychological reasons, and this, even in South Viet-Nam and Thailand.
The President said that the people of the area may feel, on the contrary, that if we do not intervene then they have reason for despair and ensuing weakness. However, it seems that the best thing to do is to try to strengthen the Control Commission and arrive at as good a government as possible.
President de Gaulle recalled the war France waged in Indo-China. He stated his feeling that a new war could not lead anywhere even if waged by the U.S. If the U.S. feels that its security or its honor compelled it to intervene, the French will not oppose such an intervention but will not participate in it, except of course if it were to lead to a world-wide war, in which case France would be always at the side of the U.S.
The President said that in the immediate future, the only thing to do is to try to coordinate in the best possible way the positions of the delegations in Geneva. He himself is extremely reluctant to think of an intervention in Laos, a country with only two air strips and no access to the sea.
General de Gaulle said that the situation might evolve differently in the future, when Chinese ambition will become more evident to the people of its area. The Chinese are greatly feared in Southeast Asia even by Ho Chi Minh. If their ambition becomes evident it may create a reaction and we may find allies on the spot. For the moment, however, the Chinese are not showing their ambition openly.
The President asked whether General de Gaulle thought that it was because of this fear which exists of the Chinese that it is the Soviets who have interfered openly rather than through the Chinese.
General de Gaulle said that there might have been two reasons for the Soviets to intervene directly, the first one being the one mentioned by the President and the second a Soviet fear of the Chinese. Everybody fears the Chinese; for example, there are practically no Chinese in Hanoi, only Poles, Czechs and Russians with a very, very few Chinese.
The President expressed the doubt that we would have enough time to wait for such a change in feeling and for any quarrel between the Communist rivals to become serious. This might happen at a time when the West has already been forced out of the area. The President reminded of the rivalry between Caesar and Pompey which came out into the open after the two generals had conquered their common enemies. For the moment then Communist rivals seem to be united by their hatred against the West.
General de Gaulle said that he was not certain that the situation was all that bad. The West still has many possibilities, as long as it refrains from military action. It still has influence. French influence had never been as strong as since the French armies had left the area. There is a constant demand for French teachers and specialists, and a constant increase in the number of students in French schools not only in South Viet-Nam but even in North Viet-Nam including Hanoi.
President Kennedy said that this might be because hostility towards the U.S. has replaced hostility towards its friends. If the U.S. is forced out, France may no longer appear as the lesser evil. The President further stated that he had visited both Saigon and Hanoi in 1951 and he saw the scope of the French effort. France had a lot of troops and good troops in Indo-China. He understands as a consequence that any intervention in that part of the free world have to be a major operation.
General de Gaulle said that such indeed would not be the case, and the worst thing that could happen to the West would be a military defeat. To sum up, General de Gaulle said that what should be used is careful diplomacy and to seek a return to the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The West should encourage Souvanna Phouma and Sihanouk and, without being obvious about it, the King of Thailand who would wish to play a more active part but is prevented from doing so by Marshal Sarit. Contacts must be maintained with Mr. Nehru because India, in spite of her poverty and her difficulties, is a genuine nation and the key to that part of the world.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]
104. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, June 1, 1961, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-161. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Saigon, priority to Bangkok, priority to CINCPAC for POLAD, and niact to Geneva for Harriman.
2183. For Secretary from Ambassador. Reference: Paris 5239 to Dept, 791 to Geneva;/2/ Deptel 1311;/3/ Deptel 1317 to Vientiane, Fecon 57 to Geneva./4/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 102.
/3/In telegram 1311, May 30, the Department of State asked urgently for comments on telegram 5239 from Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5-3061)
/4/See footnote 3, Document 102.
I fully realize force arguments contained reftels and that under circumstances they may be controlling. Confe 68/5/ not received here.
/5/Document 102.
I would nevertheless urge that before deciding to rely exclusively on French for military training and support we take a most careful look at what they would be prepared and able to do.
Experience with French training Lao Army in past has been uniformly unsatisfactory not only because of inadequacy personnel and financial support but more importantly because of general patronizing attitude towards Lao and approach to training as being more designed train troops to serve under foreign officers than to be self-reliant leaders. MAAG, and I believe JCS, also feel many French practices outmoded and inefficient, particularly in crucial area of logistics. These considerations important in view essentiality having limited forces which will be allowed to RLG trained to maximum capability.
French would also have difficult legacy of dislike and friction on part most FAL and many other Lao including political leaders to overcome, based upon past unhappy experience and aura of colonialism. Our support such large French role here may consequently alienate many Lao.
I also wonder what reaction Thais would be in light recent French attitude SEATO./6/
/6/In telegram 2184 from Bangkok, June 3, Young stated that the Thais believed that the French military presence in Laos had actively favored the Souvanna-Kong Le group over the RLG and that France had purposely hamstrung SEATO. Young concluded that the Thais would consider the "salvaging" of French influence in Laos as a "very thin veil for US disengagement in Laos." (Department of State, Central Files. 751J.00/6-361)
Question France becoming principal source materiel and equipment also raises serious problem since after several years' effort and much expense we have almost completed equipment of FAL with entirely U.S. materiel.
To change back to French equipment would involve considerable waste, necessitate retraining troops to new equipment and considerable period of time in which FAL would be back in the situation we have striven to avoid of having two or more types of equipment, each of which has to be separately serviced and separately supplied with ammunition and spare parts.
Further question arises whether French primary interest would be in actually making Lao Forces best possible, or whether they would be mainly interested in maintaining prestige and political presence France in Laos.
From viewpoint military efficiency and local acceptability, our view is that training could better be accomplished by Danes, Swiss, Swedes or Indians with mat[riel supplied by U.S.
Message unsigned
105. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 2, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-261. Secret. Rusk was in Paris accompanying the President on his State visit.
Secto 4. For Acting Secretary from Secretary.
Just before departure saw material giving Sihanouk's further thinking about Laos,/2/ as well as messages suggesting growing cleavage between Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao. Please have colleagues access following idea and give reactions promptly to Paris and Vienna.
/2/In telegram 2140 from Vientiane, Brown reported that Sihanouk had told Royal Lao Government representative Leum in Geneva that Laos was in danger of going Communist and suggested that a coalition government in Laos should be formed and Laos should join the neutral bloc. (Ibid., 751J.00/5-2461)
Communist bloc now banking heavily on Communist Laos arising from their doctrine of "three forces" in that country. Sihanouk and other neutrals and some Allies inclined to accept or consider it inevitable. It would be minor miracle if we succeed blocking coalition government shared by "thirds" in view of military situation on ground. Even SEATO intervention could do little more than save precarious toehold unless there follows major escalation.
Would it make sense to accept "thirds" idea but adjust it as follows. Since both sides are caught with notion that Souvanna himself is neutral (despite some US misgivings) let Souvanna put together a central government without Pathet Lao or strongly committed anti-Communist elements such as Phoumi. He could do so with civil servant types or others recommended by King as reliable neutralists. Then apply "thirds" to provincial arrangements with clear understanding with King and Souvanna as to local autonomy such matters as police and security. Let Pathet Lao keep northern provinces including Xieng Khouang, let Phoumi and Boun Oum return to southern Laotian panhandle and let Souvanna control Vientiane-Luang Prabang axis. This would put friends in panhandle, a neutralist buffer between Pathet Lao and Thailand in northwest and leave Pathet Lao their God-forsaken northeast.
Some such arrangement plus international apparatus being discussed Geneva might have many advantages compared with alternatives. We do not want strong central government composed of "thirds." We want Vietnam and Thailand insulated. We have no real US ambitions Laos itself. My suggestion could be presented as not being partition but recognition that neutral government ought to be neutral and not a battleground for contending interests. Instead of quarreling over distribution of portfolios parties might agree on territorial precedence of influence and authority. Further, if Souvanna offered this role by French and France promises to take seriously Geneva Accord arrangements for French presence Seno plus Vientiane, we might save something worth saving. We have been saying the RLG should give us more to support. Would this idea give both Western and neutral countries something to support? Under such arrangements we could do a great deal in panhandle. If Commies want to make something out of northeast, let them try.
This is not a policy directive but a question.
Rusk
106. Paper Prepared by the Head of the Delegation to the Laos Conference (Harriman)/1/
Geneva, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1906. Secret. Drafted for the President's meeting with Khrushchev at Vienna and included in a folder entitled "Miscellaneous Substantive."
LAOS
The issue presently stalling the Laos conference concerns the effectiveness of the cease-fire.
As you know, the Pathet Lao are deliberately violating the de facto cease-fire agreement with continuous attacks in the Pa Dong area. They are refusing access to International Control Commission teams attempting to investigate alleged violations in pursuance of its mission to "supervise and control" the cease-fire.
Soviets have so far refused to send instructions, requested by the ICC, which will make it clear that the ICC should investigate alleged violations, and calling on both parties to cooperate with the ICC in its inspections. (Royal Government has publicly assured full cooperation.) Underscored phrases in the attached draft instructions are proposed by US-UK-France as additions to latest Russian draft instructions. They are all that is necessary to clear up this issue.
In addition, we want agreement that the ICC should be given the equipment it is asking to do its job.
All these points are in support of the requests of Mr. Sen, the Indian chairman of the ICC, and have been endorsed publicly or privately by all the non-Communist members of the Conference.
The cease-fire issue must be resolved in our favor if there is to be any chance for a useful result at Geneva. We believe, however, that it should be resolved in the setting of a broader discussion between the President and Khrushchev on Laos questions.
The President might seek Khrushchev's assurance that he is genuinely interested in a neutral Laos. This can be presented as an appropriate issue to test the good faith of both parties. Obviously details of a neutral status must be worked out at the Geneva Conference. But in order that semantic agreement on the term "neutrality" should not mask fundamental differences in concept, the President might touch on the following points:
1. Laos should not be aligned with either side; this involves military withdrawal on both sides--including Viet Minh and Chinese Communists.
2. Laos should not be used for the advantage of either side.
3. To this end the Laotian Government must be run by people who really believe in neutrality and not by people dedicated to Communist or U.S. interests; each side must make this clear to all parties in Laos.
4. There must be adequate machinery to satisfy each side--and its friends--that the mutual assurances are being observed.
5. An essential first step is to resolve the question of cease-fire instructions to the ICC in accordance with the attached draft./2/ If this is done, the U.S. is prepared to turn immediately to the discussion of the substantive issues at the Conference.
/2/Not found.
W. Averell Harriman/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
107. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Vienna, June 3, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Alexander Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The conversation took place at the residence and residence garden of the Ambassador in Vienna. Kennedy was in Vienna June 3-4 for a summit meeting with Khrushchev. The complete records of the discussions, along with briefing papers, schedules, and related telegrams and papers are ibid., CF 1900-1906. Documentation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume V.
SUBJECT
Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
D--Mr. Akalovsky (Interpreting)
USSR
Chairman Khrushchev
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
After lunch the President invited Mr. Khrushchev for a short walk in the garden./2/ While in the garden, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev how he managed to make himself available for such prolonged conversations as, for example, he had had with Senator Humphrey and Walter Lippmann. The President said he understood that no one had interrupted the Chairman during those meetings. As far as he was concerned, the President continued, his schedule was very crowded and he was constantly wanted on the telephone, so that it was very difficult for him to have time for lengthy uninterrupted meetings.
/2/At the earlier luncheon meeting on June 3 at the Ambassador's residence, Kennedy and Khrushchev and other U.S. and Soviet officials discussed the history of the Geneva Conference of 1954. While the conversation was predominantly social and ranged over a number of issues, Khrushchev stated that the 1954 conference had found a good solution for Vietnam and perhaps the same thing would happen this time at Geneva. (Memorandum of conversation, June 3; ibid.)
Mr. Khrushchev replied that it was true that he had indeed had prolonged uninterrupted meetings with Senator Humphrey and Lippmann. The reason why he had time for such meetings was that the Soviet Government had been decentralized to the extent that administrative functions had been transferred to the governments of the individual republics, while the government of the Union retained the responsibility for over-all planning.
The President remarked that our system of several branches of government involved contacts and consultations between the President and the various branches, and that this was a time consuming process.
To this, Mr. Khrushchev replied: "Well, why don't you switch to our system?"
The President then invited Mr. Khrushchev for a private talk inside.
The President referred to the conversation before lunch/3/ and said that some of the problems faced by the two countries had been discussed. Now he wanted to come back to the general thesis. While Laos was one problem now under discussion, others might come up in the future. Thus, it would be useful to discuss the general problem underlying the situation and consider the specifics perhaps later. In addition to Laos, which had already been discussed, such specifics might include Germany and nuclear tests.
/3/The conversation before lunch lasted from 12:45 to 1:30 p.m. and was a general discussion of communism versus capitalism and did not relate directly to Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, June 3; ibid.)
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
Mr. Khrushchev then addressed himself to the Laotian situation and said that the President knew very well that it had been the US Government which had overthrown Souvanna Phouma. One should be frank and recognize that both the United States and the USSR are supplying arms in Laos. The side supported by the USSR will be more successful because the arms supplied by the United States are directed against the people and the people do not want to take them. In China, the arms supplied by the United States to Chiang Kai Shek went to Mao Tse Tung. Chiang Kai Shek became sort of a transfer point for American arms to Mao Tse Tung. The reason for that was that Chiang's troops simply would not fight against the people. At that point Mao Tse Tung was weaker militarily than Chiang Kai Shek, but he won because his ideas won. In general, the history of revolutions is very instructive. During the Russian Revolution, the revolutionaries were weak and a counter-revolution occurred. The revolutionaries had to fight against the counter-revolutionaries, the British, the Japanese, the French, and others. Even the United States intervened. Mr. Khrushchev recalled in this connection that he had read a book by an American Colonel entitled "U.S. Adventure in Siberia". Notwithstanding all this, the revolution was victorious because the people were on its side. Mr. Khrushchev then said that we must be patient. If the United States supports old, moribund, reactionary regimes, then a precedent of internal intervention will be set, which might cause a clash between our two countries. The USSR certainly does not desire such a development.
The President rejoined by saying that he wished to explain the logic of what Mr. Khrushchev considered to be the illogical point in US position. He said that he wanted to do this not in order to defend any of our actions, but simply to explain things as we saw them. The President stated that we regard the present balance of power between Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance. The President said that he did not wish to discuss the details of the respective military postures, but that generally this was how we saw the situation.
Mr. Khrushchev interjected that he agreed with this.
The President then said that the United States has three interests. The first interest is that the right of free choice be ensured to all peoples and that such right be executed through elections as we understand them. He said that Mr. Khrushchev may not agree with this but this is what we desire. Such free choice is not possible today in many areas of the world. It is not possible in Cuba, it is not possible in Spain. Mr. Khrushchev had said that he could not understand how the US could object to Cuba while it was supporting Spain. The reason is that our second interest is of a strategic nature. Spain has no allies. It is a power standing alone. It is a dictatorship, but it makes no contribution to our strength.
Mr. Khrushchev interjected that the US had bases in Spain. The President replied that those bases were moving into history. Mr. Khrushchev observed that they were still there.
The President continued by saying that we also support Yugoslavia, which is not a capitalist country. Thus, the question might arise how the logic of our policy could be justified. The reason for this policy is that if Franco should be replaced and if the new regime were to associate itself with the Soviet Union, the balance of power in Western Europe would radically change and this is, of course, a matter of great concern to us. The third interest of the United States is to see that the next decade--and we cannot predict which way the developments during that time will go--should proceed in a way that would not greatly disturb the balance of power. The President said that he was concerned how this balance of power might be affected as China developed its military potential. This is our general view with which Mr. Khrushchev will not agree, but this is the logic of our position. Referring to the Laotian question, the President said that this was of particular concern to us. While relatively unimportant from the strategic standpoint, this country was included under the protocol to the SEATO agreement in the Treaty area, and thus we have treaty commitments in that area. The President then said that speaking frankly, US policy in that region had not always been wise. He stated that he had not been able to make a final judgment as to what the people's desires in that area are. According to our information, there are about nine or ten thousand Pathet Lao but they have two distinct advantages in our view. One is that they are for change. The President remarked that he himself is for change and that he had been elected on the basis of his advocacy of change. He then said that was not to say that if a change were to occur in Laos it would be the one the people wanted. The second advantage Pathet Lao has is the fact that they received support not only in the form of supplies, but also in the form of Viet Minh manpower, which has made them a stronger force. The problem now from a historical standpoint is to find a solution not involving the prestige or the interests of our two countries. The President recalled that last March he had said that the United States wanted a neutral and independent Laos. The USSR had said it wanted the same. The question now is of definition of these two terms, "neutral" and "independent". The President said that he believed that Cambodia and Burma were neutral and independent countries and inquired what Mr. Khrushchev's view on this was.
Mr. Khrushchev said that he held the same view.
The President continued by saying that the problem in Geneva was how to secure a cease fire in Laos and to establish a mechanism for its verification. The point is that the Soviet side had stated that forces associated with us had taken action against Pathet Lao. For our part, we have information that forces supported by the Soviet Union have violated the cease fire, particularly in the Padong area. Therefore, the ICC should undertake to determine the exact situation and if it were to find that the forces supported by the US are at fault, the US would take the responsibility. If we support the ICC in making such a determination, then the next step would be to create a neutral and independent Laos.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
The President then stated that what was of concern to the United States was the speech Mr. Khrushchev had made last January and in which he had advanced the thesis of three types of war. The problem is how this thesis should be interpreted, particularly the point on the so-called national wars of liberation. The fact is that certain groups seize power, frequently by military means. Some of such groups are friendly to the USSR and some to the United States, and the two countries lend support to them. If one takes the situation in Viet Nam, there are some seven to fifteen thousand guerillas there. We do not believe that they reflect the will of the people, while the USSR may believe so. The problem is to avoid getting involved in direct contact as we support the respective groups. In Laos, where the two countries are openly supporting the respective local groupings, the question is how to draw fire out of the situation in a way that would be mutually satisfactory to both sides.
Mr. Khrushchev said that the President and himself had a different understanding of liberation wars. As far as Laos is concerned, the Soviet Union is for an independent and neutral Laos and the Foreign Ministers of the two countries are probably talking about this problem right now.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]
Reverting to Laos, Mr. Khrushchev said that the Conference was in session and that it was there that a solution should be worked out. The USSR will exert efforts to solve the Laotian question and have a government establish control in that country. However, the Soviet Union will not agree to the ICC's becoming a kind of a supragovernment administering the country.
The President said that he wanted to respond to those remarks without referring to Poland or Taiwan. He said he agreed that the ICC should be no government. However, it should determine whether a cease fire exists. The Soviet side has claimed that there have been breaches on the part of the forces supported by us. Our people have said that the forces supported by the Soviet Union have breached the cease fire. The President said he believed it would be a simple matter for the ICC to examine these charges and to submit its report. This should take only a few days and then the next step would be the creation of an independent and neutral Laos.
Mr. Khrushchev responded by saying that the Soviet Union approached the situation differently. Referring to the President's remark that Viet Minh forces were involved in Laos, he said that he had no such information and that this was inaccurate. What is more accurate, and what is an actual fact, is that military action was started from Thailand by the United States.
The President replied that whether he or Mr. Khrushchev were right the problem was to have the ICC examine the situation with regard to the cease fire, without action by Viet Minh or any other action. The cease fire is the main problem now.
Mr. Khrushchev said that he agreed. However, he said that this could not be done without taking into account the forces participating in the struggle. There are three forces in this area and they must agree among themselves. Even if our two countries were to agree, that agreement would serve no useful purpose without agreement among the forces participating in the struggle.
The President suggested that the two countries use their influence with the people they are associated with to induce them to support the ICC and grant the Commission free access to the respective areas, so that the Commission could perform its task effectively. Then the next step would be the creation of an independent and neutral Laos.
Mr. Khrushchev expressed agreement that both countries should use their influence so as to bring about agreement among the forces participating in the Laotian struggle.
The President said that he believed that on this point agreement could be reached here. He remarked facetiously that this should be possible even if no agreement could be reached on the merits of the American election system.
Mr. Khrushchev said that this latter question was an internal affair of the United States.
In view of the late hour, the President suggested that perhaps, if there was a chance, the question of nuclear tests could be discussed during the dinner given by the Austrian President, so that tomorrow most of the time could be devoted to the problem of Germany. Otherwise, both problems could be discussed tomorrow.
Mr. Khrushchev replied that he would like to connect the questions of nuclear tests and disarmament. He said that he would set forth his position on this issue as well as, of course, on Germany. The main problem in this latter matter is that of a peace treaty. The Soviet Union hopes that the US will understand this question so that both countries can sign a peace treaty together. This would improve relations. But if the United States refuses to sign a peace treaty, the Soviet Union will do so and nothing will stop it.
The conversation ended at 6:45 p.m.
108. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.-1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. The time of the end of this meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
SUBJECT
Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR--Mr. Kohler
D--Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)
USSR
Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpretor, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
During the exchange of amenities, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev what part of the USSR he was from. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had been born in Russia, in a village in the vicinity of Kursh, 7 or 10 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, but that he had spent the early part of his life in the Ukraine. In this connection, he mentioned that recently very large deposits of iron ore had been found near Kurak. The deposits already prospected are estimated at 30 billion tons. The general estimate of these particular deposits is about 300 billion tons. Thus, he said, Soviet deposits will be sufficient to cover the needs of the entire world for a long time to come.
The President observed that he wondered why then the Soviet Union was interested in Laos.
Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was not interested in Laos, but that it was the US which had created the Laotian situation.
The President said that he was not sure whether Mr. Khrushchev and himself could reach agreement on all the items under discussion, but he appreciated the frankness and precision with which the positions had been stated. Yet he believed that agreement could be reached on the question of Laos. Yesterday, both sides had agreed that Laos was of no strategic importance and was not vital to either side. However, the United States became involved in Laos by treaty and other commitments. The President said that his interest was to secure a cease-fire and to stop the fighting. This, he thought, would be in the interest of both sides. Then a government could be secured which would not be weighted in either direction. The President referred to the remarks made yesterday regarding the situation in Burma and Cambodia, which appeared to be satisfactory to both sides, and said that agreement on Laos should be possible along the same lines. However, the first problem is to stop the fighting. In our view military activities are still going on in some areas of Laos. We have information that Viet Minh forces are involved, while Mr. Khrushchev said that Thais were involved. If the Co-Chairmen of the Conference were to instruct jointly the ICC to make a determination as to the actual situation, the ICC should go to both sides and make its investigation. The President then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's statement yesterday in which he took issue with what he called the Dulles policy of strength. The President said he wanted to change US policy in this area because Laos was of no strategic importance. In the eyes of the world, both sides are involved in the Laotian situation; the United States wishes to reduce its involvement and hopes that the Soviet Union wishes the same. However, the President continued, as President he has certain responsibilities and if he changes US policy he must see that it works. The United States also wants to secure a government which both sides could support. If the situation can be changed, and Mr. Khrushchev said yesterday that it should be changed, then we could proceed with other matters. Laos is not so important as to get us as involved as we are.
Mr. Khrushchev said that he agreed with the President's concluding remark. The Soviet Union has no commitment in Laos, has never undertaken any obligations in that area, and will not do so in the future. If the Soviet Union has helped Laos it has been only at the request of Souvanna Phouma, who represents the only legitimate Laotian Government. That Government was ousted by external forces supported by the US. This is why the Soviet Union cannot recognize any other government. The Soviet Union has no vested interest in Laos, either political or economic, or of any other nature. That country is far from Soviet borders. In general the Soviet Union has no desire of committing itself or assuming responsibilities in the various geographic areas. So when the President says that the United States has commitments, this makes a bad impression upon the USSR. The US has no right to distribute indulgences, as it were, and to interfere in the various areas of the world. Mr. Khrushchev said he liked the concluding part of the President's remarks to the effect that the two countries should not get involved. This is a correct approach but it would be bad if the United States were to attempt to claim special rights on the grounds that it had vested interests. If the President would pardon the blunt expression, such policy stems from megalomania, from delusions of grandeur. The United States is so rich and powerful that it believes it has special rights and can afford not to recognize the rights of others. The Soviet Union cannot reconcile itself with such a situation and will not concede its own rights. The Soviet Union will also help other peoples obtain their independence. This is a correct policy. If we want to normalize the situation and prevent conflicts between our two countries anywhere in the world, the US should not seek any special rights. The Soviet Union cannot accept the thesis of "don't poke your nose" because whenever the rights of the people are infringed upon, the Soviet Union will render assistance to the people. This, of course, aggravates the situation and the Soviet Union does not wish such a development. The situation should be normalized. The US should respect the rights of other peoples, the Soviet people as well as other peoples. The Soviet Union does not wish to divide the world. It has no commitment anywhere other than toward the Socialist countries. On the other hand, the United States has spread its forces all over. But time has changed. As the President has stated, the forces of the two sides are now in balance. Mr. Khrushchev said that he was making this statement not for the purpose of argument but only to recognize this fact. A great deal of restraint is required because the factors of prestige and national interests are involved here. We should not step on each other's toes and should not infringe upon the rights of other nations, small or big.
The President said that, frankly speaking, he had assumed office on January 20th and that the obligations and commitments had been undertaken before that time. Why these obligations and commitments were undertaken and what factors were involved at that time is not an issue here. The United States and the USSR should adopt the policy of creating a neutral and independent Laos. This is what the United States wants to do. The President reiterated that he did not want to increase US commitments but rather decrease them. There is no point in raking over past history to which Mr. Khrushchev objects. There are some facts in past history to which the United States also objects. But this is not an issue here. What is an issue here, is how to secure a cease-fire and to have the fighting stop. The United States wishes a government in Laos which would not be involved either with the United States or with the USSR, but would rather be genuinely neutral. The US went to the Conference with the genuine expectation that arrangements could be made to ensure an effective verification of the cease-fire and that the next step would be the creation of a truly neutral Laos. The United States does not believe that there is an effective cease-fire in Laos. But whatever the facts of past history we should now act in such a way as to pursue the policy of ensuring a truly neutral and independent Laos, which we believe is also Soviet policy.
Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could subscribe to everything the President had said and that he fully associated himself with the President's remarks, which he liked very much. However, there was one point he wanted to make. The President had said that the Laotian situation was a legacy, but one could see in that situation the President's own hand as well. The President had ordered that US military advisers in Laos should wear US military uniforms; he had also ordered a landing of Marines in Laos but the order had been rescinded.
The President interjected that there had been no order for a landing of Marines. True, there had been some speculation as to what action the US would take, but such an order had never been issued. Mr. Khrushchev responded by saying that he was referring to press reports.
Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the President's argument would be that all these commitments to Laos had been made by the previous administration. However, the Soviet Government has rescinded all the unreasonable decisions made by the previous governments under Malenkov and Bulganin. Mr. Khrushchev recalled the argument he had had with Molotov on the Austrian problem. As a result of his having overruled Molotov, a satisfactory solution of the problem was found and the US and the USSR signed the Austrian Treaty. Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sensitive with regard to US commitments. He said that the Westerners were much better than the Easterners at making threats in a refined way. Every once in a while it is intimated that Marines might be used. But as engineers know the law of physics says that every action causes counter-action. So if the United States were to send Marines, other countries might respond with their Marines or with some other forces. Thus another Korea or an even worse situation might result. Mr. Khrushchev repeated that he liked the President's statement because it reflected the Soviet policy; in fact, the President seemed to have stated the Soviet policy and called it his own. The Soviet Union could guarantee that it would exert every effort to achieve a settlement. But this depends not merely on our two countries but on the three forces in Laos as well. Agreement between our two countries would be insufficient. However, we should influence the Laotian forces so that a truly neutral government could be established. Mr. Khrushchev said that he believed that the United States had no economic interest in Laos. The President had mentioned yesterday US strategic interests in connection with Taiwan. But this, as was mentioned yesterday, could mean that the United States could also take over Crimea because that would of course improve its strategic position too. Here the policies of the USSR and the US are not only in contrast but even in direct conflict. Such policy should be cast away and a reasonable policy should be adopted. In any event, the two Foreign Ministers could discuss the details of the Laotian question. They should be locked in a room and told to find a solution.
Mr. Gromyko interjected that the Palais des Nations in Geneva was a big place with a lot of rooms.
The President said that he wanted to make a comment on Mr. Khrushchev's statement regarding uniformed US personnel in Laos. He said that this action was taken when representatives of the Soviet Union and the UK were discussing in Moscow the question of effecting a cease-fire in Laos. When it became evident that no progress had been made the action was taken in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further and to ensure a more favorable situation in which the conference could proceed. This is the kind of thing that happens when both sides are involved, and the United States would wish to avoid such developments.
Mr. Khrushchev then suggested that the questions of disarmament, nuclear tests and Germany be discussed now because otherwise there would be not enough time to do it.
The President replied that he wanted to make a final comment on the Laotian situation. He said that he was anxious to get the US military out of Laos. He had not supported and had been even reluctant to consider a landing of Marines, because he recognized that such action would entail retaliation and counteraction and thus peace in that area might be endangered. What he wanted to see in that area was an effective cease-fire and a peaceful settlement. He said perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could use his influence on Gromyko to persuade him to cooperate in bringing about an effective cease-fire in Laos and let the ICC verify the cease-fire in an effective manner. That was the basis on which the United States had agreed to come to the conference. The President then suggested that perhaps the Secretary and Gromyko could discuss this question during lunch.
Mr. Khrushchev said he could add little to what had already been said. He agreed that a cease-fire should be sought. However, other questions should not be delayed by lack of a cease-fire. The point is that the situation at front lines is always unstable and even a shot fired accidentally by a soldier could be regarded by the other side as a violation of the cease-fire. Therefore, other questions should not be made contingent upon a cease-fire. However, the President should not misunderstand this position. The USSR believes that the question of a cease-fire should be handled on a priority basis, but the basic question is to bring about agreement among the three forces in Laos, so that the formation of a truly neutral government could be secured. Mr. Khrushchev agreed that no normal conditions for settlement would exist in the absence of a cease-fire. However, he was not aware of any fighting going on; if the United States had contrary information, it should be verified.
Mr. Gromyko remarked that the ICC was already in Laos and that it could act by agreement of both sides. In response to an inquiry by the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko clarified that what he meant by both sides were the two sides fighting in Laos. The ICC should not be granted the rights of a supragovernment.
The President reiterated his hope that the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko could discuss this problem briefly during lunch./2/
/2/On June 5 at the Elysee Palace in Paris, 3 p.m., Rusk met with de Gaulle and briefed him on Kennedy's discussions with Khrushchev. As for Laos, Rusk stated that "nothing very concrete was achieved" although the Soviets might use their influence to allow the ICC to function. Rusk suggested that only time would tell how sincere the Soviet Union was about neutrality for Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, June 5; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901)
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
109. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State/1/
Bangkok, June 4, 1961, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-461. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane and Vienna for Rusk, priority to Paris, and to Geneva for Harriman and London for Rusk.
2185. Dept for Acting Secy from Amb Brown.
Such an original and far reaching proposal/2/ of course requires most careful study before considered opinion can be given. Details of proposed arrangements, for example, could in many cases be decisive of how basic power relationships worked out in practice. My preliminary reaction, however, is as fols:
/2/Although no reference telegram is indicated, Brown, who was in Bangkok, was responding to Document 105.
Concept has basic appeal from standpoint logic and cold blooded US self-interest. Ability maintain strong Western position in southern Laos with capacity plug Ho Chi Minh trail access route Hanoi to South Vietnam, insulation of Thailand from pressure of Commie presence on eastern bank Mekong wld clearly put US in better position prevent Commie take over SEA than if they shld gain control of, or dominant influence in, all Laos.
Loss of strategic Plaine des Jarres would be militarily serious and requires further analysis. We would face problem of what to do with our loyal friends the Meos. On other hand I have always felt that Sam Neua and Phong Saly were expendable. Other side would doubtless also claim northeastern Luang Prabang.
I doubt however (A) concept would in practice have desired results proposal or (B) if it would be negotiable except perhaps in extremes.
First: I do not think that central govt of Souvanna and civil servant types, plus a Souvanna controlled Vtiane/Luang Prabang region would be a reliable neutral insulation for Thailand along the crucial western and northern reaches of the Mekong. One of Souvanna's main weaknesses is in admin, judgment of men, and understanding what goes on in his govt. He must be bolstered by some hard headed conservatives to keep him posted and on right track. I would have grave doubts as to character of govt he would choose both for the center and for his region if he were left alone to do it (e.g., he considers Quinim a neutral) and of the capacity of his regional govt to resist infiltration and long remain the kind of buffer we need. We must remember that we will have little power to direct choice of personalities and arrangement of functions.
I do not think, for example, that Souvanna would accept the King's definition of who was a proper neutral for his central govt, even if the King went so far as to try to participate so deeply in its formation, which is unlikely. This govt could well be slanted adversely to US.
I feel that one might well consider a Souvanna less undesirable when flanked by strong extremes than when alone with uncertain quantities.
It is essential for US to have someone in the local ring on whom we can reasonably count to fight for US during the internal pol battle and particularly the infighting.
Second: I do not think that either the PL or Souvanna would be likely to buy this idea. Souvanna considers himself the one destined to be saviour of his country. He feels he has wide-spread support throughout the population in all areas. He has always opposed the division of the country. He would be likely to consider this a division.
The PL would strongly resist any central govt in which they were not included. Moreover, in view of their present very large influence in the panhandle (they control over half including regions very near to Thakhek and crucial corridor regions on the South Vietnam border), they would be reluctant to turn it over to Boun Oum. Even if they did, there remains as the Dept has pointed out (Deptel 748 to Vtiane) /3/ the serious problem of how to remove them physically from their strong position.
/3/The reference is in error. Telegram 748, January 12, refers to staffing arrangements at the Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 121.51J3/1-1261)
Phoumi will also be most reluctant to depart from national scene if there still is to be one.
The King would be most reluctant to accept what would seem to him as such extensive de facto partition.
Third: I agree with the Dept that the imagination boggles at the problems inherent in the task of negotiating such a proposal. Even if it is negotiated in principle, being more extensive and loosely knit than previous conceptions, it will afford us very little opportunity to influence the all important details of organization and personnel choices upon which success or failure from our viewpoint would so largely depend.
Support of important neutrals for this idea would seem at least undoubtful. Burma and Cambodia, for example, were very strong opposing any partition in their opening speeches at Geneva. India took a similar line. (We consider it very dangerous to have Krishna Menon as the sponsor for so complex and delicately balanced a proposal with so much at stake.) Reaction of Thai, South Vietnamese and King, the potentially important fourth group exemplified by Phoui, and probably also Phoumi despite his known arriere pensees about partitionment is likely, at least initially, to be that they are being let down again by the US.
Fourth: one thing seems very clear to me, namely, that we should keep this idea very much in reserve for the present. We have not yet had any real chance to come to grips with substance at Geneva, or even to feel out the participants very deeply. We have not seen the results of any Phoumi/Souvanna/Souphanouvong discussion which Phoumi is approaching with a very satisfactory attitude (Vtiane's 2190 to Dept)./4/
/4/ In telegram 2190, June 3, Brown reported that Phoumi assured him that he would not let Boun Oum meet alone with Souvanna and Souphanouvong. Phoumi planned to feel out Souvanna prior to a meeting of the three Princes. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-361)
We have had no direct contact with Souvanna. If reports of division between Souvanna and PL turn out to be true this should help US in resisting division of govt by thirds and in distribution of portfolios. We have never yet tried out the argument that division should at the very least be division by fourths, i.e., Souvanna, PL, Savannakhet, other pol groups. We do not yet have any clear idea on what type of control mechanisms we may be able to develop.
If we advance this idea now, or have it advanced by someone (our sponsorship will be almost impossible to conceal), it will become the basing point to which the other side will begin to add their demands.
If it is rejected by the other side, we will have suffered all the disadvantages of the plan and much loss of face in SEA without gaining any of its advantages. Therefore, I recommend that we further nurture and refine it in quiet for possible use as ultimate fallback position, and do not advance this idea until it is more definitely proven that the possible alternatives are worse.
Foregoing are merely preliminary thoughts after one night's reflection. I would like an opportunity to comment further after having pondered more deeply and after having had a chance to examine various practical questions such as relationship of central and regional govt. Control of army, admin of foreign aid, treatment of PL forces, relationship of SEATO to central govt and Boun Oum and Souvanna regions, etc. I understand that there is a position paper dealing with some of these problems in connection with a possible ultimate federal solution. Could a copy be sent me?
I have discussed proposal briefly with Amb Young who is commenting separately./5/
/5/In telegram 2194 from Bangkok, Young concurred with Brown's general line and noted that Thai reaction to a division of Laos would be emotional and violent and would take considerable time and preparation before they would accept it. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-561)
Young
110. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, June 7, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-761. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Moscow and Vientiane and repeated to London and Paris.
Confe 144. For Secretary from Harriman.
I called on Pushkin at 5:00 accompanied by Steeves and Crawford. I began with statement along following lines:
I had heard from our Ambassador in Vientiane of attacks that took place yesterday at Padong. Heavy artillery fire occurred throughout entire day as well as infantry attacks by PL, Vietnamese and Kong Le troops. As result Col Vang Pao commanding RLG forces withdrew from Padong to prepared positions. This constitutes most ruthless attack since cease-fire declaration and press reports today show world aroused by these actions of PL which can no longer be concealed. They obviously underline immediate need ICC investigation.
Moreover we cannot help but hold Soviet Government responsible because of its role in supplying PL by air with military supplies and equipment. In light of Vienna discussions and communique I assumed Khrushchev will want to take action. (I read to Pushkin what President said on Vienna discussions re Laos in his address last night.)/2/ I was sure Khrushchev would have same feelings as President on question since Pravda had said today that Vienna talks could be prelude to breakdown of cold war barriers and pledged Soviet Union will do all it can to improve Soviet-American relations.
/2/ For text of the communique issued after the meeting at Vienna, June 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 574. Kennedy's address to the Nation, June 6, is ibid., pp. 574-578; for the portion on Laos, see p. 576.
I told Pushkin I would be grateful if he would call foregoing to attention his government and expressed confidence Khrushchev would take immediate action to instruct ICC investigation on ground and to see to it that criminal attacks of PL cease. I added that he of course understood that effective cease-fire was prerequisite to our negotiations here. However, I did not want to take a negative attitude as I felt sure Khrushchev would want to take positive action.
Pushkin said he had no information on recent events in Padong. However, he regarded our information as one-sided. Souvanna Phouma's representative had recounted history of Padong and pointed out that area had been fully under PL control and opposing paratroopers had been sent in by air only after cease-fire established. Therefore cease-fire is two-sided matter and this was what they had in mind when referring to effective cease-fire in Vienna. Furthermore he could not accept my statement that Soviet Union responsible. If Soviet Union responsible for anything in Laos, it was for effective cease-fire established since May 3. He personally knew how much effort had gone into putting stop to hostilities in face of many obstacles since he had dealt directly with these problems in Foreign Ministry. If US had shown same degree of patience it would have had great effect. He was sure my remark that Soviet Union responsible must result from misunderstanding since he was firmly convinced Soviet Union was doing everything to make cease-fire effective. He stressed in this regard they didn't want Vienna communique to be "just a piece of paper" but something to be put into execution. Reiterating that this was two-sided question he said effective cease-fire requires end to unauthorized flights over territory of PL and Kong Le. Otherwise bad results could ensue.
I agreed this was two-way matter and this was why we were urging that ICC investigate facts. There had been allegations on both sides. Therefore, our joint instrument should be sent to investigate. We felt that this was way to settle matter between forces of PL and RLG.
Pushkin argued we can't give to this instrument such powers that do not flow from task which faces us. Draft reply to ICC message of May 20/3/ is now being considered in Moscow and they are "sure agreement will be reached." As for developments in Laos, these will be clearer tomorrow when two Princes arrive at 3:40 p.m.
/3/The ICC Report of May 20, calling for establishment of a machinery to deal with the maintenance of the cease-fire, was Document 6 of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question. (Laos/Doc/6; Department of State, L/EA Files: Lot 70 D 453)
I agreed was good to have them come and said Phoumi was going to Nice. Pushkin said Princes might go to Nice too. I told him Phoumi had agreed with ICC to abandon air supply if PL would stop their attacks. Pushkin said this was good but there should be no reasons for any provocative actions. I said I knew too much as we had first hand information from US officers on ground that PL had been attacking for some time. Therefore ICC must go and confirm facts. I was sure Khrushchev had so agreed with President Kennedy. Pushkin agreed to report my statement.
We were told Gromyko due Geneva about 8 p.m. Thursday, June 8.
111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos/1/
Washington, June 7, 1961, 9:08 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-761. Secret, Niact. Drafted by Usher; cleared with Anderson of SEA, Chapman, McConaughy, and William O. Anderson of SOV; and approved by the Secretary. Repeated niact to London, Moscow, and Paris, priority to Vientiane, and to Bangkok.
Fecon 97. Confe 136./2/ For Harriman from Secretary.
/2/In Confe 136, June 7, Harriman reported that he and the British and French Delegation heads at Geneva had agreed to cancel that afternoon's meeting in light of the Padong attack. They also agreed to recommend to their respective governments top-level demarches to Moscow. (Ibid.)
Immediately preceding message sent to Moscow and repeated to you contains text of my message to be delivered Gromyko./3/ We had not contemplated higher level approach to Soviets this juncture.
/3/In telegram 213 to Moscow, repeated to Geneva as Fecon 96, June 7, Rusk instructed Thompson to meet with Gromyko to deliver a message from him expressing grave concern over the Padong attack which was not in keeping with the agreements on the cease-fire before the Geneva Conference nor with discussions at Vienna. The ICC must be allowed to maintain the cease-fire and investigate violations. (Ibid.)
Our concept here is that may now be possible bring Soviets to agree to instructions from co-Chairmen to ICC along lines contemplated London's 107 to Geneva./4/ We would therefore not wish interpose difficulties in way of expeditious Soviet agreement by publicly challenging Khrushchev's good faith with respect Vienna joint communique.
/4/The reference is apparently in error. In this telegram, June 7, the Embassy reported that the British expected recommendations from their delegate in Geneva. (Ibid.)
Meanwhile believe you should continue pursue with your British and French colleagues course of postponing day-to-day further sessions of conference until Soviets agree to satisfactory co-Chairmen's instructions to ICC. We would seek to wait out the Soviets in this manner. Continuing postponement of Conference sessions on this issue would probably bring growing pressure on Soviets to accede to our position re instructions to ICC.
Our underlying attitude for guidance your tactics is that we wish to insist upon effective cease-fire but do not wish ourselves be in position of breaking up Conference./5/
/5/Since Gromyko left for Geneva before Thompson could deliver the message, Harriman delivered it. In Confe 166 from Geneva, June 10, Harriman reported his conversation with Gromyko in which he presented the points in Rusk's letter and asked Gromyko how to "get the train back on the track again." Gromyko asked when was the West going to end its "sit-down strike" at Geneva. Gromyko refused to accept that the Pathet Lao was responsible for Padong; he blamed the provocation on the Boun Oum "rebels." Harriman disagreed and asked Gromyko why then did he not want the ICC to investigate. Gromyko said it would first have to reach an understanding with the three sides in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-1061)
Rusk
112. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, June 11, 1961, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-1161. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, and Saigon.
Confe 175. From Harriman. Reference: Confe 152./2/
/2/In Confe 152, June 8, Harriman suggested a brief and nonsubstantive meeting with Souvanna for use in light of possible press inquiries. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-861)
I called on Souvanna Phouma at his request June 8 shortly after his arrival. Chinese were still there but left promptly.
I had decided that all I would talk to him about was future neutrality and independence of Laos.
I started by assuring him that the US Government wanted nothing except independent, neutral Laos, and asked him what his objectives were. He said his aims were the same. How could he want Communist control, pointing to his royal birth and French background. Kong Le, Khamouane, and other anti-Communist FAL ([garble, and ?]) 80 percent of population were anti-Communist. He said he believed the Soviet Union would support neutrality and independence. He didn't reply when I asked for how long in view of Khrushchev's boast that the whole world would be Communist one of these days.
I asked him whether he felt that he could withstand pressure of Communist party which had extraordinary organizational ability. He replied that he would have to organize a single mass-party to oppose NLHX. Anyway, he said that his brother Souphanouvong and Phoumy Vongvichit and NLHX/PL were really not Communist but rather Socialist. He considered they would be satisfied with Cambodian-style Laos.
I commented that he was asking me to believe too much in one afternoon, and expressed opinion that he and other leaders would have to be on guard to protect against Communist takeover. I agreed that it would be necessary to have a united front or party of all non-Communist groups in Laos in order to offset Communist drive.
Souvanna belittled Boun Oum and Phoumi as "nothings" with only a handful of military and other supporters. He also criticized the King, who wanted only yes-men around him. Souvanna claims he always stood up to the King when he felt he was wrong, which was why the King disliked him. He is also scornful of political parties like Bon's, [Boun?] which consisted he claims of only his wife, and a few other close relatives. The Assembly would have to be dissolved as the deputies were an elite without grass roots, consisting of men who could afford 50,000-kip expenses.
Souvanna said he would be grateful for US assistance in a truly neutral Laos, and asked our help in forming national unity government by bringing our influence on Boun Oum, Phoumi and King. I replied that if I did, these men might ask me to use our influence with Souvanna. I said it was clear that US could not and had no intention of interfering in Lao internal affairs. I told him communism would spread unless the people were satisfied socially and economically. Therefore Laos had a job to do. In this we would be ready to help with technical and financial assistance, if the Laotian Government wanted us to do so. Earlier in the conversation I had made it plain that we were supporting the present RLG, but accepted Souvanna as an influential political figure who was bound to play important role in future of Laos.
I asked about Quinim, who was sitting in the room. I said his daughter had been cordial, but Quinim had been somewhat cool. Was he in favor of an independent Laos, as I had heard he worked closely with the NLHX. Souvanna said that I could count on Quinim's being loyal to him and his objectives, but that Quinim was bitter as he had been badly treated by Boun Oum group.
As Krishna Menon was waiting, I left after about fifty minutes' talk.
Comment: I did my best to gain some impression of his attitude. I found him more cordial but equally self-confident compared to my two previous meetings in New Delhi and Phnom Penh. He looked somewhat tired, which was perhaps due to his long trip. He seemed convinced that he could trust the Russians, but never referred to Chinese or Viet-Minh. He considers himself the one man to lead his country, confident that he can control the left-wingers and arouse national popular support. I left with knowing little more about him than when I came in. He gave all the right answers to my questions, accepted my rather blunt statements and my questioning attitude without resentment, and appeared to want to gain our support for the time being, at least.
113. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 14, 1961, 12:02-1:07 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-1461. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins and approved in S on July 1. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
SUBJECT
Laos
PARTICIPANTS
United Kingdom
The Rt. Honorable The Earl of Home, Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
Mr. John Wright, Private Secretary
Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. R.T.D. Ledward, Counselor, British Embassy
United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. George C. McGhee, Counselor
Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Mr. John J. McCloy, Advisor to the President
Mr. Alfred Jenkins, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
When the subject turned to Laos, Lord Home described the situation as it had been upon his departure from Geneva. He believed that the cease-fire had been more of a reality since Padong. He expected the Lao caretaker government which might emerge from the meeting of the three Princes in Zurich would make a declaration of Lao neutrality and presumably another declaration that Laos would impose limits on its military establishment. It would then be up to other conference participants to make a declaration supporting and respecting Lao neutrality. The conference would then need to make some reply to the latter declaration concerning control of arms supply. The powers of the International Commission would also be at issue. So far the communists, and to some extent the Indians, had been insisting that whatever powers the Control Commission might have must not infringe upon Lao sovereignty. Lord Home said he had an oral assurance from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, however, that the powers should not be so large as to dominate the situation, nor should they be so small as to render the Commission ineffective. Lord Home had told Chen Yi that the main task of the ICC would be to assist Laos to be neutral. In the event of any infringement of the rules, the ICC must have the machinery to tell the world of such infringement and to report to the co-chairmen in such a way that the conference might be reconvened. He believed it might be possible to reach agreement with the communists on sufficient powers for the Commission. If not and the conference broke down, there would be no alternative to moving on to a modified [SEATO] Plan 5c./2/
/2/See Document 41.
Mr. McConaughy asked which Lao government would be expected to make these declarations. Lord Home said he hoped there would be a coalition government which would make them. The Secretary inquired as to the chances for a coalition government. Lord Home said that Sisouk had given the chances at 6 to 4 against.
The Secretary mentioned that a purpose of Plan 5c was to bring the interested nations back to the conference table. Lord Home said that this had never been the British understanding. The Secretary said that much depended upon the composition and quality of the Lao government which might emerge.
In response to questions, Lord Home said that he expected the coalition caretaker government to prepare the way for elections. Souvanna insisted that there was a large middle bloc, which would be Lao and neutral and not communist. Souvanna believed that he would win the elections which, in accordance with the Lao constitution, must be held within five months from the setting up of the provisional government. Souvanna had been confident that he could confine Pathet Lao members in the government to two or three ministers in unimportant positions. He further thought he could eventually rule the country with his own people and could get rid of the communists in the government. Lord Home said that in view of Souvanna Phouma's behavior in the communist capitals recently, he could not be sure how much reliance could be placed on these expectations.
The Secretary said there were two problems which must at some point come to the surface: 1) We could not participate in certifying as to the neutrality of Laos if we were not convinced that the internal arrangements would lead to a government free of communist control; and 2) if Laos were not indeed neutral, we could give no aid to it. In other words, we might find ourselves unable to sign conference agreements with which we in fact could not agree. The Secretary wondered whether Souvanna might not be so committed to the other side that he would not be influenced by the two points he had just mentioned, should they arise. Lord Home thought that it might be difficult to dispute the neutrality of a caretaker government pending elections. We would seem to have no option if the Lao agree to the government and the King approves it. However, we could of course refuse to give aid. Mr. McCloy said it was important, nonetheless, to analyze internal Lao strength as best we could--if the government was not strong it would of necessity have to "lean."
In reply to the Secretary's question, Lord Home said that Souvanna Phouma was prepared to have the French retain such military privileges as they were entitled to under the 1954 agreement. The Secretary commented that this would not be so bad if the French would take these duties seriously.
Lord Home said that if the conference did not reach a satisfactory solution, then the United Kingdom and the United States would have to face putting into operation SEATO Plan 5. We would endeavor to make it clear that communist intransigence had prevented a negotiated settlement. The Secretary said he assumed that Plan 5 would be combined with United Nations action. Lord Home agreed, saying that these actions must be simultaneous. He also thought that no one should suppose that there would be much likelihood that there would soon be a return to the conference table once the course of military intervention had been decided upon.
The discussion of Laos was concluded by Lord Home's observation that in his view Gromyko wants to reach an arrangement for a neutral Laos.
114. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Embassy in Thailand/1/
Geneva, June 16, 1961, 11 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-1661. Secret. Sent also to Saigon and Vientiane; repeated to Rangoon, New Delhi, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, and the Department of State as Confe 205. The source text is the Department of State copy.
Confe 98. In response to Department's Fecon 129 of June 16,/2/ I take this opportunity to express some thoughts on the principles upon which our efforts here in Geneva are currently being based. By frequent discussions with friendly delegates we have gained perceptible understanding on their part of this philosophy and it is submitted to addressee posts for possible consultation and discussion with the governments concerned, especially Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane, with the request that instructions from home capitals may supplement our efforts with the delegates here in Geneva.
/2/In Fecon 129, the Department suggested, inter alia, that the Delegation send a guidance message to Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane setting forth conference tactics so U.S. Ambassadors could support delegation policy at Geneva with their respective governments. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-1561)
It certainly is clear that by choosing the conference route in attempting to achieve an acceptable independent and neutral Laos surrounded by certain safeguards, that we face certain inherent hazards. It was plain that the alternative course of escalated military action faced us with grave dangers with uncertain outcomes for all concerned. Having chosen the conference route, we must accustom ourselves to accept less than perfect solutions to each of the problems as they arise unless we are prepared to turn back to the alternative of force.
The compromise on the seating of the Lao delegates in which we arrived at the formula of "agreeing to disagree" and thus permitting the presence of opposition delegates from Laos, has not been acceptable to our Southeast Asian friends. As the conference has progressed, however, it has seemed to us here in Geneva that having made the protest over the indefensible seating arrangement, and placing the onus of recalcitrance upon our Communist opponents, we would now be better off to encourage the RLG to accept the inevitable and bring their representatives to the conference table (even if they appear only when they desire to make a statement) in order that the RLG's view be heard on the substantive matters now coming before us. If the Zurich meeting does not result in a coalition delegation under a single acceptable spokesman, I believe it expedient to urge that an RLG delegation take its place in order that we have the advantage of its support.
With respect to the cease-fire, we could have continued to take adamant stand pressing Soviet co-chairman to comply in matter of acceptable instructions to ICC as well as to see to it that hostilities on the ground cease before consideration any other conference business. It will be recalled that our "sticking" on two separate issues thus far have resulted in two week-long recesses already. By continuing to stress as we have the need for a cease-fire and placing the onus on the Communists for breaching the cease-fire, I believe that we have succeeded in gaining world support on this issue, plus forcing them to take measures on the ground which have improved cease-fire conditions. RLG is in stronger position today to negotiate political solution than a month ago when PL were on offensive. To have pressed our point to the extreme would have gained a certain amount of condemnation from other delegates here at Geneva, especially among the neutrals. Further insistence upon complete compliance with our earlier demands would have led to a breakdown of the conference with PL takeover of Laos or resort to the alternative of force.
While we have reserved our right to bring to the conference further violations of the cease-fire, I believe that the time has come for us to address ourselves to the substantive aspects of the conference agenda, namely; control machinery, military forces limitations, neutrality declarations and possibly some discussion and understanding upon economic aid to Laos. In these discussions we shall need all of the friendly support that we can muster. The Thais and the Vietnamese have thus far spoken eloquently at the conference table. I earnestly hope that we can have the Thai presence again next week as we delve into these problems. Without them we would be isolated from Asian support. Although now we have French and British with us the situation would be comparable to our first difficult week. As I have said earlier in this message, I further hope that RLG spokesmen can be present to present their viewpoint. The Communists will attempt to make a great deal out of their position that control machinery has inherent in it an infringement on sovereignty. This is an obvious effort to create a situation in which they can continue to have a free hand at illegitimate activities under Vietminh aegis. We need the support of the friendly RLG and Vietnam, hopefully supported by the Cambodians, which can effectively give the lie to the concept that controls mean an abridgement of sovereignty. Unfortunately, the Indians have been very unhelpful.
With painstaking and patient effort I believe that we may be able to turn the activities of this conference to our advantage and to the achievement of a status for Laos with which friendly governments can live, providing of course a reasonable balanced government of national unity is agreed to. I want to stress, however, that it will take a lot of cooperation and a willingness at times to deviate from rigid concepts which the course of this conference has proven to be impractical.
Any reaction which our Ambassadors may want to pass on from their host governments plus personal opinion and guidance will be much appreciated here./3/
/3/In Fecon 162, June 23, Rusk agreed with Harriman's analysis, but expressed concern about Thai and South Vietnamese attitudes and the U.S. ability to keep them at the conference. Rusk also noted that there might come a point when the United States would have to end the conference without signing unsatisfactory agreements. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-1661)
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