Docs 137-153
Vientiane, July 18, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:50 p.m. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC for Polad, Geneva for Fecon, and Canberra. Transmitted in three sections.
92. Survey of Laos internal scene since Zurich leads to conclusion that despite some apparent agreement there, real current trend is towards greater polarization of forces.
PL and Souvanna are insisting on Souvanna as Prime Minister and bulk of portfolios in coalition government for at best Souvanna supporters and at worst PL. PL are steadily building up supplies, training forces, propagandizing population and otherwise consolidating their position in areas under their control in manner which clearly indicates their determination that they are here to stay. On other hand, Phoumi has returned from Washington vastly encouraged and with feeling that the U.S. is now prepared to back him militarily. He is reorganizing his forces and has definite military plans. (See CHMAAG Laos ML 3010 July 10.)/2/ Consequently he intends take stiff position in negotiations with two Princes, negotiations for which in any event he has little enthusiasm and into which he has more than once stated he was "forced" by U.S.
/2/In this telegram, CHMAAG reported that Phoumi outlined a plan to be used if the present negotiations failed. The plan had two phases beginning in November. In the first, the FAL would fight alone; in the second it would be joined by SEATO-multilateral-U.S. forces. The plan would consist of flexible guerrilla action north of the Nam Ca Dinh River and 17th parallel coupled with a strong defensive bastion to the south of this line to force the Pathet Lao from the South. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable File, Laos, 1961)
Phoumi's determination not to make unnecessary concessions is all to the good. But there are increasing indications that while Phoumi will take genuine effort to gain acceptance by Laotian King and other side of his formula of government presided over by King (either as Prime Minister or as presiding officer), he is at same time opposed to acceptance Souvanna as Prime Minister in any event, or at least on any terms PL would accept, even should King's gambit fail.
Phoumi feels that Souvanna is irretrievably lost to Communists and that men upon whom Souvanna relies as neutralists are in fact either too weak to exert moderating influence or already under Communist control. Hence he does not think that government under Souvanna could offer reasonable prospect for an independent, united and neutral Laos. Equally important, he believes that even if coalition government more predominantly neutral than he considers possible were formed, it could not long survive under present imbalance of psychological antimilitary forces in Laos. He sees no real hope that Geneva Conference or ICC will be able to establish an effective deterrent to Communist power by control measures. Since U.S. has told him categorically that we will not accept government which is likely to lead to Communist control of Laos, he concludes that he can count on U.S. support in the military action which will in his view almost certainly be required.
Phoumi is obviously fighting idea of Souvanna as PM and preparing for eventuality of breakdown of negotiations if King's gambit fails. For example: Phoumi said three times in Washington that he believes Souvanna cannot be salvaged. He has consistently refused even to consider in discussion with any Westerner who might be PM if King refused task. He told a UPI correspondent that Souvanna could no longer be considered a neutralist. Anti-Souvanna propaganda has appeared on Vientiane news. Phoumi is laying military plans for withdrawal to south. He is trying to get us to support him in King's gambit. He has indicated to Morris his pessimism as to possibility satisfactory outcome three Prince negotiations, into which he says he has been "forced" by the U.S. (Embtel 82)/3/ (Believe his more optimistic presentation to Addis (Embtel 68)/4/ should be heavily discounted.) He told Tobler a coalition government would not work and that he intended do his best to stall negotiations until November (see forthcoming septel).
/3/Dated July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1761)
/4/In telegram 68, July 14, the Embassy reported that Phoumi told Addis that he was basically optimistic that a satisfactory result could come from the three Princes' negotiations as long as conditions which the United States and Phoumi regarded as essential were safeguarded. (Ibid., 751J.00/8-1461)
Accordingly while Phoumi prepared at our insistence continue negotiations with other side, contingencies for which he now preparing include all of following:
A. Negotiations will break down and military action become necessary.
B. Enemy behavior at Geneva or in Laos will finally convince U.S. that political negotiations can only be successful if existing imbalance of military forces corrected, which at minimum will require strong public expression U.S. willingness intervene militarily.
C. Enemy will resume offensive, thus threatening rapid capture most if not all Laos unless there immediate U.S. and/or Thai and South Vietnamese military intervention.
D. Under strain protracted negotiations, enemy behavior will at some point provide RLG with good pretext for breaking off negotiations and partitioning country, in which case U.S. will find it most difficult refuse military protection to government in south.
E. Period of negotiations which will give RLG time to prepare for renewal of struggle, on increased but still minor scale when rainy season over in October or on major scale when negotiations break down.
His strategic concept seems clear--to concentrate bulk of his forces in south, where he hopes for significant military help from RTG and SVN to help him gain and maintain control over all territories south of Nam Ca Dinh. He appears now also hope that U.S. military forces would become involved on his side. He would endeavor hold Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Paksane but only with limited forces to serve as bases for counter-guerrilla and guerrilla operations in north. End result would be de facto partition of country. (For Embassy's views on implications of attempted partition and unrealistic character Phoumi's estimates FAL's unaided capacity, see Embtels 2316, 72, 69, 19,/5/ and CHMAAG ML 3010.)
/5/Telegram 2316 is Document 118. Telegrams 72, 69, and 19 from Vientiane, July 15, 14, and 6, are in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1561, 751J.00/7-1461, and 751J.00/7-661, respectively.
Meanwhile, however, Phoumi is pressing forward energetically with King's gambit. At Zurich he did everything possible to put other side in position in which it would be most difficult for them to refuse recognize royal action. He has at present support of assembly and other non-Communist Lao leaders for this concept. He is beginning public political campaign to explain basic assets of King and constitution (Embtel 48)./6/ The great unknown is, of course, reaction of King. I think Phoumi really hopes that under persuasion of assembly and Phoumi, and perhaps after discovering how difficult it will be for three Princes to agree, King will, albeit reluctantly, conclude that he must take risks to avoid his throne being later toppled by Communists, and therefore accept full powers from national congress, appoint reasonable government and assume role of de facto head of government as de jure PM. I suspect that Phoumi also believes it possible that despite probable adverse effect on world opinion, other side may refuse to accept King's action, claiming he under Phoumi and U.S. constraint, in which case they are likely to resume hostilities.
/6/Dated July 12. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-1161)
I am still doubtful that King will consent to act as PM. He will undoubtedly stall as long as possible to try to get agreement among three Princes which he can simply promulgate. He will be most reluctant to join in any proposal which either side states vigorously it will reject. My guess as to most probable result is that King will conclude that government under Souvanna, including Phoumi and PL is only solution which has any hope of bringing agreement and that Phoumi's acceptance or rejection participation in such government will depend in large measure on whether U.S. agrees or is not prepared to use force rather than accept or acquiesce in it.
It is likely therefore that after a period of protracted negotiation we will be faced with decision whether to accept best compromise for which King is able to get agreement of other side, which will certainly include Souvanna as PM and may well be otherwise less than satisfactory to us, or to support Phoumi with force in country-wide resistance, or break away to south.
On other hand, King's effort may entirely fail for reasons of intransigence, distrust, miscalculation on both sides, in which case King will probably throw in the towel, and opposing forces will remain confronted as at present without hope of agreement. In such event, even if other side does not resume large scale hostilities, it will certainly renew eroding pressures of all kinds which FAL will find it difficult effectively resist alone.
We would then have to decide whether to intervene to forestall capture of key points like Vientiane, Thakhek or Luang Prabang, or wait and react militarily to enemy attacks, or to protect only south or to write off all of Laos.
There is always the possibility that Phoumi may decide to force our hand by finding some pretext to break off negotiations and going south, in which case we will have to decide whether to support him.
Factors that might lead Phoumi to break off negotiations and go south include, a) enemy resumption of hostilities; b) encouragement by SVN and Thailand to divide country rather than yield all to communism, c) Phoumi reaction should he feel U.S. watering down its Washington assurances of support, or actively supporting Souvanna as PM, particularly in combination with idea of turning over Western military role in Laos to French.
If on other hand Phoumi did accept membership in a Souvanna-led government, he may well, either after acceptance, or as a condition of his acceptance, ask us for assurances of covert support for clandestine non-communist forces.
It is obviously impossible to predict with certainty what is likely to happen, but foregoing indicates some possibilities. In any event we should be prepared for:
A) Continuing impasse in three Princes' negotiations and Ban Na Mone talks, which while it permits Phoumi to regroup, refit and train his forces, in preparation for limited eventuality such as defense of south and do a limited amount of propagandizing population, and work in villages in the restricted area he controls, also enables enemy to consolidate his position, something which he is doing vigorously in both military and psychological fields. In balance it probably benefits enemy more in view larger area under control, his good strategic position and his better organization in villages. (We will send separate telegram on this important subject shortly.)
B) The possibility of:
i) Request by Phoumi for U.S. support, including troops, in breaking off negotiation with two princes and embarking on military plan which he outlined to Admiral Felt (CINCPAC DTG 031845Z)/7/ and CHMAAG Laos (ML 3010 DTG 100345Z), or
/7/In this telegram, July 3, CINCPAC reported that Phoumi had outlined to him the plan as summarized in footnote 1 above. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable File, Laos 1961)
ii) Such action by Phoumi on his own in effort to force our hand. (I doubt if i) or ii) are likely before October as Phoumi feels he needs time to regroup and refit his forces and apparently also feels that in this time is on his side. I did not intend give Amb Young's impression I felt such change "imminent" (last para Bangkok's 57 to Dept)./8/
/8/In telegram 57, July 14, Young suggested possible contingencies for Laos and suggested in the last paragraph that the military situation was grave with the Pathet Lao in control of much of the country and able to move to the Mekong at a number of strategic points at any time. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1461)
iii) Request by Phoumi for covert support clandestine non-Communist forces should he enter Souvanna led coalition government, or as condition to his doing so.
iv) Resumption of pressures or active hostilities by other side when enemy feels his build up sufficient, or as part of his over all strategy in worlds confrontation with U.S.
Under foregoing circumstances our best course of action would appear to be:
1) To continue to press at Geneva for satisfactory arrangements on control mechanism, powers for ICC and terms of neutrality, without awaiting formation of a coalition government.
2) To urge RLG to maintain an attitude of willingness to negotiate at PPenh, Geneva and Ban Na Mone, while avoiding damaging concessions.
3) To work on Souvanna directly and through our Allies along lines already undertaken by Amb Harriman and British.
4) While quietly supporting Phoumi's efforts to get King to act effectively on election government, keep our ultimate freedom of decision as recommended by Amb Harriman in his Confe 378 to Dept.
5) To expedite and enlarge training program for FAL, bringing special pressure on Phoumi to provide officers and NCO's for training.
6) To keep alert in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon for any indication that Phoumi is planning to put his ideas on going south into practice.
7) To plan seriously as to our reaction in case of possibilities i), ii), iii), and iv) above, consulting at least British also, as well as planning for other possibilities raised by Amb Young in Bangkok's 57 to Dept.
8) To emphasize and enlarge counter guerrilla operations by military, and if possible police, in order extend area of security.
9) To act in economic and psychological field as suggested by Embassy's forthcoming response to Deptel 20/9/ (septel) to limit allowed by security considerations.
/9/ In telegram 20, July 5, the Department asked for the Country Team's suggestions for nonmilitary ways to support the RLG and the King within Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-461)
10) To maintain and make manifest our confidence in our strength and that of our Allies and our determination to sit out negotiations as long as there is chance of gaining what we consider to be just and reasonable objectives.
11) To prove our own and SEATO forces in readiness in the event of resumption of hostilities, or any other necessity and to let this fact be known./10/
/10/At the end of this telegram the following note in an unknown hand reads as follows: "All of these recommendations would be encompassed in courses of action contained in our concept Telegram."
Brown
138. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 18, 1961, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1861. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:42 p.m.
Confe 408. From Harriman for Secretary. Re Department telegram 2222./2/
/2/Document 117.
Now that conference seems on verge serious negotiations re texts documents which will eventually incorporate any results we may be able achieve here, I feel Dept should be aware my thought re prospects future conference work. It is my assumption we will talk our way through an initial examination documents on neutrality and protocols on controls, setting all our disagreements aside "in one basket" for later bargaining purposes. I further assume that bloc will take care to preserve extensive number disagreements on controls in order maximize their bargaining position in discussion neutrality drafts, I expect to be sticky such subjects as census and withdrawal foreign military forces, French military presence and SEATO.
Once these disagreements thus isolated, we will enter serious phase of horse trading and compromise. It is manifestly impossible conduct this sort of business in group of fourteen or sixteen delegations. Therefore, only practicable solution would appear to be small informal discussions among big five (US, UK, France, Soviets and ChiComs). If I am expected to make serious effort reach agreements on documents, I must interpret my instructions re ChiCom contacts in such manner as to permit me discuss matters of substance directly, and if necessary, bilaterally with ChiCom reps. While some of these discussions can be conducted by our deputies, the nub of understanding will have to be worked out among delegation heads.
As far as I can yet determine, Wang Ping-Nan does not play precisely the same central role he did in 1954 Conference and, while he may eventually prove to be most fruitful contact point, it may also develop that American-educated Chang Han-Fu will be key man. Therefore, unless you explicitly enjoin me from working with ChiComs as indicated above, I plan to agree to suggestion already made by MacDonald for big five discussions and expect to hold such talk with ChiComs as appear useful.
139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/
Washington, July 18, 1961, 9:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1861. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Cleveland, Usher, Steeves, and Evans of DOD/ISA; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to Geneva for Fecon and priority to CINCPAC POLAD.
71. CINCPAC 031845Z, CHMAAG ML-OPT 3010, Embtel 68./2/
/2/See footnotes 6, 1, and 3, respectively, Document 137.
1. These messages reporting conversations with Phoumi reveal his interpretation of situation in Laos in light of his conversations in Washington. He appears to have fastened on selected portions of what President and Secretary told him and built unwarranted edifice upon them. He also appears to have somewhat distorted spirit of these conversations.
2. These distortions reflect certain deep-seated characteristics of Phoumi. He is man who understands and relies primarily on the use of force. He has no real appreciation of political action except in terms of force. He does not understand political process based on cooperation but only one based on authoritarian rule. (Best of non-Communist Lao elements have been put in shade by Phoumi.) At same time his appraisals of his forces and of his opponents have generally not been realistic. (FAL to initiate "strong military campaign" on or about 1 November.)
3. Thus he appears to consider that:
a) Peaceful solution, in which he has never believed, can only be brought about by coalition government.
b) No coalition government can be formed under existing circumstances except one dominated by PL.
c) US will not support Communist-dominated government and is prepared to take military action if necessary to preserve Laos.
d) Therefore it most likely that hostilities will be resumed and in fact this only way of eliminating Communists from Laos.
4. Both President and Secretary specifically avoided making any commitment whatsoever re possible US military intervention. In fact Secretary explicitly told Phoumi that we could not make such commitment as this would turn over to RLG decision which US alone must take.
5. Phoumi's evaluation of situation therefore may lead him to dangerous conclusions and actions. If he becomes convinced of US support regardless of developments, he may do little to try to negotiate any settlement with Souvanna and indeed may even insure failure of these negotiations. He might then trigger FAL offensive in firm belief that Vietminh response would be countered by US action. He does not appear to have in any way measured difficulties involved. Danger of his misinterpretation is all more real in that in past US has always supported Phoumi when chips were down.
6. Our problem is that we want to keep him firm but not encourage him to take rash actions based on serious misconceptions.
7. Therefore stating this being carried out on instructions from Washington and perhaps in company of General Boyle, you should make clear to Phoumi that:
a) His claims of 25 or 30 Viet battalions are simply not borne out by any known evidence and thus tend to cast discredit on all RLG claims.
b) Although we fully recognize importance of Vietminh participation in PL, FAL has serious inner problems on which US can help but which in final analysis RLG alone can resolve. These problems are lack of training, lack of leadership, and lack of motivation.
c) In sum he for time being should negotiate patiently and in good faith, he should not seek military solution, he should concentrate his energies on improving administration and Army, he should work to win over population to RLG.
8. While you should keep in mind that we did not give Phoumi blank check nor any promise of military intervention in event negotiations failed, we fear that to make this point too flatly might completely discourage him. However, you should clearly indicate that his military planning based upon resumption of hostilities cannot assume US agreement nor intervention which are prerogatives of Presidential decision. CINCPACs 152335Z/3/ contains guide lines for CHMAAG re assistance to Phoumi on planning.
/3/ In this telegram, July 15, CINCPAC instructed the Chief of the MAAG to obtain from Phoumi in writing an outline of a plan in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable review and evaluation of his proposed military plan of action. Phoumi's outline should set forth as a minimum, details such as assumptions, military objectives, concepts of operations, estimated forces required, and tasks. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1561)
9. In view this situation we would like again to emphasize importance closest continuing contacts with Phoumi.
Rusk
140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos at Geneva/1/
Washington, July 21, 1961, 8:37 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-2161. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Usher; cleared in draft with Meeker and Robert W. Rinden, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs; cleared by Chapman, Steeves, U. Alexis Johnson, and Bowles; and approved by Rusk.
Fecon 281. Eyes Only for Harriman from Secretary. Fecon 408./2/
/2/Reference should be to Confe 408, Document 138.
Appreciate problems you face re handling future Conference work as you enter phase of serious substantive negotiations. Department is reviewing our position at this juncture and will be cabling our concepts of future strategy Geneva.
In any event however there are a number of factors which dictate against the big five approach.
First, such an arrangement would accord to the ChiComs the very status they have hoped to achieve in this conference--recognition as one of the big powers whose cooperation is necessary to achieve solution of key international problems.
Second, you should not enter into bilateral substantive negotiations with ChiCom reps without further instructions based on situation as it develops. We do not now want to indicate any willingness negotiate substantively with ChiComs, unless and until by their actions in major issues in Laos and elsewhere, ChiComs demonstrate they really interested in reaching solutions outstanding problems.
Third, procedure for negotiating out basic substantive issues in this five power group, which includes ChiComs, would undoubtedly heighten dangerously existing apprehensions Thai, Vietnamese and other friendly Asians concerning our intentions in Southeast Asia.
Fourth, exclusion of neutrals from this forum would deprive US of any moderating influence which they may be inclined or able exercise. If we are to succeed in bringing bloc representatives around to our positions in Conference we will need any help we can get from neutrals.
For foregoing reasons believe you should not pursue big five concept. Recognize difficulty of trying hammer out agreements on substantive issues in group of 14 or 16 delegations. Believe, however, that if we cannot gain acceptance of a committee system, we will just have to accept the awkwardness of working on some kind of committee of the whole or restricted plenary basis.
Rusk
141. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow memo, A-C, 7/21/61. Top Secret. The following handwritten note by Kennedy appears on the top right of this memorandum: "Too difficult to read." All tabs are ibid., A-C, D-I, J-N, O-Appendix, but the Department of State locations are also supplied where possible in the footnotes below.
The situation with respect to Southeast Asia is, essentially, as follows.
1. The Laos Conference. The procedural bottleneck has been broken and negotiations are likely to proceed along the lines suggested in Harriman's cable (Tab A);/2/ that is, neutrality and controls will be considered together. With respect to the formation of a Laos government, we have Brown's assessment of the local scene (Tab B)./3/ Souvanna's frame of mind is suggested in Tabs B-1, B-2, and B-3./4/ Phoumi is evidently a problem, as the State Department appreciates (Tab C)./5/ Somehow he must be kept from either starting a war on his own or caving in completely. Aside from Phoumi's behavior, the crucial issue will, of course, be the powers of the ICC in Laos. Here Krishna Menon has been difficult; the Canadians have been stalwart. Their evaluation--urging us to continue patiently pressing the Indians--is in Tab D./6/ Several further cables on the Krishna Menon problem are included (Tabs D-1, D-2, D-3)./7/ Ken Galbraith obviously has his work cut out for him. My own expectation is that the conference will proceed for some time; crucial diplomatic issues will gradually become clearcut, focussed around: the composition of the government and the powers to be granted the ICC. Each side will develop a reserve position based on a split Laos. It may be that at some stage Khrushchev may hold up a solution and try to take his bargaining cards in hand--along with others--to a summit conference. In any case, Alexis Johnson and I agree that a crucial determinant of what we ultimately get will be Khrushchev's view of our military contingency plan in Southeast Asia and our will to bring it to bear if our minimum conditions are not met. Ken Young, sitting in Bangkok and knowing the extent to which our future relation with Thailand hinges on the outcome of the Laos exercise, filed his own appreciation of the crucial importance of our contingency planning (Tab E)./8/ The present military contingency plan for Laos is included as Tab F./9/
/2/Document 138.
/3/Document 137.
/4/Tab B-1 is telegram 7 from Paris, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-3161). Tab B-2 is telegram 93 from Paris, July 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-761). Tab B-3 is a CIA Field Report TDCS 3/481/073, July 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Memo, A-C, 7/21/61) All three indicated that Souvanna was still confident that he could control the Pathet Lao.
/5/Document 139.
/6/Telegram 49 from Ottawa, July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1961)
/7/Tab D-1 is Fecon 391 from Geneva, July 15. In it, Harriman reported that, thanks to Menon's influence, Nehru had sent Diefenbaker a message indicating a serious split between India and Canada on equipping the ICC in Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-1561) Tab D-2 is Fecon 394 from Geneva, July 16. In it, Harriman complained that Menon's hostility to the United States and his pro-Soviet tendencies threatened to turn Laos into another Munich. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-1661) Tab D-3 is telegram 220 to New Delhi, July 18. In it, Ambassador Galbraith was alerted that he should make representations to Nehru about Menon's role at Geneva. (Ibid., 751J.00/7-1861)
/8/Telegram 57 from Bangkok, July 14; see footnote 7, Document 137.
/9/Fourth Revised State-Defense Draft of a memorandum to the President, May 30. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Memo, D-I, 7/21/61)
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.]
5. Organization. On July 18 General Taylor and I had a long talk with Alexis Johnson on the question of organizing a concerted approach to the Southeast Asia problem. An account of that conversation is included as Tab O./10/ In addition, General Taylor left some guidelines at the Pentagon on contingency planning for Southeast Asia (Tab P);/11/ but these will not be official until the State Department signals its accord. Alexis Johnson tells me he has no objection, but wishes first to review the total position with John Steeves.
/10/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 98.
/11/See ibid., Document 101.
6. Issues for Decision and Action.
--What are our sticking points in the diplomacy of the Laos Conference?
--How far can we push the Indians to take the ICC issue in Laos seriously?
--Shall we push Phoumi into a Souvanna-led government; what are the prospects for getting a Souvanna government with a strong authentically neutralist center.
--Should we play for a split Laos?
--Should our military contingency planning for Laos be revised, with lighter weight in the Mekong Valley and a greater direct threat to North Viet-Nam? (This depends on surfacing soon on the international level North Viet-Nam aggression against South Viet-Nam.)
--How shall we respond to the Staley Report?/12/
/12/See United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 182-209.
--Should we raise soon--at our (or Diem's initiative)--the question of North Viet-Nam aggression, on an international level?
--Pending the outcome of the Laos exercise, how can we reassure the Thais?
--How should military contingency planning for Laos and Viet-Nam be related?
These are the key issues which, in my view, should promptly engage a Southeast Asia Task Force, which should now be created--without further delay.
Note: A special Appendix of papers on our dialogue with the British on contingency planning for Laos is the final item in the book./13/ On the whole, the British have come along pretty well. You may wish to note, especially, items 5 and 6, plus the forthright assessment of the Australians, item 9.
/13/See Document 142.
142. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk
Washington, July 22, 1961.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/7-2261. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text and 2-page attachment not declassified.]
143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
Washington, July 23, 1961, 2:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-2361. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Usher, Cleveland, Lee E. Metcalf of SOA, Steeves, U. Alexis Johnson, and Carl F. Salans of L; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to Vientiane and Geneva for Fecon.
301. Deptel 220./2/
/2/See footnote 6, Document 141.
Share Harriman's concern re Menon's philosophy and attitude at Conference. Appreciate fact you have done much missionary work with Indians including Menon to bring them to shoulder their responsibilities abroad, but believe time may be propitious for you to broach subject again with Nehru. Purpose would be to give him direct US exposition of position in case Menon has given him distorted version and also to urge India toward more forthcoming position on ICC. Suggest you approach Nehru along following lines:
You should tell Nehru that we desire to review with him Lao situation which continues to give us considerable concern, particularly since recently we have received impression that views of Indians and of ourselves had become divergent. Nine weeks ago when conference opened at Geneva it was our impression we and GOI were in tune on objectives to be sought. We had agreed to reactivation of ICC and to Conference on condition that there be effective and verified cease-fire so that Conference could proceed with serenity and not under threat of force. Nehru had contributed significantly to tranquilization of situation by speeding return of ICC to Laos.
Despite this auspicious start Communist intentions have become more clear and more menacing. They have prevented cease-fire from being wholly effective and blocked all attempts to have it verified by ICC. It has become evident that Communists consider they, in this instance Pathet Lao, are in position of strength and they have given no evidence of any willingness to find acceptable compromise.
It is clear that Communists are in position to exert considerable pressures within and from without Laos. Lao Communists are also members of Vietnamese Lao Dong party and geography encourages infiltration from North Viet-Nam. There are large numbers of North Vietnamese military personnel now in Laos and yet this fact is denied by Communists at Geneva who show no intention of withdrawing such personnel or of preventing their covert presence in Laos in future. It has become evident that what Communists are seeking is international recognition of a Laos which would in fact have no means to remain independent or neutral.
We understand quite well however Indian view that Communism can best be countered in Asia by having countries take a neutral stance on the larger world issues and permitting people of these countries to handle their home-grown Communists. However, we fear that Laos, because of its weaknesses and exposed geographic position, is in a category apart from all others. Furthermore, we would like to point out that no neutralist Asian country today has any Communists in its government. Yet Indians are pressing in Laos for a coalition government which would include a strong Communist representation.
If Laos then is indeed to be independent and neutral, compromise must be found. Nature of compromise we have sought is one which would create conditions in which non-Communist elements in Laos would be able to stand up to Communist pressures. It is clear to us that if non-Communist Lao elements feel abandoned by Free World and are left alone in open confrontation with PL aided and abetted by covert North Vietnamese and other Communist subversive activities, these elements will have no choice but to buckle. It seems clear to us therefore that some device must be found to protect Laos against such Communist intervention and pressures. That is reason why in our view question of ICC's authority and facilities assume great importance. Only some impartial witness such as this can offer chance to overwhelming Lao majority to remain non-Communist.
To summarize then, we have sought at Geneva first of all to insure that there be effective and verified cease-fire. Interwoven with this question has been problem which we consider chief subject of negotiation--question of ICC. We consider that declaration of neutrality is essential to define status of Laos but that it will remain meaningless unless it can be supported by some effective international mechanism. We have gone out of our way to find basis on which Conference could agree.
It has been therefore with great chagrin that recently we have seen our Indian colleagues take position which was in many ways consonant with that of Communist powers. Indian representatives have undercut Free World's attempts and particularly those of Canada to give ICC means to do its job. They have declared publicly that neutrality declaration is chief business before this Conference. They have tabled draft protocol re ICC terms reference less satisfactory than even 1954 Geneva Agreement, whereas we had assumed that India desired to see ICC become more effective international instrument for safeguarding Lao neutrality. Their actions have encouraged Communist powers, discouraged other neutrals, who are considerably worried by this situation, and are helping create situation which may well produce collapse of Conference.
We want Nehru to understand clearly that US is seeking in good faith to find formula which will permit Laos to remain both neutral and independent but US is not prepared to sell out Laos for sake of achieving international agreement. We had hoped and we still hope that India would take more affirmative stand in support of neutralist country.
Possibly Nehru may observe that effectiveness of ICC will in last analysis be dependent upon degree of cooperation it gets from Lao Government and that therefore most important immediate issue is formation coalition government. If he does, you might point out that extent to which Souvanna Phouma and neutral elements associated with him will be prepared to resist Communist domination will be greatly influenced by their estimate of international support any future Lao Government could get in taking independent stand. Assurance that there would be on ground in Laos strong, effective ICC would be key factor in encouraging Souvanna elements to maintain truly neutral coalition government.
Appreciate Ambassador now away but unaware details his schedule. Above should be used if he can see Nehru prior 30th. Request advise possibilities.
Rusk
144. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. Secret.
SUBJECT
Laos
I attended an Interdepartmental Meeting on Laos this afternoon chaired by Mr. Steeves. Before we got down to the main business--consideration of a draft telegram to Geneva/2/--Mr. Steeves reported on one or two other developments. He stated that in a conversation he had just had with Geneva it had been indicated that the process of going through the protocol on Laotian neutrality was going more rapidly than had been assumed and that consequently the draft instruction which we were to consider had become even more important as guidance. There was some discussion as to whether the statement in the draft neutrality declaration that economic aid to a neutral Laos would not have political conditions attached raised any legal problems in the light of the requirements of mutual security legislation. There was general agreement that the requirements with respect to undertakings by recipient countries could be waived, but it was agreed that this matter should be further examined urgently.
/2/Not found.
Mr. Steeves also read the text of a telegram to Geneva relating to the Communist efforts to eliminate the Seato umbrella for Laos./3/ The telegram directed the delegation to stand fast against any such efforts subject to possible further instruction from Washington after we had seen the whole text of the neutrality protocol and could assess the general lay of the land. We are prepared, as a fall-back position, to agree to a self-denying statement by the Laotians with respect to Seato protection.
/3/Fecon 294 to Geneva, July 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-2561)
The group then turned its attention to the draft telegram. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whether it was possible, through the meeting of the Princes, to get a non-Communist government in Laos. In this connection, he read a list of Souvanna's candidates, most of whom, he indicated, were Communists. In response, State (Mr. Usher) said that State did not mean to say that the present meeting of the Princes would necessarily result in agreement to a non-Communist government. However, such an outcome was a possibility under some future circumstances--for example, in the event of a conference breakdown. State, in the course of this discussion, also referred to Phoumi's intention to prolong the talk of the Princes over a period of several months. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it was imperative that the draft message be paralleled by a message to Phoumi not to give way in the discussion between the Princes. State agreed.
Mr. Steeves said that it was his understanding that the maximum to which we were prepared to go with respect to the composition of the Lao government was to permit Souvanna to have some "prominent" role up to and including that of Prime Minister and to allow one or two members of Souvanna's group (or even Pathet Lao) into the Cabinet, provided they were not in key positions. He agreed that it was important to send a parallel instruction to Phoumi which would cover two points: (a) remind him of the guidelines to which we have previously agreed with respect to the composition of the government (as summarized just above); (b) ask him not to accept a government that will not in turn accept an ICC with powers of the kind that we wish to see. In connection with this last point, Mr. Chapman, the Lao Desk Officer, pointed out that the RLG did not agree with us on the composition of the ICC. It was prepared to accept three neutrals or three neutrals plus some others. Mr. Steeves responded by saying that we would have to tell the RLG that we were going to stick by our present position and say that we wanted them to create a government which would support this position.
The question was raised as to how seriously ill Souvanna might be. It was indicated that we were asking information on the subject from the French. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the French would never tell us the truth if he were seriously ill, because his death would destroy the whole basis for French policy.
The group then turned to pages 6 and 7 of the (attached) draft telegram. One of the numerous State people present raised the question of whether Par. 2 on P.6 dealing with "reduction of pockets of enemy forces in southern and western Laos and interdiction of use of the Ho Chi Minh trail" was something that we could do with existing forces and under existing authority. [1 line of source text not declassified] However, further discussion of the paragraph produced agreement that it did go beyond existing authorization. As a result of my suggestion that we needed to clarify whether this telegram was being used to seek additional authority in this area or simply to state what we were already doing, the introductory language of the paragraph was revised to read "continue to pursue military and psychological warfare to contain PL Vietnamese forces in areas they now hold and seek approval for expansion of this action in order gradually to neutralize."./4/ In addition, it was agreed to change "reduction of pockets" to "harassment of pockets". I raised the question of whether it was clear that paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with contingency actions. As a result of the discussion which resulted, it was agreed that Par. 4 should be introduced with the phrase, "Within currently approved concepts". It was also agreed that the paragraph should be generalized by omission of the final "which" clause and deletion of the word "any" before "resumption".
/4/All ellipses are in the source text.
The introduction of Par. 5 was revised to read "develop additional courses of action for approval in addition to steps already being taken which will bring pressure...".
These changes seem to me to deal with the paragraphs we had difficulties with on pages 6 and 7. What State originally sought in Par. 2 on Page 6 was some stepping up of the limited guerilla actions which have already been approved for Laos. State's concept was for an increase which would not raise the threshold of activity to the point where it was likely that we would be accused of a major breach of the cease-fire, but which would be equal to the level of activities of the Communists in Laos. As a result of the discussion, however, Mr. Steeves suggested that this question could best be dealt with in connection with the overall plan for Southeast Asia which he is presently preparing. I agree.
I raised the question of whether Par. 5 was necessary, suggesting that this prejudged the strategy that we might wish to pursue in the event of a failure of the conference. In response, it was pointed out that we might get to a stand-off position on the ICC issue, but might not yet be prepared to intervene ourselves in Laos. We might wish rather to continue with our preparations for such intervention or other action. In such a situation, there would be certain to be suggestions that the conference be adjourned. The guidance in Par. 5 is intended to cover the situation. It is to be noted that it begins by stating "we should seek to avoid having a failure of the conference to reach an agreed solution necessarily result in a resumption of military action in Laos." Nonetheless, I argued that it did not seem to me necessary to cross this bridge at this particular time. Mr. Steeves, however, believed the guidance desirable and I dropped the argument. I do not believe that this is a crucial matter since in the event of a failure of the conference or the imminence of such failure, we shall obviously be reviewing our overall Laos policy (if we have not already determined upon it earlier) and can decide at that time what our strategy should be with respect to breaking up the conference.
With these changes, do you believe that the telegram will need to be cleared with the President? I would think not.
Bob
145. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 25, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, Rostow Report, 2d Try, I. Top Secret. This was Rostow's revision of Document 141, which the President had refused to read. The tabs were retyped, relettered, and sometimes extracted, but they remain basically the same as those to that document.
The current situation with respect to Southeast Asia is stated below. Summary back-up material follows. The relevant tabs are indicated in the text of the situation report.
1. Laos Conference.
--The procedural bottleneck has been broken and negotiations on both neutrality and ICC controls now begin in Geneva (Tab A). Alexis Johnson and I believe it most unlikely that we shall get a reasonably satisfactory resolution until the other side is convinced we will fight rather than accept a fake settlement.
--The three Princes are not yet in serious negotiation. Phoumi seems to find it difficult to pursue the middle course we want between appeasing the Communists and starting up the war again (Tabs B and C). At the moment, the King is Phoumi's main negotiating gambit (Tabs D and E). It seems doubtful that we can escape Souvanna, unless the Geneva show breaks down (Tabs F and G).
--The Indians have been difficult in Geneva (Tabs H and I); and we are putting pressure on Nehru to strengthen Indian support for the Laos ICC (Tabs J and K).
--A military contingency plan for Laos exists (Tab L); and up to a point we have agreement with the British (Tab M). The Australians are distinctly tougher than the British (Tab N). Further Pentagon staff work, which would link contingency planning in Laos to contingency planning in Viet-Nam and Thailand, is under way at General Taylor's instigation (Tab O).
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam and Cambodia.]
5. Organization.
John Steeves has been assigned to prepare a brief paper on the key issues for decision in Southeast Asia as a whole; and this paper should be the initial working basis for a Southeast Asia interdepartmental group which General Taylor and I have been trying to get established. A first draft of the Steeves paper will be ready at about Wednesday, July 26.
6. Issues for Decision and Action.
As of now these appear to be the issues which are likely to arise soon for your decision:
--What are our sticking points in the diplomacy of the Laos Conference?
--How far can we push the Indians to take the ICC issue in Laos seriously?
--Shall we push Phoumi into a Souvanna-led government; what are the prospects for getting a Souvanna government with a strong authentically neutralist center?
--Should we play for a split Laos?
--Should our military contingency planning for Laos be revised, with lighter weight in the Mekong Valley and a greater direct threat to North Viet-Nam? (Technically, this involves a judgment as to where we meet the extra Vietminh thrust, should we go in. Politically, this depends on surfacing soon, on the international level, North Viet-Nam aggression against South Viet-Nam.)
--How shall we respond to the Staley Report?
--Should we raise soon--at our (or Diem's) initiative--the question of North Viet-Nam aggression, on an international level?
--Pending the outcome of the Laos exercise, how can we reassure the Thais?
--How should military contingency planning for Laos and Viet-Nam be related?
These are among the key issues for the agenda of a Southeast Asia Interdepartmental Group whose creation should not be much further delayed.
I would add that a military mission to Viet-Nam, headed by General Taylor, is an urgent item of business. We are flying blind on many important matters, including the quality and vitality of the MAAG in Saigon. General Taylor has indicated a willingness to undertake this assignment when he feels confident that orderly planning is under way on Southeast Asia as a whole.
146. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 26, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, General: 7/25/61-7/28/61. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Reflections on Southeast Asia
Your memorandum to the President/2/ summarizing the current situation in Southeast Asia, plus my own re-immersion in the problems of Southeast Asia during the last two days have stimulated the following reflections.
/2/Document 145.
1. You have stated in the first paragraph of your memo for the President your conviction that only if we convince the other side that we will fight can we hope for a satisfactory solution in Geneva. While I believe that there is a real argument for military action to provide the basis for de facto partition of Laos and thus to protect Viet Nam and Thailand, I am less sure that the military actions that are currently under discussion will produce a more satisfactory outcome in Geneva.
The recent SNIE (58-2-61 of July 5)/3/ which assessed the consequences of a VN-Thai-RLG military action to secure the Savannakhet-Tchepone-Lao Bao line and a Plan 5 operation involving the U.S., Thai, Lao and Meo troops concluded that such military actions would not "exert any significant pressure on the Communists to become more reasonable at Geneva." The estimate also assessed the effects of a U.S. air attack upon the DRV (though not possible occupation of Hanoi/Haiphong), but does not explicitly estimate the effects of such action against the DRV on Geneva. It does suggest the strong likelihood of a Bloc military response to such action (see Par. 4 below) and therefore implicitly casts some doubt on the likelihood that it would make the Communists more amenable at Geneva. I think we need a specific intelligence judgment on the effect on Geneva of action against Hanoi/Haiphong if we go for this type of military action.
/3/Not printed. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99)
2. I continue to be quite concerned by what may come out of the discussion between the Princes and by what Phoumi's real intentions may be. I have the feeling that in this area we are playing out a drama that we have not closely related to our basic objectives and which contains real dangers to their achievement. Souvanna wants a government with a 3-6-3 PL-Souvanna-RLG composition. We are prepared at most to accept a government that has no more than two PL or Souvanna ministers plus Souvanna himself. It seems to me that our hopes are quite unrealistic and that we are either going to have to accept a Communist-dominated government or, what is more likely, accept the breakdown of these negotiations./4/
/4/Johnson added the following marginal note at this point: "The CIA comments of yesterday--into which I am now checking--obviously have a bearing here." Johnson is apparently referring to comments made at an interdepartmental meeting, July 25; see Document 144.
Phoumi's purposes in the negotiations are unclear, but they seem to contemplate stretching the negotiations out at least to October when the monsoons will be over and when he believes Souvanaphong may choose to reopen hostilities if he has not otherwise achieved his objectives. Do we share Phoumi's specific objectives in this regard? Shouldn't we attempt to reach agreement with him on this aspect of his strategy? Should timing here of a breakdown in these talks--so far as we can control it--be related to timing of other moves under the new SEA plan being prepared by Steeves? Would it be useful to have an intelligence estimate of the likelihood that Phoumi may cave in or that he may resume military action unilaterally?
3. This matter of timing raises another interesting and difficult question. It has been your view that the Communists may choose to face us with a double crisis--one in Berlin and one in Southeast Asia. As you know from my prior comment, I am somewhat skeptical as to whether Khrushchev does indeed desire a double crisis. It would present him with problems of crisis management that would in some respects be graver than our own for he must be worried about the intentions of his Chinese ally while he is preoccupied in Europe. If my view is correct we may be faced by a situation where the Communists will set the timetable for one crisis (Berlin) and we will have much greater control over the timetable for the other (SEA).
If this is the case, do we not need to determine whether, considering our own capabilities for crisis management, we wish to have a double crisis? We might be able to get away with a significantly higher level of covert guerilla activity in Southern Laos if Khrushchev was determined not to be provoked. On the other hand, the Chinese might choose to be supersensitive to such activity and use it to justify stepped up Communist activity. Again, it seems to me that it would be useful to have an intelligence estimate dealing with the likelihood that the Soviets would provoke a double crisis and their reaction to new U.S. initiatives in Southeast Asia in the context of a Berlin crisis situation.
4. Finally, on the estimative side I would like to see an intelligence appreciation of the Communist reaction to a U.S. seizure of Haiphong/Hanoi. The SNIE referred to in 1 above states that the lesser action of U.S. air attack on the DRV would almost certainly result in commitment of Soviet and Chinese aircraft to DRV defense, might result in attack on bases from which the U.S. strikes were mounted and concludes with the observation that "We cannot rule out the possibility that Communist China, considering the U.S. action a threat to its security, might undertake major military action in Laos, or even in the Taiwan Strait or Korea." Presumably, actual occupation would increase the likelihood of this latter type of Chinese reaction.
5. I am rather puzzled by your characterization of the possible need for a change in contingency planning in the penultimate paragraph under Par. 6 on p. 3 of your memo for the President. You speak of giving lighter weight to action in the Mekong Valley and greater weight to a direct threat to North VietNam. You make no direct reference to action in the panhandle of Laos. When I raised a similar point with respect to your memo on the Steeves paper, you indicated that the panhandle operation was covered by reference to the Mekong Valley. But if that is the case here also, do you really want to give lighter emphasis to it? As I have understood your concept, the primary military objective was to secure the panhandle; the primary objective of mounting a threat to Hanoi was one supporting action in the panhandle by deterring massive DRV intervention in Laos. (See Par. 3, v, p. 3 of your memo of June 30 to the President)./5/ Perhaps there has been some slippage during my week away in my understanding of your concept, but I have a feeling that your emphasis has changed somewhat to suggest that the more important purposes of an operation against Hanoi are to reduce DRV intervention in South VietNam and to get the Communists to be more reasonable at Geneva. If these are the objectives, they seem to be less possible of accomplishment than the objective of supporting an effort to achieve de facto partition of Laos. In any event, it seems to me desirable in any discussion of these various possibilities to distinguish explicitly between the Mekong-Plan 5 type activity and activity in the panhandle.
/5/Paragraph 3, v, of the memorandum from Rostow to the President, June 30, on alternative strategies in Southeast Asia reads: "plan an operation to defer the introduction of massive Vietminh and Communist Chinese forces into Laos by mounting a potential threat to Hanoi and North Vietnam from the seaward side." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, SEA, 6/1/61-7/20/61)
6. Is it your intent (Par. 5 of your memo for the President) that the Steeves paper would be worked over in the proposed SEA task force before it is considered formally by the President or only after Presidential approval? I would favor the former course of action, partly because it is likely to need a good deal of further work after Steeves is done with it, partly because the interested departments ought to have some such opportunity to work on it before the President decides such an important matter. If this procedure is followed, a new intelligence estimate might be cranked up to cover such questions as those I have suggested above as well as other aspects of the plan.
Bob
147. Editorial Note
General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, sent President Kennedy a memorandum on July 26, entitled "Southeast Asian Military Planning," which combined recommendations and advice on Laos and South Vietnam. Taylor suggested that the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces down the Laos panhandle was the most immediate threat to South Vietnam and noted that SEATO planning was not designed to deal with it. Nor, Taylor continued, was the Royal Lao Army, with or without the Meos, adequate to cope with the infiltration notwithstanding U.S. ongoing efforts to improve its performance. Taylor stated that without suggesting a reduction in the effort in north Laos, he felt a "prime military requirement" was the establishment of a secure base in south Laos capable of covering the flank of South Vietnam and providing a point of support for operations against North Vietnam. To accomplish this end, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam, assisted and encouraged by the United States, must cooperate. Taylor reinforced Walt Rostow's view that a tightly knit Southeast Asian task force was required to create a strategic plan and program for Southeast Asia. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 7/25/61-7/28/61) Taylor's memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, Document 104.
On July 26, President Kennedy met with Admiral Arleigh Burke who was retiring and receiving a Distinguished Service Medal for his service as Chief of Naval Operations. The President and Burke discussed a number of matters including Laos. Burke stated that, "The President talked about Laos being a bad place to fight. I said yes, it always would be because the communists would choose a bad place to fight. I said we may have to yet fight in Laos." (Memorandum for the record by Burke, Op-00 Memo 0364-61, July 26; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, "Bumpy Road Materials")
On July 27, Taylor and Rostow jointly sent President Kennedy a memorandum suggesting issues for decision on Southeast Asia. They recommended an integrated strategy to met the precarious situation there and suggested three choices: graceful disengagement; a U.S. military attack on North Vietnam; or a buildup of indigenous military, political, and economic strength to contain the thrust from Hanoi while preparing for U.S. intervention if the situation got worse or the Chinese intervened. Specifically on Laos, Taylor and Rostow suggested that the United States would have to decide what was the U.S. "sticking point" in Geneva and what kind of Laos government was minimally acceptable; what to do in the event of a breakdown of the conference, and would the United States accept a split Laos. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General 7/25/61-7/28/61; printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, Document 107)
On June 28, John Steeves, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Chairman of the Southeast Asian Task Force, sent the President an interim report which included consensus conclusions of the Task Force: Southeast Asia must be protected from Communist subversion; the United States must decide how to resist Communist encroachment, by military means if necessary; the U.S. approach must be coordinated for all countries of the area and include political, economic, psychological, and military measures; and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was the immediate focal point of the threat. A strategy and concept to accomplish these purposes in Laos included at Geneva the decision that the U.S. "sticking point" was an effective and well-equipped ICC with adequate terms of reference. This should be the minimum price for U.S. disengagement from Laos. Furthermore, the United State must encourage the Royal Lao Government not to accept a coalition which would merely be a prelude to a Communist take-over; continue to train and support the Lao Armed Forces so it could resist a breach of the cease-fire or a Pathet Lao offensive; be prepared to support a divided Laos with one part under a non-Communist government rather than a unified Laos under a Communist-oriented government with inadequate controls resulting from failure at Geneva; and, finally, prepare new military contingency planning, with or without SEATO concurrence, aimed at reducing the threat to Laos and South Vietnam by concentrating military action on North Vietnam should all other efforts fail. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia; General: 7/25/61-7/28/61; printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, Document 147)
148. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 28, 1961, 11 a.m.-1:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, General: 7/29/61-7/31/61. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. The time of the conclusion of this meeting is taken from the President's Appointment Book (Ibid.)
PRESENT
The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Steeves, Mr. Cottrell, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Ball
The meeting was opened by Mr. Johnson, who explained that Southeast Asia, in the current context, meant Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.
Summarizing the current situation, Mr. Johnson remarked that the Communists show no sign of wanting a neutral Laos. Our estimate is that they are very confident about the current military situation and see no reason for concessions. Thus, the question for us is whether we can introduce a new element which will change their estimate of the situation. Without such a change, it is most unlikely that there will be any agreement in Geneva.
Our position is that two elements are required for a satisfactory Laotian settlement: a strong ICC and a government which gives real promise of avoiding Communist domination. Without these two conditions, Laos will pose an increasing threat to South Vietnam. Our situation in that country is not improving. The Vietnamese are killing members of the Viet-Cong in significant numbers, but as these losses are inflicted, more are introduced, and we are on a sort of treadmill there.
The question then is whether we can make a coordinated approach to the problem of Southeast Asia. It is not easy, because Southeast Asia is an American geographical expression rather than a political reality. Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have complex relations one with another, and while their present interests are much alike, there are rivalries and differences which make cooperation difficult.
Turning to the political situation in Laos itself, Mr. Johnson reported a lack of progress in negotiations among the three Princes. His Washington visit has apparently stiffened Phoumi's back. (Mr. Johnson thought the stiffening was about right, but the President later expressed reservations.) Meanwhile, SEATO Plan 5 is ready if the cease-fire is broken, and useful military negotiations have gone forward with the British. But the British have made it very plain that they are interested in SEATO 5 only if the cease-fire is rudely broken, and then only for defensive purposes and to induce a restoration of the cease-fire.
The new element which is now being considered, in working discussions in the U.S. Government, is the creation of a plan to take and hold the southern part of Laos with combined forces of the Royal Laotian Government, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. The proposal is that we would press in Geneva for a strong ICC, making plain that unless such an arrangement is established, the U.S. will not give up its current position in Laos in support of the RLG. At the same time, we would support Phoumi in refusing to accept any government which would be likely to slip under Communist control. If these conditions are not met, and if the cease-fire is broken, we would then go, not for a re-establishment of the status quo, but for a strong new position, as described, in Southern Laos.
In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr. Johnson stated that this proposal did not exclude a Laotian Government with some members of the Pathet Lao in it. The point was, rather, how many, and in what Cabinet positions, and later there was agreement to a suggestion from Mr. Steeves that it is time now to begin discussing particular names in particular posts. Mr. Johnson continued that whatever the Government, the character and powers of the ICC are of central importance.
It was further made clear that if we were unable to agree to proposals made in Geneva and if we should support the Lao Government in a parallel position, we would nevertheless continue to talk and would not ourselves be the agents to break up the conference.
The President then expressed his own concern that Phoumi might be leaning too far forward. His real wish may be to have the conference break up and then get us into military action in Laos. Mr. Johnson replied that the best we can do is to keep in closest possible touch with Phoumi through Ambassador Brown. Meanwhile, we face a period of wrestling around in the debate about a new government. The President at a later point expressed his feeling that we should have to take a Souvanna government, sooner or later. The Secretary of State hoped that we might be able to persuade the King to take the Prime Minister's job, with the three Princes in dignified posts under him and a government composed essentially of civil servants. Mr. Johnson pointed out that our allies will disagree with us on the estimate of the prospects for any given government's future (it may be embarrassing if we become almost the only ones who mistrust a given arrangement). Mr. Steeves continued to place primary emphasis on the ICC because without it we can have no real protection. He pointed out that the Canadian Government has now taken a new and strong line in this respect. The President expressed his doubt that we have the power to get what we want in these negotiations.
It was evidently from this same gloomy view that the working party has turned to a consideration of a new military alternative. One part of this alternative plan, as explained above, is the notion of a capture of Southern Laos. The second part, Mr. Johnson explained, is the possibility of responding in a new way to any substantial intervention by the Viet-minh. The force proposed for Southern Laos would probably be able to cope with any Pathet Lao force that might be placed against it. Previously it has been supposed that if the Viet-minh should intervene, any additional action would have to be located in Laos. Now there was discussion of the possibility of meeting any such substantial intervention by the Viet-minh with a direct air and naval operation at Haiphong or Hanoi. And possibly you can deter any such attack in Laos by making clear that there are circumstances in which you would take this more energetic course. Questions from the President showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed. It was not clear how great an effect action against Haiphong or Hanoi would have on Northern Vietnam, nor whether it would be easy to hold what had been taken in a single attack. Similarly, no careful plan has yet been developed for an operation to take and hold Southern Laos. Planning is proceeding, and General Taylor is in close touch with General Lemnitzer. But the President made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in such military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event. He was not persuaded that the airfields and the existing situation in Southern Laos would permit any real operation to save that part of the country, and he emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished military leaders to see any direct involvement of U.S. troops in that part of the world. In reply it was urged that with a proper plan, with outside support, and above all with a clear and open American commitment, the results would be very different from anything that had happened before. But the President remarked that General de Gaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.
A relevant element in military planning of any sort is the financial stringency which is pressing the British to reduce their military commitments east of Suez. The current Cabinet order is that this reduction be on the order of 35 million pounds a year. The British, in any event, will be most reluctant to participate in any broader scheme of the kind which is now under discussion.
Another related element is the problem of international opinion with respect to the situation in Vietnam. It would greatly improve our position if the world could understand more clearly what in fact is happening there. In particular, any landing operations in Northern Vietnam would be much more likely to escape from international condemnation if world opinion understands the character of the attack which is now being mounted from the north against Diem. One grave question here is whether certain kinds of information available to the United States should on balance be brought to the surface and placed before the United Nations. This matter is still under study.
Mr. Johnson made it plain that no decision was being sought at this meeting, but that it would be most helpful in planning if it could be understood that the President would at some future time have a willingness to decide to intervene if the situation seemed to him to require it.
The President in reply offered no decision, but he made it very plain that he himself is at present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos. He believed that the negotiations in Geneva should be pressed forward, that we should not get ourselves badly separated from the British, that the American people were not eager to get into Laos, that nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in this area, and that he did not yet have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him, though he was eager to have it studied more carefully.
The Secretary of State then turned the discussion to the economics of the situation. He thought it important not ever to tell the President that any active military intervention would be cheap, and he pointed out that by comparison other instruments were very inexpensive indeed, and that we ought to examine what we might do in Southeast Asia if there were no budgetary limitation upon the use of such other instruments. Saving Southeast Asia would be worth a lot of money and doing it without U.S. forces would be worth a lot more. Discussion then turned to the Staley report on Vietnam, and the President agreed to the general line of argument presented by Mr. Ball. (Mr. Ball's argument was drawn from a memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President,/2/ which is attached to this record.) Mr. Ball also discussed briefly a plan for a line of credit to Thailand proposed by Ambassador Young, and the President emphasized that long-term credits of this sort should not be publicly discussed during the debate on foreign aid.
/2/Dated March 28; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, footnote 2, Document 109.
Returning to the military problems, the President emphasized the need for more accurate assessment of the situation in the future. He indicated that it would be wise for anyone making current military recommendations to examine the fate of earlier assessments. He indicated his hope that someone well known to him could go out and look at the situation directly, and while there might be arguments against having General Taylor in Laos, it emerged in the discussion that it might be good for him to go to Vietnam and to learn what he could about the whole situation from that area. General Taylor proposed to look first at the problem itself to make clear what facts need to be checked.
In summary, the President proposed the following five courses of action:
1. We should be closely on top of the conference in Geneva. He would like a weekly report of progress on that front.
2. There would be continued effort to frame a satisfactory government. If we could get an arrangement with the King in the lead, so much the better. Actual names and numbers of the players would now be discussed.
3. He was willing to accept the recommendations of the Staley report, but without a present commitment of precise amounts of money over a precise period of time.
4. The military proposals put forward by the working group will be closely examined, in the light of the criticisms and reservations expressed above. One particular aspect of these proposals is whether they would have an impact upon Vietnamese force ceilings.
5. The President hopes to have a recommendation soon as to who might go out and check the important points of fact relevant to these plans on the ground.
McGeorge Bundy
149. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)/1/
Washington, July 31, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 7/61. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Draft Protocols Relating to the ICC for Laos
In response to your request, I have obtained from the State Department various documents relating to the ICC issue. Of these, the most important is a draft French agreement which was tabled with our concurrence, articles supplementing this agreement tabled by the U.S., an alternative Indian draft and comments by the Department to Geneva on the Indian draft. I have summarized and compared the French-U.S. and Indian drafts in the attached and included the State comments. This attachment will, I believe, save you a good deal of time in finding your way through the issues and in describing the area within which negotiations must take place. I have arranged it topically, but with some variation it follows the format of the French-U.S. draft.
The attachment does not answer, however, the basic questions you raised as to (a) exact numbers of personnel, kinds of equipment, where they are to be located, etc.; and (b) the U.S. fallback position on the several issues involved. On the first, the Department of Defense has done a good deal of detailed planning. I have just requested the DOD papers. It is not planned to incorporate these details in the new agreement itself except for a statement on the location of the most important operations centers for the inspection teams (see Par. 5 of attached). However, State did not seem very clear as to the means by which our views on these subjects would be put forward. It might, I would suppose, be useful to consider whether such specifics should be put forward at Geneva as further bargaining counters. However, agreement on specifics would not seem to me to make compromise possible on such basic principles as full access, control of transport and communications equipment, majority rule, etc. These principles obviously have broader applications that cannot be satisfied by agreement on specifics.
When I first asked about a fallback position I was told that the French draft (ex the supplementary U.S. articles?) was the minimum. When I talked with Usher of State today, however, he said that he had been working on the question of fallback position over the weekend (presumably because of the President's expression of interest).
Usher emphasized that we do not want to fall back into hobbles. After some reflection and effort to think out possible compromises on specific articles, he had come to the personal conclusion that we needed first to prepare a statement of the objectives or principles which would guide any effort to offer compromises. He is attempting to incorporate this approach in the draft general guidance message to Geneva which we saw last week. He will send me his language when it is available. Following is the statement of the essential characteristics of a control mechanism as set forth in the version of the draft telegram we saw last week:
1. Its own transport and communications equipment and unconditional control thereof;
2. Free and immediate access to all areas of Laos;
3. It must be able to make decisions and issue reports by majority vote;
4. Adequate fixed and mobile teams to do its job;
5. Its security assured by RLG.
Usher confirmed my impression that the Indian draft is probably to be considered the principal alternative to our position. In response to my query he said that he did not know whether the Indian draft also reflected the Communist position. He suspected it did, in general, but agreed that this was a question worth exploring. He also acknowledged, in response to my suggestion, that the Communists might offer some proposals of their own to facilitate a "compromise" on the Indian version.
If the Indian draft does pretty well reflect the Communist position, the attached comparison will illustrate something of the range within which compromise will have to take place if agreement is to be reached (unless we offer new points for bargaining purposes). Although I have made no thorough effort to compare the Indian draft with the Geneva Accords of 1954 and although they differ in a number of obvious respects, my general impression from reading the two is that the Indian draft would establish an ICC that would have roughly equivalent functions and authority. As the attached statement may suggest, the Indian draft is rather obscure on some of the most important points, partly because the several provisions having a bearing on a particular subject are scattered.
I have summarized in this memo and the attachment all of the material I received from State except for a general memo of explanation of the U.S. position on the ICC submitted by State to the White House last May,/2/ a Cambodian draft (thoroughly vague and unsatisfactory) and State comments upon it./3/ The May statement is principally valuable for the background it provides on the question of membership of the ICC on which, because of objection by all concerned, we have, as you know, retreated to the 1954 formula./4/
/2/Memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy, May 27. (Ibid., 5/14/61-5/31/61)
/3/The Cambodian draft included provisions for "troika" and a veto by the ICC co-chairman, but nonetheless was rejected by China and the Soviet Union, causing Sihanouk to leave the Geneva Conference and have only a single Cambodian representative remain at Geneva. (Confe 318 from Geneva, June 30; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-3061)
/4/Johnson wrote the following note at the bottom of the page: "Do you want me to send a copy of this to General Taylor?"
Bob
[Attachment]
July 31, 1961.
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF FRENCH AND U.S. DRAFT
PROTOCOL ON CONTROL WITH INDIAN DRAFT
(Note: The U.S. accepted the draft tabled by the French but offered supplementary articles. State comments on the Indian draft are from Fecon 309 of July 27, 1961.)/5/
/5/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-1461)
1. Composition of International Control Commission
French Draft: Continues the commission created by 1954 agreements (Art. 1).
Indian Draft: Same (Art. 2).
2. General Functions of ICC
French Draft: To supervise and control implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the neutrality declaration (Art. 1).
Indian Draft: On cease-fire: same (Art. 2). On neutrality: preservation of neutrality, including exclusion of outside interference, is concern of Laotian Government; ICC to assist in preservation of neutrality, establishing necessary machinery in agreement with Government of Laos and in accord with this agreement (Art. 6).
3. Relations with Government of Laos: General
French Draft: Commission to act in close cooperation with government (Art. 1). Government to ensure safety of ICC and its inspection teams, in particular: (a) including, at their request, placing of protective forces at their disposal; (b) taking measures to enable them to travel quickly and safely so they may perform duties more effectively; (c) granting all privileges and immunities required for performance of duties (Art. 5).
Indian Draft: ICC to function in close cooperation with government as in French draft (Art. 10). Would have government place protective forces at disposal of ICC "if required" (instead of, if requested); privileges and immunities granted would be those "agreed"; no specific reference to measures relating to travel, though this may be covered by general provision relating to facilities for visits and inspections (see Par. 6 below) (Art. 3).
4. Authority of ICC and Its Inspection Teams
French Draft: To have all authority for investigation, inspection and verification necessary for performance of duties, including authority to hear witnesses; unrestricted access by land, sea and air to all parts of Laos; full freedom to inspect all installations, units, organizations and activities which might be of a military nature; and access to relevant documents relating to civil and military aircraft, vehicles and river craft (Art. 3).
Indian Draft: ICC "will investigate by visiting and inspecting or in other ways as appropriate such difficulties in regard to the maintenance of the cease-fire as may arise." (Art. 3). ICC to "exercise vigilance" to assist in preventing introduction or reintroduction of foreign military personnel and military equipment whose introduction is contrary to provisions of the agreement, establishing such machinery as is necessary to this purpose in agreement with the Laotian Government (Arts. 4 and 7).
(State Comment: Investigatory power of ICC seems limited to "maintenance of cease-fire". Is not clear whether reference to exercising vigilance includes investigation. See also State comment under Par. 5 below. Making establishment of ICC machinery subject to RLG agreement would undermine effectiveness and freedom of action of ICC.)
5. Composition and Location of Inspection Teams
French Draft: ICC to establish fixed and mobile teams on which the three states on the ICC shall be equally represented; the absence of the representative of one state shall not prevent ICC or teams from performing functions. ICC to establish (and change if need arises) sufficient number of operations centers to permit efficient operation of the inspection system; in particular these to be established at main points of entry and exit from the territory (Art. 2).
Supplementary U.S. Draft: Initially the ICC shall establish operating centers for its inspection teams at all major points of entry and communications centers throughout Laos. These places shall include:________. All military personnel and advisers, armaments, munitions and equipment will enter and leave only at such places specified above as may be designated by the ICC and then only after prior notification and prior approval and under the supervision of an inspection team. The ICC to withhold approval of movements inconsistent with provisions of the agreement under its supervision and control (Art. 13). When the ICC has established these operating centers and determined that it is able to operate effectively throughout Laos it will so inform the Laotian Government and members of the Conference. On the day after that notification, the provisions with respect to elimination of foreign military, the introduction of arms and equipment and movements of both will come into effect (Art. 14).
Indian Draft: Apart from general authorization to ICC to establish, in agreement with Laotian Government, machinery to prevent illegal movement of military personnel, equipment, etc. (see Par. 4 above), draft contains no comparable provisions. Draft does specify (Art. 13) that ICC personnel shall be exclusively Canadian, Indian, Polish or Laotian nationals.
(State Comment: ICC should have all authority for investigation, inspection and verification necessary for performance of their duties. Effective inspection can best be attained by requiring free and immediate access (Par. 4 above), fixed and mobile teams, commission and teams to function when any two members present, and inspections at request of any member of ICC or inspection team (see Par. 7 below).)
6. Logistic and Other Support
French Draft: Laotian Government to ensure assistance is provided at all administrative and military levels (Art. 1). ICC to have sufficient logistic resources, including all means of transport and communications required for effective performance of its duties; to have free use of these and of facilities necessary for their maintenance (Art. 4).
Indian Draft: ICC and its teams will be "afforded" facilities needed to carry out its inspections expeditiously and effectively (Art. 3). The Government of Laos shall extend to the ICC necessary facilities and assistance (Art. 10). Administrative control of personnel and equipment at the disposal of the ICC rests, to the extent necessary for the purposes of the discharge of its functions, in the ICC (Art. 14).
(State Comment: Art. 3 leaves open who will "afford" ICC equipment. It appears that RLG alone is to provide "necessary facilities and assistance", presumably including equipment. This is contrary to principle that Commission should be permitted to accept equipment from any source. Phrase in Art. 14 "to the extent necessary for such purposes" is possible source of future disputes. Complete control by ICC is necessary for effective operation of the ICC.)
7. Initiation of Investigation and Voting Provisions
French Draft: Shall be undertaken without delay when requested by Laotian Government or by any member of the ICC or any member of an inspection team (Art. 6). Decisions relating to operations of the commission or its teams and all procedural decisions shall be by majority vote (Art. 7).
Indian Draft: ICC shall undertake investigations relating to maintenance of cease-fire upon receiving information or reports from Laotian Government or other authorities designated for the purpose, or at its own initiative and in agreement with Laotian Government (Art. 3). No reference is made to investigations not relating to cease-fire other than general references with respect to "exercising vigilance" with respect to illegal introduction of military personnel and equipment (see Par. 4 above). The ICC shall decide major questions by agreement among its members (Art. 8).
(State Comment: Investigations cannot be undertaken without RLG's consent, thus making ICC freedom of access subject to RLG agreement. Voting formula seems less satisfactory than in 1954 agreement amounting to unanimity rule for "major questions" without indicating how members decide which questions are major ones.)
8. Reporting by Inspection Teams and by the ICC
French Draft: The inspection teams will report regularly, and, where urgent measures are required, immediately, to the ICC. The ICC will send the Conference a regular quarterly report and special reports (including suggestions as to measures to be taken) in case of urgency. Where members of the ICC or of a team cannot agree, majority and minority or three separate reports shall be submitted (Art. 8). The Laotian Government and the ICC may at any time propose to members of the Conference arrangements they consider necessary to adapt the activities and resources of the ICC to the situation (Art. 9). As long as the ICC exists, heads of the diplomatic missions to (country) of those states which are members of the Conference shall meet at least twice a year (or by majority agreement, at the request of one head of mission) to consider ICC reports (which will be circulated directly to them) and proposals by the ICC or the Laotian Government for changes in arrangements pursuant to Art. 9 (Art. 10).
Indian Draft: The ICC will report to the Co-Chairmen as and when necessary and in any case whenever it investigates an incident or takes other important steps. The Co-Chairmen will circulate ICC reports to members of the Conference (Art. 9). The Co-Chairmen shall, at the end of three years or earlier if requested by the Laotian Government, report to members of the Conference on the question of substantial modifications in (as well as termination of) the operations of the ICC (Art. 12). The draft contains no arrangement for regular or special meetings of Conference representatives.
(State Comment: Regular reports should be required and minority reports authorized. Transmission through the Co-Chairmen offers possibilities for delay; they should at least be required to circulate them immediately.)
9. Withdrawal of Foreign Military Personnel and Advisers
Supplementary U.S. Draft: Military personnel and advisers, other than those whose presence is consistent with the 1954 agreement [the French]/6/ shall be withdrawn as soon as possible and in no case later than _____ days after the notification by the ICC of its establishment of operating centers and of its ability to operate effectively throughout Laos (Art. 16).
/6/Brackets in the source text.
Indian Draft: All foreign military and para-military personnel and units to be withdrawn immediately under the supervision of the ICC; in any case withdrawal shall be completed within _____ days of entry into force of the agreement (Art. 4). Retention of French personnel for training of security forces may be mutually agreed between governments of France and Laos. The French cannot delegate its responsibilities to any other authority than the Laotian Government and may not recruit any personnel other than French or Laotian for this purpose (Art. 5).
(State Comment: Immediate withdrawal of foreign forces without provision similar to U.S. draft for ICC determination that it can operate effectively throughout Laos is unsatisfactory. Prohibition on delegation of French authority too restrictive; it would even prevent delegation to neutrals which might in future be desirable.)
10. Introduction of Arms and Equipment
Supplementary U.S. Draft: No arms or equipment inconsistent with the Laotian Government's declaration on the organization of its national army shall be introduced (Art. 18).
Indian Draft: Introduction of arms and war material generally, except as required for the defense and security forces of Laos, is contrary to the agreement (Art. 7).
11. ICC Costs
French Draft: Shall be borne as follows: _______ (Note: Proposed U.S. formula, not included in text of draft agreement would have U.S., USSR, Communist China, France and U.K. share equally in meeting 80 percent of costs, providing that our share for the year ending June 30, 1962, shall not be more than $2 million. Other 20 percent to be borne by the nine other members of the Conference.)
Indian Draft: To be allocated on the basis of the principles governing contributions to expenses of the UN.
(State Comment: Would mean U.S. share would be approximately one-third.)
12. Termination of the ICC
French Draft: To remain in being until members of Conference agree it can be terminated and in any case until July 31, 1964. The Co-Chairmen shall report to the Conference by that date on the question.
Indian Draft: The Co-Chairmen to report on the question at end of three years, or earlier if requested by Laotian Government.
Provisions of Supplementary U.S. Draft Not Included in Indian Draft
The parties to the cease-fire shall simultaneously inform the ICC within thirty days of the location, organization, strength and equipment of all of their forces and all foreign forces and advisers as well as the quantities of arms and equipment in their possession (Art. 15). The ICC is to report to the Laotian Government and members of the Conference any arms and equipment which appear in excess of the needs of national forces and shall recommend disposition (Art. 17).
Within ten days all POW's and civilian internees shall be released, non-Laotians being released to the ICC for repatriation (Art. 19). There shall be no reprisals or discrimination against persons, groups or organizations for their role in the hostilities (Art. 20).
Provision of the Indian Draft Not Included in French or U.S. Drafts
The ICC for Laos shall cooperate with those for Cambodia and Viet-Nam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements (Art. 11).
150. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 1, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/1/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Recent Developments in Laos Situation
Geneva Conference
On July 19 the Conference agreed on a procedure to consider in restricted plenary sessions the Soviet, French, American and Indian draft documents that have been introduced. The drafts will be considered simultaneously provision by provision in accordance with a schedule prepared by the co-chairmen. If no agreement is reached on a particular provision, further discussion of it is to continue for not more than one additional day, after which the Conference is to proceed to the next provision.
A list of items for discussion was drawn up by the co-chairmen on July 25 and substantive discussion began on July 26. The list is divided into sections covering draft declarations on the neutrality of Laos, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the international control machinery in that order.
Ban Namone Talks
Small skirmishes continue to take place, but there have been no significant violations of the cease-fire since Ban Pa Dong six weeks ago. The cease-fire talks by the military subcommittee at Ban Namone have been continued on a somewhat erratic basis, and the Royal Lao Government and the Souvanna delegations have each submitted draft regulations for the cease-fire. We are concerned about the RLG draft which was submitted without consultation with us and which ascribes a weaker role to the ICC than we are seeking in Geneva. The Souvanna draft is also full of pitfalls. The ICC is meanwhile inactive.
In the political committee, the ICC presence has been at issue, the RLG having refused to participate without an ICC presence to which the other side has objected. The issue has been dropped momentarily. It has been agreed to discuss matters relating to the formation of a coalition government, but no agreement has been reached on the order of discussion.
Internal Political Developments
On July 30 the National Congress (i.e., the King's Council and the National Assembly in joint session) passed unanimously a constitutional amendment which authorizes the Congress to ask the King to take upon himself the duties of the government or to appoint a government of his own choosing. In case of acceptance by the King, the government in power must hand over its powers to the King. There is no indication whether the King will accept these powers. In the past he has been reluctant to take decisive action.
Phnom Penh Negotiations
Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi, accompanied by thirty-six leading Lao politicians and military officers, flew to Phnom Penh on July 31 to meet with Souvanna Phouma, pursuant to the provisions of the Zurich agreement, for discussions on the formation of a government of national union. Souphanouvong has refused to attend on the grounds that these talks should be carried out at Ban Namone and among the Princes' deputies initially.
Boun Oum and Souvanna have not yet met. Lower level meetings took place yesterday and were scheduled for this morning. Phoumi is not optimistic, and has asked Ambassador Brown for maximum possible assurances of US support whether the Phnom Penh negotiations succeed or not.
There have been a number of varying reports regarding the initial proposals both sides may make. However, it seems clear that Souvanna will aim at a government with himself as Prime Minister, with 6-8 of his followers as members and 3 members each from the Boun Oum faction and the NLHX. Souvanna remains convinced that he alone can save Laos from falling to the Communists.
L.D. Battle/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Donald B. Easum of S/S signed for Battle.
151. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 3, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/8-361. Top Secret. Drafted by Steeves on August 1 and cleared by Chapman, Usher, Anderson, Jenkins, and McConaughy.
Dear Bill: In our deliberations thus far reviewing the security problem in the Indo-China peninsula, we have recognized the need for a more comprehensive and appropriate military plan to cover certain contingencies. This seemed apparent in our ad hoc meeting of the Southeast Asia Task Force which you attended on July 27./2/ On the 28th during our meeting with the President,/3/ he requested that planning be initiated on a priority basis should we face situations differing, however slightly, from those previously envisaged.
/2/No record of this meeting has been found.
/3/Document 148.
While SEATO Plan 5 is quite flexible and is so regarded by our own military community, it does have limitations and is tied by agreement with our SEATO allies, chiefly the British, to certain assumptions. Some of our allies feel that the forces envisaged would not be able to do the job. There is therefore a need to plan for situations which may be of a different magnitude and character than those used as a basis for SEATO Plan 5, which is restricted essentially to the Mekong Valley and the remaining area within Laos currently held by the RLG. General Taylor's memorandum to the President of July 26, a copy of which I attach,/4/ briefly points up the inadequacy of SEATO Plan 5 in view of certain other contingencies.
/4/See Document 147.
In order to give your planners the political guidance and the framework within which to work, I think it best to describe the various political situations which we believe could develop and then, within that prognostication, to develop contingency military plans for each of the situations. These break down as follows:
Situation 1--Our first assumption is that, with the close of the rainy season, the Communists may take a look at the political conditions then existing and decide that it is to their advantage to press for a rapid military resolution of the Laos impasse. No progress will have been made in reaching agreement for a government of national union between the three Princes, and the Pathet Lao, urged by their communist backers from the North, may conclude that it would be advantageous for them to carry out a rapid investment of the Mekong Valley. They would conclude that they could with relative ease overrun the RLG's forces and occupy Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Savannakhet and thus bring the campaign to a successful conclusion.
If this deliberate breach of the cease-fire should take place on the communist initiative and if they should move rapidly in such a campaign, it is rather clear that our response would be in accordance with SEATO Plan 5. This has been reviewed again bilaterally with the UK and clearly falls within that concept. We should realistically recognize that France, although committed under SEATO, would not participate actively with her forces. It would be SEATO minus France. Inasmuch as this situation is the one envisaged under the planning already done in character with Plan 5, I will not pursue this alternative further.
Situation 2--There is a second set of circumstances which could very easily contain the following ingredients: The talks between the Princes drag on and finally result in failure. Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong together will not accept the condition of a government which does not give them a clear majority. General Phoumi with the King's backing will not accede to Souvanna's and Souphanouvong's demands and continues to maintain the present government under Boun Oum and continues resistance.
There is a variant to this situation which cannot be ignored. Souphanouvong has already refused to join the talks now taking place in Phnom Penh. This may be an indication that under certain circumstances the Pathet Lao and the hard-core communists would defy both the neutralist Souvanna and the RLG. If Souvanna concludes that there is no possibility of his heading a government under a neutralist facade and is thus faced with the black and white choice of siding either with the communist-backed Pathet Lao or with the King and the RLG, with no hope of discovering a middle ground, he may well withdraw from the scene and return to Paris. This possibility is heightened by his current uncertain health.
During these political negotiations, the talks in Geneva will have made no meaningful progress. The ICC will not have been empowered to set up any effective program of supervision and the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh will have carried on with their build-up and preparations for a military campaign to start with the beginning of the dry season. In order not to precipitate action under SEATO, they will not take aggressive overt action of a magnitude that would trigger a SEATO response, but might undertake a campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
Under these conditions, we would be faced with a virtual and de facto partition of Laos along the lines of territorial control under "the parties" as it now exists.
A further variant to this situation could well be a regrouping of the RLG in the southern panhandle with a gradual withdrawal from exposed positions in the North, even abandoning Luang Prabang and Vientiane. If the King could be persuaded to move south, the RLG would still have his person but might even be faced with attempting to hold out in the southern province of Champassak with the political advantage of retaining the present Royal Household denied to them.
Situation 3--There is yet a third set of assumptions we must make: the three Princes through a series of meetings will come to an agreement to put together a government of national union in which there will be Pathet Lao as well as some of the present members of the RLG cabinet, and in the so-called "center" Souvanna Phouma supporters. Such a coalition, which could even be temporarily headed by the King or more likely by Souvanna would have jurisdiction over the entire country and would have the task of producing a neutralized unaligned Laos.
At Geneva, agreement would have been reached with respect to the role of the International Control Commission. It is highly unlikely that we would have been able to extract all of the objectives we would like but we would have achieved our minimum objectives. The ICC would be in place.
This situation and attending assumptions would present some difficulty to us for we would have agreed to withdraw our military personnel on the assumption that the Viet Minh and other outside communist elements would also withdraw. We would be committed to respect the neutrality of Laos and to accept the obligations of non-intervention. With Laos in this condition and while waiting to see whether an effective neutral state could, actually exist, our insurance for the security of Southeast Asia would have to be based on our programs in Thailand and Viet-Nam.
While we must be prepared for any of the above situations or even variations of any one of them, it would seem to me that, gazing in the crystal ball, the most likely one to face us is the one roughly described under situation two. In giving priority to your planning operation, I would therefore suggest that you concentrate on this one first.
The first assumption that we must make under situation two is that under these conditions SEATO as such would most likely not be involved. Many of the members of SEATO such as Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand would, of course be expected to cooperate but the plan of action would have to be quite different from any situation which SEATO has heretofore forecast.
In addition to other political, economic and psychological measures we would take to strengthen our position in Viet-Nam, Thailand and even Cambodia, I believe that a military plan for this contingency should provide for a two-pronged and possibly a multi-phased operation. We should plan to counter the DRV and base our offensive against them first from Viet-Nam and also from Laos. I believe we should accept the thesis that we have a better political and military position from which to operate against the DRV in Viet-Nam than in Laos. The operation in Laos would therefore be a holding one or one that would strengthen an operation by the RLG, supported by the Thai and Vietnamese, in the panhandle. American support would be kept to a minimum so far as ground operations were concerned but would involve specialized key personnel with ground forces for stiffening purposes, as well as air, sea and logistic support.
I believe the plan should contemplate carrying the offensive in the final stages to the DRV itself. If feasible it should include the utilization of our sea power from the Gulf of Tonkin.
In any military operation of this magnitude, our plans should of course fully take into account the possibility of Chinese or even Soviet intervention. One of the main efforts should be to devise ways and means of limiting the operation to the DRV if possible while bearing in mind the possibility of massive Chinese involvement.
This is a rather tall order in planning but, in view of the critical situation we face in Southeast Asia, I believe we should pursue it urgently.
Sincerely,
U. Alexis Johnson/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
152. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 4, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/1/61-8/7/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Hyannis Port on August 4 to be included in the President's weekend reading.
SUBJECT
Southeast Asia
Note: After the last NSC meeting/2/ General Taylor and I put our heads together with two objectives. First, to set down our understanding of your attitude towards Southeast Asia. Second, to work out the implications of that attitude for Southeast Asia planning. This is the result. The real planning job is being done at State. You may wish to read this and clarify instructions for planning. I am passing this paper to State. General Taylor concurs in this draft.
/2/See Document 127.
Assumptions.
As we understand your position: you would wish to see every avenue of diplomacy exhausted before we accept the necessity for either positioning U.S. forces on the Southeast Asian mainland or fighting there; you would wish to see the possibilities of economic assistance fully exploited to strengthen the Southeast Asian position; you would wish to see indigenous forces used to the maximum if fighting should occur; and that, should we have to fight, we should use air and sea power to the maximum and engage minimum U.S. forces on the Southeast Asian mainland.
This means we are prepared to accept a degree of risk arising from a neutral government in Laos and an ICC which promises to be tolerably effective.
On the other hand, we assume that the U.S. will not accept a government in Laos which is de facto Communist and an ICC which would be merely an instrument of a Lao government. And we assume that, to get an acceptable settlement, the other side must believe we have a contingency plan in mind which would cause them more unhappiness than a government and ICC minimally acceptable to us.
Moreover, we assume that, if the other side resumes substantial overt hostilities, we are committed to resist the take over of southern Laos; that is, we assume the U.S. would not stand idly by if the Pathet Lao moved against Vientiane, etc., but, with its allies, would implement SEATO 5 or some variant thereof.
Proceeding from this general formulation of a concept, a number of possible contingencies become apparent:
1. In order to strengthen our negotiating position in Geneva it is necessary to convince the other side that there is a limit to Communist aggression mounted via Hanoi against Southeast Asia which we will accept without a military response.
2. Our contingency plan must envisage increased application of force to meet each of the following possible situations:
--A de facto split of Laos; in which we would merely mop up the panhandle with such help as we could get for Phoumi from Sarit and Diem, with the minimum American stiffening and guarantees required to make the locals perform.
--A resumption of the offensive without a substantial increase in Vietminh interference--in which we would install some form of protection of the Mekong cities as a defensive measure but add to it the panhandle mop-up operation by indigenous Southeast Asian forces. At this point, also, it would be appropriate to initiate interdiction operations against Vietminh-Laos supply lines.
--A substantial increase in Vietminh interference in Laos or Viet-Nam which we would meet on the scale necessary by increasing pressure directly against North Viet-Nam, leading at a maximum, to attacks from the air--also, possibly, from the sea--in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. This graduated pressure could take the form of air strikes against the land lines of communications and supply centers, and sea interdiction of logistical traffic along the east coast of Viet-Nam. It could also include a naval blockade in the Gulf of Tonkin to isolate the Port of Haiphong. The interdiction operation would be susceptible to flexible control at all times to meet a changing military and political situation.
--A naval and air plan to deal with ChiCom intervention at various levels, including a definition of the nuclear threshold.
It should be noted that this pattern of contingency planning would lessen the rigidity of our present contingency planning--which leaves us with nothing between reliance on the FAL and SEATO Plan 5. It would give us one position short of SEATO Plan 5; that is, an indigenous mop-up of the panhandle. And it would afford us a whole range of alternatives, aside from merely engaging in a widening battle, absorbing more and more American troops in the Mekong Valley, if the battle should escalate.
Diplomatically this plan is based on our defining with clarity a minimum modest position for Geneva, consistent with your understanding with Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna. Our posture in Geneva might be modest but firm with this kind of contingency backup.
Four non-military actions are, however, urgent if we are to have this kind of posture.
--We must explore the possibility of collaboration among Diem, Sarit, and Phoumi in the panhandle mop-up component; and we must do so without letting Phoumi believe that this is an excuse for not negotiating in good faith.
--To provide a political base for the threat to North Viet-Nam, we must urgently begin to surface and spread about the evidence on North Viet-Nam aggression in Laos and South Viet-Nam, starting with the Viet-Nam ICC--then the Geneva conference--then, if necessary, the General Assembly of the UN. Moreover, if the Geneva conference goes into a deadlock and the end of the rainy season approaches, we may wish to consider taking the key issue (the ICC) into the UN. It is possible we would do better there than in Geneva since neutrals are braver about distant problems than those closer to home; and the threat to the peace would be self-evident.
--We must consider--if we adopt this course--when and how we should reopen negotiations on contingency planning with the British and others who might join in this enterprise; although the best situation may be for the French and British to stand down in SEATO.
--Both to establish what the diplomatic and military possibilities are and to signal our seriousness to the other side, a military mission should proceed to Southeast Asia not much later than the second half of August.
The foregoing lays out our concept and the situations which it must meet. The discussion that follows explores the controlling factors in somewhat greater detail.
A Creeping Violation of the Ceasefire.
Within the cover of the ceasefire the Pathet Lao have built up their positions in southern Laos, notably around the Tchepone area. If the conference drags on, it is altogether possible that after the rainy season closes (towards the end of September) the Pathet Lao will seek to enlarge the areas they hold in the south; and they may begin to use those areas as a base for enlarged operations against South Viet-Nam. In our view, we should begin now to try to build a basis of collaboration among Phoumi, Sarit, and Diem. The object would be a joint operation to clean up the Pathet Lao pockets in southern Laos, if this kind of a creeping offensive should be launched while the Geneva conference is still in progress and the ceasefire still on. We may wish to consider expanding our MAAG in Laos with special forces types who would be helpful in organizing and stiffening such a mopping up operation.
At this state of development, planning for the clean-up in southern Laos appears to be a pertinent contingency. The problem requires further study as to requirements and objectives to assess its feasibility and suitability before fully accepting it.
The Inadequacy of Plan 5.
Plan 5, as presently constituted, provides only for a SEATO force to hold the cities in the Mekong, thus freeing the FAL to go forth and deal with the Pathet Lao. There is no provision for a mop-up of southern Laos and for protection of the Laos-South Viet-Nam frontier. As a supplement to Plan 5, we should, therefore, vigorously encourage cooperation among Phoumi, Sarit, and Diem on a substantial basis, to mop up and to hold southern Laos if the Pathet Lao should resume an overt offensive. So far as Sarit is concerned, it is evident that he would require some guarantees from us to undertake this responsibility. The degree of the guarantee would have to depend on whether the mop-up took place under an agreed split of Laos, a de facto ceasefire, or a resumption of active hostilities.
A Substantial Increase in Vietminh Forces in Laos.
It is possible that, if the offensive is resumed by the Pathet Lao--and especially if SEATO Plan 5 is put into effect--the Vietminh will enter northern Laos in larger numbers. There may also be some ChiCom volunteers. The best deterrent against such a Vietminh or ChiCom movement would be a positioning of our forces, as the situation gets more tense, which would signal to Hanoi and its friends that the battle--if it is enlarged--will take place not in Laos but in North Viet-Nam. Aside from these deterrent moves, we may wish to plan a whole spectrum of U.S. (or SEATO) actions aimed against North Viet-Nam. These could range from harassing sea or air raids all the way up to the bombing or, even, capture of ground in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. The degree of weight applied would be accommodated to the degree of Vietminh aggression across its frontiers. In envisaging such action, we should be aware that our position would be quite unlike that faced by the French. The French problem was to try to hold on to a whole colonial area or to recapture it. Our operations in North Viet-Nam--should they be undertaken--would be merely a sanction designed to force a negotiation. The French could have held Hanoi and Haiphong until the cows came home if that were their only military objective. On the political side, however, in order to justify a positioning of our forces against Hanoi or the possible range of action envisaged, it is necessary and urgent that we begin to make our case before the world for the illegitimacy of Hanoi's adventures in Laos and Viet-Nam.
What if the ChiComs Come In?
If, along this way, our actions do not yield a negotiated settlement--the UN will certainly enter the picture--it is possible that the ChiComs will enter the engagement. On the Communist side, we should be aware that neither the Russians nor the Vietminh wish the Chinese Communists to become engaged in Southeast Asia. This is in fact one of our substantial bargaining cards in finding a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy not to be prepared to deal with the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. What we need is a spectrum of sea and naval action designed to chew up Chinese-North Viet-Nam communications and Chinese Communist air and naval power. Such action would be designed to protect the only position we would envisage that American forces might take on the Southeast Asian mainland; that is, a position in the Haiphong-Hanoi area. However--just as in the case of the Berlin exercise--we must peer all the way down the road to the nuclear threshold.
A Unified versus a Split Laos
As the negotiations on Laos move towards a crisis it is important that we assess cooly the pros and cons of a unified versus a split Laos. The argument can be made either way. I think you will wish to look systematically at the pros and cons soon.
153. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/7
Paris, August 7, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Usher, edited and approved by Steeves, and approved in Rusk's office on August 8.
Ministerial Consultations on Berlin
Paris, August 4-9, 1961
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Gavin
Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Steeves
Mr. Sullivan Mr. Usher
United Kingdom
Lord Home
Mr. Malcolm MacDonald
Mr. Edward Peck
Mr. Michael Butler
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. J.W. Russell
France
M. Couve de Murville
M. Jacques Roux
M. Charles Lucet
M. M. Richer
Ambassador Falaize
M. Baraduc
Couve de Murville opened the meeting with a request for the tripartite report on Laos./2/
/2/For text of the working paper as approved, see Document 154.
Mr. Roux presented the working committee's recommendations. In his report, Mr. Roux interjected interpretive comment on three points:
Concerning the item in the report, "Composition of a neutral Lao Government," he said that Phoumi should be given a very high civilian post in the Government but "not necessarily a ministerial post."
Under Section B of the paper, "The role of the International Commission," he recalled that Souvanna has two conditions: These were, first, that he wants to have the Lao Government give its consent for investigation; and, second, he doesn't want fixed teams, but instead wants to have teams in Vientiane which would go out from there to investigate, having first obtained the Lao Government's approval.
With reference to Section C, "The Laotian Army and the problem of the Pathet Lao forces," Mr. Roux stressed the point that Souvanna should be helped during our conversations with him to understand this problem clearly. Roux went on to say that, of course, we can't go very far in this direction at this time. After our first discussions with Souvanna we would need to have further discussions among ourselves on this problem.
Ambassador Harriman commented that the paper sets forth our minimum conditions for supporting Souvanna as Prime Minister of a neutral Lao Government. He said observance of these minimum conditions would minimize the risk of Communist subversion. Referring to Section D of the paper on the French Military presence, Ambassador Harriman stressed the importance of France sending a very high caliber officer to head up the French military mission. He said this would be particularly important in connection with assisting the Lao Government with the problem of reducing and eliminating the separate Pathet Lao military forces.
Ambassador Harriman went on to say that the discussions should begin with Souvanna quickly, because he has gone back to Xieng Khouang where he is presumably under the influence of his Pathet Lao colleagues. The Ambassador said that we ought to try to separate Kong Le from the Pathet Lao.
Mr. MacDonald said that he had nothing to add to Roux's presentation except to say that he agreed one hundred percent with the working committee recommendations.
The Secretary then said that he would like to congratulate the working committee on its report and Mr. Roux for his exposition. The Secretary said that it is one thing, however, to agree on a paper and quite another matter to carry it out in Laos on terms which will lead to the results we desire. The Secretary stated that he would like it to be quite clear, in speaking for the United States, that unless we can say with integrity that this government of national unity is genuinely neutral, we cannot support it. We will not put our stamp of approval on a fraud. "If the Lao Government is not neutral," the Secretary told the other Ministers, "you can expect the United States to pull back rapidly from the concept of this paper."
The Secretary added that the military situation is also of much concern to the United States, and he suggested making the following addition to the second paragraph of Section C (The Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao Forces): "A first priority should be given to the dissolution or removal of Pathet Lao forces south of Xieng Khouang."
Lord Home said that, on the composition of the government, the first requirement is that it must be supported by the King. He said that, with reference to the Secretary's statement, if the cabinet were composed as described in the paper and had the approval of the King, and if Souvanna agreed to carry out the provisions in the paper, he, Lord Home, would have thought that situation to be about as much as we could hope to achieve. Lord Home also said he thought the paper's specifications for the ICC represented the best we could hope for. He said with respect to Souvanna Phouma's attitude on permissive inspection, we might be exchanging the Polish veto for a possible veto of the Lao Government.
Turning then to the Secretary's proposed additional sentence, Lord Home said he would like to ask how we visualized the formation of the new Lao army. He thought that the Pathet Lao and RLG forces would not necessarily be disbanded in a manner which would confine any force to any particular area.
Regarding the continuing French presence, Lord Home said that, although of course desirable, we would experience difficulty negotiating this in the Geneva Conference. He asked Couve what he thought was the minimum we might agree on at the Conference. Lord Home said it would be embarrassing to put forth at the Conference something as a minimum requirement and then have to withdraw it in order to get on with the Conference.
Couve replied that discussion of the subject at Geneva had led to the normal situation; namely, that the nature of the French presence would have to depend on the Lao Government itself. Couve said that in principle it seems proper for the Conference not to take a final position on the matter until there is a new Lao Government.
Couve went on to observe that there are two problems, first, the French military mission, and, second, the base at Seno. The mission is much more important because the base is not really a base at all but merely an airfield, which is convenient but not essential. Speaking of the base, he went on to say that this matter, of course, has to be discussed with the Laotians. Regarding the mission, Couve said it was important both politically and militarily. It was a way of maintaining some kind of Western influence and a way to be informed of what is going on in Laos. He agreed with an interjection by Ambassador Harriman that the mission was also important in precluding instructors coming in from the north. Couve also said that he agreed with the Ambassador that the mission be composed of officers and men of high quality.
Couve then went on to say that the key problem in Laos since 1952 has always been the two armies in Laos. Couve said that in his mind the main problem in the future will be whether there will continue to be a zone which in fact is under another authority than the central government in Vientiane. Couve said he didn't think Souvanna wants to have a big army. The problem is what will be left besides the regular army and where it will be located. With reference to the Secretary's proposed additional sentence, Couve observed that by saying the PL should not be allowed to remain in the south, we not imply that they should be allowed to consolidate themselves in the north again.
The Secretary said that we undoubtedly could not start with the dissolution of all forces and then begin to create a Lao army. There would be several stages. First, the withdrawal of foreign forces; second, the regroupment of Lao forces; third, the constitution of the Lao army; and fourth, the dissolution of the excess forces. Otherwise, we would get the dissolution of the FAL and no dissolution of the Pathet Lao. Then we would be left high and dry.
Lord Home said he agreed that it would have to take this course. He asked MacDonald whether there had been any discussion of this in the working group. MacDonald said there has not been enough discussion and that was why the working group had said in the paper that the matter should be discussed further among the three Governments. There had been some difference of opinion, but not necessarily conflicting.
Couve again stressed the key importance of this issue and said that it was very important to talk to Souvanna as soon as possible. It is to Souvanna's interest to have a new army which would be non-Pathet Lao.
MacDonald said there are indications that Kong Le is having serious difficulties with the Pathet Lao. There are other forces in the north which Souvanna thinks are his own, and he may plan to base a new army on Kong Le and these other forces. Couve again observed that the real problem is the dissolution of the Pathet Lao.
Mr. Steeves said he supposed this process would have to be supervised by the ICC. We probably can't get back to the 1954 process of regrouping the Pathet Lao in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. We will almost have to have a separation of forces and a drawing from them to create a new army. Maybe there could be a kind of neutral zone. The old forces could be gradually disbanded and a new one started. Under this procedure we would have to try to work out some phased withdrawal, with FAL forces drawing back to a kind of safe haven for them and the Pathet Lao withdrawing to the north.
Couve said yes to this, but added that the real problem is not the creation of a new army but the disbanding of the existing one. Lord Home asked whether we shouldn't discuss this with Souvanna. Roux replied that we already had, but Souvanna doesn't seem to have a very clear idea on the matter. The three parties are talking about it in the cease-fire negotiations. However, when the three parties form a coalition government it would be very abnormal for them to discuss this problem any more as three separate parties.
The Secretary then said that while he wished to make it clear that he was not talking about partition, the United States does consider it essential to have friendly forces in the south. The principal elements of the present FAL, who are southerners, ought to be in the south, not Pathet Lao. It may be that for a period of time we may have a kind of Laotian "war-lordism." In that case we want friends in the south. Lord Home said this would lead to the danger of partition and he thought we would want to disband certain elements wherever they are.
Couve said he agreed with the Secretary but we don't want to give the impression that we would want the Pathet Lao to continue in the north. The Secretary replied that he would rather give that impression than that we want any Pathet Lao in the south. He added further that the formation of a government with Souvanna as Prime Minister is not going to be an easy task.
Regarding the composition of the government, Couve said he supposed Souvanna was going to keep for himself the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior. Steeves asked, for himself, or for his lieutenants? Lord Home said he would think that Souvanna would appoint trusted ministers to do the work in these ministries. They should not be NLHX nor NLHX fellow-travelers. The Secretary said there should be nobody in Defense or Interior who was PL or near-PL who would have any real authority over security in the south.
Ambassador Harriman said he hoped Souvanna would be helped to understand that he must not allow Viet Cong to use Lao territory to attack Viet-Nam. The Secretary added that this is indeed in Souvanna's own interest. He should understand that if he allows these people to go through Laos, he will run the danger of armed reaction from the other side, from across the border in South Viet-Nam.
Lord Home observed that one or two things had been left rather ragged in the foregoing discussion. He said he was not quite sure he agreed with the implications of the Secretary's statement that regrouping of the PL should all take place in the north. He asked whether it could be recorded that this is a matter on which we would have further discussion. He suggested secondly that it also be recorded that in conversations with Souvanna he should be warned against permitting the use of Lao territory for the passage of foreign forces.
The Secretary said he thought the first point was important because it has a bearing on the discussions with Souvanna. Lord Home said it may be just as well to regroup and disarm military forces where they are.
Couve said one question is whether all these people from the FAL who would be regrouped in the south are people of the south. The Secretary said this was a good point and that he was thinking of regrouping in areas of native habitat. He thought the problem would be clearer after the withdrawal of foreign military forces. There are probably a number of Viet Minh in the south, particularly in the area of Tchepone. Couve observed that if armed elements were sent back to the north, this would consolidate the PL army in the north. It would be better to disarm them before they go. Lord Home said perhaps it could be worked out on the basis of sending disarmed people back to their homes.
Couve said that whatever happened regarding the working committee's paper as it now stands, we would have to decide what to do about this problem of the PL forces. He suggested that the three Governments should ask their ambassadors and military advisors in Vientiane to make a study of this problem and prepare a staff report.
The Secretary asked Lord Home whether it bothered him to remove the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh from the south. Lord Home said that certainly the Viet Minh should be gotten out. He thought the Lao people ought to stay in their own home areas. The people from the north should be sent back there but not as units. They ought to be disarmed first.
Couve then said that the Secretary's idea was that perhaps we should concentrate first on solving the situation in the south. Couve suggested that perhaps we could all agree on that. Lord Home said he thought that would be all right.
It was agreed that the three Governments would act on Couve's suggestion that the ambassadors and military officials attached to their respective embassies in Vientiane should make a study of the problem and report their findings and recommendations.
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